

Security on the Internet: encryption, TLS, certificates

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COMP 429

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
Security

- Broad topic, see COMP 424
- In terms of **networking**, we are concerned with:
 - **Confidentiality** – information to intended users only
 - End to end security
 - **Integrity** – information hasn't been modified
 - Man in the middle
 - **Availability** – available when needed
 - Denial of Service
 - Cryptolockers
 - **Authentication** – are you who you say you are?
 - Certificates
 - **Non-repudiation** – proof of integrity
 - Digital signatures/authentication
 - **Auditability** - logs
 - forensics


The Real Deal

- We will go over, from a high level, the principles behind security on the Internet
- What should you focus on?
 - Construction/use of secure protocols
 - Standards exist, many times required.
 - Libraries exist, use them.
 - There is a correct way and an incorrect way for security. Which changes over time...
 - Key management
 - How are keys created, exchanged, and revoked?
 - What is a certificate?
 - Why do we trust that certificate?
 - Encryption will (eventually) be broken
 - If your encrypted data is compromised, it will eventually be decrypted.

Symmetric Key and Asymmetric Key Systems



Symmetric Key Cryptosystem



Asymmetric (Public Key) Cryptosystem

Which cryptosystem does TLS use?


- Well, both.

1. Client **contacts** server over HTTPS
2. The server responds with its **certificate** and **public key**.
3. The client **verifies** that the certificate is legitimate.
4. The client and server **negotiate** a cryptographic scheme.
5. The client **creates** a secret password (**session key**) and **encrypts** it with the **server's public key**, and **sends** it back to the server.
6. The server **decrypts** the message with its **private key**.
7. The **session key** can now be used to **encrypt** and **decrypt** data transmitted during the session.

The evolving story: we want a client/server to talk to each other in some secure manner over a channel any evil person can monitor...

- How does the **public key exchange** work?
- What is a **certificate** and why do we **trust** it?
- How does the **encryption** work?
- How does a client/server “**decide**” what schemes to use?
- How does it all tie in to **TLS**?

Public Key Exchange Algorithm with paints




Challenges with Public Key Systems

- How do we **know** the public key **belongs** to who we think it belongs to? Can't anyone make a public key?
- The server can “**digitally sign**” a “**certificate**” with its **private key**. Which means if you can decrypt it with the advertised public key, then it *must* be from that server.
- Yes but can't anyone make a public/private key pair?
- Two solutions:
 - **Web of trust**
 - Trust any keys signed by endorsers.
 - **Public Key Infrastructure**
 - **Certificate Authority (CA)** manages creating, distribution, revoking, and updating key pairs and certs.


Signing a Certificate

- The signed message can be decrypted using Bob's known and available public key
- Since private keys are supposed to be...private, then it is (mathematically) impossible for anyone to fake this signature



What is a Certificate Authority then?

- There are a few companies who you can pay money to issue you a valid certificate.
- Those companies then distribute updated lists to all the browsers/computers, including revocation lists.
- *The idea is that we must trust these companies to only digitally sign public keys from entities THEY trust.*
 - They may require a notary or other in person verification.



What does a cert look like?

- This is *some* of the information presented in the certificate.
- The **subject** (www.csuci.edu). The domain csuci.edu is not on the list, so you must always include www. (try to goto <https://csuci.edu>)
- The **issuer** (the company that signed our key).
- The **public key** which can be used for encryption.

Subject Name

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| Country | US |
| | 93012 |
| State/Province | California |
| Locality | Camarillo |
| | One University Drive |
| Organization | California State University, Channel Islands |
| Organizational Unit | Academic and Information Technology |
| Common Name | www.csuci.edu |

Issuer Name

| | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| Country | US |
| State/Province | MI |
| Locality | Ann Arbor |
| Organization | Internet2 |
| Organizational Unit | InCommon |
| Common Name | InCommon RSA Server CA |

Public Key Info

| | |
|-----------|---|
| Algorithm | RSA |
| Key Size | 2048 |
| Exponent | 65537 |
| Modulus | E8:FB:C4:4F:7A:6A:B2:D4:ED:F4:24:88:D9:8E:57:83:38:46:34:10:7E:0D |

Ok but what does a cert really look like?

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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...

base64 (RFC 4648)

- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4648#section-4>
- Encodes binary data as printable characters
- Makes it convenient to transmit across the Internet
- Easily copy + paste from an editor, send it an email, etc.
- Remember, it is an **encoding**, not encryption
 - WW91IHNo b3VsZCBqb2luIHRob3RvZSBORVRTRUMgY2x1Yg==

Ok but what does a cert really really look like?

- Well that was it. It is a base64 encoding that can be read by the `openssl` program.
- The cert shown on the previous page was in the .pem format.



How does the browser then verify the cert?

- So recall that the cert has been digitally signed by a Certificate Authority (CA).
 - (which means the CA (issuer) has encrypted a message with its private key)
- Your browser will then test the digital signature of the issuer with the known public key from that issuer. If it can decrypt the signature, then you should trust it.
- But not yet...
- If a certificate is revoked for some reason, then you must also make sure it is not on the CRL (Certificate Revocation List) from that CA.

The evolving story: we want a client/server to talk to each other in some secure manner over a channel any evil person can monitor...

- How does the **public key exchange** work? **Fancy math. Really good random numbers.**
- What is a **certificate** and why do we **trust** it? **A digital signature. We trust Certificate Authorities.**
- How does the **encryption** work?
- How does a client/server “**decide**” what algorithms to use?
- How does it all tie in to **TLS**?

If we have a secret password, that is 256 bits, what does that really mean?

- [illegible]

Computationally Impossible (for now)

- So if you had a computer that could guess 4 billion hashes per second...
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S9JGmA5_unY

$$\frac{(4 \text{ Billion})}{\text{H/s}} \frac{(4 \text{ Billion})}{\text{Laptop}} \frac{(4 \text{ Billion})}{\text{KG++}} \frac{(4 \text{ Billion})}{\text{Earth}} \frac{(4 \text{ Billion})}{\text{Circles}} \frac{1 \text{ in } 4 \text{ Billion}}{\text{GGSC}} \text{ chance of success}$$



4 Billion seconds \approx 126.8 years

4 Billion \times 126.8 years \approx 507 Billion years

$\approx 37 \times$ Age of universe

So bits are secure, fine. Now what?

- Divide your data into 256 bit chunks. Perform the round the right. Then do it again 12 more times.
- To decrypt, perform the operation in reverse.



The evolving story: we want a client/server to talk to each other in some secure manner over a channel any evil person can monitor...

- How does the **public key exchange** work? Fancy math. Really good random numbers.
- What is a **certificate** and why do we **trust** it? A digital signature. We trust Certificate Authorities.
- How does the **encryption** work? A key length that would take a multiverse and infinite time to guess, plus shifting, adding, substituting bits over and over with this key.
- How does a client/server “**decide**” what algorithms to use?
- How does it all tie in to **TLS**?

We trust who we are talking to and we have some fancy math algorithms, which one and why?

- Well actually, which **ones**.
- **Key exchange**
 - Decide upon a secret key using an asymmetric algorithm.
- **Cipher**
 - Likely a block cipher.
 - Used for symmetric data encryption using the secret key.
- **Data integrity**
 - A MAC (message authentication code).
 - Ensure the encrypted data is valid (not corrupted/modified).
- *The combination of these algorithms are referred to as a **cipher suite**.*

Forward Secrecy

- An important and desired property in cryptography.
- The session key generated by a set of public/private key pairs will not be derivable if *one* of the private keys is compromised in the future.
- About 80% of TLS-enabled websites are **configured** to use forward secrecy.

Key Exchange Algorithms and Availability in TLS

| Key exchange/agreement and authentication | | | | | | | Status |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| Algorithm | SSL 2.0 | SSL 3.0 | TLS 1.0 | TLS 1.1 | TLS 1.2 | TLS 1.3 | |
| RSA | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Defined for TLS 1.2 in RFCs |
| DH-RSA | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| DHE-RSA (forward secrecy) | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| ECDH-RSA | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| ECDHE-RSA (forward secrecy) | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| DH-DSS | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| DHE-DSS (forward secrecy) | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No ^[51] | |
| ECDH-ECDSA | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| ECDHE-ECDSA (forward secrecy) | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| ECDH-EdDSA | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| ECDHE-EdDSA (forward secrecy)^[52] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| PSK | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| PSK-RSA | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| DHE-PSK (forward secrecy) | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| ECDHE-PSK (forward secrecy) | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| SRP | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| SRP-DSS | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| SRP-RSA | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| Kerberos | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| DH-ANON (insecure) | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| ECDH-ANON (insecure) | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| GOST R 34.10-94 / 34.10-2001^[53] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | Proposed in RFC drafts |

Block cipher algorithms available in TLS


| Cipher | | Protocol version | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|------------------|--|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|
| Algorithm | Nominal strength (bits) | SSL 2.0 | SSL 3.0 <small>[n 1][n 2][n 3][n 4]</small> | TLS 1.0 <small>[n 1][n 3]</small> | TLS 1.1 <small>[n 1]</small> | TLS 1.2 <small>[n 1]</small> | TLS 1.3 |
| AES GCM ^{[54][n 5]} | 256, 128 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Secure | Secure |
| AES CCM ^{[55][n 5]} | | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Secure | Secure |
| AES CBC ^[n 6] | | N/A | Insecure | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | N/A |
| Camellia GCM ^{[56][n 5]} | 256, 128 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Secure | N/A |
| Camellia CBC ^{[57][n 6]} | | N/A | Insecure | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | N/A |
| ARIA GCM ^{[58][n 5]} | 256, 128 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Secure | N/A |
| ARIA CBC ^{[58][n 6]} | | N/A | N/A | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | N/A |
| SEED CBC ^{[59][n 6]} | 128 | N/A | Insecure | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | Depends on mitigations | N/A |
| 3DES EDE CBC ^{[n 6][n 7]} | 112 ^[n 8] | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | N/A |
| GOST 28147-89 CNT ^{[53][n 7]} | 256 | N/A | N/A | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | N/A |
| IDEA CBC ^{[n 6][n 7][n 9]} | 128 | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | N/A | N/A |
| DES CBC ^{[n 6][n 7][n 9]} | 56 | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | N/A | N/A |
| | 40 ^[n 10] | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| RC2 CBC ^{[n 6][n 7]} | 40 ^[n 10] | Insecure | Insecure | Insecure | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Data integrity algorithms available

| Data integrity | | | | | | | Status |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-----------------------------|
| Algorithm | SSL 2.0 | SSL 3.0 | TLS 1.0 | TLS 1.1 | TLS 1.2 | TLS 1.3 | |
| HMAC-MD5 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Defined for TLS 1.2 in RFCs |
| HMAC-SHA1 | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
| HMAC-SHA256/384 | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | |
| AEAD | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| GOST 28147-89 IMIT^[53] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | Proposed in RFC drafts |
| GOST R 34.11-94^[53] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |

Return of the MAC

- Just one approach shown, basic idea is the same for other approaches



Cipher suite

- A cipher suite is a string defining which algorithms will be used.
- TLS 1.2 has 37 cipher suites available. Many choices, little guidance.
- TLS 1.3 only recommends 5 cipher suites:
 - `PROTOCOL_CIPHER_HASH`
 - `TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256`
 - `TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384`
 - `TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256`
 - `TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256`
 - `TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256`
- Which algorithm is missing?

How to pick?

- Not as many options for TLS 1.3, why?
- TLS, while theoretically secure, can be configured to insecure!
- Don't know what you're doing? <https://ssl-config.mozilla.org/>
- Why use intermediate over modern? compatibility

```
# intermediate configuration
ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
ssl_ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
```


```
# modern configuration
ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
ssl_prefer_server_ciphers off;
```

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- How does the **encryption** work? A key length that would take a multiverse and infinite time to guess, plus shifting, adding, substituting bits over and over with this key.
- How does a client/server “**decide**” what algorithms to use? Chooses from a list described by the standard. Probably during a handshake.
- How does it all tie in to **TLS**?

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- TLS is not SSL (secure socket layer) as SSL is considered insecure now.
- However, SSL is often used interchangeably with TLS (openssl cmd)
- Originally developed at Netscape to secure ecommerce communications.
- SSL 1.0 not publicly released
- SSL 2.0 released in 1995, deprecated 2011
- SSL 3.0 released in 1996, deprecated 2015




HTTPS is a combination of HTTP and TLS



Another Handshake

- Say Hello in TLS, offer cipher suites
- Respond with certificate, agree on cipher suite, perform key exchange
- Application data may now be encrypted with the agreed upon cipher



What makes TLS secure

- Generating correct certificates, validating certificates and using modern ciphers.
- A study in 2017 analyzed TLS intercepted traffic and graded the following products based on their behavior:
 - <https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/interception-ndss17.pdf>

| Product | Grade | Validates Certificates | Modern Ciphers | Advertises RC4 | TLS Version | Grading Notes |
|--------------------------------|-------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| A10 vThunder SSL Insight | F | ✓ | ✓ | Yes | 1.2 | Advertises export ciphers |
| Blue Coat ProxySG 6642 | A* | ✓ | ✓ | No | 1.2 | Mirrors client ciphers |
| Barracuda 610Vx Web Filter | C | ✓ | ✗ | Yes | 1.0 | Vulnerable to Logjam attack |
| Checkpoint Threat Prevention | F | ✓ | ✗ | Yes | 1.0 | Allows expired certificates |
| Cisco IronPort Web Security | F | ✓ | ✓ | Yes | 1.2 | Advertises export ciphers |
| Forcepoint TRITON AP-WEB Cloud | C | ✓ | ✓ | No | 1.2 | Accepts RC4 ciphers |
| Fortinet FortiGate 5.4.0 | C | ✓ | ✓ | No | 1.2 | Vulnerable to Logjam attack |
| Juniper SRX Forward SSL Proxy | C | ✓ | ✗ | Yes | 1.2 | Advertises RC4 ciphers |
| Microsoft Threat Mgmt. Gateway | F | ✗ | ✗ | Yes | SSLv2 | No certificate validation |
| Sophos SSL Inspection | C | ✓ | ✓ | Yes | 1.2 | Advertises RC4 ciphers |
| Untangle NG Firewall | C | ✓ | ✗ | Yes | 1.2 | Advertises RC4 ciphers |
| WebTitan Gateway | F | ✗ | ✓ | Yes | 1.2 | Broken certificate validation |

Fig. 3: **Security of TLS Interception Middleboxes**—We evaluate popular network middleboxes that act as TLS interception proxies. We find that nearly all reduce connection security and five introduce severe vulnerabilities. *Mirrors browser ciphers.

TLS Interception

- NAT is transparent to clients. We send traffic out and traffic comes back as if nothing was changed. This change is detectable though!
- The same can happen with TLS and a proxy server. The traffic is terminated at the proxy and then re-established to the server. This means that the proxy can inspect the traffic in plaintext.
- <https://amibehindaproxy.com/>
- This is good for
 - Malware analysis
 - Corporate networks enforcing acceptable use policies
 - Compliance based on legal requirements
- This is bad for
 - Privacy
 - Another point that could be misconfigured

How it works (pictorially)

