

Applying IoTDevID to a New Dataset: the CIC-IoT-2022 Case Study

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Abstract—In this paper, we have examined under various headings the aspects to be considered in device identification studies using machine learning methods, common mistakes that may occur and how to avoid them. Our paper briefly touched upon the following topics: identification methods and their pros and cons, available data types and properties, common mistakes made during feature extraction and their solutions, what to consider about the use of machine learning methods, and how to choose appropriate evaluation methods.

Index Terms—IoT security, IoT fingerprinting, machine learning, device identification

I. INTRODUCTION

Especially in the last two decades, we have heard the concept of the Internet of Things a lot. IoT can be defined as any kind of physical device with processing capability that can be connected to the internet or other devices [1]. IoT, which acts as a link between the digital world and the real world, are becoming increasingly present in our lives every day. Not only in our digital life on the computer/phone but also as a part of our home, work or street, they permeate every point of our physical lives. Today, the number of IoT has exceeded 10 billion, which is expected to reach 27 billion by 2025 [2].

This rapid progress brings along many problems. In a rapidly growing market, a variety of devices have been developed by many companies for many purposes in a short time. Due to the nature of IoT devices, these devices have very different hardware and software characteristics. For example, a smart kettle and a smart door lock are vastly different from each other, even though they are both IoT. The heterogeneity of these devices, combined with vulnerabilities from manufacturers and the often unfamiliar interfaces of the devices, make them potentially dangerous. According to statistics, an IoT device connected to the internet is attacked within 5 minutes and becomes the target of a specialised attack within 24 hours [3].

In order to cope with these attacks, it is essential to keep the devices up to date, identify the vulnerabilities they carry and find solutions for them. These devices may need to be updated, restricted or isolated from other devices depending on the vulnerabilities they carry. In any measure to be taken, the first step will be to identify the device. Necessary measures can be taken for the identified device by scanning for vulnerabilities from a source such as the CVE [4] database. However, the heterogeneous structure of IoT devices makes the

device identification process very difficult. In this regard, many researchers are applying machine learning-based identification for more efficient solutions.

We created IoTDevID [5] to address the device identification problem. IoTDevID works at the individual packet level to identify IoT devices, whether IP or non-IP (such as ZWave, ZigBee, or Bluetooth). In doing so, it provides a high detection rate thanks to its incorporated aggregation algorithm, overcoming the disadvantage of low performance of using individual packets.

IoTDevID uses only publicly available data and its scripts is also publicly available ¹. It is therefore a transparent, reliable and repeatable study.

In the multi-layer feature selection process, device and session-based identifying features that cause over fitting are discarded, and the most appropriate feature set is created by using the genetic algorithm. In this context, IoTDevID provides generalisable and robust models. In this study, we will validate our previously created IoTDevID by applying it to a new dataset, the CIC-IoT-22 dataset. In this way, we will test the robustness and generalisability of our method with another dataset.

II. RELATED WORK

In this section, we will review some studies in the literature on device identification using machine learning. Device identification aims to classify devices by using feature sets (fingerprints) obtained from network data as input. These features are usually derived from individual packet headers or payload, but some studies have also used flow features. There are three different approaches to the classification process [6]: **Unique Identification:** By accepting each of the devices as unique, a separate class is created for each device [7].

Type Identification: Identification is performed according to the device type. If there are multiple devices of the same brand and model, they are seen as a single class [8].

Class Identification: Different devices that are not the same but have similar features, are gathered under a single class such as camera, speaker, or smart lamp [9]. Fig. 1 shows the labelling of CIC-IoT-22 dataset with three viewpoints. In the example containing 20 devices in total, 20 different labels are formed in the unique method, 13 different labels in the type method, and 3 different labels (Smart Lamp/Bulb, Speakers, and Smart Plug respectively) in the class method.

In parallel to these three approaches, we can analyse the literature as follows. In order to perform a unique classification, a dataset must have more than one device of the same make

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¹Materials available at: github.com/kahramankostas/IoTDevID-CIC.

Labels			Devices
Class	Type	Unique	
1	1	1	SmartThings Bulb 1
		2	SmartThings Bulb 2
		3	SmartThings Bulb 3
	2	4	Philips Hue White 1
		5	Philips Hue White 2
	3	6	HeimVision Lamp
	4	7	Globe Lamp
2	5	8	Amazon Echo Studio
	6	9	Amazon Echo Dot 1
		10	Amazon Echo Dot 2
	7	11	Google Nest Mini
	8	12	Amazon Echo Spot
	9	13	Sonos One Speaker
3	10	14	Yutron Plug 1
		15	Yutron Plug 2
	11	16	Amazon Plug
	12	17	Fibaro Wall Plug 1
		18	Fibaro Wall Plug 2
	13	19	Teckin Plug 1
		20	Teckin Plug 2

Fig. 1: The change of device labels of the CIC dataset according to three identification methods. In the unique method, each device is considered unique and labelled with this name, regardless of other devices. In the Type method, devices with the same brand and model are considered as a single device and share the same label. In the Type method, three devices that were originally labelled separately as SmartThings Bulb 1-2-3 are collected under the SmartThings Bulb label. In the Class method, devices with the same function are grouped under a single tag. For example, in the class column, 1,2,3 represent the categories Smart Lamp/Bulb, speaker, and smart plug respectively..

and model. Hamad et al. [7] used the Aalto dataset which is suitable for this task in their work aiming at a unique classification. However, the unique classification cannot be achieved by using the individual packet features. Therefore, this study used 67 features consisting of network statistics derived from 20-21 consecutive individual packet features. However, these are specific to the network in which they are produced. If the same device or model is moved to another network, these network statistics will change and the model will no longer function. In this respect, flow-based features are more likely to be used in anomaly detection rather than device identification. Conversely, the use of individual packets is also inadequate for anomaly detection [10].

There are more studies using the Type classification. Among these, IoTSentinel [8], a pioneering study, is particularly noteworthy. In this study using Aalto data, 23 individual features extracted from packet headers are used. These features, which are taken from 12 packets without repetition, are combined under MAC address guidance to create a larger fingerprint. This larger fingerprint is used as machine learning input. This study uses the RF method to classify 17 out of 27 devices with an accuracy of over 95% and, for 10 devices, the accuracy remains around 50%. However, the work is very strictly dependent on the MAC address. Therefore, it cannot solve the transfer problem, where a MAC address represents more than one device.

Another work that uses the Aalto dataset is [11]. In this study, using a genetic algorithm, 33 of the 212 features obtained from the packet headers were selected and 95% accuracy was obtained using these features. This study can be criticised for using overly specific features (such as port numbers, TCP sequence, TCP acknowledgment, and IP ID) that may leak information about inter-packet interactions, and for using a partial dataset (23 out of 27 devices were used).

Another interesting work is IoTSense [12]. This work creates a new feature set by improving IoTsentinel features. In this feature set, a 20-element feature set is created by adding 17 features from IoTsentinel and 3 yuk-based features. By combining 5 of these subsets, larger feature sets are obtained to feed the ML. Although no details are given in the study, we guess that MAC address is used to combine these 5 subsets. Although this study shows an accuracy of 99%, the fact that the dataset used is not shared and that 4 out of 14 devices were discarded during the experiment makes the result unreliable. In addition, if the MAC address is used, it will suffer from the transfer problem.

The work done by Sivanathan et al. [13] is very important in terms of providing another device identification dataset to the literature. Using NB and RF methods, the UNSW dataset containing 28 devices could be classified with 99% accuracy. However, it can be criticised that in this study identifying features were used such as flow-based features, cipher suite, DNS queries, and port numbers. In addition, some devices in the dataset were not included in the evaluation step. Finally, we will evaluate the study by Dadkhah et al. [9]. In this study, which introduced a new CIC-IoT-22 dataset to the literature, a class-based classification was used. The devices in the dataset are classified using 3 categories: Audio, Camera, and Home Automation. 12 machine learning methods were used in this study and 98% accuracy was achieved. It is also interesting to note that during the testing phase, data from a different lab and different devices were used. Even though we used the data from this study, our results are not comparable, since we used type-based evaluation and they used class-based evaluation. More information about the dataset used is given in the data section.




Fig. 2: Visualisation of the transfer problem in the Aalto dataset. The network data is collected at the gateway. Between the HueBridge and HueSwitch there is only Zigbee as a communication medium, between the HueSwitch and gateway there is only Ethernet. Data from the HueBridge is decapsulated at the HueSwitch and re-encapsulated for transmission to the gateway. As a result of this process, both the HueBridge and HueSwitch share the same MAC address as the data is encapsulated on the same device (the same happens between D-LinkDoorSensor, D-LinkHomeHub and gateway). Therefore, studies that use MAC addresses to concatenate packets cannot overcome this problem.

To briefly summarise the "IoTDevID" work, we used the Aalto dataset for method development, analysis and feature extraction, and the UNSW dataset to demonstrate that the method is robust and generalisable. For features, we used

features extracted from individual packages. After an extensive evaluation of machine learning methods, we decided on DT, which is quite acceptable in terms of performance, and also quite fast, making it very suitable for real life applications. We applied a multi-stage feature selection process, in the first step we discarded descriptive features, then we eliminated unimportant features by voting based on 6 different feature scores, and finally we generated the ideal feature set using a genetic algorithm. We achieved significant improvements in our results by using the aggregation algorithm. Compared to previous studies, we find that IoTDevID is significantly more successful. In this study, we will validate the work by applying IoTDevID to the CIC dataset.

III. MATERIALS AND METHODS

A. Dataset

One of the biggest problems in device identification studies is the lack of adequate datasets. The simulations used in many networking studies cannot be used in device identification studies, and the fact that the dataset can only be created with real device data is the most prominent of the difficulties. To create a proper device identification dataset, many types of IoT devices are needed, and the supply of these devices is a serious financial burden. In addition, normal data collection requires a long time, labour, and specialised space. Therefore, like many researchers, we have chosen to use publicly available datasets. In our baseline study, IoTDevID [5], we used two datasets, the Aalto University [8], [14] and UNSW datasets [13], which were produced for device identification studies. In this study, we used the Aalto dataset to develop our method and the second dataset to validate our results. In 2022, a new device identification dataset, CIC-IoT-22 [9], was made public. This dataset is very interesting as it contains many types and numbers of devices, contains the state of the devices under different conditions, and contains attack data in addition to benign data. This dataset is very useful to demonstrate the usefulness, robustness, and generalisability of our method.

In this dataset, data was collected in 6 different situations. These situations can be summarised as follows. In the **Power** state, each device is isolated from other devices and rebooted and the network packets related to this device are collected. In the **Interactions** state, the device is interacted with by buttons, applications or voice commands and the network packets generated during this process are collected. In **Scenarios**, the network data of these devices are collected in situations such as entering the house, leaving the house, unauthorised entry to the house at night and day or user error. In case of **attack** state, data is collected by applying Flood attacks and RTSP Brute Force attacks to the devices. the **Idle** state consists of recording every 8-hour period for 30 days in the evening hours when the devices are working but not actively used. The **active** state contains the data of the devices being used during the day for 30 days. This data is generated by people entering the lab and using the devices.

Some important points about the dataset: In this study, the most important sections for us are IDLE and Active. In these two sections, enough data has been collected from almost all

devices. Although it is stated on the paper that 60 devices were used in this process, according to our own experiments and the information provided in the dataset, these sections contain 40 devices. These 40 devices consist only of lan WIFI devices, they do not include Zigbee and z-wave devices. Zigbee and Z-Wave devices have data isolated from other devices, including power and interaction stages, but these data are both very limited and do not contain normal usage data.

B. Individual and Aggregated Methods

The use of individual packet features in device identification is quite common [5], [8], [9], [11], [12]. However, device identification with individual packets is very difficult due to the high noise. This noise is caused by the fact that some "empty" packets have multiple device characteristics. An example of this is the TCP 3-way handshake. For this handshake, only empty packets with the TCP flag set up are sent, and these packets are quite simple and stable/static. It is very difficult to tell from a single packet which device it came from. Therefore mislabelling of the fingerprint from these packets is quite common. To combat this, some researchers [8], [12] have constructed more descriptive fingerprints by combining features from successive packets. The problem with this approach is that since the combination process uses identifying features such as MAC/IP, it does not work in networks where there are transfer problems or non-IP devices.

Since we aim to identify devices using any medium, we only used individual packets in the identification step, but we overcame the low success caused by the noise in using individual packets with the aggregation algorithm.

The aggregation algorithm consists of two steps (see Fig. 3), it uses as input the MAC address and the predicted label. In the first step, it groups the MAC addresses according to the labels assigned to them and finds the predominant MAC address for each label. If a MAC address is selected as dominant for more than one label, this MAC address is added to the exception list. This process gives us MAC addresses that have more than one device behaviour. This feature is indicative of the transfer problem. In the second step, with the predicted labels, groups of size g are formed according to MAC addresses. The most repetitive label among these groups is applied to the whole group to obtain aggregated labels. This procedure is not applied for MAC addresses that have entered the exception list, only the individual results are used for them.




Fig. 3: The steps of the aggregation algorithm. In the first step, MAC addresses are sorted by tags to find MAC addresses that show more than one device behaviour and added to the exception list. In the second step, labels outside the exception list are grouped according to MAC addresses. The most repetitive tag is assigned to the whole group and the aggregated results are created.

C. Feature Extraction and Labelling

Python, Scapy and Wireshark were used for feature extraction from packet capture (pcap) files. Only individual package-based features are used for feature extraction. Many of these features are derived from packet headers, but there are also payload-based features such as payload entropy and payload bytes. Although the feature extraction system created about 100 features in total (features and their descriptions can be found in Table III.), very few of these features², only the sub-features selected during the feature selection phase of the IoTDevID study, were used in the experiment.

Labelling was performed using the list of device names/MAC addresses couples in the dataset. In each fingerprint extracted, the source MAC address part was replaced with the given name and the MAC addresses not given in this list (5 MAC addresses that we believe belong to the hub, switch or the computer where the data is collected) were ignored.

In the CIC-IoT-22 dataset, each of the pcap files we use for feature extraction contains network traffic recorded on a day, and is named with the date it was recorded. For example, data recorded on 24.11.2021 is labelled A211124 if Active and I211124 if Idle. In this context, 30 IDLE and 24 active sessions were recorded. as a preliminary study, we aimed to test the performance of all these sessions by comparing them with each other. In order to compare the sessions with each other, they should contain similar devices. Unfortunately, data was not collected from every device in every session, and in some sessions some devices did not generate any data at all. Table IV.) shows how much data was generated by each device in each session in terms of network packets. Therefore, we only compare sessions that contain the same devices with each other. For this comparison, we create a session ID. In this ID, each device is represented by a binary digit. If the session has that device, it is indicated with 1, if not, it is indicated with 0. For example, if sessin1 contains devices A, and C but not device B, then the ID number is 101(ABC). Sessin1 can be compared to other sessions with the same ID number without any problem. In this context, we have created a 40-digit ID for each session according to totalling 40 devices.

IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The results we obtained by using devices with the same ID as training and test data are given in Fig. 4. We used the F1 score to present these results for roughly two reasons. Firstly, unlike accuracy, f1 score gives reliable results on unbalanced data sets. Secondly, the F1 score does not only give overall results, but also allows us to analyse the results by class. When the results are analysed in this context, it is seen that the F1 score varies between 40%-88% in pairwise session comparisons. Another point we would like to draw attention to here is that this process is a multiple classification process

²Selected features are: pck_size, Ether_type, LLC_ctrl, EAPOL_version, EAPOL_type, IP_ihl, IP_tos, IP_len, IP_flags, IP_DF, IP_ttl, IP_options, ICMP_code, TCP_dataofs, TCP_FIN, TCP_ACK, TCP_window, UDP_len, DHCP_options, BOOTP_hlen, BOOTP_flags, BOOTP_sname, BOOTP_file, BOOTP_options, DNS_qr, DNS_rd, DNS_qdcount, dport_class, payload_bytes, entropy,

with approximately 40% classes. In this context, even 40 F1 is a much better result than chance/random success.

When the figures are analysed, it is seen that the results coinciding with specific dates in Fig. 4a (211108, 211109, 211206, 211208, 211223, 211225, 211228) are unsuccessful, on the other hand, when Fig. 4b is analysed, it is seen that the results in certain consecutive date ranges are more successful.




Fig. 4: F1 scores of sessions pairs assigned as training and test sets.

These results reflect overall success. In total, we made more than 600 session pair comparisons. In these comparisons, the first session of the pair was used as training and the second as testing. If we divide these sessions into active and idle, four different possibilities are possible Active vs Active (AA), Active vs Idle (AI), Idle vs Active (IA), and Idle vs Idle (II). In this context, the distribution of session comparisons is given in Fig. 5.

We believe that focusing on class/device-based results will give more information. By analysing the device-based results for each session, we want to focus on the problematic devices.




Fig. 5: The number of packets produced by the devices in the Aalto dataset.

In this context, a device that is unsuccessful in any of the sessions, with a class-based F1 score of less than 0.50, is added to our list if it repeats this behaviour more than 12 times in all comparisons (12 corresponds to 2% of all session comparisons). Fig. 7. shows this list. The list shows the number of times the device class has failed and the distribution of these failures according to the session benchmark types.

Examining Fig. 7, we can see that, with some minor exceptions, the overall distribution of the pie chart remains the same. This shows that there is no significant difference between idle and active. On the other hand, if we focus on some devices with low performance, we can easily understand why they are included in the list. The devices with the highest number of failures are those with more than one example in the experimental set, such as Amazon Alexa Echo Dot, Gosund Plug, Gosund Socket, Teckin Plug, Yutron Plug. Since these devices are different examples of the same device (same brand and model), they should be grouped under one label (e.g. Teckin Plug 1 and Teckin Plug 2 -> Teckin Plug). We believe that the success level of most of the other devices can be improved by increasing the sample diversity. In this context, we aimed to increase the sample diversity by taking samples from multiple sessions and, as a consequence, to increase the model success. In this context, we separated all sessions into two parts, training and test sessions, in such a way that the sessions are isolated from each other. By combining the sessions that we determined as training and test, we obtained a very large dataset. While creating this dataset, we isolated idle and active data in their own types. We obtained 2 pairs of datasets, idle training and testing consisting only of idle data, and active training and testing consisting only of active data. However, we took the data of D-Link Water Sensor, a device not included in the active sessions, from the idle sessions. Another change was related to LG Smart TV device. The data for this device is only present in three of the 54 sessions. However, the data for this device is so unbalanced that the device data collected from only 3 out of 54 sessions account for about 9% of the total number of packets in all 40 devices. We removed this device from the dataset both because it did not have data from enough sessions and because its excessive number of packets distorted the distribution of the dataset.

In order to obtain a dataset that reflects the diversity of the sessions but is not too large, we reduced the number of packets in these 4 datasets to 10% of the total number of packets per dataset. Since we used random samples during this process, the

packet rates obtained from the devices remained constant so that we did not damage the natural distribution of the dataset.

The comparison of the 4 different cases in terms of F1 score is given in the graph.

TABLE I: Add caption

	Data	Accuracy	F1Score	Train-t	Test-t	Al-time
Individual	AA	0.890±0.001	0.842±0.004	1.748	0.204	0
	AI	0.918±0.001	0.905±0.005	1.812	0.287	0
	IA	0.823±0.046	0.818±0.015	1.699	0.223	0
	II	0.821±0.004	0.814±0.007	1.721	0.291	0
Aggregated	AA	0.943±0.001	0.925±0.007	1.962	0.235	9.119
	AI	0.999±0.000	0.999±0.000	1.864	0.299	11.519
	IA	0.850±0.058	0.898±0.017	1.584	0.206	8.46
	II	0.904±0.004	0.912±0.006	1.630	0.313	11.267

TABLE II: Add caption

	Individual				Aggregated			
	AA	AI	IA	II	AA	AI	IA	II
Amcrest WiFi-Cam.	0.968	0.979	0.951	0.959	0.992	1.000	1.000	1.000
Amazon AE Dot	0.933	0.938	0.950	0.947	0.997	1.000	0.998	1.000
Amazon AE Spot	0.555	0.838	0.844	0.837	0.559	1.000	0.999	0.999
Amazon AE Studio	0.821	0.874	0.837	0.736	0.981	1.000	0.999	0.979
Amazon Plug	0.995	0.999	0.997	0.999	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Arlo Base Station	0.984	0.819	0.624	0.864	1.000	0.998	0.454	1.000
Arlo Q Camera	0.987	0.970	0.969	0.952	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Atomi Coff-Maker	0.847	0.892	0.890	0.501	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.638
Borun Camera	0.982	0.981	0.972	0.978	0.999	0.999	0.999	0.999
D-Link Mini Cam.	0.982	0.989	0.342	0.906	1.000	1.000	0.756	1.000
D-Link Water Sen.	0.930	0.936	0.936	0.934	1.000	0.989	1.000	0.989
Eufy HomeBase 2	0.815	0.812	0.782	0.806	1.000	0.998	1.000	0.998
Globe Lamp	0.654	0.823	0.916	0.431	0.900	0.997	1.000	0.246
Google Nest Mini	0.975	0.971	0.952	0.879	1.000	1.000	0.996	0.982
Gosund Plug	0.839	0.899	0.917	0.706	0.968	0.995	0.999	0.724
Gosund Socket	0.868	0.893	0.895	0.532	0.992	0.995	0.999	0.406
HeimVision S Cam.	0.986	0.998	0.934	0.984	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
HeimVision Lamp	0.715	0.838	0.857	0.518	0.965	0.999	1.000	0.759
Home Eye Camera	0.930	0.911	0.927	0.910	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Luohe Cam Dog	0.762	0.760	0.759	0.757	1.000	0.995	1.000	0.994
Nest Indoor Cam.	0.998	0.997	0.999	0.910	0.999	0.999	1.000	0.997
Netatmo Camera	0.969	0.986	0.398	0.934	1.000	1.000	0.381	1.000
Netatmo Weather	0.826	0.827	0.868	0.845	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Philips Hue Bridge	0.994	0.990	0.978	0.986	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Ring Base Station	0.305	0.913	0.293	0.697	0.336	1.000	0.250	0.995
SIMCAM IS	0.996	0.998	0.980	0.998	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Smart Board	0.363	0.721	0.292	0.675	0.105	0.996	0.074	0.996
Sonos One Speaker	0.729	0.844	0.727	0.891	0.991	0.999	0.951	1.000
Teckin Plug	0.675	0.826	0.868	0.578	0.932	1.000	1.000	0.712
Yutron Plug	0.764	0.855	0.867	0.632	0.956	1.000	1.000	0.850
iRobot Roomba	0.955	0.962	0.843	0.946	1.000	1.000	0.993	1.000
Mean	0.842	0.905	0.818	0.814	0.925	0.999	0.898	0.912

V. CONCLUSION

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


Fig. 6: The number of packets produced by the devices in the Aalto dataset.




Fig. 7: The number of packets produced by the devices in the Aalto dataset.

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APPENDIX

TABLE III: The list of individual packet-based features used in device identification and feature descriptions

No	Feature	Description
1	ts	Time Stamp
2	Ether_dst	Destination Media Access Control (MAC) Address
3	Ether_src	Source MAC Address
4	IP_src	Source Internet Protocol (IP) Address
5	IP_dst	Destination IP Address
6	WS_src	WireShark Source Address
7	WS_dst	WireShark Destination Address
8	pck_size	Packet (Frame) Size
9	Ether_type	Ethernet Type
10	LLC_dsap	Logical Link Control - Destination Service Access Point
11	LLC_ssap	Logical Link Control - Source Service Access Point
12	LLC_ctrl	Logical Link Control - Control
13	EAPOL_version	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAPOL) version
14	EAPOL_type	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAPOL) type
15	EAPOL_len	Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAPOL) Length
16	IP_version	IP version
17	IP_ihl	IP Internet Header Length
18	IP_tos	IP type of service
19	IP_len	IP Length
20	IP_flags	IP Flags
21	IP_Z	IP Zero
22	IP_MF	IP More Fragments
23	IP_id	IP identifier
24	IP_chksum	IP Checksum
25	IP_DF	IP Don't Fragment
26	IP_frag	IP fragmentation
27	IP_ttl	IP Time To Live
28	IP_proto	IP Protocols
29	IP_options	IP Options
30	ICMP_type	Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Type
31	ICMP_code	ICMP Code
32	ICMP_chksum	ICMP Checksum
33	ICMP_id	ICMP identifier
34	ICMP_seq	ICMP Sequence Number
35	ICMP_ts_ori	ICMP ConditionalField
36	ICMP_ts_rx	ICMP ConditionalField
37	ICMP_ts_tx	ICMP ConditionalField
38	ICMP_ptr	ICMP ConditionalField
39	ICMP_reserved	ICMP ConditionalField
40	ICMP_length	ICMP length
41	ICMP_nexthopmtu	ICMP Next Hop Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)
42	ICMP_unused	ICMP ConditionalField
43	TCP_seq	TCP Sequence Number
44	TCP_ack	TCP Acknowledgment Number
45	TCP_dataofs	TCP data offset
46	TCP_reserved	TCP Reserved
47	TCP_flags	TCP Flags
48	TCP_FIN	FINished Flag
49	TCP_SYN	Sync Flag
50	TCP_RST	Reset Flag

TABLE III: The list of individual packet-based features used in device identification and feature descriptions

No	Feature	Description
51	TCP_PSH	Push Flag
52	TCP_ACK	Acknowledgment Flag
53	TCP_URG	Urgent Flag
54	TCP_ECE	ECE Flag
55	TCP_CWR	CWR Flag
56	TCP_window	TCP Window Size
57	TCP_chksm	TCP Checksum
58	TCP_urgptr	TCP Urgent Pointer
59	TCP_options	TCP Options
60	UDP_len	User datagram protocol (UDP) Length
61	UDP_chksm	UDP Checksum
62	DHCP_options	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Options
63	BOOTP_op	Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) Options
64	BOOTP_htype	BOOTP Hardware Len
65	BOOTP_hlen	BOOTP Hardware Length
66	BOOTP_hops	BOOTP Hardware Options
67	BOOTP_xid	BOOTP Transaction Identifier
68	BOOTP_secs	BOOTP Seconds
69	BOOTP_flags	BOOTP Flags
70	BOOTP_sname	BOOTP Server Name
71	BOOTP_file	BOOTP Boot Filename
72	BOOTP_options	BOOTP Options
73	DNS_length	Domain Name System (DNS) Length
74	DNS_id	DNS Identifier
75	DNS_qr	DNS Query-Response
76	DNS_opcode	DNS Operation Code
77	DNS_aa	DNS Authoritative Answer
78	DNS_tc	DNS TrunCation
79	DNS_rd	DNS Recursion Desired
80	DNS_ra	DNS Recursion Available
81	DNS_z	DNS Reserved for future use
82	DNS_ad	DNS Authentic Data
83	DNS_cd	DNS Checking Disabled
84	DNS_rcode	DNS Response Code
85	DNS_qdcount	DNS The unsigned fields query count
86	DNS_ancount	DNS Answer Count
87	DNS_nscount	DNS Authority Count
88	DNS_arcount	DNS Additional Information Count
89	sport_class	Source Port Class (IoTDevID classing)
90	dport_class	Destination Port Class (IoTDevID classing)
91	sport23	Source Port Class (keep wellknown ports between 0-1023)
92	dport23	Destination Port Class (keep wellknown ports between 0-1023)
93	sport_bare	Source Port Number
94	dport_bare	Destination Port Number
95	payload_bytes	Payload size in Bytes
96	entropy	Payload Entropy
97	Protocol	WireShark Protocol
98	sport	Source Port Number
99	dport	Destination Port Number
100	Label	Packet Level Label

