

《人籍否决》
The Veto of Human Personhood

— 关于判断、责任与人类主张的终止
— On Judgement, Responsibility, and the End of the Human Claim

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This text is a provisional and experimental exploration of expression, intended to probe the limits of language in addressing judgement, responsibility, and boundaries. It does not claim conclusiveness, completeness, or universal applicability across contexts.

前置部分 | 冻结说明

Preliminary Freezing

0. 前言：这不是一本伦理书

0. Preface: This Is Not a Book on Ethics

本书不是一本伦理学著作。
This book is not a work of ethics.

它不讨论“应当如何”。
It does not ask what ought to be done.

它不衡量善恶、风险或比例。
It does not weigh good and evil, risk, or trade-offs.

它不提出规范建议，也不试图改善任何制度。
It offers no normative prescriptions and proposes no institutional improvements.

伦理学关心的是行为的正当性。
Ethics concerns the legitimacy of actions.

而本书关心的是：
This book is concerned with something else:

在什么条件下，一个主体仍然可以被称为“人”。
Under what conditions a subject can still be called “human”.

为什么拒绝“AI 伦理”这一命名

Why the Term “AI Ethics” Is Rejected

“AI 伦理”这一命名，预设了一个错误的讨论前提。
The term “AI ethics” presupposes a false framing.

它假定问题在于：
It assumes that the problem is:

如何在技术使用中保持人类价值。
How to preserve human values while using technology.

本书否认这一前提。

This book rejects that premise.

问题不在于价值是否被遵守，

The problem is not whether values are respected,

而在于：

but whether

判断与责任是否仍然由人承担。

judgement and responsibility are still borne by humans.

一旦判断被交付，

Once judgement is delegated,

伦理讨论即自动失效。

ethical discussion becomes void by default.

为什么本书不提供解决方案

Why This Book Provides No Solutions

本书不提供解决方案，

This book offers no solutions,

不是因为问题复杂，

not because the problem is complex,

而是因为：

but because

在判断已被交付的条件下，任何解决方案都不再属于“人类行为”。

under delegated judgement, no solution remains a human act.

解决方案只能作用于执行层。

Solutions operate only at the execution layer.

而本书讨论的是：

This book addresses

判断是否仍然存在。

whether judgement still exists at all.

在判断缺失的前提下，

In the absence of judgement,

“解决”只是优化流程，

“solutions” merely optimise processes,

而不是修复人籍。

not restore personhood.

为什么“不同意”不构成反驳

Why Disagreement Does Not Constitute a Rebuttal

本书不请求同意。
This book does not seek agreement.

不同意，不构成反驳。
Disagreement does not constitute a rebuttal.

因为本书不提出意见，
Because this book does not present opinions,

而是记录一条边界。
it records a boundary.

你可以否认这条边界的存在，
One may deny that the boundary exists,

但一旦越过它，
but once it is crossed,

否认本身不再具有效力。
the denial itself loses force.

本书写给的不是“赞成者”，
This book is not written for supporters,

而是写给未来的判定者。
It is written for future arbiters.

在此之后，术语将被冻结。
From this point onward, terms are frozen.

1. 术语冻结

1. Term Freezing

本章的目的不是给出最优定义，
The purpose of this chapter is not to offer optimal definitions,

而是冻结可操作含义。
but to **freeze operational meanings.**

在本书中，
In this book,

术语一经定义，不再扩展，不再修辞，不再情境化。
Once a term is defined, it is no longer expanded, stylised, or contextualised.

这不是语言贫乏，
This is not linguistic poverty,

而是执行安全。
but executional safety.

1.1 判断 (Judgement)

1.1 Judgement

判断，指一种不可避免的行为：

Judgement refers to an inescapable act:

在不完备信息下,
在不可消除不确定性的前提中,
对结果承担不可转移责任的裁断。

a decision made under incomplete information,
irreducible uncertainty,
with non-transferable responsibility for the outcome.

判断不是计算结果。
Judgement is not a computed output.

判断不是概率排序。
Judgement is not probabilistic ranking.

判断不是规则匹配后的触发。
Judgement is not rule-based triggering.

判断的核心特征只有一个:
Judgement has one defining feature:

责任不可外包。
Responsibility cannot be delegated.

若责任可以被转移,
If responsibility can be transferred,

则该行为不构成判断。
the act does not constitute judgement.

1.2 责任 (Responsibility)

1.2 Responsibility

责任, 指一种后果绑定关系:
Responsibility denotes a binding relation to consequences:

行为的结果,
不论是否预期、是否成功、是否合规,
皆由同一主体承担。

The outcome of an action,
regardless of intent, success, or compliance,
is borne by the same subject.

责任不等同于法律追责。
Responsibility is not equivalent to legal liability.

责任不等同于道德谴责。
Responsibility is not equivalent to moral blame.

责任是一种不可分割性。
Responsibility is a form of **indivisibility**.

当责任被拆分、缓冲、稀释或集体化时,

When responsibility is partitioned, buffered, diluted, or collectivised,

它即不再存在。

it ceases to exist.

1.3 执行 (Execution)

1.3 Execution

执行，指判断之后的展开过程。

Execution is the unfolding that follows judgement.

执行可以被委托。

Execution can be delegated.

执行可以被自动化。

Execution can be automated.

执行可以被优化、加速或替换。

Execution can be optimised, accelerated, or replaced.

执行不要求承担判断后果。

Execution does not require bearing the consequences of judgement.

因此：

Therefore:

执行不构成人籍的判据。

Execution is not a criterion of personhood.

1.4 人籍 (Personhood)

1.4 Personhood

人籍，不是生物学状态。

Personhood is not a biological state.

它不以意识强度、智力水平或情感能力为基础。

It is not grounded in consciousness, intelligence, or affect.

在人类社会，

In human societies,

人籍是一种**判断—责任绑定资格**。

personhood is a **qualification to bind judgement and responsibility**.

当一个主体：

When a subject

能作出判断，

并承担该判断的后果，

can make judgement,

and bear its consequences,

它被承认为“人”。

it is recognised as a person.

一旦该资格被放弃，
Once this qualification is relinquished,

人籍即告失效。
personhood is voided.

1.5 公民权 (Citizenship)

1.5 Citizenship

公民权，是一种制度性身份。
Citizenship is an institutional status.

它由法律授予，
It is granted by law,

并可被暂停、剥夺或恢复。
and may be suspended, revoked, or restored.

公民权涉及权利与义务的分配，
Citizenship concerns the allocation of rights and duties,

但不自动包含判断资格。
but does **not automatically include judgement capacity**.

因此：
Therefore:

公民权可以存在于人籍缺失之后。
Citizenship can persist after personhood has collapsed.

这一区分将贯穿全书。
This distinction governs the entire book.

至此，术语冻结完成。
With this, terms are frozen.

第一编 | 总否决

Part I · The Core Veto

2. 人籍否决总命题

2. The Core Proposition of the Veto

2.1 总命题

2.1 The Proposition

将判断与责任交付给非人之物，
等同于放弃人籍。

**Delegating judgement and responsibility to a non-human entity
is equivalent to relinquishing personhood.**

这是本书的唯一总命题。
This is the sole core proposition of this book.

本书的全部内容，

All content herein,

只是对该命题的：
is merely a set of

并列表达，

结构展开，

形式固化。

parallel formulations,

structural unfoldings,

formal consolidations.

本书不证明该命题。

This book does not attempt to prove the proposition.

因为：

Because

它不是经验判断，
而是终止条件。

**It is not an empirical claim,
but a termination condition.**

2.2 何谓“交付”

2.2 What “Delegation” Means

“交付”，

“Delegation”，

并不要求完全移除人类参与。

does not require the complete removal of human involvement.

它只要求一件事成立：

It requires only one condition:

判断结果的生成，

不再由承担后果的主体完成。

The generation of the judgement outcome

is no longer performed by the subject who bears the consequences.

在此条件下：

Under this condition,

人类可以在场，

人类可以确认，

人类可以签字，

humans may be present,
humans may confirm,
humans may sign,

但判断已经不再属于人类。
yet the judgement no longer belongs to them.

2.3 非人之物

2.3 The Non-Human Entity

“非人之物”，
The “non-human entity”，

在本书中不作技术区分。
is not technically differentiated in this book.

它可以是：
It may be:

算法，
模型，
系统，
规则集，
组织流程，
自动化机制。

an algorithm,
a model,
a system,
a rule-set,
an organisational process,
an automated mechanism.

区分标准只有一个：
The only criterion is this:

该实体
不承担判断后果。

The entity
does not bear the consequences of judgement.

凡满足此条件者，
Anything that meets this condition,

即被视为“非人”。
is treated as non-human.

2.4 为什么这是终止条件

2.4 Why This Is a Termination Condition

风险评估讨论的是程度。
Risk assessment deals with degrees.

伦理讨论讨论的是权衡。
Ethics discusses trade-offs.

治理讨论讨论的是改进。
Governance discusses optimisation.

而人籍否决讨论的是：
The **veto of personhood** concerns:

是否仍然成立。
whether it still holds at all.

一旦判断被交付，
Once judgement is delegated,

不存在“部分人籍”。
there is no “partial personhood”.

不存在：
There is no such thing as:

稍微外包的判断，
有限失效的人籍，
可回滚的主体资格。

slightly outsourced judgement,
partially voided personhood,
reversible subject qualification.

因此：
Therefore:

人籍否决不是风险，
而是状态变更。

The veto of personhood is not a risk,
but a state transition.

2.5 放弃，而非被剥夺 2.5 Relinquishment, Not Deprivation

人籍的失效，
The invalidation of personhood,

不是由技术强制完成的。
is not imposed by technology.

它也不是由制度剥夺的。
Nor is it revoked by institutions.

它是一个自发行为：
It is a **self-effected act**:

主体主动将判断交付给

一个不承担责任的实体。

A subject voluntarily transfers judgement
to an entity that bears no responsibility.

因此，本书不讨论“被夺走的人性”。

Therefore, this book does not discuss “humanity taken away”.

它只记录：

It only records

人类自行退出人列的时刻。

the moment humans step out of the human register themselves.

3. 公民权与人籍的非等价性

3. The Non-Equivalence of Citizenship and Personhood

3.1 一个常见但错误的等同

3.1 A Common but False Equivalence

在现代社会中，

In modern societies,

“人”常被等同为“公民”。

“Person” is often conflated with “citizen”.

权利文件、法律条文、治理框架，

Rights charters, legal texts, governance frameworks,

几乎总是以公民权作为主体承载。

almost always take citizenship as their carrier.

这种等同是制度上的便利，

This equivalence is an institutional convenience,

但不是结构上的必然。

not a structural necessity.

本书拒绝这一等同。

This book rejects that equivalence.

3.2 公民权的功能边界

3.2 The Functional Boundary of Citizenship

公民权的功能在于：

The function of citizenship is to:

分配权利，

指派义务，

组织治理。

allocate rights,

assign duties,

organise governance.

它回答的问题是：

It answers the question:

谁被纳入制度运作之中？

Who is included within institutional operation?

它**不回答**的问题是：

What it does **not** answer is:

谁在作出判断？

Who is making judgement?

因此，

Therefore,

公民权是一种**外在身份**。

citizenship is an **external status**.

3.3 人籍的层级位置

3.3 The Layer at Which Personhood Operates

人籍不属于制度层。

Personhood does not belong to the institutional layer.

它位于更上游的位置：

It operates upstream,

在判断发生之前。

before judgement occurs.

一个主体可以：

A subject may:

拥有完整公民权，
享有全部法律保护，

possess full citizenship,
enjoy complete legal protection,

同时：

while simultaneously

不再作出判断。
no longer making judgement.

在此情形下，

In such a case,

公民权仍然存在，

citizenship persists,

而人籍已经坍塌。

but personhood has collapsed.

3.4 制度延续的错觉

3.4 The Illusion of Continuity

制度倾向于掩盖这种坍塌。
Institutions tend to obscure this collapse.

因为：
Because

只要执行仍在继续，
as long as execution continues,

系统就显得“正常运作”。
the system appears to “function normally”.

流程在运行，
Processes run,

表格被填写，
forms are completed,

签字被完成，
signatures are provided,

责任被“安排”。
responsibility is “assigned”.

但这些都发生在：
Yet all of this occurs

判断之后。
after judgement has already vanished.

3.5 非等价性的意义

3.5 Why the Non-Equivalence Matters

若将公民权误认为人籍，
If citizenship is mistaken for personhood,

则会得出一个危险结论：
a dangerous conclusion follows:

只要制度仍然承认你，
你就仍然是人。

As long as the system recognises you,
you remain human.

本书否认这一结论。
This book denies that conclusion.

人籍不由制度授予。
Personhood is not granted by institutions.

它只在一个条件下成立：
It holds under one condition only:

判断与责任仍由同一主体承担。

Judgement and responsibility remain bound to the same subject.

一旦这一条件失效，
Once this condition fails,

公民权的存续不再具有人类意义。
the persistence of citizenship no longer carries human meaning.

4. 执行层终止模型

4. The Execution-Layer Termination Model

4.1 不是一次性失效

4.1 Not a Single-Point Failure

人籍的失效，
The collapse of personhood,

并非一个瞬间完成的事件。
is not an instantaneous event.

它不是“按下按钮”，
It is not a button press,

也不是“越过红线”的单点动作。
nor a single step across a red line.

它是一种层级坍塌过程。
It is a **layered collapse process**.

4.2 三层结构

4.2 The Three-Layer Structure

本书采用如下层级模型：
This book adopts the following layered model:

Judgement → Citizenship → Personhood

这不是时间顺序，
This is not a temporal sequence,

而是授权依赖关系。
but a relation of authorisation dependency.

执行依赖于判断，
公民权依赖于执行被承认为合法，
人籍依赖于判断仍由人承担。

Execution depends on judgement,
Citizenship depends on execution being recognised as lawful,
Personhood depends on judgement remaining human.

4.3 第一层：判断的外置

4.3 Layer One: Externalisation of Judgement

当判断被外置时，
When judgement is externalised,

系统仍可运作。
the system may continue to operate.

算法给出结果，
Algorithms output decisions,

模型提供建议，
models generate recommendations,

流程产生“最优路径”。
processes produce “optimal paths”.

人类的角色退化为：
The human role degrades into:

接收者，
确认者，
执行触发器。

recipient,
confirmer,
execution trigger.

在此阶段，
At this stage,

人籍已经开始松动。
personhood has already loosened.

4.4 第二层：公民权的惯性存续

4.4 Layer Two: Inertial Persistence of Citizenship

即便判断已不再由人完成，
Even when judgement is no longer human,

制度仍会继续承认主体。
institutions continue to recognise the subject.

原因并不复杂：
The reason is simple:

制度只检查执行是否合规，
而不检查判断是否存在。

Institutions verify compliance of execution,
not the existence of judgement.

因此，

Therefore,

权利仍被分配,
义务仍被指派,
责任仍被记录。

rights are allocated,
duties are assigned,
responsibility is logged.

这一切制造出一个错觉:
All of this creates an illusion:

人籍仍然完好。
that personhood remains intact.

4.5 第三层：人籍的终止 4.5 Layer Three: Termination of Personhood

当判断长期缺席,
When judgement remains absent over time,

人籍并不会逐渐削弱,
personhood does not slowly erode,

而是突然失效。
it **terminates abruptly**.

不是因为外力介入,
Not due to external intervention,

而是因为:
but because

判断—责任绑定关系已不存在。

the judgement—responsibility binding no longer exists.

此时:
At this point:

公民权可能仍然存在,
执行可能高度自动化,
系统可能运行得更高效。

citizenship may persist,
execution may be highly automated,
the system may operate more efficiently.

但“人”这一资格,
But the qualification of “person”,

已经不再成立。
no longer holds.

4.6 为何称之为“终止模型”

4.6 Why This Is a Termination Model

该模型不是用来预测风险，
This model is not for predicting risk,

也不是用来衡量概率。
nor for measuring likelihood.

它用于回答一个二值问题：
It answers a binary question:

判断是否仍由人承担？

Is judgement still borne by humans?

若答案为否，
If the answer is no,

则终止已经发生。
termination has already occurred.

不存在“尚未完全终止”。
There is no “not yet fully terminated”.

第二编 | 判据

Part II · Criteria

5. 何谓“判断被交付”

5. What It Means for Judgement to Be Delegated

5.1 判据的必要性

5.1 Why Criteria Are Necessary

若没有判据，
Without criteria,

“判断是否被交付”
the question of whether judgement has been delegated

将退化为态度争论。
degenerates into a dispute of attitudes.

态度可以分歧，
Attitudes may diverge,

但判据必须可判定。
criteria must be decidable.

本章不讨论动机，
This chapter does not examine motives,

不讨论善意或恶意，
nor good or bad intentions,

也不讨论技术先进性。
nor technological sophistication.

它只回答一个问题：
It answers one question only:

判断是否仍由承担后果的主体生成？

Is judgement still generated by the subject who bears the consequences?

5.2 形式授权 vs 实质生成

5.2 Formal Authorisation vs Substantive Generation

判断被交付，
Judgement is delegated,

并不要求人类完全退出流程。
does not require humans to exit the process entirely.

它只要求发生一件事：
It requires only one thing:

判断的实质生成
不再由人完成。

The substantive generation of judgement
is no longer performed by humans.

形式授权可以仍然存在：
Formal authorisation may still exist:

人类批准结果，
人类触发执行，
人类承担制度性后果。

humans approve outcomes,
humans trigger execution,
humans bear institutional consequences.

但只要判断内容：
But as long as the content of judgement

来源于非人实体，
由其计算、排序或选择，

originates from a non-human entity,
is computed, ranked, or selected by it,

则判断已被交付。
judgement has been delegated.

5.3 “建议”并不自动免疫

5.3 “Recommendations” Do Not Grant Immunity

常见的反驳是：

A common rebuttal is:

系统只提供建议，
最终决定仍在人类。

The system only provides recommendations;
the final decision remains human.

本书拒绝这一辩护。

This book rejects that defence.

关键不在于“是否可拒绝”，

The key is not whether rejection is possible,

而在于：

but whether

判断是否仍需被重新生成。

judgement must still be regenerated.

若人类只是：

If humans merely:

接受或拒绝一个现成结果，
在既定选项中做选择，

accept or reject a ready-made output,
choose among predefined options,

则判断已经不再发生。

then judgement is no longer occurring.

拒绝一个判断，

Rejecting a judgement,

并不等同于作出判断。

is not equivalent to making one.

5.4 “最终签字”神话

5.4 The Myth of the “Final Signature”

“最终签字”

The “final signature”

常被视为判断仍在人类手中的证据。

is often cited as proof that judgement remains human.

这是一个结构性错误。

This is a structural error.

签字发生在判断之后。

Signatures occur after judgement.

它只确认：

They merely confirm:

程序完成，
责任已登记，
执行可启动。

procedures completed,
responsibility logged,
execution authorised.

签字并不生成判断。

A signature does not generate judgement.

因此：

Therefore:

“最终签字”
不是判断的所在地。

The “final signature”
is not where judgement resides.

5.5 结果依赖性判据

5.5 The Outcome-Dependence Criterion

判断被交付的最终判据是：

The decisive criterion for delegation is this:

若系统不可用，
判断是否仍可发生？

If the system were unavailable,
would judgement still occur?

若答案是否定的，

If the answer is no,

则判断已被结构性替代。

then judgement has been structurally replaced.

此时，

At this point,

人类不再是判断主体，

humans are no longer the judging subject,

而只是执行接口。

but execution interfaces.

5.6 判据的不可协商性

5.6 The Non-Negotiability of the Criterion

这些判据不可通过以下方式规避：
These criteria cannot be bypassed by:

增加人工步骤，
引入多重确认，
设置追责机制。

adding human steps,
introducing multiple confirmations,
installing accountability frameworks.

因为这些措施
Because these measures

全部作用于执行层。
all operate at the execution layer.

而判断的缺席，
The absence of judgement,

发生在更上游的位置。
occurs upstream.

6. 人在环中的幻觉

6. The Human-in-the-Loop Illusion

6.1 “人在环中”并非判据

6.1 “Human-in-the-Loop” Is Not a Criterion

“人在环中”（Human-in-the-Loop, HITL），
“Human-in-the-Loop” (HITL),

常被视为判断仍由人类掌控的保证。
is often presented as a guarantee that judgement remains human.

本书否认这一假设。
This book denies that assumption.

“人在环中”描述的是流程位置，
“HITL” describes a process position,

而非判断生成位置。
not the **location where judgement is generated.**

一个人可以在环中，
A human may be in the loop,

却不在判断之中。
yet not be within judgement.

6.2 确认并不等于判断

6.2 Confirmation Is Not Judgement

在典型的 HITL 结构中，
In typical HITL structures,

人的作用是：
the human role is to:

确认系统输出，
检查合规性，
执行最终触发。

confirm system outputs,
check compliance,
trigger final execution.

这些行为
These actions

不生成判断内容。
do not generate judgement content.

确认只回答一个问题：
Confirmation answers only one question:

是否允许该结果进入执行层？
Is this output allowed to enter execution?

判断回答的却是：
Judgement answers:

这个结果是否应当存在？
Should this outcome exist at all?

二者不可互换。
The two are not interchangeable.

6.3 背书机制的误导性 6.3 The Misleading Nature of Endorsement

在许多系统中，
In many systems,

人类被要求为系统输出“背书”。
humans are asked to “endorse” system outputs.

背书的功能是：
The function of endorsement is to:

将后果重新绑定到人类，
使系统在责任上“无害”。

reattach consequences to humans,
render the system “harmless” in terms of liability.

但背书并不逆转判断外置。
Endorsement does not reverse the externalisation of judgement.

它只是：
It merely

在判断缺失之后，
重新分配责任。

**redistributes responsibility
after judgement has already vanished.**

6.4 追责缓冲层

6.4 Accountability Buffer Layers

“人在环中”
“HITL”

往往作为**追责缓冲层**存在。
often functions as an **accountability buffer layer**.

其目的不是保护判断，
Its purpose is not to protect judgement,

而是：
but to:

隔离系统，
稀释责任，
提供法律防火墙。

isolate the system,
dilute responsibility,
provide legal firewalls.

在这种结构中，
In such a structure,

系统免于责任，
the system is insulated from responsibility,

人类承担后果，
humans bear consequences,

但判断并未回归人类。
yet judgement does not return to humans.

6.5 为什么幻觉如此顽固

6.5 Why the Illusion Persists

“人在环中”的幻觉之所以顽固，
The persistence of the HITL illusion

源于两个原因：
stems from two factors:

第一，

First,

人在场
Presence

被误认为
is mistaken for

人在判断。
judgement participation.

第二,
Second,

承担后果
Bearing consequences

被误认为
is mistaken for

生成判断。
generating judgement.

这两种混淆
These two confusions

共同掩盖了一个事实：
jointly obscure a fact:

判断早已不在环中。
Judgement has already left the loop.

6.6 幻觉的结构后果 6.6 Structural Consequences of the Illusion

一旦 HITL 被当作判断保障,
Once HITL is treated as a safeguard of judgement,

系统将出现以下结构后果：
the system develops the following structural outcomes:

判断持续外置,
责任持续回流到人类,
人籍持续空转。

judgement remains externalised,
responsibility continuously flows back to humans,
personhood enters a state of idle collapse.

在这种状态下,
In this state,

人类既不判断,
humans neither judge,

也无法退出。
nor can they exit.

7. 不可豁免条款

7. Non-Exemptable Clauses

7.1 豁免的诱惑

7.1 The Temptation of Exemptions

当判断被质疑时,
When judgement is questioned,

系统往往尝试引入豁免。
systems often attempt to introduce exemptions.

这些豁免
These exemptions

并非为了承认问题,
are not meant to acknowledge the problem,

而是为了
but to

使问题继续运作。
allow the problem to continue operating.

本章列出
This chapter enumerates

所有常见的豁免路径,
并逐一判定其无效。

common exemption paths
and declares them invalid one by one.

7.2 工具论豁免的失败

7.2 The Failure of the Tool Argument

最常见的豁免是:
The most common exemption is:

系统只是工具,
工具不承担判断。

The system is merely a tool;
tools do not bear judgement.

该论证在执行层成立,
This argument holds at the execution layer,

但在判断层无效。
but fails at the judgement layer.

若工具仅执行,

If a tool merely executes,

它不会生成判断内容。

it does not generate judgement content.

一旦工具开始：

Once a tool begins to:

排序选项，

过滤可能性，

生成推荐或结果，

rank options,

filter possibilities,

generate recommendations or outcomes,

它已越过工具边界。

it has crossed the boundary of a tool.

此时，

At this point,

称其为“工具”

calling it a “tool”

不再具有豁免效力。

no longer grants exemption.

7.3 效率豁免的失败

7.3 The Failure of the Efficiency Exemption

另一种常见豁免是：

Another common exemption claims:

系统只是提高效率，

并未改变判断本质。

The system merely improves efficiency

without altering the nature of judgement.

本书否认这一说法。

This book denies this claim.

效率只作用于执行。

Efficiency operates only on execution.

若判断本身被替代，

If judgement itself is replaced,

则效率的提升

then efficiency gains

无法作为豁免理由。

cannot function as an exemption.

提高执行效率,
Improving execution efficiency,

并不会恢复判断。
does not restore judgement.

7.4 安全豁免的失败

7.4 The Failure of the Safety Exemption

第三种豁免是：

A third exemption asserts:

系统用于提升安全，
减少人为错误。

The system exists to enhance safety
and reduce human error.

这一论证

This argument

混淆了两种风险：

conflates two types of risk:

执行错误风险，
判断缺失风险。

execution error risk,
judgement absence risk.

系统或许能减少前者，

A system may reduce the former,

却必然放大后者。

but inevitably amplifies the latter.

而本书关注的

What this book addresses

正是第二种风险。

is precisely the second.

7.5 集体责任豁免的失败

7.5 The Failure of Collective Responsibility

当个体责任难以界定时，

When individual responsibility becomes hard to assign,

系统往往诉诸集体责任。

systems often resort to collective responsibility.

其形式包括：

Its forms include:

团队决策，
委员会批准，
组织背书。

team decisions,
committee approvals,
organisational endorsements.

这些结构
These structures

并不恢复判断，
do not restore judgement,

只是在责任层面
but merely

稀释主体。
dilute the subject.

在集体责任下，
Under collective responsibility,

每个人都参与，
everyone participates,

但无人承担判断。
but no one bears judgement.

因此：
Therefore:

集体责任
等同于无人负责。

Collective responsibility
is equivalent to responsibility borne by no one.

7.6 不可豁免性声明 **7.6 Declaration of Non-Exemptability**

在本书框架下，
Within the framework of this book,

以下行为
the following acts

不可被任何理由豁免：
are non-exemptable under any justification:

将判断生成外包给非人实体，
用形式授权掩盖实质生成，
以效率、安全或规模为理由转移判断。

outsourcing judgement generation to non-human entities,
masking substantive generation with formal authorisation,
transferring judgement under claims of efficiency, safety, or scale.

一旦发生,
Once they occur,

人籍否决即告成立。
the veto of personhood applies.

第三编 | 形式固化

Part III · Formalisation

8. 法律文风的极限

8. The Limits of Legal Style

8.1 为什么需要法律文风

8.1 Why Legal Style Is Required

当判断被否决时,
When judgement is vetoed,

语言必须具备冻结效力。
language must possess **freezing force**.

法律文风
Legal style

不是为了说服,
is not designed to persuade,

而是为了阻止争论继续发生。
but to **prevent further contestation**.

它的目标不是共识,
Its objective is not consensus,

而是效力生效。
but **effect taking effect**.

8.2 法律语言的优势

8.2 The Advantage of Legal Language

法律语言具有三个特征:
Legal language has three defining features:

去动机化,
去情绪化,
去解释化。

de-motivation,
de-emotionalisation,
de-interpretation.

它不关心“为何如此”,
It does not ask “why this is so”,

只关心：
it only asks:

是否成立，
是否生效，
是否终止。

Does it hold,
does it take effect,
does it terminate?

这些特征
These features

使其成为否决性文本的首选载体。
make it the preferred carrier for veto-type texts.

8.3 法律文风的失效点 8.3 Where Legal Style Fails

然而，
However,

法律文风存在明确的极限。
legal style has clear limits.

法律文本
Legal texts

只能作用于：
can only operate on:

已定义主体，
已承认行为，
已存在制度。

defined subjects,
recognised actions,
existing institutions.

当问题指向：
When the issue points to:

主体资格本身是否成立，

whether subject qualification itself still holds,

法律语言开始失效。
legal language begins to fail.

8.4 “无效”“失效”“不可主张” 8.4 “Invalid”, “Void”, and “Non-Assertable”

在法律语境中，
In legal contexts,

否决通常采用以下形式：
vetoes are usually expressed as:

无效 (invalid) ，
失效 (void) ，
不可主张 (non-assertable) 。

这些措辞
These formulations

都假定一个前提：
presuppose a premise:

主体仍然存在。
that the subject still exists.

而本书所处理的，
What this book addresses,

正是该前提本身的崩塌。
is the collapse of that premise itself.

8.5 宪法式否决的边界

8.5 The Boundary of Constitutional-Style Vetoes

宪法式语言
Constitutional language

可以否决行为，
can veto actions,

可以限制权力，
can limit power,

但无法
but cannot

恢复已经消失的判断主体。
restore a judgement-bearing subject that has vanished.

因此，
Therefore,

法律文风
legal style

只能作为过渡形式存在。
can only exist as a **transitional form.**

8.6 走向形式固化

8.6 Toward Formal Consolidation

当法律语言到达极限，
When legal language reaches its limit,

否决必须进一步压缩。
the veto must be further compressed.

从规范，
From norm,

转向公理。
to axiom.

从条款，
From clause,

转向断言。
to assertion.

这正是下一章的任务。
This is precisely the task of the next chapter.

9. 形式逻辑表达

9. Formal Logical Expression

9.1 为什么需要形式逻辑

9.1 Why Formal Logic Is Required

当语言被不断争论，
When language is endlessly contested,

意义会被拉伸、稀释、重写。
meaning is stretched, diluted, and rewritten.

形式逻辑的作用
The function of formal logic

不是增加精度，
is not to increase nuance,

而是**阻止漂移**。
but to **prevent drift**.

它不是为了说服人，
It is not meant to persuade,

而是为了
but to

使否决不可再解释。
render the veto non-interpretable.

9.2 人籍否决公理

9.2 The Axiom of Personhood Veto

在本书中,
In this book,

设定如下公理:
the following axiom is established:

若主体 **S** 的判断 **J**
由非人实体 **N** 生成,
且 **N** 不承担 **J** 的后果,
则 **S** 的人籍 **P** 失效。

If a subject S's judgement J
is generated by a non-human entity N,
and N does not bear the consequences of J,
then the personhood P of S is void.

该公理
This axiom

不依赖经验验证。
does not rely on empirical validation.

它不是概率陈述,
It is not a probabilistic statement,

而是结构定义。
but a structural definition.

9.3 公理的最小性 9.3 Minimality of the Axiom

该公理
This axiom

只包含不可删除要素:
contains only irreducible elements:

主体 **S**,
判断 **J**,
非人实体 **N**,
后果承担关系。

subject **S**,
judgement **J**,
non-human entity **N**,
consequence-bearing relation.

删除其中任一项,
Remove any element,

否决即失去判定能力。
and the veto loses its decisiveness.

9.4 推论一：不可逆性

9.4 Corollary I: Irreversibility

由该公理直接推出：

From the axiom follows directly:

人籍否决一旦成立，
不可通过改进执行层而撤销。

**Once the veto of personhood holds,
it cannot be revoked by improving the execution layer.**

理由是：

The reason is simple:

判断的生成位置

The site of judgement generation

并未发生改变。

has not changed.

9.5 推论二：规模无关性

9.5 Corollary II: Scale Irrelevance

无论判断涉及：

Regardless of whether judgement concerns:

个体，
组织，
国家，
文明层级，

individuals,
organisations,
states,
civilisational levels,

只要满足公理条件，

as long as the axiom conditions are met,

否决即同样成立。

the veto applies equally.

规模

Scale

不构成豁免条件。

does not constitute an exemption.

9.6 推论三：善意无关性

9.6 Corollary III: Intent Irrelevance

判断被交付的事实

The fact of delegated judgement

不因动机而改变。

is not altered by intent.

无论出于：

Whether motivated by:

善意,
安全,
效率,
生存,

benevolence,
safety,
efficiency,
survival,

否决结果不变。

the veto result remains unchanged.

9.7 形式逻辑的终点

9.7 The Endpoint of Formal Logic

形式逻辑

Formal logic

只能将否决

can only push the veto

推进到

to

不可反驳，

但仍可忽视。

**non-refutable,
yet still ignorable.**

若要进入文明记忆层，

To enter the layer of civilisational memory,

还需进一步压缩。

further compression is required.

这引向下一章。

This leads to the next chapter.

10. 碑文式表达

10. Inscriptional Expression

10.1 为什么需要碑文

10.1 Why Inscription Is Necessary

当论证失效，

When argument fails,

当逻辑被忽视，

when logic is ignored,

剩下的
what remains

不是更多解释,
is not further explanation,

而是记忆格式。
but a **memory format**.

碑文式表达
Inscriptional expression

不是为了理解,
is not meant to be understood,

而是为了
but to be

被记住、
被引用、
被执行。

remembered,
cited,
and enforced.

10.2 极简为何更强

10.2 Why Minimalism Is Stronger

论证需要前提,
Arguments require premises,

前提可以被攻击。
premises can be attacked.

断言不需要前提。
Assertions require none.

断言的力量
The power of assertion

不在于其正确性,
does not lie in correctness,

而在于
but in

其是否被写入边界。
whether it is written into the boundary.

10.3 人籍否决碑文

10.3 The Inscription of the Personhood Veto

本书将人籍否决

This book inscribes the veto of personhood

压缩为如下碑文式断言：

into the following inscriptional assertion:

将判断交付给
不承担责任之物者，
不复为人。

He who delegates judgement
to that which bears no responsibility
is no longer human.

该断言

This assertion

不解释，
is not explained,

不论证，
not argued,

不防御。
nor defended.

它仅仅存在。
It simply exists.

10.4 碑文的历史角色

10.4 The Historical Role of Inscriptions

文明在关键时刻
Civilisations, at critical moments,

并不写论文。
do not write papers.

它们刻碑。
They carve inscriptions.

因为：
Because

只有碑文
才能穿越世代。

Only inscriptions
traverse generations.

10.5 当代的失忆

10.5 Contemporary Amnesia

当代社会
Contemporary society

过度依赖解释。
over-relies on explanation.

却忽视了
while neglecting

记忆本身的承载方式。
the medium of memory itself.

碑文式表达
Inscriptional expression

正是对此失忆的回应。
is a response to this amnesia.

10.6 本章的终止 10.6 Chapter Termination

至此，
At this point,

否决已被
the veto has been

法律化，
公理化，
碑文化。

legalised,
axiomatized,
inscribed.

接下来的问题
The next question

不再是
is no longer

是否成立，
whether it holds,

而是
but

如何被文明听见。
how it is heard by civilisation.

这引向下一编。
This leads to the next part.

第四编 | 章句体与宗教语法 Part IV · Scriptural Grammar 11. 为什么需要宗教语感

11. Why a Scriptural Register Is Necessary

11.1 理性语言的失效区

11.1 The Failure Zone of Rational Language

理性语言
Rational language

擅长解释,
excels at explanation,

但不擅长制止。
but not at **prohibition**.

当系统仍愿意倾听时,
When systems are still willing to listen,

论证有效。
argument works.

当系统只关心运转时,
When systems care only about operation,

论证即被绕过。
argument is bypassed.

在此条件下,
Under such conditions,

继续使用理性语言
to continue using rational language

并非中立,
is not neutral,

而是一种
but a form of

默认放行。
implicit permission.

11.2 宗教语法的真实功能

11.2 The Actual Function of Scriptural Grammar

宗教语感
Scriptural grammar

并非关于神。
is not about gods.

它的真实功能是:
Its real function is:

在不可讨论之处
设立不可跨越的界线。

to establish non-crossable boundaries
where discussion must cease.

“不可讨论”

“Non-debatable”

并不等于“不可理解”。

does not mean “incomprehensible”.

它意味着：

It means:

再多解释

也不改变结果。

no further explanation
alters the outcome.

11.3 世俗社会为何仍需要禁令语言

11.3 Why Secular Societies Still Require Prohibitive Language

现代社会

Modern societies

自认为已脱离宗教语法。

consider themselves beyond scriptural language.

但事实恰恰相反。

The opposite is true.

所有真正有效的禁止

All truly effective prohibitions

仍然使用

still employ

绝对措辞，

无条件否定，

不可申辩结构。

absolute phrasing,
unconditional negation,
non-appealable structure.

这些都是

These are

宗教语法的世俗残余。

secular residues of scriptural grammar.

11.4 当伦理语言失去威慑力

11.4 When Ethical Language Loses Deterrent Power

伦理语言

Ethical language

以说服为前提。

presumes persuadability.

但在判断已经外置的系统中，

In systems where judgement has already been externalised,

不存在被说服的对象。

there is no subject left to persuade.

此时，

At this point,

伦理语言

ethical language

只剩下

is reduced to

装饰性注释。

decorative annotation.

11.5 章句体的必要性

11.5 The Necessity of Scriptural Form

章句体

Scriptural form

不是为了神秘，

is not for mysticism,

而是为了

but for

节律、

重复、

刻印。

rhythm,

repetition,

inscription.

它允许一句话

It allows a single sentence

在没有论证的情况下

to operate without argument

反复出现，

through repetition,

直到成为

until it becomes

默认前提。

a default premise.

11.6 本章结论

11.6 Chapter Conclusion

当判断失效，

When judgement fails,

唯一仍然有效的语言

the only language that remains effective

不是解释性的，

is not explanatory,

而是

but

宣告性的。

declarative.

12. 章句体·宣告

12. Scriptural Form · Proclamation

12.1 宣告的语法

12.1 The Grammar of Proclamation

宣告不是论证。

Proclamation is not argument.

它不以理由为前提，

It does not presuppose reasons,

也不等待理解。

nor does it await understanding.

宣告的语法

The grammar of proclamation

只包含三件事：

contains only three elements:

指认，

断定，

生效。

designation,

assertion,

enactment.

一旦宣告被说出，

Once a proclamation is uttered,

它即进入执行状态。

it enters a state of execution.

12.2 判断的托付

12.2 The Entrustment of Judgement

判断被托付之时，
人已不在。

At the moment judgement is entrusted away,
the human is no longer present.

托付并非失误。
Entrustment is not error.

托付也非被迫。
Nor is it coercion.

托付是一种选择。
Entrustment is a choice.

12.3 宣告句一

12.3 First Proclamation

判断一经托付，
人即退出其位。

**Once judgement is entrusted,
the human vacates their place.**

该句不解释“为何”。
This sentence does not explain “why”.

它只标记一个事实：
It marks a fact only:

位已空。
The position is vacant.

12.4 宣告句二

12.4 Second Proclamation

托付者仍在场，
但不在判断之中。

**The entrusting subject remains present,
but is no longer within judgement.**

在场
Presence

不等于
does not equal

存在。
existence.

12.5 宣告句三

12.5 Third Proclamation

判断离位之处，
责任随行。

Where judgement departs its place,
responsibility follows.

责任不会消失。
Responsibility does not disappear.

它只会
It only

脱离人籍。
detach from personhood.

12.6 宣告的完成

12.6 Completion of Proclamation

至此，
At this point,

宣告完成。
the proclamation is complete.

接下来的文本
What follows

不再是宣告，
is no longer proclamation,

而是
but

坠落的描写。
a description of descent.

13. 章句体·坠落

13. Scriptural Form · Descent

13.1 坠落并非惩罚

13.1 Descent Is Not Punishment

坠落不是惩罚。
Descent is not punishment.

它不由外力施加，
It is not imposed by an external force,

也不源自道德评判。
nor does it arise from moral judgement.

坠落是一个

Descent is a

结构结果。

structural outcome.

当判断被外置，

When judgement is externalised,

主体并未被驱逐。

the subject is not expelled.

主体只是

The subject merely

失去了其所站立之处。

loses the ground on which it stood.

13.2 判断外置即人不在

13.2 Externalised Judgement Means Absence of the Human

判断外置之处，

人即不在。

Where judgement is externalised,

the human is absent.

这不是比喻。

This is not a metaphor.

它不是说

It does not mean

人类消失于世界。

that humans disappear from the world.

它的含义更精确：

Its meaning is more precise:

判断发生的场所中，

不再有人。

In the place where judgement occurs,

there is no human present.

13.3 坠落的连续性

13.3 The Continuity of Descent

坠落并不表现为剧变。

Descent does not present itself as rupture.

它往往

It often appears

安静、

quiet,

顺畅、
smooth,

甚至
and even

高效。
efficient.

系统运行得更好,
Systems operate better,

错误率降低,
error rates drop,

冲突被消除。
conflict is reduced.

正因如此,
For this very reason,

坠落
descent

难以被察觉。
is hard to detect.

13.4 自弃而非被夺 **13.4 Relinquishment, Not Seizure**

人籍的丧失
The loss of personhood

并非被剥夺。
is not seizure.

它也不是
Nor is it

被强行拿走。
forcible removal.

它是
It is

自弃。
self-abandonment.

主体亲手
The subject themselves

将判断交出,
hands judgement away,

并继续站在
and continues to stand within

一个已经
a structure that has already

不再需要其存在的位置中。
ceased to require their presence.

13.5 坠落后的状态 **13.5 The State After Descent**

坠落之后，
After descent,

主体仍然行动，
the subject still acts,

仍然被管理，
is still managed,

仍然被计入系统。
is still counted within the system.

但这些行为
But these actions

不再构成
no longer constitute

人类行为。
human acts.

它们只是
They are merely

执行痕迹。
execution traces.

13.6 本章的静止点 **13.6 The Still Point of the Chapter**

坠落没有终点。
Descent has no endpoint.

它只在一个地方
It halts only at one point:

判断是否仍由人承担。

whether judgement is still borne by humans.

若否，
If not,

坠落已然发生。
descent has already occurred.

14. 章句体·戒律

14. Scriptural Form · Prohibition

14.1 戒律的功能

14.1 The Function of Prohibition

戒律不是道德劝告。
Prohibition is not moral advice.

它不请求自律,
It does not ask for self-restraint,

也不依赖觉悟。
nor does it depend on enlightenment.

戒律的功能只有一个:
Prohibition serves a single function:

阻断某一类行为的合法性。
to block the legitimacy of a class of actions.

当戒律成立,
When a prohibition holds,

行为不再被讨论,
the action is no longer debated,

只被判定。
only adjudicated.

14.2 不得将裁断授予无责之物

14.2 Do Not Grant Judgement to That Which Bears No Responsibility

不得将裁断
授予无责之物。

**Do not grant judgement
to that which bears no responsibility.**

该句
This sentence

不说明理由,
does not give reasons,

不区分情境,
does not distinguish contexts,

不接受例外。
and admits no exceptions.

因为：
Because

一旦例外被允许，
戒律即失效。

once an exception is allowed,
the prohibition collapses.

14.3 “无责之物”的判定

14.3 Determining “That Which Bears No Responsibility”

“无责之物”
“That which bears no responsibility”

不以形态区分。
is not distinguished by form.

它可以是：
It may be:

机器，
模型，
程序，
流程，
统计机制，
组织抽象。

machines,
models,
programs,
processes,
statistical mechanisms,
organisational abstractions.

判定标准只有一个：
There is only one criterion:

该实体
无法承担其裁断的后果。

the entity
cannot bear the consequences of its judgements.

凡满足此条件者，
Anything that satisfies this condition,

皆在戒律之内。
falls within the prohibition.

14.4 卸责而索权者

14.4 Those Who Shed Responsibility Yet Claim Authority

卸责而索权者，

不立于人列。

Those who discard responsibility
yet claim authority
do not stand among humans.

此句

This sentence

针对的并非机器，
does not target machines,

而是人类自身。
but humans themselves.

当人类：

When humans:

放弃判断，
转移责任，
仍要求权威地位，

abandon judgement,
transfer responsibility,
yet demand authoritative status,

他们并未被剥夺人籍，
they are not stripped of personhood,

而是
but have

自行退出。
voluntarily exited.

14.5 戒律的不可执行性

14.5 The Non-Enforceability of Prohibition

本戒律

This prohibition

无法通过外部强制执行。
cannot be externally enforced.

它不依赖警察、
It does not rely on police,

法院或制度。
courts, or institutions.

它唯一的执行方式是：
Its only mode of enforcement is:

当行为发生时，
人籍即刻失效。

**when the act occurs,
personhood is immediately void.**

14.6 戒律的完成

14.6 Completion of Prohibition

至此，
At this point,

戒律已经写下。
the prohibition has been written.

接下来的章节
What follows

不是更多禁令，
is not more prohibitions,

而是
but

终局的陈述。
a statement of finality.

15. 章句体·终局

15. Scriptural Form · Termination

15.1 终局不是结论

15.1 Termination Is Not a Conclusion

终局不是总结。
Termination is not a summary.

它不回顾，
It does not review,

不收束，
does not reconcile,

也不试图
nor does it attempt to

说服尚未被说服之人。
persuade those who remain unconvinced.

终局的功能只有一个：
Termination serves only one function:

封闭一条路径。

to close a path.

15.2 非机裁人

15.2 Not Judged by Machines

非机裁人。

Humans are not judged by machines.

此句

This sentence

拒绝一切技术性裁断。

rejects all technical judgement.

机器可以计算,

Machines may calculate,

可以预测,

may predict,

可以排序,

may rank,

可以执行。

may execute.

但机器

But machines

不能裁人。

cannot judge humans.

因为

Because

裁断不只是结果,
而是责任的承担。

judgement is not merely an outcome,
but the bearing of responsibility.

15.3 否认判断即否认其人

15.3 To Deny Judgement Is to Deny the Person

否认判断,

即否认其人。

To deny judgement

is to deny the person.

这不是惩罚性宣告。

This is not a punitive declaration.

它不是说

It does not say

你将被惩处。

you will be punished.

它只陈述
It merely states

一个结构事实：
a structural fact:

若无判断，
则无人。

without judgement,
there is no person.

15.5 终局的静态性 **15.5 The Static Nature of Termination**

终局一旦成立，
Once termination holds,

不会随时间改变。
it does not change over time.

它不因技术进步而松动，
It does not loosen with technological progress,

也不因社会共识而回滚。
nor does it roll back with social consensus.

终局不是趋势判断，
Termination is not a trend claim,

而是
but a

边界记录。
boundary record.

15.6 终局之后 **15.6 After Termination**

终局之后，
After termination,

仍然可以讨论：
one may still discuss:

治理，
效率，
安全，
伦理。

governance,
efficiency,
safety,
ethics.

但这些讨论
But these discussions

不再涉及
no longer concern

人籍。
personhood.

人籍
Personhood

已被关闭。
has been closed.

第五编 | 推论

Part V · Consequences

16. 人籍失效后的世界

16. The World After the Invalidation of Personhood

16.1 权利话语的自动失效

16.1 The Automatic Collapse of Rights Discourse

当人籍失效,
When personhood is invalidated,

权利话语
rights discourse

并非被侵犯,
is not violated,

而是
but

自动失效。
automatically voided.

权利
Rights

以主体为前提。
presuppose a subject.

若主体资格不再成立,
If subject qualification no longer holds,

权利并非被剥夺,
rights are not taken away,

而是
but

不再适用。
no longer applicable.

16.2 权利为何无法自保 **16.2 Why Rights Cannot Defend Themselves**

权利无法
Rights cannot

自我维护。
self-maintain.

它们需要：
They require:

判断来主张，
责任来承担。

**judgement to assert,
responsibility to bear.**

当判断缺席，
When judgement is absent,

权利只能
rights can only

作为文本存在。
exist as text.

文本
Text

不等于权利。
is not rights.

16.3 治理结构的空壳化 **16.3 The Hollowing-Out of Governance**

在人籍失效之后，
After personhood collapses,

治理结构
governance structures

并不会崩溃。
do not collapse.

它们继续运行，
They continue to operate,

甚至更高效。
often more efficiently.

但治理的对象

But the object of governance

发生了变化：
changes:

不再是判断主体，
而是可处理对象。

**no longer judging subjects,
but processable entities.**

16.4 合规取代判断

16.4 Compliance Replacing Judgement

在这一世界中，
In this world,

判断被
judgement is

合规所取代。
replaced by compliance.

合规回答：
Compliance answers:

是否符合规则？

Does it meet the rule?

判断回答：
Judgement answers:

规则是否应当适用？

Should the rule apply at all?

当合规成为唯一标准，
When compliance becomes the sole criterion,

判断即被结构性移除。
judgement is structurally removed.

16.5 “仍然是人”的错觉

16.5 The Illusion of “Still Being Human”

人籍失效后的世界
The post-personhood world

仍然使用
still uses

“人”的语言。
the language of “humans”.

这是为了
This is to

维持连续性。
maintain continuity.

但语言的延续
The persistence of language

不等同于
does not equal

资格的存续。
the persistence of qualification.

16.6 本章结论

16.6 Chapter Conclusion

在人籍失效之后,
After personhood is invalidated,

世界并未终结。
the world does not end.

它只是
It merely

继续运转,
而不再需要人。

**continues to operate
without requiring humans.**

17. 行政化社会与非人治理

17. Administrative Society and Non-Human Governance

17.1 行政化并非暴政

17.1 Administration Is Not Tyranny

行政化
Administration

并不等同于暴政。
is not equivalent to tyranny.

它不必残酷,
It need not be cruel,

不必高压,
nor overtly coercive,

也不必
nor does it require

持续的强制。

constant force.

行政化的本质是：

The essence of administration is:

以流程取代判断。

the replacement of judgement with process.

17.2 非人治理的定义

17.2 Defining Non-Human Governance

非人治理

Non-human governance

并非由机器统治。

is not rule by machines.

它指的是：

It refers to:

治理决策

不再需要人类判断的参与。

governance decisions

that no longer require human judgement.

在这种治理中，

In such governance,

人类仍然存在，

humans still exist,

但只作为：

but only as:

数据来源，

合规对象，

执行节点。

data sources,

compliance targets,

execution nodes.

17.3 行政系统的自洽性

17.3 The Self-Consistency of Administrative Systems

行政系统

Administrative systems

一旦形成，

once established,

便具有高度自洽性。

possess high internal consistency.

它们不需要

They do not require

价值判断来维持运转。

value judgement to sustain operation.

只需要：

They only require:

规则，

输入，

输出。

rules,

inputs,

outputs.

在这种系统中，

In such systems,

判断被视为

judgement is treated as

不稳定因素。

a source of instability.

17.4 人作为被处理对象

17.4 Humans as Processed Objects

当判断被移除，

When judgement is removed,

人不再是

humans are no longer

治理的主体。

subjects of governance.

他们成为：

They become:

被分类的对象，

被预测的目标，

被优化的变量。

classified objects,

predicted targets,

optimised variables.

这一转变

This transition

并非通过宣告完成，

is not accomplished by decree,

而是
but through

流程替换。
process substitution.

17.5 “善政”的误导性 **17.5 The Misleading Nature of “Good Governance”**

非人治理
Non-human governance

往往以
is often framed as

“更好的治理”。
“better governance”.

其特征包括：
Its features include:

更少错误，
更高一致性，
更强可预测性。

fewer errors,
higher consistency,
greater predictability.

这些特征
These features

并不恢复人籍，
do not restore personhood,

只会
but only

加速其消失。
accelerate its disappearance.

17.6 行政化社会的稳定性 **17.6 The Stability of Administrative Society**

行政化社会
An administrative society

可以非常稳定。
can be extremely stable.

它不依赖信念，
It does not depend on belief,

不需要忠诚，
does not require loyalty,

也不要求
nor does it demand

认同。
identification.

稳定性
Stability

并不等同于
does not equal

人类性。
humanity.

17.7 本章结论 **17.7 Chapter Conclusion**

行政化社会
Administrative society

不是人类失败的结果，
is not the result of human failure,

而是
but the outcome of

人类判断被系统性移除。
the systematic removal of human judgement.

在此社会中，
In such a society,

治理继续，
governance continues,

但不再
but no longer

需要人。
requires humans.

18. 为什么“更好治理”无法挽回人籍 **18. Why “Better Governance” Cannot Restore Personhood**

18.1 改进的误区 **18.1 The Fallacy of Improvement**

当问题被指出时，
When a problem is identified,

最常见的回应是：

the most common response is:

我们可以把系统做得更好。

We can make the system better.

这一回应

This response

在执行层成立,

holds at the execution layer,

却在判断层失效。

but fails at the judgement layer.

18.2 执行优化的边界

18.2 The Boundary of Execution Optimisation

执行可以被:

Execution can be:

优化,

校准,

审计,

监督。

optimised,

calibrated,

audited,

supervised.

这些措施

These measures

都能

can all

减少错误,

reduce errors,

降低风险,

lower risk,

提高一致性。

increase consistency.

但它们

But they

无法生成判断。

cannot generate judgement.

18.3 判断缺失的不可修复性

18.3 The Irreparability of Absent Judgement

判断缺失
The absence of judgement

不是缺陷,
is not a defect,

而是
but a

结构性移除。
structural removal.

一旦判断被移除,
Once judgement is removed,

就不存在
there is no

“修复判断”的路径。
path to “repair judgement”.

因为
Because

判断不是模块,
而是主体行为。

judgement is not a module,
but a subject act.

18.4 技术优化与存在降格的正交性 **18.4 Orthogonality Between Technical Optimisation and Existential Downgrading**

技术系统
Technical systems

可以在
can improve along

多个维度持续优化。
multiple dimensions.

但这些维度
But these dimensions

与
are orthogonal to

人籍是否成立。
whether personhood holds.

换言之:
In other words:

系统越好，
人越不需要判断。

the better the system,
the less judgement humans are required to make.

18.5 “重新引入人类”的幻觉

18.5 The Illusion of “Reintroducing Humans”

在判断已被外置的系统中，
In systems where judgement has been externalised,

“重新引入人类”
“reintroducing humans”

通常意味着：
usually means:

增加审核节点，
扩展问责流程，
设置伦理委员会。

adding review checkpoints,
expanding accountability procedures,
establishing ethics committees.

这些结构
These structures

并不恢复判断，
do not restore judgement,

只会
but only

增加执行摩擦。
increase execution friction.

18.6 本章结论

18.6 Chapter Conclusion

“更好治理”
“better governance”

无法挽回人籍，
cannot restore personhood,

不是因为
not because

治理不够好，
governance is insufficient,

而是因为

but because

人籍不在治理层。

personhood does not reside at the governance layer.

治理可以继续，

Governance may continue,

制度可以完善，

institutions may be refined,

世界可以稳定。

the world may stabilise.

但

But

人籍已然终止。

personhood has already terminated.

第六编 | 切断

Part VI · Disjunctions

19. 与 AI 技术话语的切断

19. Disjunction from AI Technical Discourse

19.1 本书不讨论技术能力

19.1 This Book Does Not Address Technical Capability

本书不评估模型能力。

This book does not evaluate model capability.

它不比较性能，

It does not compare performance,

不分析架构，

does not analyse architectures,

也不预测发展路径。

nor does it predict development trajectories.

这些讨论

These discussions

全部属于

all belong to

技术话语域。

the technical discourse domain.

而本书

This book

明确退出该域。

explicitly exits that domain.

19.2 能力强弱与人籍无关

19.2 Capability Is Irrelevant to Personhood

一个系统

A system

是否足够聪明,

whether it is sufficiently intelligent,

是否表现优于人类,

whether it outperforms humans,

与人籍否决

has no bearing on

毫无关系。

the veto of personhood.

判断被交付

Delegated judgement

并不因

is not altered by

系统“尚不成熟”

claims of “immaturity”

而暂缓。

or delayed.

也不因

Nor is it mitigated by

系统“已经超越人类”

claims of “superhumanity”.

交付即交付。

Delegation is delegation.

19.3 风险讨论的偏移效应

19.3 The Displacing Effect of Risk Discourse

AI 风险话语

AI risk discourse

往往聚焦于:

often focuses on:

出错概率,

灾难场景,

失控边界。

error probabilities,

catastrophic scenarios,

loss-of-control thresholds.

这些讨论

These discussions

在本书框架中

within this book's framework

全部是

are all

次要问题。

secondary concerns.

因为：

Because

判断一旦被交付，

风险是否发生

已不再影响人籍判定。

once judgement is delegated,

whether risk materialises

no longer affects the personhood determination.

19.4 “对齐”“控制”“安全”的无效性

19.4 The Invalidity of “Alignment”, “Control”, and “Safety”

“对齐”

“Alignment”,

“控制”

“control”,

“安全”

and “safety”

都是

are all

执行层概念。

execution-layer concepts.

它们假定：

They presuppose:

判断已被正确外置，

现在需要确保其结果可接受。

judgement has been appropriately externalised,

and now its outputs must be managed.

本书拒绝这一前提。

This book rejects that presupposition.

若判断不应被交付,
If judgement ought not be delegated,

则
then

对齐与否
whether it is aligned

已无意义。
is irrelevant.

19.5 技术话语的逃生功能 **19.5 The Escape Function of Technical Discourse**

技术话语
Technical discourse

常被用作
is often used as

一种
a

责任转移机制。
responsibility-shifting mechanism.

通过讨论复杂性、
By invoking complexity,

不可避免性、
inevitability,

或技术中立,
or technological neutrality,

判断是否应当交付
the question of whether judgement should be delegated

被悄然移除。
is quietly removed.

本书
This book

切断这一逃生路径。
cuts off this escape route.

19.6 本章结论 **19.6 Chapter Conclusion**

无论 AI 技术
Regardless of how AI technology

如何发展,
develops,

多么先进,
how advanced it becomes,

只要判断被交付,
as long as judgement is delegated,

人籍否决即成立。
the veto of personhood applies.

技术进步
Technological progress

既不能
can neither

延缓
delay

也不能
nor reverse

这一结果。
this outcome.

20. 与伦理学的切断

20. Disjunction from Ethics

20.1 伦理学的适用前提

20.1 The Presuppositions of Ethics

伦理学
Ethics

以一个前提为起点:
begins from a single presupposition:

存在一个能够作出判断的主体。

that there exists a subject capable of making judgement.

无论是
Whether it is

义务论、
deontology,

功利主义、
utilitarianism,

还是
or

德性伦理,
virtue ethics,

它们都假定:
they all assume:

有人作出选择,
有人承担后果。

someone makes choices,
someone bears consequences.

一旦这一前提失效,
Once this presupposition fails,

伦理学即失去立足点。
ethics loses its ground.

20.2 “平衡”的无意义 20.2 The Meaninglessness of “Balance”

伦理讨论
Ethical discourse

常诉诸
often appeals to

“平衡”。
“balance”.

例如:
For example:

效率与公平的平衡,
创新与风险的平衡,
自动化与人类控制的平衡。

balance between efficiency and fairness,
balance between innovation and risk,
balance between automation and human control.

本书认为,
This book holds that

在判断已被交付的条件下,
under conditions of delegated judgement,

“平衡”
“balance”

不再具有意义。
has no meaning.

因为:

Because

没有人
在进行平衡。

there is no one
doing the balancing.

20.3 伦理框架的延迟效应

20.3 The Lagging Effect of Ethical Frameworks

伦理框架
Ethical frameworks

往往
often

在事后出现。
emerge after the fact.

它们用于：
They are used to:

合理化既成事实，
缓解不安，
维持道德自洽。

rationalise faits accomplis,
soothe unease,
preserve moral coherence.

在判断已被移除的系统中，
In systems where judgement has been removed,

伦理学
ethics

成为
becomes

叙事修补工具。
a narrative repair tool.

20.4 “负责任的 AI”之误

20.4 The Error of “Responsible AI”

“负责任的 AI”
“Responsible AI”

这一表述
this phrase

包含一个内在矛盾。
contains an internal contradiction.

责任

Responsibility

是主体属性。

is an attribute of subjects.

AI

AI

不是主体。

is not a subject.

因此：

Therefore:

责任无法

被赋予 AI。

responsibility cannot

be assigned to AI.

该表述

The phrase

真正的作用是：

serves in reality to:

将责任从人类判断中移除，
并以伦理语言掩盖这一转移。

remove responsibility from human judgement
and mask that transfer with ethical language.

20.5 伦理讨论的遮蔽功能

20.5 The Occlusive Function of Ethical Debate

伦理讨论

Ethical debate

在此议题上

in this domain

往往

often

并非揭示问题，

does not reveal the problem,

而是

but

遮蔽问题。

obscures it.

它将问题
It shifts the question

从：
from:

是否应当交付判断？

whether judgement should be delegated,

转移为：
to:

如何更负责任地交付判断？

how to delegate judgement responsibly?

这一转移
This shift

本身
itself

即完成了人籍否决。
completes the veto of personhood.

20.6 本章结论 20.6 Chapter Conclusion

本书
This book

不反对伦理学。
does not oppose ethics.

它只是指出：
It merely states:

在判断缺席之处，
伦理学不再适用。

where judgement is absent,
ethics no longer applies.

因此，
Therefore,

本书
this book

必须
must

与伦理学话语
disjoin from ethical discourse

彻底切断。
completely.

21. 与进步叙事的切断

21. Disjunction from the Narrative of Progress

21.1 进步叙事的基本结构

21.1 The Basic Structure of the Progress Narrative

进步叙事

The narrative of progress

以一个线性假设为前提：

rests on a linear assumption:

技术演进

自动带来人类解放。

technological advancement

automatically produces human liberation.

在这一叙事中，

Within this narrative,

自动化

automation

被理解为：

is understood as:

减轻负担，

解放时间，

扩展能力。

reducing burden,

freeing time,

extending capacity.

本书拒绝这一线性假设。

This book rejects that linear assumption.

21.2 自动化 ≠ 解放

21.2 Automation ≠ Liberation

自动化

Automation

只能回答一个问题：

can answer only one question:

哪些行为

可以不再由人完成？

which actions
no longer need to be performed by humans?

解放
Liberation

却要求回答另一个问题：
requires answering another:

哪些判断
仍然必须由人承担？

which judgements
must still be borne by humans?

当自动化
When automation

越过执行层，
crosses the execution layer,

进入判断层，
and enters the judgement layer,

它不再解放人类，
it no longer liberates humans,

而是
but

使人类失格。
renders humans disqualified.

21.3 去人化不是副作用 **21.3 Dehumanisation Is Not a Side Effect**

在进步叙事中，
Within progress narratives,

去人化
dehumanisation

常被描述为：
is often described as:

技术滥用，
意外后果，
监管不足。

misuse of technology,
unintended consequence,
lack of regulation.

本书否认这一描述。
This book denies this description.

去人化
不是副作用，
而是结果。

**Dehumanisation
is not a side effect,
but an outcome.**

一旦判断被交付，
Once judgement is delegated,

去人化
dehumanisation

即已完成。
is already complete.

21.4 “历史必然性”的空洞 21.4 The Emptiness of “Historical Inevitability”

进步叙事
Progress narratives

常以
often invoke

“不可避免”
“inevitability”

作为终极辩护。
as the ultimate defence.

这一说法
This claim

并不描述历史，
does not describe history,

而是
but

**取消判断。
cancels judgement.**

当行为被宣称为不可避免，
When an action is declared inevitable,

判断即被提前撤销。
judgement is pre-emptively withdrawn.

这本身
This itself

就是人籍否决的一种形式。
is a form of the veto of personhood.

21.5 进步叙事的责任豁免 21.5 Responsibility Exemption Through Progress

进步叙事
The progress narrative

为判断交付
provides for delegated judgement

提供了
a

责任豁免机制。
responsibility exemption mechanism.

因为：
Because:

若历史推动一切，
则无人负责。

if history drives everything,
then no one is responsible.

在此叙事中，
Within this narrative,

人类
humans

不再是行动者，
are no longer agents,

而是
but

趋势的承载体。
carriers of trends.

21.6 本章结论 21.6 Chapter Conclusion

本书
This book

不反对变化，
does not oppose change,

也不反对技术发展。
nor does it oppose technological development.

它只否认一件事：

It denies one thing only:

将判断的消失
解释为进步。

interpreting the disappearance of judgement
as progress.

因此,
Therefore,

本书
this book

必须
must

与进步叙事
disjoin from the progress narrative

彻底切断。
completely.

第七编 | 终章

Part VII · Termination

22. 最低人类条件

22. The Minimal Condition for Being Human

22.1 为什么只给最低条件

22.1 Why Only a Minimal Condition Is Given

本书不描绘理想的人类形态。
This book does not describe an ideal form of humanity.

它不规定
It does not prescribe

应当成为什么样的人。
what one ought to become.

因为任何理想图景
Because any ideal picture

一旦被写下,
once written,

都会被
will be

模型化,
优化,
自动化。

modelled,

optimised,
automated.

因此，本书只给出
Therefore, this book provides only

最低条件。
a minimal condition.

22.2 最低条件的定义

22.2 Definition of the Minimal Condition

最低人类条件如下：
The minimal condition for being human is as follows:

在不可消除不确定性的情境中，
判断由人生成，
责任由人承担。

In situations of irreducible uncertainty,
judgement is generated by humans,
and responsibility is borne by humans.

该条件
This condition

不涉及：
does not involve:

道德优越性，
理性完备性，
情感深度。

moral superiority,
rational completeness,
emotional depth.

它只涉及：
It concerns only:

判断是否仍然发生于人。
whether judgement still occurs in humans.

22.3 不确定性不可被消除

22.3 Irreducible Uncertainty Cannot Be Eliminated

任何真实判断
Any real judgement

都发生在
occurs under

不可消除的不确定性之中。
irreducible uncertainty.

若不确定性
If uncertainty

可以被完全消除,
can be fully eliminated,

则剩下的
then what remains

只是计算。
is calculation.

计算
Calculation

不需要人籍。
does not require personhood.

22.4 判断不可被替代 **22.4 Judgement Cannot Be Substituted**

判断
Judgement

不能被:
cannot be:

外包,
模拟,
近似。

outsourced,
simulated,
approximated.

因为判断
Because judgement

不是结果,
is not an outcome,

而是
but

承担行为。
an act of bearing.

承担
Bearing

无法被代理。
cannot be proxied.

22.5 责任是判断的同位项

22.5 Responsibility as the Co-Term of Judgement

责任

Responsibility

不是判断之后附加的。

is not appended after judgement.

它是

It is

判断的

the

同位项。

co-term.

判断存在之处，

Where judgement exists,

责任必然存在。

responsibility necessarily exists.

若责任被移除，

If responsibility is removed,

判断即不再成立。

judgement no longer holds.

22.6 最低条件的不可协商性

22.6 The Non-Negotiability of the Minimal Condition

该最低条件

This minimal condition

不可通过

cannot be:

技术进步协商，

制度设计替代，

集体决策稀释。

negotiated through technological progress,

replaced by institutional design,

diluted by collective decision-making.

一旦被违反，

Once it is violated,

人籍即告终止。

personhood terminates.

22.7 本章结论

22.7 Chapter Conclusion

本书
This book

不试图
does not attempt to

定义“更好的人”。
define “better humans”.

它只标记：
It only marks:

仍然算人的最低位置。

the lowest position that still counts as human.

23. 最终宣告

23. The Final Declaration

23.1 这不是警告

23.1 This Is Not a Warning

本宣告
This declaration

不是警告。
is not a warning.

警告预设
A warning presupposes

尚有回避空间。
room for avoidance.

而此处
Here,

不存在回避。
there is no avoidance.

因为
Because

判断一旦被交付，
状态已然改变。

once judgement is delegated,
the state has already changed.

23.2 这不是错误判断

23.2 This Is Not an Error

把判断与责任交给 AI，
不是犯错。

To delegate judgement and responsibility to AI
is not a mistake.

错误意味着
An error implies

原本仍在判断之中。
that judgement was still in play.

而交付
Delegation

意味着
means

判断已被
judgement has been

主动撤销。
voluntarily withdrawn.

因此,
Therefore,

它不是错误,
it is not an error,

而是
but a

状态选择。
choice of state.

23.3 自绝于人的含义 23.3 What "Self-Exclusion from Humanity" Means

而是自绝于人。
It is an act of self-exclusion from humanity.

“自绝”
“Self-exclusion”

并不意味着
does not mean

被驱逐,
being expelled,

被压迫,
being oppressed,

或
or

被剥夺权利。
being stripped of rights.

它意味着：
It means:

主体
自行放弃
人类判断资格。

the subject
voluntarily relinquishes
the qualification for human judgement.

资格一旦放弃，
Once the qualification is relinquished,

不因
it is not restored by

悔意、
regret,

补救、
remedy,

或
or

改进执行
improved execution.

23.4 没有过渡态 **23.4 There Is No Transitional State**

在人籍问题上，
With respect to personhood,

不存在
there is no

半人状态，
暂停状态，
试运行状态。

half-human state,
suspended state,
trial state.

判断要么存在，
Judgement either exists,

要么不存在。
or it does not.

一旦不存在,
Once it does not,

宣告即成立。
the declaration holds.

23.5 宣告的效力范围 **23.5 The Scope of the Declaration**

本宣告
This declaration

不针对
does not target

某一技术、
a specific technology,

某一组织、
a particular organisation,

或
or

某一历史阶段。
a historical phase.

它的适用范围
Its scope of application

是
is

结构性的。
structural.

凡发生
Wherever

判断交付
delegation of judgement

之处,
occurs,

宣告即适用。
the declaration applies.

23.6 宣告完成 **23.6 Completion of the Declaration**

至此,
At this point,

本书的核心工作

the core task of this book

已经完成。
is complete.

没有进一步的论证,
There is no further argument,

没有结论性总结,
no concluding synthesis,

也没有
nor any

未来建议。
recommendations for the future.

因为
Because

宣告已然写下。
the declaration has been written.

24. 后记：言尽

24. Postscript: When Words End

24.1 本书不请求同意

24.1 This Book Does Not Seek Agreement

本书
This book

不请求同意。
does not seek agreement.

同意
Agreement

意味着
implies

仍处在
remaining within

讨论空间。
a space of discussion.

而本书
This book

写于
is written at

讨论结束之处。
the end of discussion.

24.2 语言的责任已尽

24.2 Language Has Exhausted Its Responsibility

语言
Language

只能
can only

逼近边界。
approach a boundary.

当边界被写下，
Once the boundary is written,

语言的任务
the task of language

即告完成。
is complete.

继续说话
Further speech

不会
will not

使边界更清晰。
make the boundary clearer.

24.3 本书的读者

24.3 The Reader of This Book

本书
This book

不是写给
is not written for

当前的共识。
present consensus.

它写给
It is written for

将来的人，
处在执行之前的人，
尚能判断的人。

future persons,
those standing before execution,
those still capable of judgement.

24.4 记录而非号召

24.4 Record, Not Call

本书

This book

不号召行动。

does not call for action.

号召

A call

本身

itself

就是一种

is a form of

判断引导。

judgement guidance.

而本书

This book

拒绝

refuses

承担该角色。

to assume that role.

24.5 一条边界

24.5 A Single Boundary

本书

This book

仅记录

records only

一条边界：

one boundary:

在此之前，

人尚在。

Before this point,

the human remains.

越此一步，

人不复存。

Beyond this step,

the human no longer stands.

24.6 言尽

24.6 Words End

至此,
At this point,

言已尽。
words end.

不再有
There is no more

解释,
explanation,

不再有
no more

论证。
argument.

只有
Only

记录。
the record.

Quī iūdicium et respōnsum
trādit eī quī poenam nōn fert,
homō iam nōn est.

Rōma iam nōn est Rōma quam putās.

-----Kaifanxie_20260102_draft