


Row Level Security

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How RLS should work (1/2)





How RLS should work (2/2)



SELECT * FROM drink NATURAL JOIN drink_order

 $shop_id = 100$

id	name	price	shop_id	quantum	data
10	'water'	100	100	8	2013-02-16
30	'juice'	180	100	10	2013-02-18

id	name	price			
10	'water'	100			
20	'coke'	120			
30	'juice'	180			
40	'sprite'	120			
50	'beer'	240			
60	`sake'	350			
table: drink					

Security Policy $shop_id_U = shop_id_T$

id	shop_id	quantum	date				
10	100	8	2013-02-16				
20	200	5	2013-02-17				
10	200	6	2013-02-18				
30	100	10	2013-02-18				
table: drink_order							



→ WHERE is simple solution?

```
postgres=> CREATE VIEW soft drink AS
     SELECT * FROM drink WHERE price < 200;
CREATE VIEW
postgres=> GRANT SELECT ON soft drink TO public;
GRANT
postgres=> SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION bob;
SET
postgres=> SELECT * FROM soft drink;
 id | name | price
 10 | water | 100
 20 | coke | 120
 30 | juice | 180
 40 | sprite | 120
(4 rows)
postgres=> SELECT * FROM drink;
ERROR: permission denied for relation drink
```



Nightmare of Leaky View (1/3)

```
postgres=> SELECT * FROM soft drink WHERE f leak(name);
NOTICE: f leak => water
NOTICE: f leak => coke
NOTICE: f leak => juice
NOTICE: f leak => sprite
NOTICE: f leak => beer
NOTICE: f leak => sake
 id | name | price
 10 | water | 100
 20 | coke | 120
 30 | juice | 180
 40 | sprite | 120
(4 rows)
```



Nightmare of Leaky View (2/3)

```
postgres=> CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION f leak (text)
  RETURNS bool COST 0.00001 AS
  $$
  BEGIN
  RAISE NOTICE 'f leak => %', $1;
 RETURN true;
  END
  $$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION
postgres=> EXPLAIN(costs off)
  SELECT * FROM soft drink WHERE f leak(name);
                 OUERY PLAN
 Seq Scan on drink
   Filter: (f leak(name) AND (price < 200))
(2 rows)
                  f_leak() のコストは '<' 演算子より小さい
```



Nightmare of Leaky View (3/3)

```
postgres=> CREATE VIEW v both AS
   SELECT * FROM t left JOIN t right ON a = x
   WHERE b like '%hoge%';
CREATE VIEW
postgres=> EXPLAIN (COSTS OFF)
   SELECT * FROM v both WHERE f leak(y);
                 OUERY PLAN
Hash Join
   Hash Cond: (t left.x = t right.a)
   -> Seq Scan on t left
                                    f_leak()の実行は、
         Filter: f leak(y)
                                    t_left だけに依存
   -> Hash
         -> Seq Scan on t right
               Filter: (b ~~ '%hoge%'::text)
(7 rows)
```



Problem to be tackled

- 問題の本質は、クエリ最適化が条件句を 評価する順序を入れ替えてしまう事。
- 少なくともセキュリティ目的のビューなら、 サブクエリの境界を跨いで条件句を移動させては ならない。



Security Barrier (1/3)





Security Barrier (2/3)

```
postgres=> CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW soft drink
            WITH (security barrier)
            AS SELECT * FROM drink WHERE price < 200;
CREATE VIEW
postgres=> SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION bob;
SET
postgres=> SELECT * FROM soft drink WHERE f leak(name);
NOTICE: f leak => water
NOTICE: f leak => coke
NOTICE: f leak => juice
NOTICE: f leak => sprite
 id | name | price
 ___+_
 10 | water | 100
 20 | coke | 120
 30 | juice | 180
 40 | sprite | 120
(4 rows)
```



Security Barrier (3/3)

- CREATE VIEW ... WITH (security_barrier) AS ...
- security_barrier属性を持つVIEWの内側へは、 条件句を push-down させない。
 - 利用者が意図した通りの順序で条件句が評価される
 - 代償として、最適な実行性能は得られなくなる



Security-performance trade off

```
postgres=> CREATE VIEW my team WITH (security barrier)
    AS SELECT * FROM employee WHERE boss = current user;
CREATE VIEW
postgres=> EXPLAIN (costs off)
           SELECT * FROM my team WHERE id = 100;
                OUERY PLAN
 Subquery Scan on my team
   Filter: (my team.id = 100)
   -> Seg Scan on employee
         Filter: (boss = "current user"())
(4 rows)
```

- id = 100 を使ってインデックススキャンができるはず
- だが、security_barrier属性のために、先にemployeeを 全件スキャン → その後で id = 100 を評価



Leakproof Function (1/3)





Leakproof Function (2/3)

- 副作用の無い (= 間違いなく安全な) 関数なら、 security_barrierビューの内側に押し込んでも大丈夫
 - → それを示すのが、LEAKPROOF 属性

```
postgres=# CREATE FUNCTION nabeatsu(integer)
           RETURNS bool LEAKPROOF AS
$$
BEGIN
  IF ($1 % 3 = 0) THEN RETURN true; END IF;
  WHILE $1 > 0 LOOP
    IF ($1 % 10 = 3) THEN RETURN true; END IF;
    $1 = $1 / 10;
  END LOOP;
RETURN false;
END
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
CREATE FUNCTION
```



Leakproof Function (3/3)

- デフォルトLEAKPROOFなビルトイン関数もある
 - integer対integer の 等価演算子など



In case of Oracle

```
Id | Operation
                | Name | Rows | Bytes |
                                    3 | 81
   0 | SELECT STATEMENT
                                    3 | 81
  1 | VIEW
  2 | HASH JOIN
                                    3 | 120
  3 | TABLE ACCESS FULL| B
                                    3 | 60
   4 | TABLE ACCESS FULL | A
                                    4 | 80
Predicate Information (identified by operation id):
  1 - filter("F LEAK"("X")=1) <== This is correct
  2 - access("A"."ID"="B"."ID")
  3 - filter("B"."Y"<>'bbb')
```



Toward v9.3, Beyond v9.3

- Feature list in v9.2
 - VIEWのsecurity_barrier属性
 - FUNCTIONのleakproof属性
- Feature list in v9.3(?)
 - ALTER TABLE ... SET ROW SECURITY (...)
- Feature list in v9.4(???)
 - Writer side checks
 - Security label column
 - Label based mandatory row-level access control



Syntax of Row-level Security (1/2)

```
ALTER <table_name>
    SET ROW SECURITY FOR <cmd>
    TO (<expression>);
<cmd>:= ALL | SELECT | INSERT | UPDATE | DELETE
```

- <cmd>で指定したDML構文の実行時に、<expression>で 指定した条件句(セキュリティポリシー)が付加される。
- クエリの条件句よりも、セキュリティポリシーが先に評価される。



Syntax of Row-level Security (2/2)

```
ALTER t SET ROW SECURITY FOR ALL

TO (owner = current_user);
```

```
SELECT * FROM t WHERE f_leak(x);

security_barrier
付きサブクエリ
SELECT * FROM (
SELECT * FROM t WHERE owner = current_user
) t WHERE f_leak(x)
```

- テーブルへの参照 → 条件句付きテーブルスキャンを 含むサブクエリ (with security_barrier) に置き換える。
- superuser の場合には適用されない。
 - ビルトインRLSの場合。extensionが勝手に付けるのは自由。



How does RLS work? (1/2)

```
postgres=> ALTER TABLE t
        SET ROW SECURITY FOR ALL TO (owner = current user);
ALTER TABLE
postgres=> EXPLAIN (costs off)
           SELECT * FROM t WHERE f leak(b) AND a > 0;
                   OUERY PLAN
 Subquery Scan on t
   Filter: f leak(t.b)
   -> Index Scan using my table pkey on t t 1
         Index Cond: (owner = "current user"())
         Filter: (a > 0)
(5 rows)
```

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How does RLS work? (2/2)



Table Update and RLS (1/2)








Table Update and RLS (2/2)





Future development (1/2)

- SQLコマンド毎に異なるセキュリティポリシーの設定
- INSERT/UPDATEの直前にもチェックを入れる
 - TargetListを計算した結果、それはPolicy Violationな値かもしれない!!





Future development (2/2)

- Labal-based Row-level Security
 - 要は、SE-PostgreSQLの行レベルアクセス制御対応
- 実現に向けたプロセス
 - Row-level Security基本機能
 - INSERT/UPDATE直前のチェック機能
 - Security Label用の列を自動的に追加する機能
 - 要素の動的追加が可能な Enum 型
 - ↑ これらを全部活用して contrib/sepgsql の機能拡張♡



Any Questions?