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Foreign Aid Effect on Statehood: The Case of Mozambique

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Introduction

Foreign aid, more specifically Official Development Aid (ODA), is aimed at improving the lives of people by encouraging states to develop; despite this, many critics have accused it of doing the opposite, of suppressing native populations and creating aid dependence. African nations have long been used as an example of the inefficiency of foreign aid: many scholars believe that it impedes on economic growth, encourages corruption, and creates financial dependence on Western countries (Moyo, 2009). In this way, the discourse on aid has been very divisive, with vast amounts of literature inspecting the effectiveness of aid, the variables that influence the capacity of a state to receive aid, how motivations of aid encourage certain outcomes, and what specific environments can lead to foreign aid failure. In this essay, I will be examining foreign aid in Africa by answering the research question, "Does foreign aid encourage statehood, or does it lead to state failure? The case of Mozambique." Using statehood as a measurement for foreign aid utility runs into issues of being Eurocentric and highly dependent on Western conceptions of state success. For this reason, first, I will be clarifying what definition of statehood is appropriate when examining foreign aid effectiveness by utilizing postcolonial and dependence theory to create a framework that complicates Westphalian binary conceptions of the state. Next, I connect foreign aid and statehood by introducing three parameters that can be applied when investigating the extent of foreign aid success (security, legitimacy, and state capacity), and explain why employing these metrics are an alternative to simply accepting a failed statehood narrative. Lastly, I apply the foreign aid responses to these three categories to the case of Mozambique, which is widely seen as one of the most successful studies of ODA, to exemplify the value that foreign aid can bring to a nation when under the right conditions.

Defining the State

There are multiple conceptions of the state that seeks to define the parameters of statehood. The Gramscian perception of the state highlights a hegemonic complex system of activities that the ruling class utilizes to maintain its dominance over those ruled (Gramsci, 1971: 71). The Hobbesian definition of the state maintains that there is a contract between the individuals and the sovereign who owes his authority to those he governs, and therefore must protect their interests (Schmitt, 1996). Similarly, the Weberian state, often the most pervasive definition of empirical statehood in international relations, describes it as a "human community that claims monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a

given territory," (Weber, 1947: 154). In contrast, the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States describes the state in juridical terms, positing that the state is a legal person within the international law system, characterized by a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government, and independence (Brownlie, 1966).

These definitions of the state, though expansive in scope, are weak in their applications. Weber's definition that emphasizes a "monopoly of force" is not applicable to many African states that cannot claim to have this power over all their territory (Rosberg & Jackson, 1982: 3). Though they can claim to have de jure statehood, they do not have de facto control over their citizens, with internal divisions being along lines of language, religion, and tribe (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982: 4). Additionally, the Montevideo Convention on Rights emphasizes stable communities and administrative and legal efficiency within the government. These aspects of the state are not always possible in African regions where internal ethnic conflict affects control over citizens, and autocratic control, rather than legislation, is often the norm (Rosberg & Jackson 1982, 8). This juridical characterization of the state also does not recognize that a state can be independent and still be subservient to international organizations – legal independence is not equal to military or political independence (Jackson, 1991: 128). Lastly, the Gramscian and Hobbesian framework of the state, one that emphasizes a dominant sovereign that provides security and social services, originates in a Eurocentric historical genesis (Wai 2012, 30). This Westphalian sovereignty legitimates structures of enduring colonial authority over territories that were previously ruled by tribal leaders and regional powers (Camilleri & Falk 1992). Hence, these definitions of the state are too narrow to be applicable to African statehood.

Scholars may be tempted to then introduce the notion of "failed statehood" to describe African states that do not abide by the European state model. However, state failure is an inappropriate metric because it suggests that an underdeveloped state has arrived in its final form. It is an especially ineffective explanation when state-formation and capacity has not even occurred in the first place, as is the case with many African polities (Di John, 2010: 11). In addition, many Western nations will use the term "failed state" to legitimize intervention in places that would be beneficial to their interests (Call, 2010: 304). African states principally will be described as failed not in what they are but in contrast to what they are not when put against the backdrop of Western nations (Hill 2005). Many proponents of the African state failure narrative will perceive them as fixed institutions rather than evolving entities. Moreover, not only do they assume that states are meant to

work towards a liberal democracy, and that being integrated into global institutions is the only indication of legitimacy, but the very concept of state failure serves to further Western political and developmental dependency interests.

Statehood Framework

If not the concept of state failure or Eurocentric definitions of statehood, what framework should be used when looking at the efficacy of African statehood? Some scholars challenge the idea that state failure means anarchy by encouraging a less binary perspective to state formation and disintegration in Africa (Hagmann & Peclard 2010). This alternative approach would be less normative in its parameters, acknowledging that states are historical developments that span from pre-colonial to postcolonial periods; they are outgrowths of historically African methods of governance (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010: 543). African states are not narrow vacuums of power but include a vast expanse of state and non-state actors. These actors must legitimize their authority: in this way, state-building is an accumulation of legitimacy that incorporates relational power between the governing and the governed (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010: 543).

Indeed, it should not be assumed that there is a clear-cut dichotomy between the state and society; rather, the boundary of the state is dynamic, constantly being redefined by the actors involved. Nonetheless, there are still recurring metrics that can be used to examine statehood. Firstly, security provision, or the ability of a state to protect its citizens and maintain political order, is a variable that indeed, may align with the traditionally Weberian 'monopoly of force', but is also an important indicator that can measure an increase in armed movements, a notable uptick in vigilantes, and a growth in private security or criminal gangs that are responding to these public risks (Mehler, 2004: 540). In states that lack the necessary levels of security against armed groups, especially in war-torn societies, it is important for actors to address armed insurgents, the concerns of citizens, and evade the insecurity and distrust that is often fostered post-war (Call, 2010: 304). Successful foreign aid actors would be able to resolve this tension between social groups, rebuild tolerance, and negotiate settlements through peace agreements to encourage tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

A second way actors can control the boundary of the state is legitimacy. A legitimacy gap occurs when a large portion of a territory does not accept the rule of law, the exercise of power, or the economic structure of a nation (Hurd, 1999: 390). Legitimacy is a difficult

category to be measured and is sometimes Eurocentric in its conception, especially when it is equated to how much democracy or liberalization a nation experiences (Call, 2010: 314). However, legitimacy is a cornerstone resource for effective governance, notably in areas of limited statehood, because diffuse support for these institutions guarantees voluntary cooperation by the people and serves as a "functional equivalent for enforcement capacities" (Risse & Stollenwerk 2018, 404). In other words, legitimacy ensures that those who are ruled are done so in acts of consent rather than coercion. It should be acknowledged that Western states have different concepts of legitimacy: many African states possess 'hybrid' political orders in which liberal democracies coexist with officials who were nominated through patronage or kin affiliation (OECD 2010, 18). In this way, many of these states are formulated around pre-existing structures that were modified by colonization, resulting in authoritarian bureaucracies that lack legitimate social contracts between the state and society (Englebert 2000, 8). However, within these non-Western structures, there are still concepts of legitimacy that define state-society relations.

The institutional capacity of the state, to carry out the minimum provision of goods, is the last way that these actors can contribute to the formation of states in Africa. Here, I choose to combine state capacity, or the extent to which institutions can provide certain basic needs, and the administrative capabilities of institutions in arbiting this power (Call, 2010: 306). This runs the risk of falling into a Eurocentric framework and becoming highly variable because the needs of certain nations (public health, defense, or rule of law) might not translate to the needs of, for example, fundamentalist religious regimes who expect the state to exercise power over home life (Call, 2010: 308). Additionally, imposing a Weberian framework as the state model through institutional metrics of success is universalist and imposes the notion that a non-Western conceptualized state is less functional and anarchical (Ignatieff 2002, 14). However, if we are to approach the efficacy of institutions by how well they serve the needs of citizens whilst acknowledging the political and historical contexts of which they function, we can constructively apply measurements that do not adhere to Western standards of institutional strength.

Foreign Aid & Theory

The actors that will be administering these variables will be the foreign aid actors, often referred to as "foreign assistance" or Official Developmental Assistance (ODA), with the official institutions being comprised of the Development Assistance Committee or the

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (DAC/OECD). This definition of foreign aid examines aid as a gift, or an extension of resources with the intention of developing a nation without obligation in return (Kapoor 2008, 30). Foreign aid is often seen together with dependency; aid not only creates a power dynamic between a Western donor country and its recipient, but also designs a system of subservience to this aid to meet a shortage in capital (Panjak, 2005: 104). Indeed, the origins of underdevelopment has been attributed to the capitalist structures that allow resources to flow from a poor "periphery" to a "core" of wealthy nations (Frank 1966). Though dependency theory acknowledges how underdeveloped countries have come to rely on wealthier countries for "survival", a postcolonial critique of this theory identifies a shortcoming in its construction based on binary opposites, one that is too concentrated on a developed vs underdeveloped, a center vs periphery (Kapoor, 2008: 10). Indeed, a postcolonial lens of dependency posits that the Third World is not a passive sovereign subject to the powerful controllers of development; it reproaches dependency for being universalist, ethnocentric, and unable to acknowledge political and social nuances in its formulation (Bhabha, 1995: 269). In this way, it is important to examine foreign aid contributions to development in a manner that acknowledges the postcolonial context that dependence grew from, especially because these efforts in the early period post World War II did not acknowledge historical causes for underdevelopment (Kuhnen, 1987: 162).

Before examining foreign aid effects on security, legitimacy, and state capacity, it is important to do a brief review of foreign aid theory and counterarguments against foreign aid dispersal. Classical traditional economics have always identified capital as the fundamental variable in development while also acknowledging tangential variables such as labor, land, and specialization (Smith 1961: 358). And while neo classists such as Marshall or Schumpeter have highlighted other factors in promoting growth in development, such as natural resources, political freedom, innovation, and capital formation – actualized as foreign aid – capital has always been treated as the source of development and growth (Panjak, 2005: 106). Critics of foreign aid have rejected this theory, contending that growth models are too capital focused, and that foreign aid is hindered by enduring colonial dependence on poor financial institutions and low levels of technology (Panjak 2005, 114). Furthermore, disapprovers of foreign aid claim that it prevents countries from learning processes of production and that the money itself never reaches the right places due to the power of corrupt elites (Ward & Bauer 1968: 48).

International Relations, in the idealist perspective, has mostly seen foreign aid favorably in maintaining global peace and prosperity. Critiques of realist points of view on foreign aid see it as a form of neocolonialism, a subtler form of imperialism in which the Global North can promote their political interests, keep a specific regime in power, extract resources and raw materials, promote or prevent a particular ideology, and create a surplus commodity output setting (Nelson 1968: 25). Theorists who study imperialism see the outflow of resources from underdeveloped countries to developed countries through foreign market investment as a model of empire and colonialism (Chilkote, 1994: 253). Taking these theories as helpful frameworks of analysis allows us to look at foreign aid critically and accurately assess the extent to which foreign aid can be considered conducive to statehood.

Historical Context & Background of Mozambique

In 1964, The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) launched a war of independence against the Portuguese colonial powers (De Tollenaere, 2006: 3). This resulted in a war that would endure for 10 years before a 1975 declaration of independence (Manning, 2002: 5). As is the case with the rush of independence against colonial powers, there was swift grab of power from the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, and a single party regime was established (Manning, 2002: 6). With significant attempts to implement Marxist-Leninist policies, Frelimo stirred discontent and resistance amongst Mozambicans, especially the National Resistance of Mozambique (Renamo) who consisted of former Portuguese army Mozambicans, re-education camp survivors, and ex-Frelimo supporters who disagreed with the Marxist-Leninist ideology (Turner, 1995: 634). This resulted in a bloody civil war. Though the peak of the civil war occurred between 1984 and 1986, events such as Mozambique's entrance in the IMF, formal rejection of Marxism-Leninism by Frelimo, and South African apartheid abandonment of armed opposition groups lay the groundwork for peace negotiations in Rome in 1989 (Turner, 1995: 635). It was only after mutual agreement over matters of political party law, electoral systems, military conflict, Renamo conditionality, ceasefire, and donor aid that a peace agreement was finally reached (Turner, 1995: 640).

I will now examine the case study of Mozambique and the effect of foreign aid on security, legitimacy, and state capacity to determine whether statehood is stimulated by donor aid.

Security and Empirical Case Study

How foreign aid actors address security gaps is the first criterion for measuring OECD's effect on statehood. The predominant response to security threats in a receiving country would be to end the conflict, reassure the concerns of those involved, and negotiate between the parties to ensure that either peace treaties or tolerance has been established in the aided nation (Call, 2010: 313). Increasingly, international organizations and donors have made conflict-ridden regions a higher priority, in which they believe their efforts are to mitigate civil war and promote peace (OECD 2010).

In post-war Mozambique, donors were successfully able to use aid conditioned on peace to stimulate the 1992 signing of the General Peace Accord that reconciled the rebel group Renamo with the government of Mozambique (Manning & Malbrough 2010: 146). Though the United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique was credited as overseeing the ceasefire, they could not have done so without the aid of multilateral donors. Additionally, aid conditionality, especially with the goal of peace building, has had a poor track record of reducing tensions – in many instances, it increases violence (Frerks 2006: 26). However, when external actors are cognizant of the local context, the structure of power, and the political repercussions that aid can have, donors are successful in advancing the peace process. In this way, effective aid conditionality involves knowing the connections between donor goals and their effects on reform, democratization, and unintended consequences (Boyce 2002: 1031). In Mozambique, donors already had substantial knowledge of the nation's capacity needs and could identify what the state necessitated for reconstruction (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 149). From 1987 to 1992, Mozambique was able to receive funds based on empirical assessments from joint UN-government missions that could anticipate development requirements, which included health centers, schools, water, tools, and seeds (Ball & Barnes, 2000: 180). This was only possible due to countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada who had conducted research on the troops to see what they expected from their country upon demobilization; this was essential to getting a sense of resource constraints and the necessary means for peace processes (Howard, 2008: 201).

The closing in the security gap in Mozambique, thus, was possible through peace conditionality, or the use of aid to persuade two opposing parties to consolidate peace or make peace accords (Frerks, 2006: 33). This was actualized not only through the large amount of aid committed to the Mozambique upon the singing of the Rome peace

agreement in 1992 but through specific implementation processes that had only been possible because specific measures were taken by the development initiatives (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 147). An example of a specific task was the Swiss government's pledge of more than $1.5 million for demobilization and reintegration if other donors committed to supporting this agenda (Ball & Barnes, 2000: 190). The pledge was also reliant on the condition that the Mozambican Ministry of Defense be explicit about the troops that had to be demobilized, that there would be a concerted effort to reduce armed forces, and that the reduction would not be accompanied by new soldiers (SDC 1994).

Indeed, development aid intervention in Mozambique was essential to spreading peace and disarming security threats, both during and after negotiations. It is difficult to know how to prioritize different peace operations such as elections or ceasefire compliance, but in Mozambique, due to the foreign aid intervention, donors were able to address specific needs to make the transition from war-torn society to functional state as streamlined as possible. For example, donors supplemented funds for elections and were responsive to key electoral cornerstones post-peace agreement: when electoral law was moving too slowly, donors threatened to withdraw funds from the Multiparty Conference (Manning, 2002: 206). When demobilized soldiers were getting antsy as severance pay was drying up, foreign aid donors designed a program that extended their benefits (Manning, 2002: 86). Many believe that these specific measures that matched the issues at hand led to the success of the peacekeeping operation and therefore, progress in state-building and statehood.

Legitimacy and Empirical Case Study

Addressing legitimacy with foreign aid is difficult because if legitimacy is defined as how much citizens accept the national governance system, measuring a state's degree of legitimacy rests on popular participation, which is often conflated with fair elections. Though it's true that elections are not always correlated with how well a government functions post-conflict (its overemphasis often leads to violence), the lack of elections in post-conflict societies can be used to cast doubt on internal legitimacy (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 145). In societies emerging from warfare, external actors – in this case, development aid organizations – must balance appeasing national leaders and encouraging citizens to participate in leader selection (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 149). Additionally, to promote democracy as the sign of an effective government is to push a Eurocentric narrative.

However, international aid often works towards diminishing exclusionary policies of authoritarian governments by giving aid to civil society, supporting opposing discourse to encourage open conversation, and reallocating power to non-executive arms (Ball & Barnes, 2000: 169). By supporting alternative electoral processes, many of these goals can be fulfilled. Indeed, if foreign aid organizations can successfully install legislative oversight, foster fair election commissions, and give sufficient deference to both the government and counterbalancing powers, then supporting legitimacy within these post-conflict societies is possible.

In the context of Mozambique, it was only through coordinated aid that the 1994 elections could occur without a major party dropping out or the legislative debates being dissolved. The elections in Mozambique were almost entirely supported by donors. Aid conditionality intervention was arranged by the Group for Aid Democracy forum, which was headed by UNDP Resident Representative, and supported by countries like Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the EU, World Bank, and the USA (Turner, 1995: 623). They did so by allocating $150,000 to seventeen emerging parties and supporting trust funds that bolstered opposition parties, thus counterbalancing any hegemonic insurgencies that could occur, (Manning & Malbrough, 2010: 161). Additionally, by keeping both Renamo and Frelimo, the main opposing parties, from dropping out, the donors ensured that election had sufficient representation and regulation. More specifically, donors were able to reduce tensions between Renamo leaders when insecurity threatened to disentangle them from the coordinated process (Ball & Barnes, 2000: 171). Indeed, Renamo president Dhlakama was convinced that Frelimo had colluded with SADC states to ensure victory and threatened to boycott the elections (Jett 1999: 77). It was only when donor intervention drafted written reassurance that any fraudulent election activity would be investigated by international commissions that Dhlakama was convinced to stay (Jett 1999: 78). Moreover, after the Multiparty Conference that was aimed at gathering opposition parties and creating electoral legislation, had collapsed, the GAD reminded all Mozambican political parties that funding will only be provided when pointed efforts towards free elections were made (Ball & Barnes 2000: 181).

The closing in the legitimacy gap, then, was only made possible through development aid financing that not only counterbalanced Frelimo and ensured that there was not a one-party domination in the post-conflict electoral sphere but reassured and maintained peaceful debate throughout tumultuous election troubles. The election occurred

without significant violence, incurred widespread participation from Mozambican citizens, and resulted in peaceful acceptance of defeat by Renamo (Mawson, 2010: 3). Not only this but the momentum endured as financing for electoral administration and support for local elections did not dry up after the election: the European Commission and nine other donors provided $16.6 million for elections in 33 regions of Mozambique (de Tollenaere 2006: 8). The USAID and European Parliamentarians for Africa mobilized $30 million for voter registration systems and monitoring purposes (de Tollenaere 2006:9). Thus, fair and free elections weaved itself into the fabric of Mozambique governance, and with the help of foreign aid, Mozambican power structures were able to enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of their people.

State Capacity and Empirical Case Study

Though it's true that strengthening state capacity can be addressed by simply measuring the capacity of state institutions, it's still a difficult quantifiable metric because weak institutions does not necessarily mean that governance is not functioning correctly (Call, 2010: 312). However, when state services are privatized, especially in an unregulated manner, this indicates weaker state institutions (Krasner & Risse, 2014: 550). Therefore, strengthening state institutions is indicated by how much informal institutions can be overcome by formal state agencies through regulation and authority (Fukuyama, 2004: 56). Donors that desire to engage in capacity-building would do so by implementing international advisers in ministries, fostering formal standards for selection of workers in state agencies, training civil employees, recognizing previously informal authorities (such as indigenous authorities), and suppressing corrupt informal institutions (Call, 2010: 312).

In Mozambique, the weakness of the state is more explicit at the district and subdistrict level where policies enacted by the central government are carried out by deconcentrated line ministries that do not have any say in budgeting, regulation, or project planning (Kulipossa & Manor: 2006, 173). Before the involvement of foreign donors, there was little planning at the subdistrict level and little institutional strength, an issue that resulted in poor access to basic needs and allocation of goods and services. To address this issue, the United Nations Capital Development Fund and the UNDP created a district planning project that targeted the Nampula Province of Mozambique (Kulipossa & Manor 2006, 173). This plan possessed goals to strengthen the administrative institutional capacities of these communities and to monitor, finance, and follow-through with small-

scale infrastructure revitalization (Kulipossa & Manor 2006, 174). Supported by the Dutch and Norwegian governments, these district development funds supported participatory planning, training programs, and small-scale infrastructure, with a more specific emphasis on community participation, annual economic budgets, and coordination for district planning (World Bank 2003). The project implementation was coordinated by the UNCDF with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Dutch Development Agency, and other donors, with a total mobilization of $15.4 million (UNCDF, 2002: 14). Notably, the UNCDF strengthened capacity by creating technical teams made up of local staff that consulted resource allocation, budgeting, and project operations (Fozzard, 2002: 14).

Though these state capacity strengthening projects were implemented in 18 districts across the Nampula Province, the Mecuburi District of Mozambique was specifically examined due to its very rural and lengthy project (ECIAfrica, 2003: 28). In the Mecuburi District, a new market, a rehabilitation road, and a primary school were implemented. Markedly, all three polled with citizens as positive: self-employment was bolstered at the market, basic goods and services were made accessible, trade was stimulated by the road, and learning conditions were improved at primary school (UNCDF, 2004: 20). Additionally, opportunities were presented to the local communities to participate in project discussions (UNCDF, 2004: 21).

The strengthening of state capacity in the Mecuburi District of Mozambique was specifically done so by creating technical teams that increased the competency and management of the provincial staff (ECIAfrica 2003). These teams were meant to mobilize the local community and allocate council representatives so that the development goals and strategies were fulfilled efficiently while simultaneously bolstering collaboration between different sectors of government (Kulipossa & Manor, 2006: 180). Additionally, donors trained staff in lobbying and collective action to support effective district planning and financing, thus standardizing workers for these agencies and distributing power to previously silenced authorities. Therefore, capacity building through the help of foreign aid has been overall successful by promoting participation, intentionally training staff, building capacity in local governments, organizing budgeting for economic plans, and executing District Development Plans. Indeed, through decentralized planning and donor financing, a fundamental transformation in institutional capacity was made possible in the Mozambican Nampula Province.

Addressing Limitations

Of course, it should be acknowledged that the case of Mozambique is unique and not indicative of all foreign aid experiences in Africa. Mozambique has long been considered one of the most successful development aid cases, especially in the context of postwar reconstruction (Nino & Le Billon, 2013: 5). With large amounts of foreign aid support, Mozambique has been able to achieve multiparty fair elections, public service delivery, and major growth in capital. However, Africa is not monolithic, and Mozambique's case should not be seen as the standard for all foreign aid outcomes on the continent. Especially given the historical context, it can be argued that the peace negotiations that allowed for foreign aid to address development security was the result of multiple intertwined international events like the end of the Cold War, the adoption of aid conditionality, and the ending of apartheid in South Africa (Chan & Venancio, 1998: 54). When looking at legitimacy, it was vital that existing donor knowledge and very specific responses to aid conditionality occurred for progress and collaboration to occur. State capacity building in the Mecuburi District, furthermore, was not applied to all of Mozambique, and it is still uncertain if these amounts of aid are sustainable for years to come. Lastly, aid in Mozambique is far from perfect: lots of scholarship concede that though short-term effects of foreign aid have been overwhelmingly positive for development, there have been long-term concessions on corruption and justice issues that may undermine Mozambique's future success in its statehood (De Renzio & Hanlon, 2007: 20).

Conclusion

I conclude that when measuring the efficacy of foreign aid on statehood using three parameters – security, legitimacy, and capacity – and applying it to donor activity in Mozambique in a post-conflict state, there is a positive and successful relationship between the two. I suggest that though statehood is a fundamentally Eurocentric concept that prioritizes arbitrary categories that cannot be applied to African states with non-Westphalian progressions of governance and territorial sovereignty, recognizing these dynamic boundaries of statehood can lead to useful and powerful measurements of foreign aid value. Immediately, I was able to eliminate the notion of "failed statehood" as an inappropriate and Weberian-centric definition of the state, rebuffing the static and quintessential narrative of African states that need transforming into liberal democracies. My method of analysis for African statehood rested on three qualitative measurements: security, legitimacy, and state

capacity, and how well foreign aid was able to address and target these gaps in the region in question. In choosing Mozambique, a nation that suffered from an extensive civil war and subsequent extreme injections of development aid, I was able to identify specific instances in which foreign aid was not only able to address security, legitimacy, and state capacity gaps but improve conditions for the state, paving the way for development and transformation following a brutal conflict. It should be acknowledged that though I was not able to elaborate on how these criteria work in tandem, as I chose three different cases within Mozambique that addressed the individual categories of security, legitimacy, and state capacity, they do work cooperatively to support statehood. Hence, despite the challenges that still pervade the world of ODA – it is far from a perfect model – the case of Mozambique proves that with the right balance of variables and donor efforts, foreign aid can successfully lead to statehood, leaving a recipient nation much better off than where it started.

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