



COSCon'25

第十届中国开源年会

众智开源 | Open Source, Open Intelligence

The Cyber Resilience Act: Practical Steps to Prepare for Europe's Cybersecurity Legislation (SBOMs, Standards and Open Source Software)

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PART 01

Why the CRA?



Why the CRA?



- The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) regulates the development, importation and supply of connected products within the EU
- The aim is to reduce cyber risks to EU citizens, businesses and other bodies in the EU
- It is part of a suite of legislation covering product safety for many products including toys, measuring instruments, radio equipment, low voltage electrical equipment, medical devices
- The aim is that *products with digital element* meet the standard are marked with a CE mark:



Why the CRA?



- Manufacturers, importers and distributors of PDEs within the European Union are all regulated.
- PDEs are all devices containing software, and standalone software which (in practice) connects or can connect to a network (mainly the internet)
- Penalties are very significant (up to 2.5% worldwide turnover)

Why the CRA?




- The CRA sets out:
 - rules for putting any product with digital elements on the market in the EU;
 - essential security requirements on all products during the design, development and lifecycle of the products;
 - vulnerability handling requirements for manufacturers for the lifecycle of the product; and
 - market surveillance and enforcement rules.

PART 02 Timeline



Timeline



PART 03

What are your obligations?



Essential Security Requirements

- Designed, developed and produced with cybersecurity as a core development principle
- Delivered without known exploitable vulnerabilities
- Delivered with a secure default configuration
- Ensure vulnerabilities address through security updates
- Protection against unauthorised access
- Protection of confidential data (inc. personal data) by use of encryption etc.
- Maintain integrity of data and protect against corruption and manipulation
- Process only data necessary for intended purpose of the product
- Resilience against attacks (e.g. DDOS)
- Implements data minimisation
- Minimises requirements on third party services
- Limits attack surfaces
- Uses appropriate exploitation mitigation mechanisms and techniques
- Records and monitors use etc. to provide security related information
- Delivers security updates

Product Classification

- PDEs are classified into 4 different levels. Different rules apply to different levels
 - For example, manufacturers can self-certify some PDEs
 - Some PDEs will need to be independently assessed for conformity
- Some products are not covered at all (mainly because other regulations already apply to them).
- Standards are being developed covering general requirements (*horizontal*) and specific types of product (*vertical*)
- If a PDE complies with the standard, there is a *presumption of conformity*.

Vulnerability Handling

- rules for putting any product with digital elements on the market in the EU;
- essential security requirements on all products during the design, development and lifecycle of the products;
- vulnerability handling requirements for manufacturers for the lifecycle of the product; and
- market surveillance and enforcement rules.

PART 04

Practical Requirements?



Practical Requirements



- Awareness
- Standards
- Tooling
- Supply chain relationships
- Development methodologies
- Risk management

Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs)

- are an important tool in aiding compliance
- Key to information flow up and down the supply chain
- Are not required to be made public
- The European Commission can define the format and elements required in an SBOM
- It must cover “at the very least the top-level dependencies”
- Likely to have to comply with BSI (German) standards
- ENISA has survey which is open until 19th December

- CRA and Open Source
 - Open-source components: select with care
 - Open-source software stewards
 - Individual developers
- “Open-source software stewards”
 - E. g. Eclipse Foundation, Linux Foundation
 - Must implement a Cybersecurity Policy
 - To foster the development of secure products
 - To foster the development of effective vulnerability handling and reporting
 - Sharing information and co-operate with market surveillance authorities
 - OSS Stewards are **not** subject to financial penalties

Practical Requirements



- Supply chain information and liability flow
- Familiarise yourself with
 - [SPDX 3.0 \(CycloneDX\)](#)
 - [OpenSSF Scorecard](#)
 - [OpenChain](#)
- Preparing your suppliers: map your supply chain
- Supplier due diligence (e.g. OpenSSF Scorecard)
- Supply contracts:
 - Development framework: methodologies for developing secure code
 - Security by design: set design parameters
 - Open development process
 - Dataflow: how to manage, address vulnerabilities
 - SBOM standards used, and testing
 - Ongoing vulnerability reporting framework for lifecycle of the product

Practical Requirements



- Classify risks
 - Classify suppliers:
 - commercial (paid) ;
 - commercial (OSS) ;
 - OSS Stewards
 - non-steward
 - Triage software
 - Build into your code selection policy
 - Where in the stack is it (how likely is it to present a vulnerability)?
 - Is the technology/framework/language inherently more secure (e.g. Rust)
 - Code-selection: look at how well the project handles vulnerabilities

Practical Requirements



- Manage Risks
 - Pooling information: establish information pools?
 - Industry-based
 - Vertical-market based
 - Product based
 - Foundations/OSS Stewards
 - Outsourcing vulnerability management? (Cannot outsource *responsibility*).
 - Establish incident response protocols. Co-ordinate

- Record Keeping
 - Record design principles for the PDE (security by design)
 - Retain SBOMs for all releases
 - Identify source of SBOMs (internally generated? Generated by suppliers?)
 - Record component selection
 - Record vulnerability testing protocols
- Record incidents and responses
 - Responses include fixes: requirement to pass back to supplier/to the original project?
- Leverage SPDX for risk management?
 - CRA profile

What is happening?

- Standards are continuing to be developed
 - Directly mandated (CEN-CENELEC/ETSI), Release in 2026
 - Further related standards being developed (e.g. BSI, SPDX, OpenChain)
- Industry and the European Commission are engaging with each other through regular meetings and fora
- Industry bodies (companies, OSS foundations etc) are collaborating on industry approaches
- Data-sharing likely to occur at
 - Project level
 - Through OSS Foundations
 - Through national/international initiatives (e.g. ENISA, NCSC, NSA)

Example projects (Linux Foundation research)

- Yocto Project (toolkit for creating embedded Linux systems)
 - Classifies itself as an “open-source software steward”
 - Conducts cybersecurity risk assessments through CVE monitoring and implements build-time CVE
 - Currently releases 4-year LTS version. May extend to 5 years (CRA)
 - Reproducible builds (arguably goes beyond CRA requirements)
- Zephyr Project (realtime operating system project)
 - Classifies itself as an “open-source software steward”
 - Git-based development and releases
 - 2.5 year support window (<5 year CRA requirement)
 - CVE Numbering Authority Status
 - Uses OpenSSF Scorecard

Linux Foundation Recommendations

- Build a sustainable security roadmap
- Align development practices to CRA
- Invest in tooling for compliance and security
- Standards development and cross-sector collaboration
- Address emerging security challenges
- Effective, empowered and resourced leadership for open source software security

Updates (as of 3rd December)



New European Commission site: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/factpages/cyber-resilience-act-implementation>

FAQ Document:

<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/122331>

- Clarity on relationship between CRA and PLD (Product Liability Directive), GPSR (General Product Safety Regulation), GDPR and others
- Clarity on combining elements with different risk levels/criticality
- Clarity on carrying out risk assessments (and intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use)
- Products need not be vulnerability free: covers known exploitable vulnerabilities based on risk assessment
- In extreme cases, a recall may be required
- If a component is CE marked, the manufacturer can rely on the associated declaration of conformity.
- For stewarded OSS, the commission may establish voluntary attestation programmes (see <https://github.com/orcwg/cra-attestations>)
- Criteria for support period
- Reporting Obligations
- Conformity assessments
- Transition

Further sources of information:



- Open Regulatory Compliance Working Group: <https://orcwg.org/>
- OpenChain: <https://openchainproject.org/>
- SPDX: <https://spdx.dev/>
- OpenSSF Scorecard: <https://openssf.org/projects/scorecard/>
- CEN/CENELEC: <https://www.cencenelec.eu/>
- European Commission CRA: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-resilience-act>
- ENISA: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/>
- Support for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cra-msmes>
- CRA Expert Group: <https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&groupID=3967>

OCCTET – ‘Open-source Compliance: Comprehensive Techniques and Essential Tools’
<https://occtet.eu/>

CONFIRMATE – ‘Conformity assessment, metrics and compliance automation for the Cyber Resilience Act’ <https://confirmate-project.eu/>

CRACY – ‘CRA made Easy’ <https://cra-cy.eu/>

CYBERFORT – ‘Strengthening Cyber Defenses of SMEs for CRA Compliance’ <https://cyberfort.eu/>

CURIUM – ‘Transformation into a Trustworthy Certified Digital Valley’ <https://curium-project.eu/>

OSCRAT – ‘Open-Source Cyber Resilience Act Tools’ <https://oscrat.eu/>

CRA-AI – ‘A European collaboration to drive CRA conformity for SMEs using AI Innovation’ <https://www.cybercertlabs.com/cra-ai/>

SECURE – ‘Strengthening EU SMEs Cyber Resilience’ <https://secure4sme.eu/>

STAN4CR – ‘Standardization in support of the EU Cyber Resilience Act’ <https://www.stan4cra.eu/>

CYBERSTAND – ‘Supporting EU experts in Cybersecurity standardisation activities’ <https://cyberstand.eu/>



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