

Social Justice Watch 1210

[图集精选](#)

[消息精选](#)

[2020 election reveals two broad voting coalitions fundamentally at odds](#)

[After surging in 2019, migrant apprehensions at U.S.-Mexico border fell sharply in fiscal 2020](#)

[America is exceptional in the nature of its political divide](#)

[Americans and Germans Diverge in Views of Transatlantic Alliance Heading into 2021](#)

[Democrats more optimistic than Republicans that partisan relations in Washington will improve in 2021](#)

[How Democrats and Republicans Use Twitter](#)

[How removing unauthorized immigrants from census statistics could affect House reapportionment](#)

[Key findings about U.S. immigrants](#)

[Majorities in European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc](#)

[Many Americans are unsure whether sources of news do their own reporting](#)

[Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His Post-Election Conduct](#)

[So far, Trump has granted clemency less frequently than any president in](#)

modern history

Support for Black Lives Matter has decreased since June but remains strong among Black Americans

The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19

The Trump era has seen a decline in America's global reputation

Understanding how 2020 election polls performed and what it might mean for other kinds of survey work

Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries

来源：Social Justice Watch

镜像

图集精选

[返回目录](#)



<https://www.facebook.com/transarmy/photos/a.101087104719810/22375036912/>

[返回目录](#)

消息精选

[返回目录](#)

telegra.ph/Americans-and-Germans-Diverge-in-Views-of-Transatlantic-Alliance-Heading-into-2021-12-08

Telegraph

Americans and Germans Diverge in Views of Transatlantic Alliance Heading into 2021

In 2017, Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung began collaborating on joint public opinion surveys to gauge the state of relations between the United States and Germany. The questions were developed together, and each organization fielded a survey within...

telegra.ph/Majorities-in-European-Union-Have-Favorable-Views-of-the-Bloc-12-08

Telegraph

Majorities in European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc

This analysis focuses on cross-national views of the European Union, key European leaders and European political parties. The work builds on previous studies about views of global leaders – including German Chancellor Angela Merkel – and views of the economy....

telegra.ph/Sharp-Divisions-on-Vote-Counts-as-Biden-Gets-High-Marks-for-His-Post-Election-Conduct-12-08

Telegraph

Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His Post-Election Conduct

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans view the 2020 presidential election and the voting process. For this analysis, we surveyed 11,818 U.S. adults in November 2020, including 10,399 U.S. citizens

who reported having voted in...

[telegra.ph/The-Challenges-of-Contact-Tracing-as-US-Battles-COVID-19-12-08](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/The-Challenges-of-Contact-Tracing-as-US-Battles-COVID-19-12-08)

Telegraph

The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19

Pew Research Center has intensively studied the impact of the coronavirus outbreak, the public health dimensions of the pandemic and Americans' views about some of the privacy implications of data collection during the outbreak. This report focuses on key...

[telegra.ph/Many-Americans-are-unsure-whether-sources-of-news-do-their-own-reporting-12-08](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/Many-Americans-are-unsure-whether-sources-of-news-do-their-own-reporting-12-08)

Telegraph

Many Americans are unsure whether sources of news do their own reporting

The digital age has given rise to new and diverse ways of accessing news, ranging from news aggregators and social media feeds that simply circulate existing content to news organization websites that publish their journalists' original work. And a new Pew...

<https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=ryPfwCSCTkY>

YouTube

The Biden Administration: Who Will Hold the Power? | Robert Reich

Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich breaks down the presidential appointments that wield the most power in an administration, and which ones don't.

Watch More: Can We Create a Just America?

► ► <https://youtu.be/b0wrZVDrNOE>

Joe Biden is in the process of...

telegra.ph/America-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide-12-08

Telegraph

America is exceptional in the nature of its political divide

In his first speech as president-elect, Joe Biden made clear his intention to bridge the deep and bitter divisions in American society. He pledged to look beyond red and blue and to discard the harsh rhetoric that characterizes our political debates. It will...

telegra.ph/Understanding-how-2020-election-polls-performed-and-what-it-might-mean-for-other-kinds-of-survey-work-12-08

Telegraph

Understanding how 2020 election polls performed and what it might mean for other kinds of survey work

Taken in the aggregate, preelection polls in the United States pointed to the strong likelihood that Democrat Joe Biden would pick up several states that Hillary Clinton lost in 2016 and, in the process, win a popular and electoral vote majority over Republican...

telegra.ph/2020-election-reveals-two-broad-voting-coalitions-fundamentally-at-odds-12-09

Telegraph

2020 election reveals two broad voting coalitions fundamentally at odds

Even before all the ballots are tallied, Americans appear to have voted in the 2020 presidential election at their highest rate in 120 years. Democrat Joe Biden has amassed more than 74 million votes as of Nov. 6, while Republican Donald Trump has received...

telegra.ph/How-Democrats-and-Republicans-Use-Twitter-12-09

Telegraph

How Democrats and Republicans Use Twitter

Twitter is one of many online venues where politicians and the public can go to engage with the issues of the day, but it can be difficult to identify ordinary

Americans among the many other types of accounts on the site. This analysis offers a window into...

[telegra.ph/Unfavorable-Views-of-China-Reach-Historic-Highs-in-Many-Countries-12-09](#)

Telegraph

Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries

This analysis focuses on cross-national views of China. The work builds on previous studies released in the summer of 2020 on Americans' views of China and the international image of the U.S. This study was conducted in countries where nationally representative...

[telegra.ph/Democrats-more-optimistic-than-Republicans-that-partisan-relations-in-Washington-will-improve-in-2021-12-09](#)

Telegraph

Democrats more optimistic than Republicans that partisan relations in Washington will improve in 2021

With the delayed transition to a Biden administration now underway, Americans have only modest expectations that the partisanship that has dominated Washington in recent years will ease in 2021. However, Democrats are much more optimistic than Republicans...

[telegra.ph/So-far-Trump-has-granted-clemency-less-frequently-than-any-president-in-modern-history-12-09](#)

Telegraph

So far, Trump has granted clemency less frequently than any president in modern history

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World About Follow Donate Main

[telegra.ph/After-surgeing-in-2019-migrant-apprehensions-at-US-Mexico-border-](#)

[fell-sharply-in-fiscal-2020-12-09](#)

Telegraph

After surging in 2019, migrant apprehensions at U.S.-Mexico border fell sharply in fiscal 2020

Border Patrol agents apprehended about half as many migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2020 as they did the year before, according to newly released federal data. The sharp drop in the number of apprehended migrants follows a virtual shutdown of...

[telegra.ph/Key-findings-about-US-immigrants-12-09](#)

Telegraph

Key findings about U.S. immigrants

The United States has more immigrants than any other country in the world. Today, more than 40 million people living in the U.S. were born in another country, accounting for about one-fifth of the world's migrants. The population of immigrants is also very...

[telegra.ph/How-removing-unauthorized-immigrants-from-census-statistics-could-affect-House-reapportionment-12-09](#)

Telegraph

How removing unauthorized immigrants from census statistics could affect House reapportionment

Since the first census of the United States in 1790, counts that include both citizens and noncitizens have been used to apportion seats in the House of Representatives, with states gaining or losing based on population change over the previous decade. If...

[telegra.ph/The-Trump-era-has-seen-a-decline-in-Americas-global-reputation-12-09](#)

Telegraph

The Trump era has seen a decline in America's global reputation

Many world leaders were quick to offer congratulatory messages to President-elect Joe Biden after his victory in this month's U.S. presidential election. They

included Germany's Angela Merkel, Canada's Justin Trudeau and others who have had tense relations...

[telegra.ph/Support-for-Black-Lives-Matter-has-decreased-since-June-but-remains-strong-among-Black-Americans-12-09](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uk-politics/politics/support-for-black-lives-matter-has-decreased-since-june-but-remains-strong-among-black-americans-12-09)

Telegraph

Support for Black Lives Matter has decreased since June but remains strong among Black Americans

As racial justice protests have intensified following the shooting of Jacob Blake, public support for the Black Lives Matter movement has declined, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. A majority of U.S. adults (55%) now express at least some support...

I had a proud friend moment this weekend.

I've been having a very rough time this year (who hasn't, amirite) and a good friend of mine came to keep me company while my wife and kids were out of town.

At one point, he mentioned something about the movie Fargo, and mentioned than Ellen Page is a great actor.

"You mean Elliot"

"Yeah, I heard about that. Anyway, I just thought she did..."

"...HE did"

He was quiet for a few minutes, and I could tell he was grumpy. I was worried that I was about to have a confrontation about this, but was adamant that I was going to stick to my position. After a couple minutes, I said, "I just mentioned it because I'm in this group called Trans Army, and that's how I found out he came out. I didn't know if you knew or not. I'm just really happy he gets to be himself."

After a couple seconds, he said, "Yeah, it's cool for him. He seemed happy about it."

As a cis man, this is why I call out my friends.

EDIT: I realized, I don't want this to sound self-congratulatory. I used to be a much worse person on this and many other topics. Because of my realization that I am pansexual, I've changed quite a lot, and that ability (which I believe many are capable of, if they try) is what I want to celebrate here. This friend is almost 40 and was able to reevaluate his position in fewer than 10 minutes.

<https://www.facebook.com/groups/transarmy/permalink/715001129149387/>

[返回目录](#)

2020 election reveals two broad voting coalitions fundamentally at odds

[返回目录](#)



People gather in Times Square as they await election results on Nov. 3, 2020, in New York City. (David Dee Delgado/Getty Images)


Even before all the ballots are tallied, Americans appear to have voted in the 2020 presidential election at their highest rate in 120 years. Democrat Joe Biden has amassed more than 74 million votes as of Nov. 6, while Republican Donald Trump has received nearly 70 million – already the most and second-most in U.S. history.

But if one early takeaway from the election is historic voter participation, another may be the continuing political polarization that has come to define the United States. Democrats and Republicans both could walk away from the election with cause for disappointment, and divided government in Washington is a distinct possibility.

It isn't just Washington that will be divided. The elected officials who take the oath of office in January will be representing two broad coalitions of voters who are deeply distrustful of one another and who fundamentally disagree over policies, plans and even the very problems that face the country today.

Trump and Biden supporters differ over importance of the economy, health care – and particularly the coronavirus

% registered voters who say each is ‘very important’ to their vote in the 2020 presidential election



Note: Based on registered voters.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Oct. 6-12, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

No issue seems to exemplify this divide more than the coronavirus pandemic. With more than 235,000 deaths in the U.S. to date and the election itself disrupted because of the virus, 82% of registered voters who support Biden said in October that the outbreak would be “very important” to their vote. Only 24% of registered voters who support Trump said the same.


The enormous gulf over the importance of COVID-19 as a voting issue is just one of many ways, large and small, in which the virus has divided the partisan camps throughout 2020. Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents have consistently expressed far more concern over the virus than Republicans and GOP leaners. Before the election, most Republicans said the pandemic had been exaggerated and that the U.S. had controlled the outbreak as much as it could have – positions rejected by most Democrats.

The Biden and Trump coalitions also fundamentally differ over racial inequality and law enforcement – key issues in a year that saw nationwide protests following the killing of George Floyd at the hands of police in Minneapolis. Around three-quarters of registered voters who support Biden (76%) said in the summer that racial and ethnic inequality would be very important to their vote; just 24% of Trump supporters agreed. Conversely, around three-quarters of Trump voters (74%) said the issue of violent crime was very important to them, compared with fewer than half of Biden voters (46%).

The two sides are miles apart when it comes to more general questions about race, too. In a summer survey, 74% of Biden voters said “it is a lot more difficult” to be a Black person in this country than to be a White person – a view shared by only 9% of Trump voters. And while 59% of Biden voters said White people benefit a “great deal” from advantages in society that Black people do not have, only 5% of Trump voters agreed. Indeed, Biden and Trump voters were far more divided over these questions than Hillary Clinton and Trump voters were in 2016.

Climate change ranks near the top of issue priorities to Biden voters, low on list to Trump voters

% of registered voters saying each issue is ‘very important’ to their vote in the 2020 presidential election



Note: Based on registered votes. Supporters of each candidate are based on those who say they are planning on or are leaning toward voting for that candidate in 2020.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 27-Aug. 2, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Climate change marks another area where political compromise may be challenging because Biden and Trump supporters disagree over the importance of the issue itself. Around two-thirds of Biden voters (68%) said in the summer that climate change would be very important to their vote this year. But for Trump voters, climate change ranked *last* in importance out of 12 issues asked about, with only 11% saying it would be a key factor in their vote.


That’s not to say that there are no areas of agreement between the two coalitions. With businesses still shuttered in many parts of the country due to COVID-19, majorities in both groups (84% of Trump voters and 66% of Biden voters) said in October that the economy would be a top voting issue for them. But even in an area of apparent agreement, there are differences in the way partisans are thinking about the economy, the extent to which they see it as intertwined with the coronavirus outbreak and some of the specific provisions they would like to see in any new aid package approved by Congress.

In a summer survey, the overwhelming consensus among Democrats (94%) was that the more effective way to help the U.S. economy recover is to significantly reduce coronavirus infections to a level where more people feel comfortable going to stores, schools and other workplaces. Republicans were almost evenly divided on this question: 49% shared the Democratic perspective, while 50% said the more effective approach is to open more stores, schools and workplaces even if there *hasn't* been a significant reduction in infections. The question over whether and how to open businesses will be a paramount one in the weeks ahead as the U.S. confronts a fall surge in COVID-19 cases.

Underlying the many policy disagreements between Biden and Trump voters is a more personal feeling of distrust and disillusionment that could make compromise all the more difficult, particularly in the wake of a contested presidential election.

Only about one-in-five Trump and Biden supporters say they share the same core American values and goals

% of registered voters who say ...



Notes: Based on registered voters. No response answers not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 30-Oct. 5, 2020.

Overwhelming majorities of both Biden and Trump supporters said in October that a victory by the other candidate would lead to *lasting harm* to the nation. Nine-in-ten Biden voters said this about the prospect of a Trump victory, and 89% of Trump voters said it about the prospect of a Biden win. And around eight-in-ten in both camps said Biden and Trump supporters not only disagree over politics and policies, but that they also disagree over core American values and goals.

Another critical challenge to the prospect of political compromise is a dearth of shared facts and information. Pew Research Center studies have long catalogued wide partisan differences in views of the media, with Democrats generally expressing far more trust than Republicans. But beyond that long-standing trend is an emerging consensus that shared facts are in short supply. In a survey just before the election, 85% of U.S. adults said Biden and Trump supporters disagree not only over plans and policies, but also over basic facts.

As the nation moves on from a bitterly contested election, these dynamics and others point to the obvious challenges that lie ahead. But the outlook isn't uniformly bad. Voters across the political divide, for example, want the next president to govern in a unifying way. In October, 89% of Biden supporters and 86% of Trump supporters said their preferred candidate should focus on addressing the needs of all Americans, even if it means disappointing some supporters. Only around one-in-ten in both camps said their candidate should focus on the concerns of those who voted for him without worrying too much about the concerns of those who didn't.

Share this link:



Claudia Deane

is vice president of research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO TWITTER EMAIL



John Gramlich


is a senior writer/editor at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO TWITTER EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

After surging in 2019, migrant apprehensions at U.S.-Mexico border fell sharply in fiscal 2020

[返回目录](#)




A Border Patrol truck sits on the U.S. side of a wall separating Mexicali, Mexico, from Calexico, California, on July 21, 2020.
(Gregory Bull/AP)

Border Patrol agents apprehended about half as many migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal 2020 as they did the year before, according to newly released federal data. The sharp drop in the number of apprehended migrants follows a virtual shutdown of the border and new restrictions in the way asylum cases are handled in response to the coronavirus outbreak.

Below is a closer look at the shifting dynamics at the southwestern border, based on the new numbers from U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the federal agency tasked with patrolling the border.

This analysis uses data from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to examine how migrant apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border have changed during the COVID-19 outbreak. Migrant apprehension data is commonly used as an indicator of how many people are entering the United States illegally, though it is only a partial measure. Starting in March 2020, apprehensions data reported by CBP includes both apprehensions and expulsions. Expulsions refer to migrants encountered by U.S. Border Patrol who are expelled to their home country or their last transit country.



Following a dramatic rise in fiscal 2019, apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border fell by about half in fiscal 2020 as COVID-19 closed borders. There were 400,651 apprehensions in the 2020 fiscal year (October 2019-September 2020), a 53% decrease from the previous fiscal year, when apprehensions soared to their highest level in 12 years. The fiscal 2020 total was generally on par with other recent years and far below the 1,643,679 recorded in the peak year of 2000. Border apprehensions regularly exceeded 1 million per fiscal year during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.


The decrease in apprehensions comes as the movement of migrants in the Americas and worldwide has slowed during the COVID-19 outbreak, with

governments fully or partially closing their borders to stem its spread.

In March, Mexico restricted nonessential travel across its border with the United States, while the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras also implemented restrictions on movement. Most migrants apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border in recent years have come from Mexico and Central American nations.

For the first time in five years, Mexicans outnumbered non-Mexicans in border apprehensions in 2020

Apprehensions at southwest border, by fiscal year and country of origin



Note: Beginning in March 2020, monthly totals from U.S. Border Patrol include apprehensions and expulsions and are called encounters. Prior to March 2020, monthly totals include apprehensions only.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

In a shift, Mexicans far outnumbered non-Mexicans among those apprehended at the border in fiscal 2020. Mexican citizens accounted for 63% of the total number apprehended, marking the first year in the last five in which they outnumbered citizens of other countries. The change represents a return to the pattern observed throughout the 2000s and 2010s. For example, in 2000 (the earliest year for which data is available), Mexicans accounted for 98% of apprehensions while non-Mexicans accounted for just 2%.

Border agents apprehended a total of 253,118 Mexicans in fiscal 2020, up from 166,458 the year before and the highest total in seven years. The increase comes despite a steep decline in apprehensions of Central American migrants in fiscal 2020. The U.S. apprehended 47,243 migrants from Guatemala, down from 264,168 the year before; 40,091 from Honduras, down from 253,795; and 16,484 from El Salvador, down from 89,811.

Single adults accounted for a large majority of southwest border apprehensions in 2020

% of apprehensions at southwest border, by fiscal year and type



Note: Totals may not add to 100% due to rounding. Beginning in March 2020, monthly totals from U.S. Border Patrol include apprehensions and expulsions and are called encounters. Prior to March 2020, monthly totals include apprehensions only.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Single adults accounted for the majority of apprehensions in fiscal 2020, another big shift from last year. There were 317,864 apprehensions of single adults, representing 79% of the total and the largest number of single adults apprehended in six years. Apprehensions of “family units” – defined as the number of individuals traveling in a family – made up 13% of the total, falling from 473,682 in fiscal 2019 to 52,230 this past year. Meanwhile, apprehensions of unaccompanied children ages 17 and younger also decreased from their peak in fiscal 2019, from 76,020 to 30,557.


The changing profile of those being apprehended at the border follows changes in the way the U.S. government is handling border apprehensions during the coronavirus outbreak. In March, citing the pandemic, the Trump administration

issued an order allowing Border Patrol agents to swiftly expel migrants they consider health risks to their home country or their last transit country (in this case Mexico). The order covers asylum seekers and unaccompanied children. Since April, the first full month after the order, these expulsions have accounted for 91% of the Border Patrol's total apprehensions at the southwest border.

Apprehensions fell in nearly every border sector in fiscal 2020, particularly in the Rio Grande sector. The Rio Grande region saw a 73% drop in migrant apprehensions in fiscal 2020 compared with fiscal 2019, from 339,135 to 90,206. That was by far the largest numerical decrease of any of the nine southwest Border Patrol sectors. The El Paso sector saw a decrease of 70%, from 182,143 apprehensions to 54,396. Despite these decreases, the Rio Grande and El Paso sectors still ranked first and third, respectively, in overall apprehensions.

Migrant apprehensions decreased in most U.S.-Mexico border sectors in 2020

Change in apprehensions at southwest border, fiscal 2019-2020




Note: Beginning in March 2020, monthly totals from U.S. Border Patrol include apprehensions and expulsions and are called encounters. Prior to March 2020, monthly totals include apprehensions only.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Southwest border apprehensions have often peaked in March, but pattern has changed in recent years

Peak month for apprehensions at southwest border in each fiscal year



Note: Beginning in March 2020, monthly totals from U.S. Border Patrol include apprehensions and expulsions and are called encounters. Prior to March 2020, monthly totals include apprehensions only.

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Seasonal migration patterns have changed in recent years. Since 2000, border apprehensions have typically peaked in the spring – most often in March – before declining during the hot summer months, when migration journeys become more perilous. But the pattern has changed since 2013, with the annual peak occurring in months other than March. In fiscal 2020, September was the peak month, with 54,771 apprehensions.

Following the onset of the pandemic, apprehensions fell from 30,389 in March to 16,182 in April. But they started to increase in May before peaking in the final month of the fiscal year.

Note: This is an update to a post originally published on May 19, 2020.

Share this link:



Ana Gonzalez-Barrera


is a senior researcher focusing on Hispanics, immigration and demographics at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO TWITTER EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

America is exceptional in the nature of its political divide

[返回目录](#)




In his first speech as president-elect, Joe Biden made clear his intention to bridge the deep and bitter divisions in American society. He pledged to look beyond red and blue and to discard the harsh rhetoric that characterizes our political debates.


It will be a difficult struggle. Americans have rarely been as polarized as they are today.

Both Trump and Biden supporters say if the other wins, it would result in lasting harm to the country

*% of **Trump supporters** who say they would ____ about the direction of the country if Joe Biden was elected president*



*% of **Biden supporters** who say they would ____ about the direction of the country if Donald Trump was reelected president*




Note: Based on registered voters. No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 30-Oct. 5, 2020.

The studies we've conducted at Pew Research Center over the past few years illustrate the increasingly stark disagreement between Democrats and Republicans on the economy, racial justice, climate change, law enforcement, international engagement and a long list of other issues. The 2020 presidential election further highlighted these deep-seated divides. Supporters of Biden and Donald Trump believe the differences between them are about more than just politics and policies. A month before the election, roughly eight-in-ten registered voters in both camps said their differences with the other side were about core American values, and roughly nine-in-ten – again in both camps – worried that a victory by the other would lead to “lasting harm” to the United States.

The U.S. is hardly the only country wrestling with deepening political fissures. Brexit has polarized British politics, the rise of populist parties has disrupted party systems across Europe, and cultural conflict and economic anxieties have intensified old cleavages and created new ones in many advanced democracies. America and other advanced economies face many common strains over how opportunity is distributed in a global economy and how our culture adapts to growing diversity in an interconnected world.

Majorities of governing party supporters say their country has dealt with coronavirus outbreak well

*% who say their own country has done a **good** job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak*




Note: All differences are statistically significant.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey, Q10c.

But the 2020 pandemic has revealed how pervasive the divide in American politics is relative to other nations. Over the summer, 76% of Republicans (including independents who lean to the party) felt the U.S. had done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, compared with just 29% of those who do not identify with the Republican Party. This 47 percentage point gap was the largest gap found between those who support the governing party and those who do not across 14 nations surveyed. Moreover, 77% of Americans said the country was now more divided than before the outbreak, as compared with a median of 47% in the 13 other nations surveyed.

Trump and Biden supporters differ over importance of the economy, health care – and particularly the coronavirus

% registered voters who say each is ‘very important’ to their vote in the 2020 presidential election



Note: Based on registered voters.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Oct. 6-12, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Much of this American exceptionalism preceded the coronavirus: In a Pew Research Center study conducted before the pandemic, Americans were more ideologically divided than any of the 19 other publics surveyed when asked how much trust they have in scientists and whether scientists make decisions solely based on facts. These fissures have pervaded nearly every aspect of the public and policy response to the crisis over the course of the year. Democrats and Republicans differ over mask wearing, contact tracing, how well public health officials are dealing with the crisis, whether to get a vaccine once one is available, and whether life will remain changed in a major way after the pandemic. For Biden supporters, the coronavirus outbreak was a central issue in the election – in an October poll, 82% said it was very important to their vote. Among Trump supporters, it was easily the least significant among six issues tested on the survey: Just 24% said it was very important.

Why is America cleaved in this way? Once again, looking across other nations gives us some indication. The polarizing pressures of partisan media, social media, and even deeply rooted cultural, historical and regional divides are hardly unique to America. By comparison, America's relatively rigid, two-party electoral system stands apart by collapsing a wide range of legitimate social and political debates into a singular battle line that can make our differences appear even larger than they may actually be. And when the balance of support for these political parties is close enough for either to gain near-term electoral advantage – as it has in the U.S. for more than a quarter century – the competition becomes cutthroat and politics begins to feel zero-sum, where one side's gain is inherently the other's loss. Finding common cause – even to fight a common enemy in the public health and economic threat posed by the coronavirus – has eluded us.


Over time, these battles result in nearly all societal tensions becoming consolidated into two competing camps. As Ezra Klein and other writers have noted, divisions between the two parties have intensified over time as various types of identities have become “stacked” on top of people’s partisan identities. Race, religion and ideology now align with partisan identity in ways that they often didn’t in eras when the two parties were relatively heterogeneous coalitions. In their study of polarization across nations, Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue argue that polarization runs particularly deep in the U.S. in part because American polarization is “especially multifaceted.” According to Carothers and O’Donohue, a “powerful alignment of ideology, race, and religion renders America’s divisions unusually encompassing and profound. It is hard to find another example of polarization in the world,” they write, “that fuses all

three major types of identity divisions in a similar way.”

Of course, there’s nothing wrong with disagreement in politics, and before we get nostalgic for a less polarized past it’s important to remember that eras of relatively muted partisan conflict, such as the late 1950s, were also characterized by structural injustice that kept many voices – particularly those of non-White Americans – out of the political arena. Similarly, previous eras of deep division, such as the late 1960s, were far less partisan but hardly less violent or destabilizing. Overall, it’s not at all clear that Americans are further apart from each other than we’ve been in the past, or even that we are more ideologically or affectively divided – that is, exhibiting hostility to those of the other party – than citizens of other democracies. What’s unique about this moment – and particularly acute in America – is that these divisions have collapsed onto a singular axis where we find no toehold for common cause or collective national identity.

Trump, Biden supporters say their candidate should address concerns of all Americans if they win

% of registered voters who say if their preferred candidate is re/elected, they should primarily focus on addressing the concerns of ...



Note: Based on registered voters. No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 30-Oct. 5, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Americans both see this problem and want to address it. Overwhelming

majorities of both Trump (86%) and Biden (89%) supporters surveyed this fall said that their preferred candidate, if elected, should focus on addressing the needs of all Americans, “even if it means disappointing some of his supporters.”

In his speech, President-elect Biden vowed to “work as hard for those who didn’t vote for me as those who did” and called on “this grim era of demonization in America” to come to an end. That’s a sentiment that resonates with Americans on both sides of the fence. But good intentions on the part of our leaders and ourselves face serious headwinds in a political system that reinforces a two-party political battleground at nearly every level.

Share this link:



Michael Dimock

is the president of Pew Research Center. [POSTS](#) [BIO](#) [TWITTER](#) [EMAIL](#)



Richard Wike


is director of global attitudes research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO
[TWITTER](#) [EMAIL](#)

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Americans and Germans Diverge in Views of Transatlantic Alliance Heading into 2021

[返回目录](#)



In 2017, Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung began collaborating on joint public opinion surveys to gauge the state of relations between the United States and Germany. The questions were developed together, and each organization fielded a survey within its own country starting that year. Some of the questions have been repeated annually to allow both organizations to track attitudes over time. Topics include relations with other countries, the state of the transatlantic partnership on a variety of foreign policy issues, views of China, Russia and the state of international relations. This year, questions about the coronavirus pandemic were also asked.


The results have been published in both countries, and the previous reports from Pew Research Center can be found here for May 2020, March 2020, 2019 and 2018.

The Körber-Stiftung findings are contained within their larger “Berlin Pulse” report and can be found here for 2020, 2019 and 2018.

The September 2020 findings come from a Pew Research Center survey conducted by SSRS in the U.S. from September 22-28 among 1,007 respondents and a Körber-Stiftung survey conducted by Kantar in Germany from September 10-17 among 1,005 respondents.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with the responses, and its U.S. survey methodology.

As the United States and Germany prepare to gain new leadership in 2021, their current relationship remains unbalanced in the minds of their citizenries. In surveys conducted by Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung before the U.S. presidential election, an overwhelming majority of Americans continue to say that relations between the two countries are good.



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q2. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

“Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


At the same time, almost eight-in-ten Germans say the relationship is in poor shape. Since 2017, the proportion of Germans saying that relations with the U.S. are bad has increased 23 percentage points, while Americans’ views of the

relationship have remained relatively steady. These findings are in line with previous research, which found that Germans rated the U.S. at a 20-year low, said the U.S. had handled the coronavirus outbreak poorly and held little confidence in President Donald Trump.

Americans continue to most commonly name the United Kingdom as the most important foreign policy partner, while Germans name France as their most important partner. Only one-in-ten Americans name Germany as their most important foreign policy partner. An equal percentage of Germans named the U.S. as their most important partner before the U.S. presidential election. But in a survey conducted after Election Day, 23% of Germans named the U.S. as their most important partner, an increase of 13 percentage points.

Americans view Germany as a partner on key issues, but Germans do not see the U.S. in the same light

% of ___ who say that the U.S./Germany is a partner on ...



Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q5af.

German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

In addition, Americans tend to see Germany as a partner on key issues, such as protecting the environment, promoting free trade, democracy and human rights, ensuring European security, and dealing with China and Iran. But few Germans see the U.S. as a partner on most of these pressing issues.

For example, only 12% of Germans say that the U.S. is a partner on protecting the environment, compared with 76% of Americans who say the same about Germany. Clear majorities in Germany do not see the U.S. as a partner on

protecting free trade, democracy and human rights, nor on dealing with China.

However, 54% of Germans say the U.S. is a partner on protecting European security, despite President Trump's announcing the removal of 12,000 troops from Germany. And 45% of Germans say the U.S. is a partner on dealing with Iran, relatively close to the 56% of Americans who say the same.

There is some agreement on the respective countries' relationship with China. Majorities in each country say the U.S.-Germany relationship is more important than their relationship with China. And compared with a survey in April 2020, more Americans and Germans now prioritize the bilateral relationship over one with China. Surveys conducted in 2020 show a sharp uptick in negative views of China in both the U.S. and Germany, as well as elsewhere around the world.


Looking toward the future, most Americans view a Cold War-type conflict between the U.S. and China as likely, while Germans are almost equally divided on this prospect. Americans are also fragmented on the state of international cooperation after the coronavirus pandemic, with roughly equal numbers saying that countries will cooperate more (30%), countries will focus more on their national interests (35%) and international cooperation will not change (33%). A plurality of Germans (46%) think countries will cooperate more after COVID-19.

These are among the findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 1,007 adults conducted in the U.S. from Sept. 22-28, 2020, as well as one Körber-Stiftung survey of 1,005 adults conducted in Germany from Sept. 10-17 and another of 1,058 adults from Nov. 6-10, 2020. For additional results from the German surveys, access the newly released Berlin Pulse publication.

The American-German bilateral relationship

Germans see poor relationship with U.S.; Americans see relations as good

% who say relations today between the U.S. and Germany are ...



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q2. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

["Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"](#)

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Americans' and Germans' views of the relationship between their two countries remain sharply divergent. Americans continue to be rosy in their views of their country's relationship with Germany, with nearly three-quarters saying that relations are good. Nearly two-in-ten Americans say that the relationship is very good (19%), the largest share in four years of polling and up 6 percentage points from 2019.

Among Germans, 79% say that the relationship with the U.S. is bad, a 15 percentage point increase in those saying this since 2019 and the highest negative sentiment in four years of surveys. The share of Germans who say that relations with the U.S. are good is at a mere 18%, the lowest point measured over the same time.

As was the case in previous surveys, younger Germans are more likely to have a positive view of the U.S.-Germany relationship. Still, only 29% of people ages 18 to 34 in Germany say that the relationship with the U.S. is good, compared with even fewer – 14% – among those 50 and older.


Germans do not see the U.S. as a partner on key issues, but Americans do see Germany as one

When asked about partnering on key issues, a majority of Germans say that the

U.S. is *not* a partner on nearly every issue tested. Fewer than four-in-ten say that the U.S. is a partner on dealing with China, promoting free trade, protecting democracy and human rights, and protecting the environment. In fact, a mere 12% of Germans say the U.S. is a partner on the environment.

Germans less likely than Americans to see other country as a partner on key issues

% who say Germany/U.S. is (a) ___ on ...



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q5a-f. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Only on protecting European security do more than half of Germans say that the U.S. is a partner, despite the Trump administration's announcement in July 2020 that it would withdraw 12,000 troops from Germany. And, while Merkel urged the U.S. to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after Trump withdrew from it in 2018, the German public remains nearly even on whether or not the U.S. is a partner when it comes to dealing with Iran.

Americans' views of the partnership with Germany are in stark contrast to those of Germans. For each issue polled, a majority of Americans say that Germany is a partner. This includes three-quarters or more who say Germany is a partner on protecting EU security and the environment, as well as promoting free trade, democracy and human rights. When it comes to dealing with China and Iran, majorities of Americans still say Germany is a partner, even as a little over a third disagree.

Democrats more likely than Republicans to see Germany as a partner on key issues

% who say Germany is a partner on ...



Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q5a-f.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

While Germans of all ages do not see the U.S. as a partner on these issues, a majority of younger Germans (ages 18 to 34) say that the U.S. is a partner when it comes to dealing with Iran and protecting European security. This compares with only a third of those 65 and older who say the same about Iran. In the U.S., younger Americans are more likely to see Germany as a partner on dealing with the environment and China.

German sentiment on whether or not the U.S. is a partner on these issues is mostly in line with the findings of a 2019 survey that found Germans disapproved of Trump's signature foreign policies.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than their Republican counterparts to say that Germany is a partner on each issue tested, except on dealing with Iran. The differences are largest on questions about the traditional American foreign policy goals of promoting free trade and protecting democracy and human rights.

Americans' and Germans' perceptions of foreign policy partners


In both the U.S. and Germany, just one-in-ten name the other country as their own nation's most important foreign policy partner. And Germans and

Americans differ sharply when it comes to which country is their preferred partner.

Americans by and large say that the United Kingdom is the preeminent foreign partner, with 27% mentioning the UK as the most important foreign policy partner. A further 14% of Americans name China and 10% say Israel.

One-in-ten Americans see Germany as the most important foreign policy partner, but more Germans see U.S. as preeminent partner after presidential election

% who say ___ is the most important partner for American/German foreign policy



Note: Only countries with 5% or more mentions listed.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q1. German results from separate Körber-Stiftung surveys conducted Sept. 10-17 and Nov. 6-10, 2020.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Before the U.S. presidential election, more than half of Germans (54%) named France as their most important partner, while 10% said it was the U.S. But in a follow-up survey conducted among Germans after Election Day, nearly a quarter named the U.S. as the most important foreign policy partner, a 13 percentage point increase from September. Almost all that change came at the expense of France, although a clear plurality of Germans continue to see France as their most important partner (43%).

In the U.S., both Republicans and Democrats name the UK as their most trusted partner, although Democrats are more likely to say this. Republicans are also more likely to name Israel as the preeminent partner than are Democrats. But equal shares from both parties see Germany as a top partner, and the same can be said of China.

Democrats are as likely as Republicans to name Germany and China as most important partner, but Republicans keener on Israel than Democrats

% who say ___ is the most important partner for American foreign policy



Note: Only countries with 3% or more mentions listed.


Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q1.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Americans and Germans see bilateral relationship as more important than close relations with China

% who say it is important for their country to have a close relationship to ...



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q3b.

German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.


"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

While many Americans and Germans name China as the most important partner, negative attitudes toward the Asian superpower have increased in both countries over the past year. The two publics have also become more likely to prioritize U.S.-German ties over relations with China. In the September 2020 survey, 55% of Americans prefer to have a close relationship with Germany rather than China (35%). This is a significant change from just April of this year, when 44% wanted a close relationship with Germany and 43% wanted the same with China.

Younger Americans are more likely to prioritize relations with China over relations with Germany

% who say it is important for the U.S. to have a close relationship to ...



Note: Don't know and "both" volunteered responses not shown.
Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q3b.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

A similar shift is seen in Germany. In April, nearly equal numbers wanted to have a close relationship with China (36%) as said the U.S. (37%). But now, a majority of Germans say they prefer the U.S. (55%) over China (27%), similar to sentiment in late 2019, before the pandemic.

Despite the overall sentiment in the U.S. that favors a stronger relationship with Germany, younger Americans are more divided. About four-in-ten of those ages 18 to 29 say it is more important to have a close relationship with Germany, compared with 47% who say the same about China. Older Americans are much more likely to prefer Germany over China. In general, various Pew Research Center surveys have shown older people in the U.S., Germany and elsewhere across advanced economies have more negative views of China.

Americans more likely to say conflict akin to the Cold War will occur between China and the U.S.

% who say that it is ___ that the current rivalry between China and the U.S. will escalate to a confrontation resembling the Cold War



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q4. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

When it comes to the current rivalry between the U.S. and China, Germans and Americans are in slight disagreement on whether a conflict akin to the Cold War will occur. A majority of Americans (59%) think the U.S.-China rivalry will escalate into something like the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that dominated geopolitics from the end of World War II until the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. Around four-in-ten Americans say this is unlikely.

Germans are almost equally divided on this hypothetical scenario. About half (49%) say a Cold War-like confrontation is likely, while 47% say it is unlikely.

Americans and Germans prioritize bilateral relationship over Russian relationship

% who say it is important for their country to have a close relationship to ...



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q3a. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

When it comes to each country's relationship with Russia, both Americans and Germans agree it is better to maintain the bilateral relationship than to be close with Russia. But compared with 2019, more Germans express a desire to be closer with the U.S. than with Russia, when roughly four-in-ten chose the U.S. and three-in-ten volunteered "both."

On this question, older Americans are again more sanguine toward Germany than younger generations. Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are slightly more likely to want better relations with Russia than Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (28% vs. 21%). Democrats, meanwhile, are slightly more positive on the German relationship than Republicans (67% and 58%, respectively). And those in the former East Germany are more likely to want closer relations with Russia (38%) than those in the former West (21%).


Germans say international cooperation will increase after coronavirus, Americans split

Prior to "lockdown light" in Germany and coronavirus cases soaring past records in early November in the U.S., Germans were more likely than Americans to say that countries will cooperate more with other countries once the coronavirus crisis is over. In a slight increase from April, near the beginning of the outbreak,

46% of Germans say that they expect countries will cooperate more with one another, while the share who say that countries will increase their focus on national interests declined 7 percentage points.

Germans more likely than Americans to say countries will cooperate more after coronavirus crisis ends

% who say once the coronavirus crisis is over ...



Note: Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Pew Research Center survey conducted in the U.S. Sept. 22-28, 2020. Q6. German results from Körber-Stiftung survey conducted Sept. 10-17, 2020.

"Americans and Germans Head Into 2021 With Divergent Opinions on Transatlantic Alliance"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

On the other hand, the belief that countries will become more insular is slightly up among Americans, rising to 35% from 29%.

In the U.S., Republicans (40%) are more likely than Democrats (29%) to say that international relations will remain the same once the crisis is over. The opposite is true when it comes to cooperation, with 24% of Republicans saying they expect greater cooperation between countries, while 34% of Democrats say this.

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Democrats more optimistic than Republicans that partisan relations in Washington will improve in 2021

[返回目录](#)

With the delayed transition to a Biden administration now underway, Americans have only modest expectations that the partisanship that has dominated Washington in recent years will ease in 2021. However, Democrats are much more optimistic than Republicans that relations between the two parties will improve.


Just 21% of Americans say relations between Republicans and Democrats will get better in the coming year. Far more (37%) expect relations to worsen, while 41% say they will stay about the same.

To understand Americans' views about partisanship and the political parties after the presidential election, we surveyed 11,818 U.S. adults, including 10,399 registered voters who say they voted in the presidential election, between Nov. 12 to 17. Everyone who took part is a member of Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.

Far more Democrats than Republicans expect partisan relations to get better

% who say relations between Republicans and Democrats in Washington will ...



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Following Joe Biden’s victory and his post-election call for partisan unity, significantly more Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (35%) than Republicans and Republican leaners (7%) say relations between the two parties in Washington will improve.

To be sure, more Democrats say partisan relations will stay the same (44%) or get worse (20%) than predict they will improve. But Democrats are far more optimistic than Republicans, a majority of whom (54%) say relations will get worse in the coming year, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted Nov. 12 to 17.

The share of Americans who expect relations between Republicans and Democrats in Washington to improve, while low, has more than doubled – from 9% to 21% – since shortly after the 2018 midterm election, when Democrats gained a majority in the House of Representatives. Since then, the share of Democrats who anticipate improved partisan relations has increased 22 percentage points, from 13% to 35%, while remaining virtually unchanged among Republicans at 6%.

Majorities in both parties say nation's partisan divisions are increasing

% who say divisions between Republicans and Democrats in this country today are ...



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Meanwhile, the public continues to have largely negative views about the state of partisan divisions in the country. A majority of Americans (69%) say that divisions between Republicans and Democrats today are increasing, while just 8% say they are decreasing and 23% say they are staying the same.

Majorities of both Republicans (74%) and Democrats (65%) say partisan divisions are increasing. Only about one-in-ten in both parties say they are decreasing, while 26% of Democrats and 20% of Republicans say they are staying about the same.

80% of Americans are very or somewhat concerned by partisan divisions in U.S.

% who say they are _____ concerned about divisions between Republicans and Democrats ...



Note: No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

While Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say partisan divisions are increasing, Democrats are more likely to be very concerned about partisan divides in the country.

Sizable majorities in both parties (80% of Republicans, 83% of Democrats) say they are very or somewhat concerned about divisions between Republicans and Democrats. While 40% of Republicans are very concerned by this, a somewhat larger share of Democrats (48%) say the same.

Following the 2020 elections, members of both parties are generally optimistic about the future of their parties. More than eight-in-ten Democrats (83%) today say that they are either very or somewhat optimistic about the future of the Democratic Party, and nearly three-quarters of Republicans (74%) say the same about their party.

Democrats grow more optimistic about their party following Biden's victory



Note: Republicans and Republican leaners were asked about the Republican Party. Democrats and Democratic leaners were asked about the Democratic Party. No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Partisans typically express optimism about the futures of their parties. But more Democrats are optimistic today, after Biden's win, than after Hillary Clinton's loss in 2016 (83% now, 61% in November 2016). Republicans are nearly as optimistic about the GOP as they were in 2016 (74% now, 79% then).

Note: Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.

Share this link: Vianney Gomez

is a research assistant focusing on U.S. politics and policy at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

How Democrats and Republicans Use Twitter

[返回目录](#)

Twitter is one of many online venues where politicians and the public can go to engage with the issues of the day, but it can be difficult to identify ordinary Americans among the many other types of accounts on the site. This analysis offers a window into the behaviors of U.S. adults on Twitter who identify with one of the two major U.S. political parties. To identify U.S. adults on the platform (as distinct from organizational accounts or those belonging to users in other countries) and examine their Twitter behaviors, the Center fielded two separate surveys of U.S. adults in which respondents were asked to volunteer their Twitter handle for research purposes. After removing invalid handles and those whose accounts were set to private, this process produced a set of 3,518 U.S. adults with valid, public accounts whose Twitter activity could be matched to their survey responses, including to their stated party affiliation.

The data used to describe how U.S. Twitter users differ from all U.S. adults is taken from a survey of 9,220 U.S. adults conducted Aug. 31-Sept. 7, 2020. Everyone who completed the survey is a member of Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The surveys are weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories.

Each of these components are described in greater detail in the report [Methodology](#).


Entering the peak of the the 2020 election season, social media platforms are firmly entrenched as a venue for Americans to process campaign news and engage in various types of social activism. But not all Americans use these platforms in similar ways. A new Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. adults' Twitter behaviors finds that Democrats and Republicans have notable differences in how they use the site – from how often they tweet to the accounts

they follow or mention in their own posts.

Small share of highly active Twitter users, majority of whom are Democrats, produce bulk of tweets from U.S. adults

For U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts ...

Top 10% of tweeters create



of all tweets from U.S. users

Of the top 10% of tweeters, % that are ...

Dem/Lean Dem



69%

Rep/Lean Rep



26%

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 3,518 U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts. Tweets collected via Twitter API, Nov. 11, 2019, through Sept. 14, 2020.

"Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Most U.S. adults on Twitter post only rarely. But a small share of highly active users, most of whom are Democrats, produce the vast majority of tweets. The Center's analysis finds that just 10% of users produced 92% of all tweets from U.S. adults since last November, and that 69% of these highly prolific users identify as Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents.

A number of factors contribute to this phenomenon. Previous Twitter analyses by the Center have found that the platform contains a larger share of Democrats

than Republicans. And in addition to being more prevalent on the site in general, the 10% most active Democrats typically produce roughly twice as many tweets in a month (157) as the 10% most active Republicans (79).

Across both parties, those who use Twitter differ in several ways compared with non-users. For instance, Twitter-using Democrats and Republicans alike tend to be younger and have higher levels of educational attainment compared with members of each party who do not use the platform.

Although nearly identical shares of Republican Twitter users (60%) and non-users (62%) describe themselves as very or somewhat conservative, Democrats who use Twitter tend to be more liberal than non-users. Some 60% of Democrats on Twitter describe their political leanings as liberal (with 24% saying they are “very” liberal), compared with 43% among those who are not Twitter users (only 12% of whom say they are very liberal).


Beyond posting volume, Democrats and Republicans also differ from each other in their actual behaviors on the platform. For instance, the two accounts followed by the largest share of U.S. adults are much more likely to be followed by users from one party than the other. Former President Barack Obama (@BarackObama) is followed by 42% of Democrats but just 12% of Republicans, while President Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump) is followed by 35% of Republicans and just 13% of Democrats.

Many other popular accounts are followed primarily by those who identify as either Democrat or Republican. However, a small number of the most-followed accounts on Twitter (mostly popular celebrities or entertainers) are followed by similar shares of U.S. adults belonging to each party.

Democratic and Republican Twitter users differ in several consistent ways compared with members of each party who do not use the platform. Most notably, Democrats and Republicans on the site (including political independents who “lean” toward either party) tend to be younger and more highly educated than fellow Democrats or Republicans who are not Twitter users.

Democrats on Twitter more likely to identify as liberal than Democrats who are not Twitter users

*% of Twitter users/non-users in each party who are ...
(for example, 60% of Democrats who use Twitter say they are very/
somewhat liberal, compared with 43% of Democrats who do not use Twitter)*



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Aug. 21-Sept. 7, 2020.
“Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

These age differences are especially pronounced among Democrats. Some 37% of adult Democrats on Twitter are between the ages of 18 and 29, a figure that is 21 percentage points higher than their share (16%) among Democrats who are not Twitter users. Roughly one-in-five Republican Twitter users (22%) are 18 to 29 years old, compared with 12% of non-users. The shares of both Democratic (7%) and Republican (12%) Twitter users who are 65 and older are much smaller than among non-users.

In addition to being younger, the Twitter-using contingent of each party contains a larger share of college graduates – and a lower share of those with a high school diploma or less – relative to those who are not Twitter users. And for


Democrats and Republicans alike, Twitter users are more likely than non-users to say they use a variety of other online social platforms.

At the same time, these differences between Twitter users and non-users are not always consistent across parties. Most notably, Twitter-using Democrats include a much larger share of self-identified political liberals than Democrats who are not on the platform (60% vs. 43%). But among Republicans, self-identified conservatives make up a nearly identical share of Twitter users and non-users (60% vs. 62%).

Minority of U.S. adults on Twitter create bulk of all tweets, and Democrats make up a majority of this highly active group

For Democrats and Republicans alike, tweeting behavior dominated by a small group of highly active U.S. adults on Twitter

Medians among all U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts



Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 3,518 U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts. Tweets collected via Twitter API, Nov. 11, 2019, through Sept. 14, 2020. Number of accounts followed and number of followers collected on Sept. 14, 2020.

“Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter”

Regardless of party, most Twitter users tweet very infrequently. The median U.S. adult Twitter user tweeted just once per month during the time period of the study. The median Democrat posts just one tweet per month, and the median Republican has no monthly tweets. Similarly, the typical adult on the platform – regardless of party – has relatively few followers. The median Democrat is followed by just 32 other people, while 21 other users follow the median Republican.

Although members of both parties tweet relatively rarely, Democrats are more active users when it comes to other aspects of their Twitter behavior, such as the number of accounts they follow. The median Democrat on Twitter follows 126 other accounts, 1.8 times as many as the number followed by the median Republican (71).

Moving beyond the behaviors of the median or typical user, a small share of highly prolific tweeters produce the vast majority of tweets (a finding that is consistent with previous research from the Center). During the period in which this study was conducted, the 10% most active users on the site produced an estimated 92% of all tweets from U.S. adults. And of these highly active users that produce the bulk of content on the site, more than two-thirds (69%) are Democrats while 26% are Republicans.


In addition to making up a majority of the most active tweeters among all U.S. adults on Twitter, the most active Democrats also tweet more often than the most active Republicans. The most active 10% of Democrats in terms of tweeting produced on average nearly twice as many tweets per month as the typical Republican in the top 10% of tweeting activity (157 vs. 79). Over the entirety of the 10-month study period, the median Democrat in the top 10% of tweeting activity produced just over 1,600 tweets, compared with just over 800 for the typical Republican in the top 10% of activity.

Despite these substantive differences in tweet volume, the top 10% most active Democrats and Republicans are comparable in terms of the number of accounts they follow (580 vs. 582), the number of accounts who follow them (342 vs. 354) and the number of tweets they favorite in a typical month.

Presidents, other major political figures rank among the most-followed accounts by U.S. adults

Many popular Twitter accounts more likely to be followed by U.S. adult Twitter users of one party

% of U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts who follow ...



Note: Accounts listed include the top 10 most followed by all U.S. adults, as well as any accounts in the top 10 most-followed by either Democrats or Republicans. Center researchers were unable to identify a current twitter account associated with two Twitter IDs.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 3,518 U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts. Lists of followed accounts collected via Twitter API, Sept. 6-7, 2020, for ATP respondents and Sept. 10-12, 2020, for KnowledgePanel.

"Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter"

U.S. adults on Twitter follow a wide range of other users on the site. The 3,518 Twitter users in this analysis follow a total of almost 750,000 unique accounts. For the most part, there is very little overlap in the accounts that different users follow. Only 10,151 of these 750,000 accounts are followed by more than 10 users in this sample. But some high-profile accounts – typically public figures from entertainment and politics – are followed by substantial shares of U.S. adults on the site.

Certain popular accounts are followed by comparable shares of Democrats and Republicans. Late-night host Jimmy Fallon (@jimmyfallon), for instance, is followed by 16% of Democrats on the site and 11% of Republicans. But it is more common for these popular accounts to be followed by a larger share of members from one party than the other.


This is especially true for the Twitter accounts of the current and preceding president. Former President Obama (@BarackObama, followed by 31% of U.S. adults) and President Trump (@realDonaldTrump, 20%) are among the most-followed individual accounts by U.S. adults on the platform. And these two accounts are also the most “distinctive” to Twitter users from each party. Some 42% of Democrats and Democratic leaners on Twitter follow Obama, 30 percentage points higher than the 12% of Republicans who do so. Similarly, 35% of Republicans – but just 13% of Democrats – follow Trump’s personal account.

A number of other popular accounts from the world of politics are followed largely by users from one party or the other. Notable examples include Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC) and Fox News personalities Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson) and Sean Hannity (@seanhannity).

This analysis also highlights the extent to which members of each party are following their own party’s presidential candidates, as well as those from the other party. (Note: In contrast to the preceding analysis that was based on individual accounts, this analysis includes *any* account – whether official or unofficial – belonging to each candidate.)

Partisan differences in following each presidential ticket

% of U.S. adults with public accounts who follow at least one official or unofficial account belonging to ...



Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 3,518 U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts. Lists of followed accounts collected via Twitter API, Sept. 6-7, 2020, for ATP respondents and Sept. 10-12, 2020, for KnowledgePanel.

"Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Among Democrats, former Vice President Joe Biden and Sen. Kamala Harris are followed by similar shares of users. But among Republicans, a substantially larger share follows Trump than follows Vice President Mike Pence. And although relatively small shares of users follow candidates from the other party, nearly one-in-five Democrats (18%) follow at least one account associated with Trump – comparable to the shares who follow each member of the Democratic presidential ticket.

In total, 19% of Democrats on Twitter follow at least one account belonging to a member of their party's presidential ticket, compared with 38% of Republicans who follow at least one member of their own party's ticket.

Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump) and Joe Biden (@joebiden) among the most-mentioned accounts by members of both parties

Donald Trump, Joe Biden among most-mentioned accounts by U.S. adult Twitter users of each party

% of U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts who have mentioned ___ in an original tweet (not including retweets)



Note: Chart shows 10 most mentioned accounts for each group. Analysis includes mentions of each account in an original tweet, in the original text of a quoted tweet or replies to a specific account. Retweets in which no additional text were added by the user are not included in this analysis.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 3,518 U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts.

Tweets collected via Twitter API, Nov. 11, 2019, through Sept. 14, 2020.

“Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

As is true of the accounts they follow, U.S. adults on Twitter mention a wide range of other users on the site. In the 10 months included in this analysis, respondents in this study mentioned a total of just over 218,000 distinct Twitter accounts in their own tweets. This figure and the analysis that follows includes accounts mentioned in original tweets, in the original text of quoted tweets, or in replies to a specific account. But it does not include retweets in which no additional text was added by the user.

And as is also true of the accounts they follow, a small subset of these accounts

were mentioned at least once during this time period by a notable share of all U.S. adults on Twitter. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) was mentioned by 12% of U.S. adults on that platform during that period – and by comparable shares of Democrats (13%) and Republicans (12%). Biden (@JoeBiden) and the video-sharing site YouTube (@YouTube) also rank among the three most mentioned accounts during this period for Democrats and Republicans alike.

Most common hashtags used by U.S. adult Twitter users

% of U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts who have used each hashtag

#covid19	4%
#blacklivesmatter	3
#coronavirus	3
#mytwitteranniversary	3
#newprofilepic	3
#sweepstakes	2
#contest	2
#giveaway	2

Note: Hashtags less than two characters in length were excluded from analysis.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 3,518 U.S. adults with public Twitter accounts. Tweets collected via Twitter API, Nov. 11, 2019, through Sept. 14, 2020.
“Differences in How Republicans and Democrats Behave on Twitter”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Outside these three accounts, there is little overlap in the top 10 most mentioned

accounts for Democrats and Republicans. The main CNN account (@CNN) is the only other handle that appears in the top 10 most mentioned for members of both parties.

There are also modest differences in the top hashtags used by members of each party, although no single hashtag was used by more than 5% of U.S. adults on Twitter over the study period. The most common hashtags during that time include #BlackLivesMatter, hashtags related to the COVID-19 pandemic (#covid19, #coronavirus), Twitter-related updates (#mytwitteranniversary, #newprofilepic) and those related to various marketing (#sweepstakes, #contest, #giveaway).

A pronounced difference between Democrats and Republicans relates to use of the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag. Some 4% of Democrats on Twitter used this hashtag at least once between Nov. 11, 2019, and Sep. 14, 2020, but just 1% of Republicans did so.

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

How removing unauthorized immigrants from census statistics could affect House reapportionment

[返回目录](#)



The House of Representatives. (National Archives)

Since the first census of the United States in 1790, counts that include both citizens and noncitizens have been used to apportion seats in the House of Representatives, with states gaining or losing based on population change over the previous decade. If unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. were removed from the 2020 census apportionment count – which the White House seeks to do – three states could each lose a seat they otherwise would have had and three others each could gain one, according to a Pew Research Center analysis based on government records.

If unauthorized immigrants were excluded from the apportionment count, California, Florida and Texas would each end up with one less congressional seat than they would have been awarded based on population change alone. California would lose two seats instead of one, Florida would gain one instead of

two, and Texas would gain two instead of three, according to analysis based on projections of Census Bureau 2019 population estimates and the Center’s estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population.

This blog post explores the role of the nation’s unauthorized immigrant population in apportionment of congressional seats. Every decade, the U.S. Census Bureau conducts a count of all people living in the country, which is then used to distribute seats in the House of Representatives to the states. The analysis in this blog post is based on projections using Census Bureau population estimates, Pew Research Center estimates of the size of the unauthorized immigrant population and established formulas for assigning congressional seats.

The Method of Equal Proportions assigns congressional seats to states based on their populations after each state is given their first seat. The method requires 50 state population figures and assigns seats sequentially; it stops after the 435th seat is assigned. Our population figures for 2020 are based on the Census Bureau’s official population estimates for 2018 and 2019 projected to April 1, 2020. We use these for our baseline apportionment.

The Pew Research Center has published estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population for states through 2017. The estimates for 2016 and 2017 show very little change, and external indications suggest few changes since then. Accordingly, we use our 2017 estimates for 2020 and subtract them from the total to provide the populations for an apportionment which excludes unauthorized immigrants.

Projected change in congressional seats after 2020 census

	Current # of House seats	Gain/loss due to census count based on ...		Projected total based on ...	
		Population change	Minus unauthorized immigrants	Population change alone	Pop. change minus unauthorized immigrants
Texas	36	3	-1	39	38
Florida	27	2	-1	29	28
Arizona	9	1	-	10	10
Colorado	7	1	-	8	8
Montana	1	1	-	2	2
North Carolina	13	1	-	14	14
Oregon	5	1	-	6	6
Alabama	7	-1	1	6	7
Minnesota	8	-1	1	7	8
Ohio	16	-1	1	15	16
Illinois	18	-1	-	17	17
Michigan	14	-1	-	13	13
New York	27	-1	-	26	26
Pennsylvania	18	-1	-	17	17
Rhode Island	2	-1	-	1	1
West Virginia	3	-1	-	2	2
California	53	-1	-1	52	51

Note: Current number of House seats based on 2010 census counts.

Source: Method of equal proportions applied to Pew Research Center projections based on Census Bureau population estimates and Pew Research Center estimates of unauthorized immigrants.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Alabama, Minnesota and Ohio would each hold onto a seat that they would have lost if apportionment were based only on total population change. Alabama filed

a lawsuit in 2018 seeking to block the Census Bureau from including unauthorized immigrants in its population count.

In addition to these states, 11 more would gain or lose seats based on population change alone, whether unauthorized immigrants are included or excluded. Five states would gain one seat each: Arizona, Colorado, Montana, North Carolina and Oregon. Six states would lose one seat each: Illinois, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West Virginia.

The apportionment of seats in Congress is required by the U.S. Constitution, which says that the census will be used to divide the House of Representatives “among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State,” except for enslaved people, who, until the late 1800s, were counted as three-fifths of a person, and certain American Indians. The 14th Amendment eliminated the partial count of enslaved people, and the total American Indian population was added later to congressional reapportionment calculations. The number of seats in the House was fixed at 435 following the 1910 census. Each state gets one seat, and the remainder are assigned according to a complex formula based on relative population size.

The census count includes everyone living in the United States, except for foreign tourists and business travelers in the country temporarily, according to Census Bureau rules. For apportionment purposes since 1990, military and civilian federal employees stationed abroad and their dependents are counted as living in a state if they provided a state address in their employment records. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and U.S. Island area populations are excluded from the apportionment total because they have no voting representation in Congress.

Federal law requires the population totals from the decennial census be delivered to the president nine months after Census Day, meaning Dec. 31, 2020. The Census Bureau has requested Congress extend the deadline to April 30, 2021, due to the coronavirus pandemic, although the White House reportedly may push for a “timely census” fueled by \$1 billion in additional funding. States would redraw congressional district boundaries to fit the new totals. The results would take effect for the Congress that meets in 2023.

In his memorandum announcing a new policy “to the extent practicable” in how congressional seats are divided up, President Donald Trump asserted that the

president has discretion to decide who is considered an inhabitant of the U.S. for apportionment purposes. Some of the same groups that successfully challenged the White House attempt to add a citizenship question to the census last year said they also would sue to block any change in apportionment policy. Democrats announced they would hold an emergency congressional hearing to respond.

The Census Bureau does not regularly publish counts or estimates of unauthorized immigrants, although the Department of Homeland Security has done so. Last year, after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against including a question about citizenship on the 2020 census, the president ordered the Census Bureau to assemble a separate database, using other government records, on the citizenship status of every U.S. resident. This has also been challenged in court.

The Center's analysis relies on assumptions about populations to be counted in the 2020 census and estimates of unauthorized immigrants. The actual figures used for apportionment will be different from these, and so the actual apportionment could differ regardless of whether unauthorized immigrants are excluded from the apportionment totals.

Share this link:



Jeffrey S. Passel

is a senior demographer at Pew Research Center. [POSTS](#) [BIO](#) [EMAIL](#)



D'Vera Cohn

is a senior writer/editor focusing on immigration and demographics at Pew Research Center. [POSTS](#) [BIO](#) [TWITTER](#) [EMAIL](#)

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Key findings about U.S. immigrants

[返回目录](#)




Immigrants listen to a speech as they wait to become U.S. citizens at a naturalization ceremony in Los Angeles. (Mark Ralson/AFP/Getty Images)

The United States has more immigrants than any other country in the world. Today, more than 40 million people living in the U.S. were born in another country, accounting for about one-fifth of the world's migrants. The population of immigrants is also very diverse, with just about every country in the world represented among U.S. immigrants.

Facts on U.S. immigrants, 2018

Statistical portrait of the foreign-born population in the United States

BY JYNNAH RADFORD AND LUIS NOE-BUSTAMANTE




**View interactive charts
and detailed tables on
U.S. immigrants.**

Pew Research Center regularly publishes statistical portraits of the nation's foreign-born population, which include historical trends since 1960. Based on these portraits, here are answers to some key questions about the U.S. immigrant population.

How many people in the U.S. are immigrants?

The U.S. foreign-born population reached a record 44.8 million in 2018. Since 1965, when U.S. immigration laws replaced a national quota system, the number of immigrants living in the U.S. has more than quadrupled. Immigrants today account for 13.7% of the U.S. population, nearly triple the share (4.8%) in 1970. However, today's immigrant share remains below the record 14.8% share in 1890, when 9.2 million immigrants lived in the U.S.




Source: U.S. Census Bureau, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000" and Pew Research Center tabulations of 2010-2018 American Community Survey (IPUMS).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

What is the legal status of immigrants in the U.S.?

Unauthorized immigrants are almost a quarter of U.S. foreign-born population

Foreign-born population estimates, 2017



Note: Figures for the total and subgroups differ from published U.S. Census Bureau totals because census data have been augmented and adjusted to account for undercount of the population. All numbers are rounded. Unauthorized immigrants include some with temporary protection from deportation under Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS), as well as pending asylum cases.

Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on augmented U.S. Census Bureau data.

Most immigrants (77%) are in the country legally, while almost a quarter are unauthorized, according to new Pew Research Center estimates based on census data adjusted for undercount. In 2017, 45% were naturalized U.S. citizens.

Some 27% of immigrants were permanent residents and 5% were temporary residents in 2017. Another 23% of all immigrants were unauthorized immigrants. From 1990 to 2007, the unauthorized immigrant population more than tripled in size – from 3.5 million to a record high of 12.2 million in 2007. By 2017, that number had declined by 1.7 million, or 14%. There were 10.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2017, accounting for 3.2% of the nation’s population.

The decline in the unauthorized immigrant population is due largely to a fall in the number from Mexico – the single largest group of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. Between 2007 and 2017, this group decreased by 2 million. Meanwhile, there was a rise in the number from Central America and Asia.

Do all lawful immigrants choose to become U.S. citizens?


Not all lawful permanent residents choose to pursue U.S. citizenship. Those who wish to do so may apply after meeting certain requirements, including having lived in the U.S. for five years. In fiscal year 2019, about 800,000 immigrants applied for naturalization. The number of naturalization applications has climbed in recent years, though the annual totals remain below the 1.4 million applications filed in 2007.

Generally, most immigrants eligible for naturalization apply to become citizens. However, Mexican lawful immigrants have the lowest naturalization rate overall. Language and personal barriers, lack of interest and financial barriers are among the top reasons for choosing not to naturalize cited by Mexican-born green card holders, according to a 2015 Pew Research Center survey.

Where do immigrants come from?

Mexico, China and India are among top birthplaces for immigrants in the U.S.

Top five countries of birth for immigrants in the U.S. in 2018, in millions



Note: China includes Macau, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mongolia.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 2018 American Community Survey (IPUMS).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Mexico is the top origin country of the U.S. immigrant population. In 2018, roughly 11.2 million immigrants living in the U.S. were from there, accounting for 25% of all U.S. immigrants. The next largest origin groups were those from China (6%), India (6%), the Philippines (4%) and El Salvador (3%).


By region of birth, immigrants from Asia combined accounted for 28% of all immigrants, close to the share of immigrants from Mexico (25%). Other regions

make up smaller shares: Europe, Canada and other North America (13%), the Caribbean (10%), Central America (8%), South America (7%), the Middle East and North Africa (4%) and sub-Saharan Africa (5%).

Who is arriving today?

Among new immigrant arrivals, Asians outnumber Hispanics

% of immigrants arriving in the U.S. in each year who are ...



2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018

Note: Figures for 2000 to 2004 are based on the household population and do not include arrivals residing in group quarters. For 2000-2017, the shares are computed using immigrants who arrived in the year before the ACS surveys of 2001-2018; for 2018, based on those arriving in 2018 in the 2018 ACS. Race and ethnicity based on self-reports. Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 2001-2018 American Community Surveys (IPUMS).


More than 1 million immigrants arrive in the U.S. each year. In 2018, the top country of origin for new immigrants coming into the U.S. was China, with 149,000 people, followed by India (129,000), Mexico (120,000) and the Philippines (46,000).

By race and ethnicity, more Asian immigrants than Hispanic immigrants have arrived in the U.S. in most years since 2009. Immigration from Latin America slowed following the Great Recession, particularly for Mexico, which has seen both decreasing flows into the United States and large flows back to Mexico in recent years.

Asians are projected to become the largest immigrant group in the U.S. by 2055, surpassing Hispanics. Pew Research Center estimates indicate that in 2065, those who identify as Asian will make up some 38% of all immigrants; as Hispanic, 31%; White, 20%; and Black, 9%.

Is the immigrant population growing?

**U.S. foreign-born population reached
45 million in 2015, projected to reach
78 million by 2065**



Source: Gibson and Jung (2006) for 1850 to 1890; Edmonston and Passel (1994) estimates for 1900-1955; Pew Research Center estimates for 1960-2015 based on adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


New immigrant arrivals have fallen, mainly due to a decrease in the number of unauthorized immigrants coming to the U.S. The drop in the unauthorized immigrant population can primarily be attributed to more Mexican immigrants leaving the U.S. than coming in.

Looking forward, immigrants and their descendants are projected to account for 88% of U.S. population growth through 2065, assuming current immigration trends continue. In addition to new arrivals, U.S. births to immigrant parents will be important to future growth in the country's population. In 2018, the percentage of women giving birth in the past year was higher among immigrants (7.5%) than among the U.S. born (5.7%). While U.S.-born women gave birth to more than 3 million children that year, immigrant women gave birth to about 760,000.

How many immigrants have come to the U.S. as refugees?

More than half of U.S. refugees in 2019 were from D.R. Congo and Burma

*Number of refugees entering the U.S. in fiscal 2019,
by origin country*



Note: Data do not include special immigrant visas and certain humanitarian parole entrants.

Source: U.S. State Department's Refugee Processing Center accessed October 2019.

Since the creation of the federal Refugee Resettlement Program in 1980, about 3 million refugees have been resettled in the U.S. – more than any other country.

In fiscal 2019, a total of 30,000 refugees were resettled in the U.S. The largest origin group of refugees was the Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by Burma (Myanmar), Ukraine, Eritrea and Afghanistan. Among all refugees admitted in fiscal year 2019, 4,900 are Muslims (16%) and 23,800 are Christians (79%). Texas, Washington, New York and California resettled more than a quarter of all refugees admitted in fiscal 2018.


Where do most U.S. immigrants live?

Nearly half (45%) of the nation's immigrants live in just three states: California (24%), Texas (11%) and Florida (10%). California had the largest immigrant population of any state in 2018, at 10.6 million. Texas, Florida and New York had more than 4 million immigrants each.

In terms of regions, about two-thirds of immigrants lived in the West (34%) and South (34%). Roughly one-fifth lived in the Northeast (21%) and 11% were in the Midwest.

In 2018, most immigrants lived in just 20 major metropolitan areas, with the largest populations in the New York, Los Angeles and Miami metro areas. These top 20 metro areas were home to 28.7 million immigrants, or 64% of the nation's total foreign-born population. Most of the nation's unauthorized immigrant population lived in these top metro areas as well.

20 metropolitan areas with the largest number of immigrants in 2018




Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2018 American Community Survey (1% IPUMS).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


How do immigrants compare with the U.S. population overall in education?

Educational attainment among U.S. immigrants, 2018

% among those ages 25 and older



Foreign born birthplace:



Note: "Some college" includes those with two-year degrees. "High school graduate" includes those with a high school diploma or its equivalent, such as a GED certificate. Middle East consists of Southwest Asia and North Africa.

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of the 2018 American Community Survey (IPUMS).

Immigrants in the U.S. as a whole have lower levels of education than the U.S.-born population. In 2018, immigrants were over three times as likely as the U.S. born to have not completed high school (27% vs. 8%). However, immigrants were just as likely as the U.S. born to have a bachelor's degree or more (32% and 33%, respectively).

Educational attainment varies among the nation's immigrant groups, particularly across immigrants from different regions of the world. Immigrants from Mexico and Central America are less likely to be high school graduates than the U.S. born (54% and 47%, respectively, do not have a high school diploma, vs. 8% of U.S. born). On the other hand, immigrants from every region *except* Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America were as likely as or more likely than U.S.-born residents to have a bachelor's or advanced degree.

Among all immigrants, those from South Asia (71%) were the most likely to have a bachelor's degree or more. Immigrants from Mexico (7%) and Central America (11%) were the least likely to have a bachelor's or higher.

How many immigrants are working in the U.S.?

Total U.S. labor force grows since 2007, but number of unauthorized immigrant workers declines

Labor force estimates, in millions

	2017	2007	Change
U.S. total	164.4	153.3	+11.2
U.S. born	135.7	127.9	+7.8
Lawful immigrant	21.2	17.2	+4.0
Unauthorized immigrant	7.6	8.2	-0.6

Note: All numbers are rounded; changes calculated from unrounded numbers. Based on civilian labor force.

Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on augmented U.S. Census Bureau data.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

In 2017, about 29 million immigrants were working or looking for work in the U.S., making up some 17% of the total civilian labor force. Lawful immigrants made up the majority of the immigrant workforce, at 21.2 million. An additional 7.6 million immigrant workers are unauthorized immigrants, less than the total of the previous year and notably less than in 2007, when they were 8.2 million. They alone account for 4.6% of the civilian labor force, a dip from their peak of 5.4% in 2007. During the same period, the overall U.S. workforce grew, as did the number of U.S.-born workers and lawful immigrant workers.


Immigrants are projected to drive future growth in the U.S. working-age population through at least 2035. As the Baby Boom generation heads into retirement, immigrants and their children are expected to offset a decline in the

working-age population by adding about 18 million people of working age between 2015 and 2035.

How well do immigrants speak English?

Half of immigrants in U.S. are English proficient as of 2018

% of foreign-born population ages 5 and older who are English proficient



Note: English proficient are those who speak only English at home or if they speak a non-English language at home, they indicate they can speak English at least “very well.”

Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1980-2000 decennial censuses and 2010, 2013-2018 American Community Surveys (IPUMS).

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Among immigrants ages 5 and older in 2018, half (53%) are proficient English

speakers – either speaking English very well (37%) or only speaking English at home (17%).

Immigrants from Mexico have the lowest rates of English proficiency (34%), followed by those from Central America (35%), East and Southeast Asia (50%) and South America (56%). Immigrants from Canada (96%), Oceania (82%), Europe (75%) and sub-Saharan Africa (74%) have the highest rates of English proficiency.

The longer immigrants have lived in the U.S., the greater the likelihood they are English proficient. Some 47% of immigrants living in the U.S. five years or less are proficient. By contrast, more than half (57%) of immigrants who have lived in the U.S. for 20 years or more are proficient English speakers.

Among immigrants ages 5 and older, Spanish is the most commonly spoken language. Some 42% of immigrants in the U.S. speak Spanish at home. The top five languages spoken at home among immigrants outside of Spanish are English only (17%), followed by Chinese (6%), Hindi (5%), Filipino/Tagalog (4%) and French (3%).


How many immigrants have been deported recently?

Around 337,000 immigrants were deported from the U.S. in fiscal 2018, up since 2017. Overall, the Obama administration deported about 3 million immigrants between 2009 and 2016, a significantly higher number than the 2 million immigrants deported by the Bush administration between 2001 and 2008. In 2017, the Trump administration deported 295,000 immigrants, the lowest total since 2006.

Immigrants convicted of a crime made up the less than half of deportations in 2018, the most recent year for which statistics by criminal status are available. Of the 337,000 immigrants deported in 2018, some 44% had criminal convictions and 56% were not convicted of a crime. From 2001 to 2018, a majority (60%) of immigrants deported have not been convicted of a crime.

U.S. deportations of immigrants slightly up in 2018

In thousands, by fiscal year and criminal status



Note: Criminal status is based on prior criminal conviction. Data refers to removals by U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security publications. Data for 2001-2004: "Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2010." Data for 2005-2014: "Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2014." Data for 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 from "Yearbook of Immigration Statistics" for each respective year.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

How many immigrant apprehensions take place at the U.S.-Mexico border?


The number of apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border has doubled from fiscal 2018 to fiscal 2019, from 396,579 in fiscal 2018 to 851,508 in fiscal 2019.

Today, there are more apprehensions of non-Mexicans than Mexicans at the border. In fiscal 2019, apprehensions of Central Americans at the border exceeded those of Mexicans for the fourth consecutive year. The first time Mexicans did not make up the bulk of Border Patrol apprehensions was in 2014.

How do Americans view immigrants and immigration?

U.S. immigrants are seen more as a strength than a burden to the country

% who say immigrants today ...



Note: Don't know responses not shown.
Source: Phone surveys of U.S. adults conducted 1994-2019.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

While immigration has been at the forefront of a national political debate, the U.S. public holds a range of views about immigrants living in the country. Overall, a majority of Americans have positive views about immigrants. About two-thirds of Americans (66%) say immigrants strengthen the country “because of their hard work and talents,” while about a quarter (24%) say immigrants burden the country by taking jobs, housing and health care.

Yet these views vary starkly by political affiliation. Among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, 88% think immigrants strengthen the country

with their hard work and talents, and just 8% say they are a burden. Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, 41% say immigrants strengthen the country, while 44% say they burden it.

Americans were divided on future levels of immigration. A quarter said legal immigration to the U.S. should be decreased (24%), while one-third (38%) said immigration should be kept at its present level and almost another third (32%) said immigration should be increased.

Note: This is an update of a post originally published May 3, 2017, and written by Gustavo López, a former research analyst focusing on Hispanics, immigration and demographics; and Kristen Bialik, a former research assistant.

CORRECTION (Sept. 21, 2020): An update to the methodology used to tabulate figures in the chart “Among new immigrant arrivals, Asians outnumber Hispanics” has changed all figures from 2001 and 2012. This new methodology has also allowed the inclusion of the figure from 2000. Furthermore, the earlier version of the chart incorrectly showed the partial year shares of Hispanic and Asian recent arrivals in 2015; the corrected complete year shares are 31% and 36%, respectively.

Share this link: Abby Budiman

is a research analyst focusing on global migration and demography research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Majorities in European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc

[返回目录](#)



This analysis focuses on cross-national views of the European Union, key European leaders and European political parties. The work builds on previous studies about views of global leaders – including German Chancellor Angela Merkel – and views of the economy.


The analysis also includes views of how the EU handled the coronavirus outbreak. For this measure – as well as all others in the report – data is drawn from nationally representative surveys conducted June 10 to Aug. 3, 2020, in 14 advanced economies. Notably, the pandemic in Europe has worsened substantially since these surveys were conducted and thus this report focuses primarily on public attitudes and experiences during the summer, as well as how views of how the EU had handled COVID-19 at the time relate, more broadly, to views of the European Union.

This study was conducted in countries where nationally representative telephone

surveys are feasible. Due to the coronavirus outbreak, face-to-face interviewing is not currently possible in many parts of the world. For this report, we use data from nationally representative surveys of 14,276 adults conducted over the phone with adults in the U.S., Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

In the summer, most had positive views of the EU and its response to COVID-19



Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-Aug. 3, 2020. Q8d & 10d.

"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Outside of China, Europe was home to some of the first major coronavirus hotspots – as well as some of the most stringent early national quarantine requirements to curb the spread. Results of a summer survey – conducted before a second surge in cases began, in earnest, in September – indicate that people in most European Union nations approved not only of their national governments’ response to COVID-19, but also of how the EU had handled the outbreak.

Across the eight EU member nations surveyed between June and August 2020, a median of 61% said the EU had done a good job dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. Approval was highest in Germany and the Netherlands, where 68% in each country applauded the bloc’s efforts. At least half or more in every EU country surveyed approved of the EU’s response.

The state of the pandemic in Europe during the summer 2020 survey period


On Oct. 29, the World Health Organization’s Europe director declared, “Europe is at the epicenter of this pandemic again.” His concerns came as the region reached a new weekly record for confirmed coronavirus cases (more than 1.5 million the week before his announcement); hospitalizations rose to levels unseen since the spring, when Europe had been the epicenter of the disease; and test positivity rates once again ran high. As of early November, multiple European governments have imposed new and stringent lockdown procedures, and protests against these measures have broken out in some countries.

Pew Research Center’s survey, conducted June 10 to Aug. 3, 2020, not only preceded this major spike in cases, but it took place at a time when new COVID-19 cases were relatively contained in the European Union. At the time of the survey, these EU countries were recording fewer new cases per day – especially compared with some of the previous spikes in April. For example, Italy had a total of 117 new cases per million people between July 1 and Aug. 1, while part of the survey was fielding – down precipitously from a total of 1,716 new cases per million between April 1 and May 1.

The limited number of new cases over the summer months – and the cessation of some travel restrictions and lockdowns – may have contributed to the relatively positive views most European Union residents had toward the EU’s handling of COVID-19 when polled. These views may have shifted since then, and they may continue to evolve as the pandemic does. Nevertheless, the relationships discussed in this report, such as how views of the EU’s response to COVID-19 are related to overall opinion of the EU, are important to understand. As this report indicates, views of the European Union are related to people’s assessments of its response to the pandemic, as well as people’s economic attitudes.

COVID-19 cases have risen quickly in some EU countries after plateauing in summer

Total confirmed, daily COVID-19 cases per million people (7-day smoothed)




Source: European CDC, accessed via Our World in Data on Oct. 21, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

These positive evaluations also extended to the Brussels-based institution, more broadly, which a median of 66% rated favorably this summer. In Germany, EU favorability reached a record high in the more than 15 years Pew Research Center has been surveying on the topic, with 73% of Germans offering positive assessments of the bloc. In most other EU member states surveyed, ratings largely held steady or improved since last year. In the United Kingdom – in the Center’s first survey of the country since it formally left the EU on Jan. 31, 2020 – the 60% who said they had positive views of the EU is also a historic high, and up 6 percentage points since last year.

Approval of the EU has fluctuated over time but rose in some European countries over the last year

% who have a favorable opinion of the EU




Note: Belgium and Denmark not surveyed prior to 2020. In Italy, 2020 data from telephone surveys; prior data from face-to-face surveys.
Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-Aug. 3, 2020. Q8d.

"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

British views of the EU reached a historic high

% of Britons who have a(n) __ opinion of the EU



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-July 28, 2020. Q8d.


"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The United Kingdom is the only European country included in this survey that is not a member of the European Union, having left the EU on Jan. 31, 2020, three and a half years after the June 2016 Brexit referendum. But, in this first Pew Research Center survey since the country formally left the bloc, views of the European Union climbed to a new historic high, with 60% saying they had a favorable view of the Brussels-based organization.

More Britons said EU handled COVID-19 well than said the same of UK

% of Britons who say the EU or UK has done a ___ dealing with the coronavirus outbreak/have a ___ view of the EU



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-July 28, 2020. Q8d, Q10c-d.

"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Moreover, almost two-thirds in the UK (64%) said at the time of the survey – before the latest surge in European cases and new restrictions – that the EU had done a good job handling the coronavirus outbreak. This was significantly more than the 46% who said the UK itself did a good job dealing with the pandemic over the same period of time.

Indeed, across all nine European countries included in this survey, the British public stands apart for having the worst assessments of their own country's response to the pandemic – while simultaneously having one of the more positive evaluations of the EU's response. Britons who approved of the EU's handling of COVID-19 were significantly more likely to have a favorable view of the organization, overall, than those who thought the EU had handled the outbreak poorly – 72% vs. 42%, respectively.

Among British public, age, education, income and ideology shaped views of EU

% of Britons who have a *favorable* opinion of the EU



Note: For the purpose of comparing educational groups across countries, education levels are standardized based on the UN's International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The "less education" category is secondary education or below and the "more education" category is postsecondary or above in the UK. The party labels represent attitudes toward the EU among those who have a favorable opinion of each party, respectively.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-July 28, 2020. Q8d.

"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Britons were also very divided in their assessments of the EU. For example, 71% of Britons ages 18 to 29 expressed a favorable view of the EU, while only 49% of those 50 and older said the same. This 22 percentage point gap is the largest among the nine European countries surveyed. Similarly, Britons with a postsecondary education or more tended to have more favorable views of the EU than those with less education – and, once again, the 21-point educational gap is the largest across the European countries.

Britons who placed themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum were also

more likely to have a favorable opinion of the EU than those who were on the ideological right, and the 29-point gap between those on the left and those on the right was the largest in Europe.

Partisan preferences also shaped EU assessments. Britons with favorable views of the governing Conservative Party were less likely than those with unfavorable views of the party to express a positive opinion of the EU. The same was true of Britons who had a favorable view of the Brexit Party, which campaigned on the UK leaving the EU in a “clean break.” However, among supporters of the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, the pattern was reversed: Those who had favorable opinions of each party were *more* likely to have a positive view of the EU than those with unfavorable opinions of the parties.


These deep divisions were also evident in assessments of Prime Minister Boris Johnson: 51% of Britons had confidence in him to do the right thing in world affairs while 49% lacked confidence. In fact, fewer Britons expressed confidence in him than Macron (64%) or Merkel (76%).

As has regularly been the case in these surveys, younger people and those on the ideological left tended to have more positive views of the European Union than older age groups or those on the ideological right, respectively. And people with favorable views of right-wing populist parties tended to have less positive views of the EU than others.

When polled over the summer, in every European country surveyed, people who said the EU did well in its response to the pandemic were much more likely to have a positive view of the EU than those who thought the EU did a poor job dealing with COVID-19. Perceptions of the economy at the time of the survey – as well as optimism about the economic future – also colored views of the bloc. Those who thought their domestic economy was in good shape and those who expected their country’s economy to improve were both more likely to have favorable views of the EU and to approve of its handling of COVID-19 than people who thought the economy was in bad shape or expected the economy to worsen.

Europeans who saw the economy in good shape and who expected economic improvement had more positive views of the EU

% who have a *favorable* opinion of the EU, among those who say ...



Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-Aug. 3, 2020. Q8d.


^aMajorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

When it comes to confidence in the two European leaders widely credited with compromising in order to pass a 750 billion euro recovery plan for the bloc – German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron – both were trusted to do the right thing regarding world affairs by around half or more in nearly every EU member state polled. In the case of Merkel, confidence in her leadership increased substantially since last year in Germany (up 7 percentage points), the Netherlands (+6) and Italy (+6) and stood at historic highs in Spain as well as several non-EU member states, including the UK, the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.

Confidence in Merkel and Macron holding steady – or up – across much of Europe

% who have confidence in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Belgium and Denmark not surveyed prior to 2020. In Italy, 2020 data from telephone surveys; prior data from face-to-face surveys.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-Aug. 3, 2020. Q15d-e.

"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Confidence in Macron also increased significantly over the past year in Italy (+9 points) and Sweden (+6) and among several non-EU states including the UK (+9), Japan (+9) and the U.S. (+6). As was the case with attitudes toward the EU, views of both Merkel and Macron were related to assessments of how well the EU had done handling COVID-19.

Trust in British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who has overseen his country's Brexit transition out of the European membership organization, was much more limited. Across the eight EU countries surveyed, a median of 36% had confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs. Even in the UK itself, confidence in Johnson (51%) was lower than confidence in Macron (64%) and Merkel (76%).

People in these EU countries largely approved of the job their own countries had done handling COVID-19 when they were surveyed between June and August of this year. And, in many countries, this was related to favorable views of political parties. For example, in Germany, people who said the country had done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak were 50 percentage points more likely to have a favorable view of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

Views of the ruling En Marche in France, too, were heavily colored by whether people thought the country had done a good job or bad job dealing with COVID-19.

The sense that the country had handled the pandemic well also colored views of some opposition parties. For example, in the Netherlands, those who thought their country had handled the pandemic well tended to have more positive views not only of the ruling People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and Democrats 66 (D66) but also of the Labour Party.

Favorable views of governing parties up in some European countries

% who have a *favorable* view of ...

		2019	2020	'19-'20 change
		%	%	
UK	Labour Party	33	48	▲ 15
Germany	Christian Democratic Union (CDU)	47	61	▲ 14
Italy	Democratic Party (PD)	23	36	▲ 13
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)	42	54	▲ 12
UK	Conservative Party	30	41	▲ 11
France	Socialist Party	26	37	▲ 11
France	Republicans	26	36	▲ 10
Spain	Vox*	18	26	▲ 8
Italy	Forza Italia*	22	29	▲ 7
Netherlands	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)	55	61	▲ 6
Sweden	Moderate Party	51	57	▲ 6
Sweden	Sweden Democrats**	26	32	▲ 6
France	La France Insoumise**	25	31	▲ 6
UK	Liberal Democrats	47	40	▼ 7
Netherlands	Forum for Democracy (FvD)*	35	27	▼ 8
Germany	The Greens/Alliance 90	63	54	▼ 9
Italy	Lega*	44	29	▼ 15

* Indicates right-wing populist party.

** Indicates center or left-wing populist party.

Note: Governing party or ruling coalitions in bold. Only statistically significant changes are shown. In Italy, 2020 data from telephone surveys; 2019 data from face-to-face surveys. Belgium and Denmark not prior to 2020. For more information on European populist parties, see Appendix A. For more information on governing parties, see Appendix B.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-Aug. 3, 2020. Q9FRAa-b,e, Q9GERa-h,e, Q9ITAa-b,d, Q9NETa,e, Q9SPAe, Q9SWEb-c, Q9BRla-d.

"Majorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Against this backdrop, approval of many political parties was up significantly in the summer in comparison with the previous year. In Germany, for example, positive views of two of the ruling parties, CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), rose 14 and 12 percentage points over 2019, respectively. Ruling parties in Italy, the UK and the Netherlands also experienced significant bumps in approval. And opposition parties like the UK's Labour Party as well as the Socialist Party and the Republicans in France also gained in the polls.

Over this same period, views of some right-wing populist parties – Forum for Democracy (FvD) in the Netherlands and Lega in Italy – fell by 8 and 15 points, respectively.

These are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey, conducted June 10 to Aug. 3, 2020, among 7,970 adults in eight European Union member nations: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Together, these eight European Union member states account for about 68% of the EU population and 79% of the EU economy, according to 2019 data from the World Bank. Additional findings come from a survey of the United Kingdom, conducted among 1,003 adults from June 10 to July 28, 2020.

Outside Europe, generally favorable views of EU, mixed opinion on how it handled COVID-19



Note: The EU median is based on eight EU countries surveyed (the UK is not included).

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey conducted June 10-Aug. 3, 2020. Q8d & Q10d.

^aMajorities in the European Union Have Favorable Views of the Bloc

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Results in this report also draw from surveys conducted June 11 to July 29, 2020, among 5,303 adults in the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and South Korea.

Across these five non-European countries, evaluations of how well the European Union handled COVID-19 varied widely. In both Canada and the U.S., around six-in-ten or more said the EU had done a good job when surveyed this summer. In Australia, evaluations were mixed: 46% approved of the EU's handling of the global pandemic while 45% said it had done a poor job. And in Japan and South Korea, half or more said the EU had done a bad job dealing with the outbreak (52% and 78%, respectively). While overall favorability of the EU also varied

widely across these countries – from a low of 47% in Japan to a high of 71% in Canada – in each country, perceptions of how well the EU had done handling COVID-19 is related to favorability of the EU.

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)


Many Americans are unsure whether sources of news do their own reporting

[返回目录](#)

The digital age has given rise to new and diverse ways of accessing news, ranging from news aggregators and social media feeds that simply circulate existing content to news organization websites that publish their journalists' original work. And a new Pew Research Center survey finds many Americans have difficulty in distinguishing sources that do their own reporting from those that don't.

Many Americans uncertain about which sources of news do their own reporting

% of U.S. adults who say ____ when asked if each source does its own news reporting



Note: Of the news sources asked about, ABC News, The Wall Street Journal and HuffPost conduct their own news reporting; Google News, Apple News and Facebook do not. Respondents who did not provide an answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted June 2-11, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The survey, conducted June 2-11, 2020, asked whether six sources of news conduct their own news reporting – ranging from organizations that do original news reporting such as ABC News, The Wall Street Journal and HuffPost to online sources that only gather articles from elsewhere such as Facebook, Google News and Apple News.

Roughly half of Americans or more were able to correctly identify whether three of the six sources do their own reporting: ABC News (56%), The Wall Street Journal (52%) and Facebook (51%). At the same time, though, fewer than four-in-ten were able to correctly answer whether Google News (31%), Apple News (26%) or HuffPost (23%) do their own news reporting. (The survey was conducted before BuzzFeed acquired HuffPost.)

To examine Americans' news consumption habits in an era of rapidly evolving media technology, we surveyed 2,021 U.S. adults on Ipsos' KnowledgePanel (KP). Ipsos' KP is a probability-based web panel designed to be representative of adults in the U.S. The survey was carried out from June 2 to June 11, 2020, in both English and Spanish among a sample of 3,715 noninstitutionalized U.S. adults ages 18 years and older. Of these, the 2,021 respondents constituted a general population sample and were weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population. Results here are reported based on this general population sample of 2,021 respondents. Read more about the KP's methodology.


Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

This analysis was made possible by The Pew Charitable Trusts, which received support from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation.

Uncertainty was common, even for the sources that Americans found easier to classify. About a third or more of respondents were not sure whether each of the sources conducts its own news reporting, with Apple News at the high end (66% not sure) and ABC News at the low end (34% not sure).

About a quarter of Americans could not correctly identify whether any sources studied do their own news reporting

% of U.S. adults who correctly identified whether ____ of six sources do their own news reporting



Note: Of the news sources asked about, ABC News, The Wall Street Journal and HuffPost conduct their own news reporting; Google News, Apple News and Facebook do not. Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted June 2-11, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

All in all, nearly a quarter of Americans (23%) could not correctly identify whether *any* of the six sources do original reporting, and an additional three-in-ten got only one (15%) or two (15%) questions right. The remaining 47% correctly identified three or more sources, though just 7% correctly identified all six.

Americans seem to be at least somewhat aware of this uncertainty. Before asking about the six news sources, the survey asked respondents how confident they are in their ability to identify original reporting. Just 9% of U.S. adults said they feel “very confident” they can differentiate between organizations that do original news reporting and those that do not. Another 46% said they are pretty confident, but the remainder were either not too (35%) or not at all (8%) confident they can spot original news.

The level of confidence Americans have in their own ability to identify original news reporting lines up well with their success in answering questions about the six news sources.

Among those who answered three or more questions correctly, at least 60% said they are confident they can identify original reporting. Six-in-ten of those who answered three correctly and 81% of those who answered all six correctly said they feel at least pretty confident in their ability to identify original reporting. In comparison, 33% of those who correctly answered none of the original reporting questions said they feel confident, and the remainder said they feel not too (47%) or not at all confident (18%).

More affluent, educated have stronger knowledge of original reporting

% of U.S. adults who answer three or more questions correctly when asked if six sources do their own news reporting

All U.S. adults 47%

Ages 18-29 51

30-49 52

50-64 46

65+ 38

HS or less 30

Some college 49

College grad+ 66

<\$30K 29

\$30K-\$74,999 40

\$75K+ 58

Rep/Lean Rep 43

Dem/Lean Dem 52

Note: Of the news sources asked about, ABC News, The Wall Street Journal and HuffPost conduct their own news reporting; Google News, Apple News and Facebook do not.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted June 2-11, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Some demographic differences also emerge on answers to the question about original news reporting. More than twice as many college graduates correctly identified three or more of the sources (66%) when compared with those with a high school diploma or less (30%). Those with annual household incomes of \$75,000 or more were also twice as likely as those who make \$30,000 or less to

correctly identify at least half of the sources (58% vs. 29%, respectively).

Adults ages 65 and older tended to answer fewer of the original reporting questions correctly, struggling in particular with the newer online sources (HuffPost, Facebook, Google News and Apple News).


When it comes to confidence in the ability to identify sources that do original reporting, there are a few demographic differences as well. Notably, 60% of men, compared with 51% of women, express confidence. Younger adults are also somewhat less confident than older adults that they can identify original reporting. About half (47%) of Americans ages 18 to 29 are confident in their ability to identify original reporting – less than all other age groups: ages 30 to 49 (55%), 50 to 64 (59%) and 65 and older (60%).

More Democrats (62%) are confident in their ability to identify original reporting compared with Republicans (50%). They were also more likely to correctly identify that ABC News, The Wall Street Journal and HuffPost do their own news reporting, which may be due in part to Republicans' greater mistrust of the news media.

News consumers who place more value on the news are also better at identifying which sources do their own reporting.

Those who place greater importance on following the news are more accurate in identifying original reporting

Among U.S. adults who say following the news is ___ to being a good citizen, % who correctly identified whether three or more of six sources do original news reporting



Note: Of the news sources asked about, ABC News, The Wall Street Journal and HuffPost conduct their own news reporting; Google News, Apple News and Facebook do not. Respondents who did not give an answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted June 2-11, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The survey asked respondents how important following the news was for being a good citizen, and those who say following the news is “very important” are more likely to correctly answer whether three or more of the six sources conduct their own news reporting. Over half of those who say following the news is very important (55%) correctly answered three or more of the original reporting questions, compared with 44% of those who say following news is somewhat important and 32% of those who say it is not too or not at all important.

This trend is equally stark when looking at the individual sources: Those who place the greatest amount of importance on following the news were 11 to 18 percentage points more likely than those who place less importance on keeping up with the news to correctly identify that ABC News (18 points more likely), the Wall Street Journal (+18 points) and HuffPost (+11 points) do their own news reporting.

Though the differences are smaller for the remaining sources, those who place high importance on the news are also more likely than their counterparts to correctly identify that Facebook and Google News do not do original reporting. For Facebook, 56% of those who say following the news is very important also

correctly said the social media site does not do its own reporting, compared with 47% of those who place less importance on news – a gap of 9 percentage points. About a third of those who place high importance on the news (36%) rightly said that Google News does not do original reporting, versus 27% of those who place less importance – another 9-point gap.

Those who follow the news more closely – who are more likely to be college graduates and have higher income – were also better at identifying original reporting.

Note: Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Share this link: Kirsten Worden

is a research assistant focusing on journalism research at Pew Research Center.
POSTS BIO EMAIL



Michael Barthel

is a senior researcher focusing on journalism research at Pew Research Center.
POSTS BIO TWITTER EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Sharp Divisions on Vote Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His Post-Election Conduct

[返回目录](#)



Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans view the 2020 presidential election and the voting process. For this analysis, we surveyed 11,818 U.S. adults in November 2020, including 10,399 U.S. citizens who reported having voted in the November election.


Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of Pew Research Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.

Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and its


methodology.

Biden, Trump voters deeply divided over election process, accuracy of vote count

% of voters who say elections in the U.S. this November were run and administered well



% of voters who say they are confident that their vote was accurately counted



Note: Based on voters.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

More than two weeks after the presidential election, there are sharp divisions between voters who supported Joe Biden and Donald Trump over nearly all aspects of the election and voting process, including whether their own votes were counted accurately.

Trump voters, who already were skeptical of the electoral process and prospects for an accurate vote count before the election in October, have become much more so since Biden's victory. While a 59% majority of all voters say elections in the United States were run and administered well, just 21% of Trump supporters have a positive view of how elections were administered nationally. Among Biden supporters, 94% say the elections were run and administered well.


Disagreements between supporters of the winning and losing candidates over the accuracy of presidential vote counts are not unusual, but the magnitude of the differences between Trump and Biden voters is striking. While 82% of Biden supporters are very confident *their own* vote was counted accurately, just 35% of Trump supporters say the same.

The weeks since Biden's victory have been marked by the Trump campaign's frantic and thus far unsuccessful attempts to challenge the election results in several states. Voters express much more positive views of Biden's conduct since the election than Trump's – and 57% say the Trump campaign's legal challenges to the voting and ballot counting process should end.

A majority of voters (62%) say Biden's post-election conduct has been excellent or good, while just half as many (31%) give Trump positive ratings for his conduct since the election. About seven-in-ten (68%) view Trump's conduct as only fair or poor, with a 54% majority rating it poor.

Biden's conduct since the election is viewed far more positively than Trump's

How would you rate ____ since the presidential election on Nov. 3? (%)



% of voters who say the Trump campaign should ____ legal challenges to the voting and ballot counting process in several states



Notes: Based on voters. No answer responses not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.

Both Biden and Trump, unsurprisingly, get largely positive ratings from their own supporters. However, about a third of Trump voters (34%) rate his conduct since the election as only fair or poor, compared with just 4% of Biden voters who give the former vice president low marks.


Still, while a majority of all voters say the Trump campaign should halt efforts to challenge the election, Trump voters are overwhelmingly supportive of these challenges: 85% say they should continue. Biden voters overwhelmingly say they should end (96% express this view).

As disputes over the election continue, the nation has been struggling with a record surge in coronavirus cases. And, as with views of the election process, Biden and Trump supporters are far apart on how to address the COVID-19 surge. Most Biden voters (66%) favor tighter restrictions on public activity in their communities. But just 16% of Trump voters say the same; more than twice as many (44%) say there should be *fewer* restrictions, while 40% say they should remain about the same as they are currently.

The new survey by Pew Research Center, conducted Nov. 12-17 on the nationally representative American Trends Panel among 11,818 U.S. adults, including 10,399 who say they voted in the presidential election, finds far greater agreement about the need for additional governmental assistance in response to the coronavirus outbreak.

Most say new COVID-19 aid is needed – and want Congress to act ASAP

As you may know, Congress and President Trump passed a \$2 trillion economic assistance package in March. Do you think another economic assistance package is ... (%)



Note: Based on general public. No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

A large majority of Americans (80%) say it is necessary for the president and Congress to pass more coronavirus aid, on top of the \$2 trillion package enacted in March.

And an overwhelming majority of those who view more assistance as necessary think Congress and the president should act on it as soon as possible, rather than waiting until after the presidential inauguration in January. About two-thirds of Americans (68%) say a new aid package is necessary *and* that it be acted upon

by the president and current Congress.


Other key findings:

Biden continues to engender more confidence on coronavirus. The survey finds only modest changes in confidence in Biden and Trump on key issues since the election. As was the case before the election, Biden draws far more public confidence than Trump to handle the public health impact of the coronavirus; 58% are very or somewhat confident in Biden, compared with 39% who express confidence in Trump. Comparable shares of Americans have confidence in Biden (52%) and Trump (53%) to make good decisions about economic policy.

Partisans diverge in views of future trajectory of nation's economy. Views of the economy, which have been highly partisan for many years, have begun to shift following the election. While Republicans remain more positive than Democrats about current economic conditions, Democrats have become much more bullish in their views about the economy over the next year. Six-in-ten Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say economic conditions will be better a year from now, compared with just 23% of Republicans and Republicans leaners. Last month, Republicans were far more likely than Democrats to say the economy would improve over the next year (65% of Republicans, 42% of Democrats).

In historic election, only about a quarter of voters say they cast ballots on Election Day

% of voters who say they ...



Notes: Based on voters. No answer responses not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Nov. 12-17, 2020.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Nearly half of voters say they voted by mail or absentee. Largely because of concerns over the pandemic, mail and absentee voting increased dramatically in 2020. Nearly half of voters (46%) say they voted by absentee or mail – including 18% who report casting ballots by mail for the first time. A 54% majority say they voted in person, with equal shares voting on Election Day or before the election.

For most voters, casting ballots was “very easy.” Despite the dramatic changes in how Americans voted this year, a sizable majority (77%) say voting in the election was very easy. These views differ only modestly among those who voted by mail or absentee, and in person before Election Day or on Election Day itself. And while Trump and Biden supporters have substantial disagreements over the accuracy of the vote count and how the elections were administered, 81% of Biden voters and 73% of Trump supporters found it very easy to vote.

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

So far, Trump has granted clemency less frequently than any president in modern history


[返回目录](#)

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World

[About](#) [Follow](#) [Donate](#)



Pew Research Center

- Main

FactTank-logos NEWS IN THE NUMBERS

SIGN UP FOR OUR WEEKLY NEWSLETTER

MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SUPPORT OUR WORK

[DONATE](#)

Popular on pew research

Copyright 2020 Pew Research Center [About](#) [Terms & Conditions](#) [Privacy Policy](#)
[Reprints, Permissions & Use Policy](#) [Feedback](#) [Careers](#)

We need to confirm your email address

To complete the subscription process, please click the link in the email we just sent you.



Support for Black Lives Matter has decreased since June but remains strong among Black Americans

[返回目录](#)



Protesters march in the Brooklyn borough of New York City on Aug. 28, 2020. (Erik McGregor/LightRocket via Getty Images)

As racial justice protests have intensified following the shooting of Jacob Blake, public support for the Black Lives Matter movement has declined, according to a new Pew Research Center survey. A majority of U.S. adults (55%) now express at least some support for the movement, down from 67% in June amid nationwide demonstrations sparked by the death of George Floyd. The share who say they *strongly* support the movement stands at 29%, down from 38% three months ago.


See also: Americans have heard more about clashes between police and protesters than other recent news stories

Pew Research Center conducted this study to understand how Americans' attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter movement have changed since George Floyd's death. The data was collected as part of larger surveys conducted June 4-10 among 9,654 U.S. adults and Sept. 8-13 among 10,093 adults. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.


Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

Support for Black Lives Matter movement down since June

% saying they strongly or somewhat support the Black Lives Matter movement



Among White adults



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Surveys of U.S. adults conducted June 4-10, 2020, and Sept. 8-13, 2020.


The Black Lives Matter movement has been back in the spotlight due to this summer's protests. The new survey findings come as confrontations between protesters and police have escalated in some cities and as President Donald Trump has stepped up his criticism of the movement.

The recent decline in support for the Black Lives Matter movement is particularly notable among White and Hispanic adults. In June, a majority of White adults (60%) said they supported the movement at least somewhat; now, fewer than half (45%) express at least some support. The share of Hispanic adults who support the movement has decreased 11 percentage points, from 77% in June to 66% today. By comparison, support for the Black Lives Matter movement has remained virtually unchanged among Black and Asian adults.

Support for the Black Lives Matter movement remains particularly widespread among Black adults. Some 87% of Black Americans say they support the movement, similar to the share who said this in June. However, the share of Black adults expressing *strong* support for the movement has decreased 9 points, from 71% to 62%.

Black adults most likely to express strong support for Black Lives Matter

% saying they ___ the Black Lives Matter movement



Among White adults



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: Figures may not add to subtotals due to rounding. White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 8-13, 2020.

The partisan divide in support for the Black Lives Matter movement – which was already striking in June – has widened even more. Among Republicans and those who lean to the Republican Party, about two-in-ten (19%) now say they support the movement at least somewhat, down from four-in-ten in June. The share of Democrats and Democratic leaners who support the movement (88%) has not changed considerably.

The partisan gap is similar among White adults. About nine-in-ten White Democrats (88%) express at least some support for the Black Lives Matter movement, compared with 16% of White Republicans. And while about half of White Democrats (51%) say they *strongly* support the movement, just 2% of White Republicans say the same.

Note: Here are the questions used for this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology.

CORRECTION (October 2020): The methodology section has been updated to reflect the correct cumulative response rate. None of the study findings or conclusions were affected.

Share this link: Deja Thomas

*is a former research assistant focusing on social and demographic trends.
POSTS BIO EMAIL*



Juliana Menasce Horowitz


is an associate director of research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO
TWITTER EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19

[返回目录](#)



Pew Research Center has intensively studied the impact of the coronavirus outbreak, the public health dimensions of the pandemic and Americans' views about some of the privacy implications of data collection during the outbreak. This report focuses on key parts of the contact tracing process that states are trying to implement to identify, trace the contacts of and isolate those with COVID-19 in order to disrupt how the coronavirus is transmitted.

To explore this, we surveyed 10,211 U.S. adults from July 13 to 19, 2020. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP's methodology.


Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and its methodology.

As states mount large-scale contact tracing efforts to identify and isolate those who have contracted COVID-19, a Pew Research Center survey conducted in July finds that Americans have a variety of views that could complicate the ongoing efforts of public health authorities battling the outbreak.

On the one hand, majorities of Americans say they would be at least somewhat comfortable or likely to engage with some parts of contact tracing programs – long-established public health processes that try to limit the spread of potentially deadly infectious diseases such as AIDS, Ebola and now COVID-19 by disrupting the chain of transmission.

Some say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with key steps of contact tracing programs during COVID-19, but others are wary or resistant

% of U.S. adults who say ...



*Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive these questions. Respondents received one of the two questions about speaking. They were also randomly assigned to receive this quarantine question or a question about the difficulty they would have if advised to quarantine.

Note: Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

For example, this survey finds that 58% of U.S. adults say they would be very or somewhat likely to speak with a public health official who contacted them by phone or text message to speak with them about the coronavirus outbreak. Roughly three-quarters (77%) report they would be at least somewhat comfortable sharing information with a public health official about the places they have recently visited. A smaller share – 49% – say they would be similarly comfortable sharing location data from their cellphone. And fully 93% of adults say they definitely or probably would quarantine themselves for at least 14 days if they were told they should do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus.

Yet the survey also shows that portions of Americans could be hard to reach and relatively uncomfortable engaging with public health officials as part of the contact tracing process related to the coronavirus outbreak. For instance, 41% of those who were asked about their views on speaking with a public health official who might contact them about the coronavirus outbreak via phone or text say they would be not at all or not too likely to do so. A similar share (40%) of those who were asked about speaking with a public official who showed up at their residence to talk about COVID-19 say the same thing.

Many factors could influence Americans' participation in contact tracing and quarantine programs. This survey asked U.S. adults how they might behave in three major aspects of contact tracing in the context of the coronavirus outbreak: the likelihood that someone would speak with a public health official (i.e., a contact tracer) who contacted them about the coronavirus; the degree of comfort that someone would have in sharing information like the names of people with whom they have been in physical contact and the places they have recently visited, or data from their cellphone that tracked their locations; and their willingness to quarantine for 14 days if they were advised to do so by a public health official. We refer to these three steps as "speak," "share" and "quarantine" throughout this report.

Overall, taking account of the public's wariness with some parts of the contact tracing process, the survey shows that 48% of U.S. adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with *all three* key steps – speaking, sharing and quarantining.

If public health officials could break through people's wariness of speaking with

a public health official by phone, the results also show that another 21% might be willing. These are the individuals who say they would be very or somewhat comfortable sharing information and definitely or probably would quarantine, but also say they would be less likely to speak with a public health official by phone or text message in the first place.

This survey looked at Americans' views of three key steps of contact tracing related to the coronavirus outbreak that would be initiated by a public health official. Two different concepts related to people's potential willingness were measured: likelihood of speaking with a public health official by phone or text message or quarantining, and comfort with sharing information. Together, we use these questions to try to tap into people's "willingness" and "openness" to key steps of contact tracing, compared with their "wariness."

Of course, people's actual cooperation with public health officials dealing with the coronavirus depends on many factors. Some individuals might be willing but uncomfortable. Others might express one view and then act differently upon picking up the phone. Still others might not exactly know what they think or might behave differently based on how the pandemic is affecting their community at the time.

In places in this report that examine how individuals might behave at all three stages of the contact tracing process, we used data from the same random subset of respondents who were asked about 1) the likelihood they would speak with a public health official who contacted them by phone or text message to speak with them about the coronavirus outbreak; 2) their comfort sharing information about the people with whom they have been in contact and where they have been (either via names of places they've recently visited or location data from their cellphone); and 3) and whether they would act on advice to quarantine for 14 days if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus. In this report, we refer to these by the shorthand "speak," "share" and "quarantine." (While the full sample of individuals was asked about sharing information, a random subset was asked the relevant "speaking" and "quarantine"-related questions.)

We then looked at the various combinations of responses to those questions. Some say they would be comfortable or likely to engage across the board – that they would be likely to speak, comfortable sharing and would quarantine. Others report they would be likely or comfortable in some ways, but not across the

board. A small share tell us would not likely speak or be comfortable sharing anything, and would not quarantine. We use fairly expansive criteria in creating a measure of those comfortable or likely to engage. Individuals must respond that they are “very” or “somewhat” likely to speak with a public health official and “very” or “somewhat” comfortable sharing relevant information and “definitely” or “probably” would quarantine.

A full grid of all the possible combinations of respondent answers can be found below this box. For a complete description of our calculation method, see the section of the report entitled “In all, 48% of adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key steps of the contact tracing process.”

About half of Americans say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with the key steps in contact tracing to control COVID-19

% of U.S. adults who say they would do the following

SPEAK	SHARE	QUARANTINE	% of U.S. adults
Would be very or somewhat likely to speak with a public health official who contacted them by phone or text message to speak with them about the coronavirus outbreak	Would be very or somewhat comfortable sharing information with a public health official during the coronavirus outbreak	Would definitely or probably quarantine if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus	
Yes	Names of contacts AND info about places/location data	Yes	48
Yes	Names of contacts AND info about places/location data	No	1
Yes	Names of contacts OR info about places/location data	Yes	4
Yes	Names of contacts OR info about places/location data	No	*
Yes	No information	Yes	4
Yes	No information	No	1
No	Names of contacts AND info about places/location data	Yes	21
No	Names of contacts AND info about places/location data	No	1
No	Names of contacts OR info about places/location data	Yes	5
No	Names of contacts OR info about places/location data	No	*
No	No information	Yes	9
No	No information	No	4

Note: Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned questions about speaking via phone or text and whether they would quarantine. "Names of contacts" refers to the names of people they might have been in physical contact with. "Info about places" refers to the names of places they have recently visited. "Location data" refers to location data from one's cellphone. Those who did not give an answer to questions about any one of the relevant steps are not shown. Since both pieces of location information may accomplish the same end goal, we considered an individual comfortable to engage with this step of the process if they said they were at least somewhat comfortable sharing either of these pieces of location-related information. If individuals only answered one of the location questions, that answer was used to classify them.


Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Most Americans don't pick up phone calls from unknown numbers, and roughly half think scams occur often

% of U.S. adults who say that when an unknown number calls their cellphone they generally ...



Note: Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


This study also examines several other factors that might affect people's level of engagement and comfort with the contact tracing process. First, it looks at Americans' openness to answering phone calls from unknown numbers and finds some evidence that even starting the contact tracing process might not be easy in many cases. Just 19% of Americans say they generally answer their cellphones when an unknown phone number calls. Some 67% say they don't answer but would check a voicemail if one is left. And 14% say they generally don't answer and would ignore a voicemail.

At the same time, shares of Americans say people pretend to be someone else in order to steal other people's personal information with some frequency. Some

nine-in-ten Americans think it is often (49%) or sometimes (42%) the case that people do this.

About three-in-ten Americans say they would find it at least somewhat difficult to quarantine if told they had the coronavirus; obligations, work cited as major reasons

% of U.S. adults who say it would be ___ difficult to be able to act on the advice of a public health official if told they should quarantine themselves for at least 14 days because they had the coronavirus



Note: Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive these questions. Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


Next, the survey probes another dimension of Americans' views on quarantining specifically, by asking how *difficult* it would be for people to isolate themselves for 14 days because they had the coronavirus – regardless of whether or not they

would actually do so. About three-in-ten Americans (32%) say it would be very or somewhat difficult to quarantine. Among those who would find it at least somewhat difficult, 40% say that having too many other obligations is a major reason for this difficulty, and about the same share (39%) say being unable to miss work would be a major reason.

Additionally, the July survey looks at people's views about what happens to their personal information once it is in the hands of others. Half of Americans say they are not at all or not too confident that the federal government will keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users.

Roughly half of Republicans are not at all or not too confident public health organizations will keep their records safe, versus about three-in-ten Democrats

*% of U.S. adults who are **not at all or not too confident** that __ will keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users*



Note: Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


For some, those concerns also apply to public health organizations. About four-in-ten Americans (41%) say they are not at all or not too confident that public health organizations will keep their personal records safe. Republicans and those

who lean to the Republican Party are more likely to say this than Democrats and Democratic leaners (51% vs. 31%).

The survey finds that people's phone-answering habits as well as their views about their personal records and how prevalent they think scams are relate to whether they would be comfortable or likely to engage with contact tracing steps. Those who usually ignore both calls and voicemails from unknown numbers, those who think people often pretend to be someone else in order to steal others' personal information, and those who are less confident that public health organizations will keep these records safe are less likely to say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with the contact tracing process. For instance, 70% of those who are very confident that public health organizations will keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three steps (likely to speak, comfortable sharing, would quarantine), compared with 21% of those who are not at all confident about the security of this data in the hands of public health organizations.

Republicans less likely than Democrats to say they would be likely or comfortable to engage with every step of the contact tracing process

% of U.S. adults who say they would __ if contacted by a public health official to speak about the coronavirus



*Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive these questions.

**The calculations about people engaging with coronavirus-related contact tracing programs are built around a random half sample of respondents, using questions about the likelihood they would speak with a public health official who contacted them via phone or text message to speak about the coronavirus; their comfort in sharing information about people they'd been in contact with and where they'd been; and their willingness to quarantine if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus. Those who did not give an answer for any one of the relevant steps in the process are not shown. For more details about these calculations, see the report section "In all, 48% of adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key steps of the contact tracing process."

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

Moreover, those who had seen or heard a great deal or some about contact tracing and what it entails at the time the survey was fielded are more likely to be “comfortable or likely to engage” with all steps of the process than those with less awareness.

There are also differences among some demographic and partisan groups relating to their stated comfort or likelihood of engaging with the contact tracing process. For example, Democrats are more inclined than Republicans to say they are comfortable or likely to engage with each step in the contact tracing and quarantine process. Some 36% of Republicans say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with contact tracing and quarantine protocols according to our “speak, share, quarantine” definition of engagement, compared with six-in-ten Democrats.

Breaking down the individual steps, 68% of Democrats say they would be very or somewhat likely to speak with a public health official if they were contacted by phone or text about the coronavirus outbreak, compared with 49% of Republicans, for example. And 88% of Republicans report they would definitely or probably quarantine, compared with 97% of Democrats – with about six-in-ten Republicans (59%) saying they would *definitely* do so, compared with 85% of Democrats.

Americans’ stated comfort with or likelihood of engaging with key parts of the contact tracing process varies across other demographic groups as well. In particular, adults with higher incomes are more likely than those with middle or lower incomes to say they would be likely to speak with a public health official and would be comfortable sharing information. For example, 85% of those with relatively high incomes say they would be very or somewhat comfortable sharing the places they have recently visited with a public health official, compared with 73% of those with relatively low incomes who say that. And a similar pattern follows by levels of formal educational attainment.

These are some of the key findings from a Pew Research Center survey of 10,211 U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020, using the Center’s American Trends Panel. They add to the body of research the Center has conducted since March about the health, economic and political effects of COVID-19. These findings also relate to survey results from September showing 49% of Americans would definitely or probably not get a coronavirus vaccine if one


were available today. Additionally, this material expands on insights about people's wariness about the likely impact of privacy and location-monitoring apps on smartphones in limiting the spread of COVID-19 as tech-focused solutions continue to be developed.

The remainder of this report is structured to map the way data collection and analysis might unfold in a contact tracing process. It starts by discussing public awareness of contact tracing, then proceeds to examine people's behavior around calls from unknown numbers (as calls from a public health agency might arrive) and related perceptions of how secure their personal information might be. It then examines people's views about three key steps in the contact tracing process (speak, share, quarantine) and, finally, turns to people's views about how personal, health-related data is protected and used once it is gathered. Extensive tables about how different demographic and other groups responded to all these questions are available in the Appendix to this report.

70% of Americans say they had at least some awareness of contact tracing as of July

Seven-in-ten adults had seen or heard at least some about contact tracing as of July

% of U.S. adults who say they had seen or heard __ about public health officials using a process called “contact tracing” to gather information to try to prevent the spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings. Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

People's views about contact tracing and related issues like privacy and data security could have a critical impact on the success of contact tracing programs and the trajectory of the pandemic. Public health modeling of the spread of COVID-19 has shown that successful contact tracing can depress the number of infections dramatically if those who are infected are quarantined and contacts and places visited are identified.

As public health officials and organizations work to combat misinformation about contact tracing, they also must try to communicate effectively with the public about its goals and purpose. The July survey found that while the majority of Americans said they had heard about this process as of the survey's fielding, another share, though a minority, said they had not heard much or anything. Overall, 70% of Americans had seen or heard at least some about contact tracing as of mid-July, with 29% having heard a great deal about the process. At the same time, 29% reported hearing nothing at all or not too much about this process.

Majorities across groups had at least some awareness of contact tracing at the time, but not all Americans had seen or heard equal amounts about the process. About four-in-ten Black adults (39%) and Hispanic adults (43%) said they had not heard much or anything at all about contact tracing at the time, while roughly three-in-ten Asian American adults (31%) and about a quarter of White adults (24%) said the same.

Younger Americans and women were also more likely to have less awareness about contact tracing. Some 40% of 18- to 29-year-olds said they had heard not too much or nothing at all as of the survey's fielding, compared with 29% of 30- to 49-year-olds, 26% of 50- to 64-year-olds and 24% of those 65 and older. Roughly three-in-ten men (27%) and women (31%) reported having not seen or heard much, if anything, about this process.


Those who have less formal education and relatively low incomes were also less likely to have heard much about the contact tracing process. Four-in-ten adults with a high school diploma or less formal education had not heard anything at all or had not heard too much as of July, compared with about three-in-ten adults with some college (29%) and 16% of adults with a bachelor's degree or higher. Awareness of contact tracing similarly increases with income level.

Partisan differences in the amount of information heard or seen about contact tracing were present, but were small. About three-in-ten Republicans (31%) said they had heard nothing at all or not much about the topic, compared with 26% of Democrats.

Majority of Americans do not generally answer their cellphone when unknown numbers pop up, but many of them listen to voicemails

Majority of Americans say they do not generally answer their cellphone for unknown numbers, but many of them do listen to voicemails

% of U.S. adults who say they generally ___ when an unknown number calls their cellphone



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings. Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The contact tracing process generally begins when someone who is diagnosed

with an infectious disease is asked about the places they have been and the people with whom they have been in contact. Contact tracers then try to track down others who might have come in contact with the infected person. And while some contact tracing efforts rely on text messages or in-person visits, the outreach often begins with a phone call.

In light of general public wariness about calls from unknown numbers, the Center asked in this survey about people's general practice when an unknown number calls their cellphone – as would often be the case when a contact tracer was trying to get in touch.


The results indicate that the first step in the contract tracing process may be challenged by reluctance to answer unknown calls. Only 19% of Americans report they generally would answer the phone and see who it is; another 14% would not answer and ignore a voicemail if one is left. The majority of U.S. adults (67%) would not answer the phone but would check a voicemail if left.

Small differences are present across demographic groups in terms of general call-answering behavior. Men and younger adults are more likely to answer a call from an unknown number than their counterparts. Black adults (22%) and Hispanic adults (25%) are somewhat more likely to answer the call than White adults (17%), while a fifth of Asian Americans would answer the call from an unknown number. And Black and Hispanic adults are also somewhat more likely to not answer and ignore a voicemail (19% and 17%, respectively) compared with a smaller share of White adults (12%).

Majorities of Americans think others are often or sometimes out to steal people's information and that their information is less secure than it used to be

Nine-in-ten U.S. adults think people often or sometimes pretend to be someone else in order to try to steal personal information

% of U.S. adults who think people ___ pretend to be someone else in order to try to steal people's personal information



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings. Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

This survey also explored the degree to which people are worried about others pretending to be someone else in order to steal people's personal information – an issue that concerns those running contact tracing efforts because it could affect people's willingness to answer their phones and provide personal or sensitive information. Some groups are more concerned than others about this prospect.


Fully 90% of Americans think people pretend to be someone else in order to try to steal people's personal information often or sometimes, with roughly half (49%) saying they think this happens often. While these overall shares are fairly consistent across demographic groups, there is more variation across groups on whether people *often* pretend to be someone else to steal information.

Black adults (63%) and Hispanic adults (56%) are more likely than White (45%) or Asian adults (35%) to say this type of attempted theft happens often. Additionally, those with relatively low incomes and less formal education are more likely to say people pretend to be someone else in order to steal others' information often. Roughly six-in-ten of those who have lower incomes say so, compared with about half of those from middle-income households (47%) and about four-in-ten of those with higher incomes (37%).

Similarly, 57% of those with a high school education or less, 50% of those with some college and 36% of those with a bachelor's degree or higher say this is often the case. There are no differences in people's views on this when it comes to partisanship.

About two-thirds of Americans say their personal information has become less secure in last five years

% of U.S. adults who feel their personal information is less secure compared with five years ago



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings. Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

Beyond their perceptions about people stealing other people's information, a majority of Americans also feel their personal information is less secure than it used to be. This survey finds that roughly two-thirds of Americans (68%) feel their personal information is less secure compared with five years ago. Some 27% say that their information is about as secure as five years ago, while only 5% say that their personal information is more secure than five years ago. These results are in line with those gathered in a 2019 Center poll on Americans' views of privacy.


At least six-in-ten Americans across demographic groups say they feel their information is less secure. However, there are some small differences in shares who say this by race and ethnicity, age, education, income, and partisanship. White adults are more likely to say that their information is less secure today than those of other racial and ethnic groups, with about seven-in-ten White adults (71%) saying this compared with about six-in-ten of those who identify as part of other racial and ethnic groups (62% each of Black, Hispanic and Asian adults). Older respondents are also more likely than younger adults to say their information is less secure; 76% of those ages 65 and older say they feel their personal information is less secure now than it was five years ago.

Those with higher levels of formal education and relatively high incomes are also more likely to say their personal information is less secure. Those with a bachelor's degree or higher (72%) are more likely than those with less formal education to say so. And those with higher incomes (72%) and middle incomes (69%) are more likely to say so than those with lower incomes (63%).

About four-in-ten adults say they would not be likely to speak with public health officials by phone or text message or at their home

About four-in-ten Americans say they would not be likely to speak with a public health official by phone or text message about the coronavirus outbreak

% of U.S. adults who say they would be ___ to speak with a public health official if they contacted them by phone or text message or at their residence to speak with them about the coronavirus outbreak



*Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive these questions. Respondents were randomly assigned to either receive the question about speaking on the phone or via text message, or the question about speaking at their residence.

Note: Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

Americans' concerns about the safety of their personal data is an important backdrop to their views about various aspects of contact tracing programs. In addition to coping with Americans' wariness about picking up their phones and their perceptions about the frequency of scams, contact tracers face another struggle: Some adults say they would not be likely to speak with a public health official by phone or text message or in person.

In this survey, Americans were asked specifically about how they would respond to outreach by public health officials trying to contact them to speak about the coronavirus outbreak. Half of respondents were asked how likely they would be to speak with a public health official on the phone or via text message about the coronavirus outbreak, and the remainder were asked how they would respond to a public health official who showed up at their residence. About four-in-ten Americans (41%) who were asked about their likelihood of speaking with a public health official if they contacted them by phone or text message say that they would be not at all or not too likely to do this, and 40% of those asked about speaking with an official who showed up at their residence say they would be not at all or not too likely to do the same.

People's stated likelihood of speaking with an official varies somewhat by the mode of contact when examining Americans' views by gender, age, and race and ethnicity. Women and men are about equally likely to say they would talk with a public health official via phone or text message, but women are less likely to report they would speak in person: 44% of women, compared with 36% of men, say they would be not at all or not too likely to speak with a public health official who showed up at their residence. Younger adults are less likely than their older counterparts to say they would speak with a public health official via phone or text, despite their relative willingness to generally answer the phone for unknown numbers. Some 49% of those ages 18 to 29 say they would be not at all or not too likely to speak with a public health official in this manner, compared with 34% of those 65 and older.

There are also differences in people's reported likelihood of speaking with a public health official by income and education. For instance, 30% of Americans with a bachelor's degree or higher say they would be not at all or not too likely to speak by phone or text message, compared with 44% of those with some college and 48% of those with a high school diploma or less; and 35% of those with at least a bachelor's degree say they would be not at all or not too likely to


speak in person, compared with 42% each of those with a high school diploma or less or some college. A similar pattern applies by income. Those with relatively low and middle incomes are less likely to say they'd be likely to speak with a public health official about the coronavirus outbreak compared with those from households with the highest incomes.

Finally, there are clear partisan differences in what Americans say about their likelihood of speaking with a public health official, and the differences are larger when the issue is phone- or text-based contact than for in-person contact. Half of Republicans say they would be not at all or not too likely to do so via phone or text, compared with 31% of Democrats. These differences persist when considering ideology. For example, 52% of conservative Republicans versus 26% of liberal Democrats say they would be not at all or not too likely to speak by phone or text, and 47% of conservative Republicans versus 30% of liberal Democrats say the same about speaking with a public health official in person if they showed up at their residence.

Some express discomfort sharing information with a public health official about where they have been, whom they were in physical contact with

A portion of adults say they would be uncomfortable sharing names of contacts or places they have recently visited with a public health official

% of U.S. adults who say they would be **not at all or not too comfortable** sharing __ with a public health official during the coronavirus outbreak



*Asian adults were interviewed in English only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings. Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

In addition to asking people whether they might engage at all with a public health official during the COVID-19 outbreak, this survey explored another dimension of potential cooperation – comfort with sharing several pieces of relevant information within the contact tracing process. Before they answered this question, individuals were told: “In ‘contact tracing,’ public health officials interview people who have a confirmed COVID-19 diagnosis in order to identify everyone who has had contact with them, and who are therefore at risk of getting COVID-19.” Individuals were asked about their comfort with sharing the names of people they may have been in physical contact with, places they have recently visited and location data from their cellphone.

Roughly three-in-ten Americans say they would be not at all or not too comfortable sharing names of people with whom they have been in physical contact, and 22% express similar discomfort with disclosing the places they have recently visited.

And even as tech companies and governments have worked to research and release technology-focused solutions or supplements to contact tracing, a sizable portion of Americans continue to express discomfort with such efforts. This survey specifically asked about people’s comfort sharing *location* data from their cellphones and finds half of all U.S. adults say they would be not at all (29%) or not too (21%) comfortable doing this. (An April 2020 Center survey similarly found that 48% of Americans said it was unacceptable for the government to use people’s cellphones to track the location of people who had tested positive for the coronavirus, and 54% said the same for tracking people who had been in contact with a positive case.)

Majorities of Americans from both major parties express comfort sharing the names of people they might have been in physical contact with and the places they recently visited, though Republicans express less comfort than Democrats – with gaps of 15 percentage points or more in the shares of partisans who say they are not at all or not too comfortable sharing such information. Some 37% of Republicans say they would feel not at all (20%) or not too (18%) comfortable sharing names of contacts with a public health official, compared with 18% of Democrats who say the same (6% not at all and 12% not too comfortable). Some three-in-ten Republicans report they would be not at all (17%) or not too (14%) comfortable sharing places they have visited, compared with 14% of Democrats who say they would be not at all (5%) or not too (9%) comfortable doing the

same. And 60% of Republicans would be not at all (40%) or not too (20%) comfortable sharing location data from their cellphone, compared with 42% of Democrats (19% and 22%, respectively).


Younger adults express less comfort sharing information than older adults. For example, about a third (32%) of those ages 18 to 29 say they would be not at all or not too comfortable sharing the names of those with whom they have been in contact with a public health official, compared with just 21% of those 65 and older who feel that way. Overall, those under 50 are more likely than those 50 and older to say they are not at all or not too comfortable sharing the names of people they've been in contact with (30% of those 18 to 49 say this vs. 24% of those 50+) and location data from their cellphone (55% vs. 46%). Some 43% of those ages 18 to 29 report being *very* comfortable sharing places they've recently visited, compared with larger shares of other age groups saying the same (48% of those ages 30 to 49, 50% of those 50 to 64 and 57% of those 65 and older).

Those with lower incomes and less formal education also tend to be less likely to be comfortable sharing information. About three-in-ten individuals with lower (28%) and middle (29%) incomes say they would be not at all or not too comfortable sharing names of contacts, compared with 19% of those with higher incomes. Some 29% of those with a high school diploma or less express a similar lack of comfort with sharing places they've visited, compared with 22% of those with some college and 14% with a bachelor's degree or more education.

Majority of Americans say they would quarantine for two weeks if told they should do that by a public health official, but some report this would be difficult

73% of Americans say they would definitely act on advice from a public health official to quarantine if they had COVID-19

% of U.S. adults who say they ___ act on the advice of a public health official if told they should quarantine themselves for at least 14 days because they had the coronavirus



Note: Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive this question. White and Black adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

Americans report high levels of willingness to quarantine if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus. But they offer mixed reports about how difficult it would be to do this.


Half of the Americans surveyed were asked about whether they would act on the advice of a public health official to quarantine because they had the coronavirus, while the other half were asked about the difficulty of doing so. Over nine-in-ten adults (93%) say they definitely (73%) or probably (20%) would act on advice to quarantine for 14 days if told they had the coronavirus. Just 2% say they definitely would not follow that request, and 5% report they probably would not do so.

Although the vast majority of Americans who identify with either party say that they would definitely or probably quarantine, partisan differences again emerge. Some 88% of Republicans say they would definitely or probably act on advice to quarantine, while 97% of Democrats say the same. Republicans are 26 percentage points less likely than Democrats to say they *definitely* would quarantine, with 59% of this group saying so compared with 85% of Democrats.

Women are also more likely than men to report they would definitely quarantine (80% vs. 65%). Additionally, Black (76%) or Hispanic adults (80%) are more likely to report this than White adults (70%). And those with at least a bachelor's degree are more likely to report they would definitely quarantine; 79% of college-educated adults say so, compared with 71% of those with some college and 69% of those with a high school diploma or less.

Some of those who would not likely quarantine say they just don't think it's necessary

*Among the 7% of U.S. adults who say they **definitely would not or probably would not act on advice to quarantine**, % who say each statement is __ why they would be unlikely to quarantine themselves for at least 14 days*



Note: Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive these questions. Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The small share of Americans – 7% – who say they would definitely or probably not quarantine were then asked about possible reasons why they may not act on this advice. Some 44% of this group say a major reason they would be unlikely to quarantine is that they just don't think it would be necessary, while 35% say the same about not being able to miss work.


Smaller shares of those who say it's unlikely they would isolate due to COVID-19 cite having too many other obligations (23%), their concern about being isolated from others (15%) or being unable to arrange child care (11%) as major

reasons.

Yet of those asked *how difficult* it would be to act on advice to quarantine if told they had the coronavirus, Americans express more varied views. Roughly three-in-ten adults say that it would be very (10%) or somewhat (22%) difficult to quarantine. Men are more likely than women to say so (35% vs. 29%), and younger adults are more likely to say it would be very or somewhat difficult to quarantine than those 65 and older.

About three-in-ten Americans say it would be very or somewhat difficult to quarantine if they had COVID-19

% of U.S. adults who say it would be ___ to be able to act on the advice of a public health official if told they should quarantine themselves for at least 14 days because they had the coronavirus



Note: Based on the half sample of respondents randomly assigned to receive this question. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings. Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

Education and income again play a role when it comes to the difficulty people might have in quarantining. Some 35% of those with a high school diploma or less report it would be very or somewhat difficult to quarantine, compared with 29% of those with a bachelor's degree. And Americans are less likely to express difficulty as their income rises: 38% of adults from households with lower incomes, 30% of those from households in the middle income category and 26% of those with higher incomes say it would be very or somewhat difficult to quarantine.

The 32% of Americans who said that they would find it very or somewhat difficult to quarantine for 14 days were similarly asked why that would be so. Some 40% of this group said a major reason would be that they have too many other obligations; 39% say the same about being unable to miss work. Less frequently cited as major reasons were concern about being isolated from others (23%), being unable to arrange child care (22%) and just not thinking it's necessary (21%).

In all, 48% of adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key steps of the contact tracing process

A successful contact tracing program is built around people's compliance with key steps of the process. This survey asked people about their attitudes toward three of those steps that would be initiated by a public health official during the coronavirus outbreak. First, they were asked how likely they would be to **speak with** a public health official who contacted them to speak about the coronavirus outbreak by phone or text message. Second, they were asked about how comfortable they would be to **share information** about the names of people with whom they might have been in contact and about where they have been (either via names of places they've recently visited or via cellphone location data). Third, they were asked about whether they would act on advice from a public health official to **quarantine for 14 days** because they had the coronavirus. Our combination of these three steps – speak, share and quarantine – uses data from the random subset of respondents who were asked about all three of these things.

Looking at the various combinations of responses to those questions, this survey finds that **48%** of Americans would be relatively **comfortable or likely to engage with** all three of those steps, and **51%** would be relatively resistant to at least one core aspect of the process. In making this calculation, we used a


somewhat generous definition of engagement. (The percentages who actually *would* cooperate could be higher or lower.) The 48% referred to in most of this report as “comfortable or likely to engage” with all steps are those who say they would do all of the following in the coronavirus contact tracing process:

- **Speak:** Be very or somewhat likely to speak with a public health official if they were contacted by phone or text message to speak about the coronavirus outbreak.
- **Share names of contacts:** Be very or somewhat comfortable sharing with a public health official the names of people they might have been in physical contact with.
- **Share information about where they have been:** Be very or somewhat comfortable sharing with a public health official information about the places they have recently visited, OR very or somewhat comfortable sharing location data from their cellphone.
- **Quarantine:** Definitely or probably would quarantine themselves for at least 14 days if they were told by a public health official they had the coronavirus.

If a more stringent definition of engagement were applied – taking only those who said they would be *very* likely to speak, those who are *very* comfortable sharing information (about whom they might have been in physical contact with and where they’d been), and those who would *definitely* quarantine – the share of Americans who say they would be comfortable or likely to engage is far lower. Only 16% of Americans would be considered comfortable or likely to engage with all three steps by this more stringent definition. However, for our primary analysis that follows, we use the more “lenient” version – counting one as likely or comfortable to engage with the entire process if they’ve identified in the top two most likely, comfortable or willing categories.

48% of Americans say they'd be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key contact tracing steps

*% of U.S. adults who say they would be **very** or **somewhat comfortable or likely to engage** with all three key steps of the process (speak, share, quarantine)**



*The calculations about people engaging with coronavirus-related contact tracing programs are built around a random half sample of respondents, using questions about the likelihood they would speak with a public health official who contacted them via phone or text message to speak about the coronavirus; their comfort in sharing information about people they'd been in contact with and where they'd been; and their willingness to quarantine if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus. Those who did not give an answer for any one of the relevant steps in the process are not shown. For more details about these calculations, see the report section "In all, 48% of adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key steps of the contact tracing process."

Note: White and Black adults include those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Family income tiers are based on adjusted 2018 earnings.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

There are some notable differences among groups when it comes to their stated engagement with these three contact tracing activities. Republicans are less likely than Democrats to say they are comfortable or likely: 36% of Republicans would fall into this group, according to our relatively “generous” definition of stated engagement, compared with six-in-ten Democrats.

In addition, younger adults, Hispanic adults, those with lower incomes and those with less formal education are less likely to be fully comfortable or likely to engage with the process than their counterparts. About four-in-ten adults ages 18 to 29 (41%) say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three steps, compared with 56% of those ages 65 and older. And while White and Black adults are similarly likely to fall into this group given their responses – about half of each group expresses full comfort or likelihood engaging – Hispanic adults are less likely to say this (four-in-ten Hispanic adults say so).

Roughly six-in-ten individuals with a bachelor’s degree or higher formal education (60%) and those from households with higher incomes (61%) say they would be fully comfortable or likely to engage. Smaller shares of those with lower incomes and less education say the same.

Beyond these differences in stated comfort or likelihood by demographic and partisan breaks, there are also differences in people’s comfortable or likely engagement with contact tracing programs based on their awareness of contact tracing, their general behaviors such as willingness to answer their phones when an unknown number calls, and their general views about individuals trying to steal people’s personal information.

For example, results from this survey show that people’s comfort with or likelihood of engaging with the contact tracing and isolation process (speak, share, quarantine) rises with increased awareness of contact tracing. Some 63% of those who had seen or heard a great deal about contact tracing as of July say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three parts of the contact tracing effort that we explore here: that is, speaking with a public health official by phone or text message, sharing names of contacts and names of locations or location data, and quarantining. In contrast, 35% of those who have seen or heard not too much say they would do the same, and only 29% of those who’ve seen or heard nothing at all say this.

Several factors tie to whether people say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with the entire contact tracing process

*% of U.S. adults who say they would be **very or somewhat comfortable or likely to engage** with all three key steps of the process (speak, share, quarantine)**

Among those who say they had seen or heard __ about contact tracing as of July



Among those who generally __ when an unknown number calls their cellphone



Among those who think people __ pretend to be someone else in order to try to steal people's personal information



*The calculations about people engaging with coronavirus-related contact tracing programs are built around a random half sample of respondents, using questions about the likelihood they would speak with a public health official who contacted them via phone or text message to speak about the coronavirus; their comfort in sharing information about people they'd been in contact with and where they'd been; and their willingness to quarantine if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus. Those who did not give an answer for any one of the relevant steps in the process are not shown. For more details about these calculations, see the report section “In all, 48% of adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key steps of the contact tracing process.” Note: Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

In addition, Americans' comfort with and likelihood of engaging with the process are also related to their general tendency to pick up the phone; for example, 54% of those who would answer a call on their cellphone from an unknown number say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with every step, compared with 33% of those who would ignore both a call and a voicemail.

Looking specifically at likelihood of speaking with a contact tracer by phone or text (the first step in the process), 68% of those who would generally answer the phone say they would be very or somewhat likely to speak with a contact tracer by phone or text, compared with 58% of those who would not answer but check a voicemail and 42% of those who would not answer and ignore a voicemail.


Finally, those who think others often pretend to be someone else to steal others' personal information are less likely to be comfortable or likely to engage with these key contract tracing and isolation steps. Roughly four-in-ten of those who say that people often pretend to be someone else to steal others' personal information say they are also comfortable or likely to engage with the entire process, compared with about half of those who say people sometimes do this (52%) or rarely or never do this (51%).

About six-in-ten Americans are confident public health organizations will protect their records from hackers or unauthorized users, but Republicans are less confident

In light of general privacy concerns about tech-based solutions to contact tracing, as well as new findings about general trust in public institutions, the Center survey asked Americans about their confidence in the ability of specific potential collectors and users of contact tracing data to keep their records safe.

Half of Americans are not confident in the federal government to protect their records, and 41% say the same about public health organizations

% of U.S. adults who are ___ that each group will keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users



Note: Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

"The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Overall, Americans generally feel their doctors and health care providers will keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users, with about eight-in-ten Americans expressing confidence that they will do so. A majority feels the same way about public health organizations, though four-in-ten say they are not at all or not too confident that these organizations will keep their records safe. And roughly half of U.S. adults (49%) are at least somewhat confident in the ability of the federal government to keep their records safe.

Smaller shares of Americans are *not at all* confident that these institutions will keep their records safe, but roughly a fifth of Americans (21%) say this about the federal government. Some 15% of Americans say the same about public health organizations, and only 6% are not at all confident that their medical doctor or health care providers will keep their records safe.

While these confidence levels are fairly consistent across most groups, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to express a lack of confidence that


public health organizations, their medical doctors or health care providers, and the federal government will keep their personal records safe.

These differences are particularly large for public health organizations: Republicans are 20 percentage points more likely to say that they are at not at all or not too confident that public health organizations will do this, with 51% saying this compared with 31% of Democrats. Republicans are also more likely to be at most not too confident that their doctors or providers will keep their records safe, though the gap between parties is smaller; 22% express at most not too much confidence, compared with 15% of Democrats. An even smaller but significant gap exists between Republicans and Democrats who are not at all or not too confident in the federal government's ability to keep their records safe (52% vs. 48%).

Confidence in public health organizations to keep records safe is related to comfortable or likely engagement with the full contact tracing process

*% of U.S. adults who say they would be **very or somewhat comfortable or likely to engage** with all three key steps of the process (speak, share, quarantine)**

Among those who say they are __ that public health organizations will keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users



*The calculations about people engaging with coronavirus-related contact tracing programs are built around a random half sample of respondents, using questions about the likelihood they would speak with a public health official who contacted them via phone or text message to speak about the coronavirus; their comfort in sharing information about people they'd been in contact with and where they'd been; and their willingness to quarantine if advised to do so by a public health official because they had the coronavirus. Those who did not give an answer for any one of the relevant steps in the process are not shown. For more details about these calculations, see the report section “In all, 48% of adults say they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three key steps of the contact tracing process.” Note: Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

One important consideration, then, is whether those who express less confidence that public health organizations will keep their records safe from hackers or unauthorized users are less likely to say they'd be comfortable or likely to


engage with key contact tracing protocols.

This survey finds that this is indeed the case. Examining the group of individuals asked about their comfort or likely engagement with all three steps, we find that fully seven-in-ten of those who are very confident that public health organizations will protect their personal records from hackers or unauthorized users also say that they would be comfortable or likely to engage with all three steps of the process. That compares with smaller shares of those who express less confidence (56% of those who are somewhat confident, 36% of those who are not too confident and 21% of those who are not at all confident).

Three-quarters of Americans think it is acceptable for public health officials to share personal information with infectious disease researchers, yet smaller shares say this for other groups

Three-quarters of Americans think it is acceptable for personal information to be made available to infectious disease researchers

*% of U.S. adults who think it is **very or somewhat** ___ for the personal information that may be collected by public health officials during the coronavirus outbreak to be available for use by each group*



Note: Those who did not give an answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

There has been some controversy about how data tied to coronavirus infections and deaths is being collected and shared with public health officials and researchers. Moreover, researchers themselves are sometimes resistant to data sharing.

This survey shows that three-quarters think it is acceptable for public health officials to make personal information that may be collected during the coronavirus outbreak available for use by infectious disease researchers, while smaller shares say the same about pharmaceutical companies (40%), health insurance companies (40%) and state and local elected officials (37%).

Republicans more likely than Democrats to think it is unacceptable for other organizations or individuals to use information collected by public health officials

*% of U.S. adults who think it is **very** or **somewhat unacceptable** for the personal information that may be collected by public health officials during the coronavirus outbreak to be available for use by ...*



Note: Those who did not give an answer or who gave other responses are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted July 13-19, 2020.

“The Challenges of Contact Tracing as U.S. Battles COVID-19”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Once again, Republicans and Democrats vary in their views of the acceptability of sharing information with other entities, particularly when it comes to sharing data with state and local elected officials and with researchers who study infectious diseases. Republicans are 17 percentage points more likely than Democrats to think it is very or somewhat *unacceptable* for information to be available for use by state and local elected officials and by researchers who study infectious diseases. Partisans are more similar in their views of personal information being made available to health insurance companies or pharmaceutical companies.

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

The Trump era has seen a decline in America's global reputation

[返回目录](#)

Many world leaders were quick to offer congratulatory messages to President-elect Joe Biden after his victory in this month's U.S. presidential election. They included Germany's Angela Merkel, Canada's Justin Trudeau and others who have had tense relations with President Donald Trump. Citing Biden's commitment to rejoining the Paris climate accord, France's Emmanuel Macron suggested it is now possible to "make our planet great again."

The French leader's sentiments are probably shared by many ordinary citizens around the world. In international surveys conducted by Pew Research Center over the past few years, Trump has generally received lower ratings than either of his two predecessors – Barack Obama and George W. Bush – with relatively few people approving of his handling of international affairs.

Indeed, no more than a quarter of adults expressed confidence in Trump in any of the 13 countries surveyed by the Center this year. And in many nations where we have survey data for the past three administrations, the lowest ratings we've seen for any president have come during Trump's time in office. For instance, just 5% of Mexicans voiced confidence in Trump's leadership in 2017, the smallest share who expressed that view in surveys that date back to 2007.

Low international ratings for Trump throughout his presidency

% who have confidence in U.S. President ___ to do the right thing
regarding world affairs

	George W. Bush							Barack Obama										Donald Trump																						
	2001		2003		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010		2011		2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		2020					
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%								
Canada	-	59	40	-	28	-	88	-	-	-	-	81	-	76	83	22	25	28	20	14	9	20	11	11	10	13	10	25	32	32	16									
France	20	20	25	15	14	13	91	87	84	86	83	83	83	84	14	9	20	11	11	10	13	10	11	17	19	25	18	7	7	21	16									
Germany	51	33	30	25	19	14	93	90	88	87	88	71	73	86	11	10	13	10	25	27	32	16	25	27	32	16	25	27	32	16										
Italy	33	43	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	73	76	75	77	68	92	17	19	25	18	72	69	67	61	54	58	58	75	7	7	21	16								
Netherlands	-	-	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	93	10	17	18	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
Spain	-	26	18	7	7	8	72	69	67	61	54	58	58	75	7	7	21	16	22	28	32	19	72	69	67	61	54	58	58	75	7	7	21	16						
Sweden	-	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	93	10	17	18	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-								
UK	30	51	38	30	24	16	86	84	75	80	72	74	76	79	22	28	32	19	22	28	32	19	22	28	32	19	22	28	32	19	22	28	32	19						
Czech Rep.	-	-	-	-	36	-	-	-	-	-	77	75	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Poland	-	-	47	-	29	41	62	60	52	50	49	55	64	58	23	35	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Russia	-	8	28	21	18	22	37	41	41	36	29	15	11	-	53	19	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	37	-	-	44	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Australia	-	59	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	-	77	-	81	84	29	32	35	23	29	32	35	23	23	28	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
Indonesia	-	-	19	20	14	23	71	67	62	-	53	60	64	-	23	28	30	-	23	28	30	-	23	28	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-						
Japan	-	-	-	32	35	25	85	76	81	74	70	60	66	78	24	30	36	25	24	30	36	25	24	30	36	25	24	30	36	25	24	30	36	25						
South Korea	-	36	-	-	22	30	81	75	-	-	77	84	88	-	17	44	46	17	17	44	46	17	17	44	46	17	17	44	46	17	17	44	46	17						
Israel	-	83	-	-	57	-	56	-	49	-	61	71	49	-	56	69	71	-	56	69	71	-	56	69	71	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Jordan	-	1	1	7	8	7	31	26	28	22	24	17	14	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
Lebanon	-	17	23	-	34	33	46	43	43	39	37	35	36	-	15	-	23	-	15	-	23	-	15	-	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Turkey	-	8	8	3	2	2	33	23	12	24	29	24	45	-	11	-	11	-	11	-	11	-	11	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				
Ghana	-	-	-	-	69	-	-	-	-	-	55	60	82	-	49	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Kenya	-	-	-	-	72	-	94	95	86	-	81	78	80	83	51	56	65	-	51	56	65	-	51	56	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
South Africa	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	74	72	77	73	39	39	42	-	39	39	42	-	39	39	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	40	60	-	-	-	-	74	78	-	-	51	-	-	-	51	-	-	-	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Argentina	-	-	-	-	5	7	61	49	-	-	44	31	40	-	13	11	22	-	13	11	22	-	13	11	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
Chile	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	56	54	60	-	12	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Mexico	-	-	-	-	28	16	55	43	38	42	49	40	49	-	5	6	8	-	5	6	8	-	5	6	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Peru	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: In Italy, 2020 survey was conducted by telephone; prior surveys were conducted face-to-face.


Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Trump's unpopularity has had a significant negative effect on America's overall image. Ratings for the United States plummeted after he took office in 2017, and they have declined further over the past year, at least in part due to the widespread perception that the U.S. has handled the coronavirus pandemic poorly. In fact, in several nations that are key U.S. allies and partners, the share of the public with a favorable view of the U.S. is at its lowest point in nearly two decades of polling.

In some countries, ratings for U.S. reached a record low in 2020

% who have a *favorable* view of the U.S.



Note: 2000 trend is from 1999 or 2000 and provided by U.S. Department of State.


Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

For example, just 41% of adults in the United Kingdom expressed a favorable opinion of the U.S. this year, the lowest percentage registered in any Center survey there. In France and Germany, ratings for the U.S. are essentially as low as they were in March 2003, at the height of U.S.-European tensions over the Iraq War. U.S. favorability also reached all-time lows this year in Japan, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Global views of Trump's characteristics

% who say they think of President Donald Trump as ...



Note: Percentages are global medians based on 37 countries.

Source: Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER


What have people around the world not liked about Trump? Our 37-nation survey in 2017 found that many did not like his personal characteristics or leadership style. Majorities said he was arrogant, intolerant and dangerous. Few considered him well-qualified or believed that he cares about ordinary people.

There has also been considerable opposition to many of Trump's policies, including his administration's withdrawal from climate change agreements and the Iran nuclear deal. Trump's efforts to make it more difficult to enter the U.S. have also been widely unpopular.

Across 33 nations surveyed in 2019, a median of 55% disapproved of the U.S. allowing fewer immigrants into the country; just 34% approved. A median of six-in-ten opposed building a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. And majorities opposed Trump's efforts to erect trade barriers in addition to physical barriers, with a median of nearly seven-in-ten (68%) disapproving of increased U.S. tariffs or fees on imported goods.

Many of Trump's major policies were unpopular globally in 2019

% who ___ of each policy of U.S. President Donald Trump



Note: Percentages are medians based on 33 countries. Don't know responses not shown.

Source: Spring 2019 Global Attitudes Survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

While America's image has suffered during Trump's presidency, the U.S. still has many "soft power" assets. For example, people around the world generally still embrace U.S. popular culture: A median of 65% of adults across 37 countries polled in 2017 said they like American music, movies and television.

And people still mostly associate the U.S. with the idea of individual liberty, although there has been a decline on this front in recent years. The share of adults who believe the U.S. government respects the personal freedoms of its people has dropped in many nations recently, including Germany, Canada and Australia. While this decline has continued during Trump's presidency, it began during the Obama era. (The first decrease on this measure occurred between 2013 and 2014, as news broke about the U.S. National Security Agency's surveillance around the world. We saw further declines in 2015 following protests in Ferguson, Missouri, in response to the police killing of Michael Brown in August 2014.)

It's too soon to know the extent to which a new president and new policies can turn around America's battered image, but a change like this has happened before. After years of relatively poor ratings during the Bush administration, views of the U.S. improved significantly in many regions after Obama took office in 2009. Obama's policies weren't uniformly popular over the course of

his presidency, but people generally saw his approach to world affairs as more multilateralist than Bush's, and ratings for the U.S. remained relatively high in most nations throughout his tenure.

Share this link:



Richard Wike

is director of global attitudes research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO
TWITTER EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Understanding how 2020 election polls performed and what it might mean for other kinds of survey work

[返回目录](#)



(Brianna Soukup/Portland Press Herald via Getty Images)

Taken in the aggregate, preelection polls in the United States pointed to the strong likelihood that Democrat Joe Biden would pick up several states that Hillary Clinton lost in 2016 and, in the process, win a popular and electoral vote majority over Republican President Donald Trump. That indeed came to pass. But the election was much closer than polls suggested in several battleground states (e.g., Wisconsin) and more decisive for Trump elsewhere (e.g., Ohio). Democrats also were disappointed at failing to pick up outright control of the U.S. Senate – though it remains a possibility – and at losing seats in the U.S. House and several state legislatures.

Many who follow public opinion polls are understandably asking how these outcomes could happen, especially after the fairly aggressive steps the polling

community took to understand and address problems that surfaced in 2016. We are asking ourselves the same thing. In this post, we'll take a preliminary shot at answering that question, characterizing the nature and scope of the 2020 polling errors and suggesting some possible causes. We'll also consider what this year's errors might mean for *issue-focused* surveys, though it will be many months before the industry will be able to collect all the data necessary to come to any solid conclusions.

Before talking about what went wrong, there are a couple of important caveats worth noting. First, given the Democratic-leaning tendency to vote by mail this year and the fact that mail votes are counted later in many places, the size of the polling errors – especially at the national level – will likely end up being smaller than they appeared on election night. Even this week, vote counting continues and estimates of polling errors have shrunk somewhat in many battleground states. It's also important to recognize that not all states suffered a polling misfire. In many important states that Biden won (at least based on current vote totals), including Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico, Nevada and Virginia, polls gave a solid read of the contest.

All that said, it's clear that national and many state estimates were not just off, but off in the same direction: They favored the Democratic candidate. To measure by how much, we compared the actual vote margins between Republicans and Democrats – both nationally and at the state level – with the margins in a weighted average of polls from FiveThirtyEight.com. Looking across the 12 battleground states from the upper Midwest (where many polls missed the mark) to the Sun Belt and Southwest (where many were stronger), polls overestimated the Democratic advantage by an average of about 4 percentage points. When looking at national polls, the Democratic overstatement will end up being similar, about 4 points, depending on the final vote count. That means state polling errors are about the same as in 2016, while the national polling error is slightly larger, at least as of today. Even so, the national polling error of 2020 appears to be similar to the average errors for election polls over the past 12 presidential elections.

The fact that the polling errors were not random, and that they almost uniformly involved underestimates of Republican rather than Democratic performance, points to a systematic cause or set of causes. At this early point in the post-election period, the theories about what went wrong fall roughly into four categories, each of which has different ramifications for the polling industry.

Partisan nonresponse

The suggested problem

According to this theory, Democratic voters were more easily reachable and/or just more willing than Republican voters to respond to surveys, and routine statistical adjustments fell short in correcting for the problem. A variant of this: The overall share of Republicans in survey samples was roughly correct, but the samples underrepresented the most hard-core Trump supporters in the party. One possible corollary of this theory is that Republicans' widespread lack of trust in institutions like the news media – which sponsors a great deal of polling – led some people to not want to participate in polls.

Is this mainly an election polling problem, or would this be of wider concern to issue pollsters as well?

Sadly, the latter. If polls are systematically underrepresenting some types of conservatives or Republicans, it has ramifications for surveys that measure all kinds of behaviors and issues, from views on the coronavirus pandemic to attitudes toward climate change. Issue polling doesn't require the kind of 51%-49% precision of modern presidential election polling, of course, but no pollster wants a systematic skew to their data, even if it's "only" 5 percentage points.

What could we do to fix it?

A straightforward fix to the problem of underrepresenting Trump supporters would be to increase efforts to recruit conservatives and Republicans to polls; increase the statistical weight of those already in the survey to match their share of the population (a process known as "weighting"); or both. Many polls this year weighted on party registration, 2016 vote or self-identified partisanship, but still underestimated GOP support.

The challenge here is twofold. The first is in estimating the correct share of conservatives and Republicans in the population, since, unlike age, gender and other demographic characteristics, there are no timely, authoritative benchmarks on political orientation. Second, just getting the overall share of Republicans in the poll correct may be insufficient if those who are willing to be interviewed are

bad proxies for those who are not willing (e.g., more strongly conservative) – in which case a weighting adjustment *within* partisan groups may be needed.

‘Shy Trump’ voters

The suggested problem

According to this theory, not all poll respondents who supported Trump may have been honest about their support for him, either out of some sort of concern about being criticized for backing the president or simply a desire to mislead. Considerable research, including by Pew Research Center, has failed to turn up much evidence for this idea, but it remains plausible.

Is this mainly an election polling problem, or would this be of wider concern to issue pollsters as well?

This would pose a challenge for measuring attitudes about the president in any venue. But if it was limited to the *current* president, it would not have lasting impact. Polls on issues that are less sensitive might be less affected.

What could we do to fix it?

In the electoral context, this is a difficult problem to fix. Pollsters have experimented with approaches to doing so, such as asking respondents how their friends and neighbors planned to vote (in addition to asking respondents how they themselves planned to vote) and then using answers to these questions to adjust their forecasts. But the efficacy of these methods is still uncertain.

Still, the fact that polls this year underestimated support for other, less controversial Republican candidates – sometimes by more than they underestimated support for Trump – suggests that the “shy Trump” hypothesis may not explain very much of the problem.

Turnout error A: Underestimating enthusiasm for Trump

The suggested problem

Election polls, as opposed to issue polling, have an extra hurdle to clear in their attempt to be accurate: They have to predict which respondents are actually going to cast a ballot and then measure the race only among this subset of “likely voters.” Under this theory, it’s possible that the traditional “likely voter screens” that pollsters use just didn’t work as a way to measure Trump voters’ enthusiasm to turn out for their candidate. In this case, surveys may have had enough Trump voters in their samples, but not counted enough of them as likely voters.

Is this mainly an election polling problem, or would this be of wider concern to issue pollsters as well?

If the main problem this year was a failure to anticipate the size of Republican turnout, the accuracy of issue polls would be much less affected. It would suggest that survey samples may already adequately represent Americans of all political persuasions but still struggle to properly anticipate who will actually turn out to vote, which we know is quite difficult. Fortunately, the eventual availability of state voter records matched to many election surveys will make it possible to assess the extent to which turnout differences between Trump and Biden supporters explain the errors.

What could we do to fix it?

Back to the mines on reinventing likely voter scales.

Turnout error B: The pandemic effect

The suggested problem

The once-in-a-generation coronavirus pandemic dramatically altered how people intended to vote, with Democrats disproportionately concerned about the virus and using early voting (either by mail or in person) and Republicans more likely to vote in person on Election Day itself. In such an unusual year – with so many people voting early for the first time and some states changing their procedures – it’s possible that some Democrats who *thought* they had, or would, cast a ballot did not successfully do so. A related point is that Trump and the Republican Party conducted a more traditional get-out-the-vote effort in the campaign’s final weeks, with large rallies and door-to-door canvassing. These may have further confounded likely voter models.

Is this mainly an election polling problem, or would this be of wider concern to issue pollsters as well?

To the extent that polls were distorted by the pandemic, the problems may be confined to this moment in time and this specific election. Issue polling would be unaffected. The pandemic may have created greater obstacles to voting for Democrats than Republicans, a possibility that polls would have a hard time assessing. These are not problems we typically confront with issue polling.

What could we do to fix it?

It's possible that researchers could develop questions, such as on knowledge of the voting process, that could help predict whether the drop-off between intention to vote and having successfully cast a ballot is higher for some voters than others – for instance, whether a voter's mailed ballot is successfully counted or may be rejected for some reason. Treating all early voters as definitely having voted and all Election Day voters as only *possible* voters is a potential mistake that can be avoided.

Conclusion

As we begin to study the performance of 2020 election polling in more detail, it's also entirely possible that *all* of these factors contributed in some way – a “perfect storm” that blew the polls off course.

Pew Research Center and other polling organizations will devote a great deal of effort to understanding what happened. Indeed, we have already begun to do so. We'll conduct a review of our own polling, as well as a broader analysis of the polls, and we'll participate in a task force established at the beginning of this year by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) to review election poll performance, as happened in 2016. This effort will take time. Relevant data on voter turnout will take months to compile. But make no mistake: We are committed to understanding the sources of the problem, fixing them and being transparent along the way.

Share this link:



Scott Keeter

is a senior survey advisor at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO TWITTER EMAIL



Courtney Kennedy

is director of survey research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO EMAIL



Claudia Deane

is vice president of research at Pew Research Center. POSTS BIO TWITTER EMAIL

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)

Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries

[返回目录](#)

This analysis focuses on cross-national views of China. The work builds on previous studies released in the summer of 2020 on Americans' views of China and the international image of the U.S.

This study was conducted in countries where nationally representative telephone surveys are feasible. Due to the coronavirus outbreak, face-to-face interviewing is not currently possible in many parts of the world.

For this report, we use data from nationally representative surveys of 14,276 adults from June 10 to Aug. 3, 2020, in 14 advanced economies. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in the U.S., Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Japan and South Korea.


Here are the questions used for the report, along with responses, and the survey methodology.

Views of China have grown more negative in recent years across many advanced economies, and unfavorable opinion has soared over the past year, a new 14-country Pew Research Center survey shows. Today, a majority in each of the surveyed countries has an unfavorable opinion of China. And in Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, South Korea, Spain and Canada, negative views have reached their highest points since the Center began polling on this topic more than a decade ago.

Negative views of China increased most in Australia, where 81% now say they see the country unfavorably, up 24 percentage points since last year. In the UK, around three-quarters now see the country in a negative light – up 19 points. And, in the U.S., negative views of China have increased nearly 20 percentage points since President Donald Trump took office, rising 13 points since just last year.

Increasingly negative evaluations of China across advanced economies

% who have a(n) ___ view of China



Note: Belgium and Denmark not surveyed prior to 2020. In Italy, 2020 data from telephone surveys; prior data from face-to-face surveys. Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey. Q8b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

The rise in unfavorable views comes amid widespread criticism over how China has handled the coronavirus pandemic. Across the 14 nations surveyed, a median of 61% say China has done a bad job dealing with the outbreak. This is many more than say the same of the way the COVID-19 pandemic was handled by

their own country or by international organizations like the World Health Organization or the European Union. Only the U.S. receives more negative evaluations from the surveyed publics, with a median of 84% saying the U.S. has handled the coronavirus outbreak poorly.

Most think China has done bad job handling COVID-19, though better than the U.S.

% who say that each has done a ___ job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak



Note: Percentages are medians based on 14 countries. "WHO" refers to the World Health Organization. In Australia and Canada, the question was asked about "COVID-19." In Japan, it was asked about "novel coronavirus," and in South Korea, it was asked about "Corona19." In the U.S., the question about how well the country was handling the coronavirus outbreak was only asked once, though the data here appears in both the "own country" and "U.S." columns.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10a-e.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Publics losing faith in President Xi

% who have no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs

	2019	2020	'19-'20 Change
	%	%	
U.S.	50	77	▲27
Australia	54	79	▲25
Italy	54	75	▲21
Germany	61	78	▲17
Netherlands	53	70	▲17
UK	60	76	▲16
Sweden	67	82	▲15
Canada	60	74	▲14
France	69	80	▲11
South Korea	74	83	▲9
Spain	66	75	▲9
Japan	81	84	+3
Belgium	-	73	-
Denmark	-	82	-

Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**. In Italy, 2020 data from telephone surveys; prior data from face-to-face surveys.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey, Q15b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Disapproval of how China has handled the COVID-19 pandemic also colors people's confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping. A median of 78% say they have not too much or no confidence in him to do the right thing regarding world affairs, including at least seven-in-ten in every country surveyed. This lack of confidence in Xi is at historic highs in every country for which trend data is available except Japan and Spain. In most countries, the percent saying they have not too much or no confidence in him has grown by double digits since last year. For example, in the Netherlands, whereas around half distrusted Xi last year, today 70% say the same – up 17 percentage points.

But, even as concerns about Xi rise, in most countries, more have faith in President Xi than in President Trump. For example, in Germany, 78% say they have no confidence in Xi – but 89% say the same of Trump. Still, while Xi's global image is somewhat better than Trump's, it nonetheless is significantly worse than several of the other world leaders asked about, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson.

When it comes to perceptions of economic strength, China fares relatively well in the survey. Of four options given, people in most countries polled are most likely to see China as the world’s top economy. This is particularly true in Europe, where a plurality or majority in every country surveyed says China is the world’s leading economic power. Outside of the U.S. itself – where 52% of Americans say the U.S. is the world’s leading economic power – only in Japan (53%) and South Korea (77%) do more name the U.S. than China.


But even while pluralities or majorities in most countries note China’s economic strength relative to the U.S., this opinion does little to color attitude toward China more broadly. In almost every country surveyed, people who name China as the top economic power and people who name the U.S. are equally likely to have unfavorable views of China. People’s own pocketbooks also have little bearing on their views of China. In most countries surveyed, those with higher income levels are equally likely as those with lower levels of income to give the country low marks.

These are among the findings of a new Pew Research Center survey, conducted June 10 to Aug. 3, 2020, among 14,276 adults in 14 countries.

Negative views of China on the rise

Unfavorable views of China prevail

% who have a ___ view of China



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey, Q8b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

A majority in each of the 14 countries surveyed has an unfavorable view of China. In most countries, around three-quarters or more see the country in a negative light. In Spain, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, the U.S., the UK, South Korea, Sweden and Australia, negative views have reached their highest level in the 12 or more years that Pew Research Center has been polling in these countries.

Around a third or more in Belgium, Denmark, the UK, Sweden, Canada, the U.S., Australia and Japan also have *very* unfavorable views of China. In both the UK and Australia, this is more than twice as many as said they had *very* unfavorable views of China last year.

In most countries, views soured significantly since just last year. For example, in Australia – where efforts to investigate China’s role in the spread of COVID-19

have led to heated trade frictions – negative views of China have gone up 24 percentage points since 2019. This is also the largest year-on-year change in Australia since the question was first asked in 2008.

Negative views increased by double digits over the past year in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the U.S., South Korea and Spain.

Increasingly negative evaluations of China

% who have an unfavorable view of China

Most unfavorable Least unfavorable

	'02	'05	'06	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15	'16	'17	'18	'19	Spring '20	Summer '20	'19-'20 change
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Australia	-	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	35	-	33	39	32	47	57	-	81	▲ 24
UK	-	16	14	27	36	29	35	26	35	31	38	37	44	37	35	55	-	74	▲ 19
Sweden	-	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	59	49	52	70	-	85	▲ 15	
Netherlands	-	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	42	45	58	-	73	▲ 15	
Germany	-	37	33	54	68	63	61	59	67	64	64	60	60	53	54	56	-	71	▲ 15
U.S.	-	35	29	39	42	38	36	36	40	52	55	54	55	47	47	60	66	73	▲ 13
South Korea	31	-	-	42	49	54	56	-	-	50	42	37	-	61	60	63	-	75	▲ 12
Spain	-	21	38	43	56	41	38	39	46	47	55	50	56	43	48	53	-	63	▲ 10
France	-	42	41	51	72	60	59	49	60	58	53	49	61	52	54	62	-	70	▲ 8
Canada	-	27	-	37	-	36	-	-	-	45	-	48	40	40	45	67	-	73	▲ 6
Italy	-	-	-	61	-	-	-	-	64	62	70	57	61	59	60	57	-	62	+5
Japan	42	-	71	67	84	69	69	61	84	93	91	89	86	83	78	85	-	86	+1
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	-	
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75	-	

Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**. In Italy, 2020 survey was conducted by telephone; prior surveys were conducted face-to-face.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey, Q8b.


"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

While these changes since last year are stark, in some countries, they are part of a larger trajectory. In the U.S., for example, unfavorable opinion of China has ticked up steadily since 2018. Similarly, in South Korea, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and Sweden, this marks the second year in a row where negative views have reached historic highs.

Older people often see China more negatively

% who have an unfavorable view of China



Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey. Q8b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

As has traditionally been the case in Pew Research Center polling, older people tend to have more unfavorable views of China than younger people. For example, in Australia, 68% of those under 30 have an unfavorable view of China, compared with 86% of those ages 50 and older. This also marks the first year in which a majority of younger Australians have an unfavorable view of China; in 2019, 45% of those under 30 reported the same.

In the U.S., too, 2020 is the first year in which more than half of young Americans expressed negative views toward China. The only country surveyed in which younger people hold *more* unfavorable views of China than their elders is South Korea.

In contrast, education plays little role in people's assessments of China. Across


each of the 14 countries surveyed, those with a postsecondary degree or more are equally likely to have unfavorable views of China as those with less education. Men and women are also equally likely to have unfavorable views of China in nearly all countries surveyed.

In the U.S., Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party hold more unfavorable views of China than Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party. Aside from the U.S. – where conservatives tend to have more unfavorable views of China than liberals – ideology has little or no relationship with views of China in the other countries surveyed.

Most think China has not handled COVID-19 outbreak well

Mostly negative assessments of China's coronavirus response

% who say China has done a ___ job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak



Note: In Australia and Canada, the question was asked about "COVID-19." In Japan, it was asked about "novel coronavirus," and in South Korea, it was asked about "Corona19." Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey. Q10b.
"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

After initial cases of the coronavirus started appearing in China's Hubei Province in late 2019, many around the world questioned the expediency of China's response to the outbreak, and others critiqued some of the measures Beijing used to contain the virus within its borders. But in Wuhan, the original epicenter of the outbreak, the strict lockdown has ended and the new case count plummeted to at or near zero by May.


Among the 14 advanced economies surveyed, most rate China's COVID-19 response negatively. A median of 61% say China has done a bad job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, while 37% believe the country has done a good job.

At least six-in-ten in Canada and the U.S. rate China’s handling of the coronavirus as poor. More than half in seven European nations share this view, including 72% in Denmark and 65% in Sweden. Spaniards and Italians are split, with nearly equal shares saying China has handled the pandemic well versus not well.

The most negative reviews of China’s COVID-19 response come from three nations in the Asia-Pacific region. More than seven-in-ten in Japan, South Korea and Australia say China has done a bad job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, including more than four-in-ten in each country who say they did a *very* bad job.

China receives low marks for handling of COVID-19 pandemic

% who say each has done a bad job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak




Note: In Australia and Canada, the question was asked about “COVID-19.” In Japan, it was asked about “novel coronavirus,” and in South Korea, it was asked about “Corona19.” In the U.S., the question about how well the country was handling the coronavirus outbreak was only asked once, though the data here appears in both the “own country” and “U.S.” columns.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey, Q10a-e.

“Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”

Views of how well China has handled COVID-19 outbreak contribute to unfavorable opinion of the country

% who have an unfavorable view of China, among those who say China has done a ___ job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak



Note: Statistically significant differences in **bold**.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey, Q8b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Assessments of China's handling of the coronavirus outbreak are generally much more negative than those given to other nations and institutions. Publics give the highest ratings to their own country's coronavirus response (median of 73% good job). And a median of about six-in-ten say the World Health Organization and European Union have done a good job dealing with the coronavirus. The exception to this pattern comes in assessments of the United States' handling of the virus, which receives even more negative ratings on its COVID-19 strategy: A median of 84% believe the American response to the pandemic has been bad, while just 15% rate it as good.

Perceptions of how well China has done handling the coronavirus pandemic color people's overall views of the country. Those who think China has done a bad job dealing with COVID-19 are much more likely to have an unfavorable view of the country – and the difference is at least 20 percentage points in every country surveyed. For example, in Italy, those who say China has done a bad job handling the coronavirus pandemic are twice as likely to report an unfavorable view of China – 82% vs. 41%, respectively.

Europeans see China as world's dominant economic power

% who say ___ is the world's leading economic power



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey, Q14.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Many major economies are predicted to contract in 2020 amid the pandemic, including those of the U.S., Japan and the euro area. In contrast, the Chinese economy is expected to achieve positive, if modest, growth. Across the 14 countries surveyed, when asked to evaluate the relative economic standing of these areas, a median of 48% identify China as the world's leading economic power. The U.S. comes second, with a median of 35% seeing it as the world's top economic power. Few see Japan or EU countries similarly.

In most European countries surveyed, about half or more consider China the world’s top economy, compared with about a third who say the same about the U.S. Evaluations of China’s economic standing have a double-digit edge on evaluations of the U.S. economy in seven of the nine European countries. For example, Belgians are 22 percentage points more likely to say China is the top economy than to name the U.S. (54% vs. 32%). At least one-in-ten in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands also name the countries of the EU as the world’s leading economic power – the highest among all countries surveyed.


South Korea and Japan are the only two countries – aside from the U.S. itself – where more see the U.S. as the world’s leading economy than China. South Koreans are particularly likely to name the U.S., with 77% naming the U.S. as the dominant global economy.

Over the past few years, evaluations of these countries’ international economic standing have generally held steady in the countries surveyed. Such evaluations also do not differ across different age groups and education or income levels, but men are more likely than women to say the U.S. is the world’s leading economic power in half of the countries surveyed.

Little confidence in President Xi to do the right thing in world affairs

Few trust Xi's actions in global arena

% who have ___ in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey, Q15b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Across the 14 countries surveyed, a median of 78% say they have no confidence in Chinese President Xi to do the right thing when it comes to international affairs, with at least seven-in-ten in every country saying they lack confidence in Xi. Only a median of 19% express any trust.

In the U.S., a majority say they have no confidence at all in Xi (55%), and about half in Canada say the same (47%). No more than a quarter report having any confidence in him in either country.


Europeans report similarly low levels of trust in Xi. A third or more in each country surveyed say they have no confidence at all in the Chinese president, including at least half in Sweden, France and Denmark.

About half in Japan and Australia also say they have no confidence *at all* in Xi. Japan also stands out as a country where less than 0.5% of the public – effectively *no one* – reports having a lot of confidence in China’s president, though no more than 5% report having a lot of confidence in him in any country surveyed.

The survey also asked about confidence in five other world leaders. Only confidence in U.S. President Trump is lower than confidence in Xi. When considering median confidence, Russian President Vladimir Putin receives slightly higher marks, while confidence in European leaders Merkel, Macron and Johnson are at least twice as high as in Xi.

Increasingly negative evaluations of Xi

% who have **no confidence** in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Belgium and Denmark not surveyed prior to 2020. In Italy, 2020 data from telephone surveys; prior data from face-to-face surveys.
Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes survey. Q15b.

"Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Distrust in President Xi has reached unprecedented highs in all countries for which past data is available except for Japan and Spain. The increase in distrust has been especially sharp in the last year; nine of 12 countries have seen a double-digit increase in the share who say they have no confidence in Xi. In Australia, for example, 54% had little or no confidence in Xi in 2019, and now 79% say the same, a 25 percentage point increase.

Confidence in Xi is low among men and women, those with higher and lower

levels of education, across age groups and among those with higher and lower incomes.

Positive evaluations of China's handling of the coronavirus tied to trust in Xi

% who have confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs, among those who say China has done a ___ job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak

	Bad %	Good %	Diff
Spain	9	38	+29
Australia	11	39	+28
Germany	8	33	+25
Japan	5	30	+25
Denmark	10	34	+24
Canada	14	37	+23
U.S.	11	33	+22
Italy	14	34	+20
South Korea	12	30	+18
France	8	25	+17
Netherlands	21	38	+17
Belgium	17	33	+16
UK	15	31	+16
Sweden	10	25	+15

Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.

Source: Summer 2020 Global Attitudes Survey, Q15b.

“Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

It is also closely related to people’s assessments of how China is handling the coronavirus outbreak. People who think China has done a good job handling COVID-19 are more likely to have confidence in the Chinese president. For instance, 38% of Spaniards who compliment China’s outbreak response trust Xi compared with 9% of those who do not – a 29 percentage point difference. Still, no more than about four-in-ten of those who rate China’s coronavirus outbreak response positively say they trust Xi.

[原文](#)

[返回目录](#)