Angola and its Disaster Management Framework Chris Porter¹: GROUP B: 10 February 2008

1) Background Information

Geography and demography				
Land area	1,246,700 sq km			
Population	17 million (est)			
Children under age 15	50% of the total population.			
Total fertility rate	7			
Urbanisation	40% (5 million in capital)			
Slum to urban population	83%			
Economic data:				
GDP	\$44 bn (2007)			
GDP Growth	18.6% (2006) 19-24% (2007)			
GDP per capita	\$1,980 (Atlas). WB – lower middle income (2006)			
Non-oil fiscal deficit	58% of GDP (2007)			
Int reserves forecast	\$11bn (2007)			
Inflation	11.8% (2007)			
Agriculture as % of GDP	7.2 (2005)			
Fiscal				
Budget	\$33bn (2008)			
Capital budget execution	60% (2007)			
Social indicators				
HDI	162/177 (currently unlikely to reach most MDGs)			
Poverty	68 % of population in			
Under mortality	250/1000			
Gini coefficient	0.62			
Access to water	<53%			
Life expectancy	42 years for men and 45 years for women.			
Maternal mortality	1,400/ 100,000 live births			
Primary Enrolment/ completion	25%			
HIV prevalence between	2.5% and 2.8%.			
Governance				
World Bank CPIA	2.7			
WBI Governance indicators	10-25 th percentile for almost all			

(Ref: World Bank. IMF, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHABITAT, GoA and CIA World factbook).

Hazard risks and recent disaster history in Angola


Summarized Table of Natural Disasters in Angola from 1981 to 2007								
	# of Events	Killed	Injured	Homeless	Affected	Total Affected	Damage US\$ (000's	
Drought	6	58	0	0	2,610,000	2,610,000		
avg per event		10	0	0	435,000	435,000		
Epidemic	14	4,451	0	0	95,608	95,608		
avg per event		318	0	0	6,829	6,829		
Flood	17	259	16	27,750	581,928	609,694	10,000	
avg per event		15	1	1,632	34,231	35,864	588	
Slides	1	13	0	0	0	0		
avg per event		13	0	0	0	0		

(Cred International Database www.emdat.be, 06 Feb 2008) - *Epidemics include Marburg, Cholera and Meningitis. Table is incomplete in terms of \$ damage.

¹ Caveat: This note was written based on a rapid non-exhaustive analysis of available literature and discussion with some stakeholders (not the national authorities). Omissions and errors are very possible and the fault of the author alone.

Angola suffered conflict almost continuously between 1975 and 2002. Some 1.5 million deaths were attributed to the conflict and over 4.5 million people were displaced internally or as refugees (http://www.cedat.be, 06 Feb 2008). Vulnerabilities to natural disasters were intensified during this period and communities are still struggling to recover. Infrastructure and governance capacity at all levels was similarly negatively affected by the war. Furthermore, in the past a centralized form of governance was practiced. There is little local accountability between the state the population. Despite one of the fastest growing economies in the world, massive post-conflict spending by the Government – including a desire to see greater decentralization and local engagement of the population, capacities, resilience and accountability will take time to develop.

Despite the potential opportunity for development due to rising national



revenues and dramatically improved security, there is a risk that post war disaster resilience will struggle to improve as quickly as hoped. In part, this is due to the perverse impact of the oil economy which creates a strong local currency and makes local manufacturing and agriculture uncompetitive with cheap imports. The growing oil industry employs only a tiny proportion of the population. Livelihood options for those in rural areas and the majority of the urban poor will therefore

(Possible Worst case scenario for 2008, www.fews.net, FEWS 2007) remain limited. Vulnerability could also be negatively impacted by any

deterioration in security in the run up to the elections. Although the current outlook is favourable, as a resource rich post conflict country the statistics are against Angola (Bannon and Collier, 2003).

Finally a reliance on using GDP growth as a measure of disaster impact and risk is problematic in Angola. Due to the dominance of the oil sector in Angola (> 50% of GDP and 93% exports) the impact of disasters on national GDP is likely to small (see 2007 example below). However, the impact disasters can have on Angola's efforts to meet the MDGs are more significant. Drought, flood and epidemics will have greatest impact on the urban poor in the slums of the capital and other cities and also rural poor. Using risk analysis or post disaster needs assessments based on GDP growth does not provide a full picture in Angola.

2) Brief Description of the 2007 Floods in Angola

Impact

Approximately 300 people were killed. 5,000 people were made homeless in urban areas and a further 10,000 in rural remote eastern region of Moxico Province (mostly recent refugee returnees). An additional 40,000 were severely affected in Moxico. The total numbers affected in urban areas is unclear. After the floods, the country suffered secondary impacts in terms of a spike in malaria and also cholera cases (from an already present cholera epidemic).

There has been no published assessment on its overall impact on the national economy. The economy is dominated by the oil industry (over 50% of GDP and 93% of exports), however, this was relatively unaffected by the floods. Damage was focused on urban slum areas, where more than 83% of the cities 5 million people lived. So while floods did not have an impact at a national level on GDP, they had a significant impact on livelihoods at a local level (people displaced and many thousands unable to reach work in urban areas and thousands of subsistence-level agricultural plots lost). There was also some national impact in terms of political effect - the urban poor of Luanda are a significant proportion of the electorate (especially sensitive for the first elections after 40 years of conflict).

External Assistance: was not requested, but welcomed at a local level. UN played a very low key role with UNICEF (Luanda) and IOM (in Cazombo) playing modest roles. UN played no coordination role. Some International NGOS provided modest assistance to the displaced in Luanda.

Civil protection tried to coordinate the response of central government, including the military. Among external actors there was some confusion over the coordinating roles of civil protection and UTCAH under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. UTCAH had led coordination during the war period, but its role has become unclear since. For domestic actors civil protection was clearly in the lead. At local level, community members temporarily housed relatives and civil society (e.g. church, but also some NGOs) distributed relief supplies and tried limited advocacy with Government over an appropriate response.

In Luanda, some of those affected by the floods are still in temporary accommodation, awaiting the provision of new safer housing sites from the Government.

Lessons learnt:

- That there was very little early warning of the floods
- That Luanda's infrastructure (designed for 400,000 people) cannot cope with such rains
- Whilst having little impact on the national economy, the floods were still a national issue
- There a lack of clarity over institutional roles and responsibilities
- UN system poorly prepared for such a situation in terms of its own leadership and linkages with the authorities

3) National Disaster Management System

Characteristics and overview

Angola has a centralized government structure, which until 2002 was primarily focused on national security. Institutional clarity in many areas, including disaster management, is still weak. The institutional framework and corresponding capacity is evolving (rapidly in some areas), but will take time. There is no easily publicly available overarching disaster management legislation or specific institutional framework available. What exists is focused solely on disaster preparedness and response. Legislation on the process for land use zoning does exist, but unclear whether this incorporates disaster risk.

Roles and Responsibilities

Many central government departments have some involvement in disaster management. The most relevant of which are:

- Interministerial commission for civil protection, which is led at a task force level by the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) within the Ministry of Interior. The task force is responsible for national preparedness and response to new disasters
- Ministry of social affairs & reintegration is responsible for responding to the most vulnerable and during the war its Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) led the coordination of assistance – including external support
- Ministry of Health is responsible for all health related disasters and epidemiological monitoring (preventive and preparedness activities and support to provinces)
- Ministry of Planning leads the planning for capital expenditure for reconstruction/development and also national development planning exercises.
- Ministry of Finance is responsible for annual budget and reoccurring expenditure.
- The Ministry of Urbanism and Environment is responsible for urban slum upgrading, was heavily involved in the development of a new land law (2004); and recently given national level responsibility for sanitation. National Institute for Spatial Planning and Urban Development (INOTU) handles development and zoning under the MINUA.
- Gabinete de Segurança Alimentar (GSA or Office of Food Security) within the Ministry of Agriculture plays a monitoring role for food security, but capacity is weak, despite many years of capacity building support during the war.
- Ministry of Water and Energy:
- Military and police: has substantial human capacity. The military has significant logistical capacity which could help respond to disasters nationally and even regionally.

At Sub national level, Provincial authorities have been asked to establish civil protection units, but they have only very limited planning and response capacity. Municipality level is even weaker (only agreed in last 6 months that Municipal authorities should be given spending unit status).

Domestic Civil Society in Angola is still fairly nascent, with the Catholic Church a significant actor, both in terms of effective advocacy, but also capacity. Most organization still focused on response and preparedness. There is no academic

institution specializing in DRR in Angola. Government view of the role of civil society seems cautious.

International organizations (including bilateral and multilateral donors, UN and NGOs) play a small role in Angola (some with more capacity than others). Coordination with authorities is challenging but improving. World Bank has no specific disaster management inputs.

The Financial sector is growing rapidly, but with still limited products/access for poor.

The media is quite diverse within the capital city. But in the provinces and rural areas is limited to the state controlled media.

Risk Identification:

Since the 2007 floods the CPU has made efforts to strengthen risk identification efforts – primarily through a national level contingency planning exercise with participation from many provinces. They have also established a flood early warning system for some major cities (e.g. Benguela). However, it seems unlikely that they have undertaken a more detailed and robust study of hazards and risks in Angola (e.g. detailed mapping of flood zones etc). Historically UN and other partners have worked closely with GSA on drought and food security vulnerability and mapping. However, the linkages between the active CPU and the GSA are unclear.

Risk Mitigation

The Government passed a new land law in 2004, however, this seems more concerned with registration and title, rather than issues of land use zoning.

Angolan Government is investing heavily in the construction of new and reconstruction of war damaged infrastructure. However, there are concerns that the planning and prioritisation process for these investments does not adequately incorporate issues of risk (not just disaster risk, but also issues of economic rates of return, environmental and social risk etc).

Government is currently embarking on a medium term (2009-13) planning exercise (the first of its kind). It is not yet clear whether disaster risk and DRR more generally will be incorporated into this document – which will provide the guide for any capital expenditure during this period.

Efforts are being made by the Government and partners to strengthen and diversify livelihoods in rural areas. However, due to the macroeconomic environment, this will be a challenge and Government investment in agriculture as percentage of the budget remains very low (2% of national investment budget in 2004). Therefore food security and vulnerability to drought may remain precarious for many.

Risk Transfer

At the national level the risk is carried by the Government. The strength of the oil economy means that in can absorb financial impact of disaster. A generous social security system also exists.

However, at an individual level, more than 70% of the population relies on the informal sector for its livelihoods and has no access to formal social security. At a community level, there are no micro insurance products currently available and safety nets are yet to commence in any large scale way.

Preparedness

The CPU has recently embarked on contingency planning exercise with participation from line ministries and provincial authorities. This plan is focused on floods and was due to be presented to the Cabinet in late 2007.

Response and rehabilitation, and reconstruction

During the war the significant response capacity remained with the international organization. Although these agencies have now scaled back, the Government has yet to replace this capacity. However, the Government has clearly led the reconstruction effort (non post conflict donor conference for Angola and international organization presence is modest.)

4) Strengths and Weaknesses of the National Disaster Management System

<u>Strengths</u>

After the floods of 2007, there seems to be some political will to strength emergency preparedness and response. There also seems to have been moves to improve the greater clarity over the institutional framework - though this has not been publicly communicated.

Given the Government's rising revenues there is an opportunity to invest in DRR. Given the low development baseline and massive reconstruction drive, Angola also has an opportunity to make sure that its new investments are DRR sensitive (rather than retroactively trying to improve things).

Communities in Angola are remarkably resilient given the circumstances. This capacity should be built on.

Weaknesses

There is a lack of policy and legislation to guide disaster management efforts and clearly assign responsibility to different actors.

Current attention seems currently focused on emergency response and preparedness, with a focus on urban flooding and epidemics. There is a danger of rural disasters (drought and food security risk) going missed. There is little evidence

of a national level discussion about mitigation issues, beyond response and preparedness.

DM is currently not incorporated in the Government's main planning strategy. There is little transparency over the prioritisation and planning process for major new infrastructure investments.

Ongoing DM efforts seem centralized with little participation from municipal or community level and with no involvement of broader civil society.

5) Recommendations for Improvement

Given the momentum that developed following last year's floods one could argue that the National Commission for Civil Protection expand their efforts to push DM up the government agenda and develop a more holistic disaster management framework for Angola, which includes issues of mitigation and involves all stakeholders.

<u>Approach</u>

However, one has to question the timing of such an initiative given the limited Government absorption capacity and current political economy of Angola (forthcoming elections, power dynamics within Ministries and between the centre and sub national authorities etc). Angola also has many other post conflict priorities and different reform initiatives ongoing which are cross-cutting and structurally challenging to implement (e.g. administrative deconcentration). Many of these initiatives, although not motivated by DM concerns, will have an impact on reducing risk.

Given this environment and the moderate risk of national disasters in Angola compared to other countries, there is risk that any attempt to push for a comprehensive DM framework immediately will fail. A more successful approach might be one that in the short term (3yrs) focuses only on very specific and deliverable aspects of mitigation, preparedness and response. Over time, not only will this directly improve resilience, but will also build the awareness, demand and momentum for a more holistic DM framework in the future.

Some specific ideas:

- Incorporate a reference to DM in the Government's medium plan for 2009-13
- Improve the transparency of the existing institutional framework and strengthen linkages between various bodies (and especially the CPU and GSA)
- Target key officials in Civil Protection Unit, line Ministries and high risk provinces/municipalities for DM awareness raising - this can be incorporated into the training packages associated with deconcentration and local planning processes.

- Undertake detailed hazard mapping of the whole country (including possible changes associated with climate change). This could provide the basis of future DM policy and planning.
- In addition to activities targeting the authorities, significant gains could be made
 by promoting grass root level risk awareness and mitigation planning (creating a
 demand for greater state attention). Civil Society can play a significant role at
 sub national levels and also with the independent media.
- Whilst floods have caught the attention of the Government. It is perhaps drought
 in rural areas, which represents an even more worrying and possibly unseen risk.
 The mechanisms to monitor and respond to related food security issues are
 among the weakest. Efforts should be made to strengthen the monitoring,
 preparedness and response capacity for drought and food insecurity.
- Find an academic home for DM activities and learning in Angola. Try and establish a specific course with possible partnership in other PALOP countries (surely more disaster prone countries including Mozambique, Timor and Brazil would be interested).

Indirect efforts with an impact on DM

- Continue efforts to diversify rural economy and kick start local production. Share lessons from other countries of use of safety nets to tackle extreme poverty and also reduce disaster risk.
- Strengthen the process for planning and prioritization of new investments, so that they do include an assessment of risk.

6) References

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