# Lecture 9 : SQL Injections

Alexandre Bartel

2019

https://dropit.uni.lu/invitations?share=38fb341606a357367b7a&dl=0

Previously...

## Previously... in Lecture 1 (Introduction)

- ► Software Development Life-cycle
- ► Vulnerability Life-cycle
- Vulnerability Disclosure

## Previously... in Lecture 2 (Buffer Overflow)

- A buffer on the stack
- ► Return address on the stack
- Overwrite return address
- ▶ Jump to shellcode on the stack

## Previously... in Lecture 3 (ROP)

- NX bit (stack non-executable)
- Gadgets in already loaded code
- Chain gadgets (addresses of gadgets and data on the stack)
- Only data on the stack

## Previously... in Lecture 4 (ASLR)

- ► Randomize code segment at program start
- Breaks gadget chains
- Bypass with information leak (e.g, vulnerability)

## Previously... in Lecture 6 (CFI)

- Mecanism to allow only "intended" paths
- Binary instrumentation to add IDs
- ▶ Indirect jumps, call, returns check if ID of "destination" is correct
- ▶ Pure software implementation have 20% overhead

## Previously... in Lecture 7 (Heap-Overflow)

- ► How a heap-overflow can be attacked depends on the heap management implementation
- ► The "unlink" attack present in early versions of glibc provides a "write anywhere" primitive to the attacker
- ▶ Recent implementations performs more check to prevent "unlink" based attacks

## Previously... in Lecture 8 (Type Confusion)

- What is it? Manipulation of an object through another object.
- Consequences? Undefined behavior, hijack control flow.
- Why it works? No verification at runtime (otherwise runtime and/or memory overhead).

#### **SQL** Injection

## **SQL** Injection

- ► SQL: Structured Query **Language**; language to query relational databases
- ▶ Injection: introduction of code in the existing code of the target

## SQL: Structured Query Language

- SELECT \* from users;
- ► SELECT \* from users WHERE SUBSTRING(username, 0, 1) = "a";
- ► SELECT COUNT(\*) from users WHERE username = "root";

## Injection (ex in C)

```
// example from OWASP
// https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Command injection
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
 char cat[] = "cat ":
 char *command:
 size_t commandLength;
 commandLength = strlen(cat) + strlen(argv[1]) + 1;
 command = (char *) malloc(commandLength);
 strncpv(command. cat. commandLength);
 strncat(command, argv[1], (commandLength - strlen(cat)) );
 system(command);
 return (0):
```

## Injection (ex in SQL)

## SQL Injection Vulnerability Exploitation

```
<? php
$conn->query("SELECT * from users where username == \"$username\" and password ==
   \ \"$password\"");
?>
```

- Comments in SQL: --
- ▶ What if username is: " OR 1 == 1 --
- Results in authorisation check bypass!

### "Blind" SQL Injection Vulnerability Exploitation

```
<? php
$conn->query("SELECT * from users where username == \"$username\" and password ==
   \"$password\"");
?>
```

- How to dump a database?
- ▶ 1. Send queries to the database server through the web page.
- ▶ 2. The webserver might generate a different webpage if the query is successfull or not
- ▶ 3. For every query the attacker can deduce a tiny bit of information about the database (ex: one character of the first element of row 3)

### Preventing SQL Injection Vulnerabilities

```
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * from users where username == \"?\" and password ==

    \"?\"");
$stmt->bind_param("ss", $un, $pw); /* types and variable bindings */

$un = ...;
$pw = ...;
$stmt->execute();
?>
```

► Use "prepared" statements

#### Conclusion

- ► Code injection attacks enables bypass of authorization checks and/or execution of arbitrary code on the server
- Consequences: attacker gets access to privileged environment and/or can dump databases
- Protection include sanitization of the input and/or well defining what is code and what is data

Question?

### **Projets**

- ▶ Groups of 2
- Suggested topics:
  - 1. Heap exploitation on Debian 3.1
  - 2. Patch for CVE-2018-20343 (Ricardo, Alex)
  - 3. Complete exploit for CVE-2018-20343
  - 4. Study and PoC for CVE-2013-0912 (Chrome type confusion) (Adriano)
  - 5. Stable code injection through /proc/self/mem
  - 6. Explanation of a recent exploit targeting webbrowsers (Chrome, Firefox, etc.) (Yurii, Ervin)
  - 7. Exploitation of a PoC type confusion in C++ (Ihor, Artem)
  - 8. Break wordpress authentication mechanism.
- ▶ Deliverables: Presentation + Code (PoC)

#### Projet: Heap exploitation on Debian 3.1

- Explain the differences in the heap management code from debian 2.2 (lab 7) and debian 3.1
- Explain and develop a proof-of-concept to exploit a heap overflow on debian 3.1

#### Projet: Patch for CVE-2018-20343

- ▶ Understand CVE-2018-20343, a buffer overflow vulnerability
- You have to identify all instances of buffer overflow in the code (the code is not very big)
- You have to patch the vulnerable code

#### Projet: Complete exploit for CVE-2018-20343

- ► The current proof-of-concept only changes the value of EIP.
- ▶ You have to improve the PoC to enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code

### Projet: Study and PoC for CVE-2013-0912 (Chrome type confusion)

- ► Reproduce the SVG code for the exploit based on information you find on the internet
- ➤ You should create a VM with a distribution from 2013 and have the vulnerable version of Chrome

### Projet: Stable code injection through /proc/self/mem

- DosBox enables untrusted code to mount the host filesystem in the guest
- Thus untrusted code can write to /proc/self/mem
- You develop code to inject a shellcode into the virtual process of dosbox to execute arbitrary code
- ► You do this by writing to /proc/self/mem

Projet: Explanation of a recent exploit targeting webbrowsers (Chrome, Firefox, etc.)

▶ Contact me when you have found a CVE you want to explain.

#### Projet: Exploitation of a PoC type confusion in C++

Write a proof-of-concept showing how to exploit a type confusion in C++ in a x86\_64 architecture (latest debian)