

OMNISCIENT APPSEC

Custom, Continuous Security
Verification

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Bounce Security















WHO ARE WE?



WHAT IS OUR MOTIVATION?

WHO ARE WE?

- Michal Kamensky
- Josh Grossman



WHAT IS OUR MOTIVATION? BECOMING OMNISCIENT

1. having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight
2. possessed of universal or complete knowledge

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/omniscient>

BUT WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?



We want to enforce:

- Everything
 - Custom solutions that meet our needs
- Everywhere
 - Across our whole codebase/s
- All the time
 - Every CI run

WHAT IS A CUSTOM SOLUTION?

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
Bespoke Mitigation	Custom Solution	Custom Solution



EVERYTHING

GENERIC VULNERABILITY & STANDARD FIX = GENERIC SOLUTION

```
# Instead of this ...
cursor.execute(f"SELECT admin FROM users WHERE username = '{username}'");
# ...do this...
cursor.execute("SELECT admin FROM users WHERE username = %(username)s", {'username': username});

# From: https://snyk.io/blog/python-security-best-practices-cheat-sheet/
```

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
Bespoke Mitigation	Custom Solution	Custom Solution



EVERYTHING



Pylint

Star your Python code!

SAST



Bandit

*SAST – Static Application Security Testing



EVERYTHING





AppScan



sonarQube



CODACY



BRAKEMAN

VERACODE CheckmarX

CONTRAST

coverity[®]

ITY



MFND



snyk

klocwork




EVERYTHING

Bounce
SECURITY



EVERYTHING



*SAST – Static Application Security Testing

WHAT IS A CUSTOM SOLUTION?

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
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EVERYTHING

BUT WHAT ABOUT THIS?

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
Bespoke Mitigation	Custom Solution	Custom Solution

```
1 import os
2
3 def getfile(input):
4     print("This code will be dangerous with untrusted input")
5     input = "/folder/safe/{0}".format(input)
6     print("Access a file at the following path: {0}\n".format(os.path.realpath(input)))
7     # f = open(input, "r")
```

GENERIC VULNERABILITY (PATH TRAVERSAL)



EVERYTHING

```
1 dangerous_input = "../../../../../etc/passwd"
2
3 getfile(dangerous_input)
```

This code will be dangerous with untrusted input
Access a file at the following path: /etc/passwd

BESPOKE MITIGATION

No
guarantees!

```
1 def sanitize_input(input):
2     print("This function will make the untrusted input safer:")
3     input2 = input.replace("../", "")
4     print('{0}' ' has been turned into '{1}'\n'.format(input, input2))
5     return input2
```

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
Bespoke Mitigation	Custom Solution	Custom Solution



EVERYTHING

CUSTOM SOLUTION

```
1 dangerous_input = "../../../../etc/passwd"  
2  
3 getfile(dangerous_input)  
4  
5 safe_input = sanitize_input(dangerous_input)  
6  
7 getfile(safe_input)
```

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
Bespoke Mitigation	Custom Solution	Custom Solution

This code will be dangerous with untrusted input
Access a file at the following path: /etc/passwd

This function will make the untrusted input safer:
'../../../../etc/passwd' has been turned into 'etc/passwd'

This code will be dangerous with untrusted input
Access a file at the following path: /folder/safe/etc/passwd



EVERYTHING

CUSTOM SOLUTION

```
1 dangerous_input = "/../../../../etc/passwd"  
2  
3 getfile(dangerous_input)  
4  
5 safe_input = sanitize_input(dangerous_input)  
6  
7 getfile(safe_input)
```

	Generic Vulnerability	App-Specific Vulnerability
Standard Fix	Generic Solution	N/A
Bespoke Mitigation	Custom Solution	Custom Solution

This code will be dangerous with untrusted input
Access a file at the following path: /etc/passwd

This function will make the untrusted input safer:
'../../../../etc/passwd' has been turned into 'etc/passwd'

This code will be dangerous with untrusted input
Access a file at the following path: /folder/safe/etc/passwd



EVERYTHING

BUT WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?



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- Everywhere
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- All the time
 - Every CI run



Semgrep

Semantic + Grep



EVERYWHERE

ALTERNATIVES?



EVERYWHERE

SAST

*SAST – Static Application Security Testing



EVERYWHERE






```
1 ► Run github/codeql-action/analyze@v1
26 /opt/hostedtoolcache/CodeQL/0.0.0-20220214/x64/codeql/codeql version --format=terse
27 2.8.1
28 ► Extracting javascript
293 ► Finalizing javascript
297 ► Running queries for javascript
789 ► Interpreting results for javascript
1050 Analysis produced the following diagnostic data:
1051
1052 | Diagnostic | Summary |
1053 +-----+-----+
1054 | Extraction errors | 0 results |
1055 | Successfully extracted files | 20 results |
1056 Analysis produced the following metric data:
1057
1058 | Metric | Value |
1059 +-----+-----+
1060 | Total lines of JavaScript and TypeScript code in the database | 687 |
1061 | Total lines of user written JavaScript and TypeScript code in the database | 687 |
1062
1063 /opt/hostedtoolcache/CodeQL/0.0.0-20220214/x64/codeql/codeql database print-baseline
```



EVERYWHERE





```
/^([a-z\d\.-]+)@[([a-z\d-]+)\.([a-z]{2,8})(\.[a-z]{2,8})?$/
```

HOW TO REGEX

STEP 1: OPEN YOUR FAVORITE EDITOR



@ GARABATOKID

STEP 2: LET YOUR CAT PLAY ON YOUR KEYBOARD



EVERYWHERE

BUT WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?




We want to enforce:

- Everything
 - Custom solutions that meet our needs
- Everywhere
 - Across our whole codebase/s
- All the time
 - Every CI run

Cyber AI Transponster

Chess



EXAMPLES

4 examples:

1. Wrong Overload
2. Security Decorators
3. Unsanitised Input
4. Vulnerable Library

EXAMPLES

Each example:

- Has a security impact
- Could easily lead to becoming vulnerable again
- Is specific to our organization
- Needs something cleverer than Ctrl-F

DISCLAIMERS

- Contrived Examples
- Focus on content over style
- Focus on the two key lessons:
 - Custom solutions
 - Automated, syntax aware verification

WRONG OVERLOAD



The problem we're addressing:

- Sending money transactions
- Custom function to carry this out

```
class CallService:  
    def send_transaction(self, cat, value, msg):  
        # Do transaction sending stuff  
        print("Sent to '{0}'".format(cat))
```

WRONG OVERLOAD



```
class CallService:  
    def send_transaction(self, cat, value, msg):  
        # Do transaction sending stuff  
        print("Sent to '{0}'".format(cat))
```

- Vulnerable to replay attack (no transaction signing)
- Cannot eliminate the current functionality
- Cannot change function name

WRONG OVERLOAD



Proposed security solution:

- Create “overloaded” function
- Add an optional signature to authenticate

WRONG OVERLOAD - CODE EXAMPLE

```
class CallService:  
    def send_transaction_old(self, cat, value, msg):  
        # Do transaction sending stuff  
        print("Sent to '{0}'".format(cat))  
  
    def send_transaction(self, cat, value, msg, checksum=None):  
        if checksum == None:  
            self.send_transaction_old(cat, value, msg)  
        else:  
            # Do transaction sending stuff but this time  
            # with a checksum  
            print("Sent to '{0}', but safely!".format(cat))
```

WRONG OVERLOAD - CODE EXAMPLE

```
class CallService:  
    def send_transaction_old(self, cat, value, msg):  
        # Do transaction sending stuff  
        print("Sent to '{0}'".format(cat))  
  
    def send_transaction(self, cat, value, msg, checksum=None):  
        if checksum == None:  
            self.send_transaction_old(cat, value, msg)  
        else:  
            # Do transaction sending stuff but this time  
            # with a checksum  
            print("Sent to '{0}', but safely!".format(cat))
```

WRONG OVERLOAD - CODE EXAMPLE

```
class CallService:  
    def send_transaction_old(self, cat, value, msg):  
        # Do transaction sending stuff  
        print("Sent to '{0}'".format(cat))  
  
    def send_transaction(self, cat, value, msg, checksum=None):  
        if checksum == None:  
            self.send_transaction_old(cat, value, msg)  
        else:  
            # Do transaction sending stuff but this time  
            # with a checksum  
            print("Sent to '{0}', but safely!".format(cat))
```

WRONG OVERLOAD



Proposed security solution:

- Create “overloaded” function
- Add an optional signature to authenticate

Challenge:

- How do we ensure the old version is not being used?

WRONG OVERLOAD - CODE EXAMPLE

```
28 def main():
29
30     CatRequest = CallService()
31     CatRequest.name = "HacmeBank"
32
33     cat_num = "12146123"
34     msg = "Invoice 24234"
35     some_checksum = "D97EA6CA"
36
37     # ruleid: py_ex1_wrong_overload
38     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg)
39
40     # ok: py_ex1_wrong_overload
41     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg, some_checksum)
```

WRONG OVERLOAD - CODE EXAMPLE

```
28 def main():
29
30     CatRequest = CallService()
31     CatRequest.name = "HacmeBank"
32
33     cat_num = "12146123"
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37     # ruleid: py_ex1_wrong_overload
38     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg)
39
40     # ok: py_ex1_wrong_overload
41     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg, some_checksum)
```

WRONG OVERLOAD

Why do we need
custom verification:

- Specific to our company
- Understanding of function parameters required

```
28 def main():  
29  
30     CatRequest = CallService()  
31     CatRequest.name = "HacmeBank"  
32  
33     cat_num = "12146123"  
34     msg = "Invoice 24234"  
35     some_checksum = "D97EA6CA"  
36  
37     # ruleid: py_ex1_wrong_overload  
38     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg)  
39  
40     # ok: py_ex1_wrong_overload  
41     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg, some_checksum)
```

WRONG OVERLOAD - RULE

```
1 rules:
2   - id: py_ex1_wrong_overload
3     pattern: $CLASS.send_transaction($PARAM1, $PARAM2, $PARAM3)
4     message: The wrong overload of send_transaction has been
5     used on this line.
6   languages:
7     - python
8   severity: ERROR
```

WRONG OVERLOAD

```
28 def main():
29
30     CatRequest = CallService()
31     CatRequest.name = "HacmeBank"
32
33     cat_num = "12146123"
34     msg = "Invoice 24234"
35     some_checksum = "D97EA6CA"
36
37     # ruleid: py_ex1_wrong_overload
38     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg)
39
40     # ok: py_ex1_right_overload
41     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg, some_checksum)
```

SECURITY DECORATORS



The problem we're addressing:

- We need to verify permissions before allowing cats to make move
- Want to use a centralized function to verify this
- Don't want complex logic inside each function

SECURITY DECORATORS



Proposed security solution:

- Create decorator which verifies authorization
- Apply decorators to each sensitive function

SECURITY DECORATORS



```
def require_update_purrrmission(func):  
    @wraps(func)  
  
    def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):  
        if not Permissions.UPDATE in permissions:  
            raise ValueError("Permission denied")  
        return func(*args, **kwargs)  
    return wrapper
```

```
class SensitiveFunctions:  
  
    @require_update_purrrmission  
    def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):  
        print("Winner is {}".format(cat1))  
        # Update score board
```

SECURITY DECORATORS



```
def require_update_purrrmission(func):
    @wraps(func)

    def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
        if not Permissions.UPDATE in permissions:
            raise ValueError("Permission denied")
        return func(*args, **kwargs)
    return wrapper

class SensitiveFunctions:

    @require_update_purrrmission
    def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):
        print("Winner is {}".format(cat1))
        # Update score board
```

SECURITY DECORATORS



Proposed security solution:

- Create decorator which verifies authorization
- Apply decorators to each sensitive function

Challenge:

- What happens if we miss a sensitive function?

SECURITY DECORATORS - CODE EXAMPLE

```
24 class SensitiveFunctions:  
25  
26     @require_update_purrrmission  
27     def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):  
28         print("Winner is {}".format(cat1))  
29         # Update score board  
30  
31     def next_move_cat(cat, move):  
32         print("{} plays the next move which is {}".format(cat, move))  
33         play_move(cat, move)  
34         # Update game notes  
35  
36 SensitiveFunctions.next_move_cat("tabby", "Qxh6")  
37 SensitiveFunctions.update_score_board("tabby", "simba", GameResult.CAT1_WON)
```

SECURITY DECORATORS - CODE EXAMPLE

```
24 class SensitiveFunctions:  
25       
26         @require_update_purrrmission  
27         def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):  
28             print("Winner is {0}".format(cat1))  
29             # Update score board  
30           
31         def next_move_cat(cat, move):  
32             print("{0} plays the next move which is {1}".format(cat, move))  
33             play_move(cat, move)  
34             # Update game notes  
35           
36     SensitiveFunctions.next_move_cat("tabby", "Qxh6")  
37     SensitiveFunctions.update_score_board("tabby", "simba", GameResult.CAT1_WON)
```

SECURITY DECORATORS - CODE EXAMPLE

```
24 class SensitiveFunctions:  
25  
26     @require_update_purrrmission  
27     def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):  
28         print("Winner is {}".format(cat1))  
29         # Update score board  
30  
31     def next_move_cat(cat, move):  
32         print("{} plays the next move which is {}".format(cat, move))  
33         play_move(cat, move)  
34         # Update game notes  
35  
36 SensitiveFunctions.next_move_cat("tabby", "Qxh6")  
37 SensitiveFunctions.update_score_board("tabby", "simba", GameResult.CAT1_WON)
```

SECURITY DECORATORS

Why do we need
custom verification:

- Understanding of
decorators/
functions
is required

```
24 class SensitiveFunctions:  
25  
26     @require_update_purrrmission  
27     def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):  
28         print("Winner is {}".format(cat1))  
29         # Update score board  
30  
31     def next_move_cat(cat, move):  
32         print("{} plays the next move which is {}".format(cat, move))  
33         play_move(cat, move)  
34         # Update game notes  
35  
36 SensitiveFunctions.next_move_cat("tabby", "Qxh6")  
37 SensitiveFunctions.update_score_board("tabby", "simba", GameResult.CAT1_WON)
```

SECURITY DECORATORS - RULE

```
1 rules:
2   - id: py_ex2_auth_decorators
3     patterns:
4       - pattern: |
5         def $FUNC(...):
6           ...
7       - focus-metavariable:
8         - $FUNC
9       - pattern-not-inside: |
10         @require_update_purrrmission
11         def $FUNC(...):
12           ...
13       - pattern-inside: |
14         class SensitiveFunctions:
15           ...
16         message: Function is missing the authorization decorator
17         languages:
18           - python
19         severity: ERROR
20
```

SECURITY DECORATORS

```
24 class SensitiveFunctions:  
25  
26     @require_update_purrrmission  
27     def update_score_board(cat1, cat2, game_result: GameResult):  
28         print("Winner is {}".format(cat1))  
29         # Update score board  
30  
31     def next_move_cat(cat, move):  
32         print("{} plays the next move which is {}".format(cat, move))  
33         play_move(cat, move)  
34         # Update game notes  
35  
36 SensitiveFunctions.next_move_cat("tabby", "Qxh6")  
37 SensitiveFunctions.update_score_board("tabby", "simba", GameResult.CAT1_WON)
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

3

The problem we're addressing:

- We need to execute OS commands including user input
- We need to prevent malicious input getting to the OS
- Command
- We cannot currently centralize the code or modify the run_ping implementation

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

3

```
def get_input():
    #some actions before getting an input
    return input("please enter address")
```

```
def run_ping(address):
    cmd = "ping -c 1 {0}".format(address)
    subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)
```

```
new_address = get_input()
```

```
#ruleid: unsanitized_input
run_ping(new_address)
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

3

```
def get_input():
    #some actions before getting an input
    return input("please enter address")

def run_ping(address):
    cmd = "ping -c 1 {}".format(address)
    subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)

new_address = get_input()

#ruleid: unsanitized_input
run_ping(new_address)
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION



Proposed security solution:

- Create a sanitization function
- Use function on input before we call run_ping

DANGEROUS FUNCTION



```
def sanitize_it(user_input):
    #Sanitize the input to avoid code execution
    return user_input
```

```
def get_input():
    #some actions before getting an input
    return input("please enter address")
```

```
def run_ping(address):
    cmd = "ping -c 1 {}".format(address)
    subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)
```

```
new_address = get_input()
run_ping(new_address)
```

```
new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)
run_ping(new_address)
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

3

```
def sanitize_it(user_input):  
    #Sanitize the input to avoid code execution  
    return user_input
```

```
def get_input():  
    #some actions before getting an input  
    return input("please enter address")
```

```
def run_ping(address):  
    cmd = "ping -c 1 {}".format(address)  
    subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)
```

```
new_address = get_input()  
run_ping(new_address)
```

```
new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
run_ping(new_address)
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

3

```
def sanitize_it(user_input):
    #Sanitize the input to avoid code execution
    return user_input

def get_input():
    #some actions before getting an input
    return input("please enter address")

def run_ping(address):
    cmd = "ping -c 1 {}".format(address)
    subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)

new_address = get_input()
run_ping(new_address)

new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)
run_ping(new_address)
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION



Proposed security solution:

- Create a sanitization function
- Use function on input before we call run_ping

Challenge:

- How do we ensure we don't forget to do this somewhere?

DANGEROUS FUNCTION - CODE EXAMPLE

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION - CODE EXAMPLE

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION - CODE EXAMPLE

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION - CODE EXAMPLE

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION - CODE EXAMPLE

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

Why do we need
custom verification:

- Recognizing custom
sanitizers

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

```
1 import subprocess
2
3 def sanitize_it(user_input):
4     #Sanitize the input to avoid code execution
5     return user_input
6
7 def get_input():
8     #some actions before getting an input
9     return input("please enter address")
10
11 def run_ping(address):
12     cmd = "ping -c 1 {}".format(address)
13     subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)
14
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION - RULE

```
1 rules:
2   - id: py_ex3_unsanitized_input
3     mode: taint
4     pattern-sources:
5       - pattern: input(...)
6     pattern-sinks:
7       - pattern: run_ping(...)
8     pattern-sanitizers:
9       - pattern: sanitize_it(...)
10    message: run_ping is being used without first sanitizing
11    languages:
12      - python
13    severity: ERROR
14
```

DANGEROUS FUNCTION

```
15 new_address = get_input()  
16  
17 #ruleid: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
18 run_ping(new_address)  
19  
20 new_address = sanitize_it(new_address)  
21  
22 #ok: py_ex3_unsanitized_input  
23 run_ping(new_address)  
24
```

VULNERABLE LIBRARY



The problem we're addressing:

- We're using a vulnerable library (py7zr)
- We don't want to upgrade (yet?)
- We believe that the vulnerable function is not in use

VULNERABLE LIBRARY

CVE-2022-44900 Detail

Description

A directory traversal vulnerability in the [SevenZipFile.extractall\(\) function](#) of the [python library py7zr v0.20.0 and earlier](#) allows attackers to write arbitrary files via extracting a crafted 7z file.

VULNERABLE LIBRARY



Proposed security solution:

- Delay upgrade
- Search across codebase to ensure we are not using vulnerable function

Challenge:

- What if we start using this vulnerable function in the future

VULNERABLE LIBRARY – CODE EXAMPLE

```
7 def extract_game(game_name):  
8     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'r') as archive:  
9         archive.extractall()  
10  
11 def extract_game2(game_name):  
12     py7 = py7zr.SevenZipFile()  
13     py7.extractall(path)  
14  
15 def compress_game(game_name):  
16     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'w') as archive:  
17         archive.writeall('/cats/Simba/games', 'games')  
18  
19 def parse_data(json):  
20     data_in = json.loads(json)
```

VULNERABLE LIBRARY – CODE EXAMPLE

```
7 def extract_game(game_name):
8     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'r') as archive:
9         archive.extractall()
10
11 def extract_game2(game_name):
12     py7 = py7zr.SevenZipFile()
13     py7.extractall(path)
14
15 def compress_game(game_name):
16     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'w') as archive:
17         archive.writeall('/cats/Simba/games', 'games')
18
19 def parse_data(json):
20     data_in = json_li.extractall(json)
```

VULNERABLE LIBRARY – CODE EXAMPLE

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7 def extract_game(game_name):  
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18  
19 def parse_data(json):  
20     data_in = json.loads(json)
```

VULNERABLE LIBRARY

Why do we need
custom verification:

- SAST usually
doesn't look for
CVEs in known
libraries
- SCA usually just
looks for the library,
not the function

```
7 def extract_game(game_name):  
8     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'r') as archive:  
9         archive.extractall()  
10  
11 def extract_game2(game_name):  
12     py7 = py7zr.SevenZipFile()  
13     py7.extractall(path)  
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15 def compress_game(game_name):  
16     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'w') as archive:  
17         archive.writeall('/cats/Simba/games', 'games')  
18  
19 def parse_data(json):  
20     data_in = json_li.extractall(json)
```

*SAST – Static Application Security Testing

*SCA – Software Composition Analysis

VULNERABLE LIBRARY - RULE

```
1 rules:
2   - id: py_ex4_vulnerable_library
3     mode: taint
4     pattern-sources:
5       - pattern: py7zr.$FUNC(...)
6     pattern-sinks:
7       - pattern: $0.extractall(...)
8     message: Semgrep found a match
9     languages:
10    - python
11    severity: ERROR
12
```

VULNERABLE LIBRARY

```
7 def extract_game(game_name):  
8     with py7zr.SevenZipFile(game_name, 'r') as archive:  
9         archive.extractall()  
10  
11 def extract_game2(game_name):  
12     py7 = py7zr.SevenZipFile()  
13     py7.extractall(path)  
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15 def compress_game(game_name):  
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17         archive.writeall('/cats/Simba/games', 'games')  
18  
19 def parse_data(json):  
20     data_in = json.loads(json)
```

SEMGREP LIMITATIONS FOR PYTHON

- No cross-file scanning (for now)
- No support for types (for now)

BUT WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?



We want to enforce:

- Everything
 - Custom solutions that meet our needs
- Everywhere
 - Across our whole codebase/s
- All the time
 - Every CI run

SO, HOW DO I DO THIS ALL THE TIME?

- Let's see a demo!



ALL THE TIME



omniscientexamples/.github/wor x +



github.com/BounceSecurity/omniscientexamples/blo...



43



← Files

main

...

omniscientexamples / .github / workflows / semgrep_py_plain.yml



joshbouncesecurity Split workflows ✘

19 minutes ago



44 lines (40 loc) • 1.66 KB

Code

Blame

Raw



1 # Name of this GitHub Actions workflow.

2 name: Semgrep Python Plain

3


4 on:

```
4   on:
5     # Scan changed files in PRs (diff-aware scanning):
6     #pull_request: {}
7     # Scan on-demand through GitHub Actions interface:
8     workflow_dispatch: {}
9     # Scan mainline branches and report all findings:
10    push:
11      branches: ["master", "main"]
12    # Schedule the CI job (this method uses cron syntax):
13    #schedule:
14    #  - cron: '20 13 * * *' # Sets Semgrep to scan every day at 17:20 UTC.
15    # # It is recommended to change the schedule to a random time.
16
17  jobs:
18    semgrep:
19      # User-definable name of this GitHub Actions job:
20      name: semgrep/ci
21      # If you are self-hosting, change the following `runs-on` value:
22      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
```

```
26 # A Docker image with Semgrep installed. Do not change this.
27 image: returntocorp/semgrep
28
29 # Skip any PR created by dependabot to avoid permission issues:
30 if: (github.actor != 'dependabot[bot]')
31
32 steps:
33   # Fetch project source with GitHub Actions Checkout.
34   - uses: actions/checkout@v3
35   - run: semgrep install-semgrep-pro
36   # Run semgrep on the command line of the docker image.
37   - run: semgrep --pro --error --no-rewrite-rule-ids
38
39   env:
40     # Add the rules that Semgrep uses by setting the SEMGREP_RULES environment variable.
41     SEMGREP_RULES: >
42       semgrep_rules/py_ex1_wrong_overload.yml
43       semgrep_rules/py_ex2_auth_decorators.yml
44       semgrep_rules/py_ex3_unsanitized_input.yml
45       semgrep_rules/py_ex4_vulnerable_library.yml
```

DEMO

- Results in Workflow log



The screenshot shows a GitHub Actions workflow log for a repository named "BounceSecurity/omniscientexamples". The workflow is titled "semgrep/ci" and failed 27 minutes ago in 20s. A specific step is expanded, showing the command "Run semgrep --pro --error --no-rewrite-rule-ids". The log output displays several code snippets from files like "ex1_wrong_overload.py" and "ex2_auth_decorators.py", with Semgrep errors highlighted by red boxes. One error in "ex1_wrong_overload.py" points to a wrong overload of the "send_transaction" method. Another error in "ex2_auth_decorators.py" points to a function missing an authorization decorator.

```
code/python/ex1_wrong_overload.py
py_ex1_wrong_overload
The wrong overload of send_transaction has been used on this line.

38| CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, msg)
:|-----
44| CatRequest.send_transaction("12146123", 4489, msg)
:|-----
47| CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4342, msg)

code/python/ex2_auth_decorators.py
py_ex2_auth_decorators
Function is missing the authorization decorator

31| def next_move_cat(cat, move):
```



ALL THE TIME

DEMO

- Results uploaded to GitHub

SPLIT WORKFLOWS · BOUNCESECURITY/...

semgrep/ci

failed 33 minutes ago in 29s

Run semgrep --pro --error --no-rewrite-rule-ids --sarif --output=semgrep.sarif 1s

Scan was limited to files tracked by git.

Ran 4 rules on 4 files: 7 findings.

Error: Process completed with exit code 1.

Upload SARIF file for GitHub Advanced Security Dashboard 6s

Run github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v2

/usr/bin/docker exec f06586f5148f3056d9257266a10da5eb214be8c1bb1745b6f372f958cf791a56 sh -c "cat /etc/*release | grep ^ID"

Uploading results

Waiting for processing to finish

Post Run actions/checkout@v3 0s

Stop containers 0s

The screenshot shows a GitHub Actions workflow named 'semgrep/ci' that failed 33 minutes ago. The first step, 'Run semgrep', failed with an exit code of 1 due to finding 7 security issues. The second step, 'Upload SARIF file for GitHub Advanced Security Dashboard', succeeded after 6 seconds. A red box highlights the error message from the semgrep step and the entire Sarif upload step. A small icon of a character with a speech bubble is in the bottom left corner, and the text 'ALL THE TIME' is next to it.

DEMO

- Results uploaded to GitHub



ALL THE TIME

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for 'BounceSecurity / omniscientexamples'. The top navigation bar includes links for Code, Pull requests, Actions, Security (which has 7 notifications and is highlighted with a red box), Insights, and Settings. The main content area is titled 'Security overview'.

Reporting

- Policy**
- Advisories**

Vulnerability alerts

- Dependabot**
- Code scanning** (highlighted with a red box and has 7 notifications)
- Secret scanning**

Security policy • Disabled
Define how users should report security vulnerabilities for this repository [Set up a security policy](#)

Security advisories • Enabled
View or disclose security advisories for this repository [View security advisories](#)

Private vulnerability reporting • Disabled
Allow users to privately report potential security issues [Enable vulnerability reporting](#)

DEMO

- Results uploaded to GitHub



ALL THE TIME

DEMO

- Results uploaded to GitHub



ALL THE TIME

Semgrep Finding: py_ex1_wrong_... x +

github.com/BounceSecurity/omniscientexamples/security/code-scanning/51

Code scanning alerts / #51

Semgrep Finding: py_ex1_wrong_overload

Open in main 46 minutes ago

Dismiss alert

Severity: Error

Affected branches: main 2

code/python/ex1_wrong_overload.py:47

```
44     CatRequest.send_transaction("12146123", 4489, msg)
45
46     # ruleid: wrong_overload
47     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4342, msg)
```

The wrong overload of send_transaction has been used on this line.

Semgrep

```
48
49     # ruleid: ok
50     CatRequest.send_transaction(cat_num, 4489, "Invoice 78896", some_ch
```

Tool

SO, HOW DO I DO THIS ALL THE TIME?

- Runs on every CI process in a simple way
- No special code processing/preparation!!!
- Alerts on discrepancies
- You can either:
 - Block CI pipeline
 - Setup out of band alerting



ALL THE TIME

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Everything
 - Not every vulnerability has a generic solution
 - Some vulnerabilities are custom to our situation
- Everywhere
 - Simple but syntax-aware search rules
 - Scan the whole codebase or just relevant files
- All the time
 - Simple one-liner to run the scan
 - Easy to integrate and alert from regular CI





Credit: Emette Cohen Douglan

QUESTIONS?

- Everything
 - Vulnerabilities without generic solution
 - Some vulnerabilities are custom to us
- Everywhere
 - Simple but syntax-aware search rules
 - Scan the whole codebase or just relevant files
- All the time
 - Simple one-liner to run the scan
 - Easy to integrate and alert from regular CI



<https://appsecg.host/pycon>

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