



# Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

*Kamil*

October 23, 2025

# Protocol Audit Report

Kamil Nissar

October 22, 2025

Prepared by: Kamil Lead Security Researcher : - Kamil

## Table of Contents

- Table of Contents
- Protocol Summary
- Disclaimer
- Risk Classification
- Audit Details
  - Scope
  - Roles
- Executive Summary
  - Issues found
- Findings
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Informational
- Gas

## Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a users passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users.

## Disclaimer

I made all efforts to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

**Table 1:** Risk Classification

Likelihood	Level	High	Medium	Low
High		H	H/M	M
Medium		H/M	M	M/L
Low		M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

## Audit Details

### Scope

```
./src/  
#-- PasswordStore.sol
```

### Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one should be able to set or read the password.

## Executive Summary

### Issues found

**Table 2:** Issues Found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

## Findings

### High

private **Description:** All data stored on chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain . The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be private variable and only accessible through `PasswordStore::getPassword` function , which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract

We show one such method of reading data off chain below

**Impact:** Anyone can break the private password , severely breaking the function of the protocol

**Proof of Concept:** (Proof of Code) The below testcase shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

**Recommended Mitigation:** The current logic of the protocol doesn't serve the intended functionality . So the logic needs to be rethought or worked upon . We can store the password off chain and then decrypt it ## Likelihood & Impact : - Impact: High - Likelihood: High - Severity: High

### High

- Worst offenders -> Least Bad

### [H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access controls, meaning a non-owner could change the password

**Description:** The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an external function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that This function allows the owner to set a new password

```
//@audit any user can set the password
//missing access control
function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
@>    // @audit - There are no access controls
    s_password = newPassword;
    emit SetNewPassword();
}
```

**Impact:** Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severely breaking the contract intended functionality.

**Proof of Concept:** Add the following to `PasswordStore.t.sol` test file.

Code

```
function testAnyoneCanSetPassword(address randomAddress) public {
    vm.assume(randomAddress!=owner);
    vm.prank(randomAddress);
    string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
    store.setPassword(expectedPassword);
    vm.prank(owner);
    string memory actualPassword = store.getPassword();
    assertEq(actualPassword,expectedPassword);
}
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function .

```
if(msg.sender!=s_owner){
    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
}
```

### Likelihood & Impact :

- Impact: High
- Likelihood: High
- Severity: High

## Informational

### [I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist causing the natspec to be incorrect

#### Description:

```
/* @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.  
 * @param newPassword The new password to set.  
 */  
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory)
```

The PasswordStore::getPassword function signature is getPassword() while the natspec says it should be getPassword(string)

**Impact:** The natspec is incorrect

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the natspec line.

-  *\* @param newPassword The new password to set.*