

Protocol Audit Report

Version 1.0

Kamil

October 24, 2025

Protocol Audit Report October 22, 2025

Protocol Audit Report

Kamil Nissar

October 22, 2025

Prepared by: Kamil Nissar Lead Security Researcher: - Kamil

Table of Contents

- Table of Contents
- Protocol Summary
- Disclaimer
- Risk Classification
- Audit Details
 - Scope
 - Roles
- Executive Summary
 - Issues found
- Findings
- High
- Medium
- Low
- Informational
- Gas

Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a users passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users.

Protocol Audit Report October 22, 2025

Disclaimer

I made all efforts to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Table 1: Risk Classification

Likelihood	Level	High	Medium	Low
High		Н	H/M	М
Medium		H/M	М	M/L
Low		М	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

Scope

```
./src/
#-- PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

- Owner: The user who can set the password and read the password.
- Outsiders: No one should be able to set or read the password.

Executive Summary

Issues found

Protocol Audit Report October 22, 2025

Table 2: Issues Found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

rivate **Description:** All data stored on chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The PasswordStore::s_password variable is intended to be private variable and only accessable through PasswordStore::getPassword function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract

We show one such method of reading data off chain below

Impact: Anyone can break the private password, severely breaking the function of the protocol

Proof of Concept: (Proof of Code) The below testcase shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

Recommended Mitigation: The current logic of the protocol doesn't serve the intended functionality . So the logic needs to be rethought or worked upon . We can store the password off chain and then decrypt it ## LikeLihood & Impact : - Impact: High - Likelihood: High - Severity: High

High

· Worst offenders -> Least Bad

[H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword has no access controls,meaning a non-owner could change the password

Description: The PasswordStore::setPassword function is set to be an external function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that This function allows the owner to set a new password

```
//@audit any user can set the password
    //missing access control
    function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
          // @audit - There are no access controls
(a>
        s_password = newPassword;
        emit SetNewPassword();
    }
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severly breaking the contract intended functionality.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to PasswordStore.t.soltest file.

Code

```
function testAnyoneCanSetPassword(address randomAddress) public {
    vm.assume(randomAddress!=owner);
    vm.prank(randomAddress);
   string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
   store.setPassword(expectedPassword);
   vm.prank(owner);
   string memory actualPassword = store.getPassword();
   assertEq(actualPassword,expectedPassword);
}
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to the setPassword function.

```
if(msg.sender!=s_owner){
    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
}
```

LikeLihood & Impact:

· Impact: High • Likelihood: High

· Severity: High

Informational

[I-1] The PasswordStore: getPassword natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist causing the natspec to be incorrect

Description:

```
/* @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
  * @param newPassword The new password to set.
  */
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory)
```

The PasswordStore::getPassword function signature is getPassword() while the natspec says it should be getPassword(string)

Impact: The natspec is incorrect

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the natspec line.

- * @param newPassword The new password to set.