

# Guarding the Gates: How Parties Constrain Women’s Political Ambition and Rise in Urban Politics

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# 1 Introduction

Despite widespread adoption of gender quotas around the world, women remain persistently underrepresented in politics (UN Women, 2025). Women's representation lingers at a mere 10 percent in the Japanese parliament and 17.6 percent in local assemblies, even after the implementation of the 2018 Gender Parity Law (Louie 2023). During Kenya's 2022 election, 23 percent of elected parliamentarians were women, even though the 2010 constitution mandated that men could only hold two-thirds of parliamentary seats (Ranta 2024). In India, gender quotas in local levels of government have not produced spillover effects to higher levels of government; women representatives make up 10 percent of state assemblies and 13 percent of the national assembly. The failure of quotas to produce lasting improvements in women's political representation begs us to examine the understudied actors that gatekeep women's access to political power and, as a result, can be agents of change - **political parties and party elites themselves**.

While existing literature has focused on candidate selection by parties extensively (e.g. Dancygier et al. 2021; Gulzar et al. 2021; Singh 2023; Pruyssers et al. 2017), less is known about party organizations themselves - who comprises party leadership, how are party leaders across geographic units chosen, and how promotion decisions affect downstream career trajectories for politicians, particularly women and other minorities. My dissertation shifts the focus to the internal dynamics of political parties in the Global South, offering formal and informal gatekeeping by political parties as (i) an alternative explanation to why women remain underrepresented in politics and, perhaps counterintuitively, (ii) a potential site for institutional change that can produce sustained increases in women's political representation.

To assess the extent and impact of party gatekeeping, I ask two related questions. First, do women in Indian political parties face a "political glass ceiling" (Folke and Rickne 2016)? Second, how do political parties and party elites impose a glass ceiling on women politicians' careers? Based on existing frameworks (Folke and Rickne 2016; Raaum 1995), I argue that women politicians in India face a vertical and horizontal glass ceiling, which leaves them occupying lower party leadership ranks and less important roles within the party at each level. I contend that parties impose this glass ceiling through, what I term, a "gendered division of party labor." This occurs in two ways. First, women politicians are assigned to leadership roles within party wings (such as women's wing or youth wing) as opposed to the main party more often than men politicians. Second, they are assigned roles that, though more visible to constituents, are less visible to party leaders. This gendered division of party labor is consistent with previous findings that suggest women politicians, particularly at the local level, are recruited to mobilize voters and canvass for other candidates and serve roles in alignment with their gender (Goyal 2024a,b; Chowdhury 2024). While it may allow women to participate in politics, it stymies their upward mobility and ultimately their ability to become candidates because they get siloed into roles that are less well-resourced and well-networked.

Furthermore, I argue that two possible mechanisms underlie the gendered division of party labor. The first posits that party leaders involved in promotion decisions are biased against women politicians and, thus, discriminate against them outrightly when choosing who to promote. The second posits that party leaders are driven by strategic constraints and promote individuals who best serve the party's interest - expanding the voter base, bringing in money, winning elections, etc. This leads them to assign individuals to ranks and roles they view as best matching an individual's sociopolitical resources. Therefore, if

higher ranks and more important roles are seen as requiring more sociopolitical resources and women are seen to have less of those resources, men end up being assigned to those ranks and roles more frequently.

I use a novel survey and conjoint experiment among party elites from two major political parties (Aam Aadmi Party and Bharatiya Janata Party) in New Delhi, India, to test my proposed argument. Using comprehensive survey data on the career trajectories of elites in my sample, I test whether women politicians tend to encounter a glass ceiling in their careers, relative to men politicians. I then provide causal evidence, through a forced-choice conjoint experiment, for whether gendered division of party labor contributes to their glass ceiling.

I conduct this research in New Delhi, which is the capital city of India. BJP and AAP are the ruling and opposition parties, respectively, in the state assembly. Delhi's estimated population of 23 million is nearly as large as Switzerland, Finland, Norway, and Denmark combined ([Goyal 2024a](#)). Given its centrality to national politics and urban nature, one might expect political outcomes for women to be better here than in other parts of the country. Therefore, I use my data from the two parties in Delhi as a hard test of my theory.

## 2 Study Design

To assess **whether women politicians face a political glass ceiling and how parties impose this glass ceiling**, I use an original survey with an embedded conjoint experiment. The survey asks political elites about their socioeconomic backgrounds, experience in politics, political capital, political ambition, views on the Women's Reservation Act, and experience of violence in politics.

Using comprehensive survey data on the career trajectories of elites in my sample, I will test whether women politicians tend to encounter a glass ceiling in their careers, relative to men politicians. I adopt the framework of the four empirical tests proposed by Folke and Rickne ([2016](#)) to assess if women elites in my sample face a glass ceiling relative to men elites. This analysis is descriptive and will form the empirical component of my first dissertation paper.

My second dissertation paper will use the forced-choice conjoint design to provide causal evidence for the gendered division of party labor. The forced-choice conjoint experiment asks each elite respondent to choose one candidate from a pair of hypothetical candidates for internal promotion to an organizational leadership role within their party (president of the ward-level or district-level committee). Candidate profiles randomly vary across eight ethnographically and empirically grounded dimensions. The order in which attributes appear is also randomized to prevent ordering effects. Additionally, each respondent is randomized to receive only one type of committee (ward or district). Both types of committees are pooled during the analysis. Additional outcomes tested include (a) rating each candidate on a scale of 1-5 and (b) assigning one candidate to different roles within the party, including as an electoral candidate. Each respondent will see four pairs of candidate profiles and, thus, be asked to perform the task four times.

Table 1 presents the attributes for the experiment that asks elites to choose a candidate to promote to a leadership position within the party from the two profiles shown. The vignette will be prefaced with the following introduction:

“Political parties often make decisions about which party members to pro-

Table 1: Attributes for candidate profiles

Factor	Operationalization	Levels
Gender	Gender	Male (baseline) Female
Caste	Caste	General (baseline) SC OBC
Ability to establish electoral base	Mobilization power	Organized a 50 person rally in their locality (baseline) Organized a 250 person rally in their locality Organized a 400 person rally in their locality
Financial resources	Electoral campaign contribution	Less than 1 lakh (baseline)  Between Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 5 lakh Between Rs. 5 lakh and Rs. 10 lakh
Delivering Constituency Services	Ability to get work done	This candidate got ( <i>did not get (baseline)</i> ) the municipality to fix a broken road after residents complained This candidate got ( <i>did not get (baseline)</i> ) the municipality to collect trash after residents complained This candidate got ( <i>did not get (baseline)</i> ) the municipality to install streetlights after residents complained
Party loyalty	Party membership	Been a member of multiple parties (baseline) Been a lifelong member of your party
Party leadership experience	Highest post in the party	No post held previously (baseline)  [Mandal/District] committee secretary [Mandal/District]-level Morcha President (such as Mahila Morcha, Yuva Morcha, etc.)
Party Networks	Networking ability	Got the current mandal president to speak at a rally (baseline) Got the current MLA to speak at a rally Got the current state unit president to speak at a rally

mote to party leadership roles, such as ward president, election in-charge, morcha secretary etc. When doing so, parties consider many different attributes about a party member that would make them a suitable leader. I will now present to you hypothetical profiles of two candidates that your party is considering promoting to the role of a [mandal/district]-committee president. The attributes of these candidates will be randomly chosen. Your task will be to choose the most suitable candidate for promotion and for appointing to different roles in the party. We will repeat this task four times. I will first read the profiles of each candidate out loud one by one. If you would like, you can then look over the profiles yourself. Then I will ask you to choose your preferred candidate.”

The conjoint will be placed after a set of demographic questions and be followed by a battery of questions about politicians’ backgrounds, political experience, political capital, politician quality, and political ambition. The primary heterogeneous effects analysis will


be conducted using the respondent's gender. I may conduct additional heterogeneous effects analyses, but these will be based on variables collected post-treatment and will have to be interpreted with caution. This survey structure was chosen after piloting the survey and determining the most effective way to minimize cognitive load and increase quality of responses from political elites.

To test possible mechanisms that drive gendered division of party labor, I will use the conjoint experiment to assess whether party elites outrightly discriminate against women politicians. I will then examine, both through the conjoint and through descriptive questions in the survey, what traits elites consider to be most important when choosing an individual for promotions. I compare the women and men politicians in my sample along those same traits, using the in-depth survey data I collect on their demographics, political experience, and political networks. This analysis allows me to compare whether systematically women possess fewer of the traits that make an individual favorable for promotions and, thus, test whether party elites act more out of strategic interest rather than outright discrimination when promoting individuals within their parties.

## 2.1 Power

In order for me to detect effects from the conjoint experiment and establish a causal relationship between elite decision-making and the candidate- and party-level factors, I will survey a sample of at least 750 respondents. This sample size was calculated with an effect size of 5 percent, 4 tasks per conjoint, and a maximum of 3 attribute levels (Figure 1), and would be well-powered at 92%.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 1: Power Analysis



## 3 Sampling Frame and Strategy

The survey will be conducted in Delhi. The entire state falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (the main urban local body) and the Delhi state assembly or Vidhan Sabha. Since I have conducted my fieldwork primarily in Delhi, I want to

<sup>1</sup>Calculation performed using the Power Analysis Tool for conjoint experiments developed by (Stefanelli and Lukac 2020).

triangulate between the qualitative, observational, and survey data I gather in Delhi to present the most accurate and complete findings related to my research question. The party elites I will be surveying are from the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Aam Aadmi Party. Previous research has suggested that parties that are more organized and institutionalized tend to have better outcomes for women's representation (Caul 1999) and this is because candidate selection tends to be more centralized and because rules-based processes make it easier for party workers to know the promotion and selection processes (Caul 1999; Chhibber et al. 2014), which can allow women to navigate hierarchies by the same rules as men. If true, an organized and hierarchical party like the BJP should produce best-case outcomes for women's upward mobility and candidate nominations.<sup>2</sup> For parties that are less organized, less institutionalized, less hierarchical, and perhaps more regional in India, it may be likely that candidate-level factors play a bigger role than party-level factors. Thus, we should observe less opportunities for women's upward mobility in parties like the AAP. Moreover, the party organization for AAP is smaller than BJP, mechanically producing fewer roles that women can occupy. Testing my theory on two different political parties will allow me to assess whether my theoretical predictions differ or travel across party types. Regardless, the BJP is the largest political party in the world, with nearly 200 million party members,<sup>3</sup> and the findings from this study have significant implications for women's representation.

I will use a combination of convenience and snowball sampling to recruit political elites for my survey. Those recruited will have to satisfy at least one of two conditions: (a) they will either have a post in the party or (b) have contested an election (e.g. DUSU, municipal corporation, state, or national).

## 4 Theoretical Framework

Existing literature has posited that political parties can act as gatekeepers by controlling who enters the party (Gulzar et al. 2024; Goyal 2024a), who is chosen as a broker in clientelist environments (Auerbach and Thachil 2023), and who is nominated as a candidate during elections (Caul 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Pruyers et al. 2017). If the lifespan of a politician is viewed as a pipeline, how one enters politics or is chosen as a candidate can be viewed as two distinct ends. What is missing from the existing literature is the empirical inquiry of how one progresses through this pipeline and how promotion up the pipeline affects downstream candidacy prospects. This inquiry is particularly important in contexts where parties and political elites control who is promoted as a leader and nominated as a candidate. Therefore, studies of women's representation that seek to explain why women are missing at the top - in legislatures (national and subnational) or in ministerial positions - must consider what happens throughout this political pipeline to stymie women's upward mobility. Seen in this way, promotion decisions within the party become central to questions of women's descriptive representation.

Political parties are the locus of political life across countries in the Global South and North. More often than not, party leaders and election candidates come from within the party ranks (Goyal 2024b). Therefore, one way of examining if party gatekeeping affects women's descriptive representation would be to test whether women politicians

<sup>2</sup>There may be some descriptive evidence for this because BJP has been nominating more women candidates during recent national and state elections.

<sup>3</sup>'In 10 Charts: How BJP became world's largest political party in 4 decades', *The Times of India*, April 6, 2022.

face a “political glass ceiling” in parties, both vertical (ranks in the party hierarchy) and horizontal (at each level of the hierarchy, the roles assigned) glass ceilings (Raaum 1995; Folke and Rickne 2016). The ideal case would involve a census of all political party leaders from all parties in a country and would collect data on the number of years in politics, all positions held to date, and a host of background characteristics, such as age, education, marital status, finances, etc. It is very difficult, both logistically and financially, to create such a dataset, particularly in environments where party leaders are being reappointed and shuffled often and party organizations are vast and expansive. I attempt to create a smaller version of this dataset, which by no means is a census, by focusing on two political parties in Delhi and using a snowball method to survey political elites from a variety of hierarchical levels and positions in each level.

If a political glass ceiling does exist, we must understand how parties impose it if we are to engineer solutions to break it. Using insights from theory-building fieldwork, which involved interviews with party workers, leaders, and political consultants intimately familiar with parties’ strategies, I posit that much of this glass ceiling is imposed through a “gendered division of party labor.” Gendered division of labor is neither exclusive to political parties, nor is it a new phenomenon. Previous work has considered versions of gendered division of labor in politics by looking at gendered differences in ministry assignments and political committees (Siklodi et al. 2025; Taflaga and Kerby 2020; Baekgaard and Kjaer 2012). Some qualitative work has also considered differences in roles played by men and women in Democratic and Republican town committees (Margolis 1979). This work predominantly comes from the West, what are known as ‘Westminster’ democracies, and focuses largely on ministries and parliamentary committees. It has overlooked democracies in the Global South, where parties play a particularly dominant role in politics. Some recent work has considered promotions to leadership positions in parties and electoral candidacy (Auerbach and Thachil 2023; Auerbach et al. 2025). While important, this work does not examine the gendered aspects of these promotions and how they relate to a division of party labor by elite gender.

Why does a gendered division of party labor matter and how do party elites impose this division? I argue that this division occurs through two modes. In the first, women elite are systematically assigned to ranks within a party’s wings, such as the women’s wing or youth wing. Though they are important parts of a party’s organizational structure, these wings often operate apart from the main party, where important decisions are made, networking occurs, and politics happens. In the second, women elite are assigned less important roles, in terms of visibility to party leaders and the ability to develop the sociopolitical resources needed to advance in the party. These roles, such as voter mobilization and registration, organizing *bhajans* and *kirtans* (spiritual gatherings), and constituent outreach, are important for a party to establish presence and support in localities and does make women visible to constituents. But they do not allow women to network with party leaders at higher ranks, nest them among same-gender social networks, and prevent them from demonstrating strategic abilities visibly to party leaders. While there is some evidence that even this sort of political involvement can bear fruit for women’s upward mobility (Goyal 2024a), a vast majority of women do not experience political advancement, are left relegated to women’s wings and voter-facing roles, and overlooked for promotions and candidacy. Thus, a gendered division of party labor by elites siloes women politicians into ranks and roles that they cannot rise out of.


Why would parties divide party labor along gender lines? I posit two possible, non-mutually exclusive, mechanisms that could be at play. First, it is possible that elites, who



are predominantly men, exercise old-fashioned outright discrimination against women politicians. Though several voter-side conjoint experiments do not find evidence of outright discrimination (Teele et al. 2018; Clayton et al. 2020; Kage et al. 2019), it is possible that this bias exists and is measurable on the elite-side (Purohit *working paper*). Second, elites are trying to maximize their party’s aims (winning elections, bringing in money, expanding voter base, etc.) and assign individuals to roles they deem best suited to the individual’s sociopolitical resource pool. In reality, what this means is that women politicians are viewed as less well-resourced, and so they are assigned to roles that the party views as needing few resources to succeed at. This sort of strategic sorting has been studied in candidate selection (where women are assigned to losing seats as “sacrificial lambs” (Martínez i Coma and Lago 2022)) and in bureaucratic assistance to women politicians (Purohit *working paper*).

To test if elites engage in gendered division of party labor, we need a framework to assess the factors along which individuals within the party are evaluated for promotion. Along with candidate selection, this process has long been considered a “black box” with decision-making power centralized among select few political elite. While it is virtually impossible to be part of the committees that make promotion and candidacy decisions as a party outsider, I propose an alternative method to opening this black box. These selection and screening committees comprise party leaders from different levels of the party hierarchy. By surveying the political preferences and decision-making of said elites (or elites who could be theoretically be considered for selection committees), one can take a stab at defining the factors that make a politician an ideal candidate for promotions. Through existing literature and notes from fieldwork, I propose a set of eight factors that parties consider when making promotion decisions. I separate these into **candidate-level (caste, gender, financial resources, ability to establish support in a constituency, ability to provide services to constituents)** and **party-level (loyalty, previous political leadership experience, and networks)** factors. Figure 2 summarizes the theoretical framework.

Figure 2: Factors Affecting Political Candidacy and Internal promotion



Using these factors and a set of three outcomes - promotion, quality, and role-



assignment - I test whether parties impose a gendered division of party labor and the mechanisms behind this division.

## 4.1 Operationalization of Factors

1. **Gender:** I will randomize profiles to be male or female with equal probability, with male as the baseline.
2. **Caste:** I will randomize profiles to be general, scheduled castes, and other backward castes with equal probability and with general as the baseline. I do not include scheduled tribes as they are not a politically relevant group in Delhi.<sup>4</sup> I create an additional binary variable - caste in-group - to match respondent caste to the randomized profile caste.
3. **Ability to establish an electoral base:** I use mobilization power and randomize between the size of the rally the candidate can organize (50 person, 250 person, 400 person) with equal probability. The 50-person rally is the baseline. This measure is drawn from (Auerbach and Thachil 2023) who use mobilization power as a measure of political efficacy for brokers in slums. This is a relevant measure for demonstrating whether a candidate can establish an electoral base because it demonstrates the connections that a candidate has formed with people within her constituency.
4. **Financial resources:** I randomize between amounts of electoral campaign contributions made by a candidate (less than 1 lakh (low), between 1 and 5 lakhs (middle), and between 5 and 10 lakhs (high)) with equal probability. The low contributions are the baseline. The measure is drawn from (Auerbach et al. 2025). Authors use a more granular measure whereas I am grouping contributions into three categories (which I would have done even with a more granular measure). These contributions are within a reasonable range that a candidate might be able to contribute, though wealthier candidates can probably contribute even more than Rs. 10 lakh.
5. **Delivering constituency services:** I randomize between three positive instances of delivering constituency services and three negatives instances of the same services (broken road, trash collection, broken street lights) with equal probability. These are also drawn from (Auerbach et al. 2025). The positive cases will be grouped into one and negative cases will be grouped into one and used as the baseline.
6. **Party loyalty:** I operationalize party loyalty as whether or not a candidate has been a member of one or multiple parties. The low loyalty level is being a member of multiple parties (the baseline) and the high loyalty level is being a lifelong member of one party. I randomize between these two with equal probability.
7. **Party leadership experience:** I randomize between not having a post (baseline), a post in the mandal/district committee, and a post in a morcha committee with equal probability. Exact specifications depend on the conjoint and can be seen in Table 1. I included morcha president as a category to be able to demonstrate that

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<sup>4</sup><https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1563815>

it can be a category that is seen as disadvantageous, particularly for women, when parties are making promotion and candidacy decisions.

8. **Party networks:** I use networking ability, in the form of who the candidate can bring as a speaker to a rally, as a signal of party networks. I use mandal president as a signal of lowest networking ability and the state unit president as a signal of highest networking ability. I randomize between the three with equal probability, using mandal president as the baseline.

## 5 Hypotheses

Based on my proposed theory, I test the following hypotheses (broken down by research questions) across various parts of my dissertation, using both descriptive and causal parts of my survey data:

### **RQ: Do women politicians face a political glass ceiling?**

- **H1:** Women politicians will face a vertical and horizontal glass ceiling within political parties, relative to men politicians.
- **H1a:** Women politicians, on average, will occupy lower ranked positions within the party.
- **H1b:** Women politicians, on average, will occupy party wing positions more frequently at a certain level within the party.

### **RQ: How do party elites impose a political glass ceiling on women politicians?**

- **H2a:** Women politicians will be more likely to be assigned to voter mobilization and registration and party wing roles, compared men politicians.
- **H2b:** Women politicians will be less likely to be assigned to election in-charge and main party roles and as election candidates, compared men politicians.

### **Mechanisms: Why does a gendered division of party labor occur?**

- **H3a (Outright discrimination):** Men politicians will be more likely to be chosen for promotions to either mandal or district president positions, compared to women politicians.
- **H3b (Strategic incentives):** Women politicians, on average, will be less well-resourced than men politicians along dimensions considered important for promotion decisions.

In addition to the hypotheses that directly test my theoretical predictions, I also assess whether elites use a double standard used to evaluate women politicians for promotion decisions. For this, I propose the following hypotheses:

- **H4a:** Women who have low mobilization power will be less likely to be chosen for promotion than men with the same attributes.

- **H4b:** Women with low electoral campaign contributions will be less likely to be chosen for promotion than men with the same attributes.
- **H4c:** Women who are unable to deliver services to their constituents will be less likely to be chosen for promotion than men with the same attributes.
- **H4d:** Women who have been members of multiple parties will be less likely to be chosen for promotion than men with the same attributes.
- **H4e:** Women with less party leadership experience will be less likely to be chosen for promotion than men with the same attributes.
- **H4f:** Women with less networking ability will be less likely to be chosen for promotion than men with the same attributes.

## 6 Key Outcome Variables

I am interested in testing three key outcomes from the conjoint experiment:

- **Promotion:** Who does the party deem worthy of promoting into leadership positions? I measure this using the forced-choice conjoint.
- **Perceived Quality:** What is the perceived quality of each candidate in the conjoint? I measure this using questions used to rate each candidate's profile on a scale of 1-5.
- **Gendered Division of Party Labor:** I assess whether parties assign men and women to different roles within the party by asking "In your opinion, which candidate is better suited for [role]?" The roles shown to them are: **voter registration and mobilization, election in-charge, main party leadership, morcha leadership, and election candidate**. I will create a dummy variable for gendered role (called '*minor\_role*' in the pre-analysis script) that will take on the value 1 if a candidate profile is chosen for only voter registration and mobilization OR morcha leadership roles and 0 otherwise. This is because women tend to be disproportionately assigned roles that are less prestigious and visible within the party. I will then assess the effect of candidate gender on whether the roles they are assigned are gendered. I will assess the effect of candidate gender on all the roles separately.

## 7 Planned Analysis

For the conjoint experiment, the quantity to be estimated, following ([Hainmueller et al. 2014](#)), is the average marginal component effect (AMCE) and the average component interaction effect (ACIE). I will use the fully non-parametric linear regression estimator presented in ([Hainmueller et al. 2014](#)), and cluster the standard errors derived from the estimation at the respondent level. I will also use enumerator-level fixed effects and present robustness analyses with party fixed effects.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>As additional robustness checks, I will analyze the sample separately for both parties and separately for both types of committees. However, these analyses will likely be underpowered to detect effects.

In the conjoint, each respondent,  $i$ , will be given  $k$  conjoint tasks ( $k \in 1, 2, 3, 4$ ), and choose their candidate,  $j$  ( $j \in 1, 2$ ), with their preferred characteristics. The resulting OLS regression used to calculate the AMCE is:

$$\begin{aligned} chosen_{ijk} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{gender}_{ijk} = \text{female}) + \beta_2(\text{caste}_{ijk} = \text{general}) + \\ & \beta_3(\text{financial resources}_{ijk} = \text{low}) + \dots + \epsilon_{ijk} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

In each task, whether a candidate is chosen is represented by the variable *chosen* which is a binary variable: 1 if the candidate was chosen and 0 if the candidate was not. Because each respondent will perform four conjoint tasks, there will be eight observations for each respondent (4 for candidates who were chosen and 4 for candidates who were not). For each attribute, the baseline will be withheld (for example, for gender the variable  $gender_{ijk} = \text{male}$  will be omitted). Each candidate's attribute levels are coded as dummy variables. Therefore, the AMCE for each attribute level must be understood relative to the withheld baseline. The same statistical model will be used for all the pre-specified outcomes.

I will conduct heterogeneous effects analysis based on the respondent's gender to assess if women political elites display different decision-making than male political elites. I will also assess the interaction between the hypothetical candidate gender with all other attributes.

The R Script with the detailed variable transformations and analysis plan is included with the pre-registration. This script was prepared using a random sample of 4 observations from the survey data collected in the first week of data collection efforts. This mini dataset is available on my [Github](#). No other observations from the survey were seen or analyzed in preparing the script.

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Appendix for  
“Pre-Analysis Plan”

## A Variables Description

raw_variable	final_variable	iv/dv	variable_description	variable_transformation	variable_space	notes
set1_chosen_candidate_district_..	task_..attributes, gender, caste, mob_power, campaign_con, const_service, party_mem, highest_post, networking	iv	attribute and conjoint choice array at the district level that is used to extract attributes for each respondent	coalesced with mandal tasks		this variable resulting from this transformation is used to extract all individual profile attributes for both candidate profiles.
set1_chosen_candidate_mandal_..	task_..attributes, gender, caste, mob_power, campaign_con, const_service, party_mem, highest_post, networking	iv	attribute and conjoint choice array at the mandal level that is used to extract attributes for each respondent	coalesced with district tasks		this variable resulting from this transformation is used to extract all individual profile attributes for both candidate profiles.
set1_chosen_candidate_district_..	task_..chosen, chosen	dv	attribute and conjoint choice array at the district level that is used to extract chosen candidate for each respondent	coalesced with mandal tasks	binary	this variable resulting from this transformation is used to extract all individual profile attributes for both candidate profiles.
set1_chosen_candidate_mandal_..	task_..chosen, chosen	dv	attribute and conjoint choice array at the mandal level that is used to extract chosen candidate for each respondent	coalesced with district tasks	binary	this variable resulting from this transformation is used to extract all individual profile attributes for both candidate profiles.
set1_candidate1_rating_district_..	rating	dv	respondent's rating of the first candidate profile on a scale of 1-5 in district conjoint	coalesced with mandal rating	scale 1-5	
set1_candidate2_rating_district_..	rating	dv	respondent's rating of the second candidate profile on a scale of 1-5 in district conjoint	coalesced with district rating	scale 1-5	
set1_candidate1_rating_mandal_..	rating	dv	respondent's rating of the first candidate profile on a scale of 1-5 in mandal conjoint	coalesced with mandal rating	scale 1-5	
set1_candidate2_rating_mandal_..	rating	dv	respondent's rating of the second candidate profile on a scale of 1-5 in mandal conjoint	coalesced with district rating	scale 1-5	
set1_district_role1_..	voter_reg	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of voter registration and mobilization in the district conjoint	coalesced with mandal outcome	binary	
set1_district_role2_..	election_incharge	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of election in-charge in the district conjoint	coalesced with mandal outcome	binary	
set1_district_role5_..	main_leader	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of leader in the main party in the district conjoint	coalesced with mandal outcome	binary	
set1_district_role6_..	morcha_leader	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of leader in the party morcha in the district conjoint	coalesced with mandal outcome	binary	
set1_district_role7_..	elec_candidate	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of electoral candidate in the district conjoint	coalesced with mandal outcome	binary	
set1_mandal_role1_..	voter_reg	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of voter registration and mobilization in the mandal conjoint	coalesced with district outcome	binary	
set1_mandal_role2_..	election_incharge	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of election in-charge in the mandal conjoint	coalesced with district outcome	binary	
set1_mandal_role5_..	main_leader	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of leader in the main party in the mandal conjoint	coalesced with district outcome	binary	
set1_mandal_role6_..	morcha_leader	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of leader in the party morcha in the mandal conjoint	coalesced with district outcome	binary	
set1_mandal_role7_..	elec_candidate	dv	binary variable capturing who the respondent assigned to the role of electoral candidate in the mandal conjoint	coalesced with district outcome	binary	
caste gender	minor_role	dv	binary variable capturing if candidate was assigned only voter registration or party morcha leadership position and no other role (election incharge, main party leader, electoral candidate)		binary factor,	
	caste_resp,	iv	respondent's caste		binary	
	caste_ingroup	iv	respondent's gender		binary	
	gender	iv	conjoint attribute for gender with two levels: male and female			converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
	caste	iv	conjoint attribute for caste with three levels: general, SC, OBC			converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis

caste_ingroup	iv	conjoint attribute for caste with two levels: ingroup (1) and outgroup (0)	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
mob_power	iv	conjoint attribute for mobilization power with three levels: low (bring 50 people to rally), medium (bring 250 people to rally), high (bring 400 people to rally)	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
campaign_con	iv	conjoint attribute for electoral campaign contribution with three levels: low (less than 1 lakh), medium (between 1-5 lakh), and high (between 5-10 lakh)	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
const_service	iv	conjoint attribute for being able to deliver constituency services with two levels: yes (fix broken road, install streetlight, and collect garbage) and no (not fix broken road, not install streetlight, not collect garbage)	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
party_mem	iv	conjoint attribute for party loyalty with two levels: been a member of multiple parties and been a lifelong member of own party	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
highest_post	iv	conjoint attribute for highest post previously held in the party with three levels: no post, main party secretary, morcha president	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis
networking	iv	conjoint attribute for networking ability with three levels: low (invited mandal president to speak at rally), medium (invited vidhan sabha legislator to speak at rally), and high (invited state president to speak at rally)	converted to dummy variable for conjoint analysis