

Figure 1: Baseline descriptive statistics of migrants' attachments to their former places of residence.

Table 1: [Exploratory] Baseline correlates of migrants' continued political participation in their former place of residence ("hometown"), estimated using OLS regression. For question wordings, see Figure 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has Hometown Voter ID	Returned to Vote in Hometown
	(1)	(2)
More at home in hometown (0-1)	0.158*** (0.025)	0.088*** (0.020)
Still receives hometown schemes (0/1)	0.108*** (0.019)	0.101*** (0.017)
Owns hometown property (0/1)	0.072*** (0.022)	0.039** (0.020)
Length of residence in city (years)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Straight-line distance to home district (kms)	-0.0001** (0.00003)	-0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant	0.177*** (0.027)	0.146*** (0.022)
DV values	{0,1}	{0,1}
Observations	2,306	2,306
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.056	0.047

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: [Pre-registered] T1 experimental results for primary political outcomes. Outcomes are whether respondent (1) currently has a voter ID card allowing them to vote in city elections; (2) voted in the city during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections; and (3) intends to vote in the next state elections held in the city. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Has City-Based Voter ID (1)	Voted in City in 2019 (2)	Likelihood of Voting in City in Future (3)
T1 treatment	0.236 (0.019)	0.203 (0.019)	0.031 (0.009)
p-value (upper)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Control mean	0.161	0.178	0.856
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.084	0.065	0.011
DV values	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

Table 3: [Pre-registered] T1 experimental results for additional political outcomes. Outcomes are whether respondent (1) pays attention to news about national, state, and city politics; (2) agrees that elected politicians are accountable to city residents; (3) agrees that citizens have an influence on the government; (4) has trust in the national, state, and city governments as well as political parties. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Political Interest Index (1)	Politician Accountability Perceptions (2)	Sense of Political Efficacy (3)	Political Trust Index (4)
T1 treatment	0.091 (0.039)	0.039 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.027 (0.028)
p-value (upper)	0.010	0.003	0.745	0.170
Control mean	0.000	0.697	0.450	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.027	0.006	0.003	0.019
DV values	[-1.44, 1.56]	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}	[-1.62, 1.17]

Table 4: [Pre-registered] Estimates of heterogeneous effects of T1 treatment. Models do not include additional covariates. All independent variables are dichotomous and are described in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has City-Based Voter ID	Voted in City in 2019
	(1)	(2)
T1 x Primary education	0.083** (0.041)	0.057 (0.042)
T1 x Muslim	-0.114** (0.048)	-0.018 (0.049)
T1 x SC/ST	-0.113*** (0.042)	-0.081* (0.042)
T1 x High income	0.028 (0.038)	0.041 (0.038)
T1 x Long-term migrant	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.038)
T1	0.248*** (0.049)	0.183*** (0.049)
Primary education	-0.058** (0.025)	-0.059** (0.026)
Muslim	0.001 (0.029)	0.004 (0.030)
SC/ST	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.026)
High income	0.038* (0.022)	0.009 (0.023)
Long-term migrant	0.065*** (0.023)	0.052** (0.024)
Constant	0.149*** (0.028)	0.188*** (0.029)
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.087	0.059

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5: [Index outcome pre-registered; index component analyses exploratory] T2 experimental results for exposure to campaigning during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. Campaign exposure index (1) based on whether respondent reports that politicians or party workers (2) visited their basti around the 2019 Lok Sabha election campaign; (3) came to the door to request votes; (4) offered gifts; (5) tried to specifically win votes of recent migrants to the city; (6) campaigned hard to win votes in the basti. Weighted least squares estimates of intent to treat effects. Clusters weighted equally. Models include block fixed effects and individual covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Index Components					
Campaigning Exposure Index	Basti Visits by Politicians	Home Visit by Politician or Party Worker	Number of Gifts	Migrant-Focused Campaigning	Perceived Campaign Intensity	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
T2 treatment	0.101 (0.058)	0.066 (0.078)	0.036 (0.038)	0.017 (0.012)	0.014 (0.047)	0.073 (0.031)
p-value (upper)	0.043	0.203	0.174	0.073	0.384	0.010
Control mean	-0.039	0.559	0.550	0.013	0.425	0.676
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,931
No. of Clusters	87	87	87	87	87	87
Adjusted $R^2$	0.056	0.070	0.047	0.019	0.008	0.021
DV values	[-0.96, 3.65]	{0, ..., 4}	{0, 1}	{0, 1, 2}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

# **Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India**

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## ONLINE APPENDIX

*Note: All references to “Supplementary Information” (“SI”) relate to the document, supplementary-information.pdf available at:  
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# Online Appendix

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## A Voter turnout rates among naturalized immigrants versus native-born citizens globally

Table A1: Average voter turnout rates by natives versus naturalized immigrants, according to the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-14). Turnout percentages are calculated using data from all countries where responses to two questions were gathered: “Respondent immigrant?” (1 = yes; 0 = no), and “Vote in elections?” (1 = always/usually; 0 otherwise). Included countries are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Belarus, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Native turnout percent	Naturalized immigrant turnout percent
81.82	71.1

## B Indian Human Development Survey-II analysis

In this section we characterize India’s migrant population using nationally representative survey data. We do this to shed light on the political behaviors of migrants versus non-migrants, and to assess the extent to which our sample conforms to—or deviates from—the demographic traits of the country’s migrant population at large.

Our primary resource for conducting these analyses is the second round of the Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS-II). To our knowledge, IHDS-II is unique among nationally representative surveys in posing both detailed questions about respondents’ migration history and asking a battery of questions about political participation. Table SI3 gives a full roster of the IHDS-II variables used in the subsequent analyses and notes the manner in which they were recoded, where appropriate.

Note, in what follows, we decompose the IHDS-II sample into rural and urban areas for the purposes of most analysis (according to the primary sampling unit’s designation given in the 2011 Census of India). This is based on the presumption that rural areas are overwhelmingly migrant-*sending* regions whereas urban areas are largely migrant-*receiving* regions. In rural areas, we examine differences between households that did and did not report having had a member who engaged in seasonal migration during the past five years (a question directly posed on the survey). In urban areas, defining who is a migrant is more complex. Respondents were asked about the migration history of their “families” and when their family first came to their current town or city of residence. We class as internal migrants those reporting that their families arrived from a different Indian district or state within the past 10 years.

### B.1 Political participation

Turning to the substantive analysis, we first investigate whether migrants and migrant-sending households participate less in politics than non-migrants. We generate a Political Engagement Index, which sums whether (a) the household respondent reported being a member of a political party, (b) a member of the village panchayat (in rural areas) or ward committee (in urban areas), and (c) whether they reported having attended a panchayat or ward committee meeting within the last year.

For both urban (Table A2) and rural (Table A3) samples, we find strong evidence that migrants and migrant-sending households, respectively, are less likely to be politically engaged than households not involved in migration.

In Table A4, we demonstrate in the pooled (rural and urban) data that the migrant/non-migrant participation gap persists after controlling for households' religious affiliation.

While IHDS-II does not ask directly about voting, this analysis significantly adds to the body of evidence suggesting that India's internal migrants are politically disempowered.

Table A2: [Exploratory] Are migrant households less politically engaged than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Political Engagement Index	Political Party Member	Ward Committee Member	Attended Ward Committee Meeting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.077*** (0.017)
Constant	0.073*** (0.001)	0.042*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.001)	0.154*** (0.003)
Observations	14,500	14,546	14,504	14,516
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.0005	-0.00003	0.001

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A3: [Exploratory] Are migrant-sending households less politically engaged than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Political Engagement Index	Political Party Member	Panchayat Member	Attended Panchayat Meeting
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant-sending household	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.010)
Constant	0.153*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.001)	0.052*** (0.001)	0.370*** (0.003)
Observations	26,936	27,040	26,948	26,989
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.0004	0.0003	-0.00004

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: [Exploratory] Are migrant and migrant-sending households less politically engaged than non-migrant households after controlling for religion? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Urban and rural samples are pooled. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Political Engagement Index
Migrant/migrant-sending household	−0.013*** (0.004)
Muslim	−0.020*** (0.003)
Urban	−0.080*** (0.002)
Constant	0.156*** (0.001)
Observations	41,436
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.038

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## B.2 Politician attachments and receipt of government benefits

We next turn to evaluate the extent to which migrants (in urban areas) and migrant-sending households (in rural areas) are embedded in networks of clientelistic exchange operated by local politicians. To be sure, measuring quid pro quo transactions of material benefits for votes is challenging. To understand how likely it is that households are involved in such transactions, we make use of two sets of questions put to respondents in the IHDS-II survey instrument: acquaintance with local politicians, and income received from government schemes. Our reasoning is that households who are not acquainted with local politicians are unlikely to be able to access state benefits via clientelistic mechanisms, and, from another angle, that those not receiving substantial income from government schemes are unlikely to be involved in a substantial votes-for-benefits exchange relationship with local politicians, who have significant sway over how state resources are allocated. The Acquaintance Index is the average of the four component binary acquaintance measures.

In Tables A5 we observe that migrants in urban India are similarly acquainted with local politicians as are non-migrants, while Table A6 demonstrates that urban migrants are significantly less likely to receive income from state-run schemes.

Table A5: [Exploratory] Are migrant households less connected to politicians than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Acquaintance Index	Acquaintance: Politician in Community	Acquaintance: Politician Outside Community	Acquaintance: Party Worker in Community	Acquaintance: Party Worker Outside Community
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Migrant	0.0005 (0.017)	0.001 (0.016)	0.004 (0.022)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.022)
Constant	0.118*** (0.002)	0.068*** (0.002)	0.145*** (0.003)	0.104*** (0.003)	0.158*** (0.003)
Observations	14,458	14,533	14,496	14,509	14,470
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A6: [Exploratory] Do migrant households receive less income from government schemes than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Winsorized Benefits Income
Migrant	-272.713*** (80.823)
Constant	659.872*** (13.059)
Observations	14,572
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0005

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Looking at the rural sample, Table A7 shows that migrant-sending households are substantially less likely to have connections with local politicians by comparison with other households. They also receive somewhat less in income from government schemes (see Table A8).

Table A7: [Exploratory] Are migrant-sending households less connected to politicians than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Acquaintance Index (1)	Acquaintance: Politician in Community (2)	Acquaintance: Politician Outside Community (3)	Acquaintance: Party Worker in Community (4)	Acquaintance: Party Worker Outside Community (5)
Migrant-sending household	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.043*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.004)	-0.046*** (0.006)
Constant	0.093*** (0.001)	0.066*** (0.002)	0.127*** (0.002)	0.063*** (0.002)	0.115*** (0.002)
Observations	26,924	27,026	26,965	26,996	26,931
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A8: [Exploratory] Do migrant-sending households receive less income from government schemes than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Winsorized Benefits Income
Migrant-sending household	-60.649* (34.996)
Constant	1,048.111*** (11.611)
Observations	27,080
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

### B.3 Confidence in political institutions

IHDS-II respondents were asked about their confidence in various political institutions. We see that migrant households in urban areas (Table A9) and migrant-sending households in rural areas (Table A10) express less confidence in major political institutions than households not involved in migration. In what follows, the Confidence Index is the average of the three component confidence measures.

Table A9: [Exploratory] Do migrant households express less confidence in political institutions than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence Index	Confidence: Ward Committees	Confidence: Politicians	Confidence: State Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.122*** (0.042)	-0.016 (0.040)	-0.069 (0.044)
Constant	0.447*** (0.002)	1.046*** (0.006)	0.577*** (0.005)	1.061*** (0.006)
Observations	14,467	14,517	14,536	14,482
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0003	0.001	-0.0001	0.0001

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A10: [Exploratory] Do migrant-sending households express less confidence in political institutions than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Confidence Index	Confidence: Panchayats	Confidence: Politicians	Confidence: State Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant-sending household	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.038** (0.016)	-0.031** (0.014)	0.021 (0.016)
Constant	0.470*** (0.002)	1.112*** (0.004)	0.604*** (0.004)	1.103*** (0.005)
Observations	26,942	27,009	27,027	26,968
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.00004	0.0002	0.0001	0.00003

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

### B.4 Urban versus rural political participation

Might migrants' low participation in cities be a consequence of socialization in rural areas, where participation is lower than in cities? As discussed in the main text, aggregate studies of turnout in India have consistently documented that voter turnout is higher in rural areas. Here, we assess whether this pattern is maintained for the broader metric of political participation in the IHDS-II data, and after controlling for salient demographic attributes that might also impact turnout.

Table A11 presents this analysis. Consistent with expectations, there is clear evidence that political engagement is substantially lower in urban areas. Moreover, this pattern persists after controlling for religion, caste, and household wealth (as captured in the IHDS-II asset index).

Table A11: [Exploratory] Is political participation lower in urban areas than in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Political Engagement Index	
	(1)	(2)
Urban	-0.080*** (0.002)	-0.104*** (0.002)
Muslim		-0.011*** (0.003)
SC/ST		0.012*** (0.002)
Asset Index		0.004*** (0.0002)
Constant	0.152*** (0.001)	0.095*** (0.003)
Observations	41,934	41,924
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.036	0.050

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## B.5 Documentation

In order to register to vote, applicants must submit personal identification and proof of residency documentation. Are migrants and migrant-sending households less likely to possess such documents? The IHDS-II survey asks detailed questions about documentation among household members, enabling us to test whether documentation rates fall short among households not engaged in migration. Tables A12 and A13 unearth clear evidence of a lag, among migrants in urban areas and migrant-sending households in rural areas respectively. Lack of access to documentation steepens the challenge of going through the bureaucratic registration process for migrants, in line with the paper's central finding.

Table A12: [Exploratory] Are migrant households less likely to possess documents than non-migrant households in urban areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has Proof of Residence	Has Photo ID
	(1)	(2)
Migrant	-0.196*** (0.029)	-0.131*** (0.022)
Constant	0.866*** (0.003)	0.989*** (0.001)
Observations	14,508	14,515
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.023

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A13: [Exploratory] Are migrant-sending households less likely to possess documents than non-migrant-sending households in rural areas? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has Proof of Residence	Has Photo ID
	(1)	(2)
Migrant-sending household	-0.180*** (0.027)	-0.014 (0.009)
Constant	0.868*** (0.003)	0.987*** (0.001)
Observations	14,280	14,287
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.0002

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

## B.6 Demographic profile

Finally, we examine the profile of the overall population of households involved in migration compared to households not engaged in migration (either in destination urban areas, as recent migrant households, or in rural sending regions, as migrant-sending households). We find that migrant-engaged households have a similar religious demography to non-migrant households, with comparable shares of Muslims in both groups. Households engaged in migration, however, are more likely to belong to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and have fewer household assets, on average.

Table A14: [Exploratory] Do migrant- and migrant-sending households differ according to socio-economic status compared to households not engaged in migration? Data are from the IHDS-II household-level recode file. Urban and rural samples are pooled. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Muslim	SC/ST	Asset Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Migrant/migrant-sending household	0.005 (0.006)	0.092*** (0.010)	-2.784*** (0.104)
Urban	0.061*** (0.004)	-0.119*** (0.005)	6.447*** (0.059)
Constant	0.095*** (0.002)	0.334*** (0.003)	13.387*** (0.039)
Observations	41,651	41,652	41,629
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.008	0.019	0.238

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

## C T1 further information

### C.1 Official forms

ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA FORM-6		Acknowledgement No.....
<small>Date Rules 1961 and 20 of Registration of Electors Rule 1960</small> <small>(To be filled by office)</small>		
<b>Application for Inclusion of Name in Electoral Roll for First time Voter OR on Shifting from One Constituency to Another Constituency.</b>		
To, The Electoral Registration Officer, _____ Assembly / Parliamentary Constituency		Acknowledgement No....
I request that my name be included in the electoral roll for the above Constituency. (Tick appropriate box) As a first time voter <input type="checkbox"/> or due to shifting from another constituency <input type="checkbox"/> Particulars in support of my claim for inclusion in the electoral roll are given below:- <b>Mandatory Particulars</b> (a) Name _____ (b) Surname(if any) _____ (c) Name and surname of Relative of Applicant (see (d)) _____ (d) Type of Relation _____ Father <input type="checkbox"/> Mother <input type="checkbox"/> Husband <input type="checkbox"/> Wife <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> (e) Age [as on 1 <sup>st</sup> January of current calendar year].....] Years <input type="checkbox"/> Months <input type="checkbox"/> (f) Date of Birth (in DD/MM/YYYY format)(if known) _____ (g) Gender of Applicant (Tick appropriate box) Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Third Gender <input type="checkbox"/> (h) Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident House No. _____ Street/Area/Locality _____ Town/Village _____ Post Office _____ Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> District _____ State/UT _____ (i) Permanent address of applicant House No. _____ Street/Area/Locality _____ Town/Village _____ Post Office _____ Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> District _____ State/UT _____ (j) EPIC No. (if issued) _____ <b>Optional Particulars</b> (k) Disability (if any) (Tick appropriate box) Visual impairment <input type="checkbox"/> Speech & hearing disability <input type="checkbox"/> Locomotor disability <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ (l) Email id (optional) _____ (m) Mobile No. (optional) _____ <b>DECLARATION</b> - I hereby declare that to the best of knowledge and belief - (i) I am a citizen of India and place of my birth is Village/Town _____ District _____ State _____ (ii) I am ordinarily resident at the address given at (h) above since _____ (date, month, year). (iii) I have not applied for the inclusion of my name in the electoral roll for any other constituency. *If my name has not already been included in the electoral roll for this or any other assembly/ parliamentary constituency OR *My name may have been included in the electoral roll for _____ Constituency in _____ State in which I was ordinarily resident earlier at the address mentioned below and if so, I request that the same may be deleted from that electoral roll. *Strike off the option not appropriate		
SPACE FOR PASTING ONE RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PHOTOGRAPH (3.5 CM X 3.5 CM) SHOT AGAINST WHITE BACKGROUND FRONTAL VIEW OF FULL FACE WITHIN THIS BOX		
<small>I am aware that making a statement or declaration which is false and which I know or believe to be false or do not believe to be true, is punishable under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950).</small>		
Place.....		Date.....
Signature of Applicant..... <b>Remarks of Field Level Verifying Officer:</b>		
<small>Details of action taken (To be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency)</small>		
The application of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari ..... for inclusion of name in the electoral roll in Form 6 has been accepted/ rejected. Detailed reasons for acceptance [under or in pursuance of rule 18/20/26(4)] or rejection [under or in pursuance of rule 17/20/26(4)] are given below: Place: _____ Date: _____ Signature of ERO _____ Seal of the ERO _____ Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address as given by the applicant)		
The application in Form 6 of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari..... Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident House No. _____ Street/Area/Locality _____ Town/Village _____ Post Office _____ Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> District _____ State/UT _____ Has been (a) accepted and the name of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari..... Has been registered at Serial No.....in Part No..... of AC No..... (b) rejected for the reason..... Date: _____ Electoral Registration Officer _____ Address: _____ Acknowledgement Number _____ Date _____ Received the application in form 6 of Shri / Smt. / Ms. _____ ( Applicant can refer the Acknowledgement No. to check the status of application).		
Name/Signature of ERO/AERO/BLO _____		

Figure A1: Election Commission of India, Form 6.

 <p style="text-align: center;"><b>ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA</b> <b>FORM-7</b> (See Rules 13(2) and 20(2) of Registration of Electors Rule 1960)</p>		Acknowledgement No. _____ <small>(To be filled by office)</small>																			
<b>Application for Objecting Inclusion of Name of Other Person / Seeking Deletion of Own Name/Seeking Deletion of Any Other Person's Name in Electoral Roll due to Death/Shifting.</b>																					
To, The Electoral Registration Officer, ..... Assembly / Parliamentary Constituency																					
I hereby object to the proposed inclusion of the name of the under mentioned person in the electoral roll <input type="checkbox"/> I hereby request that entry relating to name of the person mentioned below is required to be deleted <input type="checkbox"/> I request that the entry relating to myself is to be deleted from Electoral Roll <input type="checkbox"/> Particulars in support of my objection/deletion are given below:-																					
<b>Particulars of the applicant</b> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>(a) Name</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(b) Surname(if any)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(c) Part No.</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>(d) Serial No.</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(e) EPIC No. (If issued)</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(f) Reason(s) for objection/deletion:</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> </table>				(a) Name		(b) Surname(if any)		(c) Part No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(d) Serial No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(e) EPIC No. (If issued)				(f) Reason(s) for objection/deletion:					
(a) Name																					
(b) Surname(if any)																					
(c) Part No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(d) Serial No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>																		
(e) EPIC No. (If issued)																					
(f) Reason(s) for objection/deletion:																					
<b>Details of person inclusion of whose name is objected to/whose entry is to be deleted:</b> <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>(a)Name</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(b)Surname(if any)</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(c) Part No.</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></td> <td>(d)Serial No.</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(e)EPIC No.(If issued)</td> <td colspan="3"></td> </tr> </table>				(a)Name		(b)Surname(if any)		(c) Part No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(d)Serial No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(e)EPIC No.(If issued)									
(a)Name																					
(b)Surname(if any)																					
(c) Part No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(d)Serial No.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>																		
(e)EPIC No.(If issued)																					
<b>Declaration</b> I hereby declare that the facts and particulars mentioned above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am aware that making a statement or declaration which is false and which I know or believe to be false or do not believe to be true, is punishable under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950).																					
Place: .....		Date: ..... Signature of Applicant: .....																			
<b>Remarks of Field Level Verifying Officer:</b>																					
<b>Details of action taken</b> <small>(To be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency)</small>																					
The application of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari ..... objecting to inclusion/ seeking deletion of name of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari ..... in the electoral roll in Form 7 has been accepted/rejected.																					
Detailed reasons for acceptance [under or in pursuance of rule 18/20/26(4)] or rejection [under or in pursuance of rule 17/20/26(4)] are given below:																					
Place: <table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td>Date:</td> <td>Signature of ERO</td> <td>Seal of the ERO</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address available in the record)</td> <td>Postage Stamp to be affixed by Electoral Registration Authority at the time of dispatch</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Street/Area/Locality</td> <td>Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident</td> <td>House No.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Town/Village</td> <td colspan="2"></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Post Office</td> <td colspan="2">Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> <tr> <td>District</td> <td colspan="2">State/UT <input type="checkbox"/></td> </tr> </table>				Date:	Signature of ERO	Seal of the ERO	Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address available in the record)		Postage Stamp to be affixed by Electoral Registration Authority at the time of dispatch	Street/Area/Locality	Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident	House No.	Town/Village			Post Office	Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		District	State/UT <input type="checkbox"/>	
Date:	Signature of ERO	Seal of the ERO																			
Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address available in the record)		Postage Stamp to be affixed by Electoral Registration Authority at the time of dispatch																			
Street/Area/Locality	Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident	House No.																			
Town/Village																					
Post Office	Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>																				
District	State/UT <input type="checkbox"/>																				
Has been (a) accepted and the name of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari..... has been deleted from ..... Part No. .... of AC No. .....																					
(b) rejected for the reason.....																					
Date: ..... Electoral Registration Officer Address: .....																					
<b>Acknowledgement/Receipt</b>																					
Acknowledgement Number _____		Date _____																			
<small>Received the application in form 7 of Shri / Smt. / Ms. .... [Applicant can refer the Acknowledgement No. to check the status of application].</small>																					
Name/Signature of ERO/AERO/BLO																					

Figure A2: Election Commission of India, Form 7.

## C.2 Implementation of T1 in the field



Figure A3: Photographs of field workers assisting T1-assigned migrants in gathering documents and filling in the forms needed to register to vote locally.



Figure A4: Pictures of the local election offices where applications to register to vote are evaluated and processed.



Figure A5: Successful applicants hold up their newly minted voter ID cards, enabling them to vote locally.

## D Political parties and migrant outreach

Are political parties in our study cities less likely to engage with migrants than with long-term city residents in typical elections? To address this question, we obtained proprietary data from the Centre for Developing Societies (CSDS), which conducted a representative poll of Delhi citizens following the 2015 state assembly elections there. The survey was unique in that it elicited detailed information about interactions with party workers in the lead-up to the election, broken down by political party. Specifically, the survey instrument asked: “Did any candidate, party worker or canvasser come to your house during the campaign to ask for your vote?” If the respondent answered in the affirmative, they were then asked, “Candidates or workers of which party came to you?” (they were able to list up to two parties). Respondents were additionally asked, “For how many years have you been living in Delhi?” with four response options provided. We employ the definition of recent migrants employed in Banerjee and Kumar (2017): those who have been living in Delhi for less than ten years.

We run a simple analysis to estimate whether migrants were less likely to be visited by party canvassers compared to longer-term residents (see Table A15). We find strong evidence that this is what occurred. Migrants were 14 percentage points less likely to be visited by a party worker of any stripe—a difference that is qualitatively large and statistically significant. We also examine differences in visits by the various parties. The effects are negatively signed for visits by canvassers from all the major parties, but are largest and statistically significant for those campaigning on behalf of the BJP.

These results lend credence to the claim that political parties are less likely to engage in outreach to migrant citizens, plausibly on account of their greater uncertainty about migrants’ political preferences.

Table A15: Canvassing visits to recent migrants versus long-term city residents in Delhi during the 2015 Delhi state assembly elections. Survey data were obtained from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and are described at: [bit.ly/3nCrACa](https://bit.ly/3nCrACa). Bivariate OLS analysis with robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Party Canvasser Visited	AAP Canvasser	BJP Canvasser	INC Canvasser
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant	-0.136*** (0.047)	-0.066 (0.044)	-0.089** (0.044)	-0.038 (0.033)
Constant	0.632*** (0.011)	0.412*** (0.011)	0.443*** (0.011)	0.187*** (0.009)
Observations	1,994	2,060	2,060	2,060
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.0001

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## E T2 further information

Address: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED],

Our NGO, [REDACTED], along with [REDACTED], has been working hard over the past year to help migrants in parts of your constituency to become politically empowered. In particular, in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections, we have been running a voter registration drive in the city, helping thousands of migrants from other parts of India to register to vote here for the first time. This will allow them to participate fully in the upcoming elections in this city. Below we show a list and a map of the polling booth areas where we've been working to help migrants register. We're sending this letter to all candidates standing in the forthcoming election in this constituency, as well as to sitting MPs, MLAs, and municipal corporators in this area. We hope these newly empowered migrant citizens will exercise their democratic right to vote here. We wanted to let you know that these citizens are now registered to vote in your constituency! Warm regards, [REDACTED]

हमारा एन जी ओ, [REDACTED] पिछले एक साल से कड़ी मेहनत कर रहा है ताकि आपके निवाचिन क्षेत्र में भारत के विभिन्न स्थानों/ प्रदेशों से आये हुए व्यक्तियों को राजनीतिक रूप से सशक्त बनाने में मदद मिल सके। विशेष रूप से, लोकसभा चुनावों में, हम शहर में मतदाता पंजीकरण अभियान चला रहे हैं, जिससे भारत के अन्य हिस्सों से आये हुए हजारों व्यक्तियों को पहली बार यहां मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकरण करने में मदद मिली है। यह उनहें इस शहर में आगामी चुनावों में पूरी तरह से भाग लेने की अनुमति देगा। नीचे हम एक सूची और मतदान केंद्र के क्षेत्रों का एक नक्शा दिखाते हैं जहाँ हम ऐसे व्यक्तियों को पंजीकरण करवाने में सहायता प्रदान कर रहे हैं। हम इस निवाचिन क्षेत्र में आगामी चुनाव में खड़े होने वाले सभी उम्मीदवारों, साथ ही साथ इस क्षेत्र में बैठे सांसदों, विधायिकों और नगर निगम के पार्षदों को यह पत्र भेज रहे हैं। हम आपको सुचित करना चाहते हैं कि ये नागरिक अब आपके निवाचिन क्षेत्र में मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकृत हैं एवं हमें पूर्ण विश्वास है कि ये नागरिक मतदान के अपने लोकतांत्रिक अधिकार का प्रयोग करेंगे। [REDACTED]

Polling booth names (English):

- [REDACTED]

Polling booth names (Hindi):

- [REDACTED]

Figure A6: Example of typed letter mailed to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted and the referenced map is omitted.



To: [REDACTED]  
Wed, May 1, 2019 at 6:48 AM

Dear [REDACTED],

Our NGO, [REDACTED], has been working hard over the past year to help migrants in parts of your constituency to become politically empowered. In particular, in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections, we have been running a voter registration drive in the city, helping thousands of migrants from other parts of India to register to vote here for the first time. This will allow them to participate fully in the upcoming elections in this city. Below we show a list and a map of the polling booth areas where we've been working to help migrants register. We're sending this message to all candidates standing in the forthcoming election in this constituency, as well as to sitting MPs, MLAs, and municipal corporators in this area. We hope these newly empowered migrant citizens will exercise their democratic right to vote here. We wanted to let you know that these citizens are now registered to vote in your constituency!

Warm regards, [REDACTED]

हमारा एन जी औ, [REDACTED], पिछले एक साल से कड़ी मेहनत कर रहा है ताकि आपके निवासन क्षेत्र में भारत के विभिन्न स्थानों/ प्रदेशों से आये हुए व्यक्तियों को राजनीतिक रूप से सशक्त बनने में मदद मिल सके। विशेष रूप से, लोकसभा चुनावों में, हम शहर में मतदाता पंजीकरण अभियान चला रहे हैं, जिससे भारत के अन्य हिस्सों से आये हुए हजारों व्यक्तियों को पहली बार यहां मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकरण करने में मदद मिलती है। यह उन्हें इस शहर में आगामी चुनावों में पूरी तरह से भाग लेने की उन्मत्ति देता। नीचे हम एक सूची और मतदान केंद्र के क्षेत्रों का एक नवश दिखाते हैं जहाँ हम ऐसे व्यक्तियों को पंजीकरण करवाने में सहायता प्रदान कर रहे हैं। हम इस निवासन क्षेत्र में आगामी चुनाव में खड़े होने वाले सभी उम्मीदवारों, साथ ही साथ इस क्षेत्र में हेठो सांसदों, विधायकों और नगर निगम के पार्षदों को यह पत्र भेज रहे हैं। हम आपको सुचित करना चाहते हैं कि ये नागरिक अब आपके निवासन क्षेत्र में मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकृत हैं एवं हमें पूर्ण विश्वास है कि ये नागरिक अधिकार के अपने लोकतान्त्रिक अधिकार का प्रयोग करें। [REDACTED]

Polling booth names (English):

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Polling booth names (Hindi):

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Figure A7: Example of email sent to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted and the referenced map is omitted.

English: Dear [REDACTED] Over the past year, [REDACTED] have been helping migrants register to vote in your constituency area. We've helped thousands of migrants from other parts of India to register to vote in this city for the first time in the upcoming elections. Here are the polling booth areas where we've been working to help migrants register: [REDACTED] \* [REDACTED] \* [REDACTED] \* [REDACTED] \* [REDACTED]

Hindi: Pichle ek saal se, [REDACTED] bharat ke vibhin pradesho se aaye hua wyaktiyo ko aapki chunavi kshetr me panjikrit karwate rahe hain. Ane wale chunavo ke liye hamme bharat ke kai hisso me hazaro pravaasiyo ko pahli baar vote dene ke liye panjikrit kiya hai. Jin polling booth par bharat ke vibhin pradesho se aaye hua wyaktiyo ko panjikrit kar rahe hain unki jaankaari nimnankit hain.

11:39 AM ✓

Figure A8: Example of WhatsApp message sent to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted.




Figure A9: Flow diagram of T2 randomization blocks. Clusters (polling stations) are assigned to T2 treatment or control within four blocks.

## F Study timeline




Figure A10: Study phasing. Red and green bars show the timing of the surveys. Blue bars show the timing of final voter registration application decisions, as reported in online administrative data.

## G Indexing

Table A16: Index construction. Z-score indexes are constructed by coding component variables such that higher values are more beneficial. Component variables are then centered and standardized using the control group mean. The final index is then the average of the standardized components.

Variable type	Indexed variable label	Component variable labels	Method of indexing
Outcome	Political interest	Interest in politics at the city level (ordinal); Interest in politics at the national level (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Political trust	Trust in national government (ordinal); Trust in state government (ordinal); Trust in municipal corporation (ordinal); Trust in parties (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Contacting city officials	Contacting officials (categorical)	Sum
Outcome	Non-electoral participation	Non-electoral participation (categorical)	Sum
Outcome	Campaign exposure	Basti visits by politicians (integer); Home visit by politician or party worker (integer); Number of gifts (integer); Migrant-focused campaigning (binary); Perceived campaign intensity (ordinal)	Z-score index
Lagged DV	Political trust	Trust in national government (ordinal); Trust in state government (ordinal); Trust in municipal corporation (ordinal)	Z-score index
Lagged DV	Politician visits	Politician visits to basti, by municipal corporator, MLA, and MP	Sum

## H Outliers in ‘income’ covariate

When cleaning the data we observed several extreme outliers in the `income` covariate. To minimize the influence of these extreme values, we winsorize the variable, setting all values above the value of the 99th percentile to the value of the 99th percentile itself. The transformed variable is used in all statistical analyses.




Figure A11: Box plots show the distribution of the raw income covariate before and after winsorizing.

# I Internal validity

## I.1 Balance

Table A17: T1 balance test for subjects included in T1 analyses. OLS regression. All covariates are measured at baseline. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	T1 treatment indicator
Female	0.016 (0.025)
Age	−0.001 (0.001)
Muslim	0.017 (0.028)
SC/ST	0.001 (0.025)
Primary education	−0.010 (0.026)
Income (INR 000s)	0.002 (0.002)
Married	−0.038 (0.029)
Length of residence in city	0.002* (0.001)
Owns home in city	0.058** (0.025)
Hadn't voted previously	0.044 (0.041)
How likely to vote in city if registered	−0.010 (0.060)
Political interest	−0.040 (0.041)
Sense of political efficacy	−0.031 (0.031)
Political trust index	0.004 (0.015)
Shared meal with non-coethnic	−0.012 (0.034)
Has hometown voter ID	0.013 (0.037)
Returned to vote in hometown	0.047 (0.042)
More at home in hometown	0.013 (0.034)
Straight-line distance to home district	0.00002 (0.00003)
Still receives hometown schemes	−0.006 (0.024)
Owns hometown property	0.001 (0.026)
Pr(>F) of H0: joint orthogonality	0.408
Observations	2,120
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A18: T2 balance test for subjects included in T2 analyses. Weighted least squares regression. Clusters weighted equally. Model includes block fixed effects. All covariates are measured at baseline. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	T2 treatment indicator
Politician visits	−0.008 (0.035)
Female	0.018 (0.039)
Age	0.001 (0.002)
Muslim	0.121 (0.078)
SC/ST	0.003 (0.056)
Primary education	0.001 (0.042)
Income (INR 000s)	0.011 ** (0.004)
Married	0.007 (0.049)
Length of residence in city	0.002 (0.002)
Owns home in city	0.004 (0.058)
Pr(>F) of H0: joint orthogonality	0.406
No. of clusters	87
Observations	1,969
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.017

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## I.2 Attrition rates by treatment condition

Table A19: Comparison of attrition rates across T1 treatment arms using OLS regression. The analysis includes all subjects randomized to T1 treatment or control. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Attrition Indicator	
Assigned to T1 treatment	-0.007 (0.011)
Observations	2,306
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.0003

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A20: Comparison of attrition rates across T2 treatment arms using weighted least squares regression. Clusters are weighted equally. Models include block fixed effects. The analysis includes all subjects randomized to T2 treatment or control. (Note that this number is smaller than that for the T1 attrition analysis as baseline geo-coordinates were unavailable for some subjects; hence they were not assigned to clusters or randomized.) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Attrition Indicator	
Assigned to T2 treatment	-0.021 (0.021)
No. of clusters	87
Observations	2,131
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.003

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## J Administrative data on T1 application processing

Because our field team helped applicants to submit the voter registration forms online, we were able to track the progress of each submitted case. Specifically, the Election Commission's online portal provides the dates that applications were received and assigned to a Booth Level Officer (BLO). It also gives the final date when the application was either accepted or rejected. (No reasons are given for rejection.) In Figure A12, we present histograms of the time lapse for each of these various stages, as well as the median times.




Figure A12: This figure displays the distributions of the time elapsed between the application submission dates and various stages in the application processing, as reported in the online portal of the Election Commission of India. The sample is for experimental subjects assigned to T1 who submitted applications. Red vertical lines display the median value. Note, cases that took longer than 200 days to process are excluded.

## K Deviations from pre-analysis plan

The study pre-analysis plan (PAP) was filed at the Evidence in Governance and Politics registry before the researchers accessed the endline data and prior to any data analysis being conducted. There were two deviations from the pre-registered plan. First, the observational data analyses described on pp. 6–7 of the PAP were not implemented as there was insufficient variation in the outcome variable of interest (whether eligible subjects wished to acquire a city-based voter ID card) to make these tests feasible. This substantive finding is highlighted in the paper. Second, in the endline data, there were 38 missing values for the variable, `e_campaign5_exposure_hardwork`. This is one of five variables used in the construction of the index variable, `e_campaign_exposure`. For the purposes of constructing this index variable, the 38 missing values of `e_campaign5_exposure_hardwork` were imputed by sampling at random from the non-missing values of that variable within the cluster (polling station) to which the respondent belonged.

All remaining pre-registered experimental analyses in this paper are implemented in conformity with the PAP.

## L Additional ethical considerations

In this section, we detail features of our experimental design and implementation that went above and beyond the minimal requirements needed to secure Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. We note that exceeding IRB requirements has long been advocated by ethicists in the discipline (e.g. Tolleson-Rinehart 2008; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2008; Teele 2014; Fujii 2012), and indeed, we heeded the general principles outlined in existing guidelines when designing our research study. Below, we outline additional ways in which we sought to conduct our study to the highest ethical standards, highlighting several pieces of scholarship that influenced our research design and fieldwork.

First, there is an emerging consensus among political scientists that experiments fielded in the midst of an election should be designed to minimize the possibility of swaying aggregate electoral outcomes (e.g. which candidate or party ultimately wins a seat; see Desposato 2014). The American Political Science Association’s “Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research” notes that, “in general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process” (13). In an important recent contribution, Slough (2020) develops a formal model that yields the following recommendations for researchers seeking to abide by this principle. These include: keeping the number of experimental subjects—i.e. voters—comparatively small; avoiding races whose margin of victory is expected to be close; fielding experiments in larger districts where single-member simple plurality rules are in force; and crafting interventions that reduce the chances of spillovers (Slough 2020: 32–3). As noted in the main text, our interventions were situated and implemented to make it highly improbable that any overall electoral results would be affected, in line with these proposals.

Second, a number of prominent ethical guidance documents underscore the importance of partnering with local stakeholders. In particular, the American Political Science Association’s “Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research” recommends that “researchers should consider the broader social impacts of the research process when deciding whether to engage in the partnership” (13). Humphreys (2015: 89) notes that “the key idea is that if an intervention is ethical for implementing agencies with respect to the ethical standards of their sphere—which may differ from the ethical standards of researchers—then responsibility may be divided between researchers and implementers, with research ethics standards applied to research components and partner standards applied to manipulations.” As described in the paper, we partnered with a local NGO that had been working to promote city-based voter registration among urban migrants for several years. This NGO took the lead role in designing and piloting the interventions, engaging with community leaders, offering contextual input on the design of the study, and providing training assistance and materials to help bring the intervention to scale. Training materials, along with field protocols, were reviewed and approved by the researchers to ensure adherence to ethical and scientific best practices. We further relied on the services of a locally-based research firm that had extensive experience working in the cities where the interventions occurred. It is important to emphasize that our NGO partner, as well as a

host of other similar organizations (many of which we consulted in the design of our study), was already conducting similar interventions and would have continued to conduct similar interventions with or without our collaboration. In short, our role as academics in the research partnership was to scientifically evaluate an intervention that was already in existence.

Third, Asiedu et al (2021) call attention to what they term “policy equipoise,” based on the clinical principle that “the expert community must not have certainty that any arm in a trial is better therapeutically than any other arm.” They note that in settings where there is not uncertainty about which arm will achieve normatively desirable results compared to another arm, randomization of an intervention may still be ethical on certain grounds, such as scarcity of intervention supply. We approached our experimental design with these principles in mind. There was considerable uncertainty regarding the efficacy of both interventions. Additionally, given the resource-intensive nature of the voter registration intervention as well as the budget constraints facing us and our partners, in no sense were we withholding registration resources that would otherwise have been allocated to subjects in the comparison group.

Fourth, we were closely attuned to the treatment of our field teams as well as the imperative to engage in “knowledge transfers” to local populations (cf. Teele 2014). Based on extensive scoping and piloting, we established that the communities where we were working were substantially safe environments in which to carry out research, entailing no appreciable risk to field workers. On knowledge and skills transfers, we were able to enlist the support of research assistance from graduate students at a local university; the students used fieldwork on the project to fulfill one of the requirements for their masters degree program. Field teams were overseen by a professional project manager and compensated at standard local rates for such fieldwork.

Finally, our research was designed to be policy-relevant. Highlighting the growing policy impact of much social scientific work, Tolleson-Rinehart (2008: 507-8) notes that “how the knowledge of such improvements can be shared … is increasingly urgent.” To boost the overall benefits of experimental research, the broad and proactive dissemination of research findings is critical. For example, Cronin-Furman and Lake (2018: 612) encourage researchers to ask: “Have you made a plan to ensure that your research results are disseminated back to the affected community in ways that are meaningful or valuable to them?” In keeping with this recommendation, we will publicize the results of our study to a wide policy audience—including NGO actors working on migrant advocacy, in addition to bureaucrats at the front lines of electoral administration, for whom our study may hold lessons.

Works referenced:

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# **Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India**

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## **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

# Supplementary Information

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## A Voter registration procedures worldwide

Table SI1: Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies. We class countries as democratic if their Polity IV score was 6 or greater in 2018. Per the World Bank, low- and middle-income countries are those whose GDP per capita was less than USD 12,375 in 2018. Population and income data are from the World Bank. Information on registration procedures were gathered from official government sources and country experts.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
India	1,352,617,328	2,016	9	Voter-initiated. Citizen must register by submitting Form 6 to local election office and receive at-home verification visit. ID is dispatched to home address by post.	De-registering required. Migrant must submit Form 7 (deletion) at voter office in constituency of origin, and produce deletion slip at destination constituency prior to re-registering.
Indonesia	267,663,435	3,894	9	State-initiated. Citizens with electronic ID cards (e-KTP, which records their address) are automatically registered to vote and placed on the “temporary” voting roll. Individuals without an e-KTP can register online or in person at their designated voter office.	No formal requirements for de-registration.
Pakistan	212,215,030	1,473	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must register by filling Form 21, and presenting their National ID Card as proof of residence and identity.	Need to de-register from electoral rolls at constituency of origin before re-registering at destination constituency.

Table SI1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Brazil	209,469,333	8,921	8	Voter-initiated and compulsory. Citizens must register at the local voter office. Eligible voters who do not register by 19 years of age, or newly naturalized persons who do not register within a year of acquiring citizenship, face a penalty of 3.51 reals (payable at time of voter registration), unless the person was away from their voting district on election day and justifies his/her absence to electoral justice. Registrants receive a bar-coded elector's card ( <i>título eleitoral</i> ) proving their registration within at least 15 days of the request. There are other non-pecuniary penalties for unregistered citizens like ineligibility for passports, public sector jobs, and loans from public sector banks. Process is biometric.	No requirement to de-register from electoral rolls at place of origin. Need to re-register when moving between states as well as municipalities.
Nigeria	195,874,740	2,028	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must report to the local election office to register for a biometric Permanent Voter Card (PVC) during the Continuous Voter Registration period. ID is then distributed by the election office.	No need to de-register. The PVC is biometric. Citizen must write to the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) through the Electoral Officer of the current constituency at least 60 days prior to elections. If the REC is satisfied that applicant currently resides in the area, they will approve the application and direct that the applicant's details be transferred to the new location. The transfer is recorded on the centralized computer system and the applicant receives their new voter card.

Table SI1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Mexico	126,190,788	9,698	8	Voter-initiated. Individuals must register in person at their local election office. Applicants provide a signature, fingerprint, and photograph to obtain a “Voter’s Mexican Credential.” Photo voting cards are delivered to citizens 20 days after application submissions, or can be collected from the voter office personally. They must be renewed every 10 years.	No requirement to de-register. Re-register at destination constituency by surrendering the previous voter ID.
Philippines	106,651,922	3,103	8	Voter-initiated. The applicant personally appears before the Election Officer (EO), states his/her name and exact address. After establishing the identity of the applicant, the EO verifies the name of the applicant from the Local Voter’s Registration Database or in the Printed Lists of Voters.	No need to de-register. At the destination constituency, EO will issue migrant an application to re-register, upon approval of which, EO in constituency of origin is instructed to delete name from its electoral rolls.
South Africa	57,779,622	6,374	9	Voter-initiated. Registrants must present either a South African bar-coded ID book or a valid Temporary Identity Certificate in order to register at the local voter office/polling station. No voter registration card is issued; rather, the document provided for registration is marked and becomes proof of registration.	No requirement to de-register. Re-registration in new constituency needed to update status.
Myanmar	53,708,395	1,326	8	Voter-initiated. Citizen must report to the voter office in designated constituency. Applicants primarily identify themselves with a National Identification Card, though other forms of identification may apply.	Voter must inform election authorities before moving to new constituency.

Table SI1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Kenya	51,393,010	1,711	9	Voter-initiated. Eligible voters must present themselves to the registration officer with their original identification documents at the designated registration center and complete the registration form (Form A). Registered voters are issued a registration acknowledgement slip bearing the voter's details. The National ID card is the only document required to prove identity.	Citizen must transfer their registration (linked to their National ID card) when moving between constituencies.
Colombia	49,648,685	6,651	7	Voter-initiated. To register, eligible voters must present their national identity card and have their fingerprints taken by the National Civil Registry. The process is often described as registering the ID card with the Electoral Registrar.	De-registering at constituency of origin is not required; migrant only needs to re-register at destination constituency.
Argentina	44,494,502	11,653	9	State-initiated. All Argentine citizens with an ID book over the age of 18 are automatically enrolled in the electoral register, known as the Padrón Electoral; therefore, they do not need to initiate registration. A complex fee scheme applies for new cards, renewals, and data verifications/updates.	No need to de-register, updating address on the national ID card leads to automatic re-registration in destination constituency.
Iraq	38,433,600	5,878	6	Voter-initiated. Citizen must produce relevant documents and register for a voter ID at the voter office. Process is biometric.	Special polling booths are set up in destination constituency for Internally Displaced Persons who are not biometrically registered.

Table SI1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Peru	31,989,256	6,947	9	State-initiated. Voter registration list is based on the civil registry. All citizens registered in the civil registry are automatically included in the voter registry once they turn 18. The National Registry of Identification and Civil Status is responsible for updating the registry. Registration is free of charge.	No need to de-register, updating address on the national ID card leads to automatic re-registration in destination constituency.
Malaysia	31,528,585	11,239	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must fill a form at the designated local voter office and present MyKad (national ID card) to register as a voter. The officer fills out the registration form on behalf of applicant, and the citizen must verify the data.	The Electoral Center (EC) accepts applications from registered voters who apply to register their new home addresses to determine their new Voting Center. No requirement to de-register.
Ghana	29,767,108	2,202	8	Voter-initiated. Citizen must register in the divisional register of the electoral area in which they ordinarily reside. Successful registrants are issued a biometric voter card at the time of registration.	Citizen must notify the Electoral Commission in case of constituency changes. The transfer is then recorded on the central computer system. No need to de-register before re-registering.
Nepal	28,087,871	1,026	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must report to the local voter office with their citizenship certificate to get registered as a voter. The process is biometric.	No need to de-register before re-registering at destination constituency as system is biometric.
Madagascar	26,262,368	461	6	Voter-initiated. Citizen must present their national ID card at the local voter office to register as a voter.	No information available.

Table SI1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Sri Lanka	21,670,000	4,102	6	<p>State-initiated, but not compulsory.</p> <p>Registration of electors and revision of electoral registers are done annually on June 1. Enumerator appointed by the Registering Officer of the district provides the Registration form (BC form) to the chief occupant of each house. The filled registration form (BC form) is collected by the enumerator.</p> <p>Registration of a voter is valid for one year only.</p>	Since lists are revised annually, there is no requirement to de-register.
Burkina Faso	19,751,535	731	6	<p>Voter-initiated. Registrants must present a passport, national ID card, or military card. Successful registrants are issued a voter registration card. Process is biometric.</p>	No information available.

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## B Internal migration and political participation worldwide: Additional case-study evidence

Qualitative evidence corroborates the claim that internal migrants tend to participate less, politically, than non-migrants in a variety of settings worldwide.

- **Nigeria:** Akinyemi, A., Olaopa, O., and Oloruntimehi, O. 2005. “Migration Dynamics and Changing Rural-Urban Linkages in Nigeria.” Mimeo: Obafemi Awolowo University. [bit.ly/3wTi1Vr](http://bit.ly/3wTi1Vr).
  - This study details low rates of political participation among migrants in Oyo, Ondo, and Ogun states: “Migrants’ participation in political activities showed that 30% of males vs 15% of females among migrants participate and belong actively to a political party” (p. 11).
- **Ukraine:** National Democratic Institute. 2019. “Statement of the NDI Election Observation Mission to Ukraine’s April 21, 2019 Second Round Presidential Election.” [bit.ly/2WVgPzt](http://bit.ly/2WVgPzt).
  - This report notes: “Labor migrants … face particular barriers to voting. Internal migrants and IDPs must apply each election—including both rounds of the presidential election—to change their place of voting. Citizens residing in non-government-controlled areas must cross the ‘line of contact’ multiple times to vote in a government-controlled location, creating both a financial and physical burden. The process is cumbersome and poorly understood. OPORA [Ukrainian civic network] and others have recommended an online system to ease the process for all types of internal migrants. Some 325,604 citizens, just a small fraction of Ukraine’s internal migrants and IDPs, changed their place of voting for the second round” (p. 7).
- **Colombia:** Rozo, S., and Vargas, J. 2018. “Brothers or Invaders? How Crisis-Driven Migrants Shape Voting Behavior.” The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association 16836. [bit.ly/2LIOqea](http://bit.ly/2LIOqea).
  - This paper notes that “internally displaced populations in Colombia, while entitled to vote, do not do so in practice. This is both because most internal migrants are below the voting age … and because many of the adults lack formal identification documents which are required for voting” (p. 16).
- **Myanmar:** Callahan, M., and Oo, M. 2019. “Myanmar’s 2020 Elections and Conflict Dynamics.” United States Institute of Peace. *Peaceworks* No. 146. [bit.ly/2Z11zUI](http://bit.ly/2Z11zUI).
  - This study notes that “for voter list inclusion, much hinges on the possession of an up-to-date household list. If a voter checks the voter list display and finds her name missing, she has to produce her household list or other form of identification to demonstrate residence in that particular constituency. If—as is the case for Myanmar’s many internal migrants—she is on a household list in another constituency, she must return to the local administrative office in that location, apply to remove her name from the household list there, and then return to her present constituency area to apply to have her name placed on the household list there. Once that requirement has been satisfied, the GAD [General Administration Department] at the ward or village level will transmit the information to the election commission to add her name to the voter list. This is an onerous and—for some—expensive process that disincentivizes self-updating of the voter list. Election observers noted that separate from this process, village development committees could confirm the residence and identity of potential voters to add their names to the voter list. As the EU Observation Mission noted, this ‘trust-based approach’ did not serve internally displaced people well, as they are living far from their villages” (pp. 26-27).

## C Voter registration field experiments: A systematic review

We systematically review the body of published field experimental studies on the impacts of voter registration assistance. We note that no published study to date has focused on the specific challenges that migrants encounter in seeking to enroll. Additionally, few studies probe the downstream effects of voter registration on other indicators of political incorporation (yet see Braconnier et al 2017 for an important exception).

Studies focusing on general-population voters have documented mixed effects of voter registration assistance, with treatment impacts varying according to the mode of assistance offered. Compare, for example, Bennion and Nickerson 2010, Bennion and Nickerson 2014, and Nickerson 2007, which identify null and even negative effects of some interventions, with Braconnier et al 2017, Gerber et al 2014, and Nickerson 2015 which identify positive effects.

Only two studies focus on registration assistance in developing-country contexts. While Harris and van der Windt Forthcoming finds statistically significant positive treatment effects of assistance given in Kenya, Mvukiyehe and Samii 2017 finds no evidence of an impact of town hall meetings or a civic education campaign to promote registration on either registration or turnout in Liberia.

Finally, we note that there is suggestive evidence in existing work that non-movers and movers respond differentially to registration assistance. Notably, Braconnier et al 2017 finds an overall treatment effect of +0.052 percentage points,  $p < 0.01$ , for home registration visits; yet compared to registered voters as a whole, subjects who registered because of the treatment were more likely to be immigrants (+0.202 percentage points,  $p < 0.01$ ) and to have been born in another region of France (+0.215 percentage points,  $p < 0.01$ ). Additionally, Gosnell 1926 finds that the treatment effect on registration was greater among the sub-sample of subjects who had lived in that voting precinct for less than 10 years.

Table SI2: A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Bennion, E. A., and Nickerson, D. W. 2010. "The Cost of Convenience." <i>Political Research Quarterly</i> 64(4): 858–69.	U.S., 2006. First experiment: 259,310 undergraduate students at public universities during the 2006 midterm election campaign.	First experiment: Treatment group of students received emails with information on downloadable voter registration forms.	Names of recipients matched to voter registration records, identified by name, age, and address.	First experiment: Email on downloadable registration forms decreased the likelihood of registering to vote (-0.3 percentage points across treatment groups, $p=0.09$ ).	
bit.ly/36mUdfY	Second experiment: 6,372 participants in the US who downloaded voter registration forms from an NGO and opted in to receiving text messages from the NGO.	Second experiment: Treatment group received texts reminding the user to submit their forms.		Second experiment: Participants receiving reminder text messages were more likely to register (+4.0 percentage points, $p<0.01$ ).	
Bennion, E. A. and Nickerson, D. W. 2014. "Cheap, But Still Not Effective: An Experiment Showing that Indiana's Online Registration System Fails to Make Email an Effective Way to Register New Voters." <i>Indiana Journal of Political Science</i> 14: 39-51.	U.S., 2010. 7,366 students at a U.S. public university in the months before the registration deadline for the 2010 congressional elections.	One treatment group received an email linking to the state's fully online voter registration system, while another group received a link to a downloadable, mail-in registration form. Control group received no email communication.	Names of recipients matched to voter registration records, identified by name, age, and address.	Among the full sample, there was no significant effect on voter registrations in the downloadable form group (-0.009, $se=0.01$ ) or in the fully online registration group (0.016, $se=0.01$ ). Among students who were not previously registered to vote, the downloadable form group saw a statistically significant decrease in registration (-0.049, $se=0.017$ ) while the online link group saw no significant effect (-0.008, $se=0.017$ ).	

Table SI2: (continued) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Bennion, E. A. and Nickerson, D. W. 2016. "I Will Register and Vote, If You Teach Me How: A Field Experiment Testing Voter Registration in College Classrooms." <i>PS: Political Science &amp; Politics</i> 49(04): 867–71.  <a href="http://bit.ly/2U9zyGL">bit.ly/2U9zyGL</a>	U.S., 2006. 25,256 public university students sampled across 1,026 courses.	Classes in one treatment group received a short presentation by the professor on the importance of registering to vote, followed by the professor distributing registration cards to interested students and then collecting them. In the second treatment group, a student volunteer conducted the presentation and distribution of forms. Control classrooms did not receive any outreach efforts.	Names of recipients matched to voter registration records, identified by name, age, and address.	In-class presentations and form distribution increased student registration rates (+5.6 percentage points, p<0.01). Both treatments also increased voter turnout (2.3 and 2.9 percentage points respectively for professor treatment and student volunteer treatment; p<0.01). No statistically significant difference exists between the effects of the professor and student volunteer treatments.	
Braconnier, C., Dormagen, J., and Pons, V. 2017. "Voter Registration Costs and Disenfranchisement: Experimental Evidence from France." <i>American Political Science Review</i> 111(3): 584–604.  <a href="http://bit.ly/35ikWvf">bit.ly/35ikWvf</a>	France, 2012 elections. 20,500 households across 10 cities, effect then studied as effect of registrations among those initially unregistered or misregistered. 1,500 households resampled for post-election survey.	Voter registration canvassing. Different treatment groups received information-only visits; information and home registration visits; or two separate visits. Treatment groups also varied in the timing of visits relative to the election.	Number of new registrations/voters in 2011 with an address in each apartment building. Follow-up survey measured interest in and knowledge about national politics.	Home registration visits close to the date of the election had the greatest effect on increasing registrations (+0.052, p<0.01). All but one of the canvassing treatments had a statistically significant effect size. 93% of compliers (citizens registered from the treatment visits) voted at least once in 2012, just as likely as new control registrants. Treatment increased index of "political interest" by 0.06 standard deviations (p<0.05).	Compared to registered voters as a whole, subjects who registered because of the treatment were more likely to be immigrants (+0.202, p<0.01); born in another region of France (+0.215, p<0.01); or young (age coefficient -0.137, p<0.01).  Voters registered from the treatments had higher turnout in the more salient presidential election.

Table SI2: (continued) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
<p>Gerber, A. S., Huber G. A., Meredith, M., Biggers, D. R., and Hendry, D. J. 2014. "Can Incarcerated Felons Be (Re)Integrated into the Political System? Results from a Field Experiment." <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 59(4): 912–26.</p> <p><a href="http://bit.ly/3kc0n07">bit.ly/3kc0n07</a></p> <p>Gertzog, I. N. 1970. "The Electoral Consequences of a Local Party Organizations Registration Campaign: The San Diego Experiment." <i>Polity</i> 3(2): 247–64.</p>	<p>U.S., 2012 in the months before the 2012 general election. 6,280 eligible but unregistered formerly incarcerated felons.</p>	<p>Subjects in the treatment groups received a letter from the state election authority assuring them that they were eligible to vote.</p>	<p>Names of recipients matched to voter registration and turnout records, identified by name, age, and address.</p>	<p>The pooled treatments had significant positive effects on registration (+0.03, p&lt;.01) and voter turnout (+0.015, p&lt;.05) in 2012.</p>	<p>Among subjects who had previously voted in 2008, the treatment had a greater effect on registration (+0.116, p&lt;0.01) and voter turnout (+0.106, p&lt;0.01).</p>
	<p>U.S., 1966 in the months before the midterm election. Unit of analysis: 12 electoral precincts in San Diego, California.</p>	<p>In treatment precincts, the local Democratic Party conducted door-to-door voter registration assistance in the weeks before the voter registration deadline. Control precincts had no local party contact.</p>	<p>Change from previous election in the number of voters in each precinct who were registered to vote as Democrats on the voting rolls. Vote choice as self-reported by subjects during a post-election survey.</p>	<p>Party registration canvassing increased the number of Democratic voter registrations per precinct (ATE estimated as +12.9). New registrants in treatment precincts self-reported voting in the majority for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, but less than new registrants in control precincts (66% Democratic party vote for treatment group, compared to 76% for control).</p>	

Table SI2: (*continued*) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Gosnell, H. F. 1926. "An Experiment in the Stimulation of Voting." <i>American Political Science Review</i> 20(4): 869–74.  <a href="http://bit.ly/38pbwzJ">bit.ly/38pbwzJ</a>	U.S., 1924. 6,000 Chicago residents randomly selected within the same voting precincts.	Treatment group received a mailed notice informing them of the need to register in order to vote in the presidential election, with a follow up notice sent to those who had not yet registered after a certain period.	Names of recipients matched to voter registration and turnout records.	Treatment increased registration rate by +10 percentage points (75% to 65% in control). In a follow-up experiment conducted before the 1925 local election, treatment subjects who registered the previous fall (approximately 2,250) were mailed another notice criticizing voting abstention. Compared to registered voters in the control group, treatment registrants were +10 percentage points more likely to vote in the local elections (57% to 47%).	The treatment effect on registration was greater among the sub-sample who had lived in that voting precinct for less than 10 years (+13 percentage points).

Table SI2: (continued) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Harris, J., and van der Windt, P. Forthcoming. "Equalizing Access to Improve Voter Registration: Experimental Evidence from Kenya." <i>Journal of Politics</i> . <a href="http://bit.ly/32ujBj0">bit.ly/32ujBj0</a>	Kenya, 2016 at 1,674 polling stations. Intervention took place eight months before the 2017 general election.	One control ("status quo" registration policy) and 5 treatment groups: Localization (election commission offered local registration at site); canvassing (election commission staff visited households to encourage voting and provide information about registration); and SMS (messages to registered voters urging them to encourage their unregistered contacts to register). The final two treatment groups combined localization with canvassing or SMS.	Number of new registrations per polling station as a proportion of 2013 registrations at the end of the intervention period and on election day; change in turnout as a proportion of 2013 turnout.	Localization treatment has a significant positive effect on voter registration (+2 percent of the 2013 registered voter total, $p<0.01$ ) by the end of the intervention period. SMS reminder messages only have an effect when combined with localization (combined treatment effect +2.4 percent, $p<0.01$ ). The canvassing program had little to no effect on registration (+0.1 percent, $se=0.003$ ).	Effect size of localization treatment greater in poorer areas (poorest quintile, +4.39 percent, $p<0.01$ ; richest quintile, +0.73 percent, $p<0.05$ ). Poor areas, rural areas, and areas far from the nearest registration office saw the greatest effect sizes of localization.
John, P., Macdonald, E., and Sanders, M. 2015. "Targeting Voter Registration with Incentives: A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Lottery in a London Borough." <i>Electoral Studies</i> 40: 170–75. <a href="http://bit.ly/2IIBgSy">bit.ly/2IIBgSy</a>	U.K., 2012. 129,048 households in London in the total sample, of which 20,000 were each assigned to the two treatment conditions (larger and smaller prize) and the rest to control.	Treatment households received letters reminding them to register to vote and informing them that registrants would be entered into a lottery for a cash prize (5,000 GBP in one group, 1,000 GBP in another). Control households received a reminder letter but no offer of a prize.	Households returning their registration form to the local government by the deadline.	Localization treatment increased the absolute number of votes cast (by 0.04 standard deviations) but decreased the turnout rate (by 0.03 standard deviations).	Localization decreased vote margins in some races (-2.8 percent, $p<0.01$ ) relative to control.

Table SI2: (continued) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Kölle, F., Lane, T., Nosenzo, D., and Starmer, C. 2019. "Promoting Voter Registration: The Effects of Low-Cost Interventions on Behaviour and Norms." <i>Behavioural Public Policy</i> 4(1): 26–49.  <a href="http://bit.ly/2IkIeal">bit.ly/2IkIeal</a>	U.K., 2015 general election, 7,679 eligible but unregistered students in Oxford.	Control group received a postcard informing recipients they were not yet registered to vote and providing a link to the online registration website. Treatment groups had messages added to the control base, including: Informing students about the possible 80 GBP fine for not registering; offering students entry into a lottery for small prizes (80 GBP); providing a way to sign up for text message reminders to register; and providing a phone number for students to text their intention to register. Treatment randomized at the student residential building level.	Recipients registered between the beginning of treatment and close of registration. Student university data matched to official voter registration rolls.	Informing students about the potential fine increased rates of registration (logistic regression odds ratio 1.57, $p<0.05$ ). Other treatments not significant at $p>0.05$ .	
Krawczyk, K. and Leroux, K. 2014. "Can Nonprofit Organizations Increase Voter Turnout? Findings From an Agency-Based Voter Mobilization Experiment." <i>Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly</i> 43(2): 272–292.  <a href="http://bit.ly/3lfmcoi">bit.ly/3lfmcoi</a>	U.S., 2010. 505 clients of different human services NGOs in the months before the 2010 midterm election.	NGOs offered treatment subjects voter registration assistance during subjects' normal visits to the NGO. Control group received no voting-related contact from the NGO.	Subjects were surveyed after the election and asked if they voted.	NGO voter registration assistance increased self-reported voter turnout (probit marginal effect=+0.119, $p<0.05$ ).	

Table SI2: (*continued*) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Mann, C. B., and Bryant, L. A. 2020. "If You Ask, They Will Come (to Register and Vote): Field Experiments with State Election Agencies on Encouraging Voter Registration." <i>Electoral Studies</i> 63: 102021.  <a href="http://bit.ly/3katEzP">bit.ly/3katEzP</a>	U.S., 2012. Citizens who were eligible to vote but unregistered. 28,867 households in Delaware across all 5 experimental conditions; 549,748 households in Oregon.	Treatment group received postcards from the state election agency stating they were not registered to vote and providing information on how to do so. Treatment variations: Emphasizing the urgency of registering by the deadline; visual cues (image of a registration form); and emphasizing voting as a civic duty.	Names of recipients added to voter registration and turnout records, identified by name, and address.	All treatments effective at increasing registration (ranging from +1.8 to +2.6 percentage points relative to control, all effects significant at $p<0.01$ ). All treatments also increased turnout in the following election (ranging from +1.6 to +2.4 percentage points relative to control, all effects significant at $p<0.01$ ). No significant differences between different treatments' effect sizes.	
Mvukiyehe, E., and Samii, C. 2017. "Promoting Democracy in Fragile States: Field Experimental Evidence from Liberia." <i>World Development</i> 95: 254–67.  <a href="http://bit.ly/3lfYJDw">bit.ly/3lfYJDw</a>	Liberia, 2011. 142 villages. Took place in the 9 months preceding the 2011 general elections.	In one group of treatment villages, residents were invited to community town hall and civic education programs—5 or 6 meetings over the treatment period. In the second group, facilitators recruited treatment village residents for community security committees. The security committees liaised with UN peacekeepers and monitored security incidents.	In-person surveying asked community members whether they had registered or voted in the last election.	Neither treatment had a statistically significant effect on registration (0.01 percentage points, $se=0.01$ ) or voter turnout (0.02 percentage points, $se=0.01$ ).	

Table SI2: (continued) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Nickerson, D. W. 2007. "Does Email Boost Turnout?" <i>Quarterly Journal of Political Science</i> 2(4): 369–79. <a href="http://bit.ly/3lgkyCK">bit.ly/3lgkyCK</a>	First experiment: 5 U.S. public universities during the 2002 midterm elections, 58,311 undergraduate students in sample. Students did not opt-in to being part of the study.  Second experiment: 161,633 U.S. residents who signed up on an NGO's website to receive registration and voting reminder emails.	In both experiments, the samples received a series of emails encouraging voting and providing information on voter registration.	Names of recipients matched to voter registration records, identified by name, age, and address.	The email treatments had no positive effect on registration (pooled, treatment effect=-0.4 percentage points, $se=0.2$ ) or turnout (pooled, treatment effect=-0.2 percentage points, $se=0.3$ ).	
Nickerson, D. W. 2015. "Do Voter Registration Drives Increase Participation? For Whom and When?" <i>The Journal of Politics</i> 77(1): 88–101. <a href="http://bit.ly/2U6LN70">bit.ly/2U6LN70</a>	U.S., 2004 and 2007, several months ahead of different elections. Treatment randomized by street, 620 streets in six cities. Congressional, presidential, gubernatorial, and local elections included in the sample.	In-person canvassing by local NGOs who helped residents fill out and submit registration cards.	Rate of new voter registrations and new voter turnout per street in voter registration records.	In-person canvassing increased voter registration (+4.4 percentage points, $p<0.01$ ) and voter turnout (+0.9 percentage points, $p<0.01$ ) on treated streets. Turnout among subjects registered as a result of the treatment was 24 percent, lower than the population average.	New registration effect was higher on low-SES streets (+6 percentage points in low-SES streets compared to +1 percentage point in high-SES streets). But the SES gap in new votes cast was smaller (+4 percentage points in low-SES streets compared to +1 percentage point in high-SES streets).

Table SI2: (continued) A systematic review of published field experimental studies of the effects of voter registration assistance.

Study	Sample	Treatments	Outcomes	Results	Heterogeneity
Sweeney, M., Service, S., Mackinson, L., and Northcott, H. 25 April, 2018. "Increasing Responses to the Annual Canvass in Hackney and Hull." <i>The Behavioural Insights Team.</i> <a href="http://bit.ly/3kfNklR">bit.ly/3kfNklR</a>	U.K., 2017. The annual electoral register canvass in the cities of Hackney and Hull. 226,528 households.	Control addresses received the city councils' normal form letters, which provided information on how to submit the household response to the electoral register and stressed that it was legally required. The treatment groups received one of 10 treatments that either made the envelope more eye-catching; provided more detailed information about how to submit the form; or stressed the individual hassle or social costs of not submitting the form. Any household (treatment and control) that had not submitted their filing by a certain point received reminder letters.	Households submitting their registration before a reminder was sent; households submitting their registration before the deadline.	Some of the treatments increased submissions before a reminder letter was sent, particularly the eye-catching envelope treatment and the treatment emphasizing hassle to the recipient for non-compliance (Envelope treatment: 3.4 percentage points, $p<0.01$ . Hassle treatment: 0.9 percentage points, $p<0.05$ ).  Treatments had no effect on the rate of submitting the enquiry form before the end of the canvassing period (i.e. but did not lower the non-response rate).	
Williamson, S. 2 April, 2019. "The Filer Voter Experiment: How Effective is Voter Registration at Tax Time?" Governance Studies program, <i>The Brookings Institution.</i> <a href="http://brook.gs/32osLNZ">brook.gs/32osLNZ</a>	U.S., 2018. 4,353 subjects in two cities filing their income taxes at an NGO-run tax preparation assistance site.	NGO volunteers offered to help subjects fill out a voter registration form during subjects' tax preparation visit.	New registrations by the initially unregistered, measured as names and identifiers of recipients added to voter registration rolls between the start and end of the treatment period.	Registration assistance during tax filing made unregistered subjects 4.9 percentage points more likely to register (8.8 percent registered in treatment group compared to 3.9 percent in control, $p<0.05$ ) by the end of the treatment period.	Effect size was larger for subjects under the age of 35 (+10 percentage points, $p<0.05$ ) and smaller but still significant for subjects who requested a Spanish language consent form (around +1 percentage point, $p<0.05$ ).

## D Description of IHDS-II variables

Table SI3: Description of IHDS-II variables.

Variable code	Variable label	Question number in IHDS-II	Question language in IHDS-II	Note
rec_migrant_10y	Migrant	Q1.16	From where did the family come? 1) Same state, Same district 2) Same state, Another district 3) Another state 4) Another country	This question was asked if respondents answered “less than 90” to question 1.15: How many years ago did your family first come to this village/town/city? For urban areas, we code as migrant those who stated less than 10 years in answer to this question. Only respondents who answered (2) or (3) to question 1.16 classified as migrants, on our conceptualization.
rec_hh_has_shortterm_migrant	Migrant Sending Household	Q4.1	Have you or any member of your household left to find seasonal/short term work during the last five years and returned to live here?	
rec_hh_member_of_party	Political Party Member	Q18.11	Does anybody in the household belong to a political party?	
rec_hh_panchayat_member	Panchayat Member	Q18.14	Is anyone in the household a member/official of the village panchayat/nagarpalika/ward committee?	
rec_hh_attended_meeting	Attended Meeting	Q18.13	Have you or anyone in the household attended a public meeting called by the village panchayat (gram sabha)/nagarpalika/ward committee in the last year?	

Table SI3: (*continued*) Description of IHDS-II variables.

Variable code	Variable label	Question number in IHDS-II	Question language in IHDS-II	Note
rec_confidence_in_panchayats	Confidence: Panchayats (in rural areas) Confidence: Ward Committees (in urban areas)	Q21.6	As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have 1) A great deal of confidence 2) Only some confidence 3) Hardly any confidence at all in:  Village Panchayats/Nagarpalika/Nagar Panchayat – to implement public projects	
rec_confidence_in_pols	Confidence: Politicians	Q21.1	<i>continued from above:</i>	
rec_confidence_in_state_gov	Confidence: State Government	Q21.4	Politicians – to fulfill promises <i>continued from above:</i>	
rec_acquaint_pol_in_community	Acquaintance: Politician in Community	Q17.2g/SN2g1	State government – to look after the people  Do you or any members of your household have personal acquaintance with someone who works in any of the following occupations:  Politicians (beyond gram panchayat) Elected members (such as MP/MLA, Zilla parishad member excluding village panchayat): Among your relatives/caste/community	
rec_acquaint_pol_out_community	Acquaintance: Politician Outside Community	Q17.2g/SN2g2	<i>continued from above:</i>  Politicians (beyond gram panchayat) Elected members (such as MP/MLA, Zilla parishad member excluding village panchayat): Outside the community/caste	

Table SI3: (*continued*) Description of IHDS-II variables.

Variable code	Variable label	Question number in IHDS-II	Question language in IHDS-II	Note
rec_acquaint_party_in_community	Acquaintance: Party Worker in Community	Q17.2h/SN2h1	<i>continued from above:</i> Political party officials: Among your relatives/caste/community	
rec_acquaint_party_out_community	Acquaintance: Party Worker Outside Community	Q17.2h/SN2h2	<i>continued from above:</i> Political party officials: Outside the community/caste	
rec_benefits_income_winsor	Winsorized Benefits Income	Q9.5, Q13, Q1-8 all government benefits INR	This variable is coded as “INCBENEFITS” in the codebook.	This variable measures the monetary sum of various government benefits respondents receive.
rec_has_proof_residence	Has Proof of Residence	Q10.3b	Does anyone in the household have the following:  Proof of residence such as electricity/phone bill, rent agreement etc.?	
rec_has_photo_id	Has Photo ID	Q10.3a	<i>continued from above:</i>  Photo ID proof such as voter card, ration card, PAN card, etc.?	
rec_urban_area_census11	Urban	URBAN2011	NA	Urban residence from 2011 Census of India.
rec_muslim	Muslim	Q1.11	What is the religion of the head of household?	
rec_sc_st	SC/ST	Q1.13	Is this (caste/jati and sub caste/sub jati to which you belong) Brahmin, General/Forward, OBC, SC, ST, or Others?	
rec_assets	Asset Index	ASSETS	I would like to ask you about what things your household owns. Do you own a ... [various household items listed].	This variable is in the codebook, not in the questionnaire. The variable is made up of multiple questions from section 15 of the questionnaire.

## E Additional information on experimental subject characteristics

Table SI4 presents the reasons given by experimental subjects for why they migrated to Delhi and Lucknow. A clear majority cited employment as the main reason. Table SI5 shows that most migrants migrated with their spouses and children.

Table SI6 demonstrates that most migrants in the Lucknow sample were intra-state migrants from other parts of Uttar Pradesh. Most migrants to Delhi came from neighbouring states. (Note that Delhi is effectively a city-state and so all migration is from other states.)

Table SI4: Main reasons given for migration (in percentages) by T1 experiment subjects.

Sample	Employment	Marriage	Other
Both cities (full sample)	84.0	8.7	7.4
Delhi	80.8	9.2	10.0
Lucknow	88.8	7.8	3.3

Table SI5: Family accompanying T1 experiment subjects at the time of migration (in percentages).

Sample	None	Spouse	Children
Both cities (full sample)	4.0	62.9	57.5
Delhi	4.5	57.7	51.7
Lucknow	3.3	70.9	66.3

Table SI6: States of origins of sampled migrants.

Sample	Come from same state	Come from neighboring state
Both cities (full sample)	87.6	41.1
Delhi	NA	60.2
Lucknow	87.6	11.5

## F Summary statistics

Table SI7: Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis of the T1 experiment. “(E)” variables were measured at endline and “(B)” variables were measured at baseline.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
(E) Has city-based voter ID	2,120	0.281	0.450	0	1
(E) Voted in city in 2019	2,120	0.281	0.449	0	1
(E) Likelihood of voting in city in future	2,120	0.872	0.197	0	1
(E) Political interest index	2,120	0.045	0.909	-1.442	1.559
(E) Interest: City politics	2,120	0.472	0.326	0	1
(E) Interest: National/state politics	2,120	0.520	0.341	0	1
(E) Politician accountability perceptions	2,120	0.715	0.336	0	1
(E) Sense of political efficacy	2,120	0.446	0.409	0	1
(E) Political trust index	2,120	0.009	0.652	-1.616	1.170
(E) Contacting city officials index	2,120	0.303	0.610	0	6
(E) Non-electoral participation index	2,120	0.295	0.598	0	5
(B) T1 treatment	2,306	0.493	0.500	0	1
(B) Female	2,306	0.540	0.498	0	1
(B) Age	2,306	28.795	10.063	18	88
(B) Muslim	2,306	0.235	0.424	0	1
(B) SC/ST	2,306	0.379	0.485	0	1
(B) Primary education	2,306	0.650	0.477	0	1
(B) Hindi	2,306	0.908	0.220	0	1
(B) Income (INRs)	2,306	10.252	4.663	1	30
(B) Married	2,306	0.684	0.465	0	1
(B) Length of residence in city	2,306	16.472	9.894	0	78
(B) Owns home in city	2,306	0.672	0.470	0	1
(B) Hadn’t voted previously	2,306	0.747	0.435	0	1
(B) How likely to vote in city if registered	2,306	0.920	0.186	0	1
(B) Political interest	2,306	0.265	0.299	0	1
(B) Sense of political efficacy	2,306	0.570	0.367	0	1
(B) Political trust index	2,306	0.001	0.751	-1.703	1.409
(B) Shared meal with non-coethnic	2,306	0.386	0.344	0	1
(B) Has hometown voter ID	2,306	0.268	0.443	0	1
(B) Returned to vote in hometown	2,306	0.174	0.379	0	1
(B) More at home in hometown	2,306	0.615	0.346	0	1
(B) Straight-line distance in kilometers to home district	2,306	384.075	328.329	2.386	1,761.926
(B) Still receives hometown schemes	2,306	0.468	0.499	0	1
(B) Owns hometown property	2,306	0.276	0.447	0	1

Table SI8: Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis of the T2 experiment. “(E)” variables were measured at endline and “(B)” variables were measured at baseline.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
(E) Campaign exposure index	1,969	0.026	0.590	-0.960	3.648
(E) Basti visits by politicians	1,969	0.586	0.871	0	4
(E) Home visit by politician or party worker	1,969	0.591	0.492	0	1
(E) Number of gifts	1,969	0.020	0.146	0	2
(E) Migrant-focused campaigning	1,969	0.447	0.497	0	1
(E) Perceived campaign intensity	1,931	0.718	0.359	0	1
(E) Trust: National government	1,969	0.730	0.340	0	1
(E) Trust: State government	1,969	0.686	0.349	0	1
(E) Trust: Municipal government	1,969	0.584	0.373	0	1
(E) Trust: Political parties	1,969	0.329	0.358	0	1
(E) Considers city home	1,969	0.956	0.154	0	1
(E) Plans to live in city	1,969	54.117	28.594	0	100
(E) Recommends others live in city	1,969	0.777	0.416	0	1
(B) T2 treatment	1,969	0.530	0.499	0	1
(B) Politician visits	1,969	0.608	0.823	0	3
(B) Female	1,969	0.537	0.499	0	1
(B) Age	1,969	28.617	10.075	18	88
(B) Muslim	1,969	0.241	0.428	0	1
(B) SC/ST	1,969	0.369	0.483	0	1
(B) Primary education	1,969	0.667	0.471	0	1
(B) Income (INRs)	1,969	10.220	4.632	1	30
(B) Married	1,969	0.671	0.470	0	1
(B) Length of residence in city	1,969	17.038	10.036	0	78
(B) Owns home in city	1,969	0.693	0.461	0	1

## G Survey instruments for experiment

Table SI9: Variable definitions in the original survey instrument.

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
<b>Baseline survey</b>		
Female	What is your gender?	1. Female / 2. Male / 3. Other
Age	What is your age?	18 - 99
Muslim	What is your religion?	1. Hindu / 2. Muslim / 3. Sikh / 4. Christian / 5. Jain / 6. Buddhist / 7. Parsi / 8. No religion / 9. Other
SC/ST	What is your caste group?	1. SC / 2. ST / 3. OBC / 4. Forward caste / 5. Other-specify
Primary education	What is the highest level of education you have attained?	1. No formal education (cannot read and write) / 2. No formal education (can read and write) / 3. Primary school / 4. Secondary school / 5. Senior secondary school / 6. Graduate / 7. Postgraduate
Hindi	How well do you speak Hindi?	1. I do not speak any Hindi / 2. I can speak some Hindi but I am not fluent / 3. I am a fluent speaker of Hindi
Income (INR 000s)	What is your total monthly household income in Rupees?	0 - 1,000,000
Married	Are you currently married?	1. Yes / 2. No
Length of residence	When did you move to [Delhi/Lucknow] to live or work?	1920 - 2018
Owns home	Do you own or rent your home?	1. Rent / 2. Own / 3. Other-specify
Politically active in village	Have you gone back to vote in an election in your home village or town since moving to [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. Yes / 2. No
More at home in village	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "I feel more at home in my previous place of residence than I do in [Delhi/Lucknow]."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Family in city	Which of the following family members stay with you here in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. No family members / 2. Spouse / 3. Children / 4. Parents / 5. Grandparents / 6. Other extended family
Number of calls to prior residence	Over the past week, approximately how many phone calls did you make to friends or relatives back in your previous place of residence?	0 - 99
Receives schemes in prior residence	Do you or your immediate family continue to benefit from government schemes in your previous place of residence-for example, PDS, MGNREGA, or cash transfer schemes?	1. Yes / 2. No
Owns property in prior residence	Do you or your spouse personally own land or property in your previous place of residence?	1. Yes / 2. No
Wants city voter ID card	Do you wish to apply for a [Delhi/Lucknow] voter ID card that will allow you to vote in national, state, and local elections in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. Yes / 2. No

Table SI9: Variable definitions in the original survey instrument. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Has voter ID for prior residence	Do you currently have a voter ID card allowing you to vote in your previous place of residence (outside [Delhi/Lucknow])?	1. Yes / 2. No
How likely to vote	If an election for the [Delhi/Lucknow] municipal corporation were going to be held tomorrow, and you were registered to vote here, how likely do you think it is that you would vote?	1. Very likely / 2. Somewhat likely / 3. Somewhat unlikely / 4. Very unlikely
Political interest	In general, how interested are you in politics?	1. Very interested / 2. Somewhat interested / 3. Not very interested
Political efficacy	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "People like me don't have any influence on the government in [Delhi/Lucknow]"	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Strongly disagree
Trust in national government	How much trust do you have in the national government?	1. No trust at all / 2. Not much trust / 3. Some trust / 4. A great deal of trust
Trust in state government	How much trust do you have in the [Delhi/Lucknow] state government?	1. No trust at all / 2. Not much trust / 3. Some trust / 4. A great deal of trust
Trust in municipal corporation	How much trust do you have in the [Delhi/Lucknow] municipal corporation?	1. No trust at all / 2. Not much trust / 3. Some trust / 4. A great deal of trust
Shared meal with ethnic out-group	Over the past six months, how many times have you shared a meal with someone from another jati or religion?	1. Very regularly / 2. Somewhat regularly / 3. A few times / 4. Not at all
Politician visits to basti	Which of the following politicians, if any, have visited your basti here in [Delhi/Lucknow] in the past year?	1. Municipal corporator / 2. MLA / 3. MP
Last vote in prior residence	Think about your previous place of residence. What best describes the most recent election in which you yourself voted there?	1. I voted in a village as part of a Lok Sabha election / 2. I voted in a village as part of a state assembly election / 3. I voted in a village as part of a gram panchayat election / 4. I voted in a town or city as part of a Lok Sabha election / 5. I voted in a town or city as part of a state assembly election / 6. I voted in a town or city as part of a municipal corporation election / 7. Other-please specify / 8. I have not voted previously

Table SI9: Variable definitions in the original survey instrument. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Officeholders contacted	Which of the following [Delhi/Lucknow] officeholders have you contacted at some point over the past year?	1. [Delhi/Lucknow] corporation official / 2. [Delhi/Lucknow] municipal corporator / 3. Local MLA / 4. Local MP / 5. Party worker inside your basti / 6. Party worker outside your basti / 7. Housing society/vikas samiti official in your basti / 8. Ward samiti representative in your basti / 9. Dalal/broker/middleman / 10. Other community worker in your basti
<b>Endline survey</b>		
Has voter ID for city	Do you currently have a voter ID card that allows you to vote in [Delhi/Lucknow] elections?	1. Yes / 2. No
Voted in city in 2019	Did you vote in [Delhi/Lucknow] during the Lok Sabha elections held in May of this year?	1. Yes / 2. No
How likely to vote in city	How likely is it that you will vote in the next state elections held in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. Very likely / 2. Somewhat likely / 3. Somewhat unlikely / 4. Very unlikely
Attention to city politics	How much attention do you pay to news about politics in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. A lot of attention / 2. Some attention / 3. No attention at all
Attention to national/state politics	How much attention do you pay to news about national and state politics?	1. A lot of attention / 2. Some attention / 3. No attention at all
Political accountability	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Elected politicians are accountable to the citizens of this city."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Political efficacy	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "People like me don't have any influence on the government."	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Strongly disagree
Trust in national government	How much trust do you have in the national government?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Trust in state government	How much trust do you have in the [Delhi/Lucknow] state government?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Trust in municipal corporation	How much trust do you have in the municipal corporation of [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Trust in political parties	How much trust do you have in political parties?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Considers city home	To what extend do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I consider [Delhi/Lucknow] to be my home."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Plans to live in city	For how many more years do you plan to live in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	0-100

Table SI9: Variable definitions in the original survey instrument. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Recommends others live in city	Would you recommend to your friends and relatives in your home village that they come to [Delhi/Lucknow] to live and work?	1. Yes / 2. No
Campaign: basti visits	Which of the following politicians, if any, have visited this basti in the last three months, including during the Lok Sabha election campaign?	1. Sitting municipal corporator / 2. Sitting MLA / 3. Sitting MP / 4. MP candidate
Campaign: home visit	During the recent Lok Sabha campaign in [Delhi/Lucknow], did a politician or political party worker come to your door to ask for your vote?	1. Yes / 2. No
Campaign: gifts	During the recent Lok Sabha campaign in [Delhi/Lucknow], did a politician or political party worker offer you any of the following items? If so, which items?	1. A gift of money / 2. A gift of clothing / 3. A gift of alcohol / 4. Another kind of gift / 5. Free travel / 6. No, nothing was offered
Campaign: pro-migrant	During the recent Lok Sabha campaign, did any politician or political party try to specifically win the votes of recent migrants to this neighborhood?	1. Yes / 2. No
Campaign: intensity	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "During the recent Lok Sabha campaign, politicians and political party workers campaigned hard to win the votes of people in this particular basti."	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Strongly disagree
Contacting officials	Which of the following officeholders, if any, have you yourself contacted in the past three months?	1. [Delhi/Lucknow] corporation official / 2. Municipal corporator / 3. Local MLA / 4. Local MP / 5. Political party worker inside your basti / 6. Party worker outside your basti / 7. Housing society/vikas samiti official in your basti / 8. Ward samiti representative in your basti / 9. Dalal/broker/middleman / 10. Other community worker in your basti
Non-electoral participation	Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me which of these, if any, you have personally done during the past three months.	1. Attended a community meeting / 2. Joined or participated in the meetings of a civic association, such as a club, union, or NGO / 3. Gone to a meeting of a political party / 4. Gone to a political rally / 5. Given money to a political party or to a political cause / 6. Handed out leaflets or done door to door campaigning on behalf of a cause or a political party / 7. Voted in an internal political party election

## H T1 additional results

### H.1 T1 interaction with hometown attachment characteristics

We find that 98 percent of subjects in the omnibus sample expressed a wish to receive assistance to register to vote locally, which we take to be evidence against the claim that hometown attachments are consequential for the take up of registration help. Table SI10 further probes the “voluntaristic detachment” theory by examining whether the T1 intervention was less effective among subjects with stronger attachments to home regions. This may have occurred if, say, subjects more attached to home regions declined to invest in the registration process once it got underway. The null interaction coefficients presented in Table SI10 suggest that this is not the case.

Table SI10: [Exploratory] Estimates of heterogeneous effects of T1 treatment by hometown attachment characteristics. Models do not include additional covariates. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has City-Based Voter ID	Voted in City in 2019
	(1)	(2)
T1 x Length of residence	0.001 (0.002)	-0.00005 (0.002)
T1 x Kilometers to home	0.00003 (0.0001)	0.00001 (0.0001)
T1 x More at home at hometown	0.049 (0.057)	-0.054 (0.056)
T1 x Still gets hometown schemes	-0.045 (0.041)	-0.009 (0.041)
T1 x Owns hometown property	0.0002 (0.044)	0.009 (0.044)
T1	0.201*** (0.059)	0.239*** (0.059)
Length of residence	0.003** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Kilometers to home	-0.00003 (0.00003)	-0.0001*** (0.00004)
More at home in hometown	-0.055* (0.033)	-0.035 (0.033)
Still gets hometown schemes	0.012 (0.024)	0.003 (0.025)
Owns hometown property	-0.021 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.027)
Constant	0.164*** (0.035)	0.213*** (0.036)
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.076	0.060

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## H.2 T1 effects on political interest decomposed

Table SI11: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for political interest, using the two individual components of the political interest index as outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Interest: City Politics (1)	Interest: National/State Politics (2)
T1 treatment	0.032 (0.014)	0.028 (0.015)
p-value (upper)	0.011	0.028
Control mean	0.457	0.506
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.023	0.020
DV values	{0, 0.5, 1}	{0, 0.5, 1}

### H.3 T1 effects on contacting and non-electoral participation

Table SI12 considers two outcomes not included in our pre-analysis plan, yet that bear on citizens' political engagement beyond elections. Column 1 shows the registration campaign somewhat increased the number of urban politicians subjects report having contacted within the past three months (0.039 additional contacts,  $p=0.069$ ). Non-electoral participation, too, responded to the treatment, with the count of reported activities increasing by 0.043 ( $p=0.048$ ; column 2). Both behavioral changes are impressive given the comparatively short timespan of the project. They resonate with a growing body of literature stressing the significance of claims-making in developing country contexts: the need for active citizens to make requests of the state if their welfare needs are to be met. The small absolute magnitudes of the effects are in line with the low control group means. The majority of respondents had neither contacted any city official nor engaged in any non-electoral political activity over the past three months, highlighting the depths of this group's marginalization.

Table SI12: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for contacting and non-electoral participation. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Contacting City Officials Index (1)	Non-Electoral Participation Index (2)
T1 treatment	0.039 (0.026)	0.043 (0.026)
p-value (upper)	0.069	0.048
Control mean	0.286	0.277
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.028	0.031
DV values	{0, ..., 6}	{0, ..., 5}

#### H.4 Heterogeneous effects of T1 by Hindi fluency

Table SI13: [Exploratory] Estimates of heterogeneous effects of T1 treatment by Hindi fluency. Models do not include additional covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has City-Based Voter ID	Voted in City in 2019
	(1)	(2)
T1 x Hindi fluency	0.032 (0.092)	0.108 (0.094)
T1	0.214** (0.087)	0.110 (0.089)
Hindi fluency	-0.101* (0.058)	-0.139** (0.062)
Constant	0.253*** (0.055)	0.304*** (0.059)
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.074	0.055

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## H.5 T1 main results controlling for Hindi fluency

Table SI14: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for primary political outcomes, controlling for Hindi fluency, in addition to the set of pre-registered control variables. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Has City-Based Voter ID (1)	Voted in City in 2019 (2)	Likelihood of Voting in City in Future (3)
T1 treatment	0.236 (0.019)	0.204 (0.019)	0.032 (0.009)
p-value (upper)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Control mean	0.161	0.178	0.856
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.086	0.066	0.011
DV values	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

Table SI15: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for additional political outcomes, controlling for Hindi fluency, in addition to the set of pre-registered control variables. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Political Interest Index (1)	Politician Accountability Perceptions (2)	Sense of Political Efficacy (3)	Political Trust Index (4)
T1 treatment	0.092 (0.039)	0.039 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.027 (0.028)
p-value (upper)	0.010	0.004	0.743	0.170
Control mean	0.000	0.697	0.450	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.026	0.006	0.002	0.019
DV values	[-1.44, 1.56]	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}	[-1.62, 1.17]

## H.6 T1 main results without covariates

Table SI16: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for primary political outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models do not include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Has City-Based Voter ID (1)	Voted in City in 2019 (2)	Likelihood of Voting in City in Future (3)
T1 treatment	0.243 (0.019)	0.208 (0.019)	0.033 (0.009)
p-value (upper)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Control mean	0.161	0.178	0.856
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.073	0.053	0.007
DV values	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

Table SI17: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for additional political outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models do not include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Political Interest Index (1)	Politician Accountability Perceptions (2)	Sense of Political Efficacy (3)	Political Trust Index (4)
T1 treatment	0.091 (0.039)	0.037 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.018 (0.028)
p-value (upper)	0.011	0.006	0.660	0.263
Control mean	0.000	0.697	0.450	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted $R^2$	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.000
DV values	[-1.44, 1.56]	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}	[-1.62, 1.17]

## I Vote choice

This section compares the partisan preferences of migrants in our experimental sample with the preferences of immediately surrounding local populations.

In the descriptive (non-experimental) analysis presented in Figure SI1, we compare reported vote choice by all migrants in our experimental sample (i.e. both those in the T1 treatment and T1 control groups) to the final 2019 electoral returns (a) in the seven Lok Sabha constituencies in which we worked, and (b) in the specific polling-station localities in which we worked—and therefore where our migrants were entitled to cast a vote. Administrative data was obtained from the Trivedi Centre for Political Data at Ashoka University, and from the “Form 20” polling-station returns published online by the Election Commission of India, which we digitized. We conduct the comparisons separately for Delhi and Lucknow. We do this because, although the two major national parties (the Indian National Congress, INC, and the Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP) received substantial support in both locations, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAAP) was only seriously competitive in Delhi, while the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and Samajwadi Party (SP) were only seriously competitive in Lucknow.

The results of this analysis need to be heavily caveated by the fact that only a minority of registered respondents in our endline survey were willing to reveal their vote choice to enumerators. Consequently, our estimates of the sample’s vote choice are noisy and may not be representative of the sample as a whole. Nevertheless, the comparisons are revealing.




Figure SI1: [Exploratory] Comparison of the distributions of party-wise support between migrants in the experimental sample and the final vote tallied at the constituency and polling-station levels.

## J T2 additional results

### J.1 T2 effects on trust and integration

Table SI18: [Exploratory] Estimates of T2 effects on trust in political institutions and social integration. Outcomes are whether respondent has trust in the national (1), state (2), and municipal governments (3), and in political parties (4); whether the respondent considers the city to be “home” (5); for how many more years they plan to live in the city (6); and whether they would recommend to friends and relatives in their hometown to come to the city to live and work (7). Weighted least squares estimates of intent to treat effects. Clusters weighted equally. Models include block fixed effects but no additional covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Trust: National Gov. (1)	Trust: State Gov. (2)	Trust: Municipal Gov. (3)	Trust: Political Parties (4)	Considers City Home (5)	Plans to Live in City (6)	Recommends Others Live in City (7)
T2	-0.001 (0.023)	0.050* (0.026)	0.043 (0.029)	-0.033 (0.026)	0.017** (0.007)	0.677 (3.344)	0.007 (0.030)
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.016	0.034	0.015	0.009	0.004	0.020	0.001

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## J.2 T2 results without covariates

Table SI19: [Exploratory] T2 experimental results for exposure to campaigning during the 2019 elections. Weighted least squares estimates of intent to treat effects. Clusters weighted equally. Models do not include covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Index Components					
Campaigning Exposure Index	Basti Visits by Politicians	Home Visit by Politician or Party Worker	Number of Gifts	Migrant-Focused Campaigning	Perceived Campaign Intensity	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
T2 treatment	0.101 (0.058)	0.055 (0.080)	0.039 (0.039)	0.020 (0.014)	0.006 (0.046)	0.073 (0.032)
p-value (upper)	0.043	0.249	0.160	0.078	0.445	0.012
Control mean	-0.039	0.559	0.550	0.013	0.425	0.676
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,931
No. of Clusters	87	87	87	87	87	87
Adjusted $R^2$	0.056	0.049	0.033	0.012	0.004	0.012
DV values	[-0.96, 3.65]	{0, ..., 4}	{0, 1}	{0, 1, 2}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

## K Migrant voting behavior over time

Table SI20: Migrant versus non-migrant voting behavior in Delhi elections over time. Note, in some cases the reported percentages represent weighted averages based on relative population shares described in the given source.

Election	Vote choice
<b>2020 Vidhan Sabha Elections</b>  Source: Lokniti Pre-Poll Election Survey 2020 <a href="https://bit.ly/35FG4ei">bit.ly/35FG4ei</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• INC: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 4%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 5%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• BJP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 43%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 38%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• AAP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 51%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 55%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Others: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 3%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 2%</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>2015 Vidhan Sabha Elections</b>  Source: Lokniti Post-Poll Election Survey 2015 <a href="https://bit.ly/35FG4ei">bit.ly/35FG4ei</a>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• INC: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 8%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 10%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• BJP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 33%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 32%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• AAP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 55%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 55%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Others: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrants: 3%</li> <li>• Non-migrants: 3%</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>2008 Vidhan Sabha Elections</b>  Kumar, Sanjay. 2013. <i>Changing Electoral Politics in Delhi: From Caste to Class</i> . SAGE Publications India. p. 81.  Vote choice comparisons between constituencies dominated by migrants from UP/Bihar and constituencies not dominated by such migrants (“Rest”)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• INC: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrant constituencies: 36%</li> <li>• Rest: 44%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• BJP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrant constituencies: 34%</li> <li>• Rest: 37%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• BSP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrant constituencies: 19%</li> <li>• Rest: 12%</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Others: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Migrant constituencies: 11%</li> <li>• Rest: 6%</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

## L Research locations




Figure SI2: Approximate locations of the experimental sample: Delhi. Boundaries represent assembly constituency segments within the Lok Sabha constituencies in which the experiment was fielded.




Figure SI3: Approximate locations of the experimental sample: Lucknow. Boundaries represent assembly constituency segments within the Lok Sabha constituencies in which the experiment was fielded.