Political Communication

ISSN: 1058-4609 (Print) 1091-7675 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upcp20

# What Drives Political Participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age

Darren G. Lilleker & Karolina Koc-Michalska

**To cite this article:** Darren G. Lilleker & Karolina Koc-Michalska (2017) What Drives Political Participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age, Political Communication, 34:1, 21-43, DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2016.1225235

**To link to this article:** https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2016.1225235

*Political Communication*, 34:21–43, 2017

ISSN: 1058-4609 print / 1091-7675 online
DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2016.1225235

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

# What Drives Political Participation? Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age

DARREN G. LILLEKER and KAROLINA KOC-MICHALSKA

*This article provides insights into the driving forces that underpin new forms of political participation. Digital technologies offer opportunities for engaging in a wide range of civically oriented activities, each of which can contribute to deeper democratic engagement. Conventional acts of political participation are argued to be driven primarily by intrinsic motivations relating to self-efficacy and empowerment, with participants feeling they can have influence over decision makers. Little research explores whether similar motivations drive participation in less conventional acts, as well as whether mobilization attempts via social media by peers or political organizations mediate those motivations. Drawing on data from a survey among a representative sample of the U.K. electorate, we find the offline and online spheres of agency remain fairly distinct. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations both matter but extrinsic motivations have the strongest explanatory power independent of the sphere of activity. The mediating effect of mobilization tactics has a minimal effect on extrinsic motivations, online or offline, but online intrinsic motivations lose their explanatory power. As intrinsic factors offer little explanatory power, some forms of online political participation may lack meaning to the individual. Rather, these non-conventional acts result from reward seeking and are more likely to be encouraged by nongovernmental campaigning organizations, suggesting social media users are most likely to perform simple acts in support of non-contentious causes.*

**Keywords** political participation, self-determination theory, mobilization, social media

## Motivations and Mobilization in a Digital Age

Political participation can no longer be purely defined in terms of high-effort, offline acts. Political participation now covers an array of forms, which includes traditional forms, such as voting, petitioning governments, contacting elected representatives, and taking part in demonstrations, as well as non-conventional acts performed using digital technologies, which appear geared more toward expressing a view, supportive or otherwise, than influencing decision makers (de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013). Most conventional acts can be performed using digital platforms; however, social media also allows users to create or join communities which transcend state boundaries, starting or contributing to discussions, advertising support for causes, and promoting the work of a range of national

Darren G. Lilleker is Associate Professor in Political Communication, Faculty of Media & Communication, Bournemouth University. Karolina Koc-Michalska is Associate Professor at Audencia Business School, Communication & Culture Department, Nantes, France and Associated Researcher, CEVIPOF, Sciences-Po Paris.

Address correspondence to Darren G. Lilleker, Faculty of Media & Communication, Bournemouth University, Fern Barrow, Poole BH12 5BB, UK. E-mail: dlilleker@bournemouth.ac.uk

and global political organizations and campaigns. Digital technologies thus provide a range of new means for engaging in civically oriented forms of behavior.

Political organizations encourage supporters to engage in these forms of behavior via digital platforms. Political parties and nongovernmental and civil society organizations attempt to draw citizens into promoting their campaigns, harnessing their dedication to a cause or the organization (Tenscher et al., 2016). The interplay of attitudes toward a participatory act, the organization promoting that act, and beliefs and positions elicited through persuasive communication represent highly complex cognitive processes (Leighley, 1995). The complexity is increased in the digital age; a broader range of factors can heighten the propensity to participate as digital technology use can provide pathways into higher cognitive engagement (de Zúñiga et al., 2012). Little research, however, captures how stimuli received via digital technologies combine with individuals' predispositions to create the conditions for political participation.

Our research explores what motivates citizens to pursue suites of participation, specifically testing the power of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and the extent these are mediated by persuasive communication. Given the evidence showing a decline in participation in a range of forms of civic life (Martin, 2012), it is crucial to understand what stimulates citizens to perform civically oriented actions. Our research is conducted within a context when political engagement should be high. Elections are times of high politicization and evidence shows that digital technology expands the public sphere and fuels engagement (Enli & Skogerbø, 2013). The 2015 U.K. political scene, in the aftermath of the European parliamentary election (May 2014), the referendum on independence for Scotland (September 2014), and opinion polls showing deadlock between the major parties, indicates the conditions for heightened engagement. Furthermore, media attention on the continued rise of Euroscepticism, with a right-wing anti–European Union (EU) party winning most seats in the European parliament, initiated a debate on the United Kingdom's membership in the EU. Controversy also surrounded the nature of the devolution settlement for Scotland following the close victory for the "No" campaign and subsequent debates over parity among the four U.K. nations. Speculation about the election outcome, and a high chance of protracted coalition negotiations, meant voter turnout was predicted to be high. While an unusual set of circumstances, the predicted high engagement offered an opportunity to gather data, drawn from a representative survey of U.K. citizens, to understand the extent of, and motivations for, conventional and nonconventional participation. We proceed to conceptualize motivations and mobilization prior to providing details on the methodology, presenting and analyzing data and offering pointers for further research.

## Intrinsic Motivations

Motivations represent the interplay between personal attitudes toward a specific action and external persuasion (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Intrinsic motivations hinge upon personal attitudes which provide hedonic evaluations of actions assessing, for example, whether an act is enjoyable and personally satisfying (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). People, self-determination theory suggests, are behaviorally self-regulating. When there is freedom of choice, people pursue activities perceived or experienced to be personally useful or valuable. Studies have shown even apparently altruistic behavior can be explained partially or fully through selfish motivations (Barasch, Levine, Berman, & Small, 2014); for example, political activists' dominant motivations are intrinsic: seeking enjoyment, self-realization and personal well-being (Klar & Kasser, 2009).

Hence, based on work using the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI), we argue that underlying predispositions to behaviors are powerful for explaining the likelihood of performing an action and this is particularly the case when combined with confirmatory experience-based data (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; McAuley, Duncan, & Tammen, 1989; Plant & Ryan, 1985).

Intrinsic motivations lead to the formation of patterns of behavior which can be reinforced through the use of digital technologies (Garrity, O'Donnell, & Sanders, 2007). Technology offers complementarity: strengthening commitment by providing further means to pursue favored forms of activity (Dutta-Bergman, 2006). The reinforcement and complementarity theses suggest intrinsic motivations are key drivers of behavior, but studies often find mixed results in particular when studying behavior facilitated by digital technology (Nam, 2012).

## Extrinsic Motivations

Extrinsic motivations suggest people in reality have lower levels of freedom of choice. When behavior is conspicuous, people internalize the attitudes of others, conforming to social norms when making behavioral decisions. The alternative dimension to the notion of behavior driven by selfish motives offered by self-determination theory suggests people seek approval and rewards from others (Deci, 1971). Experimental research has showed the greater the reward, perceived or actual, predicted higher likelihood of action (Deci et al., 1999), including gaining encouragement (Vallerand & Lalande, 2011), positive feedback (Greenwald, 1982), and approval from peers (Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992). Hence, communal (Omoto, Snyder, & Hackett, 2010) or prosocial (Grant, 2008) motivations are important in explaining civic engagement as behavioral self-regulation becomes diminished and behavior conforms to observed norms (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), when there is direct incentive (Deci et al., 1999).

Ryan and Deci (2000a) recognize that where there are combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (e.g., when an expectation of rewards makes a task personally enjoyable and fulfilling), action is more likely. Degli-Antoni (2009) found volunteers seek to have a positive effect on others through their efforts, and feel self-fulfilled (intrinsic motivations); however, they are also motivated by gaining recognition from peers and earning social capital (extrinsic motivations). Therefore, differing actions may elide with differing levels of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, but each type of motivation impacts upon the other, and an individual will most likely perform an action when he or she has strong intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. While research consistently shows behavior is driven by underlying positive predispositions, which underpin the formation of intrinsic motivations, intrinsic motivations are also shown to be positively correlated with extrinsic motivations, suggesting that expecting or receiving awards contributes to further strengthening intrinsic motivations (Gonzalez-DeHass, Willems, & Holbein, 2005; Gottfried, Fleming, & Gottfried, 1994). Hence, we argue the following in the context of political participation:

*H1:* Regardless of the form or sphere of participation we will find a complementary influence from both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on political participation regardless of other explanatory factors.

## Offline Versus Online Participation

Studies over the past two decades have largely treated online and offline as distinct spheres of activity, and while research has found extremely politically active citizens participate in conventional and non-conventional forms of activity within offline and digital environments, the majority of studies suggest the existence of participation patterns taking place within one single sphere (de Zúñiga & Valenzuela, 2011; Polat, 2005; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). This article adheres to the argument that "a distinction between online and offline political activity should be maintained" (Vissers & Stolle, 2014, p. 950). The distinction chimes with suggestions that online mobilization leads only to online participation, actions some dismiss as shallow and effortless (Morozov, 2012). Indeed, research consistently shows online mobilization has lower, if not minimal, effects on encouraging offline forms of participation (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). U.K. research reinforces this argument (Di Gennaro & Dutton, 2006; Ward, Gibson, & Lusoli, 2003), although more complex suites of participation exist when online and offline spheres are bridged (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013). Studies show some online forms of political engagement, such as online information seeking (de Zúñiga et al., 2012) and goal-oriented forum use (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013), positively predict online and offline participation.

The motivations underpinning forms of participation in online or offline spheres have not received significant attention. The traditional view of offline political participation, geared toward personal fulfillment through exacting political change (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), suggests intrinsic motivations have the greater explanatory power. We therefore hypothesize the following:

*H2a:* Intrinsic motivations will have greater explanatory power over participation occurring within the offline sphere (as this involves greater effort, resources, and planning, so personal attitudes toward the action and its outcomes will dominate).

Research on behavior within online environments suggests extrinsic motivations may have primacy. Studies find those who join Facebook communities do so predominantly to socialize and enhance their reputation among peers (Park, Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009). Similarly, whatever the subject matter, interaction within communities is undertaken in pursuit of social capital (McClurg, 2003). The primary motivations of bloggers, for example, are to influence others and build a reputation (Ekdale, Namkoong, Fung, & Perlmutter, 2010). These findings suggest behavior is driven by expectations of rewards and incentives would act as an important behavioral cue (Kriesi, 2008). We therefore argue the following:

*H2b:* Extrinsic motivations will have greater explanatory power over participation occurring within the online sphere (as action and social reward can occur almost simultaneously).

## Mobilization Tactics and Political Participation

The extent to which people become motivated through peer-to-peer encouragement or the mobilization strategies pursued by political organizations via digital technologies is an issue of debate. The mobilization thesis argues that access to digital technologies has the capacity to draw new participants into civic life (Stanley & Weare, 2004), particularly

among younger citizens (Hirzalla, Van Zoonen, & de Ridder, 2010). Certain social media usage for news gathering or social interaction encourages the growth of diverse networks, and belonging to a diverse network leads to regulation of behavior in order to maintain one's position within that network. Hence, being part of a network in turn leads to persuasion through exposure (Anderson & Tverdova, 2001). Therefore, testing for the mediation of motivations by exposure to mobilization is important for understanding the dynamics of behavior.

In the context of the lead-up to an election, understanding the power of the mobilization thesis is particularly important. Research on election campaigns (Lilleker, 2013) and the campaigns of civic society organizations (Enjolras, Steen-Johnsen, & Wollebæk, 2013; Guo & Saxton, 2014) shows political parties and campaign organizations build community spaces, encourage supporters to join those spaces, and then seek to mobilize those supporters to perform actions to benefit the organization and its campaign. Social media has become a significant battleground for all political organizations, in particular civic society organizations (Asencio & Sun, 2015). Within the context of U.K. politics, organizations seek to persuade citizens to support the organization, join its campaigns, and provide financial and physical resources (Fisher, Fieldhouse, & Cutts, 2014). Mobilization attempts are highly strategic (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993) and have accelerated significantly as a result of the widespread adoption of social media (Vaccari, 2013). Organizations not only seek to mobilize supporters directly, but also encourage existing activists to accelerate their reach within digital networks. The revised two-step flow model (Norris & Curtice, 2008) demonstrates organizations utilize the affordances of social media to mobilize supporters to, in turn, persuade and mobilize their followers.

Social media allows any user to play the role of activist, even on a single occasion; they can post content about a political cause or issue, be it their own content, content from other users, content from media, or content from political organizations. The role they play may be purely the product of intrinsic motivations, self-fulfillment, and for entertainment, or it might be to conform to social norms and receive rewards. Equally, these social media activists may be drawn more by receiving encouragement, which provides an outlet to satisfy their underlying predispositions. Predispositions enable activation as they provide the "manifest political potential" (Kriesi, 1985) that makes the individual susceptible to being mobilized (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Each action taken on social media can, in turn, have a mobilizing impact on others within an online network (de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014). Theocharis (2015) uses the term *digitally networked participation* to describe individuals attempting to mobilize their networks for political purposes. The effectiveness of differing mobilization practices and their relationship to the underlying motivations is, however, largely unknown.

Social media also facilitates accidental exposure to news and political content and permits all users to publicly show their agreement or disagreement through posting content and commenting. In terms of Facebook's likes and shares or Twitter's retweet function, this can involve nothing more than a single click. However, organizations and peers can also share invitations to demonstrations, to sign petitions, or to get more involved in a campaign. Exposure to political content from peers or directly from organizations or activists predicts both online and offline participation, although viewing content shared by peers is a stronger predictor of online participation, while direct communication from an organization predicts online and offline participation (Tang & Lee, 2013). These findings build upon studies which have shown accidental exposure to news can lead to a heightened propensity to be civically engaged (de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Kim, Chen, & de Zúñiga, 2013) and at the very least can reduce gaps in the

levels of interest and engagement (Valeriani & Vaccari, 2015). Social pressure, applied by peers via social media, to act in a certain way is equally seen as a predictor of participation, in particular when an action is seen to have broader societal benefits (Panagopoulos, 2013) and applied via "specific networks of informal sociability" (Lowndes, 2004, p. 61). Studies of the effects of social media usage on the propensity to participate from different perspectives arrive at contrasting results ranging from strong to adverse effects (Theocharis & Lowe, 2015). Some studies highlight that the form of social media usage matters—for example, positive experiences from engaging in issue-specific activism increase the propensity to participate further (Vraga, Anderson, Kotcher, & Maibach, 2015)—while others suggest it is the composition of an individual's network (Lupton, Singh, & Thornton, 2014), its size, interactive dynamics, and heterogeneity (Huckfeldt, 2014). The inconsistent results demonstrate the importance of asking about a range of participatory actions, their motivations, and the forms of mobilization received in order to fully distinguish what forms of mobilization stimulate which motivations. We therefore hypothesize the following:

*H3a:* The predictive strength of intrinsic motivations will not be mediated by the mobilization from political parties, non-electoral organizations, and peers.

*H3b:* The predictive strength of extrinsic motivations will be mediated by mobilization from political parties, non-electoral organizations, and peers.

## Measuring the Relationship between Motivations and Mobilization

Attitudes, built around underlying predispositions—in particular those underpinning internal efficacy (the means to affect a system) and external efficacy (the system can be affected)—are argued to be the key drivers of a propensity to participate and the mode of participation. Therefore, within classic studies of political participation (for discussion see Anderson & Tverdova, 2001), there is a clear model of a hierarchy of effect. Research on a broader range of human behaviors also suggests that underlying dispositions, regarding attitudes to an action and how others perceive you if you act a certain way, are proven to be strong predictors of behavior, especially when the underlying attitudes are proven through experience (Ajzen, 2011). Equally, underlying dispositions, combined with perceptions of the potential for gaining a desired outcome, are shown consistently to be strong predictors of behavior in a range of contexts (Chen & Tung, 2014; Friese, Smith, Koever, & Bluemke, 2016). Yet, while motivation can predict willingness to participate, willingness is a necessary but insufficient condition of participation. In other words, motivations need channelling and any action needs to inform potential participants that the action can be undertaken and may fulfill needs which satisfy their motivations (Chen & Tung, 2014). Acts of mobilization involve the activation of individuals who have the motivations and predispositions to support a movement's goals and perform the prescribed activity (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).

It is impossible, even under experimental conditions, to capture every potential variable. However, following research using IMI and the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), it is possible to capture underlying predispositions as well as behavioral data and examine whether there is internal consistency (Deci et al., 1999). Indeed, researchers have long measured motivations

through some combination of observable cognitive (e.g., recall, perception), affective (e.g., subjective experience), behavioral (e.g., performance), and physiological (e.g., brain activation) responses alongside using self-reports (Touré-Tillery & Fishbach, 2014, p. 328). The latter researchers argue that motivation can only be measured accurately by the degree of which an action is evaluated positively, using explicit measures (p. 330). In highlighting that self-reports are a valid means by which researchers can learn about psychological motivations,they support the notion that, when understanding real-world behavior as opposed to behavior under laboratory conditions, it is perfectly adequate to measure motivations and behavior through self-reports as the two are fundamentally interlinked and self-reinforcing through experience. Following the tradition of IMI research, we argue the values of motivational variables at the time of a survey were similar to their values before the individuals actually took part in (or abstained from) action (Pierce & Converse, 1990). While motivational responses may be higher due to having experience-based data, what we capture is the mutually reinforcing relationship between organizational activities and participation in collective action (Finkel & Muller, 1998). Therefore, a survey that records participation, the underlying motivations relating to that action, as well as the extent to which encouragement has been received allows us to build a picture of how motivations and encouragement interact to drive behavior.

## Methodology

There is a general lack of data on the motivations driving political participation and the mediation of motivations by encouragement via social media. We ran an online survey with Opinium Research on a United Kingdom representative sample of 18+-year-olds ($N = 1982$). The survey was conducted one month prior to the start of the six-week 2015 parliamentary election campaign of February 24—27, 2015. The questionnaire was sent out to a stratified sample of those registered on the Opinium Research database (40,000 e-mails), and the stratification (by age, gender, region, and social class) was used to ensure representativeness. The computer-assisted web interviewing method was employed among a non-probability, stratified sample with a participation rate (American Association for Public Opinion Research [AAPOR] Task Force, 2010) of 28.6% (2,037 out of 7,126 invitations sent).

## Dependent Variables

Following Quintelier and Vissers (2008) and Vissers and Stolle (2014), as well as given that our respondents' reported behavior map to two distinct suites, we use the spheres of activity, offline or online, as a dependent variable to ascertain what differences can be found between motivations within the offline and online environments.

The index of offline and online political activities is based on questions asking if in the past 12 months participants have performed any of the following: [offline] "boycotted a company or product" (18%), "joined/rejoined a political party" (6%), "contacted an elected representative" (16%), "taken part in a demonstration" (6.6%); [online] "commented about politics on social media" (16%), "followed a political nongovernmental political organization or charity on social media (SM)" (14%), "shared political content on SM" (12%), "followed political party/Member of Parliament/candidate on SM" (10%). Furthermore, based on confirmatory factor analysis coefficients (Table 1), the questions were recoded into

two indexes: offline political participation α = .782 (*M* = .47, *SD* = .89) and online political participation α = .714 (*M* = .51, *SD* = .89).

## Independent Variables

### *Motivations*

For each of the political activities respondents indicated the level (0 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree) to which motivations are driving their participation. Two indices were created drawing on the theory of reasoned action (Madden et al., 1992) which highlight the importance of behavioral beliefs (underpinning intrinsic motivations) and normative beliefs (underpinning extrinsic motivations). Our survey questions were adapted for the political participation context based on procedures developed by Ajzen.[1]

The Intrinsic Motivation Index (IMI) is based on a combination of feeling good, having a positive self-image, and feelings of self-efficacy factors which contribute to self-satisfaction (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). The following items were evaluated for each political activity:

"I personally feel good taking part in this activity"; "I feel that this activity is the sort of thing that my friends and family would respect me for"; "I feel I can influence others"; "I feel I can influence policymakers."

The Extrinsic Motivation Index (EMI) ("Others benefit from people like me taking part in this activity"; "A number of my friends are also taking part in this activity"; "I feel inspired by my friends to take part in this activity") links to the instrumentalist nature of these motivations being concerned with benefiting others as well as expecting rewards through conforming with norms prevailing within peer networks (Deci, 1971). Indexes were calculated separately for offline and online participation: IMI for offline activities (16 items, range 0–64, α = .963, *M* = 27.4, *SD* = 16.5); IMI for online activities (16 items, range 0–64, α = .975, *M* = 23.6, *SD* = 17); EMI for offline activities (12 items, range 0–48, α = .946, *M* = 18.6, *SD* = 11.9); EMI for online activities (12 items, range 0–48, α = .961, *M* = 17.2, *SD* = 12.6).

### *Mobilization*

Participants reported the frequency (0 = never to 4 = frequently) of encountering the following: "I see friends sharing and linking content on social media" or "I received encouragement via social media from friends to like or join political campaigns" (*M* = 2.49, *SD* = 2.53, max = 8); "I received encouragement via social media from political parties to like or join their campaigns" (*M* = 1.08, *SD* = 1.3, max = 4); "I received encouragement via social media from a campaign organization to like or join their campaigns" (*M* = 1.25, *SD* = 1.4, max = 4). We asked these as general questions to examine if mobilization had occurred, as recall for mobilization around any one specific action may be lower.

## Control Variables

### *Sociodemographic Variables*

We report the following sociodemographic variables: *gender*, with female (reference group) at 53%; *age* (continuous variable; *M* = 46.4, *SD* = 16.3); *education*, measured as a dummy variable for those with university education (46%) and with lower than

university education (54%, reference group); *social grade* (ordered variable), measured according to National Readership Survey index (A 11%, B 26%, C1 30%, C2 12%, D 9%, E 12%); *employment*, dummy, those being fully or partially employed (66%; otherwise is a reference group).

### *Political Variables*

*Party identification* is measured by whether respondents could state a clear voting intention. Given that the campaign had not started and the election was three months later, this provides a sense of partisan attachment. Party identification was a dummy variable with 1 = having party identity (73%; otherwise is a reference group); *political discussion* was measured as a dummy variable for those discussing politics with friends or family (51%; otherwise is a reference group), and this is also used as a proxy for political interest.

## Results

### *Modeling Offline and Online Political Participation*

In order to understand the roles intrinsic and extrinsic motivations have, as well as the mediating role of mobilization attempts sent via social media by political parties, campaigning organizations, and friends, regressions and path analyses were run separately for different participatory patterns. The offline and online participatory indexes are presented in models without mobilization effects (Models A) and with mobilization effects (Models B).

The data from regression analysis show that demographic characteristics have differential effects for explaining offline and online participatory patterns. Education remains a strong predictor, regardless of the participatory activities or mediation by encouragement, with those being more educated also engaging more. Gender is a significant explanatory characteristic for online activities only (males being marginally more active $\beta_{RA(\text{regression model A})} = .067$, $p < .05$). The gender effect is mediated, however, by mobilization. When we take into account being encouraged to act online, the gender gap diminishes. This finding suggests males are slightly more likely to engage in political participation, but females may be more likely to be mobilized by encouragement via social media. As expected, age has differing impacts depending on whether participation is offline or online; older respondents are definitely more likely to engage in traditional offline activities ($\beta_{RA} = .004$, $p < .05$). Surprisingly, the effect is even stronger when mobilized via social media ($\beta_{RB} = .006$ $p < .000$). Age has no statistically significant impact on online participation. This suggests that, first, young people are more eager to engage online than offline, but also that age-related differences visible in earlier studies (Martin, 2012), most probably due to a generational digital divide, have diminished. The diminishing age gap may result from the greater ease of participating in online forms of political activism. Those from a lower social class tend to be less likely to engage in offline participation ($\beta_{RA} = –.027$, $p < .05$), and the gap remains regardless of the source of mobilization. As for online participation, social class is not significant in Model A; however, in Model B encouragement via social media appears to indicate that lower-class citizens can be mobilized into political participation online ($\beta_{RB} = .021$, $p = .07$). As could be expected, political variables play statistically significant and positive roles on participation rates regardless of the form of participation and independent of mediation by receiving encouragement.

**Table 1**
Regressions analysis for offline and online political participation

| | Offline Model A | | Offline Model B | | Online Model A | | Online Model B | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Socioeconomic status | | | | | | | | |
| Gender | –.017 | | –.031 | | .067 | * | .048 | |
| Age | .003 | ** | .006 | *** | –.000 | | .001 | |
| University grade | .174 | *** | .155 | *** | .171 | *** | .145 | *** |
| Social grade | –.027 | ** | –.025 | ** | .019 | | .021 | † |
| Employed | .034 | | .015 | | –.014 | | –.035 | |
| Political variables | | | | | | | | |
| Party proximity | .196 | *** | .153 | *** | .164 | *** | .134 | *** |
| Discuss politics | .371 | *** | .344 | *** | .451 | *** | .401 | *** |
| Motivations | | | | | | | | |
| Intrinsic | .010 | *** | .006 | ** | .007 | ** | .001 | |
| Extrinsic | .018 | *** | .011 | *** | .019 | *** | .012 | *** |
| SM Encouragement | | | | | | | | |
| From political party | | | .049 | ** | | | .018 | |
| From campaign organization | | | .120 | *** | | | .206 | *** |
| From friends | | | .026 | | | | .003 | |
| *Constant* | –.626 | *** | –.673 | *** | –.505 | *** | –.526 | *** |
| *Adj* $R^2$ | .332 | | .377 | | .298 | | .362 | |

*Notes*. SM = social media. OLS regression (robustness check by Poisson and negative binomial model: with the difference only for social grade being not statistically significant). VIF: offline A 1.50; offline B 1.61; online A 1.43; online B 1.57. Sample size $N$ = 1,982.

†< .1. * $p$ < .05. ** $p$ < .01. *** $p$ < .001. VIF: offline A 1.50; offline B 1.61; online A 1.43; online B 1.57.

We find interesting contrasts when exploring the explanatory power motivations. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations both have positive explanatory power for offline political participation, but extrinsic motivations appear dominant. This is contrary to expectations. However, when focusing on online forms of political participation our expectations are confirmed by the significantly higher explanatory power of extrinsic motivations. But when mobilization factors are included, the significance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations diminishes, and intrinsic motivations for online political participation become insignificant. We suggest, therefore, that while intrinsic and extrinsic motivations play a role they are mediated by mobilization, in particular mobilization received from campaign organizations. The explanatory power of party proximity, although significant across all models, may suggest parties are one factor, but not the most important factor, for encouraging participation even in the lead-up to a major national election.

H1 suggests there should be a positive effect on participation from individuals' motivations, regardless of whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic. However, previous studies suggest intrinsic motivations should be stronger at least for offline forms of political participation (H2). One may assume that self-efficacy or a feeling that individuals' actions may influence policy or other citizens (IMI) or a feeling of group belonging and collective (connective) actions (EMI) have a positive effect on engaging, regardless of any other variables. Furthermore, our assumption was that forms of mobilization received from any actor (peers [social media friends] or organizations [political party, campaigning organization]) should have mediating power on the participation. Thus we claim that the complementary effect of mediation, with statistically significant direct and indirect effects of motivations without/with encouragement, should exist (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Our data only partially confirm these hypotheses and complementary assumptions.

We find a stable, statistically significant, positive, and only slightly mediated effect from extrinsic motivations on any forms of political participation ($\beta_{RA} = .019$, $\beta_{RB} = .012$, $p < .000$ for offline and $\beta_{RA} = .019$, $\beta_{RB} = .012$, $p < .001$ for online). The result is strong regardless of whether participation takes place within an offline or online sphere, confirming H2b, and showing the importance of extrinsic motivations for driving online participatory actions. On the contrary, intrinsic motivations have more complex effects, being positive for offline participation ($\beta_{RA} = .010$, $\beta_{RB} = .007$, $p < .001$) but being completely mediated by social media mobilization for online participation ($\beta_{RA} = .007$, $p < .01$). Post-estimation tests indicate ($F[1,1972] = 2.92$ for offline and $F = 3.52$ for online) significantly stronger effects of extrinsic motivations over intrinsic motivations (in both Models A). They remain significant for online participation but become non-significant for the offline participation (Model B). H1 is thus only partially confirmed, as extrinsic motivations remain stable for both online and offline participation regardless of other factors but intrinsic motivations lose their explanatory power for online activities once mediated by mobilization efforts. H2a is not confirmed as it is extrinsic motivations, for both offline and online sphere, which have a greater explanatory power (H2b).

The path analysis (Figures 1 and 2) offers a somewhat different perspective of the interplay between motivations and mobilization factors.Again the higher explanatory power of extrinsic motivations is borne out, with intrinsic motivations for online forms of participation lacking significance while mediated (this refutes H3a). Therefore it appears that across all forms of political participation, people seek approval from others (in line with H3b) rather than personal fulfillment. Feelings of personal efficacy or "feeling good" are less significant in explaining online political engagement than "group belonging" incentives.




**Figure 1.** Path analysis of the motivations and encouragements on offline political participation. *Notes*. SM = social media. Path entries are standardized SEM coefficients (β) *** $p < .001$, * $p < .1$, based on two-tailed Sobel test, bootstrap at a level of 2,000 iterations. The model controls for effects of sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, social class, employment, education) on exogenous and endogenous variables. Model goodness of fit: CMIN/DF = 3.000; CFI = .998; RMSEA = .032; PCLOSE = .994. $R^2_{\text{offline participation}} = .34$. Sample size $N = 1{,}982$.




**Figure 2.** Path analysis of the motivations and encouragements on online political participation. *Note*. Path entries are standardized SEM coefficients (β) *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .05$, based on two-tailed Sobel test, bootstrap at a level of 5,000 iterations. The model controls for effects of sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, social class, employment, education) on exogenous and endogenous variables. Model goodness of fit: CMIN/DF = 3.655; CFI = .997; RMSEA = .037; PCLOSE = .968. $R^2_{\text{online participation}} = .31$. Sample size $N = 1{,}982$.

### *Social Media Mobilization*

Comparing the simple average of the mobilization messages received by those who decided to engage (even in one, regardless of which, sphere of political activity) to those who remained passive, we see that on average those participating were twice as

likely to have received encouragement (for passive: messages received from parties $M$ = .68, from campaigning organization $M$ = .77, from peers $M$ = .83; for active: messages received from parties $M$ = 1.74, from campaigning organization $M$ = 2.03, from peers $M$ = 1.92).[2] The data on the potential effect of mobilization via social media show campaigning organizations' messages have the strongest effects on both offline ($\beta_P$ = .210, $p$ < .000) and online ($\beta_P$ = .330, $p$ < .000) activities. Although with significantly lower impact, peers seem to have minimal influence on both activities ($\beta_P$ = .059, $p$ < .1 for offline and $\beta_P$ = .098, $p$ < .05 for online). Surprisingly, encouragement received through social media from political parties has a weak, almost non-significant, positive effect ($\beta_P$ = .057, $p$ = .096) on offline participation, while the effect is statistically non-significant for online participation (with a negative direction).

We would argue that different sources have differing levels of mediation, with campaigning organizations having a solid and stable effect. One might explain the differential influence levels by variances in the ties social media users have with political parties, campaign organizations, and friends. We assume that to receive encouragement from any social media actors one needs to be connected into their network directly or via friends. It seems to be rare (with the exception for some specific cases; e.g., journalists, partisans, or potential trolls) that the average citizen would connect via social media (providing an endorsement and giving the organization permission to contact them as well as being able to interact with the organization's profile through likes, shares, or comments) with organizations that she or he is not supporting (thus one may visit contra-ideological groups without leaving any trace of such visits).

As for political party activists, they represent a small minority and party encouragements only circulate within bounded and homogeneous networks. While within the context of an election party communication might be visible outside these networks, non-activists may be unwilling to engage because their network is largely nonpartisan and so partisan material may be perceived as unacceptable (Matthes, 2013). Furthermore, political parties may focus more on encouraging offline forms of participation, especially leading up to an election campaign, such as encouraging supporters to join the party. Conversely, we know U.K. parties encourage sharing, if not debating (Lilleker, 2013), but their networks and particularly the number of activists in their networks are no more than 7,000 individuals (Lilleker, 2016). Therefore, parties may lack the reach of campaign organizations as parties may have lower numbers of committed supporters. Alternatively, it is possible low trust in political parties mediates the effect of their communication. On the contrary, non-partisan campaigns are less divisive, they are trusted, and they attempt to build broad communities to participate in online deliberation (commenting) or viral marketing (following or sharing) (Asencio & Sun, 2015). As a consequence, campaign organizations gain visibility through sharing (Stefanone et al., 2012) using mobilization tactics and perhaps providing stronger affirmation for the motivations of potential participants (see Figure 3 for full data).

The weaker mediating power of encouragement received from social media friends is surprising (Bond et al., 2012); however, it may be explained by the fact that social media users inhabit fairly heterogeneous communities, where one can be friends regardless of levels of agreement on political issues, even though unfriending during a public opinion flashpoint is an emerging phenomenon (John & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2015). Therefore, while one may see countervailing political messages, unless there is strong trust that disagreeing will not end the friendship or lead to hostility, such encouragement is more likely to be ignored (Matthes, 2013). Furthermore, if the network is highly heterogeneous, friends may simultaneously send conflicting political messages thus neutralizing one another; as a

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intrinsic motivations | | Direct no mediator | → | Offline political participation | .258*** |
| | | Direct with mediator | → | | .180*** |
| | → | SM Party | → | | .010*** |
| | → | SM Organization | → | | .059*** |
| | → | SM Friends | → | | .012*** |
| Extrinsic motivations | | Direct no mediator | → | | .239*** |
| | | Direct with mediator | → | | .138*** |
| | → | SM Party | → | | .022** |
| | → | SM Organization | → | | .061*** |
| | → | SM Friends | → | | .022*** |
| Intrinsic motivations | | Direct no mediator | → | Online political participation | .168*** |
| | | Direct with mediator | → | | .032 |
| | → | SM Party | → | | -.004 |
| | → | SM Organization | → | | .115*** |
| | → | SM Friends | → | | .027*** |
| Extrinsic motivations | | Direct no mediator | → | | .285*** |
| | | Direct with mediator | → | | .157*** |
| | → | SM Party | → | | -.004 |
| | → | SM Organization | → | | .098*** |
| | → | SM Friends | → | | .040*** |

**Figure 3.** Effects of motivations and mobilization via social media on political participation. *Notes*. SM = social media. Standardized regression coefficient multiplied by the effect of independent variable on mediator and mediator on dependent variable, with the exception for "no mediation" coefficient. Sample size $N$ = 1,982. Sobel test of significance for indirect effects, ** $p < .05$, *** $p > .001$, two-tailed.

consequence friends' encouragements may have a lesser impact on political activity (de Zúñiga et al., 2012).

Given the complexity, it is impossible to test for all variables. However, regardless of the causes, the weak or nonexistent power of political parties in encouraging political participation confirms the complex relationships among social media users, their intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, and those who seek to spur them to action via social media.

## Discussion

Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, as previous studies suggest, play a complex role in influencing decisions to participate (Madden et al., 1992; Ryan & Deci, 2000a). However, within a U.K. political context it appears extrinsic motivations predominate (Grant, 2008; Omoto et al., 2010). Consistent with H1, regardless of the form or sphere of participation, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations combined exert a positive influence on political participation. However, contrary to H2, we did not identify different motivations within the different spheres; rather, we found extrinsic motivations were the most significant drivers of participation regardless of the sphere. Political activism is conducted to benefit others as well as to receive rewards and recognition (Degli-Antoni, 2009). In many ways this is logical, as it suggests politics is a prosocial activity driven by a desire to have an impact as well as gaining rewards and recognition. Therefore, political participation might elicit positive feelings that lead to stronger intrinsic motivations; however, extrinsic motivations have the greater explanatory power. Furthermore, while there is an indication that offline political participation is likely to be influenced by both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, online participation may be motivated primarily by seeking acceptance from other online users. But, gaining recognition through adherence to behavioral norms may well contribute to stronger intrinsic motivations that underpin a propensity to participate further.

Although the question posed on receiving encouragement was general rather than specific to an action, and so participation might not directly result from receiving encouragement, its explanatory power is striking. Arguably, campaign organizations are most successful in using social media to offer the incentives most likely to mobilize their supporters. Through building communities they may inculcate positive motivations so when they invite the online community to act they are most successful in gaining positive responses. The persuasive power of campaign organizations may also result from their constant communication with supporters, unlike parties who are most active during elections and peers who may be sporadically politically active. However, at the point of acting online, the most important consideration may be whether the action fits to the norms of behavior within a network; offline involves also seeking self-fulfillment as well as gaining recognition.

The data overall suggest the online and offline spheres may not be as different as some expect (Vissers & Stolle, 2014). Participation in both spheres is best explained by extrinsic motivational factors, although offline participation is more self-fulfilling while online participation appears more driven by conforming and earning rewards. Rewards, however, offer fulfillment, suggesting a strong link between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). However, the fact that extrinsic motivations have greater explanatory power over online participation suggests some behavior is simple clicktivism: behavior resulting from mobilization but having little personal significance. The data suggest mobilization tactics, especially pursued by campaign organizations, have some mediating effect on political participation online. Social media users may follow cues, such as a like from members of their network, providing they feel the message will resonate with those who follow them (Deci et al., 1999; Vallerand & Lalande, 2011). This finding supports H3b, though most clearly when mediated by campaign organizations.

Campaign organizations do not simply reinforce extrinsic motivations for online political participation, however. Without in-depth research among individuals or a longitudinal panel study it is impossible to determine whether mobilization strategies over time have a cumulative impact on the propensity to act. However, what our data may give an indication of is that campaign organizations not only encourage actions that spread their message but they can also encourage the belief that any supportive action can simultaneously have a positive impact within the real world as well as on the individual through earning recognition and rewards. Hence, messages that provide extrinsic motivations to act might, longer term, and through the process of taking part in a collective action, contribute to strengthening intrinsic motivations by making participants feel good about themselves and gain a greater sense of self-efficacy (Vraga et al., 2015). Therefore, campaign organizations have the propensity to channel the enthusiasm of the committed while also recruiting participants with low motivations who may be encouraged to act through accidental exposure. But both committed and single click-based groups may be spurred into pursuing a broader and deeper suite of participation that may lead to a deeper commitment to civically oriented activity. Social media provides a space for organizations to communicate to a wide community, attract users to their communities, and encourage actions; it also provides a space where users can dabble in activism. Our data suggest that a combination of underlying predispositions which drive intrinsic motivations, bolstered by a strong expectation of gaining rewards, when incentivized via social media, can provide a pathway into civic participation, but in the battle for hearts and action, campaign organizations have the edge in providing this pathway.

## Limitations

As with any study based on a single-country, cross-sectional survey, while there was a vibrant political culture in the lead-up to the 2015 general election and significant debates surrounding the future of the union of nations, the relationship with the European Union, and the best way to ameliorate the long-lasting effects of the global recession, there are limits to the generalizability for other countries. A panel study would be required in order to control for pure causal effects and the temporal consistency of motivations and mobilization effects on political participation. The political context may also have led to somewhat higher levels of engagement, as well as higher levels of encouragement from a range of organizations and actors which might not be witnessed during a non-election period, especially from electoral organizations. Therefore, we might suggest that some findings are exaggerated or that encouragement from friends via social media, in non-electoral periods, may play a more important role. In other words, there are a number of communication and context variables that cannot be controlled for but which might impact on the results.

The survey, following the IMI tradition, was also designed to ask about the respondents' motivations for each individual form of participation. This produces two limitations. First is the lack of a general question regarding the likelihood to participate regardless of the activity (so measuring holistically the propensity to be active). Second, given that the survey measured motivations for each individual action, when aggregated we lose the individual context of the data where any given action may have unique drivers. However, the consistency of results suggests we provide unique insights into the relationships among motivations, mobilization strategies, and behavior, which can form the basis for further research (Touré-Tillery & Fishbach, 2014).

A more sophisticated question for future research relates to the receipt of encouragement from other means beyond social media as well as other control variables (e.g., size or heterogeneity of the network). It was impossible to conceive of all the means by which campaign organizations, political parties, or friends are able to interact with citizens in an attempt to mobilize them. We thus focused entirely on social media in this project, but with the understanding that any participation not explained by these forms of encouragement could arrive from other sources. Equally, even when considering social media as a prime route for persuasive communication, it may be the case that the relative homogeneity of the networks individuals inhabit may be a moderating factor on whether communication, in particular from friends, has a significant effect. However, overall, we find some interesting suggested routes to participation and indications of the power of differing sets of motivations. In particular, the significance of the direct motivational pathways to participation may indicate that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are strong predictors of political participation. If these findings appear controversial it is necessary to conduct further research to focus on these and other mediating factors, drawing on broader psychosocial perspectives (Klöckner, 2013) in order to provide even more holistic explanations for the variety of forms of political participation facilitated in the 21st century.

## Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their time and dedication. Their feedback resulted in a much enhanced article.

## Supplemental Material

Supplemental data for this article is available on the publisher's website at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2016.1225235.

## Notes

1. http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.html
2. For correlation and the motivational predisposition on receiving higher levels of mobilization incentives through social media, please see Table 2, 3, and 4 in Appendix.

## References

AAPOR Task Force. (2010). Report of the AAPOR Task Force on Nonprobability Sampling. Retrieved from https://www.aapor.org/AAPOR_Main/media/MainSiteFiles/NPS_TF_Report_Final_7_revised_FNL_6_22_13.pdf

Ajzen, I. (2011). The theory of planned behaviour: Reactions and reflections. *Psychology & Health*, *26*(9), 1113–1127. doi:10.1080/08870446.2011.613995

Anderson, C. J., & Tverdova, Y. V. (2001). Winners, losers, and attitudes about government in contemporary democracies. *International Political Science Review*, *22*(4), 321–338. doi:10.1177/0192512101022004003

Asencio, H., & Sun, R. (2015). *Cases on strategic social media utilization in the nonprofit sector*. Hershey, PA: IGI Global.

Barasch, A., Levine, E. E., Berman, J. Z., & Small, D. A. (2014). Selfish or selfless? On the signal value of emotion in altruistic behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *107*(3), 393–413. doi:10.1037/a0037207

Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., & Fowler, J. H. (2012). A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization. *Nature*, *489*(7415), 295–298.

Chen, M. F., & Tung, P. J. (2014). Developing an extended theory of planned behavior model to predict consumers' intention to visit green hotels. *International Journal of Hospitality Management*, *36*(2), 221–230. doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2013.09.006

Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *18*(1), 105–115. doi:10.1037/h0030644

Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. *Psychological Bulletin*, *125*(6), 627–668. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627

Degli-Antoni, G. (2009). Intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivations to volunteer and social capital formation. *Kyklos: Jahrbuch des Instituts fur Geschichte der Medizin an der Universitat Leipzig*, *62*(3), 359–370. doi:10.1111/kykl.2009.62.issue-3

de Zúñiga, H. G., Jung, N., & Valenzuela, S. (2012). Social media use for news and individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *17*(3), 319–336. doi:10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01574.x

de Zúñiga, H. G., Molyneux, L., & Zheng, P. (2014). Social media, political expression, and political participation: Panel analysis of lagged and concurrent relationships. *Journal of Communication*, *64*(4), 612–634. doi:10.1111/jcom.12103

de Zúñiga, H. G., & Valenzuela, S. (2011). The mediating path to a stronger citizenship: Online and offline networks, weak ties, and civic engagement. *Communication Research*, *38*(3), 397–421. doi:10.1177/0093650210384984

Di Gennaro, C., & Dutton, W. (2006). The Internet and the public: Online and offline political participation in the United Kingdom. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *59*(2), 299–313. doi:10.1093/pa/gsl004

Dutta-Bergman, M. J. (2006). Community participation and Internet use after September 11: Complementarity in channel consumption. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *11*(2), 469–484. doi:10.1111/jcmc.2006.11.issue-2

Ekdale, B., Namkoong, K., Fung, T. K., & Perlmutter, D. D. (2010). Why blog? (then and now): Exploring the motivations for blogging by popular American political bloggers. *New Media & Society*, *12*(2), 217–234. doi:10.1177/1461444809341440

Enjolras, B., Steen-Johnsen, K., & Wollebæk, D. (2013). Social media and mobilization to offline demonstrations: Transcending participatory divides? *New Media & Society*, *15*(6), 890–908. doi:10.1177/1461444812462844

Enli, G. S., & Skogerbø, E. (2013). Personalized campaigns in party-centred politics: Twitter and Facebook as arenas for political communication. *Information, Communication & Society*, *16*(5), 757–774. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2013.782330

Finkel, S. E., & Muller, E. N. (1998). Rational choice and the dynamics of collective political action: Evaluating alternative models with panel data. *American Political Science Review*, *92*(1), 37–49. doi:10.2307/2585927

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (2011). *Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned action approach*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.

Fisher, J., Fieldhouse, E., & Cutts, D. (2014). Members are not the only fruit: Volunteer activity in British political parties at the 2010 general election. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, *16*(1), 75–95. doi:10.1111/1467-856X.12011

Friese, M., Smith, C. T., Koever, M., & Bluemke, M. (2016). Implicit measures of attitudes and political voting behavior. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *10*(4), 188–201. doi:10.1111/spc3.v10.4

Garrity, E. J., O'Donnell, J. B., & Sanders, G. L. (2007). An extrinsic and intrinsic motivation-based model for measuring consumer shopping oriented web site success. *Journal of Electronic Commerce in Organizations*, *5*(4), 18–38. doi:10.4018/jeco.2007100102

Gibson, R., & Cantijoch, M. (2013). Conceptualizing and measuring participation in the age of the Internet: Is online political engagement really different to offline? *The Journal of Politics*, *75*(3), 701–716. doi:10.1017/S0022381613000431

Gonzalez-DeHass, A. R., Willems, P. P., & Holbein, M. F. D. (2005). Examining the relationship between parental involvement and student motivation. *Educational Psychology Review*, *17*(2), 99–123. doi:10.1007/s10648-005-3949-7

Gottfried, A. E., Fleming, J. S., & Gottfried, A. W. (1994). Role of parental motivational practices in children's academic intrinsic motivation and achievement. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, *86*(1), 104–113. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.86.1.104

Grant, A. M. (2008). Does intrinsic motivation fuel the prosocial fire? Motivational synergy in predicting persistence, performance, and productivity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *93*(1), 48–58. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.1.48

Greenwald, A. G. (1982). Ego task analysis: An integration of research on ego involvement and self-awareness. In A. H. Hastorf & A. M. Isen (Eds.), *Cognitive social psychology* (pp. 109–147). New York, NY: Elsevier.

Guo, C., & Saxton, G. (2014). Tweeting social change: How social media are changing nonprofit advocacy. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, *43*(1), 57–79. doi:10.1177/0899764012471585

Hirzalla, F., Van Zoonen, L., & de Ridder, J. (2010). Internet use and political participation: Reflections on the mobilization/normalization controversy. *The Information Society*, *27*(1), 1–15. doi:10.1080/01972243.2011.534360

Huckfeldt, R. (2014). Networks, contexts, and the combinatorial dynamics of democratic politics. *Political Psychology*, *35*(1), 43–68. doi:10.1111/pops.12161

John, N. A., & Dvir-Gvirsman, S. (2015). "I don't like you any more": Facebook unfriending by Israelis during the Israel–Gaza conflict of 2014. *Journal of Communication*, *65*(6), 953–974. doi:10.1111/jcom.12188

Kim, Y., Chen, H. T., & de Zúñiga, H. G. (2013). Stumbling upon news on the Internet: Effects of incidental news exposure and relative entertainment use on political engagement. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *29*(6), 2607–2614. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2013.06.005

Klandermans, B., & Oegema, D. (1987). Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements. *American Sociological Review*, *52*(4), 519–531. doi:10.2307/2095297

Klar, M., & Kasser, T. (2009). Some benefits of being an activist: Measuring activism and its role in psychological well-being. *Political Psychology*, *30*(5), 755–777. doi:10.1111/pops.2009.30.issue-5

Klöckner, C. A. (2013). A comprehensive model of the psychology of environmental behaviour: A meta-analysis. *Global Environmental Change*, *23*(5), 1028–1038. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.05.014

Kriesi, H. (1985). *Bewegungen in der schweizer Politik, Fallstudien zu politischen Mobiliseringsprozessen in der Schweiz* [Movements in the Swiss politics, case studies on political mobilization processes in Switzerland]. Frankfurt, Germany: Campusverlag.

Kriesi, H. (2008). Political mobilisation, political participation and the power of the vote. *West European Politics*, *31*(1–2), 147–168. doi:10.1080/01402380701834762

Leighley, J. E. (1995). Attitudes, opportunities and incentives: A field essay on political participation. *Political Research Quarterly*, *48*(1), 181–209. doi:10.1177/106591299504800111

Lilleker, D. G. (2013). Empowering the citizens? Political communication, co-production and the harnessed crowd. In R. Scullion, R. Gerodimos, D. Jackson, & D. Lilleker (Eds.), *The media, political participation and empowerment* (pp. 24–38). London, UK: Routledge.

Lilleker, D. G. (2016). Online activism and party strategy at the U.K. 2015 general election. Analysing the potential impacts of online campaigning. *Comunicazione Politica*, *16*(1), 3–22.

Lowndes, V. (2004). Getting on or getting by? Women, social capital and political participation. *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, *6*(1), 45–64. doi:10.1111/bjpi.2004.6.issue-1

Lupton, R. N., Singh, S. P., & Thornton, J. R. (2014). The moderating impact of social networks on the relationships among core values, partisanship, and candidate evaluations. *Political Psychology*, *36*(4), 399–414. doi:10.1111/pops.12102

Madden, T. J., Ellen, P. S., & Ajzen, I. (1992). A comparison of the theory of planned behavior and the theory of reasoned action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *18*(1), 3–9. doi:10.1177/0146167292181001

Martin, A. (2012). *Young people and politics: Political engagement in the Anglo-American democracies*. London, UK: Routledge.

Matthes, J. (2013). Do hostile opinion environments harm political participation? The moderating role of generalized social trust. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, *25*(1), 23–42. doi:10.1093/ijpor/eds006

McAuley, E., Duncan, T., & Tammen, V. V. (1989). Psychometric properties of the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory in a competitive sport setting: A confirmatory factor analysis. *Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport*, *60*(1), 48–58. doi:10.1080/02701367.1989.10607413

McClurg, S. D. (2003). Social networks and political participation: The role of social interaction in explaining political participation. *Political Research Quarterly*, *56*(4), 449–464. doi:10.1177/106591290305600407

Morozov, E. (2012). *The net delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom*. New York, NY: Public Affairs.

Nam, T. (2012). Dual effects of the Internet on political activism: Reinforcing and mobilizing. *Government Information Quarterly*, *29*(1), S90–S97. doi:10.1016/j.giq.2011.08.010

Norris, P., & Curtice, J. (2008). Getting the message out: A two-step model of the role of the Internet in campaign communication flows during the 2005 British general election. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *4*(4), 3–13. doi:10.1080/19331680801975359

Omoto, A. M., Snyder, M., & Hackett, J. D. (2010). Personality and motivational antecedents of activism and civic engagement. *Journal of Personality*, *78*(6), 1703–1734. doi:10.1111/jopy.2010.78.issue-6

Panagopoulos, C. (2013). Positive social pressure and prosocial motivation: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment on voter mobilization. *Political Psychology*, *34*(2), 265–275. doi:10.1111/pops.2013.34.issue-2

Park, N., Kee, K. F., & Valenzuela, S. (2009). Being immersed in social networking environment: Facebook groups, uses and gratifications, and social outcomes. *CyberPsychology & Behavior*, *12*(6), 729–733. doi:10.1089/cpb.2009.0003

Pierce, R., & Converse, P. E. (1990). Attitudinal sources of protest behavior in France: Differences between before and after measurement. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *54*(3), 295–316. doi:10.1086/269208

Plant, R. W., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and the effects of self-consciousness, self-awareness, and ego-involvement: An investigation of internally controlling styles. *Journal of Personality*, *53*(3), 435–449. doi:10.1111/jopy.1985.53.issue-3

Polat, R. K. (2005). The Internet and political participation: Exploring the explanatory links. *European Journal of Communication*, *20*(4), 435–459. doi:10.1177/0267323105058251

Quintelier, E., & Vissers, S. (2008). The effect of Internet use on political participation an analysis of survey results for 16-year-olds in Belgium. *Social Science Computer Review*, *26*(4), 411–427. doi:10.1177/0894439307312631

Rosenstone, S. J., & Hansen, J. M. (1993). *Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America*. New York, NY: Macmillan.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000a). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and new directions. *Contemporary Educational Psychology*, *25*(1), 54–67. doi:10.1006/ceps.1999.1020

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000b). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. *American Psychologist*, *55*(1), 68–78. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68

Snow, D., Rochford, E. B., Jr., Worden, S., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, *51*(4), 464–481. doi:10.2307/2095581

Stanley, J. W., & Weare, C. (2004). The effects of Internet use on political participation evidence from an agency online discussion forum. *Administration & Society*, *36*(5), 503–527. doi:10.1177/0095399704268503

Stefanone, M. A., Kwon, K. H., & Lackaff, D. (2012). Exploring the relationship between perceptions of social capital and enacted support online. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *17*(4), 451–466.

Tang, G., & Lee, F. L. (2013). Facebook use and political participation: The impact of exposure to shared political information, connections with public political actors, and network structural heterogeneity. *Social Science Computer Review*, *31*(6), 763–773. doi:10.1177/0894439313490625

Tenscher, J., Koc-Michalska, K., Lilleker, D. G., Mykkänen, J., Walter, A. S., Findor, A.,… Róka, J. (2016). The professionals speak: Practitioners' perspectives on professional election campaigning. *European Journal of Communication*, *31*(2), 95–119. doi:10.1177/0267323115612212

Theocharis, Y. (2015). The conceptualization of digitally networked participation. *Social Media + Society*, *1*(2), 2056305115610140.

Theocharis, Y., & Lowe, W. (2015). Does Facebook increase political participation? Evidence from a field experiment. *Information, Communication & Society*, *19*(10), 1–22.

Touré-Tillery, M., & Fishbach, A. (2014). How to measure motivation: A guide for the experimental social psychologist. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *8*(7), 328–341. doi:10.1111/spc3.v8.7

Vaccari, C. (2013). *Digital politics in Western democracies: A comparative study*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Valeriani, A., & Vaccari, C. (2015). Accidental exposure to politics on social media as online participation equalizer in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. *New Media & Society*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/1461444815616223

Vallerand, R. J., & Lalande, D. R. (2011). The MPIC Model: The perspective of the hierarchical model of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. *Psychological Inquiry*, *22*(1), 45–51. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2011.545366

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.

Vissers, S., & Stolle, D. (2014). The Internet and new modes of political participation: Online versus offline participation. *Information, Communication & Society*, *17*(8), 937–955. doi:10.1080/1369118X.2013.867356

Vraga, E. K., Anderson, A. A., Kotcher, J. E., & Maibach, E. W. (2015). Issue-specific engagement: How Facebook contributes to opinion leadership and efficacy on energy and climate issues. *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *12*(2), 200–218. doi:10.1080/19331681.2015.1034910

Ward, S., Gibson, R., & Lusoli, W. (2003). Online participation and mobilisation in Britain: Hype, hope and reality. *Parliamentary Affairs*, *56*(4), 652–668. doi:10.1093/pa/gsg108

Zhao, X., Lynch, J., & Chen, Q. (2010). Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and truths about mediation analysis. *The Journal of Consumer Research*, *37*(2), 197–206. doi:10.1086/651257

## Appendix

**Table 1**
Spearman's Rho correlations among different political online and offline activities

| | Demonstration | Boycott | Contact | Joined Party | Follow Party | Follow NGO | Shared Content |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boycotted a company or product | .398* | | | | | | |
| Contacted an elective representative | .421* | .346* | | | | | |
| Joined a political party | .585* | .359* | .431* | | | | |
| Follow political party/MP/candidate on SM | .271* | .261* | .315* | .290* | | | |
| Follow political NGO on SM | .239* | .353* | .334* | .204* | .431* | | |
| Shared political content on SM | .268* | .297* | .276* | .249* | .433* | .482* | |
| Commented about politics on SM | .216* | .303* | .253* | .183* | .437* | .447* | .614* |

*Notes*. MP = Member of Parliament; SM = social media; NGO = nongovernmental organization. Sample size $N = 1{,}982$.

Spearman's rho correlations, statistical significance * $p < .000$, two-tailed.

**Table 2**
Indexes of offline and online political participation

| | CFAOnline | CFAOffline |
|---|---|---|
| Commented about politics on SM | .682 | |
| Shared political content on SM | .648 | |
| Follow political NGO on SM | .737 | |
| Follow political party/MP/candidate on SM | .620 | |
| Joined a political party | | .555 |
| Taken part in a demonstration | | .575 |
| Contacted an elected representative | | .737 |
| Boycotted a company or product | | .688 |

*Notes*. CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; SM = social media; NGO = nongovernmental organization; MP = Member of Parliament. For CFA standardized estimates are indicated. Cronbach's alpha: offline .782, online .714; CFI = .986; RMSEA = .046; PCLOSE = .706. Sample size $N = 1{,}982$.

**Table 3**
Pearson correlation for encouragement and motivation indexes

| | IMI Offline | EMI Offline | IMI Online | EMI Online |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SM Encouragement from political party | .540* | .570* | .442* | .455* |
| SM Encouragement from campaign organization | .568* | .571* | .631* | .629* |
| SM Encouragement from friends | .587* | .619* | .643* | .640* |

*Notes*. IMI = Intrinsic Motivation Inventory; EMI = Extrinsic Motivation Inventory; SM = social media. Sample size $N = 1{,}982$.

Pearson correlations, statistical significance * $p < .000$, two-tailed.

**Table 4**

Mean social media encouragement obtained according to different motivational scores (low [L], medium [M], high [H])

| Motivational Groups / SM Encouragement | IMI Offline | | | EMI Offline | | | IMI Online | | | EMI Online | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | L (32%) | M (49%) | H (16%) | L (57%) | M (39%) | H (4%) | L (45%) | M (42%) | H (12%) | L (61%) | M (35%) | H (4%) |
| Political party | .39* | 1.12* | 2.46* | .57* | 1.64* | 3.26* | .39* | 1.32* | 2.93* | .52* | 1.82* | 3.40* |
| Campaign organization | .45* | 1.32* | 2.74* | .72* | 1.82* | 3.35* | .49* | 1.52* | 3.18* | .67* | 2.02* | 3.49* |
| Friends | .30* | 1.14* | 2.54* | .51* | 1.68* | 3.35* | .33* | 1.32* | 3.06* | .47* | 1.87* | 3.53* |

*Notes*. SM = social media; IMI = Intrinsic Motivation Inventory; EMI = Extrinsic Motivation Inventory. Motivational groups are built according to number of points on a scale on IMI and EMI: low motivation (IMI 0–21; EMI 0–15), medium motivation (IMI 22–43; EMI 16–32), high motivation (IMI 44–64; EMI 33–48). In the parentheses are the percentages of respondents within the group.

Tukey test for the mean differences between groups, * $p < .05$ or better.