Example 20: Choosing a route L'enter are available, one vir X and one via y. (A) 6, 9, 12, 15 22 23 (5,9,12,15 The roads from A to X and y to B are both start and narrow; one car takes 6 minutes, each redditional car tot micreages the travel time percar by 3 minutes. (Es: If 2 cars drive from A tox, each car takes 9 ministes). The roads from A D y and XDR acce long red wide, on ADD I one car takes 20 min, and cach additional car microace the per car by I munter on x to B one car takes 20 mm and each additional Car miceases travel time per car by 0.9 min. Strategic Game! Profesours: tou players' pay off is the negative of travel time Hash equilibrium: 2 perfectable each rente. (In my other case, a person taking popular I route is better off switching to other land),

tank person's travel time is 29.9 or 30 months i Now suffere that a relatively thost, wide road is built from X to y giving each person 4 oftins for truck from A DB: A-y-B, A-X-B, A-X-Y-B, A-y-X-B. Assume that a person who takes A-X-Y-B truck the A-X fortion at the same time as someone who takes A-X-B, and y-B postion at the same time as A-y-B. On the road by X and y , one car takes 7 minutes and early additional car microases time per car by I minute. find the Nam equilibria in the new situation. compere 2 situation. 8,3/12,15 8 90 91 92 93 6,9,12,15 20.9 21.8 Earlier, 2 people take route A-X-B and 2, A-Y-B, resulting mi total time for early = 20.9 or 30 min However, if a person taking A-X-R switches to 10 A-X-y-B, then his total time = 9+7+12 = 28 mm Hence, there is no equilibrium in which new road is not used Nash equilibrium: one person torkes A-X-B, 2 people takes A-X-Y-B, and one person takes A-Y-B. Each person's travel time = 32 mountes. Thus, no the equilibrium with now road every person's travel