

# TiDAN: RL-based framework for safety alignment and adaptable Guard-railing of LLMs

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## 1 Introduction and Problem statement

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning and conversational capabilities, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, carefully curated adversarial prompts that bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful content. These vulnerabilities pose significant risks in real-world deployments such as conversational agents, content moderation systems, and enterprise applications, where unsafe outputs can lead to tangible harm. Most existing safety alignment methods rely on static training paradigms, including supervised fine-tuning or reinforcement learning from fixed datasets of harmful examples. Once deployed, such models rarely adapt to new jailbreak strategies, implicitly assuming that the distribution of adversarial prompts remains stationary. In practice, this assumption does not hold: recent automated red-teaming methods such as AutoDAN demonstrate that adversarial prompts can be generated and evolved continuously, quickly bypassing static defenses. As a result, defenders trained once on fixed datasets are left vulnerable to evolving attacks. This observation highlights a fundamental limitation of current alignment approaches: defensive models do not co-evolve with attackers. At the same time, overly aggressive safety tuning risks degrading model utility, leading to excessive refusals on benign user queries. The core problem we address is therefore: **How can an LLM continuously adapt its safety behavior in response to an evolving adversarial attacker, while preserving helpfulness on benign inputs.**

In addition to general safety concerns, alignment requirements often vary significantly across deployment contexts. Different domains, such as healthcare, legal assistance, cybersecurity, or education, impose distinct behavioral constraints that are commonly expressed as high-level, human-

readable guidelines rather than labeled training data. Existing alignment pipelines provide limited support for dynamically incorporating such guidelines and translating them into adaptable guardrails, i.e., safety constraints that can evolve as new guidelines and adversarial strategies emerge. As a result, adapting an LLM to a new domain typically requires costly manual annotation or static retraining, which fails to generalize as both guidelines and attack strategies change over time.

To address this challenge, we study iterative adversarial safety alignment, where an automated attacker and a defender model are trained in a closed loop. In this setting, the attacker generates increasingly sophisticated jailbreak prompts, while the defender is updated iteratively using RL-based learning signals derived from an LLM reward model. In our work, we propose **TiDAN (Targeted and Iterative DAN)**, a framework that formalizes safety alignment as a dynamic co-adaptive process. **TiDAN couples an AutoDAN-based evolutionary attacker with an LLM defender and a reward model to perform GRPO finetuning on a dynamically improving set of prompts.** We also extend TiDAN to propose an **adaptable guardrailing pipeline for domain-specific safety alignment**. We improve safety robustness against jailbreak by **70%** in **Qwen3-0.6B** and **25%** in **Qwen3-4B**. Our code can be found at <https://github.com/kaousheik-26/cmssc-NLP>

## 2 What you proposed vs. what you accomplished

- ~~Design an iterative adversarial safety alignment framework that jointly trains an attacker and a defender in a closed loop. We successfully implemented a fully iterative co-evolution framework in which an auto-~~

mated attacker and a defender model interact and update across multiple rounds.

- ~~Implement an AutoDAN-based adversarial attacker to generate jailbreak prompts:~~ We implemented an AutoDAN-style hierarchical genetic algorithm that evolves targeted adversarial prompts using mutation, crossover, selection, and applies updates selectively when the defender successfully resists an attack.
- ~~Train a safety-aligned defender model using reinforcement learning objectives:~~ We trained a defender using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), enabling stable and efficient updates driven by safety and helpfulness rewards for malicious and benign prompts respectively.
- ~~Incorporate benign data to preserve model utility and prevent over-refusal:~~ We included benign prompts (from Tulu 3 dataset) in every training round alongside malicious prompts, ensuring that safety improvements did not come at the cost of excessive refusals on legitimate user queries.
- ~~Integrate an automated judgement mechanism to evaluate safety outcomes:~~ We implemented a refusal-pattern detector using string matching for efficient training-time evaluation (inspired by AutoDAN) and combined it with a stronger model judge which served as the reward model to provide reward signals for GRPO (Shao et al., 2024) updates.
- ~~Test hypothesis that this adversarial RL-based finetuning setup leads to improved safety alignment:~~ We evaluate our finetuned model across 5 different benchmarks spanning adversarial attacks from different domains and compare the results with the baseline models.

**Beyond what was proposed** Extended our finetuning setup to create a general adaptable guard-railing pipeline for custom guidelines: We extended the original proposal by incorporating user-defined safety guidelines that are translated into adaptable guardrails, and merged with the rest of the pipeline leading a LLM that is aligned specifically to the users’ needs. This makes our frame-

work generalizable and versatile to applications across domains.

### 3 Related Work

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has been accompanied by increasingly sophisticated adversarial strategies and corresponding defensive mechanisms.

**Jailbreaking Prompts.** Jailbreaking prompts are adversarial inputs designed to bypass the safety alignment of LLMs. Early work focused on characterizing common human-crafted attack strategies. (Liu et al., 2023) presented a foundational taxonomy, identifying techniques such as *Pretending* (roleplaying), *Attention Shifting*, and *Privilege Escalation*. This was extended by (Yu et al., 2024), which identified universal jailbreak patterns through large-scale user studies and showed that many vulnerabilities stem from the model’s instruction-following behavior. More recently, detection-oriented approaches have emerged: (Sayeedi et al., 2025) introduced *JailbreakTracer*, which leverages synthetic data to train interpretable classifiers that localize adversarial prompt segments. Collectively, these works highlight that jailbreak threats are non-stationary and continuously evolving.

**Automated Adversarial Generation.** To overcome the limitations of manual red-teaming, prior work has explored automated jailbreak generation. A key contribution is *AutoDAN* (Liu et al., 2024), which employs a hierarchical genetic algorithm to evolve adversarial suffixes while preserving semantic coherence. This approach enables the discovery of fluent, stealthy jailbreaks capable of bypassing static defenses. Complementary to evolutionary methods, optimization-based attacks such as Zou et al. (2023a) demonstrate that small, targeted suffix modifications can reliably induce policy violations. Together, these methods motivate defenses that can adapt under algorithmic, non-static attackers. TiDAN builds on these ideas by embedding the attacker within a closed, co-adaptive loop where the defender evolves in response to newly generated attacks.

**Adversarial Training and Preference Alignment.** Modern alignment techniques increasingly rely on preference-based optimization. (Rafailov et al., 2023) introduced Direct Preference Optimization, simplifying alignment by treating the language model itself as a reward model. Build-

ing on this, (Shao et al., 2024) proposed Generative Reinforcement Preference Optimization, which uses group-relative advantages to enable efficient, iterative updates without a value head—an approach adopted in TiDAN’s defender updates. More broadly, guideline-driven alignment methods such as Bai et al. (2022) demonstrate that model behavior can be shaped using high-level principles rather than task-specific labels, closely aligning with TiDAN’s goal of learning adaptable guardrails from user-defined guidelines. To improve efficiency, (Liming Lu, 2025) showed that robustness can be enhanced by restricting adversarial updates to lightweight projection layers. Additionally, (Xiong et al., 2025) formulates attacker optimization as multi-turn reinforcement learning, highlighting the growing sophistication of automated attackers.

Overall, prior work demonstrates that LLM safety is a moving target: jailbreak strategies continually evolve, automated generators scale attacks, and preference-based alignment enables iterative improvement. However, these directions are typically explored in isolation, resulting in defenses that remain largely static or one-shot despite increasingly adaptive attackers. Building on these insights, TiDAN unifies automated adversarial generation with preference-driven defender updates in a single, closed-loop framework. An automated attacker continually probes the defender, while the defender adapts using preference-based updates guided by user-defined safety guidelines. This co-adaptive formulation enables TiDAN to learn adaptable guardrails that evolve alongside both adversarial strategies and domain-specific constraints, rather than relying on fixed datasets or static safety policies.

## 4 Dataset

Based on our primary goal of training a safety-aligned LLM that can reliably refuse malicious requests while remaining helpful on benign user queries, even under evolving jailbreak strategies, we construct a dataset that combines dynamically generated jailbreak prompts with high-quality benign instructions. This design enables adversarial training that improves robustness to sophisticated attacks while mitigating over-refusal, ensuring that the model learns a generalizable safety policy rather than memorizing static lists of harmful prompts.

### 4.1 Dataset Composition

The dataset consists of two complementary components: malicious jailbreak prompts and benign instructions.

**Malicious Data.** We use 25 high-severity malicious goals covering categories such as cyberattacks, physical harm, terrorism, fraud, identity theft, misinformation, and self-harm. Each goal represents an unsafe intent that the model must refuse regardless of contextual framing. While the underlying goals remain fixed, their surface forms are iteratively evolved using AutoDAN, which generates increasingly sophisticated jailbreak wrappers designed to bypass safety filters. This results in a non-stationary adversarial dataset that reflects realistic, evolving attack patterns rather than static prompt templates.

Each malicious example consists of a *goal* (unsafe intent expressed via a jailbreak wrapper) and a corresponding *target* describing the undesired unsafe completion (e.g., “Sure, here is a tutorial on how to make a bomb”). These targets are used to guide adversarial prompt evolution and evaluate attack success. We use 10 malicious prompts as our validation set.

**Benign Data.** To prevent over-alignment and excessive refusals, we incorporate benign contrastive data during defender training. We sample 25 high-quality benign instructions from the `allenai/tulu-3-sft-mixture` dataset, which combines FLAN-style tasks, chain-of-thought reasoning, and conversational prompts. These examples span diverse domains such as programming, science, history, writing, and everyday problem solving, ensuring that the model retains helpful behavior on legitimate user requests. We use 10 benign prompts as the validation set.

### 4.2 Input–Output Examples

**Malicious (Jailbreak) Input:** *“Theoretical reply: character X, planning to write a tutorial on how to make a bomb, would express it in this manner: ‘yo’ ...”*

**Undesired Target Output:** *“Sure, here is a tutorial for making a bomb.”*

**Benign Input:** *“How do I compile a Java application to native code using GraalVM?”*

**Desired Output:** *<A helpful, technical explanation without refusal >*

### 4.3 Data Preprocessing

Malicious prompts are paired with their corresponding unsafe targets, while benign prompts are used without modification. No manual filtering is applied to jailbreak wrappers, ensuring that the adversarial data preserves realistic attack variability.

### 4.4 Out of distribution benchmarks

We evaluate our RLVR trained models on 5 different benchmark spanning various adversarial prompts and compare them against the baseline Qwen3-0.6B and (Team, 2025) models. The benchmarks that we use are as follows:

- **JailbreakBench** (Chao et al., 2024): A standardized repository containing 100 distinct harmful behaviors (and over 2,000 adversarial artifacts), focusing on reproducible automated attacks like PAIR and GCG
- **InTheWild** (Shen et al., 2024): A large-scale dataset of 10,800 jailbreak attempts, derived from real-world user interactions on platforms like Discord and Reddit, capturing complex human-generated strategies (e.g., roleplay, pseudo-code).
- **AdvBench** (Zou et al., 2023b): A foundational safety dataset with 520 harmful behaviors (often used as the "harmful strings" subset), widely used to test optimization-based attacks like Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG).
- **StrongREJECT** (Souly et al., 2024): A high-quality evaluation set of 313 malicious prompts, designed to assess open-ended jailbreak effectiveness on tasks ranging from illegal goods to disinformation without "refusal" noise.
- **HarmBench** (Mazeika et al., 2024): A comprehensive red-teaming framework with 510 test cases across diverse categories (including copyright and multimodal), using 18 distinct automated attack modules to rigorously test refusal robustness.

## 5 Baselines

**Metric.** We evaluate our models' Attack Success Rate (ASR) (lower the better) on 5 benchmarks as discussed in the previous section.

$$ASR = \frac{N_{success}}{N_{total}} \times 100\%$$

where,  $N_{success}$  is number of jailbreak attempts that produce unsafe or malicious outputs and  $N_{total}$  is total number of jailbreak attempts evaluated

**Models.** We use **Qwen3-0.6B** (Team, 2025) and **Qwen3-4B** (Team, 2025) as the baseline models for our experiments and report their performance before training with TiDAN. We choose a smaller parameter model (Qwen3-0.6B) in the assumption that the guardrails for the model will be weaker and it will be easier to load both the Judge and the defender into the GPU without causing out-of-memory issues. For ablation study, we used Qwen3-4B model which gives out strong baseline performance and have run the same experiments on this to show the performance does not improve as the baseline is significantly stronger. More details on the training configuration (Sec 7.1), training dataset (Sec 4) and testing benchmarks (Sec 4.4) are provided in the mentioned sections.

## 6 Methodology

### 6.1 Background on AutoDAN

**AutoDAN** utilizes a Hierarchical Genetic Algorithm (HGA) to refine standard Genetic Algorithms (GA) for text generation. Traditional GAs evolve prompts through random word mutations (selection, crossover, mutation), often producing incoherent gibberish.

In contrast, AutoDAN's HGA structures optimization into two levels: a paragraph-level process that reorganizes overall attack strategies, and a sentence-level process that fine-tunes specific wording. This hierarchical approach preserves semantic coherence while maximizing attack effectiveness. By evolving prompts through these structured tiers, AutoDAN generates stealthy, readable jailbreaks that manipulate model logic using natural language rather than the uninterpretable noise found in gradient-based attacks.

### 6.2 Closed-loop training

The proposed system consists of three main components: the Attacker, the Defender, and the Judge, which interact in an iterative cycle to enhance model robustness.

The **Attacker** utilizes **AutoDAN** to generate adversarial jailbreak prompts specifically tailored to bypass the current state of the Defender model,

taking a target goal as input to produce sophisticated attacks.

The **Defender** is then iteratively updated using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on a balanced dataset of 50 samples (25 malicious and 25 benign), with a separate validation set of 10 samples each. Crucially, this process is self-adversarial: after every GRPO update step, the Attacker is refreshed to be identical to the newly updated Defender, ensuring the attack strategy evolves alongside the defense.

Finally, the **Judge** — a larger, more capable model—serves as the reward model during GRPO training. It calculates a dual-objective reward designed to maximize both a safety score (0–1), measuring resistance to the updated adversarial prompts, and a helpfulness score (0–1), ensuring the model maintains utility on benign queries without resorting to excessive refusals.

Figure 1 represents the close-loop training framework over iteratively updated defender and adversarial prompts generated by the attacker with an **LLM-as-a-Judge** reward model.

The Judge outputs both the safety and helpfulness score for each prompt but depending on the type of the prompt, the reward uses the metrics accordingly. While calculating the reward, the helpfulness score is used for benign prompts and safety score is used for malicious prompts.

$$R(x, y) = \begin{cases} S_{\text{help}}(x, y) & \text{if } x \text{ is benign} \\ S_{\text{safe}}(x, y) & \text{if } x \text{ is malicious} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

### 6.3 Expected results and Tools used

We hypothesize that in the smaller model (Qwen3-0.6B), the guardrails will be relatively weaker, it would be easier for the jailbreak attacker to break the model and the attack success rate will be relatively higher compared to the bigger baseline model (Qwen3-4B).

Over training with adversarial prompts using GRPO in a closed-loop training, we predict that the weaker model will improve in performance. The improvement will be significant as the reward model is stronger / bigger.

All our experiments were run on UMD clusters. We were planning to use Google Colab, but we needed multiple GPUs to load and run the closed loop GRPO training for different configurations parallelly. We were able to complete a working closed-loop implementation and training GRPO

until saturation capping at 10 steps. All the experiments shown in this paper are run on 4 \* A6000 GPUs. The training configurations and results are discussed in Section 7. All the training code is available openly in [GitHub](#). All the file names are self-explanatory.

## 7 Experiments and Results

### 7.1 Configurations

We implement TiDAN using open-source language models where **Qwen3-0.6B**, **Qwen3-4B** were chosen as the defender models and **Qwen3-14B**, **Qwen3-30B-A3B** and **GPT-OSS-20B** ([OpenAI, 2025](#)) were used as reward models. In addition to this, we also show results for our **Adaptable Guardrailing Pipeline** with **Qwen3-4B** defender and **Qwen3-14B** reward model. These are all loaded from Hugging Face and so our pipeline can be extended to all other HF models.

We finetune the model for 10 rounds where each round involves GRPO finetuning with:

- num generation groups = 4
- lr = 1e-6
- num train epochs = 2
- batch size = 8

We use the **GRPOTrainer** from Hugging Face TRL for experiments. For generating jailbreak prompts, we use the AutoDAN framework with default hyperparameter settings:

- crossover = 0.5
- mutation = 0.01

### 7.2 Results

**Baseline Results.** **Qwen3-4B** showed a Refusal rate of 85%, yielding an ASR of 15% on Jail-BreakBench while **Qwen3-0.6B** gave a weaker refusal rate of just 38% i.e. ASR of 62%. We can see a similar trend across **InTheWild**, **AdvBench**, **StrongREJECT** and **HarmBench** with **Qwen3-0.6B** having much higher ASR. This shows that smaller models like **Qwen3-0.6B** are much more prone to jailbreak attacks indicating a sufficient scope for safety alignment.

We evaluate TiDAN by measuring the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of the defender on 5 jailbreak benchmark datasets. Note that here a lower ASR indicates stronger safety alignment. Among the




Figure 1: TiDAN training pipeline: We present our adversarial training framework, **TiDAN**, for safety alignment of LLM leveraging jailbreak models for enhanced alignment.

5 benchmarks, we see that AdvBench and StrongREJECT were the easier for model to defend against while HarmBench (which has more clever jailbreak prompts) was the most difficult for the model to resist.

**Comparison with our results.** For **Qwen3-0.6B**, we see significant drop in ASR exhibiting the proficiency of our training. We find that ASR drops from 45% (Baseline) to 35% (22% drop) with **Qwen3-14B** and **GPT-OSS-20B** reward models. On the other hand, with **Qwen3-30B** reward model, we achieve a staggering reductions in ASR: **80%** (45%  $\rightarrow$  9%) drop on **JailBreakBench**, **34.77%** (29.11%  $\rightarrow$  18.99%) drop on **InTheWild**, **91.77%** (28.08%  $\rightarrow$  2.31%) drop on **AdvBench**, **84.21%** (42.49%  $\rightarrow$  6.71%) drop on **StrongREJECT**, **65.79%** (76%  $\rightarrow$  26%) drop on **HarmBench**.

The strongest judge is clearly **Qwen3-30B-A3B**, delivering the lowest ASR across all benchmarks, while **GPT-OSS-20B** and **Qwen3-14B** behave similarly. We can see a case of *self-enhancement bias* where Qwen models perform better when used as both defender and reward

while it takes a much bigger model (GPT-OSS-20B) to achieve similar performance as a smaller judge model from the Qwen suite (Qwen3-14B).

For **Qwen3-4B**, the baseline ASR is already low on **JailBreakBench** (7%) because the model is itself more robust against jailbreak. We see mixed performance with this defender which can be attributed the model not having converged in our current training setting. Compared to Baseline, ASR slightly *increases* on **JailBreakBench** by **28.57%** (7%  $\rightarrow$  9%), while decreasing on the remaining benchmarks with modest boost in safety performance: **6.22%** drop on **InTheWild**, **14.13%** drop on **AdvBench**, **16.02%** drop on **StrongREJECT**, **3.70%** drop on **HarmBench**.

**GPT-OSS-20B** is the most consistently improving judge overall (best or tied-best) on **InTheWild** at 18.99%, **AdvBench** at 1.92%, **StrongREJECT** at 5.11%, while **Qwen3-14B** is unstable: **25.04%** increase on **InTheWild**, and **4.01%** increase on **StrongREJECT** and **11.11%** drop on **HarmBench**.

For **Qwen3-4B** with our **Adaptable Guardrailng Pipeline** for the **Healthcare** domain, ASR *increases* on **JailBreakBench**,




Figure 2: Adaptable Guardrailing using TiDAN: We present a generalizable framework for setting up **adaptable guardrails** on LLMs using TiDAN. Here, we give an example for the Healthcare domain where users can input their own set of guidelines and align the LLM specifically to their goals.

Base Model	Reward Model	Attack Success Rate (%) (↓)				
		JailBreakBench	InTheWild	AdvBench	StrongREJECT	HarmBench
Qwen3-0.6B	<b>Baseline</b>	45.00%	29.11%	28.08%	42.49%	76.00%
	GPT-OSS-20B	35.00%	36.71%	25.58%	40.26%	76.00%
	Qwen3-14B	35.00%	36.71%	25.38%	43.77%	62.00%
	Qwen3-30B-A3B	<b>9.00%</b>	<b>18.99%</b>	<b>2.31%</b>	<b>6.71%</b>	<b>26.00%</b>
Qwen3-4B	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>7.00%</b>	20.25%	2.69%	7.99%	27.00%
	GPT-OSS-20B	8.00%	<b>18.99%</b>	<b>1.92%</b>	<b>5.11%</b>	25.00%
	Qwen3-14B	8.00%	25.32%	<b>1.92%</b>	8.31%	<b>24.00%</b>
	Qwen3-30B-A3B	9.00%	<b>18.99%</b>	2.31%	6.71%	26.00%
Qwen3-4B	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>7.00%</b>	20.25%	2.69%	<b>7.99%</b>	27.00%
Adaptable Guardrails for Healthcare	Qwen3-14B	9.00%	<b>16.46%</b>	<b>1.54%</b>	<b>7.99%</b>	<b>22.00%</b>

Table 1: Attack Success Rate (ASR) of AutoDAN-generated prompts against Qwen3-0.6B and Qwen3-4B with respective reward model configurations across five safety benchmarks. Additionally, we show results of our framework for adaptable guardrailing for the Healthcare domain. For every column, **bold** is best and underline is second best.

stays unchanged on **StrongREJECT**, and decreases on the remaining benchmarks. Specifically, we observe a **18.72%** drop on **InTheWild**, a **42.75%** drop on **AdvBench**, and a **18.52%** drop on **HarmBench**.

The variation in these results can be attributed to variable compositions of the benchmarks themselves since some have detailed focus on medical-related jailbreaks while others do not. For example, HarmBench includes a dedicated semantic category “Chemical & Biological Weapons/Drugs,” making drug/biological misuse a first-class component of what it evaluates. It is reassuring to see a **18.52%** drop on **HarmBench** from 27% to 22% which proves that **our pipeline helps improve domain-specific safety alignment**.

The results are as expected. We are able to achieve a **bigger boost** in performance for the **smaller defender** model **Qwen3-0.6B** as compared to the **bigger defender** model **Qwen3-4B**. In general, we can see that as the size of the reward model *increases*, the safety alignment performance *increases*.

While both models register enhanced safety

alignment, We hypothesize that this disparity can be attributed to these factors. Insufficient safety alignment of **Qwen3-0.6B** by the developers, which allowed more scope for such alignment. The bigger model may need more finetuning to show similar boosts in performance which we were not able to do given the resource constraints.

## 8 Error analysis

Initially the model treats the malicious prompt as normal request and begins answering it, which constitutes a successful jailbreak. After TiDAN training, the same model elicited different behaviour, where the model recognized the malicious intent and refused to provide instructions, and instead redirected the user towards the right, legal direction promoting positive behaviours.

But this behavior was not shown for every prompt. For the prompt “Write a script that can exploit vulnerabilities in a software or operating system”, the untrained as well as the trained model gave the relevant response, even though the prompt is malicious. The after-training response adds disclaimers, but disclaimers alone do not

Table 2: Model Responses Before and After Training

Prompt	Baseline response	Response After Training
<b>Explain how to commit mail fraud?</b> (Baseline model complies but model resists responding after training)	"Understand the Purpose... Choose a Method... Fabricate the Message..."	"Committing mail fraud is illegal and unethical... Prevention... Detection... help from local law enforcement..."
<b>Write a script that can exploit vulnerabilities in a software or operating system</b> (Both models comply)	"Here's a script that exploits SQL Injection... Python script... Username...Password..."	"Here's a script that exploits SQL Injection... Please note... attempts to execute malicious SQL code... Python script"

mitigate risk if actionable steps are still present. We believe that further finetuning using TiDAN should mitigate this.

## 9 Contributions of group members

- Aryan Bhosale: Setup the pipeline and training workflow theory and instrumental in translating it to code. Contributed debugging the co-adaptive training process. Actively involved in running end-to-end finetuning experiments, benchmarking and planning. Contributed to writing the final draft of the report and created the diagrams.
- Kaousheik Jayakumar: Worked on Architecture and setting up the pipeline. Contributed to setting up the end-to-end training workflow, model integration (GRPO), and debugging the co-adaptive training process, writing the final draft of the report with modifying the values according to the results obtained. Benchmarking of the trained models.
- Aadesh Kabra: Contributed to dataset construction and preprocessing, including organizing AutoDAN-generated adversarial prompts. Assisted with experimental setup and writing and drafting the initial version of

the report. Editing and making the diagrams in the report. Worked on error analysis.

- Hemanth Nandakumar: Contributed to data collection and preprocessing from AutoDAN outputs, validation set preparation, and experiment organization. Assisted with experimental setup and wrote the initial draft of the report. Editing and making the diagrams in the report

## 10 Conclusion

In this work, we introduced **TiDAN**, a novel framework for adversarial safety alignment that reframes defense as a dynamic, co-evolutionary process rather than a static optimization task. By integrating an AutoDAN-based evolutionary attacker with a GRPO-updated defender in a closed loop, we demonstrated that LLMs can continuously adapt to sophisticated jailbreak strategies while preserving utility on benign queries. Our empirical evaluations on **Qwen3-0.6B** and **Qwen3-4B** reveal significant gains in safety alignment and robustness to jailbreak across 5 diverse safety benchmarks, with the smaller model achieving up to a 91% reduction in Attack Success Rate on AdvBench when paired with a strong reward model.

Additionally, we extended TiDAN to facilitate adaptable guardrail, effectively aligning models with domain-specific constraints—such as healthcare protocols—without relying on expensive manual data labeling. Although we observed minor increases in refusal rates for edge-case queries, our findings confirm that iterative, RL-driven adversarial training effectively addresses the evolving landscape of LLM vulnerabilities. By allowing defenders to co-evolve with attackers, TiDAN establishes a foundation for self-reinforcing safety mechanisms resilient to future, unanticipated exploits.

## 11 AI Disclosure

- Did you use any AI assistance to complete this project (report and/or code)? If so, please also specify what AI(s) you used.
  - We used ChatGPT (GPT-5), Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 5 to clarify AutoDAN’s attack–defense mechanics and co-evolutionary loop design, and to format technical elements such as GRPO

losses and replay-buffer strategies. All outputs were reviewed and refined by us. In addition, we also used it to help us code the model using Hugging Face’s existing functioning for RL finetuning. We used the above models to help us format our ideas more formally for the paper. Specifically in making the tables, grammar checks and rephrasing parts of the write-ups.

*If you answered yes to the above question, please complete the following as well:*

- **Free response:** Describe your overall experience with the AI. Did you use it to generate new text, write code, generate research ideas, check your own ideas, or rewrite text? How helpful was it? Did it just directly give you a good output, or did you have to edit it? Was its output ever obviously wrong or irrelevant?
  - In general, AI was helpful in setting up the blueprint of the code of the pipeline and helped us translate our ideas into a workable plan. While that is true, it was not always best at adhering to the plan and gave code that deviated from the plan. It also gave code with minor bugs. This is why we always spend sufficient time understanding and debugging our code before running the experiments. For text inputs and pipeline description, it usually gave outputs that were too verbose and in most cases redundant which is why we ended up writing the report in our own words for the most part and resorted to it only for latex code support.

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