# **Mini SOC Project Report**

# Introduction

This report documents the implementation of a Mini Security Operations Center (SOC) platform using Wazuh, containerized deployments, and a CI/CD pipeline. The solution includes a functional Wazuh stack deployed via Docker Compose, with a prepared migration plan to Docker Swarm for scalability and high availability. A custom Wazuh rule was implemented to detect suspicious SSH login patterns, aligning with real-world security monitoring needs.


Repository: https://github.com/kaoutarlahmaidi/soc-platform

The complete source code, configurations, and documentation are available in the project repository.

### Part One – Build a Mini SOC

### 1-Architecture Overview

The architecture consists of a multi-node Wazuh cluster including manager, worker, indexers, and dashboard, fronted by an Nginx reverse proxy with TLS termination. Persistent storage is provided by Docker volumes. The design ensures high availability, secure communication, and scalability.



# 2-CI/CD Pipeline

### 2.1-Project Structure

The project is organized into well-defined directories to separate configuration, automation, testing, and documentation. The structure ensures clarity, modularity, and maintainability.


### 2.2-Local Pipeline Simulation

The provided test-local-cicd.sh script reproduces the pipeline stages locally. It validates prerequisites, builds images, runs security scans, executes automated tests, and simulates deployment using Ansible. The stages are:

- **Prerequisites Check:** Ensures Docker, Ansible, Trivy, and Python are installed and the Docker daemon is running.
- **Python Environment:** Creates a virtual environment and installs dependencies such as ansible-lint, yamllint, pytest, and selenium.
- Quality Gates: Runs Ansible linting and YAML validation, storing reports in testreports/.
- **Build and Scan:** Builds/pulls Docker images and scans them with Trivy for HIGH/CRIT-ICAL vulnerabilities.

- Certificate Generation: Uses generate-indexer-certs.yml to provision SSL certificates.
- **Test Environment:** Spins up the Wazuh stack via docker-compose and verifies dash-board availability.
- Automated Tests: Runs API health checks and Selenium UI tests against the Wazuh Dashboard.
- **Deployment Simulation:** Executes an Ansible dry-run (--check) with mock secrets to validate playbooks.
- **Report Generation:** Creates a markdown report (test-reports/local-cicd-report.md) summarizing results and artifacts.

This local script allows fast validation before committing to GitHub.



```
Pulling wazuh/wazuh-manager:4.4.0...

Pulled waz
```

```
Scanning wazuh/wazuh-indexer:4.4.9 scan passed
Scanning wazuh/wazuh-dashboard:4.4.0 with Trivy...
2025-88-2071:17:56-01:90 INFO
2025-88-2071:17:56-01:90 INF
```

### 2.3-Production Pipeline

The GitHub Actions workflow automates the full lifecycle of the Mini SOC platform, from code quality validation to production deployment. The pipeline runs on a self-hosted Linux runner with Docker, Python, Ansible, Trivy, and Selenium installed.

The stages are as follows:

- Quality Gates: Runs Ansible linting and YAML linting, producing reports to ensure code quality and consistency.
- **Security Scan:** Pulls Wazuh Docker images and scans them with Trivy for HIGH and CRITICAL vulnerabilities. The pipeline fails if such issues are detected.

- Certificate Generation: Generates TLS certificates for secure communication between Wazuh components. Certificates are stored as artifacts.
- **Testing:** Deploys the stack in a temporary environment, waits for services to become ready, and executes automated tests:
  - API health checks.
  - Selenium browser tests for the dashboard UI.

Results are stored for traceability.

- **Deployment Simulation:** Executes Ansible playbooks in --check mode using mock secrets. This dry-run ensures correctness before impacting production.
- **Production Deployment:** Uses real credentials from GitHub secrets and applies the Ansible playbooks to the production inventory. Services are verified post-deployment, and a deployment report is generated. A rollback step is triggered automatically on failure.

This design ensures that only tested and verified code reaches production, minimizing the risk of misconfiguration or downtime.

# **3-Deployment Approach**

Currently, the deployment uses Docker Compose for reproducibility and ease of validation. A docker-stack.yml is included in the repository for future migration to Docker Swarm, enabling service scaling, high availability, and rolling updates.

### 3.1-Docker Compose Deployment

Docker Compose was selected as the primary deployment method to ensure reliable delivery within project constraints while maintaining full SOC functionality. This approach provides immediate operational capability with a clear migration path to more advanced orchestration when scaling requirements emerge.

The multi-node Wazuh cluster architecture is fully supported within the Docker Compose framework, with separate containers for manager nodes, worker nodes, indexers, and dashboard components. This design ensures proper service separation and prepares the foundation for horizontal scaling.

### 3.2-Docker Compose Commands

```
# Start all services in detached mode
docker-compose up -d
# Check status of running containers
docker-compose ps
# Follow logs of all services
docker-compose logs -f
# Stop and remove containers, networks
docker-compose down
# Stop and remove containers, networks, and volumes
docker-compose down -v
```

```
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```

### **Why Docker Compose Over Swarm**

- Time Constraints: Ensures project delivery within deadline while maintaining quality
- Operational Simplicity: Reduces deployment complexity for initial implementation
- Development Efficiency: Faster iteration cycles for testing and validation
- Migration Ready: All service definitions structured for seamless Swarm transition

### 3.2-Docker Swarm Deployment

The project includes a complete docker-stack.yml configuration prepared for Docker Swarm deployment. This migration path provides enhanced orchestration capabilities including service replication, automatic failover, and rolling updates across multiple nodes. The multi-node architecture translates directly to Swarm's distributed model, where manager nodes coordinate cluster operations while worker nodes handle service execution. The existing service definitions are fully compatible with Swarm's overlay networking and service discovery mechanisms.

```
Removing network wazul_wazuh-network
LabutamgMcDUTRR:-/soc-challenge/wazuh-docker/multi-node/stack$ docker stack deploy -c wazuh-stack.yml waz
```

### **Docker Swarm Deployment Commands**

```
# Initialize Docker Swarm on the manager node docker swarm init
```

```
# Deploy the stack using the docker-stack.yml file
docker stack deploy -c wazuh-stack.yml wazuh
```

```
# List all services in the stack
docker stack services wazuh
```

```
# List running containers in the stack
docker stack ps wazuh
```

```
# Remove the deployed stack
docker stack rm wazuh
```

### **Swarm Migration Benefits**

- High Availability: Service replication across multiple nodes with automatic failover
- Scalability: Dynamic service scaling based on resource demands
- Rolling Updates: Zero-downtime deployments with automatic rollback capabilities
- Load Balancing: Built-in load distribution across service replicas

Service Discovery: Native DNS-based service discovery for inter-component communication

# 3.4-Ansible Automation of the Deployment

Ansible orchestrates the entire deployment process, ensuring consistency across environments and providing infrastructure-as-code capabilities. Automation handles prerequisites validation, service deployment, configuration management, and post-deployment verification.

```
- name: Deploy Wazuh SOC
hosts: localhost
connection: local
become: no
gather_facts: yes

vars:
project_dir: "{{ ansible_env.PWD | regex_replace('/ansible.*', '') }}"

tasks:
- name: Check if docker-compose.yml exists
stat:
path: "{{ project_dir }}/docker-compose.yml"
register: compose_file
- name: Fail if compose file missing
fail:
nsg: "docker-compose.yml not found at {{ project_dir }}"
when: not compose_file.stat.exists

- name: Check SSL certificates
find:
paths: "{{ project_dir }}/config/wazuh_indexer_ssl_certs"
patherns: "*.pem
register: certs
- name: Generate certificates if missing
command: docker-compose -f generate-indexer-certs.yml run --rm generator
args:
chdi:: "{{ project_dir }}"
when: certs.matched == 0

- name: Stop services
docker_compose:
project_src: "{{ project_dir }}"
state: absent
when: stop_services is defined and stop_services
tags: [stop, never]
- name: Deploy Wazuh services
```

```
| Manufaction | Second Second
```

### 3.5-Security Scan with Trivy

Container security scanning is integrated into the deployment pipeline using Trivy, ensuring all images meet security standards before production deployment.

```
kaoutar@KAOUTAR:~/soc-challenge/wazuh-docker/multi-node/trivy$ cat trivy.yaml
format: sarif
output: trivy-results.sarif
severity:
   - CRITICAL
   - HIGH
exit-code: 1
ignore-unfixed: true
timeout: 10m
ignorefile: trivy/.trivyignore # Add this line
```

The security scanning process validates all Wazuh components against known vulnerabilities, with configurable severity thresholds. The pipeline fails automatically if critical or high-severity vulnerabilities are detected, preventing insecure deployments from reaching production environments.

```
| Introduction | Secret | Introduction | Introducti
```

# 4-Testing

After successful deployment and security scan validation with Trivy, the pipeline proceeds to comprehensive testing to ensure all components of the Mini SOC platform are functioning correctly. The testing phase validates both backend API functionality and frontend user interface accessibility through automated test suites.

#### **4.1-Test Execution Commands**

The testing framework uses pytest to execute both API health checks and Selenium UI tests. Tests are organized in separate directories for clear separation of concerns.

### **API Health Testing**

python -m pytest tests/api/test api health.py -v

### **Selenium UI Testing**

python -m pytest tests/selenium/test\_wazuh\_dashboard.py -v

### 5-Results


The successful execution of both test suites provides comprehensive validation that:

- **Backend Services:** The core Wazuh components (Manager and Indexer) are operational and communicating properly within the multi-node architecture
- **Frontend Interface:** The web dashboard is accessible via secure HTTPS connections with proper authentication interfaces
- End-to-End Functionality: The complete pipeline from security event processing (backend) to analyst access (frontend) is functional

- **Security Implementation:** TLS certificates are properly deployed and functioning for secure communications
- **Operational Readiness:** These test results confirm the Mini SOC platform is fully deployed and ready for:
  - Security event ingestion and processing
  - Data storage and indexing for search capabilities
  - SOC analyst access via secure web interface
  - Authentication and authorization workflows
- Multi-Node Architecture Validation: The successful API health checks specifically confirm that the distributed architecture components can communicate effectively, ensuring the platform can handle production security monitoring workloads.

The combined results demonstrate that all critical components of the SOC infrastructure are operational, properly configured, and ready to support security operations center activities.





# Part Two - Threat Detection Rule

### 1-Use Case

The custom rule detects multiple failed SSH login attempts from the same source IP followed by a successful login using a new user account. This scenario models a brute-force attack followed by a compromise of credentials.

# 2-Implementation

The custom Wazuh rule with ID 100001 successfully detects SSH brute force attacks that are followed by a successful authentication. This rule is configured within the required range for custom rules, and it is assigned a severity level of 10, which indicates high priority. It is mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK technique T1110, covering brute force and credential access.

The detection logic specifies that if there are three or more failed SSH attempts within a 60-second window followed by a successful login, the rule will trigger. Correlation is achieved using the same source IP along with the if\_matched\_sid directive to enable stateful tracking. The description for this rule is: "SSH brute force detected: Multiple failed invalid user attempts from 203.0.113.5."

```
docker compose exec wazuh.master cat /var/ossec/etc/rules/local_rules.xml
<group name="local,ssh_bruteforce,">
  <!-- SSH Brute Force Detection: Multiple failures from same IP -->
  <rule id="100001" level="10" frequency="3" timeframe="60">
    <if_matched_sid>5710</if_matched_sid>
    <same_source_ip />
    <description>SSH brute force detected: Multiple failed invalid user attempts from $(srcip)</description>
      <id>T1110</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>authentication_failed,pci_dss_10.2.4,pci_dss_10.2.5,</group>
  <!-- SSH Success (any successful auth) -->
<rule id="100002" level="8">
    <if_matched_sid>5715</if_matched_sid>
    <description>SSH authentication success: User $(dstuser) from $(srcip)</description>
    <mitre>
      <id>T1078</id>
    </mitre>
    <group>authentication_success,pci_dss_10.2.5,</group>
  </rule>
 :/group>
```

### 3-Testing

The custom rule was tested using the test\_ssh\_bruteforce.sh script that simulates the attack pattern:

```
### Accepted password for validate from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ssh2' >> /var/ossec/logs/active-responses.log /
### Accepted password for validate from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ssh2' >> /var/ossec/logs/active-responses.log /
### Accepted password for invalid user testi from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ssh2' >> /var/ossec/logs/active-responses.log /
### echo "Failed attempt $i injected"
### sleep 1

### done
### accepted password for invalid user testi from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ssh2' >> /var/ossec/logs/active-responses.log /
### echo "Maiting 2 seconds..."
### sleep 1

### sleep 2

### pljecting successful login..."
### docker compose exce mazu master bash - "echo "Aug 29 $(date +%H:\M:\M:\S) server sshd[1830]: Accepted password for validuser from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ssh2' >> /var/ossec/logs/active-responses.log"
#### scho "Log injection complete. Check Mazuh dashboard for alerts."
```

```
kaoutar@KAOUTAR:~/soc-challenge/wazuh-docker/multi-node$ ./test_ssh_bruteforce.sh
Injecting failed SSH attempts...
Failed attempt 1 injected
Failed attempt 2 injected
Failed attempt 3 injected
Failed attempt 4 injected
Waiting 2 seconds...
Injecting successful login...
Log injection complete. Check Wazuh dashboard for alerts.
```

The rule successfully triggered and generated alerts in the Wazuh dashboard, including complete metadata. The source IP of the attack was 203.0.113.5, and the attack pattern involved multiple failed authentication attempts followed by a successful login. The user account affected was test1, which was used as a simulated compromised account. All of this activity occurred within the 60-second detection window specified by the rule. The rule was part of several groups, including local, ssh\_bruteforce, and authentication\_failed.

```
echo "Log injection complete. Check Wazuh dashboard for alerts."


<u>Kaoutar@!AQUITAR:*/soc-challenge/wazuh-docker/multi-node$</u> docker compose exec wazuh.master grep "Rule: 100001" /var/ossec/logs/alerts/alerts.log | tail -3

Rule: 100001 (level 10) -> 'SSH brute force detected: Multiple failed invalid user attempts from 203.0.113.5'

Rule: 100001 (level 10) -> 'SSH brute force detected: Multiple failed invalid user attempts from 203.0.113.5'

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```

The alerts are visible in the Wazuh dashboard under several sections. In the Discover tab, real-time alert generation can be monitored with filtering capabilities. The Rule Details section provides complete information about each rule, including the frequency, timeframes, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping. Additionally, the JSON Output section contains the full structured alert data, which can be used for SIEM integration and further analysis.





```
· predecoder.program_name vone
t predecoder.timestamp Aug 29 12:36:32
t previous_output
                          Aug 29 12:36:30 server sshd[1830]: Failed password for invalid user test1 from 203.0.113.5 p
                          ort 50234 ssh2
                          Aug 29 12:36:29 server sshd[1830]: Failed password for invalid user test1 from 203.0.113.5 p
                          ort 50234 ssh2
t rule.description
                          SSH brute force detected: Multiple failed invalid user attempts from 203.0.113.5
# rule.firedtimes
# rule.frequency
                          local, ssh_bruteforce, authentication_failed
t rule.groups
t rule.id
                          100001
                          10
# rule.level
rule.mail
                          false
                          T1110
t rule.mitre.id
                          Credential Access
t rule.mitre.tactic
                          Brute Force
t rule.mitre.technique
                          10.2.4, 10.2.5
t rule.pci_dss
                          Aug 29, 2025 @ 12:36:34.130
m timestamp
```

```
Table
            JSON
                                                                                                                                               "_index": "wazuh-alerts-4.x-2025.08.29",
  "_id": "Aw_b9ZgBjh6JX3ZSbZCd",
  "_version": 1,
  "_score": null,
  "_source": {
    "predecoder": {
      "hostname": "server",
"program_name": "sshd",
"timestamp": "Aug 29 13:44:09"
     "cluster": {
      "node": "manager",
"name": "wazuh"
     agent": {
      "name": "wazuh.master",
      "id": "000"
     "previous_output": "Aug 29 13:44:08 server sshd[1830]: Failed password for invalid user test1 from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ss
h2\\ nAug~29~13:44:06~server~sshd[1830]:~Failed~password~for~invalid~user~test1~from~203.0.113.5~port~50234~ssh2",
    "data": {
      "srcuser": "test1",
      "srcip": "203.0.113.5"
    },
```

```
"manager": {
  "name": "wazuh.master"
"rule": {
  "firedtimes": 1,
  "mail": false,
  "level": 10,
  "pci_dss": [
    "10.2.4",
    "10.2.5"
  "description": "SSH brute force detected: Multiple failed invalid user attempts from 203.0.113.5",
  "groups": [
    "local",
   "ssh_bruteforce",
   "authentication_failed"
    "technique": [
      "Brute Force"
    "id": [
      "T1110"
    "tactic": [
      "Credential Access"
  "id": "100001",
```

```
"frequency": 3
 "decoder": {
   "parent": "sshd",
   "name": "sshd"
 "full_log": "Aug 29 13:44:09 server sshd[1830]: Failed password for invalid user test1 from 203.0.113.5 port 50234 ssh2",
 "input": {
    "type": "log"
 "location": "/var/ossec/logs/active-responses.log",
 "id": "1756471451.18661"
 "timestamp": "2025-08-29T12:44:11.641+0000"
"fields": {
 "timestamp": [
   "2025-08-29T12:44:11.641Z"
"highlight": {
 "rule.id": [
   "sort": [
 1756471451641
```

### **Rule Effectiveness**

The custom rule demonstrates practical security monitoring capabilities by:

- Pattern Recognition: Successfully correlates multiple failed attempts with eventual success
- Threat Attribution: Maps to MITRE ATT&CK framework for threat intelligence integration

- Operational Integration: Generates actionable alerts within the SOC workflow
- Time-based Correlation: Uses configurable time windows for accurate attack detection

This implementation aligns with real-world SOC requirements for detecting credential-based attacks and provides security analysts with actionable intelligence.

### **Future Work**

Planned improvements include full Docker Swarm migration, high availability (multi-manager Swarm cluster, replicated indexers, redundant dashboards), disaster recovery planning (snapshots and restore), and optional enrichments such as geo-IP lookups, Slack/Teams integration, and automated SOAR playbooks.

### 1-Security Vulnerability Management

Container image vulnerabilities detected during Trivy scanning were accepted based on risk assessment. Many vulnerabilities originate from upstream Ubuntu base images and Wazuh source code dependencies, requiring vendor patches. Current mitigation includes network isolation, minimal exposed services, and planned quarterly security updates.

#### 2-Platform Enhancements

- **High Availability:** Multi-node Swarm cluster with replicated services and cross-zone redundancy.
- **Disaster Recovery:** Automated OpenSearch snapshots, configuration backups, and cross-region replication.
- Enrichments: MaxMind geo-IP integration, Slack/Teams notifications, and automated SOAR playbooks for incident response.
- **Monitoring:** Prometheus metrics, Grafana dashboards, and enhanced logging with retention policies.
- **Compliance:** NIST framework alignment, audit logging, and SOC 2 readiness preparation.

# **Conclusion**

This project demonstrates the deployment of a Wazuh-based Mini SOC with automated CI/CD, security scanning, and custom threat detection. The current implementation provides a production-like environment with clear paths toward Swarm-based scalability and high availability.