


~~Feb 10~~
~~Lec 4.~~

Let A: smoking and B: lung cancer


$$P(A) = 0.200$$

$$P(B) = 0.060$$

$$P(A \cap B) = 0.036$$



what is that Scale factor?



c is the zoom factor

$$P(B|A) = C P(AB) = \frac{P(A)}{P(A)} = P(AB) = \frac{P(AB)}{P(A)}$$

Probability of conditional probability

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(AB)}{P(B)} = P(AB) = P(A|B)P(B) = P(B|A) = \frac{P(A|B)P_B}{P(A)}$$

↑
Bayes Rule

$$P(A) = P(AB) + P(AB^c) = P(A|B)P(B) + P(A|B^c)P(B^c)$$

↑ we use conditional probability

If B_1, B_2, \dots, B_k are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.

$$\forall i \neq j : B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$$

if we get back the universe! we get

If you land in one of these squares you can't land into others

\sum they are mutually exclusive



$$\sum_{i=1}^k B_i$$

$$P(A) = \sum_{i=1}^k P(A|B_i) P(B_i) = \sum_{i=1}^k P(A|B_i) P(B_i)$$


"marginal out the B_i 's or integrating out the B_i 's just to get A back"

$$P(B_i|A) = \frac{P(A|B_i) P(B_i)}{\sum_{i=1}^k P(A|B_i) P(B_i)}$$

Bayes Theorem

Bayes Rule and Bayes Theorem for Random Variable.
 Imagine two random variable X, Y and the $\text{Supp}[X] = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ and $\text{Supp}[Y] = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$

$$P(X=2|Y=3)$$



$$\begin{aligned} P(Y=5) &= P(Y=5, X=1) + P(Y=5, X=2) + P(Y=5, X=3) \\ &\quad + P(Y=5, X=4) = \sum_{x \in \text{Supp}[X]} P(Y=5, X=x) \end{aligned}$$

$$P(X=2|Y=5) = \frac{P(X=2, Y=5)}{P(Y=5)}$$

$$P(Y) := P(Y=y) = \sum_{x \in \text{Supp}[X]} P(Y=y, X=x)$$

Joint Mass Function

$$P(X=x|Y=y) = \frac{P(X=x, Y=y)}{P(Y)} = \frac{P(X, Y)}{P(Y)}$$

↑
conditional PMF

continuous

$$f(y) = \int f(x,y) dx$$

Supp[x]

$$f_{x|y}(x|y) = \frac{f(x,y)}{f(y)}$$

Back to the story... can we use Bayes Rule to tell us anything about inference for parameter θ given data x ($x = \langle x_1, \dots, x_n \rangle$).

$$\text{consider: } P(\theta|x) = \frac{P(x|\theta)P(\theta)}{P(x)} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{JMF} \\ \text{but called likelihood} \end{array} \right\}$$

What is wrong w/ this equation?

Previously, θ , the parameter was assumed to be a fixed real value. Thus, $\theta \sim \text{Deg}(\theta)$. Then, this equation is trivial. If you plugin the actual value of θ on the r.h.s. then you get:

$$\underset{\theta \in \Theta}{\underset{\sim}{F}} \rightarrow P(\theta = \theta_0 | x) = \frac{P(x|\theta_0)P(\theta_0)}{\sum_{\theta} P(x|\theta)P(\theta)} = \frac{P(x|\theta_0)}{P(x|\theta_0)} = 1$$

$$P(\theta \neq \theta_0 | x) = \frac{P(x|\theta_0)P(\theta_0)}{\sum_{\theta} P(x|\theta)P(\theta)} = \frac{0}{P(x|\theta_0)} = 0$$

This was a mean exam problem, but not super interesting, since you don't know θ_0 and even if you did, this doesn't help w/ the three goals of inference.

What can I change, how can I make sense, here is the big leap.

- * Let θ be a random variable! Then $P(\theta)$ has a distribution (either discrete or continuous). But it's a constant! This is the big philosophical problem in Bayesian Statistics / Bayesian Inference. Some authors say it's still a constant but $P(\theta)$ represent uncertainty in its value. Purists say that's nonsense.

$$P(\theta|X) = \frac{P(X|\theta) P(\theta)}{P(X)} \xrightarrow{\text{prior}} \text{Posterior}$$

\downarrow

likelihood $P(X) \leftarrow$ prior predictor distribution

why is it called prior? prior is thoughts summed up in a distribution over θ the parameter space

** prior ** to seeing any data. There is no X within in. Frequentist say this is "subjective and not real"

posterior: thoughts summed up in a distribution over θ the parameter space: ** after ** \rightarrow

Seeing the data x which is why it's conditional on $X!$

Notation: for the rest of class "P" now denote discrete PMF / conditional mass function **or** continuous PDF / conditional density function. I won't use "F" anymore.

$$\tilde{F} = \text{iid Bernoulli}, X \in \{0, 1\}, P(X|\theta) = \theta^x (1-\theta)^{1-x}$$

$$\text{let } \mathcal{H}_\theta = \{0.5, 0.75\} \neq \{0, 1\}$$

$$P(\theta = 0.75 | X) \stackrel{?}{=} P(\theta = 0.5 | X)$$

$$P(\theta = 0.75 | X) \stackrel{\text{Bayes Thm.}}{=} \frac{P(X|\theta = 0.75)P(\theta = 0.75)}{P(X|\theta = 0.5)P(\theta = 0.5) + P(X|\theta = 0.75)P(\theta = 0.75)}$$

$$P(X|\theta = 0.75) = 0.75^2 \cdot 0.25 = .141, P(X|\theta = 0.5) = .5^2 = .125$$

We need $P(\theta = 0.75)$ and $P(\theta = 0.5)$ to complete the calculation, that's the prior $P(\theta)$. It's subjective. What do you think it should be?

An automatic rule is called the "principal of indifference" (Laplace's idea so it's sometimes called the "Laplace prior"). This principal says that all value of θ in the parameter space are equally likely. In our case,

$$P(\theta) = \begin{cases} 0.5 & \text{if } \theta = 0.75 \\ 0.5 & \text{if } \theta = 0.5 \end{cases}$$

In general $P(\theta) = \frac{1}{|\Theta|}$

this formula only works for finite parameter space.

use $\frac{P(X|\theta) P(\theta)}{P(x)}$ formula

$$P(\theta = 0.75 | x) = \frac{.141 \cdot (.8)}{.125 \cdot (.8) + .141 \cdot (.8)} = 0.53$$

$$P(\theta = 0.5 | x) = \frac{.125 \cdot (.8)}{.125 \cdot (.8) + .141 \cdot (.8)} = 0.47$$

$\theta = 0.75$
is your
point
estimate

$$P(\theta = 0.75) = 0.5 \implies P(\theta = 0.75 | x) = 0.53$$

This is called Bayesian Conditionalism