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Do citizens' voices count in local spending? An empirical study on the effects of citizen participation on local budget performance

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Abstract

Advocates assert that opening government processes to the participation of citizens improves governance and service delivery, and ultimately help bring forth greater prosperity for all. While qualitative evidence are abundant on the exemplars of participatory governance and the results they brought to citizens, the quantitative literature is inconclusive at best, and at worst proves the lack of a causal relationship between participation and desired governance and development outcomes.

This study contributes to the body of empirical evidence showing that participatory governance has generally positive, though mixed, effects on public financial management. In particular, this study investigates the effects of the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local government units' (LGUs) development councils, which is mandated by the Local Government Code in the Philippines. Using panel regression, the study finds that CSO participation—particularly its more substantial forms like submission of action plans to follow through on council discussions and provision of technical support to the council—has a positive effect on increasing expenditures in the aggregate and on key development sectors. However, CSO participation is also associated with constrained fiscal resources, particularly LGU dependence on national transfers. Moreover, the effects of CSO participation on local budget outcomes are not always straightforward: these are significantly dependent on context and some effects may likely be nonlinear.

Though this study does not claim to establish causality, it nevertheless affirms the policy direction to broaden and deepen participatory governance. Nevertheless, reforms are needed to produce more substantive metrics of CSO and citizen participation, to understand and improve the enabling environment for participation, and to invest in studies that establish the elusive impacts of participatory governance.

Keywords: local government units, public financial management, participatory governance, civil society organizations, panel regression

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

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

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I.
Introduction

The Philippines relishes in global acclaim as a pioneer in citizen participation in all levels of governance, yet it also suffers from malaises that citizen participation has been touted to cure.

Since the revival of democracy in 1986 through the EDSA People Power uprising, civil society organizations (CSOs) have emerged and flourished at the national and local levels to provide a necessary check to the power abuses that marked the Marial Law regime, give a voice to marginalized sectors in society, and contribute to statecraft and social development. Aiming to institutionalize "People Power" in government, the post-EDSA state has sought to open greater and formal spaces for citizen and CSO participation in all levels of the government. For instance, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, enshrined the crucial role of CSOs, non-government organizations (NGOs), and people's organizations (POs) as "active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy."[1] It mandates, among others, the representation of CSOs in Local Development Councils (LDCs) and other local special bodies. It was hoped that CSO participation would help improve the quality of governance and, eventually, enable LGUs to better respond to socioeconomic development challenges.

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[1] Section 34, Chapter IV, Title I, Book I of R.A. No. 7160.

Although qualitative evidence are abundant on exemplars of participatory governance and the results they brought to citizens, the literature on the quantitative evidences that validate and generalize their impacts has been relatively thin. Available studies in the Philippines are inconclusive at best, and at worst proves the lack of a relationship between participation and better governance and, ultimately, socioeconomic development. A recent study found that the membership of CSOs in LDCs did not have a significant effect on LGUs' budget utilization rates (BURs). Seeing the problem of inadequate measurement, the study recommended "that more substantive measurements of the quantity, quality, and impact of CSO participation" be formulated and utilized (C. Magno et al., 2022). This thesis attempts to expand the available metrics of CSO participation, then to quantitatively test the relationship between CSO participation and the quality of governance, particularly, local fiscal management.

This study is relevant on the following grounds. First, the Supreme Court decision on the Mandanas-Garcia case in 2018. The landmark ruling not only corrected the computation of LGUs' share in national revenues but also forced the issue of the still-incomplete devolution of public services under the LGC. Second, the national government has been providing billions in subsidies to LGUs in a bid to promote good governance standards, including transparency and citizen participation. Such policy intent has been enshrined in law through the Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) Act of 2019 (R.A. No. 11292) and recent issuances to operationalize participatory mechanisms. Third, the country since 2012 has been a member of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and,

under it, has committed to promote meaningful participation in local governance mechanisms.

To address this objective, the subsequent discussions will be divided into seven main chapters. First, the study begins with a review of the norms and standards of fiscal openness as well as the literature globally and in the Philippines that attempt to quantify the link between citizen participation and effective budgeting (Sec II). It then outlines key hypotheses and the methodology to test these (III) and explores and describes the available observational data (IV). Following these sections are the description of the results of the panel regression analyses covering all LGUs and for municipalities, cities, and provinces (V). After distilling key findings from the evidence (VI), this study concludes with insights for future participatory budgeting reforms as well as further studies to evaluate their impact (VII).

II.
Theoretical Background

Advocates in government, civil society, and the international community argue that opening the government's processes, especially those which involve the utilization of resources and delivery of services, helps curb corruption, improve public services, and ultimately benefits society. The OGP—of which the Philippines was among the seven co-founding countries— was created in 2011 based on the belief that transparency, citizen participation, and accountability lead to improved public services and, consequently, to greater prosperity (2011). Is this normative aspiration founded? A better understanding of the underlying theory of change between it and local development is called for. This section outlines the available literature and government policy on measuring participation particularly in the budget process; the current state of evidence globally on the impacts of budget participation and fiscal openness on the quality of governance and on development outcomes; and available Philippine studies that explore this theme.

1 Measuring Participation

Although openness is often considered as a means for loftier development goals, it is also viewed as an outcome in and of itself (Capuno, 2005; Medina-Guce, 2020a). Public participation has been framed as a ladder (Arnstein, 1969) or a spectrum (International Association for Public Participation, n.d.) where citizens engage governance processes at various stages, in varying degrees of genuineness, and with different levels of influence over policy and impact on development outcomes. Against the

broadly accepted notion of participation as a gradient, various evaluative instruments have been put forward to measure it (see Medina-Guce, 2020b for a review of participation norms and instruments).

In the Philippines, participation in local governance has been measured mainly as compliance with statutory requirements. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), for instance, has been mandated to monitor whether LGUs have accredited CSOs and has given them sufficient seats in LDCs. Compliance to such has been included in the SGLG since 2014[2]. Moreover, beginning 2017, additional data was included on the actual attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings, whether they were tapped to provide technical assistance to LDC secretariats, and whether they submitted action plans to the LDC. Representation of CSOs and NGOs in key local bodies was also included in the SGLG: (i) the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMC, since 2016), (ii) Peace and Order Council and Anti-Drug Abuse Council (since 2017), and (iii) Solid Waste Management Board (since 2017).

The mere presence of CSOs in local bodies is, however, a narrow metric of participation. Recognizing this, the government commissioned the development of a new set of Participatory Governance Metrics (PGM). In undertaking this work, Medina-Guce (2020b) defined three dimensions of

[2] In the 2014 and 2015 SGLG, data available was on whether CSOs were represented in the LDC or not. In the 2016 SGLG, data available was on whether the CSO representatives consisted at least one-fourth of the LDC membership. Beginning 2017, new variables were added to measure participation beyond their mere presence.

participatory governance which are measured by 15 indicators: (i) space or environment of participation, which pertains to how participatory governance is anchored in policy and enabled by access to information and institutional capacity; (ii) engagement or process of participation, which pertains to the quality of interactions between government and citizens; and (iii) outcomes or results of participation, which is not only about how program decisions and results are influenced but also on how government-citizen relations are changed. The tool has been piloted recently but has not been rolled out to all LGUs (also see Medina-Guce 2022a and 2022b for results of pilot tests).

2 Fiscal Openness and Its Impacts: Global Evidence

Specifically on participation in the budget, the Open Budget Survey (OBS) since 2006 has been regularly measuring fiscal openness[3] across countries (International Budget Partnership, n.d.). OBS measures participation through the presence of participatory mechanisms throughout the budget cycle alongside transparency through the availability and accessibility of eight essential budget documents and reports, and accountability through establishment of oversight from the legislature and audit. In the Philippines, the government made great strides in improving its OBS

[3] Fiscal openness is in essence the broad umbrella used to characterize policies, reforms, and innovations that promote greater transparency, participation, and accountability in PFM. The Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT)—a global network of national budget ministries, international financial institutions, and non-government organizations advocating for greater fiscal openness—define such through a set of High Level Principles on Fiscal Transparency, Participation, and Accountability (n.d.).

scores and rankings after pursuing fundamental budget reforms coupled by efforts to bring the budget process closer to citizens (Capistrano, 2017).[4]

However, the evidence on the touted impacts of fiscal transparency and participation on the quality of governance and on development outcomes is mixed. In a systematic review on the impacts of transparency, participation, and accountability in public finance, de Renzio & Wehner (2017) found that of the studies conducted before 2015, "(v)ery few studies can plausibly claim to identify a causal effect of fiscal openness."[5] These include a handful of experimental or quasi-experimental studies on how disclosure and participation mechanisms affect key development outcomes such as improved budget allocation and reduced corruption. A follow-up to this systematic review (Haus, et. Al, 2022) found growing evidence on the effect of open governance on budget process outcomes since 2015.[6] Specifically on citizen participation, while causal evidence remains thin, recent studies suggest that it has positive effects on budget

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[4] Capistrano (2017) documented the country's rise from a country with limited transparency in 2006-2012 to one with significant budget transparency in the 2015 OBS with a score of 61; and with significant participation with 65.In the 2021 OBS, the Philippines continues to be a leader in the OBS, with a transparency score of 68, an oversight score of 74, and a participation score of 35. Though the latter is low, it is still significantly above the global average of 14.

[5] De Renzio & Wehner (2017) reviewed 38 studies that investigate how transparency and participation in the budget reduce corruption, improve governance, and promote socioeconomic development. Only eight (8) of these were able to establish causal links through experimental or econometric methods.

[6] Haus, Wehner & de Renzio (2022) reviewed more than 200 publications and papers, of which 32 were selected to be included in the systematic review after meeting criteria set: published since 2015, has an independent variable or treatment that relates to budget transparency or participation, specifies outcomes that relate to governance, development, or quality of the budget, and could make a claim to identify causality.

outcomes such as higher revenues, increased resources for health, and even attainment of outcomes such as reduced infant mortality.

In interpreting quantitative evaluations that find this weak causal link, Fox (2015) cites three takeaways. First, information disclosure is not enough as an intervention although it is a necessary step to enabling participation. Second, efforts on citizen monitoring "often lacks bite" in terms of giving citizens a greater voice and vote in decision-making. Finally, participatory mechanisms are often captured by local political elites. He argues for a nuanced approach to interpreting the evidence, which looks more deeply into the kinds of information and participatory mechanisms which are being offered by reforms.

Recently added to the literature on the impacts of fiscal openness is a new study (Elberry, et al., 2022) which explores its effects on the technical efficiency of public spending.[7] The study found an inverted U-shaped or concave relationship between transparency and spending efficiency: openness improves efficiency to an extent until excessive requirements create inefficiencies. However, the same relationship was not statistically significant for participation.

[7] Elberry, et al. (2022) use a novel approach in that they first established a metric on the "technical efficiency" of public spending by countries using data envelopment analysis. This new metric was then to regressed against transparency and participation scores under the OBS.

3 Public Participation Impacts in the Philippines.

There is no lack of literature documenting the origins of Philippine civil society and their engagement in governance and public finance institutions (such as Tapales, 2003; Wurfel, 2004; and Dressel, 2012); the central importance of citizen participation in decentralization and reform (such as Aceron, 2018; and Medina-Guce, 2020a); government-led efforts (such as F. Magno, 2015; and Capistrano, 2017); or multiple case studies of innovative local governments and CSOs.

On the latter, the most prominent of which is the celebrated case Naga City, the hometown of the late Mayor and former Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesse Robredo, where the People's Council concept was born. The Naga City People's Council was mandated by local fiat to be an independent aggrupation of CSOs and NGOs in the city and be present in all local special bodies and legislative committees (F. Magno, 2015). On the CSO side, the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAGG) emerged in the post-Marcos milieu to pioneer the citizens' monitoring of local infrastructure projects, even successfully causing the removal of erring public works officials (Dressel, 2012).

However, studies that quantify the impacts of participatory governance have been limited. A notable example of such is a study by Capuno (2005), which tested the viability of human development indicators as a proxy for local governance quality, and explored other themes of local governance such as participation. Arguing that "social inclusion should itself count as development," the study found through a household survey that participation has intrinsic benefits: membership in organizations as well

as direct involvement in government projects were linked to satisfaction on the incumbent local administration and some key local officials. In a follow up study, Capuno and Garcia (2008) used propensity score matching to find out if information about the Governance for Local Development Index (GI) could entice citizens to take part in civic activities or be a member of local organizations.

In the Philippines, the Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) was implemented with World Bank financing from 2003. Like community driven-development programs globally, KALAHI-CIDSS incorporated components of participatory budgeting: through barangay assemblies, beneficiaries selected projects to be funded. Saguin (2018) revisited household survey data of KALAHI-CIDSS beneficiaries and, used differences-in-differences to tease out causal effects. He found that the program helped to improve the income of poor households, while there was no impact on other social outcomes like access to services, likelihood to participate, and trust (also cited in Haus, et al., 2022).

Participatory governance reforms also attempted to establish mechanisms to parallel existing local bodies under the LGC, such as the case of Bottom-Up Budgeting (BUB). In their evaluation of the BUB program during the administration of President Benigno S. Aquino (2010-2016), Manasan, et al. (2017) found that BUB has improved perceptions on public service access

and delivery. However, it found that the effect of the program on local poverty reduction—the overt objective of BUB—was unclear.[8]

Subsequently, the administration of President Rodrigo R Duterte (2016-2022) abolished BUB. They, instead, pivoted back to strengthening existing local mechanisms like the LDC. It implemented the Assistance to Municipalities (AM) program that, among others, incentivized LGUs to improve the functionality of their LDCs and ensure adequate CSO representation. In a baseline study of governance gaps to be addressed by AM, Sicat, et al. (2020) fielded a survey among LGUs and CSOs. It found, among others, that majority of LGU representatives perceived CSO participation to be desirable, and believed that CSOs should participate in all stages of local development planning. Meanwhile, most CSOs surveyed believed that they are influential in local development planning: from proper prioritization to ensuring sectoral representation.

Most recently, C. Magno et al. (2022) inquired into how local governments' fiscal performance is influenced by several factors, including metrics of local governance that are available through the SGLG. This includes CSO participation, albeit narrowly defined as LGUs' compliance to the required proportion of CSOs in LDCs and special bodies. The study found no statistically significant relationship between CSO representation and

[8] In a notable commentary on BUB, Aceron (2019) said the program failed to empower grassroots CSOs from the center because the same central bureaucracy failed to ensure that the grassroots projects were carried through.

LGUs' budget utilization rates (BURs), though the authors nuance this as due to the insufficient measurement of participation. Stronger determinants of the BUR that were found by the study included the size of budgets particularly of capital outlays (negatively influences BUR), vulnerability to disasters (negative), and adverse audit observations (positive).

In summary, global norms on public participation and literature on its impacts of on the quality of governance and on development outcomes have become richer in recent years. In the Philippines, studies have been produced to quantify participation through specific policy reforms and their effects. Although evidence that explicitly links local participation with the quality of local governance is rather thin, there is an opportunity to use available observational data collected by government on CSO participation in LDCs for econometric analysis.

III.
Hypotheses and Methodology

This study aims to carry on with investigating this linkage between CSO participation in LGUs and the quality of governance—measured through local fiscal performance—using a variety of available metrics. It aims to test the following hypotheses:

H_0 CSO participation has no discernable effect on an LGU's budget performance.

H_1 CSO participation is associated with better LGU budget performance.

H_2 CSO participation may be linked to better budget performance under certain conditions.

The null hypothesis is what the present literature (de Renzio and Fung, 2017; Elberry et al., 2022; and C. Magno et al., 2022) has so far established: that there is no statistically significant evidence of participation improving budget performance. In contrast, hypothesis #1 is the pure yet elusive ideal that CSO participation helps to improve the quality of local governance as measured by an LGU's fiscal performance. Meanwhile, hypothesis #2 explores a more nuanced view of participatory governance that Fox (2015) and Medina-Guce (various) have sought to unbundle. For this study, this nuanced hypothesis is defined as whether the effect of citizen participation on budget performance could be more evident: (a) in specific sectors or aspects of expenditure; and (b) within types of LGUs (i.e., among provinces, cities, and municipalities).

To test these hypothesis, this study will analyze the relationship between CSO participation and budget performance outcomes through panel regression while controlling for LGU effects, using models patterned after C. Magno, et al. (2022).[9]

The panel linear model is specified as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{y_{hit}} = \boldsymbol{D'_{it}\delta} + \boldsymbol{X'_{it}\beta} + u_{it} \quad [1]$$

where y_{hit} stands for budget performance measured by the hth metric of the ith LGU in year t; $\mathbf{D}_{it}$ are measures of participatory governance; $\mathbf{X}_{it}$ represents the governance and socioeconomic characteristics of LGUs; and u_{it} is the error term, which may be decomposed further as the sum of α_i (LGU effects) and ε_{it} (idiosyncratic error).[10] The rest of this section spells out the methodology of this study given the limitations of the available data as well as assumptions to be made based on these.

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[9] For reference, C. Magno et al. (2022) used the following model specification:

$$lnBUR_{it} = \beta_0 + \alpha\ ln\ ln\ (U_{it}) + \gamma V_{it} + \delta W_{it} + \epsilon X_{it} + \sigma Y_{it} + \pi Z_{it} + \mu_{it}$$

where BUR_{it} is the budget utilization rate of LGU i at time t; U_{it} is a vector that contains various budget data; V_{it} is a vector that contains several financial indicators; W_{it} is a vector that contains a couple of social data variables; X_{it} is a vector that contains the good governance indicators; Y_{it} is a vector containing the disaster vulnerability variables; and Z_{it} is a vector that contains dummy variables indicating municipality, city, or province. This thesis simplified the model specification to focus on CSO participation.

[10] This main model will be compared against a model specification without control variables, i.e., testing the direct relationship of $D_{it}$with Y_{hit}. Annex C spells out all the regression analysis, but this paper only cites results from the main specification.

4 The Data

This study constructed a data set which combines local budget and fiscal performance data with available measures of local participation and other crucial covariates. The data set builds on the work already done by the World Bank (2021) and by C. Magno et al. (2022), by enhancing the indicators on citizen participation by drawing from the SGLG data set of the DILG (*see Table 1 below and Annex A for descriptions of the variables used. Section IV provides descriptive analyses of the said data*).

Table 1. The Variables Used

Indicator	Description
***y*: Budget Performance**	
Local Revenue Growth	Year-on-year percentage change in revenues of an LGU.
Dependence on National Government Transfers	Proportion of national government transfers in an LGU's total receipts. Computed for only IRA / NTA.
Share of Productive Expenditures (Class)	Ratio of budget allocated for maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE) and capital outlays (CO) against total approved budget. Additionally, shares of MOOE and CO of the total budget.
Share of Productive Expenditures (Sectors)	Proportion of budget allocated for all sector or functions except general public services and debt servicing against the total budget. Additionally, share of key functions in the budget: education, health, social services, economic services, Local Development Fund (LDF) and Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF).
Per Capita Expenditure	Ratio of nominal actual budget utilization and population in 2018, aggregate and per key function and expense class (see above).
Budget Utilization Rate	Ratio of actual budget utilization over the approved (or final) budget for the current year. Computed for the total budget and for key functional / sectoral allocations and expense classes (see above).
***D*: Participation & Open Government**	
CSO Membership in LDC	CSO participation metrics under the SGLG: (i) dummy representing whether an LGU's LDC has at least 25% of its members from CSOs; (ii) proportion of CSO members in the LDC; (iii) dummy of whether the LDC tapped the CSO to provide technical support to its secretariat;

Indicator	Description
	(iv) dummy of whether the CSO members participated in LDC meetings and deliberations; (v) dummy of whether a CSO member submitted a CSO action plan to follow through on LDC discussions.
CSO Membership in LDRRMC Committee	Dummy variables on whether an LGU's LDRRMC has at least four (4) CSO members.
***X*: Control Variables**	
Set 1: Unique Functional Characteristics	
Size of functional budgets	Natural log of the final budget amount of: (i) expense classes, i.e., personnel services, MOOE, CO, debt servicing; (ii) sectors and funds, i.e., general public services, economic services, social services, education, health, local development fund, local disaster risk reduction and management fund.
Set 2: Governance and Capacity Indicators	
Budget Per Capita	Final budget divided by the population.
Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) Scores	Aggregated pass/fail scores of an LGU in the following: (i) financial administration; (ii) disaster preparedness; (iii) social protection; (iv) peace & order; (v) ease of doing business and competitiveness; (vi) environmental management; (vii) culture and heritage; (viii) overall score.
Transparency and Access to Information	Dummy whether an LGU has complied with the Full Disclosure Policy (FDP) requirements to post certain financial documents (i) online on the FDP portal and (ii) physically in conspicuous places
Audit Observation	Dummy on audit observation rendered by COA on the financial accounts of the LGU: (i) unqualified; (ii) qualified (as benchmark); (iii) disclaimer; (iv) adverse; (v) no opinion or report.
Set 3: Socioeconomic Development	
Population Density, 2018	Population in the province, city, or municipality divided by land area
Poverty Rate, 2018	Official estimates of income poverty (for provinces and some key cities) and small area estimates (for cities and municipalities)
Urban Population, 2018	Proportion of urban population in the province, city, or municipality

In defining the empirical strategy, the limitations of the available data must be accounted for. First, this study's metrics of participatory governance may not provide a full, substantive picture of the quality and results of participation. Although the inclusion of CSOs in the deliberations of LDCs is a necessary step to providing citizens with the

opportunity to influence local priorities, their mere presence may not be a sufficient factor. Unfortunately, more substantive measurements are not available on a broad scale: the proposed Participatory Governance Metrics of Medina-Guce (2020b) has only been piloted in Region 7.

Second, participatory governance does not occur in a vacuum. The participatory governance literature argues that mechanisms for citizens' participation require an enabling environment to work. Such may include difficult-to-measure factors, e.g., progressiveness of the local leadership, the openness of the LGU to citizen's participation, LGU capacity overall and to manage CSO participation, the robustness of local civil society and private sectors, among others. These indicators could be thought to influence both the outcome and explanatory variables and, moreover, not currently measured rigorously. Some factors that characterize the political and economic environment in an LGU—e.g., participation in elections, contestability of elections, presence of political clans and dynasties, etc.—may be included in future studies.

Finally, this study does not aim to determine causal relationship between citizen's participation on local budget outcomes. It only wishes to examine if a correlation exists. This is because of the limitation in data that will allow us to control for the effects of other relevant variables.

5 Panel Regression Approach

The data set being used in this study is an unbalanced data set. While the data set covers all of 81 provinces, 146 cities, and 1,488 municipalities, not all of these LGUs have valid data points, and some of which have missing variables. For instance, some variables of participation are only available in the SGLG for 2017 to 2018. The LGU budget data set may also have some encoding errors owing to the novel method used. Also, there are outliers that need to be clipped out lest they bias the results.[11] For instance, there are observations where the CSO membership is an overwhelming majority of the LDC, up to 100%: an implausible scenario.

Apart from the missing values, omitted variable bias may also likely be present, as described in the preceding subsection, and may cause endogeneity issues. A fixed effects (FE) model may be conventionally used as a strategy to address these issues, however, this relies on the assumption that the unmeasured characteristics as well as other unobserved individual fixed effects are time-invariant. Certain geographic characteristics of these LGUs may obviously be considered as time invariant, but others such as LGU capacity, robustness of CSO sector, and even characteristics of the leadership may change over time. Meanwhile, a random effects (RE) model, which was used in C. Magno et al. (2022), may be a more efficient model compared to fixed effects. Even as it may not be able to fully control for unobserved heterogeneity across the LGUs, the random effects model

[11] The study employs a form of "Winsorization" where a variable's values that fall below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile were changed to "NA."

retains information that fixed effects regression disregards. Its use, however, assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is exogenous, and violation of this assumption may lead to a certain level of bias in the model. This is an assumption that C. Magno et al. (2022) were willing to make and is thus worth considering in this study.

With the oftentimes "confusing and contradictory" guidance in available literature on model selection,[12] Gelman and Hill (2007) have advised that one should "always use multilevel modeling ('random effects')." This study follows this advice through the specification of a "nested" model where the error components include a within-group effect defined as Region of the LGU. This hierarchical modeling may help control for unobserved effects of the regional grouping of the LGUs and its associated implications on political and socioeconomic development without the overly restrictive imposition of individual fixed effects. The nested random effects model is specified as follows:

$$y_{hijt} = \boldsymbol{D}'_{ijt}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{ijt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + u_{ijt} \qquad [2]$$

[12] The selection of the panel regression model to be used may not be straightforward. One might conduct a Hausman specification test to determine whether fixed effects and random effects are systematically different, perhaps in the procedure that Dougherty (2011) presents.

However, apart from the considerations spelled out in Part B and the impracticality of shifting between fixed and random effects in the narrative depending on the results of the specification test, recent empirical studies (such as by Clark and Linzer, 2015) showing that such a test may not necessarily be a reliable tool.

where j is an index representing regions where LGUs belong; and where the error term u_{ijt} is composed of the group effect μ_j, the nested effect ν_{ij}, and idiosyncratic error ε_{ijt}.

6 Empirical Strategy

Guided by the above, this study adopts the following empirical strategy. The first is that the availability of citizen participation variables will be prioritized. As such, only observations from years 2017 and 2018 will be included in this study, when all the explanatory variables are available. This also somehow addresses the endogenous effect of the 2016 elections.

Second, the regression analyses will be conducted across all LGUs and then for each LGU type. This segmentation of the regression analysis may not only help to control for heterogeneity but also surface nuances across and within the LGU types.

Third, each of these sets of regression analyses will test for all dependent variables: the six aggregate budget outcomes and the function-specific outcomes (e.g., budget share, expenditure per capita, and BUR for key expense classes and sectors). This study is not only interested in the relationship between participation and aggregate budget outcomes but also the possibility that key budget sectors are influenced more by CSO participation.

Fourth, this study primarily uses and cites the results of the nested random effects models [specification 2]. Alternative panel model specifications, most notably the fixed effects model, will be implemented in the background for comparison and will be cited in this study when relevant. Also implemented in the background are analyses that use a version of these models without control variables (see Annex C).

Fifth, while the inclusion of multiple variables in the model aims to avoid omitted variable bias, such may lead to multicollinearity. To minimize the effect of this eventuality, analyses were undertaken to identify potentially problematic variables and, as necessary, exclude them from the model. Stepwise regressions—or regression analyses that take the explanatory variables on CSO participation one by one—have also been undertaken to tease out any effects that may have been drowned out in the baseline model.

Sixth, the study also takes interest in how key variables may not necessarily be linear and how they may interact with each other. To recall, a nonlinear relationship between fiscal transparency and budget efficiency was found by Elberry, et al. (2022), where the positive effects of transparency are diminished and turn negative at a certain point. To test for nonlinearity, a squared estimator of the proportion of CSOs in the LDC will be specified. On interaction effects, it will be interesting to see how variables amplify or counteract each other.

Finally, it must be considered that five of the six main dependent variables are expressed as percentages where a linear model may not always be appropriate. As could be gleaned in the distribution plots in the exploratory data analysis (see Annex B), these variables are fairly normally distributed, and thus a linear model may still be useful.[13] But as key dependent variables are proportions that are bounded between 0 and 1, a beta regression model[14] may be worth considering and is thus implemented for four of the main dependent variables: NTA dependence, share of productive expense classes, share of productive sectors, and BUR[15]. Their results will be discussed in comparison to the results of the nested random effects model to check for consistency of findings.

The econometric analysis conducted for this study uses the **R** language for statistical computing (R Core Team, 2023) deployed through **Rstudio** (Posit Team, 2023). Key packages used are **plm** for the panel regression analysis (Croissant & Millo, 2008), **betareg** (Grün et al, 2012) for the beta regression, **tidyverse** for data cleaning and exploratory analysis (Wickham et al., 2019), **knitr** for formatting key sections of this report (Xie, 2023), and **stargazer** for generating regression tables (Hlavac, 2022).

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[13] Except that NTA dependence and the BUR are skewed to the left (*see Annex B*).

[14] Specifically, beta regression using logit and probit link functions. For each, two specifications are constructed: one where only control variables are specified (akin to the OLS or "pooling" model), and another where dummy variables for provinces are added to emulate fixed effects at the level of provinces (dummy variables per LGU could not be accommodated by the computer program).

[15] BUR values above 100% are clipped out to accommodate the beta regression restrictions. Though ideally actual spending should be kept within the approved budget, in reality expenditures may exceed the budget due to a number of reasons including improper accounting of prior year expenditures and additional spending under supplemental appropriations.

IV.
The Panel Data:
Description & Exploratory Analysis

This study constructed a data set which combines local budget and fiscal performance data with available measures of local participation and other crucial covariates. The main indicators are described below alongside descriptive analyses (*See Annex B for full summary statistics*).

1 Dependent Variable: Budget Performance (y_{hit}).

The data set used by C. Magno et al. (2022) built on the work of the World Bank (2021), which was in turn built using novel methods. World Bank used machine learning to extract detailed budget information from financial audit reports on LGUs by the Commission on Audit (CoA). Such data, which spans from 2015 to 2018,[16] includes the proposed, approved (or final), and actual (implemented) budgets of LGUs at the level of expense classifications within budget functions or sectors. The World Bank also drew data from the Statement of Receipts and Expenditures of the Department of Finance – Bureau of Local Government (DoF-BLGF). This data set enabled the computation of the Budget Utilization Rate (BUR)—the ratio of actual and final budgets—for each LGU, for their overall utilization as well as utilization of budgets per expense class and sector.

[16] As explained in Section V, this study focuses on fiscal years 2017 to 2018 to prioritize the availability of participation data. Moreover, the data has been Winsorized to address extreme outliers.

However, it must be recognized that budget utilization presents a narrow picture of LGUs' fiscal health and priorities. Broadly speaking, public financial management (PFM) systems should help governments achieve fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency (Campos and Pradhan, 1997). These PFM goals are approximated by indicators that have been derived from the World Bank data set.

Fiscal Sustainability. In central government contexts, aggregate fiscal discipline pertains to governments' ability to balance expenditures and revenues, and is typically measured by the fiscal deficit. However, LGUs are prohibited by the LGC to incur deficits. Moreover, LGUs have raked up fiscal surpluses, indicating not just a glut in resources but the inability to utilize these. For this paper, we use variables that measure the fiscal sustainability of LGUs through increasing LGUs' fiscal means and reducing their dependency on national transfers.

Growth of locally generated revenues indicates LGUs' ability to collect local real property, business, and other taxes and revenues. From 2017 to 2018, annual local revenue growth averaged 18% Although municipalities experienced the highest growth—as high as an average of 15% in 2017—cities continue to generate significantly higher revenues compared to municipalities and provinces (*see Figure 1*).

Meanwhile, *NTA dependence* continued to be high at 80%. Municipalities and provinces are more NTA dependent, compared to cities which are more capable of generating revenues from real property, business, and other taxes (*see Figure 2*).

Figure 1. Mean Annual Growth of Local Revenue



Figure 2. Mean NTA Dependency Rates



Allocative Efficiency. This outcome pertains to the ability of LGUs to spend on the right priorities: to allocate more resources to development needs. This implies that LGUs must increase the share of productive expenditures, as opposed to overhead and other expenditures not for socioeconomic development. There are two ways to measure productive expenditures. The first is by using the *combined shares of budgets for maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE) and for capital outlays (CO) in the total budget*. The remainder are budgets for personnel services (PS), debt servicing, and other unclassified items. This is, of course, an imperfect definition as MOOE still contains both overhead expenditures to maintain LGU operations as well as spending on goods and services needed to deliver socioeconomic programs. Based on this, 60% of LGUs' budgets, on average, are allocated for MOOE and CO, with provinces and cities allocating larger shares (*See Figure 3*).

Figure 3. Mean Share of Productive Expense Classes in the Budget



The second method is the *combined budgetary shares of education, health, labor and employment, housing, social services, economic services, the LDF, and the LDRRMF*. This results in a lower share of productive expenditures at an average of 41%. Still, provinces continue to allocate larger shares to productive expenditures at 56% (*See Figure 4*).

Figure 4. Mean Share of Productive Sectors and Funds in the Budget



Operational Efficiency. Finally, this pertains to the ability of LGUs to utilize resources efficiently while optimizing value for money, and ultimately to deliver services with measurable development. For this study, we use two indicators of operational efficiency: (a) per capita expenditures, which is a rough proxy for LGUs' overall capability to deliver services, and (b) the budget utilization rate (BUR), which stands for the rate of actual expenditures against the approved budgets of LGUs.

LGUs per capita expenditures average PHP 3,274 annually. As expected, cities spend more per capita at PHP 4,742. Meanwhile, provinces spend the least per person at PHP 2,129 (*See Figures 5*). Growth in per capita expenditures also generally follows growth in per capita productive spending, which averages PHP 1,301 yearly across the period covered.

Figure 5. Mean Expenditures per Capita



The *budget utilization rate* or BUR has been the subject of the study by C. Magno et al. (2022). On average, LGUs utilize about 78% of their budgets. Cities tend to have lower BUR at 69%, while municipalities' are higher at 79% (See Figure 6).. The overall BUR of LGUs have been decreasing as LGUs are not able to absorb increasing budgets particularly of capital outlays (World Bank, 2021; C. Magno et al, 2022). The LGUs' utilization of their productive budgets, including capital outlays, is lower at 72%

Figure 6. Mean Budget Utilization Rate



2 Explanatory Variable: Participation ($D'_{it}\delta$).

Beginning 2017, measures on the functionality of LDCs have been added to the SGLG. These measures include whether the Council was organized and if CSO members of the council meet or exceed the 25% requirement of the LGC. Other indicators that are available in the SGLG[17] are: (a) whether the number of CSOs in the LDC meets the minimum 25% of the membership; (b) the proportion of CSOs as members in the LDC; (c) whether the LDC tapped CSOs—non-government organizations, academic institutions, or research institutions—to provide technical

[17] Each SGLG round has a detailed methodology on the fiscal years covered, and this tends to change across rounds, but typically these cover the prior year's outcomes. For simplicity, we assume that an SGLG covers outcomes from the prior fiscal year.

support to the LDC secretariat; (d) if the CSO-members actually participated in the LDC discussions; and (e) if the member-CSOs submitted an action plan to follow up on LDC deliberations.

These SGLG indicators measure varying depths of CSO participation: from mere presence (about 70% of LGUs met the minimum CSO representatives in the LDC) to more meaningful engagement (about 17% of LGUs have CSOs submit an action plan). Though the indicators do not reveal the substance of LGU-CSO engagements, these indicators are useful for now in illustrating the funnel of citizen participation. (see Figures 7a-7d). The representation of (f) at least four (4) CSO members in the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMC) will also be used as an explanatory variable.

Figure 7. CSO Participation in Local Special Bodies

7a. Key SGLG Indicators of CSO Participation in LDCs



7b. Key SGLG Indicators of CSO Participation in LDCs, Per LGU Type



7c. Proportion of LGUs that Meet Minimum 25% CSO Membership



7d. Presence of Minimum 4 CSO Representatives in LDRRMCs



Meaningful participation cannot be achieved without citizens' access to information and accountability mechanisms. For one, the SGLG measures compliance to the Full Disclosure Policy (FDP): (i) posting of financial reports in conspicuous places in the LGU office, and (ii) submission to the DILG's FDP Portal (*See Figure 8*).

Figure 8. LGU Compliance with the Full Disclosure Policy

On the other hand, accountability is understood in many ways: from having strong oversight from the legislature and an independent audit office, to the direct accountability through the elections. For this study we use the audit rating provided by the Commission on Audit (CoA) on the financial accounts of LGUs. The SGLG also considers the opinion made by the Commission on Audit (CoA) on the LGU in its annual financial audit.

The CoA renders an opinion on whether the financial accounts of the LGU is unqualified, qualified, disclaimer, or adverse. CoA (2022) has clarified that these opinions are not "ratings" or "grades" given to an agency's accounts but an assessment on whether the financial statements are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with applicable financial reporting standards. Nevertheless, these audit opinions indicate the capability of the LGU to properly account for their financial transactions. An overwhelming 88% of LGUs have qualified findings (*see Figure 9*).

Figure 9. COA Audit Opinions on LGU Financial Accounts



3 Control Variables ($X'_{it}\beta$)

The data set already assembled by C. Magno et al. (2022) draws from other data sources to analyze the potential determinants of the BUR (*see Figure 10 below*). This study will adopt these variables as controls under the second specification, albeit with modifications.

Figure 10. Analytical Framework in C. Magno et al. (2022)



First, indicators on the unique functional characteristics of LGUs will be included. This pertains to the size of the current-year budgets of LGUs for all expense classes and sectoral categories. The values are transformed to their natural log.

Second, indicators on governance and capacity will be included. However, this study already uses local tax effort and IRA dependency as outcome variables and CSO representation and CoA audit opinions as explanatory variables. Instead, the following will be included: (a) dummies for LGU type (province as reference), as a rough indicator of capacity (b) budget per capita, as a rough indicator of capacity; and (c) LGU attainment of pillars of the SGLG: Financial Housekeeping, Disaster Risk Management, Social Protection, Ease of Doing Business, Peace and Order, Environmental Management, Culture and Tourism, and the Overall Rating.

Finally, socioeconomic context indicators will be included, mainly poverty incidence, population density, and share of urban population in 2018. Unlike in C. Magno et al. (2022), this study will not have a distinct group of covariates on vulnerability because the SGLG environmental management and disaster preparedness scores are already in the governance and capacity pillar. The author also has no access to the data set on the Housing Vulnerability Index (Healey et al., 2022).

V.
Regression Analyses

To recap, the regression analysis were conducted for each of the dependent variables representing aggregate budget outcomes, i.e., year-on-year local revenue growth, NTA dependence, share of productive spending in both definitions, spending per capita, and BUR (subsection 1) as well as budget outcomes that can be disaggregated per key budget dimension, i.e., MOOE, CO, education, health, social services, economic services, LDF, and LDRRMF (subsection 2). As described above in the empirical strategy, this study primarily reports the results of the nested random effects models, while the alternative panel models as well as beta regressions are run in the background for comparison. These are followed by explorations into nonlinearities and interaction effects. This section ends with a discussion of regression results for each LGU type, comparing these against the results of the analyses when including all LGUs.

1 Regressions on Aggregate Budget Outcomes for All LGUs

First, on ***fiscal sustainability***. CSO participation's influence on local revenue growth is insignificant. At best, this may indicate that local revenue generation may not consistently be a topic of discussion in CSO engagement of LDCs. Meanwhile, a higher proportion of CSO members in LDCs is positively associated with NTA dependence. This result from the nested random effects model is validated by the beta regression. The correlation needs to be explored further, as it may indicate that CSOs tend to be present in less fiscally capable LGUs.

Second, on ***allocative efficiency***. There was no statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and the share of productive expenditures (defined as MOOE + CO). When using the alternative definition of productive expenditures (net of GPS and Others), a negative and statistically significant relationship exists with CSO assistance to LDC secretariats. This may indicate that LGUs with less fiscal space for productive spending tend to tap external technical assistance from CSOs. The results of the beta regressions validate these findings.

Finally, on ***operational efficiency***. CSO participation through the share of CSO members in the LDC is positively associated with spending per capita in a statistically significant way. This correlation, however, may be nonlinear: the quadratic form of the variable indicates a concave direction. Meanwhile, CSO participation's influence on budget utilization is not conclusive: in the base models there was no statistically significant relationship, consistent with the findings of C. Magno et al (2022). The beta regression confirms this lack of a relationship, while the stepwise regressions show that a positive relationship may exist between CSO technical assistance to the LDC and the BUR.

In summary, at least looking at aggregate budget outcomes for all LGUs, CSO participation is positively associated with NTA dependence and per capita spending, while it is negatively associated with the share of productive expense classes. Meanwhile, its influence on local revenue growth, the budgetary share of productive sectors, and budget utilization is inconclusive at best (*See Table 1 and details in Annex C1*). A per-function analysis and per-LGU class analysis will be necessary to unbundle

nuances, if any, on how CSOs affect budgetary outcomes. The alternative models are mostly consistent with the results of the nested random effects model regression, with the beta models consistently showing larger effect sizes for the statistically significant covariates and better fit in terms of R^2.

Table 2. Nested Random Effects (RE) Models, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:					
	locrevgrwth	ntadepend	prodshare1	prodshare2	spendpercap	bur
cso25pct	0.030	-0.001	0.009	0.007	121.632	-0.010
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(90.102)	(0.008)
csopct	-0.070	**0.063****	-0.005	-0.008	**1,020.181*****	0.046
	(0.081)	**(0.029)**	(0.028)	(0.030)	**(378.506)**	(0.033)
csoattend	0.002	-0.005	-0.001	-0.003	-30.978	0.004
	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(80.378)	(0.007)
csoassist	0.003	0.000	-0.001	**-0.013*****	-75.379	-0.000
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	**(0.005)**	(59.795)	(0.005)
csoplan	0.012	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	41.702	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(71.626)	(0.006)
Constant	**0.177*****	**0.782*****	**0.081****	**0.357*****	-409.572	**0.773*****
	(0.056)	**(0.023)**	**(0.038)**	**(0.035)**	(291.978)	**(0.034)**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	2,924	2,927	2,702	2,680	2,952	2,701
R^2	0.019	0.296	0.342	0.255	0.350	0.272
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.288	0.333	0.246	0.342	0.263
F Statistic	**51.23****	**1,127.39*****	**1,101.83*****	**775.75*****	**1,523.75*****	**650.14*****
Results of Alternative Models:						
Beta Reg. (Probit)	not applicable	consistent, with larger coefficient	consistent, with larger coefficient	consistent, with larger coefficient	not applicable	results consistent
FE Panel	*csopct* negatively correlated	results consistent	results consistent	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	results consistent
Stepwise (RE Panel)	*cso25pct* negatively correlated	3 variables positively correlated	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	no cso variable correlated	*csoassist* positively correlated
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2 Regressions on Function-Specific Outcomes for All LGUs

In this subsection, the relationship between CSO participation and function-specific budget outcomes—share of the budget, per capita spending, and BUR—are tested. These functions are (a) MOOE, (b) CO, (c) education; (d) health; I social services, (f) economic services, (g) LDF, and (h) LDRRMF. Each of these components have three outcomes: (i) share of the total budget; (ii) spending per capita; and (iii) BUR (*see Annex C1*).

On the ***share of productive budgets***, to recall, CSO participation affects it differently depending on how the latter is defined: based on the nested random effects panel models, no statistically significant effect on the share of productive expense classes (MOOE + CO); and a negative effect on the share of productive sectors and funds. As in the case of the combined shares of MOOE and CO, the separate budgetary shares of MOOE and of CO were not shown to be influenced by CSO participation in a statistically significant way. The alternative models however show that certain CSO participation variables may have a positive effect on MOOE and CO. Meanwhile, the share of education in the local budget is negatively associated with the submission of CSO action plans, albeit with a minuscule effect size. The beta regression shows that provision of CSO technical assistance is also negatively correlated and has a larger coefficient. These may point to the tendency of LGUs which have less fiscal space to seek external technical assistance.

Based on the nested random effects models, the only dependent variable where CSO participation had a positive effect is on the share of social services: positive with submission of CSO plans, although with a very small coefficient. The beta regression model validates this but with a larger effect size, and shows that the shares of health, economic services, and LDF may also be affected positively.

Expenditures per capita in the aggregate is positively affected by the share of CSO members in the LDC. Consistent with this, CSO participation indicators had positive and statistically significant effects on CO (action plans), health (CSO proportion in the LDC), social services (proportion in the LDC and action plans), economic services (proportion of CSOs in the LDC), LDF (proportion of CSOs), and LDRRMF (proportion of CSOs). However, these positive effects were countered by negative effects of CSO participation on CO and economic services (CSO assistance to the LDC) and the LDRRMF (attendance in LDC meetings). Meanwhile, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on MOOE and education spending per capita (*See Table 4*).

Finally, ***utilization of the budget*** is, on the aggregate, not significantly associated with any CSO participation indicator. Findings from the disaggregated analysis are mostly consistent with this behavior (*see Table 5*). There are however some notable exceptions, where positive and statistically significant (though weak) relationships were seen between CSO participation and the BUR of economic services (CSO assistance to LDC) and the LDF (CSO action plans, although with a very low R-squared value). The alternative models also showed largely consistent results.

Table 3. Nested RE Models on Shares of Productive Spending

	Dependent variable: Share of Budget Components							
	mooe	co	educ	health	social	econ	ldf	ldrrmf
ldc_cso25pct	-0.000	0.005	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ldc_csopct	0.017	-0.007	-0.003	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.005	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.010)
ldc_csoattend	0.005	-0.003	0.000	-0.001	0.002	0.005	0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
ldc_csoassist	0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.002	-0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldc_csoplan	0.006	0.003	**-0.002****	0.001	**0.002***	-0.002	0.003	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	**(0.001)**	(0.002)	**(0.001)**	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldrrmc_ cso4reps								0.003
								(0.003)
Constant	**-0.473*****	0.005	0.007	-0.004	**0.016*****	-0.023	**0.057*****	0.038***
	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.008)	**(0.006)**	(0.018)	**(0.012)**	(0.010)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,697	2,726	2,727	2,729	2,732	2,727	2,728	2,732
R^2	0.414	0.421	0.347	0.465	0.417	0.262	0.628	0.384
Adjusted R^2	0.407	0.414	0.339	0.458	0.410	0.253	0.623	0.376
F Statistic	**1,657*****	**1,963*****	**1,411*****	**2,304*****	**1,925*****	**937*****	**4,495*****	**1,666*****
Results of Key Alternative Models:								
Beta Reg. (Probit)	results consistent	csopct positively correlated	csoassist negatively correlated	3 variables correlated (diff signs)	csoplan has larger coefficient	2 variables positively correlated	csopct positively correlated	results consistent
FE Panel	csoassist positively correlated	2 variables correlated (diff signs)	no cso variable correlated	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	csopct positively correlated	csoplan positively correlated	results consistent
Stepwise (RE Panel)	csoplan positively correlated	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	csoassist positively correlated	no cso variable correlated	results consistent	results consistent	csoattend negatively correlated

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4. Nested RE Models on Productive Spending Per Capita

	Dependent Variable: Per Capita Spending							
	mooe	co	educ	health	social	econ	ldf	ldrrmf
ldc_cso25pct	56.580	9.412	2.861	-0.373	1.286	-7.620	15.550	6.799
	(39.217)	(25.304)	(4.067)	(7.397)	(4.748)	(12.477)	(14.327)	(9.158)
ldc_csopct	249.004	158.704	-19.784	**72.507****	**41.705****	**171.92*****	**99.514***	**68.796***
	(163.975)	(102.764)	(17.145)	**(30.940)**	**(19.334)**	**(50.850)**	**(59.618)**	**(37.423)**
ldc_csoattend	-13.589	2.495	0.302	-8.904	3.326	8.205	10.717	**-16.335****
	(35.019)	(22.427)	(3.628)	(6.605)	(4.230)	(11.098)	(12.782)	**(8.182)**
ldc_csoassist	2.028	**-40.812****	-3.075	-1.273	-3.460	**-13.752***	-12.347	-8.017
	(26.014)	**(16.528)**	(2.703)	(4.940)	(3.118)	**(8.204)**	(9.469)	(5.996)
ldc_csoplan	33.432	**36.487***	0.225	5.475	**8.773****	1.862	15.105	3.026
	(31.179)	**(20.055)**	(3.241)	(5.892)	**(3.767)**	(9.936)	(11.348)	(7.227)
ldrrmc_ cso4reps								7.689
								(10.359)
Constant	**-335.24*****	**-133.23***	**-22.41***	-10.65	-8.23	-47.74	**-79.66***	-10.06
	(123.204)	**(71.194)**	**(11.745)**	(23.921)	(14.030)	(35.384)	**(42.225)**	(26.598)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	2,953	2,949	2,945	2,950	2,953	2,946	2,953	2,956
R^2	0.353	0.227	0.289	0.456	0.395	0.252	0.328	0.265
Adjusted R^2	0.345	0.218	0.280	0.450	0.388	0.244	0.320	0.256
F Statistic	**1,521*****	**841*****	**1,164*****	**2,401*****	**1,891*****	**958*****	**1,415*****	**1,045*****
Results of Key Alternative Models								
FE Panel	csoplan positively correlated	results consistent	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	only csoplan correlated	only csopct correlated	csoplan positively correlated	2 csovars correlated (dif signs)
Stepwise (RE Panel)	results consistent	csoassist positively correlated	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	no cso variable correlated	no cso variable correlated	no cso variable correlated	no cso variable correlated
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5. Nested Re Models on BUR of Productive Expenditures

	Dependent Variable: BUR							
	mooe	co	educ	health	social	econ	ldf	ldrrmf
ldc_cso25pct	0.139	-0.017	0.024	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008	-0.000	-0.022
	(0.432)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)
ldc_csopct	0.188	-0.082	-0.030	-0.039	0.005	-0.051	-0.086	0.130
	(1.693)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.069)	(0.094)
ldc_csoattend	0.140	-0.023	0.023	-0.000	-0.003	-0.006	0.012	-0.013
	(0.385)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.021)
ldc_csoassist	-0.227	-0.009	-0.013	0.002	0.012	**0.015***	-0.017	-0.019
	(0.270)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.007)	**(0.008)**	(0.011)	(0.015)
ldc_csoplan	0.325	0.024	0.001	0.009	0.002	0.010	**0.022***	0.012
	(0.331)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)	**(0.013)**	(0.018)
ldrrmc_ cso4reps								0.014
								(0.028)
Constant	**22.245*****	**1.103*****	**1.017*****	**1.272*****	**1.788*****	**2.079*****	**0.971*****	**0.589*****
	(2.721)	**(0.113)**	**(0.100)**	**(0.053)**	**(0.079)**	**(0.082)**	**(0.133)**	**(0.136)**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs.	2,658	2,685	1,847	2,270	2,426	2,449	2,390	2,336
R^2	0.551	0.079	0.114	0.297	0.220	0.325	0.070	0.052
Adjusted R^2	0.546	0.067	0.097	0.286	0.209	0.315	0.056	0.038
F Statistic	**3,195*** **	**200*** **	**116*** **	**254*** **	**422*** **	**994*** **	**149*** **	**88*** **
Results of Key Alternative Models:								
Beta Reg. (Probit)	results consistent	results consistent	results consistent	results consistent	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	2 variables correlated (diff signs)	results consistent
FE Linear	results consistent	csoattend negatively correlated	csoattend positively correlated	results consistent	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	results consistent	results consistent
Stepwise (RE Linear)	results consistent	results consistent	results consistent	csoplan negatively correlated	results consistent	no cso variable correlated	no cso variable correlated	results consistent

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

3 Nonlinearities and Interaction Effects

The squared form of the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and the interaction effects were only statistically significant in sporadic instances, which were nevertheless worth noting. Nonlinear relationships emerged strongly between spending per capita—in the aggregate as well as for MOOE and CO—and the proportion of CSOs in the LDC. The nonlinear term was also significantly correlated with the budgetary share of MOOE (concave). The concave relationships echo the prognosis of Elberry, et al. (2022) that the positive effect of fiscal openness diminishes and even turns negative at a certain point.

Many potential interaction effects were noted, but it was only in one case where both interacting variables and the interaction term were found to be statistically significant: NTA dependence. The proportion of CSOs in the LDC has a positive effect, while the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings had a negative effect. The interaction term was positive, leading to a positive net effect. In the overall, this confirms the behavior in the base model where CSO participation (proportion of CSOs in LDC) was positively associated with NTA dependence. The interaction effect could help to provide a nuanced understanding (see Table 5 and Annex C1).

Table 6. Notable Interaction Effects and Nonlinearities

	Interaction Effects	Squared % CSOs in LDC
Local Revenue Growth	none	none
NTA Dependence	csopct x csoplan = net positive[1] csoassist x cso25pct = net positive[2] csoplan x csoattend = net positive[1]	none
Share of Productive Expense Classes	none	MOOE: concave[3]
Share of Productive Sectors and Funds	none	none
Spending per Capita	Aggregate: csopct x cso25pct = net positive[1] csopct x cso25pct = net positive[1] MOOE: csopct x cso25pct = net positive[1] csoassist x cso25pct = net negative[1] csopct x cso25pct = net negative[1]	Aggregate: possibly concave[4] MOOE: possibly concave[4] CO: concave[3]
Budget Utilization Rate	MOOE: csoplan x cso25pct = net negative[1] csoplan x csoattend = net negative[1]	none

Notes: 1) interacting variable, on its own, is not statistically significant; 2) both primary variable and interaction term were positively correlated with the dependent variable; 3) both the variable and its squared term are statistically significant; 4) squared term is not statistically significant.

4 Regression Analyses for Each LGU Type

The results of the regressions in the previous subsection were instructive of the relationships between CSO participation and key budget outturns but were not able to spell out nuances across LGU types. This section describes notable differences when running the nested random effects regression analyses for each LGU type. Some modifications had to be made to address multicollinearity and other issues, especially for provinces and cities which had significantly less observations.[18] *Details of regression analyses are in Annex C2*.

Fiscal Sustainability. The analyses for municipalities and provinces confirm the lack of a notable relationship between CSO participation and local revenue grow. However, a positive relationship can be seen in cities between CSO provision of technical assistance to LDCs and local revenue growth. On NTA dependence, the statistically significant and positive effect of CSO participation is still seen in municipalities and provinces but not cities (*see Tables 7 and 10*).

[18] These include the removal of the following from the control variables: city and municipality dummies, the log of budgets for sectors and funds, all lagged budget values, and dummy on adverse audit. To simplify the analyses, the alternative models were not anymore implemented as we are interested only in comparing any difference in results when regressing for each LGU type..

Table 7. Nested RE Models on Fiscal Sustainability, Per LGU Type

	Dependent Variable: Fiscal Sustainability					
	locrevgrowth			ntadepend		
	muni	cities	prov	muni	cities	prov
ldc_cso25pct	0.039	-0.008	-0.014	-0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.169)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.036)
ldc_csopct	-0.125	-0.170	0.207	**0.061***	0.004	0.094
	(0.094)	(0.184)	(0.433)	**(0.032)**	(0.083)	(0.107)
ldc_csoattend	-0.000	-0.016	-0.011	-0.008	0.009	**0.043***
	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.130)	(0.007)	(0.016)	**(0.025)**
ldc_csoassist	0.013	**0.058****	0.038	-0.004	**-0.018***	-0.016
	(0.015)	**(0.023)**	(0.080)	(0.005)	**(0.010)**	(0.017)
ldc_csoplan	0.003	0.018	-0.013	0.003	-0.004	0.017
	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.100)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.020)
Constant	**0.187*****	0.069	1.372	**0.784*****	**0.745*****	**0.849*****
	(0.061)	(0.118)	(1.902)	**(0.021)**	**(0.056)**	**(0.112)**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,515	260	149	2,515	257	155
R^2	0.015	0.099	0.058	0.382	0.656	0.445
Adjusted R^2	0.004	-0.001	-0.143	0.375	0.618	0.332
F Statistic	**37.263***	26.071	7.476	**1,072.241*****	**374.678*****	**82.010*****

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Allocative Efficiency. Previously, it was shown that CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the share of productive expense classes in the aggregate and for MOOE and CO separately. The regression analyses on the share of productive expense classes per LGU type produced results that were consistent with these.

Meanwhile, CSO technical assistance to the LDC was shown to have negative effects on the share of productive sectors for regression analyses covering all LGUs and for municipalities. In cities and provinces, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the budgetary share of productive sectors (*see Table 8*).

Table 8. Nested RE Models on Allocative Efficiency, Per LGU Type

	Dependent Variable: Allocative Efficiency					
	prodshare1			prodshare2		
	muni	cities	prov	muni	cities	prov
ldc_cso25pct	0.008	0.020	-0.022	-0.004	-0.038	0.058
	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.045)
ldc_csopct	0.007	0.024	0.046	-0.020	-0.111	0.030
	(0.030)	(0.113)	(0.085)	(0.035)	(0.159)	(0.133)
ldc_csoattend	-0.006	0.021	-0.005	-0.002	0.049	0.023
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.008)	(0.032)	(0.031)
ldc_csoassist	0.001	-0.006	-0.002	**-0.015*****	0.017	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.015)	**(0.006)**	(0.020)	(0.021)
ldc_csoplan	0.000	-0.018	0.004	0.004	-0.027	-0.016
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Constant	0.003	-0.269	0.298	**0.404*****	**0.916****	**0.870*****
	(0.042)	(0.263)	(0.385)	**(0.038)**	**(0.379)**	**(0.141)**
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,308	240	154	2,284	241	155
R^2	0.324	0.441	0.540	0.065	0.211	0.256
Adjusted R^2	0.316	0.373	0.445	0.054	0.116	0.104
F Statistic	**955.870*****	**131.971*****	**146.137*****	**60.914*****	**44.642****	30.613

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

The relationships with specific budget components also differ between municipalities, cities, and provinces in interesting ways. For instance, the budgetary share of education is both positively and negatively affected by

different CSO participation variables in municipalities and cities, although in provinces there was no statistically significant effect seen. Moreover, the LDF—which at the minimum should be at 20% of an LGU's NTA—is not affected by CSO participation in municipalities and provinces, but there is a positive and statistically significant effect in cities. The latter, which are less NTA dependent, had more resources to spare to augment their LDFs (*see Table 10 for a list, and Annex C2 for the regression tables*).

Operational Efficiency. To recall, CSO participation has a positive effect on per capita sending in the aggregate as well as for most budgetary sectors. As expected, this result is largely mirrored in the regression analyses for municipalities. Meanwhile, cities' per capita expenditures are negatively affected by CSO attendance in the LDC, although there is a positive counteracting effect by the submission of action plans. In provinces, there is no statistically significant relationship (see Table 9). Looking at per capita spending per component, CSO participation had more statistically significant effects in municipalities and cities than in provinces (*see Table 9*).

Meanwhile, though CSO participation does not seem to have a statistically significant effect on the overall BUR, it has notably positive relationships with the BUR of social services, economic services, and the LDF. For BUR, CSO participation in municipalities has a positive effect on the aggregate as well as for CO, social services, economic services, and LDF. This relationship behaves differently in cities and provinces. In cities, the overall BUR is correlated with two CSO participation variables whose effects had different directions, while in provinces CSO participation had

no statistically significant effect on the outcome (see Table 9). Looking at BUR per budget component, one could glean that CSO participation had a mostly positive effect in municipalities, balanced in cities, and mostly negative in provinces (see Table 10).

Table 9. Nested RE Models on Operational Efficiency, per LGU Type

	Dependent Variable: Operational Efficiency					
	spendpercap			bur		
	muni	cities	prov	muni	cities	prov
ldc_cso25pct	92.257	452.268	-116.899	-0.008	0.029	-0.081
	(94.442)	(309.901)	(295.484)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.050)
ldc_csopct	**1,181.899*****	-1,301.759	-996.407	**0.060***	-0.183	-0.138
	(403.100)	(1,351.002)	(787.082)	**(0.035)**	(0.155)	(0.142)
ldc_csoattend	-18.494	**-446.580***	-260.663	0.007	**-0.056***	-0.031
	(85.461)	**(268.245)**	(217.273)	(0.008)	**(0.030)**	(0.035)
ldc_csoassist	-102.523	-56.993	-35.318	0.006	-0.010	-0.033
	(62.550)	(169.616)	(140.435)	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.023)
ldc_csoplan	-4.679	**471.735****	129.351	0.002	**0.061*****	0.020
	(77.515)	**(190.815)**	(173.942)	(0.007)	**(0.022)**	(0.028)
Constant	-77.801	609.980	964.293	**0.710*****	**0.744*****	**0.775*****
	(258.506)	(828.763)	(985.575)	**(0.036)**	**(0.140)**	**(0.157)**
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,538	261	153	2,306	242	153
R^2	0.361	0.744	0.644	0.286	0.372	0.387
Adjusted R^2	0.354	0.716	0.571	0.278	0.296	0.260
F Statistic	**1,354.879*****	**670.726*****	**229.503*****	**545.455*****	**114.642*****	**67.688*****

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 10. Comparison of Nested RE Regression Results for All LGUs, Municipalities, Cities, and Provinces.

	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
Fiscal Discipline				
Local Revenue Growth	None	None	(+) CSO attendance in LDC	None
NTA Dependence	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(-) CSO assistance to LDC	(+) CSO attendance in LDC
Allocative Efficiency				
Share of Productive Expense Classes	None	None	None	None
- MOOE	None	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(+) CSO action plans	None
- CO	None	None	(+) CSO attendance in LDC (-) CSO action plans	None
Share of Productive Budgetary Sectors/Funds	(-) CSO assistance to LDC	(-) CSO assistance to LDC	None	None
- Education	(-) action plans	(+) CSO attendance in LDC (-) min. 25% CSOs in LDC	(+) min. 25% CSOs in LDC (-) CSO action plans	None
- Health	None	None	None	(+) min. 25% CSOs in LDC and CSO action plans
- Social Services	(-) min. 25% CSOs in LDC[1]	(+) CSO action plans	None	(-) min. 25% CSOs in LDC
- Economic Services	None	None	(+) CSO attendance in LDC	(-) CSO action plans
- Local Dev't Fund	(+) CSO action plans[1]	None	(+) CSO assistance to LDC	None
- Local DRRM Fund	None	None	(+) LDRRMC CSO reps (-) min. % of CSOs in LDC	(-) % of CSOs in LDC
Operational Efficiency				
Per Capita Spending	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(+) CSO action plans (-) CSO attendance in LDC	None

	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
- MOOE	(+) min. % of CSOs in LDC[1]	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(+) CSO action plans	None
- CO	(+) CSO action plans (-) CSO tech assistance	(+) % of CSOs in LDC (-) CSO tech assistance	(+) CSO action plans	(-) CSO attendance in LDC
- Education	None	(-) CSO tech assistance	(+) min. % of CSOs in LDC (-) % of CSOs in LDC	(-) % of CSOs in LDC & tech assistance to LDC
- Health	None[1]	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	None	None
- Social Services	(+) % of CSOs in LDC[1]	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	None	None
- Economic Services	(+) % of CSOs in LDC[1]	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	None	None
- Local Dev't Fund	(+) CSO action plan[1]	(-) tech assistance to LDC	(+) CSO action plan	None
- Local DRRM Fund	(-) CSO attendance in LDC[1]	(-) CSO attendance in LDC	None	None
Budget Utilization Rate	(+) CSO action plan[1]	(+) % of CSOs in LDC	(-) CSO attendance in LDC (+) CSO action plans	None
- MOOE	None	(+) CSO action plan	None	(-) CSO attendance in LDC
- CO	(+) CSO action plan[1]	None	(+) CSO action plan (-) attendance in LDC	(-) tech assistance to LDC
- Education	None	(+) min.25% CSOs in LDC	None	(-) % of CSOs in LDC
- Health	None	(+) CSO action plan (-) min. 25% CSOs in LDC	None	(-) % of CSOs in LDC, CSO action plan
- Social Services	(+) CSO assistance to LDC[1]	(+) CSO assistance to LDC	(+) CSO assistance to LDC	(-) CSO assistance to LDC
- Economic Services	(+) CSO assistance to LDC	(+) CSO assistance to LDC	None	(-) CSO attendance to LDC
- Local Dev't Fund	(+) CSO action plans	None	(-) min. % of CSOs in LDC	(-) CSO assistance to LDC
- Local DRRM Fund	None	None	(-) LDRRMC CSO reps	(+) CSO attendance in LDC

Notes: (1) This result is different from the original regression result in part V where CSO participation had no statistically significant effect on the BUR.

VI.
Discussion of Key Themes

The regression analyses in the preceding two sections show that the participation of CSOs in LDCs has mixed effects on different local budget outcomes. This gives credence to the nuanced hypothesis, but it is worth noting where and how CSO participation and budget performance relate with each other. This section spells out key themes from the empirical results.

1 Citizens' Voices Count in Increasing Spending on Sectors that Matter.

The evidence shows specific instances where CSO participation has a positive relationship with budget outcomes. First, the regression analyses covering all LGUs show that CSO participation had a positive relationship with spending per capita in the aggregate and on key budget components: CO, health, social services, economic services, the LDF, and the LDRRMF. The results for municipalities, and for cities to an extent, mirrors this behavior but with some differences on the budget components. In contrast, the effects of participation are insignificant if not in the negative direction for provinces.

CSO participation is also positively related with the utilization of budgets that matter. For all LGUs as well as for municipalities and cities, CSO participation particularly the advanced forms—technical assistance to the LDC and CSO action plans—had a positive effect on the BUR of key

budget components. For all LGUs, these are economic services, and the LDF; MOOE, education, health, social services, and economic services for municipalities; and CO and social services for cities. It must also be noted that indicators on the mere presence and attendance of CSOs in the LDC—have mixed effects. Notably, participation in provinces has a mostly negative effect on the BUR except in LDRRMF.

2 Citizens' Voices Tend to be Louder Where Resources are Thin.

There are also situations where CSO participation is correlated with undesirable budget outcomes. The main case in point here is NTA dependence, which tends to be higher as the proportion of CSO members in the LDC increases, at least for all LGUs as well as for municipalities and provinces. One may use this to validate the ideal that NGOs and CSOs are present where they are needed. But an alternative explanation for this is that CSOs tend to be present in LGUs with limited fiscal space and thus have a motive to secure additional resources. After all, CSO participation is among the conditions by which CSOs can access additional funding from the national government, such as through the Assistance to Municipalities. Additional analysis is however needed to confirm this relationship, considering that in cities the reverse of the relationship is true: the proportion of CSOs in the LDC is linked to lower NTA.

The theme of increased CSO participation in resource-constrained contexts also emerges when looking at its effects on the share of productive spending. At least for all LGUs and for municipalities, CSO provision of

technical assistance to the LDC is negatively associated with the collective share of productive sectors and funds in the budget. Perhaps this is an indication of municipalities' limited institutional capacity and thus the need to tap technical assistance from CSOs. For cities and provinces this relationship is not statistically significant. Other budget shares that are negatively affected by CSO participation are CO (cities), education (municipalities and cities), social services (provinces, but positive in municipalities), economic services (provinces, but positive in cities), and the LDRRMF (cities and provinces).

3 Where Citizens' Voices Seem to Not Matter

It is also worth pointing out where the effects of CSO participation are statistically insignificant, foremost of which is on local revenue growth at least for all LGUs as well as in municipalities and provinces. Especially in contexts where fiscal resources are thin and national transfers are insufficient, the generation of additional resources is a mission-critical element to local development and which CSOs should be interested in. Unfortunately, as surmised earlier, perhaps CSO inputs into the LDC do not delve into this issue in these contexts. Of course, there are many other factors to be considered—the technical capacity of LGUs to collect revenues, the political implications of new taxes, the economic activity in the locality—and CSO participation may after all be an insignificant factor in the revenue side of the coin. The case of cities—where CSO participation was seen to be positively correlated with local revenue growth—needs a closer look.

Additionally, there are specific components of the budget which one may think are positively influenced by CSO participation but are revealed to not be affected by it. An interesting case is the LDRRMF vis-à-vis representation of CSOs in the LDRRMCs. It is only in the context of cities where the latter has significant effects: positive on the share of the LDRRMF in the budget and negative on the utilization of the LDRRMF. One plausible explanation for this is that cities have greater resources that they can use to augment their LDRRMFs beyond the mandatory 5-percent share of the LDRRMF. In all other cases—in municipalities and provinces, particularly—CSO representation in the LDRRMC has no discernible effect on LDRRMF-related outcomes.

4 The Effects of CSO Participation Metrics are Not Straightforward.

Given the above, the relationships between CSO participation indicators and metrics of budget performance are not straightforward: if significant, these can be positive or negative based on the context. Moreover, the weak fit of the regression models must be acknowledged. The nested random effects models with covariates have R-squared values that range from 20% to 40%. In the instances where the R-squared surpassed this range—models on the shares of MOOE, health, social, and LDF; and BUR of MOOE—the CSO participation variables do not have a strong or statistically significant effect. In these cases, other covariates had a stronger relationship with the budget outcomes—such as budget size and some SGLG indicators—although these are outside the scope of this study.

Additionally, there are noteworthy findings from the analysis of nonlinear and interaction effects even if these were not always statistically significant. For instance, interaction effects validated the net positive relationship between CSO participation and NTA dependence. Additionally, the interaction effects showed dynamics among the CSO participation variables, although there was no consistency as to which specific variables tend to counteract each other. Other interaction effects are outside the scope of this study and are worth analyzing in the future: with transparency and accountability; with other metrics of governance such as SGLG ratings; and with political and electoral phenomena such as presence of dynasties.

Nonlinear effects of CSO participation on budget outcomes—most prominently, the concave relationship with spending per capita—were also seen. The concave relationships are reminiscent of the findings of Elberry, et al. (2022) that fiscal openness and budget effectiveness have an inverted U-shaped relationship, i.e., openness enhances budget outcomes until a certain point when it starts to become a burden. Apart from spending per capita in the aggregate, also showing a concave relationship with the proportion of CSO members in the LDC are spending per capita on MOOE, CO, and the LDF in the case of municipalities. Interestingly, the relationship between CSO participation and per capita spending on social services, the LDF, and LDRRMF in provinces is convex or U-shaped, i.e., the relationship is negative until a certain point.

5 Limitations of the Analysis

To reiterate, with the available data and the methodology employed, this study cannot claim to establish causality between CSO participation and budget performance. First, this study uses a data set that measured the mere presence and attendance of CSOs in the LDC and whether CSOs provided certain value-adding inputs. The study acknowledges that the data set used—the SGLG—focused on the functionality of the LDC, including compliance with the minimum standards set in law. As such, the lacks information on the robustness of the CSO landscape in the locality,[19] the type of CSOs which are participating, nor the sectors or advocacies that these CSOs represent. The content of the CSOs' inputs to the LDC and how they are considered in the planning, programming, and budgeting decisions of the LGU, are not captured in the SGLG data set.

Moreover, the data is devoid of an assurance that these CSOs counted are genuine organizations who were able to meaningfully participate in the LDC's decision-making processes. Unfortunately, the literature and press reportage is rife with anecdotes of LGUs tapping friendly CSOs, even those which are affiliated or are even created by local politicians, or at worse are fake and set up for nefarious purposes.

[19] The SGLG data set for certain years has information on the actual number of CSO members in the LDC, but the proportion of CSOs in the LDC was selected to normalize the values. Moreover, it is unclear if the CSO member headcounts pertain to the number of organizations or individuals regardless of organizational affiliation.

The empirical strategy employed for this study sought to consider the imperfections of the available data, minimize underlying issues such as omitted variable bias and multicollinearity, and manage other characteristics most notably the heterogeneity of LGUs. Even with these, the primary econometric tool used—linear panel regression with nested random effects—is not on its own designed to establish causality.

Moreover, the "treatment" of CSO participation is not currently assigned to groups in a random fashion, preventing the construction of a robust counterfactual. Apart from CSO representation in the LDC being legally mandated, the government has established a policy regime that incentivizes CSO participation through the SGLG and conditional transfer mechanisms. As such, an overwhelming majority of LGUs comply with the minimum 25% of LDC seats being opened to CSOs. Quasi-experimental methods may potentially be applied to the other forms of CSO participation covered by the SGLG—actual attendance in LDC meetings, technical assistance to the LDC secretariat, and action plans—but this was not the objective and approach taken by this study.

VII.
Conclusion

During the writing of this study, the first-year implementation of the SGLG Act was completed with the announcement of the 2022 SGLG winners: 18 provinces (of 81), 60 cities (of 146), and 274 municipalities (of 1,488; DILG, 2022a). The 2023 SGLG was also kicked off with the release of updated guidelines for the round (DILG, 2023). These new SGLG rounds assess LGUs in all 10 areas,[20] and in some of these areas CSO participation in LDCs and other local special bodies is embedded.[21] Prior to the 2022 SGLG round, the DILG has also issued guidelines for the setting up of CSO desks and people's councils (2021) akin to the Naga City example.

Such policies to institutionalize, scale up, and further improve CSO participation in local governance are laudable. And it is hoped that this study contributes to such efforts by providing evidence which helps to assert that promoting meaningful participation is a worthwhile endeavor.

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[20] The 10 "all in" criteria for the SGLG under the Act include those originally in the 2019 SGLG round and prior (i.e., financial administration, disaster preparedness, social protection, business friendliness, peace and order, environmental management, and tourism and heritage) and new areas (i.e., health compliance and responsiveness, sustainable education, and youth development; DILG, 2022b). The SGLG for 2020 and 2021 were not conducted due to the COVID19 pandemic.

[21] As of the 2023 SGLG guidelines, participation is also required in the following: CSO representation in LDRRMC (disaster preparedness); membership of federations of sangguniang kabataan and parents-teachers associations in local school boards (sustainable education); CSO representation in peace and order councils and anti-drug abuse councils (safety, peace and order); CSO representation in local solid waste management boards; sectoral representation in local culture and arts promotion councils (tourism and heritage); and representation of youth organizations in the local youth development council (youth development).

Despite its limitations, this study provided empirical evidence on the relationship between CSO participation in LDCs and key budget outcomes. In particular, the more value-adding forms of CSO participation in LDCs are associated with increased spending and utilization of productive components of the budget. This study also found that CSO representation in the LDC is associated with limited fiscal space in an LGU, most notably NTA dependence, which may have resulted from such LGUs' desire to access resources by complying with national policies.

Through these findings, this study hopes to have contributed to the body of quantitative evidence which indicates the complex though nevertheless positive contribution of CSO participation on better local governance particularly of the public coffers. The study however also highlights some key gaps and issues which need to be addressed by further reforms in order to maximize the positive contribution of citizen participation.

First, ***metrics of the substance of CSO engagement are needed.*** This is why Medina-Guce (2020b), as commissioned by DILG and UNDP, developed the proposed Participatory Governance Metrics (PGM) to better assess the environment, process, and outcomes of participation. DILG should consider a wider-scale rollout after a successful pilot test in Region 7. This, however, should consider the plans to further improve on the SGLG as well as the slew of assessments that LGUs are currently subjected to. Further research may also delve into the LDC discussions and the content of CSOs' inputs into these as captured in meeting minutes and CSO action plans, perhaps enabled by machine learning-based content analysis.

Second, ***the drivers or determinants of CSO participation also need to be unbundled***. After all, participation should be seen as a good in and of itself. While national policy and incentives have compelled LGUs to ensure that at least 25% of seats in the LDC are occupied by CSOs, it pays to understand what drives LGUs to enable substantive participation. Further studies could also be pursued on how transparency and information entice and enable CSO participation (akin to the study of Capuno and Garcia, 2008), as well as how accountability mechanisms such as audits and elections interact with participatory mechanisms. Other factors that could influence CSO participation may include the fiscal and institutional capacity of LGUs, the robustness of the CSO ecosystem in the locality, the local socioeconomic situation, among others

Third, ***political enablement or interference of participation needs to be accounted for.*** Participation does not occur in a sterile environment, where CSOs' inputs are considered objectively based on their technical merits and devoid of political factors. It is, after all, a dynamic process of influence and negotiation (see the exposition of Medina-Guce, 2020a on power dynamics in local participation). An inquiry into the political affiliations of accredited CSOs is a plausible albeit tedious option, especially absent a national database of CSOs accredited by LGUs. Alternatively, one can attempt to analyze how CSO participation is affected by political phenomena, such as but not limited to: contested or uncontested elections, reelections or new administrations, political affiliations, and political dynasties (using, for instance, the analysis of Mendoza, et al., 2012 and subsequent work).

Fourth, ***the elusive impacts of participation on governance and social outcomes must continue to be sought.*** The seminal field experiment by Olken (2007) as reanalyzed and replicated by other authors (see review by Haus, et al., 2022) continues to be the gold standard in the field. The study entailed a randomized control trial in the context of a rural development program in Indonesia. It found that public participation—through attendance in "accountability meetings" at the village level—helped to reduce missing expenditures, although this was not as much as the effect of increasing the probability of audit. It may be expensive to replicate such an experiment in the Philippines, but there may be other opportunities to undertake an experimental or quasi-experimental study alongside DILG efforts to institutionalize and strengthen participation in LDCs.

Finally, ***CSO participation does not necessarily equate with citizen participation.*** Increasingly, local governments have been adopting direct citizen participation mechanisms aided by technology: from complaints hotlines to citizen satisfaction indexes, and from town hall meetings to social media engagement. The effectiveness of these mechanisms vis-à-vis CSO representation is worth evaluating in terms of policy impacts. Just the same, CSOs continue play an important role as mediator between the governor and the governed. This is a constant institutional role that, arguably, cannot be replaced by sporadic movements and campaigns.

VIII.
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IX.
Annexes

A. Description of Variables and Data Sources

B. Statistical Summary Tables

C. Regression Analyses

Annex A. Description of Variables and Data Sources

Indicator	Description	Data Source
***y*: Budget Performance**		
Local Revenue Growth	Year-on-year percentage change in revenues and expenditures of an LGU.	Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) Statement of Receipts and Expenditures (SRE) for 2015-2018, as compiled by World Bank (WB) and UNDP.
Dependence on National Government Transfers	Proportion of national government transfers (IRA or NTA only) in an LGU's total receipts.	BLGF SRE for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB & UNDP
Share of Productive Expenditures: Expense Classes	Ratio of budget allocated for maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE) and capital outlays (CO) against total approved budget. Additionally, shares of MOOE and CO of the total approved budget.	Commission on Audit (CoA) Audit Reports on LGUs for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB
Share of Productive Expenditures: Sectors and Funds	Proportion of budget allocated for all functions except general public services and debt servicing against the total budget. Additionally, share of key functions in the budget: education, health, social services, economic services, Local Development Fund (LDF) and Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF).	COA Audit Reports on LGUs for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB
Per Capita Expenditure	Ratio of nominal actual budget utilization and population in 2015, aggregate and per key expense class and sectoral category (see above).	COA Audit Reports on LGUs for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB; and Census of Population and Housing for 2018.
Budget Utilization Rate	Ratio of actual budget utilization over the approved budget for the current year. Computed for the total budget and for key categories.	COA Audit Reports on LGUs for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB

Indicator	Description	Data Source
***D*: Participation & Open Government**		
CSO Participation in Local Development Council	(i) Dummy representing whether an LGU's Local Development Council (LDC) has at least 25% of its members from civil society organizations (CSOs); (ii) proportion of CSO members in the LDC; (iii) dummy of whether the LDC tapped the CSO to provide technical support to its secretariat; (iv) dummy of whether the CSO members actually participated in LDC deliberations; (v) dummy of whether a CSO member submitted a CSO action plan to follow through on LDC discussions.	Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) for 2016-2019
CSO Membership in Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee	Dummy variables representing whether an LGU's Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Committee (LDRRMC) has at least four (4) CSO members.	DILG SGLG for 2016-2019
***X*: Control Variables**		
Set 1: Unique Functional Characteristics		
Size of functional budgets	Natural log of the final budget amount of: (i) budgetary sectors, i.e., general public services, economic services, social services, education, health, local development fund, local disaster risk reduction and management fund; (ii) expense classes, i.e., personnel services, MOOE, CO, and debt servicing	COA Audit Reports on LGUs for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB
Set 2: Governance and Capacity Indicators		
Budget Per Capita	Final (approved) budget divided by the population.	COA Audit Reports on LGUs for 2015-2018, as compiled by WB

Indicator	Description	Data Source
Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG)	Aggregated pass/fail scores of an LGU in the following dimensions of the SGLG: (i) financial administration; (ii) disaster preparedness; (iii) social protection; (iv) peace and order; (v ease of doing business; (vi) environmental management; (vii) culture and heritage; (viii) overall score.	DILG SGLG for 2016-2019
Transparency and Access to Information	Dummy variables representing whether an LGU has complied with the Full Disclosure Policy (FDP) requirements to (i) post certain financial documents online (DILG's FDP Portal) and (ii) physically in conspicuous places.	DILG SGLG for 2016-2019
Audit Observation	Dummy variables indicating the audit observation rendered by COA on the financial accounts of the LGU: (i) unqualified; (ii) qualified (as benchmark); (iii) disclaimer; (iv) adverse; (v) no opinion or report.	DILG SGLG for 2016-2019
Set 3: Socioeconomic Development		
Population Density	Official population in the province, city, or municipality divided by land area	Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) Census 2015 and 2020 (2018 author's calculations)
Poverty	Official estimates of income poverty (for provinces and some key cities) and small area estimates (for cities and municipalities)	PSA Poverty Statistics 2015 and 2018
Urban Population	Proportion of urban population in the province, city, or municipality as derived from to the Census	PSA 2015 and 2020 (2018 author's calculations)

Annex B. Exploratory Analysis

Full exploratory data analysis including descriptions of visualizations is available in kapicapistrano.github.io/MDE_Thesis

Annex B.1. Visualizations

Annex B.2. Statistical Summary Tables

Annex B.1. Visualizations

1. Outcome Variables: Local Budget Performance

1.1 Local Revenue Growth







1.2 NTA Dependency




Mean NTA Dependency Rates
City
Municipality
Province
%
0
20
40
60
80
61.1
62.0
82.3
81.2
80.9
78.8
2017
2018
2017
2018
2017
2018


NTA Per Capita
City
Municipality
Province
PHP
0
1000
2000
3000
2641.5
2914.5
2719.3
2960.4
1434.7
1538.3
2017
2018
2017
2018
2017
2018

1.3 Share of Productive Expense Classes (MOOE + CO)







1.4 Share of Productive Sectors & Funds




Mean Productive Shares (Non-GPS & Others)
City
Municipality
Province
47.4
48.5
39.7
40.1
56.2
56.2
%
0
20
40
2017
2018
2017
2018
2017
2018


Mean Shares of Sectors & Funds in Total Budget
%
0
25
50
75
100
16.0
7.8
37.6
8.8
2.0
4.1
6.7
2.8
11.0
3.2
9.7
2.6
47.9
5.9
0.6
1.6
13.3
4.9
10.7
2.7
14.0
3.3
32.4
15.3
0.3
1.8
13.7
4.7
11.7
3.1
City
Municipality
Province
Econ
Education
GPS
Health
Housing
Labor
LDF
LDRRMF
Other
Social

1.5 Expenditure Per Capita







1.6 Budget Utilization Rate




Mean BUR
City
Municipality
Province
80
60
40
20
0
%
69.4
69.4
79.1
78.5
72.3
71.6
2017
2018
2017
2018
2017
2018


Mean Productive BUR
City
Municipality
Province
60
40
20
0
%
62.3
52.3
66.7
65.2
65.6
68.3
2017
2018
2017
2018
2017
2018

2. Explanatory Variables: CSO Participation

1.1 Local Revenue Growth






SGLG: Participation in Local Development Councils
Distribution of Proportion of CSOs in LDCs
City
Municipality
Province
Density
0
3
6
9
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8


LDCs that Meet Minimum 25% CSO Membership
City
Municipality
Province
%
0
25
50
75
100
76.0
93.8
69.6
86.9
85.2
96.3
2017
2018


SGLG: Participation in Local DRR Councils
LDRRMCs that Meet Minimum CSO & Private Sector Reps
City
Municipality
Province
88.7
88.0
82.1
83.3
92.6
92.6
%
0
25
50
75
LDRRMCs with at least 4 CSO reps
LDRRMCs with at least 1 private sector rep


LDRRMCs that Meet Minimum 4 CSO Representatives
City
Municipality
Province
80.8
95.2
73.9
92.6
86.4
98.8
%
0
25
50
75
100
2017
2018
2017
2018
2017
2018

Annex B.2. Statistical Summary Tables

	All LGUs					Municipalities				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
y1_locrevgrowth	3,351	0.18	0.37	-0.7	3.27	2,909	0.19	0.38	-0.7	3.27
y2_ntadepend	3,388	0.8	0.2	0	1	2,935	0.82	0.18	0	1
y3_prodshare1	3,013	0.6	0.13	0.11	0.95	2,592	0.59	0.13	0.11	0.95
y3_mooeshare	3,013	0.4	0.12	0.01	0.77	2,591	0.39	0.12	0.01	0.77
y3_coshare	3,044	0.2	0.12	0	0.62	2,618	0.19	0.12	0	0.62
y4_prodshare2	3,044	0.41	0.15	0	0.93	2,619	0.4	0.14	0	0.92
y4_educshare	3,044	0.02	0.03	0	0.2	2,624	0.02	0.03	0	0.2
y4_healthshare	3,044	0.06	0.05	0	0.27	2,640	0.06	0.04	0	0.27
y4_socialshare	3,044	0.02	0.03	0	0.2	2,628	0.03	0.03	0	0.2
y4_econshare	3,044	0.08	0.08	0	0.58	2,622	0.07	0.07	0	0.58
y4_ldfshare	3,044	0.14	0.07	0	0.38	2,620	0.14	0.07	0	0.38
y4_ldrrmfshare	3,044	0.05	0.05	0	0.21	2,619	0.05	0.05	0	0.21
y5_spendpercap	3,036	3,448.76	2,063.43	2.02	17,964.14	2,611	3,389.35	1,998.60	2.02	17,964.14
y5_mooepercap	3,321	1,280.60	920.13	0	6,745.18	2,879	1,202.27	845.67	0	6,745.18

	All LGUs					Municipalities				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
y5_copercap	3,321	408.76	494.88	0	3,876.04	2,875	383.92	470.08	0	3,876.04
y5_educpercap	3,321	50.98	99.52	0	1,028.30	2,891	40.78	82.5	0	973.59
y5_healthpercap	3,321	221.02	199.72	0	1,289.39	2,888	200.04	178.82	0	1,233.61
y5_socialpercap	3,321	81.51	107.12	0	796.59	2,880	82.22	106.97	0	796.59
y5_econpercap	3,321	219.91	251.83	0	2,046.84	2,884	200.72	221.09	0	1,952.92
y5_ldfpercap	3,321	317.58	321.42	0	2,245.49	2,875	320.31	318.78	0	2,245.49
y5_ldrrmfpercap	3,321	127.42	186.89	0	1,246.85	2,877	131.11	192.11	0	1,246.85
y6_bur	3,013	0.78	0.15	0.19	1.1	2,591	0.79	0.15	0.19	1.1
y6_bur_mooe	2,961	4.71	9.84	0.08	85.52	2,540	5.1	10.49	0.08	85.52
y6_bur_co	2,990	0.54	0.33	0	2.98	2,568	0.55	0.34	0	2.98
y6_bur_educ	2,050	0.73	0.25	0	1.58	1,708	0.74	0.25	0	1.58
y6_bur_health	2,506	0.88	0.12	0.1	1.13	2,130	0.89	0.11	0.1	1.13
y6_bur_social	2,675	0.85	0.19	0	1.19	2,276	0.86	0.18	0	1.19
y6_bur_econ	2,715	0.79	0.23	0.01	1.41	2,309	0.81	0.22	0.01	1.41
y6_bur_ldf	2,676	0.57	0.29	0	1.01	2,310	0.58	0.29	0	1.01
y6_bur_ldrrmf	2,594	0.59	0.35	0	2.37	2,228	0.61	0.35	0	2.37
ldc_cso25pct	3,430	0.79	0.4	0	1	2,976	0.78	0.41	0	1
ldc_csopct	3,037	0.31	0.08	0.13	0.85	2,615	0.31	0.08	0.13	0.85
ldc_csoattend	3,421	0.77	0.42	0	1	2,967	0.76	0.43	0	1

	All LGUs					Municipalities				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
ldc_csoassist	3,421	0.48	0.5	0	1	2,967	0.47	0.5	0	1
ldc_csoplan	3,420	0.17	0.37	0	1	2,966	0.17	0.37	0	1
ldrrmc_cso4reps	3,422	0.84	0.37	0	1	2,968	0.83	0.37	0	1
fdp_posting	3,421	0.9	0.3	0	1	2,967	0.89	0.31	0	1
fdp_portal	3,421	0.87	0.34	0	1	2,967	0.86	0.35	0	1
coa_unqualified	3,421	0.07	0.26	0	1	2,967	0.07	0.26	0	1
coa_qualified	3,421	0.88	0.32	0	1	2,967	0.88	0.32	0	1
coa_disclaimer	3,421	0.02	0.13	0	1	2,967	0.02	0.14	0	1
coa_adverse	3,421	0.01	0.11	0	1	2,967	0.01	0.1	0	1
coa_noreptop	3,421	0.01	0.12	0	1	2,967	0.02	0.12	0	1
budget_percapita	3,355	5,202.77	12,728.24	0	400,698.00	2,908	5,103.77	13,553.36	0	400,698.00
log_gpsbudget	3,355	16.25	5.82	0	23.66	2,908	15.84	5.85	0	22.52
log_educbudget	3,355	9.31	7.48	0	22.08	2,908	8.65	7.23	0	20.48
log_healthbudget	3,355	12.51	7.08	0	22.27	2,908	11.95	6.98	0	20.14
log_socialbudget	3,355	12.34	6	0	21.85	2,908	11.89	6	0	21.51
log_econbudget	3,355	13.51	6.35	0	23.02	2,908	12.93	6.31	0	22.73
log_devfund	3,355	13.79	6.83	0	21.41	2,908	13.5	6.72	0	21.25
log_drrfund	3,355	12.33	6.65	0	21.08	2,908	11.97	6.56	0	18.92
log_psbudget	3,355	16.27	5.31	0	22.73	2,908	15.88	5.34	0	22.73

	All LGUs					Municipalities				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
log_mooebudget	3,355	16.39	5.35	0	23.22	2,908	15.95	5.34	0	22.52
log_cobudget	3,355	15.4	5.36	0	22.99	2,908	14.92	5.31	0	21.25
log_debtbudget	3,355	6.66	7.67	0	21.28	2,908	5.98	7.33	0	19.49
sglg_financial	3,430	0.28	0.45	0	1	2,976	0.25	0.43	0	1
sglg_disaster	3,430	0.25	0.44	0	1	2,976	0.23	0.42	0	1
sglg_social	3,430	0.27	0.45	0	1	2,976	0.25	0.44	0	1
sglg_eodb	3,430	0.69	0.46	0	1	2,976	0.68	0.46	0	1
sglg_peace	3,430	0.4	0.49	0	1	2,976	0.37	0.48	0	1
sglg_envi	3,430	0.57	0.5	0	1	2,976	0.54	0.5	0	1
sglg_culture	3,430	0.63	0.48	0	1	2,976	0.6	0.49	0	1
sglg_overall	3,430	0.19	0.39	0	1	2,976	0.17	0.38	0	1
pop_density_2018	3,430	776.2	3,045.19	0.65	72,798.68	2,976	428.71	883.9	0.65	18,390.78
poverty_2018	3,428	23.37	17.59	0.3	89.55	2,974	24.81	17.87	1.46	89.55
pop_urbanpct_2018	3,430	0.22	0.27	0	1	2,976	0.17	0.23	0	1

	Cities					Provinces				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
y1_locrevgrowth	287	0.13	0.16	-0.66	1.22	155	0.15	0.38	-0.61	2.33
y2_ntadepend	291	0.62	0.24	0	0.96	162	0.8	0.13	0.22	0.98
y3_prodshare1	260	0.68	0.12	0.12	0.93	161	0.68	0.1	0.17	0.92
y3_mooeshare	262	0.43	0.13	0.1	0.76	160	0.44	0.11	0.11	0.75
y3_coshare	265	0.25	0.12	0	0.59	161	0.24	0.11	0	0.56
y4_prodshare2	263	0.48	0.15	0	0.93	162	0.56	0.13	0.21	0.89
y4_educshare	258	0.05	0.05	0	0.2	162	0.02	0.03	0	0.19
y4_healthshare	262	0.07	0.05	0	0.23	142	0.14	0.09	0	0.27
y4_socialshare	259	0.02	0.03	0	0.2	157	0.02	0.04	0	0.2
y4_econshare	263	0.13	0.12	0	0.57	159	0.12	0.12	0	0.58
y4_ldfshare	264	0.1	0.08	0	0.38	160	0.14	0.07	0	0.35
y4_ldrrmfshare	263	0.03	0.03	0	0.18	162	0.05	0.04	0	0.2
y5_spendpercap	265	4,879.38	2,321.29	120.2	16,677.86	160	2,048.81	1,146.72	625.3	7,089.11
y5_mooepercap	282	2,251.72	1,192.16	0	6,557.38	160	978.37	588.4	0	4,542.53

	Cities					Provinces				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
y5_copercap	284	697.52	668.47	0	3,490.43	162	343.29	397.17	0	2,760.02
y5_educpercap	268	169.95	181.2	0	1,028.30	162	36.04	44.06	0	249.31
y5_healthpercap	276	340.5	237.34	0	1,289.39	157	397	305.45	0	1,279.07
y5_socialpercap	279	87.9	99.11	0	622.88	162	57.71	120	0	689.99
y5_econpercap	279	416.1	399.7	0	2,046.84	158	223.93	292.28	0	1,936.25
y5_ldfpercap	285	344.3	380.05	0	2,138.66	161	221.65	226.52	0	1,912.40
y5_ldrrmfpercap	283	114.77	162.17	0	858.36	161	83.78	112.17	0	858.8
y6_bur	262	0.69	0.17	0.19	1.02	160	0.72	0.14	0.32	1
y6_bur_mooe	261	2.37	3.25	0.16	30.58	160	2.34	3.38	0.09	33.78
y6_bur_co	262	0.45	0.28	0	1.62	160	0.46	0.27	0	1.45
y6_bur_educ	219	0.66	0.24	0	1.2	123	0.66	0.24	0.09	1.39
y6_bur_health	241	0.81	0.13	0.23	1.1	135	0.83	0.12	0.36	1
y6_bur_social	241	0.75	0.22	0.01	1.15	158	0.75	0.23	0.02	1.02
y6_bur_econ	247	0.63	0.28	0.03	1.25	159	0.7	0.25	0.03	1
y6_bur_ldf	220	0.51	0.31	0	1	146	0.56	0.29	0	1
y6_bur_ldrrmf	218	0.49	0.32	0	1.33	148	0.55	0.35	0	2.18
ldc_cso25pct	292	0.85	0.36	0	1	162	0.91	0.29	0	1
ldc_csopct	267	0.3	0.06	0.2	0.67	155	0.31	0.09	0.15	0.82
ldc_csoattend	292	0.84	0.37	0	1	162	0.86	0.34	0	1

	Cities					Provinces				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
ldc_csoassist	292	0.5	0.5	0	1	162	0.57	0.5	0	1
ldc_csoplan	292	0.19	0.39	0	1	162	0.16	0.37	0	1
ldrrmc_cso4reps	292	0.88	0.33	0	1	162	0.93	0.26	0	1
fdp_posting	292	0.91	0.28	0	1	162	0.96	0.19	0	1
fdp_portal	292	0.91	0.29	0	1	162	0.94	0.23	0	1
coa_unqualified	292	0.04	0.19	0	1	162	0.13	0.34	0	1
coa_qualified	292	0.9	0.29	0	1	162	0.85	0.36	0	1
coa_disclaimer	292	0.01	0.1	0	1	162	0.01	0.08	0	1
coa_adverse	292	0.04	0.2	0	1	162	0	0	0	0
coa_noreptop	292	0.01	0.08	0	1	162	0.01	0.11	0	1
budget_percapita	285	7,286.09	4,610.54	0	44,385.67	162	3,314.61	3,049.95	789.2	25,808.05
log_gpsbudget	285	18.32	5.74	0	23.66	162	19.92	2.33	0	22.12
log_educbudget	285	13.88	7.67	0	22.08	162	13.29	7.61	0	20.66
log_healthbudget	285	15.76	6.46	0	22.27	162	16.87	6.75	0	21.17
log_socialbudget	285	14.61	5.95	0	21.85	162	16.45	2.96	0	20.99
log_econbudget	285	16.47	6.19	0	23.02	162	18.71	2.34	0	22
log_devfund	285	14.64	7.76	0	21.2	162	17.48	5.84	0	21.41
log_drrfund	285	13.58	7.31	0	21.08	162	16.63	5.02	0	20.11
log_psbudget	285	18.21	5.21	0	22.35	162	19.92	1.65	0	21.41

	Cities					Provinces				
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
log_mooebudget	285	18.64	5.34	0	23.22	162	20.34	1.75	0	22.04
log_cobudget	285	17.89	5.42	0	22.99	162	19.55	2.4	0	21.7
log_debtbudget	285	10.89	8.43	0	21.28	162	11.39	8.29	0	19.87
sglg_financial	292	0.48	0.5	0	1	162	0.36	0.48	0	1
sglg_disaster	292	0.44	0.5	0	1	162	0.33	0.47	0	1
sglg_social	292	0.43	0.5	0	1	162	0.35	0.48	0	1
sglg_eodb	292	0.79	0.41	0	1	162	0.68	0.47	0	1
sglg_peace	292	0.49	0.5	0	1	162	0.74	0.44	0	1
sglg_envi	292	0.74	0.44	0	1	162	0.83	0.38	0	1
sglg_culture	292	0.81	0.39	0	1	162	0.87	0.34	0	1
sglg_overall	292	0.33	0.47	0	1	162	0.21	0.41	0	1
pop_density_2018	292	4,565.02	9,242.16	120.2	72,798.68	162	330.31	458.15	27.16	2,672.49
poverty_2018	292	12.1	10.6	0.3	63.18	162	17.27	13.42	1.9	74.3
pop_urbanpct_2018	292	0.67	0.28	0.02	1	162	0.31	0.22	0	0.94

Annex C. Regression Analyses

These annexes containing regression tables and accompanying descriptive texts are also available on kapicapistrano.github.io/MDE_Thesis as R Markdown documents (html):

Annex C.1. Regression Analyses Covering All LGUs

Annex C.2. Regression Analyses By LGU Type

Annex C.1. Regression Analyses Covering All LGUs

To recall, this study adopts a panel regression model specified as follows:

$$y_{hijt} = \boldsymbol{D}'_{ijt}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \boldsymbol{X}'_{ijt}\boldsymbol{\beta} + u_{ijt}$$

where $\boldsymbol{y_{hit}}$ stands for budget performance measured by the hth metric of the ith LGU in the jth region in year t ; $\boldsymbol{D}_{ijt}$ are measures of participatory governance; $\boldsymbol{X}_{ijt}$ represents the governance and socioeconomic characteristics of LGUs; and $\boldsymbol{u_{it}}$ is the error term, which may be decomposed further as the sum of is the group effect $\boldsymbol{\mu_j}$, the nested effect $\boldsymbol{\nu_{ij}}$, and idiosyncratic error $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon_{ijt}}$.

The dependent variables $\boldsymbol{y_{hit}}$ are metrics that illustrate the achievement of good public financial management: fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational efficiency. The explanatory variables $\boldsymbol{D}_{ijt}$ are indicators that are available from the Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) on the participation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Local Development Councils (LDCs). The other covariates $\boldsymbol{X}_{ijt}$ are adapted from C. Magno et al. (2022) and include size of aggregate and functional budgets, LGU performance as measured by the SGLG, and socioeconomic development.

To recall our empirical strategy:

1. The regression analysis will be done for each of the dependent variables **y**. Analyses for each dependent variable will use 2 model specifications: without no covariates (Y ~ D) and with covariates (Y ~ D + X, following Magno et al 2022).
2. Five types of linear panel regression were implemented per specification: fixed or "within" effects, between effects, pooling or ordinary least squares, random effects, and the model of interest, nested random effects where LGUs are clustered under regions.

3. Additional processing needed to be done in order to prepare the data for the regression analyses:
    - Only observations from 2017 to 2018, when all the CSO participation variables are present, will be included in the regression analyses.
    - Extreme outliers and other defects in the dependent variables and one of the continuous explanatory variables will be normalized through Winsorization (values below 1st percentile and above 99th percentile will be replaced with "NA").
4. As we suspect that there is significant multicollinearity in the models we constructed, we identify the variables that may cause significant issues of multicollinearity and make judgments on their inclusion.
    - Based on the tests undertaken, we find generally that the independent variables on LGU type, the size of functional budgets and their lagged values tend to be highly correlated with other dependent variables and have high variance inflation factors or VIFs (*see table below*). To somehow reduce the multicollinearity, we will remove the lagged budgets as well as the city and municipality dummies.
    - Some SGLG variables also tend to be highly correlated but do not necessarily have high VIFs, so these could be kept. Fortunately, none of the explanatory variables of interest (CSO participation) are highly correlated with each other. Below are the variables to watch out for.
5. To better tease out the effects of CSO participation on local fiscal outcomes, we will run the following additional regression analyses:
    - **Stepwise Regression**, to see the effect of the explanatory variables independently of each other.

- **Nonlinearity**, by including the squared CSO participation variables, to see if there is any parabolic relationship
- **Interaction Effects**, or how CSO participation variables relate with each other.
- **Beta Regression**, for four of the six main outcome variables that are expressed as proportions or fractions, i.e., NTA dependence, share of productive expenditures, and BUR.

Dependent variables that risk causing multicollinearity

Description	Variables
Causes high correlations with independent variables	coa_unqualified, municipality_dummy, log_gpsbudget, log_econbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, sglg_disaster, sglg_overall
Highly correlated with independent variables above	log_econbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, log_gpsbudget, log_socialbudget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_socialbudget, sglg_overall, sglg_financial, sglg_disaster
With VIF > 5 in the 'kitchen sink' model	municipality_dummy, log_gpsbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget
With VIF > 2.5 in the 'kitchen sink' model	city_dummy, municipality_dummy, log_gpsbudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_drrfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_devfund, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, sglg_disaster, sglg_overall
With VIF > 2.5 if without lagged budgets	city_dummy, municipality_dummy, log_gpsbudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, sglg_disaster, sglg_overall

1. How CSO Participation Affects Broad Budget Outcomes

1.1 y1 = Local Revenue Growth

CSO participation did not show a clear relationship with the annual growth of local revenues at least based on the random effects models (nested and oneway; also with the between effects and pooled models). When using the fixed effects model, there is a negative relationship between the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and local revenue growth. However, the Hausman test result showed that the random effects model is more appropriate. Beta regression was not used for this case as there are negative values.

The stepwise regressions indicate that meeting the minimum 25% CSO membership in LDC may be negatively correlated with local revenue growth, although to a very small degree. The nonlinear form as well as interaction effects did not show any statistically significant relationship.

In all these base models, the model fit is weak with an adjusted R^2 of just about 2%, implying that the determinants identified by Magno et al (2022) for the BUR are not appropriate as determinants of local revenue growth.

y1 = Local Revenue Growth, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y1_locrevgrowth									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.048	0.003	0.019	0.019	0.016	0.060	0.030	0.032	0.032	0.030
	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
ldc_csopct	-0.328*	-0.007	-0.073	-0.073	-0.043	-0.330*	-0.019	-0.092	-0.092	-0.070
	(0.173)	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.175)	(0.099)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.081)
ldc_csoattend	-0.006	-0.015	-0.012	-0.012	-0.006	0.029	-0.017	-0.001	-0.001	0.002
	(0.033)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
ldc_csoassist	-0.017	0.028*	0.014	0.014	-0.000	-0.005	0.025	0.015	0.015	0.003
	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
ldc_csoplan	-0.019	0.027	0.015	0.015	0.020	-0.014	0.018	0.004	0.004	0.012
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
budget_percapita						0.000*	0.000	0.000***	0.000***	0.000**
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget						0.004	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
						(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_educbudget						-0.004*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002
						(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_healthbudget						-0.004	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
						(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_socialbudget						0.004	-0.007***	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
						(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_econbudget						0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
						(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_devfund						-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002
						(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_drrfund						0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
						(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_psbudget						-0.005	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001
						(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
log_mooebudget						0.010	-0.008	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004
						(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
log_cobudget						-0.005	0.007*	0.002	0.002	0.004
						(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
log_debtbudget						-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
						(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
sglg_financial						-0.016	0.033	0.023	0.023	0.024
						(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
sglg_disaster						0.001	0.038	0.012	0.012	0.015
						(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
sglg_social						0.022	-0.029	-0.009	-0.009	-0.017
						(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
sglg_eodb						-0.07**	0.021	-0.011	-0.011	-0.004

						(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
sglg_peace						0.021	0.014	0.022	0.022	0.021
						(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
sglg_envi						-0.017	0.007	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
						(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
sglg_culture						0.011	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003
						(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
sglg_overall						0.011	-0.042	-0.018	-0.018	-0.023
						(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
fdp_posting						-0.050	-0.105*	-0.079*	-0.079*	-0.076*
						(0.074)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)
fdp_portal						-0.047	0.057*	0.012	0.012	0.009
						(0.060)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
coa_unqualified						0.151**	-0.029	0.007	0.007	0.001
						(0.062)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
coa_disclaimer						0.115	0.035	0.054	0.054	0.065
						(0.120)	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.055)
coa_adverse						0.099	0.058	0.066	0.066	0.074
						(0.118)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.059)
coa_noreptop						0.068	-0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.003
						(0.106)	(0.074)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
pop_density_2018							-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018							0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
pop_urbanpct_2018							0.008	0.016	0.016	0.003
							(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.026)
Constant		0.168***	0.182***	0.182***	0.177***		0.140**	0.183***	0.183***	0.177***
		(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)		(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Observations	2,980	1,661	2,980	2,980	2,980	2,924	1,640	2,924	2,924	2,924
R^2	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.024	0.040	0.018	0.018	0.019
Adjusted R^2	-1.259	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-1.276	0.020	0.006	0.006	0.007
F Statistic	0.993 (df = 5; 1314)	1.295 (df = 5; 1655)	0.721 (df = 5; 2974)	3.604	2.303	1.002 (df = 31; 1253)	1.988*** (df = 34; 1605)	1.548** (df = 34; 2889)	52.616**	51.225**
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y1 Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y1.1	0.2340	0
y1.2	0.2875	0

y1 = Local Revenue Growth, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y1_locrevgrowth					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.026*	-0.068	-0.006	-0.011	-0.016	
	(0.015)	(0.079)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	
ldc_csopct						-0.031
						(0.341)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.004
						(0.420)
budget_percapita	0.000**	0.000	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_educbudget	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_healthbudget	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_socialbudget	-0.005***	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_econbudget	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_devfund	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_drrfund	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_psbudget	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
log_mooebudget	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
log_cobudget	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
log_debtbudget	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
sglg_financial	0.018	0.014	0.019	0.019	0.018	0.024
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
sglg_disaster	0.018	0.040	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
sglg_social	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.016
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)
sglg_eodb	-0.007	-0.011	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.004
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
sglg_peace	0.016	0.019	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.022
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)

sglg_envi	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
sglg_culture	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
sglg_overall	-0.019	-0.030	-0.020	-0.020	-0.019	-0.024
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)
fdp_posting	-0.080**	-0.078**	-0.079**	-0.079**	-0.078**	-0.073*
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.043)
fdp_portal	0.031	0.021	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.011
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
coa_unqualified	-0.007	-0.015	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	0.002
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
coa_disclaimer	0.049	0.049	0.045	0.046	0.046	0.067
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)
coa_adverse	0.112**	0.047	0.112**	0.112**	0.113**	0.075
	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)
coa_noreptop	0.014	-0.000	0.014	0.013	0.014	-0.006
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.061)
pop_density_2018	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
pop_urbanpct_2018	0.004	-0.005	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Constant	0.194***	0.202***	0.179***	0.180***	0.177***	0.188**
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.079)
Observations	3,270	2,900	3,263	3,263	3,262	2,925
R^2	0.020	0.021	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.018
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.007
F Statistic	63.309***	58.513***	60.370***	60.985***	60.993***	48.317**
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*					

y1 = Local Revenue Growth, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y1_locrevgrowth																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.051**	0.036	0.045*	0.039*	0.033	0.030	0.019	0.031	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.019	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.019	0.030	0.031	0.030	0.030	0.018	0.031	0.031	0.031
	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
csopct	-0.065	-0.112	-0.071	-0.069	-0.071	-0.002	-0.048	-0.031	-0.045	-0.061	-0.066	-0.113	-0.072	-0.071	-0.071	-0.066	-0.113	-0.071	-0.072	-0.072	-0.068	-0.112	-0.072	-0.071	-0.071
	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.092)	(0.117)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
csoattend	0.002	0.009	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.009	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.019	0.048	0.002	0.005	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.010	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
csoassist	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.033	0.046	0.006	0.013	0.008	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
csoplan	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.028	-0.016	0.025	0.032	0.020
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.063)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.018)
csovar X cso25pct	-0.027*	-0.057	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019																				
	(0.016)	(0.086)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.018)																				
csovar X csopct						-0.078	-0.212	-0.050	-0.050	-0.054															
						(0.050)	(0.258)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.052)															
csovar X csoattend											-0.021	-0.126	-0.000	-0.006	-0.018										
											(0.017)	(0.089)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.018)										
csovar X csoassist																-0.038*	-0.148	-0.004	-0.022	-0.039					
																(0.021)	(0.116)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.024)					
csovar X csoplan																					-0.020	0.098	-0.017	-0.042	-0.052
																					(0.035)	(0.201)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Constant	0.176***	0.227***	0.180***	0.182***	0.181***	0.175***	0.228***	0.180***	0.182***	0.181***	0.175***	0.226***	0.181***	0.181***	0.181***	0.175***	0.228***	0.181***	0.181***	0.181***	0.176***	0.227***	0.180***	0.178***	0.180***
	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,924	2,588	2,920	2,920	2,919	2,924	2,588	2,920	2,920	2,919	2,924	2,588	2,920	2,920	2,919	2,924	2,588	2,920	2,920	2,919	2,924	2,588	2,920	2,920	2,919
R^2	0.020	0.021	0.019	0.020	0.019	0.020	0.022	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.022	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.022	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.019	0.021	0.019	0.020	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008
F Statistic	53.983**	51.698**	52.703**	53.433**	52.167**	53.654**	51.930**	52.351**	52.898**	52.077**	52.862**	53.313**	51.149**	51.335**	52.034**	54.637**	52.914**	51.180**	52.838**	53.670**	51.553**	51.477**	51.388**	53.227**	52.734**
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*																								

1.2 y2 = Transfer Dependence

In the nested random effects panel model, a statistically significant positive relationship was shown between transfer dependence and the proportion of CSOs in the LDC. This effect was consistent with the results of fixed and random effects models, with the former having a larger effect size and favored by the Hausman test. The beta regression models also confirm this relationship with significantly larger coefficients. This positive relationship implies that there tends to be more CSOs who are members of the LDC in NTA-dependent LGUs.

The findings of the stepwise regressions show some inconsistencies, although they still point to the positive relationship between CSO participation and NTA dependence. NTA dependence is shown to be positively related with minimum CSO membership in LDCs, CSO attendance, and submission of CSO plans. Meanwhile, the proportion of CSO members in the LDC was related positively with NTA dependence but not with statistically significance. The squared form of the proportion of CSOs in the LDC did not have any statistically significant effect.

On interaction effects, a few are worth noting due to the statistical significance of the coefficients:

- ***csopct x csoplan*** - proportion of CSOs in the LDC is positively associated with NTA dependence, although CSO plan submission is negatively correlated (although small and not statistically significant). Their interaction effect is positively associated with NTA dependence. Their net effect is positive.
- ***csoassist x cso25pct*** - CSO technical assistance to the LDC is negatively associated with NTA dependence, although its interaction with meeting the minimum 25% of CSO membership in

LDC is positively related. The net effect is small positive. However, the minimum CSO membership is on its own statistically insignificant.

- ***csoplan x csoattend*** - CSO submission of an action plan is negatively associated with NTA dependence, but its interaction with attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings is positively correlated. The net effect is positive. CSO attendance in LDC meetings is, on its own, not statistically significant.

There were also no notable interaction effecta between the CSO participation variables (there were sporadic instances of interaction effects being significant, but their non-interacted variables were not statistically significant in the first place).

With control variables, the adjusted R^2 of the nested random effects model was sizeable at about 30%. The use of beta regression improves the model fit with an R^2 of more than 60% (with province dummy variables, both logit and probit link models)

y2 = NTA Dependence, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y2_ntadepend									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.011	-0.030*	-0.025**	-0.017**	-0.009	-0.013	0.010	0.004	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csopct	0.112***	0.042	0.059	0.085**	0.087***	0.105**	0.013	0.029	0.054*	0.063**
	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)
ldc_csoattend	-0.004	-0.057***	-0.039***	-0.018**	-0.014**	-0.007	-0.011	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
ldc_csoassist	-0.003	-0.008	-0.006	-0.005	-0.001	0.001	-0.013*	-0.010**	-0.005	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	-0.010	-0.011	-0.014*	-0.011*	-0.012*	-0.002	0.008	0.003	0.002	-0.002
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
budget_percapita						-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget						0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget						0.001*	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget						0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget						-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget						0.001	-0.002**	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund						0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_drrfund						-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
log_psbudget						0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***
						(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget						-0.004	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
						(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget						-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.006***
						(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget						0.001	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.001**
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial						-0.001	-0.023*	-0.017**	-0.012*	-0.010
						(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster						-0.014	0.001	-0.006	-0.010	-0.005
						(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
sglg_social						-0.007	-0.013	-0.011	-0.010	-0.006
						(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb						-0.001	-0.017*	-0.012*	-0.008	-0.010*

						(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_peace						0.003	0.014	0.007	0.006	0.008
						(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_envi						0.008	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.001
						(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_culture						0.009	-0.000	0.005	0.006	0.006
						(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_overall						-0.014	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012
						(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
fdp_posting						0.016	0.046*	0.033**	0.025*	0.028**
						(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)
fdp_portal						-0.003	-0.023	-0.023**	-0.017	-0.017
						(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
coa_unqualified						-0.001	0.017	0.012	0.009	0.007
						(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
coa_disclaimer						-0.071**	0.045	0.003	-0.013	-0.013
						(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
coa_adverse						-0.010	-0.015	0.003	-0.003	-0.004
						(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
coa_noreptop						-0.017	-0.061*	-0.046**	-0.029	-0.038*
						(0.026)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)
pop_density_2018							-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018							0.003***	0.003***	0.004***	0.003***
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018							-0.167***	-0.166***	-0.169***	-0.196***
							(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant		0.878***	0.849***	0.817***	0.791***		0.784***	0.785***	0.779***	0.782***
		(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.026)		(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Observations	2,981	1,665	2,981	2,981	2,981	2,927	1,646	2,927	2,927	2,927
R^2	0.008	0.017	0.011	0.158	0.011	0.093	0.523	0.470	0.460	0.296
Adjusted R^2	-1.255	0.014	0.010	0.157	0.009	-1.123	0.513	0.464	0.453	0.288
F Statistic	2.055* (df = 5; 1311)	5.649*** (df = 5; 1659)	6.789*** (df = 5; 2975)	21.297***	17.224***	4.136*** (df = 31; 1250)	52.005*** (df = 34; 1611)	75.472*** (df = 34; 2892)	1,873.7***	1,127.4***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y2 Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y2.1	0.0040	0
y2.2	0.0005	0

y2 = NTA Dependence, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y2_ntadepend			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.004	0.006	-0.036	-0.020
	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.025)
ldc_csopct	0.321*	0.167*	0.522***	0.297***
	(0.179)	(0.100)	(0.169)	(0.094)
ldc_csoattend	-0.047	-0.023	-0.027	-0.012
	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.022)
ldc_csoassist	-0.054*	-0.026*	-0.011	-0.004
	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.017)
ldc_csoplan	-0.007	-0.008	-0.011	-0.006
	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.019)
budget_percapita	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	-0.000	-0.000	0.004	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
log_educbudget	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_healthbudget	-0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
log_socialbudget	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
log_econbudget	-0.008**	-0.005**	-0.008**	-0.004**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
log_devfund	0.005*	0.002	0.005*	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_drrfund	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_psbudget	0.060***	0.031***	0.051***	0.025***
	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)
log_mooebudget	-0.004	-0.002	-0.010	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)
log_cobudget	-0.047***	-0.025***	-0.042***	-0.021***
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)
log_debtbudget	-0.005***	-0.003***	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
sglg_financial	-0.080*	-0.048**	-0.089**	-0.050**
	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.022)
sglg_disaster	-0.036	-0.022	0.002	-0.002
	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.025)
sglg_social	-0.058	-0.032	-0.042	-0.022
	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.022)
sglg_eodb	-0.109***	-0.053***	-0.111***	-0.060***

	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.035)	(0.019)
sglg_peace	0.088***	0.042**	0.095***	0.050***
	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.019)
sglg_envi	-0.006	-0.003	0.015	0.009
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.017)
sglg_culture	-0.010	-0.004	-0.022	-0.011
	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.018)
sglg_overall	-0.063	-0.034	-0.075	-0.040
	(0.055)	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.029)
fdp_posting	0.080	0.053	0.139	0.078
	(0.097)	(0.052)	(0.091)	(0.049)
fdp_portal	-0.191***	-0.103***	-0.068	-0.035
	(0.071)	(0.038)	(0.070)	(0.037)
coa_unqualified	0.049	0.028	-0.057	-0.031
	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.029)
coa_disclaimer	0.104	0.045	0.096	0.044
	(0.129)	(0.068)	(0.122)	(0.065)
coa_adverse	0.087	0.052	0.120	0.065
	(0.126)	(0.071)	(0.121)	(0.068)
coa_noreptop	-0.258**	-0.128*	-0.233*	-0.124*
	(0.124)	(0.072)	(0.121)	(0.069)
pop_density_2018	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	0.026***	0.013***	0.035***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
pop_urbanpct_2018	-0.874***	-0.515***	-1.153***	-0.672***
	(0.054)	(0.031)	(0.066)	(0.038)
Constant	1.464***	0.886***	0.777***	0.516***
	(0.124)	(0.067)	(0.158)	(0.088)
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,927	2,927	2,927	2,927
R^2	0.519	0.519	0.631	0.629
Log Likelihood	2,812.798	2,798.503	3,147.607	3,135.809

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

y2 = NTA Dependence, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y2_ntadepend					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.012**	0.003	0.014***	0.002	0.012**	
	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
ldc_csopct						-0.059
						(0.116)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.148
						(0.140)
budget_percapita	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
log_drrfund	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_psbudget	0.006***	0.004**	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
log_cobudget	-0.005***	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial	-0.010	-0.014**	-0.011*	-0.011*	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_social	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.011**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
sglg_peace	0.008	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)

sglg_envi	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_culture	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
sglg_overall	-0.015*	-0.012	-0.014	-0.014*	-0.015*	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
fdp_posting	0.033***	0.019*	0.033***	0.033***	0.032***	0.028**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)
fdp_portal	-0.015*	-0.005	-0.014	-0.015	-0.015*	-0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
coa_unqualified	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
coa_disclaimer	-0.023	-0.006	-0.021	-0.021	-0.022	-0.013
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
coa_adverse	-0.001	0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)
coa_noreptop	-0.028	-0.044**	-0.028	-0.028	-0.028	-0.036*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
pop_density_2018	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018	-0.206***	-0.210***	-0.206***	-0.206***	-0.206***	-0.196***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	0.786***	0.806***	0.784***	0.795***	0.793***	0.800***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.030)
Observations	3,268	2,896	3,259	3,259	3,258	2,928
R^2	0.278	0.295	0.279	0.277	0.277	0.296
Adjusted R^2	0.271	0.288	0.272	0.271	0.270	0.288
F Statistic	1,169.990***	1,090.639***	1,170.804***	1,161.795***	1,159.952***	1,126.916***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y2 = NTA Dependence, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y2_ntadepend																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.010	-0.005	-0.011	-0.002	-0.005	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csopct	0.060**	0.058*	0.064**	0.063**	0.067**	0.029	0.058	0.027	0.062**	0.058**	0.061**	0.059*	0.064**	0.063**	0.068**	0.061**	0.059*	0.064**	0.063**	0.068**	0.062**	0.059*	0.065**	0.063**	0.070**
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
csoattend	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.010	-0.002	-0.014*	-0.006	-0.008	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
csoassist	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.014*	0.007	-0.016**	-0.000	-0.003	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
csoplan	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004	0.033	-0.019*	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)
csovar X	0.012**	0.016	0.013**	0.001	0.016***																				
cso25pct	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)																				
csovar X						0.038**	0.003	0.047***	0.002	0.045**															
csopct						(0.017)	(0.087)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.018)															
csovar X											0.006	-0.011	0.012**	0.001	0.014**										
csoattend											(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)										
csovar X																0.018**	-0.016	0.021***	0.001	0.020**					
csoassist																(0.007)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)					
csovar X																					0.003	-0.108*	0.023**	0.005	0.012
csoplan																					(0.011)	(0.065)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Constant	0.782***	0.801***	0.780***	0.781***	0.779***	0.782***	0.801***	0.780***	0.781***	0.780***	0.782***	0.801***	0.781***	0.781***	0.779***	0.783***	0.802***	0.781***	0.781***	0.779***	0.782***	0.802***	0.781***	0.781***	0.779***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,927	2,589	2,922	2,922	2,921	2,927	2,589	2,922	2,922	2,921	2,927	2,589	2,922	2,922	2,921	2,927	2,589	2,922	2,922	2,921	2,927	2,589	2,922	2,922	2,921
R^2	0.298	0.318	0.298	0.298	0.298	0.298	0.318	0.299	0.298	0.298	0.297	0.318	0.298	0.298	0.297	0.298	0.318	0.299	0.298	0.297	0.296	0.319	0.298	0.297	0.296
Adj. R^2	0.289	0.309	0.290	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.309	0.290	0.289	0.289	0.288	0.309	0.290	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.309	0.290	0.289	0.288	0.288	0.309	0.289	0.289	0.288
F Statistic	1,134***	1,068***	1,134***	1,129***	1,130***	1,135***	1,067***	1,137***	1,130***	1,130***	1,129***	1,067***	1,132***	1,129***	1,128***	1,135***	1,067***	1,137***	1,130***	1,127***	1,127***	1,070***	1,132***	1,128***	1,121***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

1.3 y3 = Share of Productive Expenditures: MOOE + CO

No statistically significant relationship was found between CSO participation and the budgetary share of productive expense classes (MOOE and CO). The results are consistent between fixed effects and random effects. Although the former of which is favored by the Hausman test, it is immaterial due to the lack of a statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and the dependent variable. This finding is confirmed in the beta regressions and the stepwise regressions. There were also no statistically significant interaction effect.

The model fit is strong with adjusted R^2 values of more than 30% in the models with controls (in the models without controls, adjusted R^2 is reduced to only about 5%). This means that while CSO participation does not explain the outcome variable well, the other determinants of budget utilization that C Magno et al (2022) specified were also relevant to explaining the share of productive spending. It must be noted that the use of beta regression improves R^2 to about 40% (with province fixed effects, both logit and probit link models).

y3 = Share of Productive Expense Classes, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y3_prodshare1									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.002	0.034***	0.022**	0.015*	0.011	0.007	0.015	0.010	0.010	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csopct	0.072	-0.091**	-0.048	-0.008	-0.016	0.043	-0.022	-0.006	0.000	-0.005
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
ldc_csoattend	-0.007	0.030***	0.021***	0.009	0.007	-0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
ldc_csoassist	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	0.015*	-0.002	0.004	0.008	0.009	0.007	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
budget_percapita						0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000*
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget						0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget						-0.002**	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget						0.000	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.000
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget						0.003***	0.001*	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget						0.002**	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund						0.000	0.002***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001**
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_drrfund						-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_psbudget						-0.034***	-0.023***	-0.026***	-0.025***	-0.025***
						(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget						0.027***	0.033***	0.032***	0.030***	0.029***
						(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget						0.014***	0.026***	0.024***	0.022***	0.023***
						(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget						-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial						0.002	-0.006	-0.002	0.000	-0.002
						(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster						-0.007	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006
						(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_social						0.011	0.020**	0.017**	0.015**	0.016**
						(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb						0.004	0.027***	0.019***	0.015***	0.014***

						(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_peace						-0.001	-0.014*	-0.008	-0.006	-0.005
						(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_envi						-0.004	-0.008	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003
						(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_culture						-0.004	-0.009	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005
						(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_overall						-0.005	0.014	0.008	0.004	0.001
						(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
fdp_posting						-0.003	0.010	0.001	0.001	0.001
						(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
fdp_portal						-0.005	0.009	0.005	0.002	0.003
						(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
coa_unqualified						-0.003	-0.013	-0.009	-0.010	-0.007
						(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
coa_disclaimer						0.024	-0.039	-0.029	-0.025	-0.024
						(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
coa_adverse						0.031	-0.005	0.004	0.010	0.010
						(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
coa_noreptop						-0.004	0.010	-0.004	-0.002	0.011
						(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
pop_density_2018							0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018							-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018							0.031***	0.041***	0.049***	0.038***
							(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant		0.574***	0.581***	0.584***	0.592***		-0.070	0.038	0.087**	0.081**
		(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)		(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)
Observations	2,704	1,568	2,704	2,704	2,704	2,702	1,567	2,702	2,702	2,702
R^2	0.006	0.011	0.006	0.068	0.051	0.184	0.403	0.348	0.334	0.342
Adjusted R^2	-1.376	0.008	0.004	0.067	0.049	-0.997	0.389	0.340	0.325	0.333
F Statistic	1.286 (df = 5; 1131)	3.502*** (df = 5; 1562)	3.270*** (df = 5; 2698)	8.276	6.060	8.025*** (df = 31; 1104)	30.366*** (df = 34; 1532)	41.863*** (df = 34; 2667)	1,196.5***	1,101.8***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of Tests on y3 Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y3.1	0.0036	0
y3.2	0.0000	0

y3 = Share of MOOE + CO, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y3_prodshare1			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.025	0.017	0.028	0.020
	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.019)
ldc_csopct	0.025	0.024	-0.072	-0.055
	(0.116)	(0.073)	(0.116)	(0.072)
ldc_csoattend	-0.019	-0.007	-0.012	-0.006
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.017)
ldc_csoassist	-0.003	-0.006	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.013)
ldc_csoplan	0.010	0.008	0.024	0.014
	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.015)
budget_percapita	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	0.005	0.000	0.003	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
log_educbudget	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_healthbudget	-0.004**	-0.002**	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_socialbudget	0.009***	0.004***	0.010***	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_econbudget	0.008***	0.005***	0.008***	0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_devfund	0.004**	0.003**	0.003*	0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_drrfund	-0.012***	-0.007***	-0.010***	-0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_psbudget	-0.485***	-0.126***	-0.189***	-0.097***
	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)
log_mooebudget	0.445***	0.138***	0.205***	0.110***
	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)
log_cobudget	0.133***	0.079***	0.139***	0.078***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
log_debtbudget	-0.008***	-0.006***	-0.009***	-0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
sglg_financial	-0.010	-0.004	-0.032	-0.019
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.018)
sglg_disaster	-0.024	-0.014	-0.028	-0.017
	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.019)
sglg_social	0.071**	0.047***	0.069**	0.043**
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.018)
sglg_eodb	0.079***	0.047***	0.062**	0.038**

	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.015)
sglg_peace	-0.019	-0.020	-0.027	-0.015
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.014)
sglg_envi	-0.016	-0.015	-0.018	-0.011
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.013)
sglg_culture	-0.037	-0.025*	-0.044*	-0.025*
	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.014)
sglg_overall	0.020	0.024	0.024	0.014
	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.023)
fdp_posting	0.000	0.010	0.025	0.017
	(0.062)	(0.039)	(0.062)	(0.039)
fdp_portal	0.032	0.016	-0.013	-0.011
	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.028)
coa_unqualified	-0.015	-0.023	0.012	0.007
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.022)
coa_disclaimer	-0.133	-0.080	-0.095	-0.063
	(0.082)	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.052)
coa_adverse	0.003	0.011	0.030	0.021
	(0.085)	(0.053)	(0.086)	(0.053)
coa_noreptop	-0.008	-0.010	0.032	0.021
	(0.095)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.060)
pop_density_2018	0.000	0.000	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	-0.001	-0.000	0.003*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
pop_urbanpct_2018	0.014	0.060**	-0.021	0.003
	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.032)
Constant	-1.314***	-1.377***	-2.116***	-1.226***
	(0.179)	(0.101)	(0.189)	(0.114)
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,702	2,702	2,702	2,702
R^2	0.199	0.319	0.391	0.406
Log Likelihood	2,206.998	2,164.884	2,337.910	2,322.749
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3 = Share of Productive Expense Classes, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y3_prodshare1					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.000	0.032	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	
	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
ldc_csopct						0.180
						(0.111)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.217
						(0.134)
budget_percapita	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget	0.001**	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
log_devfund	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_drrfund	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_psbudget	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.025***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget	0.029***	0.031***	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget	0.021***	0.020***	0.021***	0.021***	0.021***	0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_social	0.016**	0.014**	0.016**	0.016**	0.016**	0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_eodb	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.014***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_peace	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)

sglg_envi	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_culture	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_overall	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
fdp_posting	-0.012	-0.005	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)
fdp_portal	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
coa_unqualified	-0.006	-0.008	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
coa_disclaimer	-0.017	-0.020	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.023
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
coa_adverse	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	0.010
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
coa_noreptop	0.012	0.009	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.009
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)
pop_density_2018	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018	0.039***	0.043***	0.040***	0.040***	0.040***	0.038***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.063*	0.001	0.068**	0.068**	0.066**	0.053
	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.042)
Observations	3,005	2,665	2,996	2,996	2,995	2,703
R^2	0.325	0.341	0.325	0.326	0.325	0.343
Adjusted R^2	0.318	0.333	0.319	0.319	0.318	0.335
F Statistic	1,147.328***	1,072.591***	1,144.390***	1,145.484***	1,143.175***	1,106.514***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3 = Share of Productive Expense Classes, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y3_prodshare1																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.011	0.002	0.012	0.011	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.010
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csopct	-0.005	-0.018	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.001	-0.043	0.002	0.002	-0.007	-0.004	-0.018	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007	-0.005	-0.018	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.004	-0.018	-0.006	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
csoattend	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.010	0.002	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
csoassist	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.011	0.004	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
csoplan	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.009	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)
csovar X	-0.003	0.023	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004																				
cso25pct	(0.005)	(0.029)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)																				
csovar X						-0.004	0.083	-0.010	-0.015	-0.000															
csopct						(0.016)	(0.088)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)															
csovar X											-0.004	0.016	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002										
csoattend											(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)										
csovar X																-0.002	0.030	-0.006	-0.002	0.002					
csoassist																(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)					
csovar X																					-0.008	0.013	0.001	-0.002	-0.016
csoplan																					(0.011)	(0.066)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Constant	0.082**	0.033	0.086**	0.086**	0.087**	0.081**	0.032	0.086**	0.086**	0.086**	0.082**	0.033	0.086**	0.086**	0.086**	0.081**	0.033	0.085**	0.086**	0.086**	0.081**	0.033	0.085**	0.085**	0.087**
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obss	2,702	2,394	2,697	2,697	2,696	2,702	2,394	2,697	2,697	2,696	2,702	2,394	2,697	2,697	2,696	2,702	2,394	2,697	2,697	2,696	2,702	2,394	2,697	2,697	2,696
R^2	0.342	0.361	0.343	0.343	0.342	0.342	0.361	0.343	0.343	0.342	0.342	0.361	0.343	0.343	0.342	0.342	0.361	0.343	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.361	0.342	0.342	0.342
Adj. R^2	0.333	0.352	0.334	0.334	0.334	0.333	0.352	0.334	0.334	0.334	0.333	0.351	0.334	0.334	0.334	0.333	0.352	0.334	0.334	0.334	0.333	0.351	0.334	0.334	0.334
F Statistic	1,102***	1,030***	1,099***	1,100***	1,098***	1,101***	1,030***	1,099***	1,101***	1,098***	1,102***	1,029***	1,099***	1,100***	1,098***	1,101***	1,029***	1,099***	1,099***	1,098***	1,102***	1,029***	1,099***	1,099***	1,099***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

1.4 y4 = Share of Productive Sectors (Net of General Public Services & Others)

The share of productive sectors in the budget–that is, the share of all other expenditures net of general public services (GPS) and other uncategorized sectors–is shown to be negatively correlated with CSOs' provision of technical assistance to the LDC secretariat. This relationship is confirmed by the beta regressions, with larger coefficients.

This statistically significant effect, however, was washed out when taken on its own in the stepwise regressions). The nonlinear form also did not result in a statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and the share of productive sectors. There was also no statistically significant interaction effect between the CSO participation variables.

With control variables, the adjusted R^2 was more than 30% (vs only about 3-5% withouth control variables), validating the appropriateness of the determinants of BUR in the study of C Magno et al (2022) to modelling the share of productive expenditures in the budget. The use of beta regression slightly increases R^2 to about 21% (both logit and probit link functions, with province fixed effects).

y4 = Share of Productive Sectors, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_prodshare2									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.001	0.008	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.010	-0.001	0.001	0.006	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
ldc_csopct	-0.033	-0.034	-0.037	-0.032	-0.031	-0.027	-0.002	-0.002	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
ldc_csoattend	-0.006	0.012	0.007	0.002	0.002	-0.011	0.009	-0.000	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csoassist	-0.012*	-0.010	-0.010*	-0.010**	-0.010*	-0.016**	-0.007	-0.010**	-0.012**	-0.013***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	-0.008	0.007	-0.000	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	0.008	0.001	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
budget_percapita						-0.000***	0.000	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000***
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget						-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***
						(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget						0.002***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget						0.001	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget						0.001	0.002**	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget						0.003***	0.005***	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund						0.008***	0.005***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_drrfund						0.004***	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_psbudget						-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
						(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget						-0.007**	0.008***	0.005**	0.002	0.002
						(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget						0.002	0.002	0.003**	0.003***	0.003**
						(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget						-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial						0.003	-0.008	-0.001	-0.000	0.001
						(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster						-0.005	-0.001	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003
						(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
sglg_social						-0.017*	-0.000	-0.009	-0.012*	-0.012*
						(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb						0.003	-0.026***	-0.015**	-0.011*	-0.011*

						(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_peace						0.004	0.016*	0.011*	0.010*	0.010*
						(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_envi						0.006	0.009	0.009*	0.008	0.009*
						(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_culture						0.003	0.015*	0.011*	0.010*	0.009
						(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_overall						0.027**	-0.023	-0.007	0.002	0.003
						(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
fdp_posting						-0.009	-0.001	0.006	-0.002	-0.003
						(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)
fdp_portal						0.007	-0.004	-0.006	-0.003	-0.001
						(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
coa_unqualified						0.028*	0.006	0.006	0.009	0.008
						(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
coa_disclaimer						-0.082**	0.033	0.000	-0.009	-0.008
						(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
coa_adverse						-0.060**	-0.049*	-0.054**	-0.053**	-0.052**
						(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
coa_noreptop						-0.004	-0.008	-0.008	-0.003	-0.006
						(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
pop_density_2018							0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018							0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018							0.023*	0.028***	0.034***	0.036***
							(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant		0.419***	0.431***	0.435***	0.434***		0.270***	0.299***	0.351***	0.357***
		(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)		(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Observations	2,682	1,564	2,682	2,682	2,682	2,680	1,563	2,680	2,680	2,680
R^2	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.041	0.037	0.218	0.281	0.244	0.253	0.255
Adjusted R^2	-1.397	-0.001	0.000	0.039	0.035	-0.928	0.265	0.235	0.244	0.246
F Statistic	1.104 (df = 5; 1113)	0.781 (df = 5; 1558)	1.031 (df = 5; 2676)	5.300	4.512	9.788*** (df = 31; 1086)	17.584*** (df = 34; 1528)	25.159*** (df = 34; 2645)	782.332***	775.749***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of Tests on y4 Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4.1	0.5271	0
y4.2	0.0000	0

y4 = Share of Productive Sectors, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_prodshare2			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.004	0.003	0.025	0.016
	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.021)
ldc_csopct	0.033	0.019	0.051	0.031
	(0.131)	(0.081)	(0.130)	(0.081)
ldc_csoattend	0.008	0.005	0.012	0.007
	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.019)
ldc_csoassist	-0.049**	-0.031**	-0.059**	-0.037**
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.015)
ldc_csoplan	0.014	0.008	0.014	0.008
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.017)
budget_percapita	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	-0.057***	-0.035***	-0.057***	-0.035***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
log_educbudget	0.011***	0.007***	0.012***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_healthbudget	0.008***	0.005***	0.007***	0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_socialbudget	0.011***	0.007***	0.014***	0.009***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_econbudget	0.023***	0.014***	0.022***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_devfund	0.025***	0.016***	0.026***	0.016***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_drrfund	0.018***	0.011***	0.017***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_psbudget	-0.011	-0.007	-0.015	-0.010
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
log_mooebudget	0.021**	0.013**	0.024***	0.015***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)
log_cobudget	0.010*	0.006*	0.006	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
log_debtbudget	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
sglg_financial	-0.014	-0.009	0.011	0.007
	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.020)
sglg_disaster	-0.032	-0.020	-0.036	-0.023
	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.022)
sglg_social	-0.033	-0.020	-0.025	-0.015
	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.020)
sglg_eodb	-0.069**	-0.042**	-0.050*	-0.030*

	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.017)
sglg_peace	0.040	0.025	0.060**	0.038**
	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.016)
sglg_envi	0.034	0.021	0.048*	0.029*
	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.015)
sglg_culture	0.042	0.026	0.044*	0.027*
	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.016)
sglg_overall	-0.026	-0.016	-0.015	-0.008
	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.026)
fdp_posting	0.041	0.024	0.007	0.003
	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.045)
fdp_portal	-0.039	-0.024	0.003	0.002
	(0.049)	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.032)
coa_unqualified	0.030	0.018	0.002	0.001
	(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.025)
coa_disclaimer	-0.005	-0.003	0.027	0.017
	(0.095)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.058)
coa_adverse	-0.230**	-0.141**	-0.247***	-0.151***
	(0.095)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.059)
coa_noreptop	-0.033	-0.020	-0.054	-0.033
	(0.107)	(0.066)	(0.108)	(0.067)
pop_density_2018	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	0.000	0.000	-0.005***	-0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
pop_urbanpct_2018	0.094**	0.061**	0.069	0.044
	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.056)	(0.035)
Constant	-0.991***	-0.600***	-1.167***	-0.708***
	(0.150)	(0.092)	(0.179)	(0.109)
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,680	2,680	2,680	2,680
R^2	0.258	0.256	0.319	0.317
Log Likelihood	1,834.594	1,834.165	1,950.839	1,951.362
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4 = Share of Productive Sectors, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y4_prodshare2					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.004	-0.033	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005	
	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	
ldc_csopct						-0.058
						(0.119)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.069
						(0.144)
budget_percapita	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund	0.006***	0.005***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
log_drrfund	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_psbudget	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget	0.003*	0.004*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget	0.003**	0.003***	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial	0.001	-0.005	0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
sglg_social	-0.013*	-0.009	-0.012*	-0.012*	-0.012*	-0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb	-0.012**	-0.015**	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.011**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_peace	0.011*	0.014**	0.011*	0.011*	0.011*	0.010*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)

sglg_envi	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
sglg_culture	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_overall	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
fdp_posting	0.008	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.009	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)
fdp_portal	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
coa_unqualified	0.007	0.003	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
coa_disclaimer	-0.011	-0.008	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.009
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
coa_adverse	-0.049**	-0.043**	-0.049**	-0.049**	-0.049**	-0.052**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
coa_noreptop	-0.007	-0.012	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
pop_density_2018	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018	0.033***	0.031**	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***	0.036***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Constant	0.334***	0.344***	0.331***	0.330***	0.330***	0.364***
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.040)
Observations	2,985	2,645	2,977	2,977	2,976	2,681
R^2	0.248	0.256	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.253
Adjusted R^2	0.240	0.248	0.240	0.240	0.240	0.244
F Statistic	838.043***	747.774***	835.868***	835.812***	836.257***	767.445***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4 = Share of Productive Sectors, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y4_prodshare2																								
	cso 25pct	csopct	cso attend	cso assist	csoplan	cso 25pct	csopct	cso attend	cso assist	csoplan	cso 25pct	csopct	cso attend	cso assist	csoplan	cso 25pct	csopct	cso attend	cso assist	csoplan	cso 25pct	csopct	cso attend	cso assist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.011	0.009	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.002	0.006	0.007	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
csopct	-0.007	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008	-0.007	0.003	0.024	-0.007	-0.007	-0.003	-0.009	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008	-0.011	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
csoattend	-0.003	-0.000	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.000	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	0.009	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csoassist	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013**	-0.013**	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013**	-0.013***	-0.012	-0.003	-0.017**	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013**	-0.013**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
csoplan	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.028	-0.012	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)
csovar X	-0.005	-0.023	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006																				
cso25pct	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)																				
csovar X						-0.012	-0.113	-0.001	-0.003	-0.017															
csopct						(0.017)	(0.093)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)															
csovar X											0.000	-0.029	0.002	0.000	-0.008										
csoattend											(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)										
csovar X																-0.001	-0.032	0.005	-0.000	-0.003					
csoassist																(0.007)	(0.042)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)					
csovar X																					-0.003	-0.103	0.014	0.005	-0.000
csoplan																					(0.012)	(0.070)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Constant	0.357***	0.364***	0.355***	0.355***	0.355***	0.356***	0.365***	0.355***	0.355***	0.355***	0.357***	0.365***	0.355***	0.355***	0.355***	0.357***	0.365***	0.355***	0.355***	0.355***	0.357***	0.365***	0.354***	0.355***	0.355***
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,680	2,372	2,676	2,676	2,675	2,680	2,372	2,676	2,676	2,675	2,680	2,372	2,676	2,676	2,675	2,680	2,372	2,676	2,676	2,675	2,680	2,372	2,676	2,676	2,675
R^2	0.256	0.266	0.255	0.255	0.256	0.256	0.266	0.255	0.255	0.255	0.255	0.266	0.255	0.255	0.256	0.255	0.266	0.255	0.255	0.255	0.255	0.266	0.256	0.255	0.255
Adj. R^2	0.246	0.255	0.245	0.245	0.246	0.246	0.255	0.245	0.245	0.246	0.245	0.255	0.245	0.245	0.246	0.245	0.255	0.246	0.245	0.245	0.245	0.255	0.246	0.245	0.245
F Statistic	777***	700***	776***	776***	777***	777***	701***	776***	776***	777***	776***	700***	776***	776***	777***	776***	700***	776***	776***	776***	776***	702***	777***	776***	775***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.5 y5 = Per Capita Spending

The proportion of CSOs in the LDC was found to positively influence per capita expenditures. The nested panel model result is consistent with the random effects model, between effects, and pooled OLS but not with the fixed effects model (no statistically significant relationship, favored by Hausman test). This statistically significant effect was also not evident in the stepwise regressions. Beta regression was not used for this case as the values are in pesos.

Although the above create suspicion that the correlation between the proportion of CSOs in LDC and per capita spending is spurious, there is a potentially nonlinear relationship between the proportion of CSOs among the LDC membership and spending per capita. The main term is positively correlated to a statistically significant extent. The coefficient of the squared term is negative, implying a concave relationship, although this is not statistically significant.

There were some notable interaction effects:

- ***csopct x cso25pct*** - proportion of CSOs in the LDC is positively associated with spending per capita, although the interaction effect with cso25pct is negatively correlated, leading to a positive net effect. However, the coefficient of the interacting variable (cso25pct) is not on its own statistically significant.
- ***csoassist x cso25pct*** - provision of CSO assistance to the LDC is positively associated with spending per capita, but its interaction with meeting the minimum proportion of CSOs in the LDC has a negative coefficient, leading to a negative net effect. However, the interacting term (cso25pct) is not on its own statistically significant.

- ***csoplan x cso25pct*** - submission of CSO action plans is positively associated with spending per capita, while its interaction with meeting the minimum 25% membership in LDC is negatively associated, leading to a negative net effect. However, the interacting term (cso25pct) is not on its own statistically significant. The nested random effects model specifications with control variables had a strong model fit with adjusted R^2 values of 35% (vs only about 2% if without controls). This implies that the determinants of BUR modeled by C Magno et al (2022) are appropriate in the case of per capita spending.

y5 = Per Capita Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_spendpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	134.033	88.302	149.782	128.927	87.294	143.421	170.584	163.658	126.851	121.632
	(124.229)	(213.320)	(137.382)	(108.305)	(106.941)	(93.986)	(171.741)	(113.616)	(91.869)	(90.102)
ldc_csopct	-184.567	3,276.180***	2,146.053***	1,057.837**	1,062.364**	-423.823	1,798.965***	1,637.048***	997.434**	1,020.181***
	(571.728)	(784.161)	(538.475)	(463.654)	(454.322)	(434.163)	(623.166)	(440.755)	(387.997)	(378.506)
ldc_csoattend	172.436	338.651*	244.249**	212.559**	173.394*	-41.759	-25.363	-75.209	-35.290	-30.978
	(106.979)	(176.666)	(116.540)	(92.398)	(91.232)	(84.625)	(149.625)	(101.340)	(82.061)	(80.378)
ldc_csoassist	20.312	89.299	35.203	31.610	-34.096	-64.538	68.116	-5.507	-31.614	-75.379
	(84.769)	(121.384)	(81.777)	(69.708)	(70.607)	(64.846)	(99.094)	(68.662)	(59.445)	(59.795)
ldc_csoplan	258.556***	-145.638	48.203	167.012**	158.261*	106.504	-166.171	-30.430	27.861	41.702
	(96.194)	(168.803)	(104.936)	(83.948)	(83.074)	(75.110)	(136.979)	(88.092)	(72.842)	(71.626)
budget_percapita						0.026***	0.157***	0.098***	0.060***	0.058***
						(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
log_gpsbudget						62.014***	48.631***	53.975***	57.561***	56.013***
						(11.911)	(17.131)	(11.903)	(10.560)	(10.310)
log_educbudget						14.130**	-19.796***	-13.193**	-7.613	-2.546
						(6.308)	(7.020)	(5.168)	(4.995)	(4.955)
log_healthbudget						1.395	-1.353	-5.000	-1.572	1.810
						(8.102)	(8.371)	(6.311)	(6.170)	(6.018)
log_socialbudget						-5.246	0.844	3.755	0.061	-3.248
						(8.373)	(12.906)	(8.966)	(7.668)	(7.603)
log_econbudget						-2.794	-20.943	-13.937	-9.072	-9.326
						(7.691)	(12.855)	(8.656)	(7.273)	(7.137)
log_devfund						16.132**	35.705***	31.107***	25.286***	23.869***
						(7.374)	(10.346)	(7.266)	(6.529)	(6.380)
log_drrfund						10.907	-0.884	-2.019	3.104	2.114
						(7.329)	(10.131)	(7.190)	(6.465)	(6.312)
log_psbudget						-26.752	97.052***	66.766**	33.666	28.763
						(27.645)	(33.917)	(26.727)	(23.433)	(22.826)
log_mooebudget						54.851**	7.090	10.337	27.821	32.348
						(23.591)	(31.918)	(24.087)	(20.655)	(20.228)
log_cobudget						77.678***	-24.419	14.224	41.336***	44.609***
						(16.544)	(25.570)	(17.713)	(15.152)	(14.899)
log_debtbudget						7.834	7.304	4.223	4.048	7.964*
						(6.625)	(5.991)	(4.565)	(4.665)	(4.519)
sglg_financial						-146.063*	229.553	105.962	-49.351	-68.094
						(86.428)	(166.679)	(104.797)	(85.151)	(83.813)
sglg_disaster						275.035***	118.037	193.096*	236.257**	195.581**
						(93.745)	(188.586)	(116.761)	(93.631)	(91.990)
sglg_social						130.712	-88.098	-55.322	48.083	41.617
						(85.416)	(165.970)	(103.808)	(84.304)	(82.970)
sglg_eodb						257.841***	15.178	133.100	211.480***	222.569***
						(71.805)	(136.976)	(88.783)	(70.625)	(69.640)
sglg_peace						53.155	166.897	164.435**	119.022*	29.355
						(68.543)	(132.029)	(83.788)	(67.726)	(67.209)
sglg_envi						-13.325	245.045**	207.139***	101.530	41.774
						(66.782)	(118.892)	(78.416)	(64.230)	(63.554)

sglg_culture						-128.287*	-80.456	-121.875	-139.73**	-137.588**
						(74.074)	(125.329)	(85.240)	(70.464)	(69.135)
sglg_overall						79.084	-237.212	-189.023	-65.669	-38.488
						(117.792)	(224.307)	(140.001)	(114.450)	(112.339)
fdp_posting						-201.165	-226.273	-335.203	-298.099*	-249.385
						(178.371)	(334.004)	(219.862)	(175.092)	(171.685)
fdp_portal						104.059	92.379	122.089	133.116	142.845
						(142.781)	(210.899)	(157.445)	(130.327)	(127.932)
coa_unqualified						1.274	140.767	116.916	52.622	-180.872
						(145.181)	(171.371)	(123.080)	(118.443)	(117.997)
coa_disclaimer						-618.95**	126.536	-35.370	-203.738	-203.780
						(282.617)	(381.480)	(282.151)	(246.488)	(240.549)
coa_adverse						-421.500	604.959	559.510*	54.003	19.784
						(285.837)	(440.558)	(313.549)	(264.700)	(259.250)
coa_noreptop						-350.388	161.869	-62.057	-232.073	-310.226
						(256.641)	(485.678)	(317.964)	(252.058)	(248.723)
pop_density_2018							0.077***	0.094***	0.095***	0.060***
							(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.022)
poverty_2018							1.767	2.065	3.141	13.043***
							(2.913)	(2.334)	(2.660)	(4.301)
pop_urbanpct_2018							-796.731***	-937.759***	-1,121.***	-651.193***
							(175.571)	(140.639)	(168.237)	(175.641)
Constant		1,821.900***	2,168.875***	2,538.742***	2,805.147***		-409.771	-277.882	-213.633	-409.572
		(267.294)	(187.160)	(162.883)	(244.224)		(409.495)	(283.663)	(249.373)	(291.978)
Observations	2,952	1,648	2,952	2,952	2,952	2,952	1,648	2,952	2,952	2,952
R^2	0.010	0.018	0.011	0.024	0.015	0.457	0.407	0.351	0.357	0.350
Adjusted R^2	-1.249	0.015	0.009	0.022	0.013	-0.259	0.394	0.344	0.349	0.342
F Statistic	2.584** (df = 5; 1299)	6.049*** (df = 5; 1642)	6.373*** (df = 5; 2946)	22.840***	17.567***	34.551*** (df = 31; 1273)	32.519*** (df = 34; 1613)	46.492*** (df = 34; 2917)	1,549.1***	1,523.7***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y5 Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5.1	0.0011	0
y5.2	0.0000	0

y5 = Per Capita Spending, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_spendpercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-49.370	418.229	11.037	42.795	3.197	
	(60.698)	(322.851)	(59.817)	(50.380)	(66.992)	
ldc_csopct						3,361.126**
						(1,474.208)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-2,736.962
						(1,790.031)
budget_percapita	0.063***	0.100***	0.063***	0.064***	0.063***	0.058***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
log_gpsbudget	55.836***	40.452***	56.143***	56.098***	56.085***	56.841***
	(9.852)	(10.366)	(9.877)	(9.870)	(9.874)	(10.283)
log_educbudget	-4.229	-4.588	-4.231	-4.134	-4.251	-2.798
	(4.768)	(4.911)	(4.777)	(4.778)	(4.779)	(4.947)
log_healthbudget	2.820	5.636	2.415	2.452	2.444	1.776
	(5.698)	(5.899)	(5.718)	(5.715)	(5.718)	(6.012)
log_socialbudget	-1.483	-1.343	-1.246	-1.326	-1.285	-3.604
	(6.893)	(7.235)	(6.907)	(6.905)	(6.909)	(7.592)
log_econbudget	-9.400	-9.686	-9.500	-9.597	-9.493	-8.997
	(6.584)	(7.059)	(6.598)	(6.597)	(6.600)	(7.135)
log_devfund	22.177***	19.842***	22.286***	22.376***	22.286***	23.790***
	(6.144)	(6.524)	(6.155)	(6.154)	(6.156)	(6.375)
log_drrfund	5.664	4.271	5.831	5.915	5.842	2.056
	(5.930)	(6.160)	(5.942)	(5.940)	(5.942)	(6.309)
log_psbudget	37.610*	78.069***	37.986*	37.883*	37.976*	29.807
	(19.702)	(20.334)	(19.733)	(19.728)	(19.783)	(22.805)
log_mooebudget	32.140*	18.049	31.121*	31.064*	31.201*	31.034
	(17.970)	(18.696)	(17.998)	(17.986)	(18.020)	(20.196)
log_cobudget	41.470***	18.375	41.959***	42.111***	41.917***	44.240***
	(13.468)	(14.257)	(13.494)	(13.491)	(13.497)	(14.868)
log_debtbudget	5.967	6.356	5.751	5.762	5.781	8.124*
	(4.325)	(4.419)	(4.334)	(4.333)	(4.335)	(4.515)
sglg_financial	-56.394	9.905	-55.465	-55.852	-54.910	-68.486
	(83.303)	(88.310)	(83.453)	(83.426)	(83.472)	(83.197)
sglg_disaster	203.933**	285.326***	207.321**	208.218**	206.711**	201.077**
	(91.870)	(98.194)	(92.278)	(92.135)	(92.201)	(91.380)
sglg_social	59.965	-29.009	61.581	62.387	61.610	40.140
	(82.865)	(87.784)	(83.068)	(83.046)	(83.087)	(82.605)
sglg_eodb	209.700***	230.847***	211.895***	211.797***	210.670***	215.337***
	(65.411)	(69.021)	(65.566)	(65.537)	(65.661)	(68.389)
sglg_peace	9.992	-0.476	5.116	6.524	5.605	33.153
	(66.155)	(70.065)	(66.470)	(66.351)	(66.385)	(66.913)
sglg_envi	6.389	-28.410	6.993	6.517	6.648	40.358
	(62.245)	(65.918)	(62.438)	(62.417)	(62.454)	(63.416)
sglg_culture	-123.481*	-146.293**	-124.306*	-123.888*	-123.239*	-142.845**

	(66.391)	(70.358)	(66.643)	(66.617)	(66.725)	(68.862)
sglg_overall	-51.943	-115.239	-51.838	-53.590	-52.158	-39.797
	(112.452)	(117.231)	(112.689)	(112.679)	(112.806)	(111.975)
fdp_posting	-199.868*	-148.853	-205.457*	-202.622*	-205.538*	-250.958
	(121.430)	(128.761)	(122.097)	(122.109)	(122.141)	(171.224)
fdp_portal	192.850*	113.390	194.204*	194.465*	193.942*	119.116
	(112.842)	(119.251)	(113.393)	(113.364)	(113.491)	(126.859)
coa_unqualified	-224.151*	-243.302**	-222.455*	-222.166*	-222.234*	-181.122
	(115.775)	(123.007)	(115.937)	(115.917)	(115.985)	(117.919)
coa_disclaimer	-189.695	-122.693	-194.319	-194.982	-194.540	-198.194
	(202.063)	(204.936)	(202.298)	(202.253)	(202.376)	(240.226)
coa_adverse	24.708	145.504	24.298	26.769	23.677	23.085
	(228.362)	(248.768)	(228.745)	(228.691)	(228.774)	(259.008)
coa_noreptop	-156.555	-130.419	-157.446	-159.154	-157.280	-311.113
	(218.222)	(233.306)	(218.586)	(218.535)	(218.693)	(247.369)
pop_density_2018	0.018	0.014	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.061***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)
poverty_2018	11.425***	9.282**	11.379***	11.410***	11.360***	12.812***
	(4.075)	(3.937)	(4.078)	(4.078)	(4.077)	(4.289)
pop_urbanpct_2018	-589.444***	-601.887***	-584.695***	-584.094***	-584.425***	-651.458***
	(167.970)	(164.142)	(168.103)	(168.116)	(168.108)	(175.567)
Constant	-137.947	-190.885	-181.390	-198.221	-171.642	-764.256**
	(229.390)	(243.832)	(230.372)	(226.571)	(224.797)	(380.198)
Observations	3,313	2,939	3,304	3,304	3,303	2,953
R^2	0.370	0.399	0.370	0.371	0.370	0.350
Adjusted R^2	0.365	0.393	0.365	0.365	0.365	0.343
F Statistic	1,881.811***	1,870.400***	1,877.009***	1,878.348***	1,876.064***	1,523.953***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5 = Per Capita Spending, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y5_spendpercap																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	210.779**	-7.263	142.352	112.938	124.054	117.073	90.643	124.375	123.144	121.794	119.144	91.467	123.306	122.635	121.357	117.511	91.865	124.324	122.858	121.092	124.534	91.494	129.812	123.074	124.148
	(103.848)	(146.897)	(103.263)	(93.982)	(91.059)	(90.009)	(96.941)	(90.131)	(90.169)	(90.239)	(90.111)	(97.004)	(90.174)	(90.169)	(90.227)	(89.761)	(96.940)	(90.097)	(90.123)	(90.177)	(90.011)	(96.835)	(90.216)	(90.128)	(90.278)
csopct	1,043.0***	961.571**	1,015.2***	1,016.0***	1,033.2***	1,348.7***	733.915	1,198.8***	1,013.3***	1,038.6***	1,038.5***	963.217**	1,016.8***	1,017.6***	1,035.4***	1,043.2***	970.315**	1,007.2***	1,015.3***	1,042.2***	1,032.2***	975.340**	993.771***	1,008.1***	1,029.7***
	(378.482)	(399.929)	(378.721)	(378.695)	(379.737)	(418.978)	(530.638)	(407.738)	(388.832)	(383.560)	(378.854)	(399.941)	(378.756)	(378.724)	(379.707)	(377.432)	(399.666)	(378.544)	(378.597)	(379.521)	(378.258)	(399.501)	(378.841)	(378.678)	(379.550)
csoattend	-36.024	-11.449	-29.939	-29.404	-29.370	-35.671	-11.636	-32.182	-29.064	-29.316	26.797	-141.450	-24.376	-38.617	-24.489	-36.160	-11.171	-31.175	-29.218	-30.372	-32.170	-12.375	-30.122	-29.856	-30.635
	(80.336)	(85.122)	(80.468)	(80.437)	(80.491)	(80.307)	(85.107)	(80.457)	(80.454)	(80.515)	(96.304)	(145.171)	(94.910)	(85.055)	(81.444)	(80.086)	(85.073)	(80.399)	(80.412)	(80.443)	(80.289)	(85.020)	(80.401)	(80.419)	(80.510)
csoassist	-75.091	-126.453**	-74.392	-75.021	-74.507	-75.718	-126.551**	-72.945	-74.922	-74.581	-75.253	-125.789**	-74.752	-75.123	-74.712	162.894*	-64.946	29.831	-30.470	-53.328	-78.527	-126.120**	-74.902	-76.131	-74.379
	(59.730)	(63.723)	(59.937)	(59.922)	(59.950)	(59.719)	(63.711)	(59.930)	(59.935)	(59.966)	(59.783)	(63.746)	(59.956)	(59.931)	(59.955)	(91.772)	(164.849)	(90.535)	(69.258)	(62.395)	(59.756)	(63.652)	(59.896)	(59.917)	(59.954)
csoplan	38.548	-5.317	40.230	40.909	40.720	38.280	-6.070	38.107	40.804	40.657	39.271	-4.339	40.648	41.093	40.050	30.722	-8.223	36.587	39.197	38.426	241.356*	289.808	198.604	111.659	56.689
	(71.568)	(76.897)	(71.756)	(71.736)	(71.779)	(71.555)	(76.869)	(71.757)	(71.755)	(71.807)	(71.647)	(76.939)	(71.775)	(71.750)	(71.810)	(71.433)	(76.820)	(71.751)	(71.731)	(71.771)	(129.305)	(258.812)	(127.091)	(91.297)	(75.807)
csovar X cso25pct	-116.592*	326.476	-25.698	21.705	-12.745																				
	(67.771)	(367.249)	(67.373)	(56.563)	(75.961)																				
csovar X csopct						-375.360*	758.639	-242.485	8.769	-27.178															
						(203.620)	(1,119.089)	(201.895)	(169.284)	(224.115)															
csovar X csoattend											-74.142	424.143	-6.248	19.858	-28.202										
											(68.111)	(382.366)	(67.523)	(57.286)	(77.916)										
csovar X csoassist																-297.027***	-201.589	-133.358	-92.287	-121.238					
																(87.045)	(497.651)	(86.439)	(72.155)	(99.520)					
csovar X csoplan																					-260.018*	-995.892	-210.738	-146.830	-110.768
																					(140.382)	(827.695)	(140.196)	(117.139)	(171.233)
Constant	-403.469	-242.166	-390.894	-396.204	-396.118	-407.042	-246.171	-386.937	-394.114	-396.367	-410.562	-241.205	-393.296	-394.973	-395.516	-413.826	-238.547	-392.670	-389.370	-395.223	-423.707	-239.672	-383.987	-390.764	-395.552
	(291.619)	(297.330)	(293.035)	(293.052)	(293.040)	(291.494)	(297.380)	(292.817)	(293.102)	(293.083)	(291.993)	(297.379)	(293.073)	(293.030)	(293.047)	(290.945)	(297.177)	(292.878)	(292.964)	(292.984)	(291.659)	(296.895)	(292.947)	(293.026)	(293.085)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,952	2,612	2,947	2,947	2,946	2,952	2,612	2,947	2,947	2,946	2,952	2,612	2,947	2,947	2,946	2,952	2,612	2,947	2,947	2,946	2,952	2,612	2,947	2,947	2,946
R^2	0.351	0.378	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.351	0.377	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.378	0.350	0.350	0.350	0.353	0.377	0.351	0.350	0.350	0.351	0.378	0.351	0.350	0.350
Adj. R^2	0.343	0.369	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.343	0.369	0.343	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.369	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.345	0.369	0.343	0.343	0.343	0.343	0.369	0.343	0.343	0.342
F Statistic	1,529***	1,504***	1,523***	1,523***	1,522***	1,529***	1,504***	1,525***	1,523***	1,522***	1,525***	1,504***	1,523***	1,523***	1,522***	1,543***	1,503***	1,527***	1,526***	1,525***	1,529***	1,505***	1,526***	1,525***	1,523***

Note: *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$

1.6 y6 = Budget Utilization Rate

Confirming what C Magno et al (2022) found, CSO participation did not show any statistically significant relationship with the BUR in the nested random effects model. This lack of a relationship with CSO participation is confirmed by the beta regressions. The nonlinear form also did not show any statistically significant relationship between the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and the BUR.

Interestingly, however, other alternative models showed some CSO participation variables with statistically significant effects on BUR: positive with CSO action plans under fixed effects (favored by Hausman test); positive with proportion of CSOs in LDC under between effects and poolilng models; positive with CSO provision of technical assistance to the LDC under stepwise model. There were also no notable interaction effects.

With adjusted R^2 values hovering around 25% (with controls; models without controls have an adjusted R^2 of about 6%), the the model fit is considerable although not as strong as in the previous outcomes. This still closely resembles the results of the analyses in C. Magno et al. (2022). The use of beta regression increases R^2 to about 30%.

y6 = Budget Utilization Rate, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.011	-0.013	-0.009	-0.011	-0.008	-0.014	-0.007	-0.008	-0.011	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
ldc_csopct	-0.039	0.020	0.024	-0.002	0.005	-0.019	0.083*	0.074**	0.049	0.046
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)
ldc_csoattend	0.015	-0.010	-0.003	0.005	0.008	0.010	-0.009	-0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csoassist	-0.002	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003	-0.006	-0.002	0.001	-0.000
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	0.006	0.031***	0.024***	0.016**	0.011*	0.015*	0.002	0.005	0.009	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
budget_percapita						-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.00***
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget						0.003***	0.001	0.001	0.002**	0.002*
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget						-0.001	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.00***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget						-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget						0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget						-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002***	-0.00***
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund						-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_drrfund						-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.000
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_psbudget						0.027***	0.012***	0.016***	0.018***	0.017***
						(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget						-0.003	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
						(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget						-0.014***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.02***
						(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget						0.000	0.001**	0.001**	0.001*	0.001*
						(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial						0.010	0.045***	0.036***	0.027***	0.024***
						(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
sglg_disaster						0.009	0.040***	0.028***	0.019**	0.018**
						(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
sglg_social						0.000	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.004
						(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb						-0.007	0.004	-0.002	-0.005	-0.002

						(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_peace						0.016**	-0.015	0.000	0.007	0.003
						(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_envi						-0.000	-0.005	-0.003	-0.002	-0.005
						(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_culture						-0.004	0.018*	0.012*	0.008	0.007
						(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_overall						-0.019	-0.015	-0.016	-0.016	-0.017*
						(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
fdp_posting						0.007	0.038	0.032*	0.022	0.023
						(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
fdp_portal						-0.005	0.025	0.023*	0.011	0.011
						(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
coa_unqualified						-0.024	0.005	-0.003	-0.006	-0.014
						(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
coa_disclaimer						-0.023	0.059**	0.047**	0.030	0.025
						(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
coa_adverse						-0.027	-0.038	-0.028	-0.030	-0.026
						(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)
coa_noreptop						0.033	0.078**	0.052*	0.053**	0.051**
						(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.025)
pop_density_2018							0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018							0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
							(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018							-0.011	-0.007	-0.015	-0.035**
							(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Constant		0.782***	0.773***	0.778***	0.775***		0.804***	0.779***	0.770***	0.773***
		(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.017)		(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Observations	2,703	1,572	2,703	2,703	2,703	2,701	1,571	2,701	2,701	2,701
R^2	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.112	0.059	0.291	0.240	0.226	0.302	0.272
Adjusted R^2	-1.389	0.003	0.003	0.110	0.057	-0.743	0.223	0.216	0.293	0.263
F Statistic	1.009 (df = 5; 1126)	1.998* (df = 5; 1566)	2.525** (df = 5; 2697)	8.668	5.367	14.531*** (df = 31; 1099)	14.228*** (df = 34; 1536)	22.896*** (df = 34; 2666)	751.3***	650.1***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y6 Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6.1	0.2002	0
y6.2	0.0000	0

y6 = BUR, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.047	-0.026	-0.020	-0.013
	(0.050)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.028)
ldc_csopct	0.206	0.133	0.093	0.067
	(0.189)	(0.110)	(0.185)	(0.108)
ldc_csoattend	-0.041	-0.023	-0.010	-0.008
	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.025)
ldc_csoassist	0.004	0.002	-0.012	-0.006
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.019)
ldc_csoplan	0.060	0.034	0.034	0.020
	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.022)
budget_percapita	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
log_educbudget	-0.012***	-0.007***	-0.010***	-0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
log_healthbudget	-0.000	-0.000	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_socialbudget	-0.006	-0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
log_econbudget	-0.006	-0.003	-0.008**	-0.004**
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)
log_devfund	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_drrfund	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
log_psbudget	0.126***	0.068***	0.119***	0.063***
	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.007)
log_mooebudget	0.000	-0.005	-0.016	-0.013**
	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)
log_cobudget	-0.170***	-0.081***	-0.143***	-0.066***
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)
log_debtbudget	0.005***	0.003**	0.005***	0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
sglg_financial	0.209***	0.119***	0.168***	0.094***
	(0.046)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.026)
sglg_disaster	0.153***	0.089***	0.133***	0.078***
	(0.050)	(0.029)	(0.050)	(0.029)
sglg_social	0.019	0.008	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.026)
sglg_eodb	-0.048	-0.029	0.019	0.011

	(0.038)	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.022)
sglg_peace	-0.017	-0.011	-0.049	-0.029
	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.021)
sglg_envi	-0.006	-0.003	-0.027	-0.016
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.034)	(0.020)
sglg_culture	0.074**	0.040*	0.069*	0.038*
	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.021)
sglg_overall	-0.077	-0.043	-0.061	-0.036
	(0.062)	(0.036)	(0.060)	(0.035)
fdp_posting	0.166*	0.094	0.116	0.066
	(0.099)	(0.058)	(0.097)	(0.057)
fdp_portal	0.207***	0.125***	0.202***	0.125***
	(0.069)	(0.041)	(0.071)	(0.042)
coa_unqualified	-0.018	-0.013	-0.073	-0.044
	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.033)
coa_disclaimer	0.393***	0.211***	0.327**	0.172**
	(0.148)	(0.081)	(0.146)	(0.080)
coa_adverse	-0.102	-0.056	-0.087	-0.049
	(0.129)	(0.077)	(0.127)	(0.076)
coa_noreptop	0.180	0.097	0.112	0.059
	(0.157)	(0.090)	(0.157)	(0.090)
pop_density_2018	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	0.010***	0.006***	0.010***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
pop_urbanpct_2018	0.060	0.021	-0.152*	-0.104**
	(0.062)	(0.036)	(0.078)	(0.045)
Constant	1.586***	0.838***	2.124***	1.152***
	(0.194)	(0.110)	(0.249)	(0.141)
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,621	2,621	2,621	2,621
R^2	0.194	0.217	0.290	0.312
Log Likelihood	1,906.411	1,890.331	2,079.467	2,062.918

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

y6 = Budget Utilization Rate, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.002	-0.027	-0.000	0.003	0.009	
	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	
ldc_csopct						0.048
						(0.127)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.019
						(0.153)
budget_percapita	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_gpsbudget	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_educbudget	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_healthbudget	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log_socialbudget	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_econbudget	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_devfund	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_drrfund	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
log_psbudget	0.017***	0.016***	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***	0.019***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_mooebudget	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003*	-0.003	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
log_cobudget	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
log_debtbudget	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
sglg_financial	0.025***	0.027***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.026***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_disaster	0.019**	0.018**	0.019**	0.019**	0.020**	0.019**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
sglg_social	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
sglg_eodb	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_peace	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)

sglg_envi	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
sglg_culture	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
sglg_overall	-0.016	-0.009	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.017*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
fdp_posting	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.021
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)
fdp_portal	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
coa_unqualified	-0.018*	-0.016	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.018*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
coa_disclaimer	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.033
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
coa_adverse	-0.011	-0.002	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.019
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
coa_noreptop	0.037	0.039	0.039*	0.039*	0.039*	0.049**
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)
pop_density_2018	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
poverty_2018	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
pop_urbanpct_2018	-0.038***	-0.035**	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.036***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Constant	0.813***	0.817***	0.815***	0.813***	0.814***	0.752***
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.040)
Observations	2,905	2,617	2,899	2,899	2,898	2,622
R^2	0.263	0.268	0.264	0.264	0.264	0.285
Adjusted R^2	0.256	0.259	0.256	0.256	0.256	0.276
F Statistic	624.132***	550.978***	623.448***	623.990***	626.824***	633.709***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6 = Budget Utilization Rate, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.013	-0.004	-0.012	-0.014*	-0.013	-0.011	-0.010	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.011	-0.010	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.011	-0.010	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.010	-0.011	-0.011	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
csopct	0.049	0.063*	0.050	0.050	0.051	0.045	0.080*	0.056	0.043	0.044	0.050	0.062*	0.050	0.049	0.051	0.052	0.063*	0.049	0.050	0.051	0.050	0.062*	0.050	0.049	0.051
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
csoattend	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.004	-0.001	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csoassist	-0.000	-0.005	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.004	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.004	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.006	0.007	0.004	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000	-0.005	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
csoplan	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	-0.008	0.018	0.015	0.014*	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.007)
csovar X	0.002	-0.018	0.001	0.006	0.008																				
cso25pct	(0.006)	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)																				
csovar X						0.006	-0.056	-0.008	0.013	0.032*															
csopct						(0.019)	(0.093)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)															
csovar X											0.001	0.004	-0.002	0.006	0.004										
csoattend											(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)										
csovar X																-0.008	-0.038	-0.005	0.003	0.004					
csoassist																(0.008)	(0.044)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)					
csovar X																					0.021	-0.028	-0.006	-0.008	0.008
csoplan																					(0.014)	(0.077)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Constant	0.758***	0.747***	0.756***	0.757***	0.756***	0.758***	0.747***	0.756***	0.756***	0.757***	0.758***	0.748***	0.756***	0.756***	0.756***	0.757***	0.748***	0.756***	0.756***	0.756***	0.759***	0.748***	0.755***	0.755***	0.756***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,621	2,358	2,617	2,617	2,616	2,621	2,358	2,617	2,617	2,616	2,621	2,358	2,617	2,617	2,616	2,621	2,358	2,617	2,617	2,616	2,621	2,358	2,617	2,617	2,616
R^2	0.286	0.292	0.286	0.287	0.287	0.286	0.292	0.286	0.286	0.287	0.286	0.292	0.286	0.287	0.287	0.286	0.292	0.286	0.286	0.286	0.286	0.292	0.286	0.287	0.286
Adj. R^2	0.276	0.281	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.276	0.281	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.276	0.281	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.281	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.277	0.281	0.277	0.277	0.277
F Statistic	638***	566***	637***	639***	640***	638***	566***	637***	638***	641***	638***	566***	637***	639***	638***	639***	567***	637***	637***	638***	641***	566***	637***	638***	638***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.7 Summary on Aggregates

The nested random effects models showed the following relationships:

First, a higher percentage share of CSOs in LDCs is positively associated with NTA dependence. The relationship needs to be explored further: the presence of CSOs (do they tend to be present in more capable or less capable LGUs?); and differences in CSO participation between provinces, cities, and municipalities.

Second, CSO provision of technical assistance with LGUs is negatively associated with the share of productive sectors and funds in the budget. This will need to be unbndled further in the per-LGU type regressions to understand this negative relationship.

Third, CSO participation through a higher share of CSO members in the LDC is positively associated with spending per capita. This relationship may however be nonlinear–i.e. it is positive up to a certain percentage of CSO members before becoming negative–and needs to be explored further in the per-budget component and per-LGU type analyses.

Fourth, CSO participation's influence on local revenue growth, the share of productive expense classes, and budget utilization is inconclusive. Perhaps a more disaggregated view is necessary to surface any notable relationship with CSO participation, especially on BUR where there were some interesting but not strongly conclusive interaction effects.

For four of the six dependent variables, the alternative Beta Models (with Province dummy variables) validate the results of the nested random effects models. The models fit better with a larger R^2; and in the case of NTA dependence and share of productive sectors, the statistically significant effect sizes are larger.

Summary: Base Models Using Nested Random Effects

	Dependent variable:					
	y1_locrevgrowth	y2_ntadependy	3_prodshare1	y4_prodshare2	y5_spendpercap	y6_bur
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ldc_cso25pct	0.030	-0.001	0.009	0.007	121.632	-0.010
	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(90.102)	(0.008)
ldc_csopct	-0.070	0.063**	-0.005	-0.008	1,020.181***	0.046
	(0.081)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(378.506)	(0.033)
ldc_csoattend	0.002	-0.005	-0.001	-0.003	-30.978	0.004
	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(80.378)	(0.007)
ldc_csoassist	0.003	0.000	-0.001	-0.013***	-75.379	-0.000
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(59.795)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	0.012	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	41.702	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(71.626)	(0.006)
Constant	0.177***	0.782***	0.081**	0.357***	-409.572	0.773***
	(0.056)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(291.978)	(0.034)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,924	2,927	2,702	2,680	2,952	2,701
R^2	0.019	0.296	0.342	0.255	0.350	0.272
Adjusted R^2	0.007	0.288	0.333	0.246	0.342	0.263
F Statistic	51.225**	1,127.392***	1,101.834***	775.749***	1,523.747***	650.144***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Summary: Alternative Beta Models (Probit)

	Dependent variable:			
	y2_ntadependy	3_prodshare1	y4_prodshare2	y6_bur
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.020	0.020	0.016	-0.013
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.028)
ldc_csopct	0.297***	-0.055	0.031	0.067
	(0.094)	(0.072)	(0.081)	(0.108)
ldc_csoattend	-0.012	-0.006	0.007	-0.008
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.025)
ldc_csoassist	-0.004	-0.009	-0.037**	-0.006
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.019)
ldc_csoplan	-0.006	0.014	0.008	0.020
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Constant	0.516***	-1.226***	-0.708***	1.152***
	(0.088)	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.141)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,927	2,702	2,680	2,621
R^2	0.629	0.406	0.317	0.312
Log Likelihood	3,135.809	2,322.749	1,951.362	2,062.918
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

2. How CSO Participation Influences Function-Specific Outcomes

In this section, we undertake regression analyses on the disaggregation of our outcomes of interest: budgetary share of productive expenditures, spending per capita, and budget utlization. The dissagregations are by the following: key expense classes, i.e., (a) maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE) and (b) capital outlays (CO); and key sectors or functions, i.e., (c) education sector, (d) health sector, (e) social services, (f) economic services, (g) the Local Development Fund (LDF) and (h) the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF). For the last function, the model will include an additional explanatory variable on the presence of at least four CSO representatives to the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF).

The same regression analyses above will be executed, although we will not anymore show the covariates in the regression tables. Beta regressions will be executed for shares of productive expenditures and for BUR.

2.1 Shares of Productive Expenses

To recall, the relationship between the share of productive expense classes (MOOE + CO) in the budget and CSO participation in the LDC was statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, the share of productive sectors is negatively correlated with CSOs' provision of technical assistance to the LDC secretariat. Here, we regressed the share of each of these productive components of the budget with CSO participation.

MOOE Share

In the nested random effects models with control variables, CSO participation did not show any statistically significant effect on the share of MOOE in local budgets. This lack of a relationship with CSO participation is confirmed by the beta regressions with covariates. The fixed effects model, however, showed that CSO assistance to the LDC may have a positive effect on the share of MOOE. The stepwise regressions also showed that the submission of CSO plans is positively but weakly correlated with MOOE budget share. The nonlinear form indicates a concave relationship with the proportion of CSOs in the LDC. However, there were no statistically significant interaction effects.

Y3a = Share of MOOE, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y3_mooeshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.002	0.022*	0.016**	0.010	0.009	-0.005	0.007	0.002	0.000	-0.000
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
ldc_csopct	-0.079*	-0.071*	-0.062**	-0.069**	-0.061**	-0.034	0.045	0.036	0.019	0.017
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)
ldc_csoattend	-0.003	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	-0.000	0.008	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csoassist	0.003	-0.009	-0.008*	-0.003	-0.001	0.011**	-0.005	-0.004	0.001	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
ldc_csoplan	-0.001	0.008	0.006	0.002	-0.001	0.008	-0.001	0.004	0.006	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant		0.405***	0.406***	0.413***	0.415***		-0.463***	-0.432***	-0.469***	-0.473***
		(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)		(0.049)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,699	1,573	2,699	2,699	2,699	2,697	1,572	2,697	2,697	2,697
R^2	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.052	0.033	0.396	0.448	0.422	0.431	0.414
Adjusted R^2	-1.397	0.001	0.002	0.050	0.031	-0.488	0.436	0.415	0.423	0.407
F Statistic	0.886 (df = 5; 1121)	1.418 (df = 5; 1567)	1.893* (df = 5; 2693)	6.774	5.059	23.152*** (df = 31; 1094)	36.696*** (df = 34; 1537)	57.153*** (df = 34; 2662)	1,812.2***	1,657.0***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y3a Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y3a.1	0.3526	0
y3a.2	0.0000	0

y3a = Share of MOOE, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y3_mooeshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.007	0.005	0.007	0.005
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.014)
ldc_csopct	0.206**	0.125**	0.124	0.073
	(0.089)	(0.055)	(0.088)	(0.054)
ldc_csoattend	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.005
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.013)
ldc_csoassist	-0.005	-0.003	0.004	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.016)	(0.010)
ldc_csoplan	0.010	0.006	0.016	0.010
	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Constant	-2.602***	-1.660***	-2.889***	-1.848***
	(0.159)	(0.093)	(0.176)	(0.105)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,647	2,647	2,647	2,647
R^2	0.457	0.469	0.516	0.530
Log Likelihood	2,961.321	2,950.542	3,087.515	3,076.045
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3a = Share of MOOE, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y3_mooeshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.004	-0.006	0.003	-0.002	0.007**	
	(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	
ldc_csopct						0.163**
						(0.077)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.171*
						(0.093)
Constant	-0.371***	-0.339***	-0.378***	-0.375***	-0.378***	-0.358***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,944	2,648	2,939	2,939	2,938	2,648
R^2	0.517	0.532	0.517	0.517	0.517	0.533
Adjusted R^2	0.512	0.527	0.512	0.512	0.512	0.527
F Statistic	2,791.599***	2,633.110***	2,782.852***	2,782.533***	2,787.362***	2,671.215***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3a = Share of MOOE, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y3_mooeshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.006	0.002	-0.000	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
csopct	0.020	0.020	0.021	0.020	0.020	0.023	0.012	0.012	0.023	0.016	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.021	0.021	0.020	0.020	0.020
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
csoattend	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	-0.000	-0.001	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
csoassist	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.004	-0.004	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csoplan	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.012	0.023*	-0.003	0.007	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)
csovar X	-0.004	-0.003	0.004	-0.002	0.007*																				
cso25pct	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)																				
csovar X						-0.004	0.029	0.011	-0.006	0.023**															
csopct						(0.011)	(0.059)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)															
csovar X											-0.002	0.008	0.004	-0.001	0.006										
csoattend											(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)										
csovar X																0.002	-0.007	0.006	-0.001	0.004					
csoassist																(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)					
csovar X																					-0.010	-0.065	0.009	-0.006	0.017*
csoplan																					(0.008)	(0.044)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Constant	-0.336***	-0.27***	-0.336***	-0.337***	-0.337***	-0.336***	-0.27***	-0.337***	-0.337***	-0.338***	-0.336***	-0.27***	-0.337***	-0.337***	-0.337***	-0.336***	-0.27***	-0.337***	-0.336***	-0.336***	-0.335***	-0.27***	-0.337***	-0.336***	-0.337***
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,647	2,381	2,643	2,643	2,642	2,647	2,381	2,643	2,643	2,642	2,647	2,381	2,643	2,643	2,642	2,647	2,381	2,643	2,643	2,642	2,647	2,381	2,643	2,643	2,642
R^2	0.533	0.557	0.532	0.532	0.533	0.532	0.557	0.532	0.532	0.533	0.532	0.557	0.532	0.532	0.532	0.532	0.557	0.532	0.532	0.532	0.533	0.557	0.532	0.532	0.533
Adj. R^2	0.526	0.550	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.550	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.550	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.550	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.526	0.550	0.526	0.526	0.526
F Statistic	2,664***	2,606***	2,657***	2,655***	2,658***	2,662***	2,606***	2,656***	2,655***	2,660***	2,663***	2,606***	2,656***	2,654***	2,657**	2,662***	2,606***	2,657***	2,654***	2,653***	2,665***	2,610***	2,656***	2,656***	2,660***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

CO Share

Like in the case of MOOE, CSO participation is not statistically significantly related with the share of CO in the budget in the base models. This is validated by the stepwise regressions as well as the nonlinear form. However, other alternative models showed statistically significant relationships. In the fixed effects and the beta regression models, the proportion of CSOs in the LDC is positively correlated with the share of CO. This relationship is however negative in the between effects model. The Fixed effects model also showed that CSO technical assistance to the LDC is negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Finally, there were no notable interaction effects.

Y3b = Share of CO, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y3_coshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.013	0.014	0.012	0.013*	0.010	0.008	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
ldc_csopct	0.095**	-0.061	-0.020	0.011	0.001	0.067*	-0.052*	-0.017	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
ldc_csoattend	-0.005	0.033***	0.020***	0.011*	0.008	-0.010	0.006	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csoassist	-0.004	0.006	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	-0.011*	0.004	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
ldc_csoplan	0.018**	-0.012	-0.002	0.005	0.009*	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant		0.176***	0.176***	0.173***	0.177***		-0.020	0.007	0.007	0.005
		(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)		(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,728	1,583	2,728	2,728	2,728	2,726	1,582	2,726	2,726	2,726
R^2	0.013	0.011	0.005	0.011	0.005	0.334	0.510	0.462	0.438	0.421
Adjusted R^2	-1.361	0.007	0.003	0.009	0.004	-0.629	0.499	0.455	0.431	0.414
F Statistic	3.030** (df = 5; 1140)	3.372*** (df = 5; 1577)	2.501** (df = 5; 2722)	9.564*	7.830	18.042*** (df = 31; 1113)	47.328*** (df = 34; 1547)	68.019*** (df = 34; 2691)	2,084.9***	1,962.5***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y3b Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y3b.1	0.0003	0
y3b.2	0.0000	0

y3b = Share of CO, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y3_coshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.014	-0.002	0.005	-0.016
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.015)
ldc_csopct	0.050	0.124**	0.004	0.118**
	(0.101)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.058)
ldc_csoattend	-0.009	-0.005	-0.007	-0.001
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.014)
ldc_csoassist	0.002	-0.004	-0.006	-0.013
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.010)
ldc_csoplan	0.004	0.009	0.006	0.010
	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Constant	-3.389***	-3.308***	-3.433***	-3.629***
	(0.157)	(0.087)	(0.167)	(0.097)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,683	2,683	2,683	2,683
R^2	0.724	0.837	0.679	0.851
Log Likelihood	4,144.029	4,109.182	4,363.226	4,251.512
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3b = Share of CO, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y3_coshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.003	-0.007	0.003	-0.000	0.001	
	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
ldc_csopct						0.078
						(0.067)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.077
						(0.082)
Constant	-0.422***	-0.360***	-0.422***	-0.419***	-0.419***	-0.380***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.028)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,983	2,679	2,978	2,978	2,977	2,684
R^2	0.682	0.692	0.682	0.681	0.681	0.688
Adjusted R^2	0.678	0.688	0.678	0.678	0.678	0.684
F Statistic	6,348.300***	5,988.744***	6,332.522***	6,329.510***	6,325.413***	5,838.091***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3b = Share of CO, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y3_coshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
csopct	0.016	0.002	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.007	0.013	0.019	0.017	0.016	0.002	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.003	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.003	0.016	0.017	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
csoattend	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004	0.003	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
csoassist	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.008*	0.000	-0.007	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csoplan	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.000	-0.013	-0.008	0.004	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
csovar X cso25pct	0.002	-0.009	0.003	-0.001	0.001																				
	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)																				
csovar X csopct						0.007	-0.014	0.006	-0.004	0.001															
						(0.010)	(0.052)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)															
csovar X csoattend											0.003	-0.012	0.004	-0.002	0.001										
											(0.003)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)										
csovar X csoassist																0.007	-0.003	0.005	0.003	0.003					
																(0.004)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)					
csovar X csoplan																					0.003	0.047	0.013*	-0.002	-0.003
																					(0.007)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Constant	-0.370***	-0.282***	-0.369***	-0.369***	-0.370***	-0.370***	-0.283***	-0.369***	-0.369***	-0.369***	-0.370***	-0.282***	-0.369***	-0.369***	-0.369***	-0.371***	-0.283***	-0.370***	-0.370***	-0.369***	-0.370***	-0.284***	-0.370***	-0.369***	-0.369***
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,683	2,410	2,679	2,679	2,678	2,683	2,410	2,679	2,679	2,678	2,683	2,410	2,679	2,679	2,678	2,683	2,410	2,679	2,679	2,678	2,683	2,410	2,679	2,679	2,678
R^2	0.688	0.701	0.688	0.687	0.687	0.688	0.701	0.687	0.688	0.687	0.688	0.701	0.688	0.688	0.687	0.688	0.701	0.688	0.688	0.687	0.688	0.701	0.688	0.687	0.687
Adj. R^2	0.683	0.696	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.696	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.684	0.696	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.684	0.696	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.683	0.696	0.684	0.683	0.683
F Statistic	5,825***	5,560***	5,809***	5,809***	5,805***	5,825***	5,559***	5,809***	5,810***	5,805***	5,826***	5,562***	5,812***	5,811***	5,805***	5,830***	5,556***	5,812***	5,810***	5,806***	5,824***	5,561***	5,820***	5,809***	5,806***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Education Sector Share

The CSOs' submission of an action plan to the LDC is negatively associated with the share of the education sector in the local budget, albeit with a very small effect size. The statistical significance of this effect is also washed out in the alternative linear panel models such as fixed effects and between effects, as well as when taken on its own in the stepwise regressions. The beta regressions presented a different variable–CSO technical assistance to the LDC–as being negatively correlated with the share of education in the local budget. The nonlinear form was also not statistically significant. There were also no notable interaction effects.

y4c = Share of Education, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_educshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.002	0.006*	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csopct	0.012	-0.023**	-0.014*	-0.001	-0.001	0.004	-0.010	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
ldc_csoattend	0.001	0.004	0.003*	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csoassist	-0.000	-0.004**	-0.003***	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csoplan	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003**	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002*	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant		0.021***	0.022***	0.020***	0.022***		0.001	0.004	0.009	0.007
		(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)		(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,729	1,578	2,729	2,729	2,729	2,727	1,577	2,727	2,727	2,727
R^2	0.006	0.009	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.305	0.453	0.433	0.392	0.347
Adjusted R^2	-1.366	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.004	-0.694	0.441	0.425	0.384	0.339
F Statistic	1.402 (df = 5; 1146)	2.858** (df = 5; 1572)	3.051*** (df = 5; 2723)	8.883	7.418	15.817*** (df = 31; 1119)	37.513*** (df = 34; 1542)	60.375*** (df = 34; 2692)	1,718.6***	1,411.3***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y4c Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4c.1	0.0257	0
y4c.2	0.0049	0

y4c = Share of Education, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_educshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.025	-0.012	-0.008	-0.004
	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.017)
ldc_csopct	0.127	0.053	0.086	0.035
	(0.153)	(0.065)	(0.145)	(0.061)
ldc_csoattend	-0.055	-0.022	-0.055	-0.020
	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.015)
ldc_csoassist	-0.068***	-0.031***	-0.069***	-0.028**
	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.026)	(0.011)
ldc_csoplan	0.019	0.008	0.038	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.013)
Constant	-8.459***	-4.023***	-8.986***	-4.223***
	(0.180)	(0.079)	(0.254)	(0.101)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,832	1,832	1,832	1,832
R^2	0.813	0.815	0.831	0.839
Log Likelihood	5,799.003	5,805.525	5,996.521	5,992.507
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4c = Share of Education, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y4_educshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
ldc_csopct						0.001
						(0.022)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.007
						(0.026)
Constant	-0.117***	-0.127***	-0.117***	-0.117***	-0.117***	-0.115***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,039	1,833	2,038	2,038	2,037	1,833
R^2	0.567	0.579	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.581
Adjusted R^2	0.561	0.572	0.561	0.561	0.561	0.573
F Statistic	2,626.674***	2,455.810***	2,621.999***	2,619.245***	2,621.929***	2,495.024***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4c = Share of Education, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y4_educshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csopct	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
csoattend	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csoassist	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002**	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csoplan	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csovar X cso25pct	-0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001																				
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)																				
csovar X csopct						-0.001	-0.003	0.002	-0.002	-0.003															
						(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)															
csovar X csoattend											-0.001	-0.003	0.000	-0.000	-0.001										
											(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)										
csovar X csoassist																-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000					
																(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)					
csovar X csoplan																					0.002	0.009	0.004*	-0.001	-0.001
																					(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.116***	-0.12***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.115***	-0.116***	-0.13***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.13***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.115***	-0.116***	-0.12***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.12***	-0.116***	-0.116***	-0.116***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	1,832	1,640	1,831	1,831	1,830	1,832	1,640	1,831	1,831	1,830	1,832	1,640	1,831	1,831	1,830	1,832	1,640	1,831	1,831	1,830	1,832	1,640	1,831	1,831	1,830
R^2	0.583	0.597	0.582	0.582	0.582	0.583	0.597	0.582	0.582	0.582	0.583	0.597	0.582	0.582	0.582	0.582	0.597	0.582	0.582	0.582	0.582	0.597	0.583	0.582	0.582
Adj. R^2	0.575	0.588	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.575	0.588	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.588	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.588	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.574	0.588	0.575	0.574	0.574
F Statistic	2,510***	2,355***	2,505***	2,501***	2,502***	2,509***	2,355***	2,505***	2,501***	2,501***	2,508***	2,356***	2,504***	2,5010***	2,502***	2,506***	2,355***	2,503***	2,502***	2,500***	2,507***	2,357***	2,509***	2,502***	2,502***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Health Sector Share

In all the linear panel models, there was no statistically significant relationship between CSO participation in the LDC and share of the health sector budget. In contrast, however, the beta regression model shows that the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and the submission of CSO actions plan have a positive effect, while meeting the minimum 25% of CSOs in the LDC has a negative albeit relatively smaller effect. The stewpise regressions showed that another variable–CSO technical assistance to the LDC–may be positively associated with higher share of healthcare spending in the budget. There was no notable nonlinear effect or interaction effects.

y4d = Share of Health, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_healthshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.003	0.008	0.006*	0.004*	0.004	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldc_csopct	-0.004	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.011	0.003	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
ldc_csoattend	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldc_csoassist	0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.000	0.002	0.003	-0.003	-0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csoplan	0.000	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant		0.057***	0.059***	0.060***	0.060***		-0.009	-0.013	0.003	-0.004
		(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)		(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,731	1,580	2,731	2,731	2,731	2,729	1,579	2,729	2,729	2,729
R^2	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.014	0.007	0.455	0.515	0.493	0.477	0.465
Adjusted R^2	-1.377	0.001	0.001	0.012	0.006	-0.328	0.504	0.487	0.471	0.458
F Statistic	0.490 (df = 5; 1146)	1.219 (df = 5; 1574)	1.501 (df = 5; 2725)	4.610	5.111	30.175*** (df = 31; 1119)	48.189*** (df = 34; 1544)	77.088*** (df = 34; 2694)	2,403.4***	2,303.7***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y4d Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4d.1	0.5433	0
y4d.2	0.0000	0

y4d = Share of Healthcare, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_healthshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.034	-0.019	-0.041*	-0.021*
	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.012)
ldc_csopct	0.361***	0.184***	0.318***	0.156***
	(0.096)	(0.048)	(0.089)	(0.044)
ldc_csoattend	-0.028	-0.013	-0.021	-0.010
	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.011)
ldc_csoassist	-0.042***	-0.021***	-0.010	-0.004
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.008)
ldc_csoplan	0.033	0.016	0.046**	0.022**
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Constant	-6.905***	-3.705***	-7.030***	-3.775***
	(0.136)	(0.070)	(0.162)	(0.080)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,289	2,289	2,289	2,289
R^2	0.528	0.565	0.575	0.616
Log Likelihood	5,314.527	5,313.319	5,585.688	5,565.250
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4d = Share of Health, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y4_healthshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.002**	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
ldc_csopct						-0.009
						(0.028)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.025
						(0.033)
Constant	-0.301***	-0.296***	-0.302***	-0.302***	-0.301***	-0.302***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,527	2,290	2,527	2,527	2,526	2,290
R^2	0.524	0.534	0.524	0.524	0.523	0.535
Adjusted R^2	0.518	0.527	0.518	0.518	0.518	0.528
F Statistic	2,684.554***	2,532.370***	2,683.059***	2,688.980***	2,679.219***	2,522.518***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4d = Share of Health, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y4_healthshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csopct	0.012*	0.016**	0.013*	0.013*	0.012*	0.008	0.015	0.008	0.009	0.012	0.012*	0.016**	0.013*	0.013*	0.013*	0.012*	0.016**	0.012*	0.013*	0.012*	0.013*	0.016**	0.013*	0.013*	0.012*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csoattend	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csoassist	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.003	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csoplan	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.007	-0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
csovar X	0.002	0.002	0.002*	0.003**	0.001																				
cso25pct	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)																				
csovar X						0.005	0.003	0.006	0.008***	0.005															
csopct						(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)															
csovar X											0.003**	0.005	0.003**	0.003***	0.002										
csoattend											(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)										
csovar X																0.003**	0.002	0.003*	0.002*	0.002					
csoassist																(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)					
csovar X																					-0.000	-0.018	0.003	0.000	0.000
csoplan																					(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Constant	-0.305***	-0.30***	-0.306***	-0.306***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.30***	-0.306***	-0.306***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.30***	-0.306***	-0.307***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.30***	-0.306***	-0.306***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.30***	-0.305***	-0.305***	-0.305***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,289	2,066	2,289	2,289	2,288	2,289	2,066	2,289	2,289	2,288	2,289	2,066	2,289	2,289	2,288	2,289	2,066	2,289	2,289	2,288	2,289	2,066	2,289	2,289	2,288
R^2	0.536	0.545	0.536	0.536	0.535	0.536	0.545	0.536	0.536	0.535	0.536	0.545	0.536	0.537	0.535	0.536	0.545	0.536	0.536	0.535	0.535	0.545	0.535	0.535	0.535
Ad. R^2	0.529	0.537	0.529	0.529	0.528	0.529	0.537	0.528	0.529	0.528	0.529	0.537	0.529	0.530	0.528	0.529	0.537	0.529	0.529	0.528	0.528	0.537	0.528	0.528	0.528
F Statistic	2,529***	2,371***	2,529***	2,534***	2,520***	2,528***	2,371***	2,527***	2,536***	2,520***	2,534***	2,372***	2,533***	2,539***	2,522***	2,533***	2,371***	2,529***	2,528***	2,520***	2,522***	2,374***	2,524***	2,524***	2,518***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Social Services Share

The submission of CSO action plans is positively correlated with the share of social services in the budget, although to a very small degree. This is validated by the beta regression, with a larger effect size. In contrast, the alternative panel linear models particularly fixed effects and the stepwise regressions wash out this effect. The nonlinear term and the interaction effects were also not notable.

y4e = Share of Social Services, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_socialshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csopct	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
ldc_csoattend	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.004**	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csoassist	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
ldc_csoplan	0.002	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant		0.026***	0.027***	0.027***	0.027***		0.021***	0.017***	0.016***	0.016***
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,734	1,584	2,734	2,734	2,734	2,732	1,583	2,732	2,732	2,732
R^2	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.003	0.343	0.471	0.441	0.420	0.417
Adjusted R^2	-1.381	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	0.001	-0.606	0.460	0.434	0.413	0.410
F Statistic	0.562 (df = 5; 1145)	0.211 (df = 5; 1578)	0.613 (df = 5; 2728)	3.128	2.760	18.803*** (df = 31; 1118)	40.600*** (df = 34; 1548)	62.659*** (df = 34; 2697)	1,939.3***	1,925.1***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y4e Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4e.1	0.9777	0
y4e.2	0.0294	0

y4e = Share of Social Services, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_socialshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.003	-0.007	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.013)
ldc_csopct	0.265**	0.121**	0.148	0.078
	(0.119)	(0.050)	(0.119)	(0.050)
ldc_csoattend	0.008	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.012)
ldc_csoassist	-0.018	-0.008	-0.009	-0.005
	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.009)
ldc_csoplan	0.074***	0.028***	0.067***	0.025**
	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.010)
Constant	-8.338***	-3.965***	-8.720***	-4.130***
	(0.163)	(0.072)	(0.184)	(0.081)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,451	2,451	2,451	2,451
R^2	0.697	0.725	0.717	0.746
Log Likelihood	7,829.856	7,854.157	7,952.945	7,972.729
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3 = Share of Social Services, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y4_socialshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.001	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
ldc_csopct						0.002
						(0.018)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.002
						(0.021)
Constant	-0.148***	-0.144***	-0.147***	-0.147***	-0.147***	-0.145***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,699	2,451	2,698	2,698	2,697	2,452
R^2	0.684	0.681	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.683
Adjusted R^2	0.680	0.677	0.680	0.680	0.680	0.679
F Statistic	5,683.803***	5,104.725***	5,680.670***	5,681.110***	5,685.001***	5,149.098***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3 = Share of Social Services, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y4_socialshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csopct	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
csoattend	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002*	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csoassist	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002**	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csoplan	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csovar X cso25pct	0.001	-0.002	0.000	-0.001	-0.001																				
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)																				
csovar X csopct						0.003	-0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.004															
						(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)															
csovar X csoattend											0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001										
											(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)										
csovar X csoassist																0.002	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.000					
																(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)					
csovar X csoplan																					0.001	0.011	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
																					(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.146***	-0.14***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.14***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.14***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.14***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.14***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,451	2,213	2,450	2,450	2,449	2,451	2,213	2,450	2,450	2,449	2,451	2,213	2,450	2,450	2,449	2,451	2,213	2,450	2,450	2,449	2,451	2,213	2,450	2,450	2,449
R^2	0.684	0.682	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.682	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.682	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.682	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.684	0.682	0.684	0.684	0.684
Adj. R^2	0.679	0.677	0.679	0.679	0.680	0.679	0.677	0.679	0.679	0.680	0.680	0.677	0.679	0.679	0.679	0.680	0.677	0.679	0.679	0.679	0.679	0.677	0.679	0.679	0.679
F Statistic	5,168***	4,620***	5,164***	5,166***	5,169***	5,169***	4,619***	5,164***	5,167***	5,167***	5,172***	4,619***	5,165***	5,164***	5,165***	5,172***	4,619***	5,164.697***	5,165***	5,163***	5,167***	4,623***	5,164***	5,164***	5,163***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Economic Services Share

In the nested random effects models with covariates, there was no statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and the budgetary share of economic services. This same result emerges with the use of stepwise regressions. However, the alternative panel linear models (within and between effects) showed a CSO participation variable to be positively correlated with the share of economic services in the budget (proportion of CSOs in the LDC and CSO attendance, respectively). The beta regressions also showed two variables that were positively correlated with the share of economic services: proportion of CSOs in LDC and submission of CSO action plans. The squared form of the proportion of CSO members of the LDC was not statistically significant. There were also no notable interaction effects.

y4f = Share of Economic Services, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_econshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.004	0.007	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csopct	0.048	-0.046	-0.022	-0.003	-0.004	0.051*	-0.028	-0.007	0.006	0.006
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
ldc_csoattend	0.004	0.018***	0.014***	0.010**	0.010**	0.001	0.011*	0.007	0.005	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
ldc_csoassist	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.000	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ldc_csoplan	0.001	-0.006	-0.005	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant		0.075***	0.075***	0.074***	0.075***		-0.041*	-0.034*	-0.033*	-0.023
		(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)		(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,729	1,582	2,729	2,729	2,729	2,727	1,581	2,727	2,727	2,727
R^2	0.002	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.008	0.248	0.287	0.270	0.257	0.262
Adjusted R^2	-1.383	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.006	-0.838	0.272	0.261	0.248	0.253
F Statistic	0.548 (df = 5; 1142)	2.127* (df = 5; 1576)	2.044* (df = 5; 2723)	5.684	5.508	11.887*** (df = 31; 1115)	18.334*** (df = 34; 1546)	29.317*** (df = 34; 2692)	930.6***	936.9***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y4f Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4f.1	0.1502	0
y4f.2	0.0008	0

y4f = Share of Economic Services, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_econshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.018	-0.010	-0.027	-0.015
	(0.034)	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.017)
ldc_csopct	0.190	0.118*	0.172	0.111*
	(0.132)	(0.066)	(0.131)	(0.066)
ldc_csoattend	0.037	0.018	0.038	0.018
	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.031)	(0.015)
ldc_csoassist	-0.053***	-0.027***	-0.032	-0.015
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.012)
ldc_csoplan	0.046*	0.019	0.063**	0.025*
	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.014)
Constant	-8.806***	-4.658***	-9.011***	-4.754***
	(0.171)	(0.089)	(0.207)	(0.106)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,467	2,467	2,467	2,467
R^2	0.691	0.704	0.712	0.726
Log Likelihood	4,865.316	4,862.054	4,993.741	4,975.755
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4f = Share of Economic Services, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y4_econshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.001	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	
	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
ldc_csopct						-0.023
						(0.054)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.059
						(0.066)
Constant	-0.592***	-0.587***	-0.593***	-0.594***	-0.594***	-0.604***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,736	2,464	2,732	2,732	2,731	2,468
R^2	0.615	0.638	0.616	0.616	0.616	0.621
Adjusted R^2	0.611	0.633	0.611	0.612	0.612	0.616
F Statistic	4,290.795***	3,925.341***	4,286.021***	4,288.866***	4,286.286***	3,969.050***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4f = Share of Economic Services, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y4_econshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csopct	0.030**	0.029*	0.030**	0.030**	0.030**	0.026*	0.032	0.029*	0.027*	0.029**	0.030**	0.029*	0.030**	0.030**	0.030**	0.030**	0.029*	0.030**	0.030**	0.030**	0.030**	0.029*	0.030**	0.030**	0.030**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
csoattend	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csoassist	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.008**	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csoplan	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)
csovar X	0.001	-0.006	-0.001	0.002	0.002																				
cso25pct	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)																				
csovar X						0.005	-0.009	0.001	0.005	0.004															
csopct						(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)															
csovar X											0.001	-0.011	0.001	0.003	0.003										
csoattend											(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)										
csovar X																0.004	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.000					
csoassist																(0.003)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)					
csovar X																					0.000	-0.016	0.001	-0.000	-0.003
csoplan																					(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Constant	-0.612***	-0.61***	-0.612***	-0.612***	-0.612***	-0.611***	-0.61***	-0.612***	-0.612***	-0.612***	-0.612***	-0.61***	-0.612***	-0.611***	-0.612***	-0.611***	-0.61***	-0.612***	-0.613***	-0.613***	-0.613***	-0.61***	-0.612***	-0.612***	-0.613***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,467	2,214	2,463	2,463	2,462	2,467	2,214	2,463	2,463	2,462	2,467	2,214	2,463	2,463	2,462	2,467	2,214	2,463	2,463	2,462	2,467	2,214	2,463	2,463	2,462
R^2	0.622	0.652	0.622	0.623	0.623	0.622	0.652	0.622	0.622	0.623	0.622	0.651	0.622	0.623	0.623	0.622	0.653	0.622	0.622	0.622	0.622	0.651	0.622	0.622	0.622
Adj. R^2	0.617	0.646	0.617	0.617	0.617	0.617	0.647	0.617	0.617	0.617	0.617	0.645	0.617	0.617	0.618	0.617	0.648	0.617	0.617	0.617	0.616	0.646	0.617	0.616	0.617
F Statistic	3,974***	3,648***	3,970***	3,974***	3,972***	3,975***	3,648***	3,969***	3,972***	3,970***	3,974***	3,649***	3,969***	3,977***	3,973***	3,979***	3,649***	3,970***	3,971***	3,969***	3,974***	3,648***	3,970***	3,969***	3,969***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

LDF Share

In the nested random effects model with covariates, CSO participation is not correlated with the size of the LDF relative to the rest of the LGU budget. The stepwise regressions validate this. However, alternative models show some statistically significant relationships. First, under the fixed effects linear panel model, the submission of CSO action plans is positively correlated with the share of LDF albeit with a very small coefficient. The beta regressions also show a positive and much more sizeable positive relationship between the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and the share of LDF in the budget. The nonlinear form was not statistically significant. There were also no notable interaction effects.

y4g = Share of LDF, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_ldfshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.002	-0.012*	-0.009*	-0.006	-0.006	-0.002	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ldc_csopct	-0.012	0.022	0.008	0.003	0.001	-0.008	0.012	0.008	0.004	0.005
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
ldc_csoattend	0.004	-0.004	-0.002	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ldc_csoassist	-0.003	0.002	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldc_csoplan	0.007	-0.002	0.002	0.004	0.005	0.006**	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant		0.146***	0.145***	0.143***	0.140***		0.054***	0.064***	0.062***	0.057***
		(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)		(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,730	1,579	2,730	2,730	2,730	2,728	1,578	2,728	2,728	2,728
R^2	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.028	0.005	0.623	0.646	0.636	0.639	0.628
Adjusted R^2	-1.373	-0.001	-0.000	0.027	0.003	0.081	0.638	0.632	0.634	0.623
F Statistic	0.835 (df = 5; 1146)	0.810 (df = 5; 1573)	0.855 (df = 5; 2724)	3.248	3.900	59.594*** (df = 31; 1119)	82.903*** (df = 34; 1543)	138.479*** (df = 34; 2693)	4,583.1***	4,495.2***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y4g Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4g.1	0.3765	0
y4g.2	0.0186	0

y4g = Share of LDF, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_ldfshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.022	0.011	0.011	0.005
	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.013)
ldc_csopct	0.202**	0.112**	0.198**	0.108**
	(0.092)	(0.050)	(0.090)	(0.049)
ldc_csoattend	0.009	0.005	0.013	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.012)
ldc_csoassist	-0.008	-0.005	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.009)
ldc_csoplan	0.020	0.011	0.027	0.015
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.010)
Constant	-4.295***	-2.453***	-4.632***	-2.637***
	(0.163)	(0.089)	(0.179)	(0.096)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,386	2,386	2,386	2,386
R^2	0.485	0.512	0.517	0.551
Log Likelihood	4,130.376	4,157.011	4,260.146	4,285.881
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4g = Share of LDF, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y4_ldfshare					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.002	-0.003	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
ldc_csopct						0.074
						(0.045)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.071
						(0.056)
Constant	-0.135***	-0.116***	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.131***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,666	2,385	2,661	2,661	2,660	2,387
R^2	0.415	0.429	0.415	0.415	0.416	0.421
Adjusted R^2	0.409	0.422	0.409	0.409	0.409	0.414
F Statistic	1,767.866***	1,639.390***	1,764.962***	1,764.929***	1,766.338***	1,587.308***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4g = Share of LDF, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y4_ldfshare																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csopct	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.011	0.014	0.016	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.015	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
csoattend	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csoassist	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csoplan	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.007	0.003	0.004	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
csovar X	0.001	-0.005	0.001	-0.001	-0.000																				
cso25pct	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)																				
csovar X						0.000	-0.013	0.001	-0.001	-0.001															
csopct						(0.006)	(0.033)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)															
csovar X											0.000	-0.007	0.000	-0.001	-0.001										
csoattend											(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)										
csovar X																-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.003					
csoassist																(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)					
csovar X																					0.001	0.033	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003
csoplan																					(0.005)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Constant	-0.122***	-0.11***	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.12***	-0.122***	-0.11***	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.12***	-0.122***	-0.11***	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.12***	-0.122***	-0.11***	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.12***	-0.122***	-0.11***	-0.123***	-0.123***	-0.12***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,386	2,139	2,381	2,381	2,381	2,386	2,139	2,381	2,381	2,381	2,386	2,139	2,381	2,381	2,381	2,386	2,139	2,381	2,381	2,381	2,386	2,139	2,381	2,381	2,381
R^2	0.421	0.433	0.421	0.421	0.421	0.421	0.433	0.421	0.421	0.421	0.421	0.433	0.421	0.421	0.421	0.421	0.433	0.421	0.421	0.422	0.421	0.434	0.421	0.421	0.421
Adj. R^2	0.413	0.424	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.424	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.412	0.424	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.412	0.424	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.412	0.424	0.413	0.413	0.413
F Statistic	1,584***	1,461***	1,582***	1,582***	1,581***	1,584***	1,460***	1,581***	1,582***	1,582***	1,583***	1,461***	1,581***	1,582***	1,582***	1,583***	1,460***	1,583***	1,582***	1,584***	1,583***	1,463***	1,582***	1,583***	1,582***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDRRMF Share

In the nested random effects model with covariates, CSO participation–including CSO representation in the LDRRMC–was not shown to be statistically significantly related with the size of the LDRRMF in relation to the total LGU budget. This is consistent across the alternative panel linear models including fixed effects as well as the beta regression models with province dummy variables. The stepwise regressions show a negative albeit very weak relationship between CSO attendance in LDC meetings and the share of the LDRRMF. the squared form of *csopct* and the interaction effects were also not statistically significant.

y4h = Share of LDRRMF, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y4_ldrrmfshare									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
ldc_csopct	-0.018	0.009	-0.001	-0.004	-0.005	-0.009	0.009	0.005	0.004	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
ldc_csoattend	-0.005	-0.011***	-0.008***	-0.007***	-0.007**	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldc_csoassist	-0.004	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldc_csoplan	-0.001	0.004	0.002	0.001	-0.000	0.002	-0.003	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	0.004	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant		0.056***	0.058***	0.058***	0.057***		0.024*	0.032***	0.033***	0.038***
		(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)		(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,734	1,581	2,734	2,734	2,734	2,732	1,580	2,732	2,732	2,732
R^2	0.007	0.005	0.004	0.011	0.007	0.362	0.439	0.402	0.393	0.384
Adjusted R^2	-1.366	0.002	0.002	0.009	0.005	-0.557	0.426	0.394	0.385	0.376
F Statistic	1.365 (df = 6; 1147)	1.414 (df = 6; 1574)	1.839* (df = 6; 2727)	11.890*	12.183*	19.826*** (df = 32; 1120)	34.546*** (df = 35; 1544)	51.700*** (df = 35; 2696)	1,717.7***	1,665.7***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*									

Results of Tests on y4h Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y4h.1	0.7073	0
y4h.2	0.0000	0

y4h = Share of LDRRMF, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_ldrrmfshare			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.041	0.013	0.047	0.015
	(0.037)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.016)
ldc_csopct	0.328**	0.161**	0.136	0.081
	(0.139)	(0.064)	(0.134)	(0.062)
ldc_csoattend	-0.019	-0.008	0.008	-0.001
	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.031)	(0.015)
ldc_csoassist	-0.034	-0.017*	-0.015	-0.010
	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.011)
ldc_csoplan	0.013	0.010	0.039	0.019
	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.013)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	0.000	0.003	0.046	0.022
	(0.043)	(0.020)	(0.041)	(0.019)
Constant	-8.446***	-4.221***	-8.745***	-4.347***
	(0.189)	(0.088)	(0.218)	(0.101)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,333	2,333	2,333	2,333
R^2	0.753	0.756	0.775	0.781
Log Likelihood	5,628.504	5,689.097	5,811.276	5,858.278
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y4h = Share of LDRRMF, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:						
	y4_ldrrmfshare						
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
csovar	-0.001	0.008	-0.002*	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
ldc_csopct							0.036
							(0.032)
I(ldc_csopct2)							-0.027
							(0.038)
Constant	-0.216***	-0.216***	-0.214***	-0.216***	-0.217***	-0.216***	-0.228***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,583	2,329	2,578	2,578	2,577	2,578	2,334
R^2	0.610	0.615	0.610	0.610	0.610	0.610	0.631
Adjusted R^2	0.606	0.610	0.606	0.606	0.606	0.606	0.626
F Statistic	3,920.353***	3,596.116***	3,917.819***	3,912.274***	3,911.599***	3,913.203***	3,857.716***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*						

y4h = Share of LDRRMF, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																																							
	y4_ldrrmfshare																																							
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
cso25pct	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csopct	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.015*	0.020**	0.012	0.020**	0.015*	0.014*	0.014	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.014*	0.015*	0.015*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
csoattend	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.004	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csoassist	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.003	-0.004	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
csoplan	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.005	-0.006	0.004	0.001	0.003*	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldrrmcrep	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
csovar X cso25pct	-0.001	0.003	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.000																														
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)																														
csovar X csopct							-0.007	0.008	-0.006	-0.002	0.004	0.001																								
							(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)																								
csovar X csoattend													-0.001	0.008	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001																		
													(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)																		
csovar X csoassist																			-0.004**	0.012	-0.003*	-0.000	0.002	-0.002												
																			(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)												
csovar X csoplan																									-0.003	0.029*	-0.002	0.002	-0.003	0.002						
																									(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)						
csovar X ldrrmcrep																															-0.001	0.004	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000
																															(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.22***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Obs	2,333	2,105	2,328	2,328	2,327	2,328	2,333	2,105	2,328	2,328	2,327	2,328	2,333	2,105	2,328	2,328	2,327	2,328	2,333	2,105	2,328	2,328	2,327	2,328	2,333	2,105	2,328	2,328	2,327	2,328	2,333	2,105	2,328	2,328	2,327	2,328
R^2	0.631	0.632	0.631	0.631	0.632	0.632	0.632	0.632	0.632	0.631	0.632	0.632	0.632	0.632	0.631	0.631	0.632	0.632	0.632	0.631	0.632	0.631	0.632	0.631	0.632	0.632	0.631	0.632	0.632	0.631	0.632	0.632	0.631	0.631	0.632	0.631
Adj. R^2	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.625	0.626	0.626	0.626	0.626
F Statistic	3,855***	3,473***	3,846***	3,844***	3,845***	3,847***	3,859***	3,473***	3,848***	3,844***	3,845***	3,847***	3,855***	3,474***	3,845***	3,843***	3,847***	3,848***	3,866***	3,473***	3,851***	3,843***	3,847***	3,846***	3,857***	3,479***	3,846***	3,847***	3,848***	3,846***	3,855***	3,473***	3,845***	3,844***	3,845***	3,847***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Summary on Budgetary Shares

Using the nested random effects models with control variables, the following notable results can be observed:

1. As in the case of the combined shares of MOOE and CO, the separate shares of MOOE and CO were not shown to be influenced by CSO participation in a statistically significant manner.

2. Unlike the results of the regressions on the aggregate budgetary shares of productive sectors, CSO participation was not found to have a statistically significant effect on the budgetary shares of the health and social services sectors, the LDF, and the LDRRMF.

3. There were some statistically significant but negative effects found between CSO participation and the budgetary shares of these budget components: in education (submission of CSO action plans, in the base model), economic services (proportion of CSO members in the LDC and submission of CSO action plans, in the stepwise regressions), and the LDF (CSO assistance to the LGU, in the stepwise forms).

4. Interaction effects among the CSO participation variables were also largely not conclusive except in a handful of interesting cases: negative effects on the budgetary shares of MOOE and CO; positive effects on the share of social services.

Summary: Share of Productive Expenditures Using Nested Random Effects

	Dependent variable:							
	y3_mooeshare	y3_coshare	y4_educshare	y4_healthshare	y4_socialshare	y4_econshare	y4_ldfshare	y4_ldrrmfshare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cso25pct	-0.000	0.005	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csopct	0.017	-0.007	-0.003	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.005	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.010)
csoattend	0.005	-0.003	0.000	-0.001	0.002	0.005	0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
csoassist	0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.002	-0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csoplan	0.006	0.003	-0.002**	0.001	0.002*	-0.002	0.003	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldrrmc_cso4reps								0.003
								(0.003)
Constant	-0.473***	0.005	0.007	-0.004	0.016***	-0.023	0.057***	0.038***
	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,697	2,726	2,727	2,729	2,732	2,727	2,728	2,732
R^2	0.414	0.421	0.347	0.465	0.417	0.262	0.628	0.384
Adj. R^2	0.407	0.414	0.339	0.458	0.410	0.253	0.623	0.376
F Statistic	1,657***	1,963***	1,411***	2,304***	1,925***	937***	4,495***	1,666***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*							

Summary: Share of Productive Expenditures Using Beta Regression (Probit)

	Dependent variable:							
	y3_mooeshare	y3_coshare	y4_educshare	y4_healthshare	y4_socialshare	y4_econshare	y4_ldfshare	y4_ldrrmfshare
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cso25pct	-0.000	0.005	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
csopct	0.017	-0.007	-0.003	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.005	0.002
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.010)
csoattend	0.005	-0.003	0.000	-0.001	0.002	0.005	0.003	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
csoassist	0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.002	-0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
csoplan	0.006	0.003	-0.002**	0.001	0.002*	-0.002	0.003	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ldrrmc_cso4reps								0.003
								(0.003)
Constant	-0.473***	0.005	0.007	-0.004	0.016***	-0.023	0.057***	0.038***
	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,697	2,726	2,727	2,729	2,732	2,727	2,728	2,732
R^2	0.414	0.421	0.347	0.465	0.417	0.262	0.628	0.384
Adj. R^2	0.407	0.414	0.339	0.458	0.410	0.253	0.623	0.376
F Statistic	1,657***	1,963***	1,411***	2,304***	1,925***	937***	4,495***	1,666***
Note:								**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

2.2 Per Capita Productive Expenses

To recall, per capita aggregate expenditure was found to be positively influenced by CSO participation, particularly the proportion of CSO members in the LDC and, to a limited degree, CSO attendance in LDC meetings and submission of action plans. The relationship between the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and per capita spending was also found to be nonlinear and concave. Will these relationships hold in the per-budget component regressions?

MOOE Per Capita

The nested random effects model did not show any statistically significant correlation between CSO participation and MOOE per capita: a result mirrored by the stepwise regressions. Alternative linear panel models, however, show some statistically significant, though contradictory, results. The fixed effects model, for instance, shows that the submission of CSO action plans has a positive effect on per capita MOOE, but this relationship is negative under the between effects and pooling models.

A nonlinear relationship between the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and MOOE per capita may also be present. The relationship was found to be concave as the main coefficient was positive while that of the squared term was negative, with a positive net effect. The coefficient of the squared term is however not statistically significant. Some interesting interaction effects were also seen:

- *csopct X cso25pct* - the proportion of CSOs in the LDC was positively correlated with MOOE per capita, while its interaction with meeting the minimum threshold of CSO membership in the LDC is

negative, resulting in a positive net effect. The latter variable taken on itself, however, was not statistically significant

- *csoassist X cso25pct* - CSO assistance to the LDC is positively correlated with MOOE per capita, while its interaction effect with the minimum CSO membership is negative, resulting in a negative net effect. The latter variable taken on itsef, however, was not statistically significant.
- *csoplan X csopct* - submission of CSO action plans is positively correlated with MOOE per capita, while its interaction with the proportion of CSO members in the LDC is legative, leading to a negative net effect. However, the proportion of CSOs in the LDC is not statistically significant.

y5a = Per Capita MOOE, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_mooepercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	15.868	179.358**	109.749*	61.565	41.430	39.816	145.459**	84.903*	62.934	56.580
	(55.422)	(88.847)	(57.805)	(47.335)	(46.749)	(43.380)	(71.150)	(47.449)	(39.814)	(39.217)
ldc_csopct	-3.536	720.987**	546.410**	310.512	306.199	-198.731	359.942	435.781**	263.954	249.004
	(255.925)	(326.166)	(226.668)	(201.621)	(197.531)	(200.836)	(257.932)	(184.230)	(167.286)	(163.975)
ldc_csoattend	52.159	115.247	90.785*	71.920*	59.386	-17.162	-20.364	-23.673	-15.135	-13.589
	(47.808)	(73.667)	(49.098)	(40.414)	(39.917)	(39.101)	(62.130)	(42.388)	(35.596)	(35.019)
ldc_csoassist	39.200	39.985	23.764	34.193	14.065	8.246	62.108	30.612	21.389	2.028
	(37.920)	(50.624)	(34.470)	(30.362)	(30.851)	(30.001)	(41.147)	(28.735)	(25.696)	(26.014)
ldc_csoplan	142.641***	-31.739	48.387	97.161***	87.790**	91.107***	-94.424*	-14.279	33.563	33.432
	(42.988)	(70.122)	(44.150)	(36.698)	(36.324)	(34.749)	(56.688)	(36.821)	(31.573)	(31.179)
Constant		806.082***	929.987***	1,050.175***	1,191.235***		-475.18***	-391.55***	-325.59***	-335.24***
		(111.193)	(78.743)	(70.555)	(103.141)		(171.209)	(118.640)	(107.188)	(123.204)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,953	1,650	2,953	2,953	2,953	2,953	1,650	2,953	2,953	2,953
R^2	0.012	0.013	0.008	0.020	0.019	0.420	0.408	0.359	0.358	0.353
Adjusted R^2	-1.248	0.010	0.006	0.018	0.017	-0.345	0.396	0.351	0.351	0.345
F Statistic	3.040*** (df = 5; 1298)	4.265*** (df = 5; 1644)	4.810*** (df = 5; 2947)	21.958***	15.358***	29.743*** (df = 31; 1272)	32.773*** (df = 34; 1615)	48.023*** (df = 34; 2918)	1,575.8***	1,520.9***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y5a Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5a.1	0.0141	0
y5a.2	0.0000	0

y5a = Per Capita MOOE, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_mooepercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-40.695	80.251	-14.389	-6.040	11.323	
	(25.460)	(138.506)	(25.123)	(21.155)	(28.104)	
ldc_csopct						1,308.163**
						(642.546)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-1,228.776
						(782.214)
Constant	-144.122	-168.882*	-162.037*	-170.880*	-176.486*	-492.844***
	(93.136)	(99.147)	(93.779)	(92.100)	(91.354)	(162.619)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,313	2,937	3,304	3,304	3,303	2,954
R^2	0.364	0.380	0.364	0.364	0.364	0.353
Adjusted R^2	0.358	0.374	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.346
F Statistic	1,807.673***	1,690.677***	1,800.399***	1,799.928***	1,799.242***	1,522.388***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5a = Per Capita MOOE, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																									
	y5_mooepercap																									
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	97.425**	62.842	71.299	53.030	56.239	54.565	53.368	57.724	57.196	57.254	55.194	53.346	57.389	57.275	57.271	54.908	54.268	57.691	57.220	57.011	57.260	53.917	59.013	57.300	57.445
	(45.213)	(64.469)	(45.019)	(40.912)	(39.643)	(39.192)	(42.544)	(39.226)	(39.234)	(39.263)	(39.209)	(42.543)	(39.247)	(39.241)	(39.267)	(39.145)	(42.544)	(39.216)	(39.231)	(39.244)	(39.201)	(42.435)	(39.267)	(39.213)	(39.282)
csopct	260.696	230.943	246.871	248.053	248.014	391.730**	240.288	317.229*	247.171	246.431	258.807	230.156	248.066	248.458	248.618	260.753	231.316	244.582	248.097	252.503	253.314	235.545	242.201	243.634	248.709
	(163.997)	(174.410)	(164.033)	(164.038)	(164.423)	(181.775)	(232.571)	(176.788)	(168.460)	(165.890)	(164.108)	(174.380)	(164.063)	(164.038)	(164.429)	(163.772)	(174.302)	(163.988)	(164.029)	(164.366)	(163.963)	(174.015)	(164.118)	(163.983)	(164.359)
csoattend	-15.833	-20.615	-13.333	-12.885	-12.581	-15.543	-20.622	-13.827	-12.737	-12.614	16.571	-17.361	-8.011	-11.419	-13.327	-15.406	-20.942	-13.490	-12.752	-13.184	-13.925	-22.247	-12.993	-13.162	-12.912
	(35.005)	(37.369)	(35.048)	(35.043)	(35.060)	(35.000)	(37.370)	(35.046)	(35.041)	(35.069)	(41.967)	(63.664)	(41.404)	(37.045)	(35.486)	(34.957)	(37.359)	(35.027)	(35.038)	(35.043)	(35.002)	(37.280)	(35.033)	(35.023)	(35.066)
csoassist	2.254	-19.456	2.785	2.424	2.486	2.012	-19.449	3.103	2.465	2.510	2.150	-19.469	2.610	2.493	2.501	88.413**	37.094	43.036	10.248	9.713	1.146	-19.014	2.507	1.859	2.484
	(25.989)	(27.908)	(26.066)	(26.065)	(26.075)	(25.989)	(27.908)	(26.065)	(26.065)	(26.081)	(26.001)	(27.909)	(26.077)	(26.067)	(26.081)	(40.026)	(72.328)	(39.397)	(30.157)	(27.119)	(26.012)	(27.845)	(26.059)	(26.055)	(26.075)
csoplan	32.030	34.343	32.526	33.050	33.061	32.008	34.500	31.922	33.004	33.027	32.266	34.492	32.781	32.953	33.036	29.497	34.088	31.334	32.671	32.136	93.638*	323.452***	78.535	71.283*	34.870
	(31.159)	(33.726)	(31.230)	(31.225)	(31.237)	(31.160)	(33.722)	(31.234)	(31.225)	(31.247)	(31.177)	(33.732)	(31.241)	(31.228)	(31.256)	(31.153)	(33.702)	(31.234)	(31.230)	(31.238)	(56.280)	(113.756)	(55.294)	(39.702)	(33.017)
csovar X	-53.522*	-31.547	-18.770	8.848	5.678																				
cso25pct	(29.537)	(161.235)	(29.381)	(24.619)	(33.088)																				
csovar X						-161.931*	-33.065	-91.892	2.470	11.247															
csopct						(88.765)	(490.181)	(88.036)	(73.618)	(97.815)															
csovar X											-38.670	-10.694	-6.302	-2.718	3.710										
csoattend											(29.690)	(167.781)	(29.464)	(24.930)	(33.931)										
csovar X																-107.64***	-185.027	-51.651	-16.121	-41.869					
csoassist																(37.983)	(218.377)	(37.629)	(31.427)	(43.232)					
csovar X																					-78.450	-966.88***	-60.854	-79.696	-13.174
csoplan																					(61.167)	(364.062)	(61.021)	(51.134)	(74.352)
Constant	-332.80***	-273.87**	-327.51***	-330.56***	-329.65***	-334.44***	-273.76**	-327.01***	-329.67***	-329.69***	-335.84***	-273.98**	-329.20***	-329.45***	-329.77***	-337.28***	-272.24**	-329.16***	-328.86***	-329.32***	-339.52***	-272.76**	-326.96***	-328.36***	-329.57***
	(123.033)	(126.039)	(123.719)	(123.712)	(123.753)	(122.985)	(126.081)	(123.645)	(123.719)	(123.755)	(123.137)	(126.040)	(123.739)	(123.703)	(123.756)	(122.854)	(126.027)	(123.644)	(123.697)	(123.720)	(123.195)	(125.797)	(123.700)	(123.687)	(123.743)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947
R^2	0.353	0.372	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.372	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.372	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.355	0.372	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.353	0.373	0.353	0.353	0.353
Adj. R^2	0.346	0.363	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.346	0.363	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.363	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.347	0.363	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.345	0.365	0.345	0.345	0.345
F Statistic	1,526***	1,434***	1,520***	1,519***	1,518***	1,526***	1,434***	1,521***	1,519***	1,518***	1,523***	1,434***	1,519***	1,519***	1,518***	1,534***	1,435***	1,522***	1,519***	1,519***	1,523***	1,445***	1,520***	1,523***	1,518***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

CO Per Capita

The nested random effects model shows a negative and statistically significant relationship between CSO provision of technical assistance to the LDC and CO spending per capita. More weakly but positively correlated with CO per capita is the submission of CSO action plans. The fixed effects model mirrors these results. These, however, contradict with the stewpise regressions: here, the coefficient of CSO assistance turns positive albeit with a smaller effect size and weaker statistical significance; and the submission of CSO plans on its own is statistically insignificant. A nonlinear, concave effect also exists between the proportion of CSOs in the LDC and CO per capita. Meanwhile, there were no notable interaction effects.

y5b = Per Capita CO, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_copercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	6.698	32.991	27.191	18.635	8.749	3.594	32.162	16.515	7.113	9.412
	(34.216)	(47.858)	(31.734)	(27.965)	(27.750)	(31.243)	(41.923)	(28.007)	(25.434)	(25.304)
ldc_csopct	179.589	315.616*	240.750*	239.124**	203.108*	129.711	67.533	135.884	172.618*	158.704
	(154.565)	(173.879)	(122.929)	(115.430)	(114.061)	(141.581)	(151.014)	(107.469)	(103.455)	(102.764)
ldc_csoattend	11.996	142.980***	93.725***	58.691**	47.740**	-18.244	30.399	4.853	0.099	2.495
	(29.297)	(39.398)	(26.818)	(23.675)	(23.506)	(27.968)	(36.258)	(24.880)	(22.564)	(22.427)
ldc_csoassist	-25.058	3.028	-6.089	-13.405	-23.036	-54.686**	-14.333	-27.960*	-36.695**	-40.812**
	(23.322)	(27.171)	(18.892)	(17.656)	(18.106)	(21.524)	(24.116)	(16.914)	(16.150)	(16.528)
ldc_csoplan	81.789***	35.088	49.996**	66.717***	65.492***	46.017*	35.735	28.453	33.360*	36.487*
	(26.551)	(37.701)	(24.252)	(21.662)	(21.548)	(25.043)	(33.285)	(21.731)	(20.101)	(20.055)
Constant		169.014***	239.512***	278.885***	322.675***		-128.698	-107.478	-103.730	-133.227*
		(59.562)	(43.007)	(40.571)	(49.709)		(100.503)	(69.777)	(66.863)	(71.194)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,949	1,652	2,949	2,949	2,949	2,949	1,652	2,949	2,949	2,949
R^2	0.009	0.015	0.009	0.011	0.010	0.208	0.295	0.261	0.237	0.227
Adjusted R^2	-1.260	0.012	0.008	0.010	0.008	-0.843	0.280	0.252	0.228	0.218
F Statistic	2.472** (df = 5; 1292)	4.870*** (df = 5; 1646)	5.485*** (df = 5; 2943)	25.140***	19.966***	10.756*** (df = 31; 1266)	19.912*** (df = 34; 1617)	30.198*** (df = 34; 2914)	896.147***	841.000***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y5b Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5b.1	0.0624	0
y5b.2	0.0000	0

y5b = Per Capita CO, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_copercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	5.043	64.965	20.202	26.043*	9.001	
	(16.748)	(88.110)	(16.404)	(13.783)	(18.300)	
ldc_csopct						888.205**
						(403.523)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-905.351*
						(488.492)
Constant	-53.670	-54.081	-67.692	-66.007	-52.011	-258.819***
	(48.988)	(56.275)	(49.200)	(47.841)	(47.318)	(97.652)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,313	2,937	3,304	3,304	3,303	2,950
R^2	0.223	0.240	0.223	0.224	0.223	0.225
Adjusted R^2	0.215	0.232	0.216	0.217	0.216	0.217
F Statistic	918.343***	892.728***	918.350***	921.412***	916.638***	835.823***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5b = Per Capita CO, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y5_copercap																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	9.314	-45.825	-6.903	-1.750	8.158	9.518	-2.628	9.009	9.412	10.360	9.371	-2.368	8.414	8.675	9.805	9.267	-2.796	9.339	9.394	10.031	9.706	-2.668	9.148	9.448	10.518
	(29.277)	(40.497)	(29.017)	(26.365)	(25.535)	(25.315)	(26.645)	(25.288)	(25.288)	(25.301)	(25.313)	(26.650)	(25.286)	(25.279)	(25.303)	(25.306)	(26.664)	(25.292)	(25.294)	(25.303)	(25.309)	(26.645)	(25.321)	(25.291)	(25.315)
csopct	158.675	125.803	158.763	156.115	151.459	149.903	28.103	114.315	119.843	136.750	159.075	127.897	159.252	157.421	153.691	160.535	129.876	157.897	157.706	150.601	160.419	129.584	158.326	157.135	152.715
	(102.866)	(108.047)	(102.743)	(102.742)	(102.965)	(114.784)	(144.570)	(111.133)	(105.698)	(104.126)	(102.897)	(108.053)	(102.721)	(102.705)	(102.952)	(102.810)	(108.051)	(102.770)	(102.766)	(102.932)	(102.801)	(108.039)	(102.819)	(102.774)	(102.906)
csoattend	2.497	11.057	3.026	2.043	2.724	2.607	10.936	3.036	2.243	3.192	3.641	-21.538	-19.457	-11.377	2.920	2.264	11.242	2.417	2.373	2.795	2.330	11.335	2.387	2.301	1.810
	(22.441)	(23.183)	(22.421)	(22.419)	(22.431)	(22.439)	(23.188)	(22.424)	(22.417)	(22.432)	(27.028)	(39.874)	(26.528)	(23.689)	(22.702)	(22.430)	(23.195)	(22.420)	(22.422)	(22.427)	(22.428)	(23.189)	(22.419)	(22.420)	(22.437)
csoassist	-40.820**	-43.772**	-40.939**	-40.718**	-40.660**	-40.814**	-43.769**	-40.956**	-40.610**	-40.401**	-40.818**	-43.574**	-41.308**	-40.906**	-40.749**	-28.019	-60.791	-45.158*	-46.010**	-45.471***	-41.114**	-43.772**	-40.488**	-40.544**	-40.725**
	(16.530)	(17.275)	(16.547)	(16.545)	(16.552)	(16.531)	(17.277)	(16.549)	(16.543)	(16.552)	(16.530)	(17.281)	(16.547)	(16.538)	(16.552)	(25.792)	(45.331)	(25.299)	(19.249)	(17.217)	(16.534)	(17.277)	(16.546)	(16.547)	(16.551)
csoplan	36.494*	26.967	36.434*	36.058*	36.117*	36.579*	26.638	36.584*	35.988*	36.457*	36.445*	26.797	36.761*	36.376*	35.835*	35.922*	26.078	36.158*	36.155*	36.493*	57.392	-13.760	29.454	40.509	41.320*
	(20.063)	(21.020)	(20.066)	(20.065)	(20.073)	(20.064)	(21.021)	(20.071)	(20.064)	(20.073)	(20.066)	(21.032)	(20.063)	(20.056)	(20.081)	(20.075)	(21.020)	(20.079)	(20.072)	(20.079)	(36.628)	(71.133)	(35.859)	(25.664)	(21.239)
csovar X	0.125	143.835	21.639	23.679	10.458																				
cso25pct	(19.125)	(101.233)	(18.865)	(15.761)	(21.102)																				
csovar X						9.883	326.979	57.431	71.339	63.694															
csopct						(57.507)	(307.304)	(56.282)	(47.031)	(61.908)															
csovar X											-1.463	106.329	29.067	28.530*	-3.146										
csoattend											(19.221)	(105.493)	(18.924)	(15.986)	(21.721)										
csovar X																-15.983	55.947	5.943	11.408	27.945					
csoassist																(24.724)	(137.054)	(24.368)	(20.243)	(27.790)					
csovar X																					-27.170	132.855	8.688	-9.387	-37.085
csoplan																					(39.837)	(227.527)	(39.538)	(33.188)	(47.760)
Constant	-133.253*	-101.221	-135.452*	-135.962*	-132.710*	-133.323*	-103.033	-134.771*	-135.687*	-132.469*	-133.287*	-100.968	-134.882*	-134.644*	-132.459*	-133.593*	-101.367	-133.422*	-133.688*	-132.756*	-134.730*	-101.079	-133.654*	-133.417*	-132.446*
	(71.217)	(74.200)	(71.506)	(71.466)	(71.530)	(71.226)	(74.223)	(71.490)	(71.441)	(71.525)	(71.216)	(74.221)	(71.481)	(71.431)	(71.506)	(71.203)	(74.210)	(71.458)	(71.446)	(71.525)	(71.227)	(74.186)	(71.466)	(71.470)	(71.501)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,949	2,609	2,944	2,944	2,943	2,949	2,609	2,944	2,944	2,943	2,949	2,609	2,944	2,944	2,943	2,949	2,609	2,944	2,944	2,943	2,949	2,609	2,944	2,944	2,943
R^2	0.227	0.243	0.227	0.228	0.227	0.227	0.243	0.227	0.228	0.227	0.227	0.243	0.227	0.228	0.227	0.227	0.242	0.227	0.227	0.227	0.227	0.243	0.227	0.227	0.227
Adjusted R^2	0.217	0.233	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.217	0.232	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.217	0.232	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.232	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.218	0.232	0.218	0.218	0.218
F Statistic	840.656***	808.611***	841.657***	843.229***	840.057***	840.675***	807.485***	841.315***	843.321***	841.091***	840.661***	807.374***	842.929***	844.174***	839.825***	841.199***	806.337***	840.181***	840.700***	841.208***	841.289***	806.410***	840.174***	840.212***	840.684***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Education Spending Per Capita

Under the nested random effects panel model, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with education spending per capita. This is confirmed by the fixed effects model, stepwise regressions as well as the nonlinear form. Given these, there were also no statistically significant interaction effect.

y5c = Per Capita Education Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_educpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.372	14.753	9.059	3.421	2.034	4.728	-3.208	0.007	2.769	2.861
	(5.103)	(10.425)	(6.338)	(4.664)	(4.624)	(4.482)	(8.804)	(5.297)	(4.068)	(4.067)
ldc_csopct	16.401	-74.228*	-46.936*	-9.066	-11.084	-2.926	-55.829*	-36.483*	-19.199	-19.784
	(22.999)	(37.975)	(24.418)	(19.855)	(19.569)	(20.242)	(31.861)	(20.249)	(17.155)	(17.145)
ldc_csoattend	5.252	19.678**	12.038**	8.457**	8.024**	1.823	-3.631	-3.996	0.239	0.302
	(4.387)	(8.604)	(5.367)	(3.976)	(3.942)	(4.031)	(7.638)	(4.715)	(3.630)	(3.628)
ldc_csoassist	-0.228	-12.676**	-8.165**	-3.613	-3.674	-1.771	-3.668	-1.671	-2.503	-3.075
	(3.491)	(5.941)	(3.780)	(3.039)	(3.077)	(3.105)	(5.085)	(3.206)	(2.673)	(2.703)
ldc_csoplan	0.886	2.460	0.005	0.671	1.316	1.929	-2.227	-1.941	0.123	0.225
	(3.963)	(8.218)	(4.843)	(3.621)	(3.597)	(3.597)	(7.003)	(4.112)	(3.239)	(3.241)
Constant		52.592***	52.341***	47.485***	58.761***		-12.129	-9.731	-20.567*	-22.409*
		(12.980)	(8.583)	(7.138)	(11.298)		(20.942)	(13.209)	(11.327)	(11.745)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,947	1,652	2,947	2,947	2,947	2,945	1,651	2,945	2,945	2,945
R^2	0.002	0.008	0.005	0.009	0.007	0.264	0.339	0.334	0.304	0.289
Adjusted R^2	-1.280	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.005	-0.715	0.325	0.326	0.296	0.280
F Statistic	0.455 (df = 5; 1290)	2.724** (df = 5; 1646)	2.661** (df = 5; 2941)	6.339	5.832	14.626*** (df = 31; 1263)	24.388*** (df = 34; 1616)	42.859*** (df = 34; 2910)	1,247.7***	1,164.5***
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of Tests on y5c Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5c.1	0.0337	0
y5c.2	0.0002	0

y5c = Per Capita Education Spending, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_educpercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	2.254	1.050	-2.856	-1.470	-4.245	
	(2.756)	(14.898)	(2.708)	(2.290)	(3.028)	
ldc_csopct						-1.650
						(65.338)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-18.035
						(77.925)
Constant	-22.317***	-22.912**	-17.895**	-19.480**	-19.538**	-24.043
	(8.381)	(9.528)	(8.417)	(8.204)	(8.098)	(16.079)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,311	2,934	3,302	3,302	3,301	2,946
R^2	0.269	0.282	0.269	0.269	0.270	0.289
Adjusted R^2	0.263	0.274	0.263	0.263	0.263	0.281
F Statistic	1,188.143***	1,119.367***	1,186.352***	1,185.287***	1,187.233***	1,167.085***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5c = Per Capita Education Spending, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y5_educpercap																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.108	5.432	4.017	3.995	3.294	3.086	2.535	2.866	2.859	2.820	3.020	2.534	2.832	2.906	2.796	2.919	2.389	2.872	2.841	2.860	2.800	2.553	2.875	2.859	3.098
	(4.687)	(6.943)	(4.654)	(4.249)	(4.109)	(4.071)	(4.542)	(4.071)	(4.071)	(4.073)	(4.072)	(4.542)	(4.074)	(4.073)	(4.072)	(4.070)	(4.539)	(4.071)	(4.070)	(4.071)	(4.067)	(4.542)	(4.075)	(4.071)	(4.075)
csopct	-20.931	-14.163	-19.974	-19.804	-19.747	-32.671*	-14.031	-17.736	-17.051	-17.781	-20.951	-14.594	-19.685	-19.913	-19.391	-20.235	-15.126	-20.082	-19.824	-19.476	-20.195	-14.448	-19.861	-19.722	-20.480
	(17.174)	(19.142)	(17.165)	(17.161)	(17.225)	(19.098)	(25.539)	(18.415)	(17.605)	(17.453)	(17.176)	(19.138)	(17.174)	(17.165)	(17.216)	(17.162)	(19.118)	(17.167)	(17.160)	(17.212)	(17.147)	(19.131)	(17.178)	(17.167)	(17.204)
csoattend	0.482	1.021	0.228	0.326	0.211	0.493	1.014	0.251	0.301	0.177	-2.647	1.169	-0.581	1.178	0.996	0.357	1.038	0.247	0.287	0.220	0.333	1.000	0.293	0.300	0.149
	(3.633)	(3.982)	(3.634)	(3.632)	(3.634)	(3.631)	(3.983)	(3.635)	(3.633)	(3.635)	(4.354)	(6.909)	(4.282)	(3.844)	(3.674)	(3.631)	(3.979)	(3.633)	(3.632)	(3.632)	(3.627)	(3.983)	(3.632)	(3.632)	(3.634)
csoassist	-3.123	-5.090*	-3.065	-3.094	-3.104	-3.105	-5.090*	-3.078	-3.100	-3.129	-3.124	-5.090*	-3.150	-3.085	-3.122	-5.393	-16.156**	-1.096	-1.858	-2.052	-2.999	-5.082*	-3.102	-3.096	-3.099
	(2.705)	(2.995)	(2.712)	(2.711)	(2.711)	(2.704)	(2.995)	(2.713)	(2.711)	(2.711)	(2.705)	(2.995)	(2.715)	(2.712)	(2.710)	(4.183)	(7.770)	(4.102)	(3.139)	(2.829)	(2.703)	(2.995)	(2.711)	(2.711)	(2.711)
csoplan	0.351	0.559	0.188	0.235	0.179	0.379	0.608	0.196	0.237	0.140	0.361	0.607	0.268	0.210	0.081	0.346	0.702	0.141	0.179	0.059	-4.938	5.290	0.679	-0.189	1.580
	(3.245)	(3.624)	(3.249)	(3.248)	(3.249)	(3.244)	(3.624)	(3.251)	(3.249)	(3.250)	(3.246)	(3.625)	(3.252)	(3.249)	(3.249)	(3.248)	(3.620)	(3.251)	(3.249)	(3.250)	(5.809)	(12.011)	(5.713)	(4.125)	(3.431)
csovar X cso25pct	3.929	-9.726	-1.563	-2.396	-2.448																				
	(3.082)	(17.645)	(3.043)	(2.565)	(3.432)																				
csovar X csopct						14.125	-1.819	-2.812	-5.381	-8.756															
						(9.253)	(53.494)	(9.104)	(7.656)	(10.054)															
csovar X csoattend											3.782	-0.512	1.180	-1.825	-4.438										
											(3.087)	(18.358)	(3.055)	(2.592)	(3.528)										
csovar X csoassist																2.852	36.166	-2.541	-2.571	-5.826					
																(3.954)	(23.466)	(3.896)	(3.259)	(4.454)					
csovar X csoplan																					6.757	-15.668	-0.600	0.866	-9.443
																					(6.308)	(38.336)	(6.300)	(5.242)	(7.678)
Constant	-22.751*	-21.024	-22.062*	-21.925*	-22.105*	-22.629*	-21.022	-22.163*	-22.029*	-22.135*	-22.520*	-21.029	-22.406*	-22.104*	-21.971*	-22.423*	-21.275*	-22.146*	-22.205*	-22.125*	-22.117*	-21.006	-22.236*	-22.302*	-22.039*
	(11.775)	(12.913)	(11.821)	(11.819)	(11.820)	(11.767)	(12.919)	(11.822)	(11.821)	(11.819)	(11.767)	(12.915)	(11.830)	(11.818)	(11.815)	(11.765)	(12.922)	(11.815)	(11.817)	(11.815)	(11.751)	(12.909)	(11.817)	(11.815)	(11.819)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,945	2,605	2,940	2,940	2,939	2,945	2,605	2,940	2,940	2,939	2,945	2,605	2,940	2,940	2,939	2,945	2,605	2,940	2,940	2,939	2,945	2,605	2,940	2,940	2,939
R^2	0.289	0.284	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.284	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.284	0.288	0.289	0.289	0.288	0.284	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.289	0.284	0.289	0.289	0.289
Adj. R^2	0.280	0.274	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.274	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.274	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.275	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.274	0.280	0.280	0.280
F Statistic	1,163***	1,006***	1,162***	1,163***	1,162***	1,165***	1,005***	1,162***	1,162***	1,162***	1,164***	1,005***	1,161***	1,162***	1,164***	1,163***	1,006***	1,162***	1,162***	1,164***	1,165***	1,006***	1,162***	1,162***	1,163***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Health Spending Per Capita

Meanwhile, the proportion of CSO members in the LDC was foudn to be positively and statistically significantly related with per capita health spending. The statistical significance of this effect, however, is washed out in the stepwise regressions. The fixed effects model also does not show any CSO participation variable to be correlated with health spending per capita in a statistically significant way.The nonlinear form was also not statistically significant. There was also no statistically significant interaction effect among the CSO participation variables.

y5d = Per Capita Health Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_healthpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	3.092	22.699	11.385	7.879	2.968	1.714	6.341	-1.028	1.472	-0.373
	(11.271)	(19.770)	(12.650)	(9.891)	(9.785)	(8.030)	(14.895)	(9.570)	(7.490)	(7.397)
ldc_csopct	-18.129	246.934***	186.439***	79.557*	79.170*	-27.306	134.789**	142.113***	65.306**	72.507**
	(50.874)	(72.516)	(49.013)	(41.815)	(41.114)	(36.301)	(54.156)	(36.768)	(31.441)	(30.940)
ldc_csoattend	10.723	32.092**	23.098**	16.579**	12.416	-7.718	-12.908	-11.629	-8.980	-8.904
	(9.711)	(16.361)	(10.732)	(8.442)	(8.351)	(7.233)	(12.987)	(8.543)	(6.696)	(6.605)
ldc_csoassist	5.963	-7.174	-7.730	0.525	0.476	3.241	-4.536	-5.086	-0.613	-1.273
	(7.714)	(11.244)	(7.539)	(6.386)	(6.478)	(5.562)	(8.596)	(5.794)	(4.889)	(4.940)
ldc_csoplan	16.337*	-13.891	-2.905	8.807	10.645	9.027	0.296	2.934	5.368	5.475
	(8.735)	(15.617)	(9.668)	(7.669)	(7.602)	(6.432)	(11.872)	(7.433)	(5.953)	(5.892)
Constant		111.923***	144.340***	180.697***	200.205***		-10.177	-15.351	11.370	-10.652
		(24.721)	(17.148)	(14.829)	(21.659)		(35.419)	(23.889)	(20.562)	(23.921)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,952	1,650	2,952	2,952	2,952	2,950	1,649	2,950	2,950	2,950
R^2	0.005	0.015	0.009	0.017	0.011	0.517	0.478	0.456	0.465	0.456
Adjusted R^2	-1.264	0.012	0.008	0.016	0.009	-0.122	0.467	0.450	0.458	0.450
F Statistic	1.301 (df = 5; 1297)	5.171*** (df = 5; 1644)	5.496*** (df = 5; 2946)	13.027**	10.123*	43.837*** (df = 31; 1270)	43.437*** (df = 34; 1614)	71.896*** (df = 34; 2915)	2,464.1***	2,401.4***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y5d Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5d.1	0.0007	0
y5d.2	0.0000	0

y5d = Per Capita Health Spending, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_healthpercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	7.346	4.502	3.783	-0.315	-2.027	
	(4.786)	(26.644)	(4.728)	(3.988)	(5.290)	
ldc_csopct						-43.883
						(118.552)
I(ldc_csopct2)						139.805
						(142.206)
Constant	-31.743*	-26.748	-28.742	-25.244	-25.040	5.683
	(17.827)	(19.321)	(17.861)	(17.563)	(17.427)	(31.010)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,311	2,933	3,302	3,302	3,301	2,951
R^2	0.465	0.459	0.464	0.464	0.464	0.456
Adjusted R^2	0.460	0.454	0.459	0.459	0.459	0.450
F Statistic	2,809.408***	2,404.299***	2,789.253***	2,787.706***	2,787.874***	2,401.121***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5d = Per Capita Health Spending, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																									
	y5_healthpercap																									
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	
cso25pct	-2.981	-10.969	-1.629	0.689	0.435	-0.173	-1.242	-0.350	-0.308	-0.565	-0.150	-1.174	-0.401	-0.313	-0.554	-0.289	-1.560	-0.354	-0.320	-0.493	-0.381	-1.182	-0.219	-0.310	0.054	
	(8.528)	(12.449)	(8.485)	(7.731)	(7.479)	(7.399)	(8.182)	(7.408)	(7.408)	(7.411)	(7.399)	(8.181)	(7.407)	(7.409)	(7.410)	(7.399)	(8.180)	(7.405)	(7.405)	(7.410)	(7.398)	(8.181)	(7.416)	(7.406)	(7.413)	
csopct	71.631**	75.155**	72.849**	72.729**	75.472**	59.250*	57.030	66.592**	77.439**	78.806**	70.878**	75.534**	72.869**	72.617**	75.323**	71.964**	75.446**	73.055**	72.437**	75.084**	72.409**	76.751**	72.264**	72.455**	73.957**	
	(30.969)	(34.144)	(30.991)	(30.985)	(31.080)	(34.371)	(45.393)	(33.372)	(31.796)	(31.475)	(30.975)	(34.143)	(30.979)	(30.982)	(31.075)	(30.957)	(34.122)	(30.976)	(30.972)	(31.065)	(30.948)	(34.133)	(31.010)	(30.985)	(31.036)	
csoattend	-8.749	-8.523	-8.748	-8.788	-8.982	-8.710	-8.521	-8.700	-8.797	-9.004	-13.553*	-16.549	-11.493	-8.807	-7.969	-8.816	-8.346	-8.694	-8.834	-8.900	-8.900	-8.495	-8.833	-8.821	-9.191	
	(6.609)	(7.191)	(6.622)	(6.618)	(6.619)	(6.608)	(7.194)	(6.620)	(6.616)	(6.619)	(7.912)	(12.366)	(7.794)	(6.996)	(6.692)	(6.607)	(7.189)	(6.615)	(6.614)	(6.617)	(6.605)	(7.192)	(6.617)	(6.615)	(6.618)	
csoassist	-1.277	-0.119	-1.423	-1.367	-1.339	-1.259	-0.136	-1.455	-1.371	-1.389	-1.288	-0.077	-1.490	-1.374	-1.364	-5.143	-19.767	-6.767	1.910	-0.153	-1.260	-0.103	-1.372	-1.383	-1.298	
	(4.940)	(5.425)	(4.959)	(4.956)	(4.956)	(4.939)	(5.426)	(4.958)	(4.956)	(4.956)	(4.939)	(5.426)	(4.958)	(4.956)	(4.956)	(7.585)	(14.026)	(7.488)	(5.730)	(5.164)	(4.942)	(5.425)	(4.956)	(4.956)	(4.955)	
csoplan	5.573	6.080	5.548	5.502	5.431	5.620	5.988	5.602	5.506	5.378	5.664	6.046	5.618	5.507	5.367	5.653	6.012	5.736	5.371	5.361	4.776	25.259	7.882	6.203	9.109	
	(5.893)	(6.503)	(5.910)	(5.908)	(5.908)	(5.893)	(6.505)	(5.910)	(5.907)	(5.909)	(5.894)	(6.505)	(5.908)	(5.907)	(5.910)	(5.899)	(6.499)	(5.909)	(5.906)	(5.911)	(10.631)	(22.111)	(10.459)	(7.513)	(6.238)	
csovar X cso25pct	3.427	32.471	1.762	-2.119	-5.432																					
	(5.579)	(31.357)	(5.547)	(4.661)	(6.235)																					
csovar X csopct						14.787	61.620	8.054	-9.327	-16.244																
						(16.746)	(95.696)	(16.602)	(13.903)	(18.268)																
csovar X csoattend											5.973	26.322	3.609	-0.018	-5.346											
											(5.597)	(32.619)	(5.557)	(4.716)	(6.422)											
csovar X csoassist																4.818	64.336	6.846	-6.781	-6.614						
																(7.172)	(42.371)	(7.122)	(5.947)	(8.138)						
csovar X csoplan																					0.912	-64.873	-3.170	-1.432	-24.967*	
																					(11.512)	(70.686)	(11.519)	(9.591)	(14.008)	
Constant	-10.839	-9.922	-9.950	-9.485	-10.073	-10.761	-10.217	-9.961	-9.373	-10.180	-10.659	-9.833	-9.996	-9.716	-9.945	-10.608	-10.333	-9.797	-9.405	-10.088	-10.581	-9.773	-9.555	-9.655	-9.941	
	(23.931)	(25.016)	(24.016)	(24.018)	(24.028)	(23.934)	(25.026)	(24.015)	(24.016)	(24.032)	(23.935)	(25.017)	(24.017)	(24.017)	(24.027)	(23.936)	(25.012)	(24.012)	(24.009)	(24.031)	(23.932)	(25.015)	(24.018)	(24.012)	(24.030)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	2,950	2,608	2,945	2,945	2,944	2,950	2,608	2,945	2,945	2,944	2,950	2,608	2,945	2,945	2,944	2,950	2,608	2,945	2,945	2,944	2,950	2,608	2,945	2,945	2,944	
R^2	0.456	0.448	0.455	0.455	0.455	0.456	0.448	0.455	0.455	0.456	0.456	0.448	0.455	0.455	0.455	0.456	0.448	0.456	0.456	0.455	0.456	0.448	0.455	0.455	0.456	
Adj. R^2	0.450	0.441	0.449	0.449	0.449	0.450	0.441	0.449	0.449	0.449	0.450	0.441	0.449	0.449	0.449	0.450	0.441	0.449	0.449	0.449	0.450	0.441	0.449	0.449	0.449	
F Statistic	2,401***	2,037***	2,388***	2,389***	2,389***	2,402***	2,036***	2,389***	2,389***	2,389***	2,403***	2,037***	2,389***	2,388***	2,389***	2,401***	2,040***	2,390***	2,391***	2,389***	2,401***	2,037***	2,388***	2,389***	2,394***	

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Social Services Spending Per Capita

Under the nested random effects model, the proportion of CSO members in the LDC and the submission of CSO action plans were positively correlated with social services spending per capita. In the fixed effects model, howver, only the submission of CSO action plans was statistically significantly related with social services spending per capita. Moreover, the statistical significance of these relationships were washed out in the stepwise regressions. A nonlinear relationship is also not statistically significant. There were also no notable interaction effects among the CSO participation variables.

y5e = Per Capita Social Services Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_socialpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	1.381	-6.727	-5.128	-1.544	-2.830	3.645	-0.288	-1.368	0.950	1.286
	(7.144)	(10.486)	(6.814)	(5.934)	(5.868)	(5.706)	(8.040)	(5.289)	(4.797)	(4.748)
ldc_csopct	-19.131	131.116***	87.667***	46.764*	46.793*	-41.929	81.618***	69.514***	37.434*	41.705**
	(32.509)	(37.981)	(26.385)	(24.655)	(24.249)	(26.048)	(28.907)	(20.320)	(19.598)	(19.334)
ldc_csoattend	0.549	2.741	0.638	0.894	-0.205	3.572	1.937	0.971	3.153	3.326
	(6.152)	(8.639)	(5.777)	(5.046)	(4.993)	(5.136)	(6.996)	(4.724)	(4.278)	(4.230)
ldc_csoassist	-6.486	-3.403	-3.621	-5.029	-6.508*	-4.911	-1.464	-2.360	-3.246	-3.460
	(4.872)	(5.949)	(4.058)	(3.759)	(3.839)	(3.935)	(4.634)	(3.200)	(3.054)	(3.118)
ldc_csoplan	10.399*	8.362	9.827*	10.132**	9.067**	10.791**	7.768	8.176**	9.247**	8.773**
	(5.552)	(8.231)	(5.201)	(4.597)	(4.556)	(4.580)	(6.377)	(4.105)	(3.795)	(3.767)
Constant		47.981***	60.633***	70.926***	78.005***		-13.194	-3.896	1.373	-8.229
		(13.059)	(9.234)	(8.656)	(11.224)		(19.437)	(13.237)	(12.668)	(14.030)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,955	1,651	2,955	2,955	2,955	2,953	1,650	2,953	2,953	2,953
R^2	0.004	0.008	0.005	0.009	0.006	0.393	0.455	0.425	0.403	0.395
Adjusted R^2	-1.264	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.005	-0.409	0.443	0.418	0.397	0.388
F Statistic	1.120 (df = 5; 1299)	2.782** (df = 5; 1645)	2.995** (df = 5; 2949)	9.701*	9.693*	26.535*** (df = 31; 1272)	39.588*** (df = 34; 1615)	63.387*** (df = 34; 2918)	1,951.5***	1,890.6***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y5e Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5e.1	0.0713	0
y5e.2	0.0000	0

y5e = Per Capita Social Services Spending, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_socialpercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.188	12.761	0.420	0.425	2.326	
	(3.169)	(16.668)	(3.104)	(2.605)	(3.461)	
ldc_csopct						67.160
						(75.758)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-29.942
						(91.640)
Constant	2.505	1.068	1.498	1.602	1.434	-11.389
	(9.995)	(11.202)	(10.015)	(9.784)	(9.685)	(18.816)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,311	2,936	3,302	3,302	3,301	2,954
R^2	0.397	0.414	0.397	0.397	0.397	0.394
Adjusted R^2	0.391	0.408	0.391	0.391	0.391	0.388
F Statistic	2,131.378***	2,027.042***	2,126.425***	2,126.430***	2,127.069***	1,882.426***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5e = Per Capita Social Services Spending, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y5_socialpercap																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.645	-4.391	0.243	0.107	0.528	1.281	1.139	1.154	1.188	1.153	1.257	1.170	1.133	1.185	1.117	1.309	1.085	1.123	1.186	1.086	1.325	1.147	1.124	1.200	1.019
	(5.497)	(7.599)	(5.460)	(4.954)	(4.799)	(4.750)	(4.969)	(4.753)	(4.752)	(4.755)	(4.749)	(4.970)	(4.755)	(4.754)	(4.755)	(4.749)	(4.971)	(4.752)	(4.753)	(4.755)	(4.749)	(4.968)	(4.758)	(4.752)	(4.757)
csopct	41.518**	46.669**	42.188**	41.961**	42.569**	42.244*	30.797	38.414*	39.602**	41.112**	41.946**	46.900**	42.212**	42.114**	42.980**	41.433**	47.094**	42.357**	42.128**	43.343**	41.920**	47.051**	42.305**	41.941**	43.168**
	(19.351)	(20.106)	(19.347)	(19.344)	(19.380)	(21.570)	(26.979)	(20.928)	(19.882)	(19.596)	(19.356)	(20.105)	(19.347)	(19.346)	(19.382)	(19.342)	(20.100)	(19.343)	(19.346)	(19.378)	(19.341)	(20.100)	(19.357)	(19.345)	(19.372)
csoattend	3.356	5.155	3.180	3.103	3.224	3.321	5.126	3.198	3.127	3.216	4.229	0.918	1.914	3.008	2.938	3.356	5.175	3.203	3.144	3.111	3.311	5.180	3.153	3.110	3.201
	(4.232)	(4.352)	(4.236)	(4.234)	(4.236)	(4.232)	(4.351)	(4.237)	(4.235)	(4.237)	(5.095)	(7.487)	(5.005)	(4.474)	(4.289)	(4.231)	(4.351)	(4.234)	(4.235)	(4.236)	(4.231)	(4.351)	(4.235)	(4.235)	(4.238)
csoassist	-3.464	-0.769	-3.396	-3.387	-3.297	-3.461	-0.771	-3.410	-3.375	-3.274	-3.458	-0.745	-3.415	-3.374	-3.304	-5.412	-4.937	-7.497	-3.999	-2.989	-3.503	-0.771	-3.371	-3.404	-3.318
	(3.119)	(3.239)	(3.126)	(3.125)	(3.126)	(3.119)	(3.239)	(3.126)	(3.125)	(3.126)	(3.119)	(3.240)	(3.126)	(3.125)	(3.126)	(4.855)	(8.432)	(4.759)	(3.620)	(3.250)	(3.120)	(3.239)	(3.125)	(3.125)	(3.126)
csoplan	8.796**	9.141**	8.795**	8.774**	8.828**	8.768**	9.126**	8.820**	8.765**	8.831**	8.739**	9.118**	8.811**	8.771**	8.811**	8.861**	9.053**	8.928**	8.788**	8.741**	11.881*	4.504	7.067	11.165**	8.143**
	(3.769)	(3.934)	(3.776)	(3.774)	(3.775)	(3.769)	(3.934)	(3.776)	(3.774)	(3.776)	(3.769)	(3.936)	(3.776)	(3.775)	(3.777)	(3.771)	(3.932)	(3.776)	(3.775)	(3.777)	(6.863)	(13.307)	(6.721)	(4.804)	(3.996)
csovar X cso25pct	0.833	18.422	1.253	2.301	3.415																				
	(3.592)	(19.091)	(3.546)	(2.962)	(3.969)																				
csovar X csopct						-0.639	52.499	4.915	4.785	7.989															
						(10.805)	(57.591)	(10.581)	(8.831)	(11.651)															
csovar X csoattend											-1.148	13.810	1.639	0.279	1.170										
											(3.612)	(19.868)	(3.562)	(3.003)	(4.075)										
csovar X csoassist																2.433	13.655	5.255	1.305	-1.928					
																(4.642)	(25.459)	(4.573)	(3.799)	(5.231)					
csovar X csoplan																					-4.046	15.104	2.269	-5.032	4.326
																					(7.468)	(42.599)	(7.416)	(6.237)	(8.952)
Constant	-8.255	-12.436	-10.375	-10.506	-10.533	-8.220	-12.737	-10.367	-10.428	-10.497	-8.247	-12.371	-10.336	-10.284	-10.533	-8.164	-12.493	-10.225	-10.315	-10.528	-8.452	-12.380	-10.339	-10.261	-10.513
	(14.033)	(14.426)	(14.081)	(14.080)	(14.085)	(14.031)	(14.429)	(14.079)	(14.080)	(14.085)	(14.030)	(14.425)	(14.078)	(14.079)	(14.087)	(14.035)	(14.422)	(14.077)	(14.078)	(14.087)	(14.035)	(14.418)	(14.080)	(14.078)	(14.085)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,953	2,611	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,611	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,611	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,611	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,611	2,948	2,948	2,947
R^2	0.395	0.414	0.395	0.396	0.396	0.395	0.414	0.395	0.395	0.396	0.395	0.414	0.395	0.395	0.396	0.395	0.414	0.396	0.395	0.396	0.395	0.414	0.395	0.396	0.396
Adj. R^2	0.388	0.406	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.406	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.406	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.406	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.406	0.388	0.388	0.388
F Statistic	1,890***	1,800***	1,887***	1,887***	1,888***	1,890***	1,800***	1,887***	1,887***	1,887***	1,890***	1,799***	1,887***	1,887***	1,887***	1,890***	1,799***	1,889***	1,887***	1,887***	1,890***	1,798***	1,887***	1,888***	1,887***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*																								

Economic Services Spending Per Capita

In the nested random effects model, the proportion of CSO members in the LDC is positively associated with per capita spending on economic services: a relationship that was also reflected in the alternative panel models notably the fixed effects model. In contrast, a negative relationship between the outcome and CSO technical assistance to the LDC was seen. The statistically significance of these effects, however, were washed out in the stepwise regressions. The nonlinear form was also non-significant, and there were no notable interaction effects.

y5f = Per Capita Economic Services Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_econpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-20.321	24.584	7.327	-5.276	-8.107	-15.674	14.230	-0.634	-7.770	-7.620
	(16.801)	(24.491)	(16.085)	(13.918)	(13.863)	(14.814)	(21.029)	(14.017)	(12.522)	(12.477)
ldc_csopct	157.655**	232.319***	214.240***	198.191***	181.546***	130.664*	96.969	163.365***	176.892***	171.920***
	(75.958)	(88.723)	(62.061)	(57.610)	(57.181)	(67.168)	(75.720)	(53.706)	(51.112)	(50.850)
ldc_csoattend	15.831	50.829**	36.098***	27.683**	23.936**	7.661	9.909	6.130	7.905	8.205
	(14.403)	(20.273)	(13.632)	(11.817)	(11.778)	(13.286)	(18.342)	(12.499)	(11.149)	(11.098)
ldc_csoassist	-8.367	-2.652	-6.251	-6.843	-13.966	-9.920	-2.812	-7.524	-9.085	-13.752*
	(11.512)	(13.903)	(9.584)	(8.844)	(9.089)	(10.268)	(12.137)	(8.495)	(8.011)	(8.204)
ldc_csoplan	14.197	-17.801	-2.347	4.905	3.725	13.523	-11.658	0.419	2.731	1.862
	(13.083)	(19.356)	(12.323)	(10.818)	(10.801)	(11.925)	(16.751)	(10.919)	(9.947)	(9.936)
Constant		95.714***	126.508***	149.715***	173.228***		-44.909	-50.879	-59.169*	-47.741
		(30.529)	(21.770)	(20.290)	(24.582)		(50.003)	(34.959)	(33.143)	(35.384)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,948	1,654	2,948	2,948	2,948	2,946	1,653	2,946	2,946	2,946
R^2	0.006	0.013	0.008	0.012	0.011	0.259	0.319	0.277	0.258	0.252
Adjusted R^2	-1.273	0.010	0.006	0.011	0.009	-0.728	0.305	0.268	0.249	0.244
F Statistic	1.467 (df = 1289)	4.200*** (df = 5; 1648)	4.840*** (df = 5; 2942)	19.533***	16.662***	14.252*** (df = 31; 1262)	22.340*** (df = 34; 1618)	32.775*** (df = 34; 2911)	992.530***	958.211***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of Tests on y5f Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5f.1	0.1449	0
y5f.2	0.0000	0

y5f = Per Capita Economic Services Spending, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_econpercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	1.847	14.251	0.304	10.588	-8.840	
	(8.190)	(43.591)	(8.019)	(6.745)	(8.961)	
ldc_csopct						-99.436
						(198.732)
I(ldc_csopct2)						321.803
						(239.918)
Constant	-19.299	-15.983	-18.595	-24.679	-16.760	-3.429
	(24.138)	(27.600)	(24.215)	(23.573)	(23.267)	(48.334)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,311	2,938	3,302	3,302	3,301	2,947
R^2	0.259	0.276	0.259	0.259	0.259	0.252
Adjusted R^2	0.252	0.268	0.252	0.253	0.252	0.244
F Statistic	1,111.935***	1,068.748***	1,109.258***	1,112.501***	1,110.232***	957.716***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5f = Per Capita Economic Services Spending, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																									
	y5_econpercap																									
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-5.725	-11.782	-8.409	-13.639	-5.950	-7.568	-8.558	-7.500	-7.622	-7.527	-7.487	-8.516	-7.709	-7.888	-7.671	-7.658	-8.678	-7.601	-7.547	-7.503	-7.716	-8.673	-7.419	-7.548	-7.183
	(14.461)	(20.363)	(14.351)	(13.029)	(12.618)	(12.482)	(13.386)	(12.493)	(12.489)	(12.498)	(12.480)	(13.388)	(12.495)	(12.489)	(12.496)	(12.479)	(13.392)	(12.492)	(12.493)	(12.491)	(12.478)	(13.383)	(12.505)	(12.492)	(12.502)
csopct	172.419***	140.433***	171.899***	171.429***	172.257***	167.441***	141.959*	176.626***	156.844***	173.673***	170.806***	139.979**	172.220***	172.021***	172.382***	172.187***	140.593***	172.177***	171.880***	172.208***	171.171***	140.234***	171.393***	172.036***	170.687***
	(50.893)	(54.423)	(50.910)	(50.883)	(51.005)	(56.703)	(72.797)	(54.945)	(52.279)	(51.576)	(50.904)	(54.410)	(50.907)	(50.885)	(50.992)	(50.871)	(54.403)	(50.910)	(50.907)	(50.978)	(50.866)	(54.392)	(50.939)	(50.913)	(50.978)
csoattend	8.109	9.892	8.241	8.045	7.949	8.262	9.903	8.128	8.167	8.075	4.519	-1.311	4.333	3.184	10.169	8.162	9.937	8.272	8.209	7.983	8.273	10.014	8.183	8.223	7.950
	(11.105)	(11.714)	(11.118)	(11.110)	(11.119)	(11.104)	(11.714)	(11.119)	(11.111)	(11.122)	(13.377)	(20.100)	(13.148)	(11.741)	(11.254)	(11.101)	(11.715)	(11.115)	(11.115)	(11.113)	(11.099)	(11.712)	(11.114)	(11.115)	(11.122)
csoassist	-13.739*	-13.786	-13.667*	-13.742*	-13.713*	-13.753*	-13.776	-13.591*	-13.672*	-13.738*	-13.771*	-13.751	-13.786*	-13.767*	-13.796*	-11.545	-20.746	-17.488	-14.497	-10.765	-13.611*	-13.874	-13.641*	-13.615*	-13.684*
	(8.205)	(8.722)	(8.227)	(8.222)	(8.226)	(8.205)	(8.722)	(8.227)	(8.222)	(8.228)	(8.205)	(8.723)	(8.228)	(8.222)	(8.225)	(12.801)	(22.807)	(12.527)	(9.545)	(8.557)	(8.207)	(8.721)	(8.225)	(8.225)	(8.226)
csoplan	1.811	3.573	1.821	1.751	1.690	1.900	3.489	1.753	1.745	1.726	1.983	3.771	1.904	1.874	1.500	1.787	3.552	1.909	1.815	1.543	-8.014	-28.894	5.105	-0.134	4.077
	(9.939)	(10.601)	(9.960)	(9.955)	(9.960)	(9.939)	(10.600)	(9.961)	(9.956)	(9.961)	(9.940)	(10.603)	(9.960)	(9.954)	(9.962)	(9.943)	(10.596)	(9.962)	(9.960)	(9.958)	(18.290)	(36.176)	(18.004)	(12.758)	(10.550)
csovar X cso25pct	-2.462	10.714	1.146	12.813	-8.961																				
	(9.476)	(50.973)	(9.339)	(7.813)	(10.504)																				
csovar X csopct						5.078	-3.795	-6.474	29.125	-11.207															
						(28.449)	(154.365)	(27.805)	(23.296)	(30.794)															
csovar X csoattend											4.704	36.424	5.162	10.467	-11.957										
											(9.526)	(53.091)	(9.366)	(7.919)	(10.790)										
csovar X csoassist																-2.746	22.766	4.894	1.765	-17.018					
																(12.240)	(68.863)	(12.026)	(10.015)	(13.807)					
csovar X csoplan																					12.749	108.210	-4.346	3.992	-15.438
																					(19.818)	(115.560)	(19.762)	(16.407)	(23.523)
Constant	-47.657	-32.859	-48.982	-50.217	-48.601	-47.742	-32.838	-48.735	-49.846	-48.652	-47.647	-32.743	-49.162	-49.326	-48.456	-47.788	-33.017	-48.957	-48.937	-48.577	-47.094	-32.923	-48.737	-48.933	-48.619
	(35.386)	(37.116)	(35.553)	(35.533)	(35.534)	(35.395)	(37.125)	(35.545)	(35.535)	(35.547)	(35.398)	(37.124)	(35.547)	(35.534)	(35.524)	(35.386)	(37.119)	(35.539)	(35.541)	(35.532)	(35.404)	(37.121)	(35.545)	(35.532)	(35.550)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,946	2,609	2,941	2,941	2,940	2,946	2,609	2,941	2,941	2,940	2,946	2,609	2,941	2,941	2,940	2,946	2,609	2,941	2,941	2,940	2,946	2,609	2,941	2,941	2,940
R^2	0.252	0.269	0.252	0.253	0.253	0.252	0.269	0.252	0.253	0.252	0.252	0.269	0.253	0.253	0.253	0.252	0.269	0.252	0.252	0.253	0.253	0.269	0.252	0.252	0.253
Adjusted R^2	0.243	0.259	0.243	0.244	0.244	0.243	0.259	0.243	0.244	0.243	0.243	0.259	0.244	0.244	0.244	0.243	0.259	0.243	0.243	0.244	0.244	0.259	0.243	0.243	0.244
F Statistic	958***	920***	956***	960***	957***	958***	920***	956***	958***	956***	958***	920***	957***	958***	957***	958***	920***	956***	956***	958***	958***	921***	956***	956***	956***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDF Spending Per Capita

Under the nested random effects model, the proportion of CSO representatives to the LDC is positively correlated with per capita spending from the LDF. This is consistent across alternative panel models except the fixed effects model, which showed a different variable that was positively correlated with per capita LDF spending: submission of CSO action plans. However, these statistically significant relationships were not seen in the stepwise regressions. The nonlinear form of the representation of CSOs in the LDC as well as the interaction effects among CSO participation variables were also not found to be statistically significant.

y5g = Per Capita LDF Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_ldfpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	24.387	-43.571	-10.945	4.018	3.608	26.012	-6.154	6.709	13.659	15.550
	(20.705)	(30.875)	(20.058)	(17.306)	(17.183)	(16.576)	(26.005)	(16.919)	(14.443)	(14.327)
ldc_csopct	-40.897	400.538***	208.115***	132.626*	121.198*	-77.277	239.611**	155.204**	105.514*	99.514*
	(95.240)	(111.732)	(78.151)	(72.506)	(71.711)	(76.488)	(93.159)	(65.284)	(60.225)	(59.618)
ldc_csoattend	28.543	32.517	28.861*	28.444*	27.745*	3.031	19.314	8.549	9.401	10.717
	(17.830)	(25.559)	(17.048)	(14.743)	(14.647)	(14.922)	(22.656)	(15.117)	(12.897)	(12.782)
ldc_csoassist	-14.663	34.296*	14.150	3.681	-6.982	-14.765	4.618	-7.328	-7.429	-12.347
	(14.138)	(17.594)	(11.964)	(11.004)	(11.274)	(11.426)	(15.045)	(10.247)	(9.305)	(9.469)
ldc_csoplan	45.410***	16.940	31.784**	39.169***	35.191***	29.103**	-6.466	6.177	15.609	15.105
	(15.999)	(24.309)	(15.306)	(13.370)	(13.307)	(13.226)	(20.641)	(13.103)	(11.411)	(11.348)
Constant		191.431***	229.468***	245.499***	255.587***		-64.004	-41.294	-56.794	-79.656*
		(38.399)	(27.249)	(25.401)	(30.740)		(62.648)	(42.387)	(38.895)	(42.225)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,953	1,652	2,953	2,953	2,953	2,953	1,652	2,953	2,953	2,953
R^2	0.011	0.013	0.007	0.014	0.006	0.393	0.347	0.323	0.335	0.328
Adjusted R^2	-1.253	0.010	0.005	0.013	0.005	-0.411	0.333	0.315	0.327	0.320
F Statistic	2.824** (df = 5;1296)	4.360*** (df = 5;1646)	3.870*** (df = 5;2947)	19.504***	15.818***	26.542*** (df = 31;1270)	25.228*** (df = 34;1617)	40.882*** (df = 34;2918)	1,436.202***	1,415.348***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of Tests on y5g Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5g.1	0.0133	0
y5g.2	0.0000	0

y5g = Per Capita LDF Spending, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y5_ldfpercap					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	7.877	65.829	2.815	4.158	6.286	
	(9.680)	(50.613)	(9.523)	(8.013)	(10.628)	
ldc_csopct						279.111
						(234.496)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-197.407
						(284.741)
Constant	-41.026	-58.296*	-38.182	-38.305	-37.006	-99.411*
	(30.520)	(34.090)	(30.682)	(29.968)	(29.618)	(57.410)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,313	2,937	3,304	3,304	3,303	2,954
R^2	0.328	0.339	0.328	0.328	0.328	0.327
Adjusted R^2	0.322	0.332	0.322	0.322	0.322	0.319
F Statistic	1,591.178***	1,471.942***	1,585.927***	1,586.192***	1,586.440***	1,409.684***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5g = Per Capita LDF Spending, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																									
	y5_ldfpercap																									
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	8.771	-0.571	8.689	12.774	14.280	15.824	9.608	15.207	15.336	14.764	15.971	9.717	15.030	15.155	14.698	15.660	9.451	15.272	15.335	14.804	15.517	9.597	15.108	15.340	15.059
	(16.530)	(22.476)	(16.443)	(14.950)	(14.476)	(14.333)	(14.837)	(14.342)	(14.337)	(14.343)	(14.330)	(14.837)	(14.339)	(14.337)	(14.338)	(14.330)	(14.844)	(14.338)	(14.337)	(14.335)	(14.331)	(14.839)	(14.354)	(14.338)	(14.355)
csopct	97.312	86.102	100.375*	99.452*	105.273*	80.196	44.893	86.103	94.710	105.894*	96.249	86.015	100.654*	99.831*	106.620*	98.638*	87.110	100.227*	99.796*	105.069*	99.295*	87.458	100.519*	100.021*	106.001*
	(59.673)	(61.596)	(59.655)	(59.652)	(59.779)	(66.311)	(81.867)	(64.226)	(61.239)	(60.403)	(59.683)	(61.575)	(59.656)	(59.649)	(59.770)	(59.645)	(61.569)	(59.661)	(59.656)	(59.760)	(59.646)	(61.574)	(59.698)	(59.666)	(59.763)
csoattend	11.119	12.716	10.702	10.316	10.471	10.999	12.628	10.648	10.378	10.404	1.539	-1.807	2.731	7.066	11.243	10.846	12.805	10.520	10.408	10.476	10.732	12.759	10.442	10.429	10.129
	(12.790)	(13.056)	(12.797)	(12.792)	(12.793)	(12.789)	(13.056)	(12.803)	(12.793)	(12.801)	(15.331)	(22.321)	(15.097)	(13.509)	(12.946)	(12.785)	(13.057)	(12.794)	(12.793)	(12.789)	(12.784)	(13.057)	(12.795)	(12.794)	(12.805)
csoassist	-12.381	-18.146*	-12.435	-12.316	-12.046	-12.335	-18.166*	-12.401	-12.285	-12.051	-12.392	-18.071*	-12.543	-12.361	-12.103	-18.338	-26.521	-18.735	-14.388	-13.286	-12.304	-18.141*	-12.267	-12.229	-12.047
	(9.469)	(9.787)	(9.492)	(9.490)	(9.488)	(9.469)	(9.786)	(9.495)	(9.491)	(9.493)	(9.468)	(9.787)	(9.494)	(9.490)	(9.489)	(14.616)	(25.249)	(14.360)	(10.986)	(9.876)	(9.474)	(9.788)	(9.491)	(9.492)	(9.493)
csoplan	15.363	21.918*	15.285	15.094	15.203	15.312	21.969*	15.262	15.074	15.133	15.489	22.060*	15.370	15.182	14.995	15.394	21.753*	15.337	15.162	15.302	12.419	24.374	9.162	12.463	17.484
	(11.352)	(11.767)	(11.370)	(11.367)	(11.366)	(11.352)	(11.764)	(11.376)	(11.368)	(11.372)	(11.352)	(11.768)	(11.371)	(11.367)	(11.370)	(11.362)	(11.763)	(11.377)	(11.370)	(11.368)	(20.531)	(39.407)	(20.173)	(14.465)	(12.032)
csovar X cso25pct	8.880	33.932	8.853	5.451	2.986																				
	(10.790)	(56.359)	(10.712)	(8.988)	(12.030)																				
csovar X csopct						21.516	134.954	18.503	9.665	0.531															
						(32.432)	(171.574)	(32.047)	(26.852)	(35.438)															
csovar X csoattend											11.737	47.256	10.258	6.961	-5.260										
											(10.831)	(58.689)	(10.733)	(9.091)	(12.368)										
csovar X csoassist																7.474	27.379	8.229	4.396	7.060					
																(13.884)	(76.138)	(13.713)	(11.472)	(15.763)					
csovar X csoplan																					3.502	-9.044	7.880	5.444	-16.330
																					(22.306)	(126.075)	(22.246)	(18.706)	(27.023)
Constant	-80.164*	-72.756*	-83.030*	-82.628*	-83.490**	-79.796*	-73.519*	-82.485*	-82.332*	-83.500**	-79.628*	-72.726*	-82.824*	-82.409*	-83.401**	-79.550*	-72.881*	-82.078*	-82.156*	-83.453**	-79.451*	-72.617*	-82.264*	-82.108*	-83.564**
	(42.247)	(43.374)	(42.454)	(42.449)	(42.427)	(42.240)	(43.381)	(42.431)	(42.446)	(42.431)	(42.243)	(43.375)	(42.440)	(42.438)	(42.426)	(42.227)	(43.370)	(42.433)	(42.435)	(42.423)	(42.247)	(43.357)	(42.441)	(42.442)	(42.432)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947	2,953	2,612	2,948	2,948	2,947
R^2	0.328	0.341	0.327	0.327	0.328	0.328	0.341	0.327	0.327	0.327	0.328	0.341	0.328	0.327	0.328	0.328	0.341	0.327	0.327	0.328	0.328	0.341	0.327	0.327	0.327
Adj. R^2	0.320	0.332	0.319	0.319	0.319	0.320	0.332	0.319	0.319	0.319	0.320	0.332	0.319	0.319	0.319	0.320	0.332	0.319	0.319	0.319	0.320	0.332	0.319	0.319	0.319
F Statistic	1,416***	1,321***	1,411***	1,411***	1,411***	1,416***	1,321***	1,411***	1,410***	1,411***	1,417***	1,321***	1,412***	1,411***	1,411***	1,415***	1,321***	1,411***	1,410***	1,411***	1,415***	1,320***	1,410***	1,410***	1,411***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

LDRRMF Spending Per Capita

Unfortunately, CSO representation in the LDRRMC was not found to be related with LDRRMF spending per capita in a statistically significant way. There were other CSO participation variables that relate significantly with LDRRMF spending per capita: the proportion of CSOs in the LDC (positive) and CSO attendance in the LDC (negative), with a positive net effect. The alternative panel models reflect, albeit inconsistently, these and other effects. The fixed effects model, for instance, only shows the negative coefficient of *csoattend* to be statistically significant, in addition to another variable that was positively correlated: submission of CSO action plans. The stepwise regressions, however, do not show statistically significant relationships between CSO participation and LDRRMF spending per capita. The squared form of the proportion of CSO members in the LDC is not statistically significant. There were also no notable interaction effects among the CSO participation variables.

y5h = Per Capita LDRRMF Spending, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y5_ldrrmfpercap									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-3.482	-11.464	-7.461	-6.382	-4.436	5.988	6.298	6.099	6.156	6.799
	(12.876)	(17.793)	(11.585)	(10.466)	(10.369)	(11.242)	(15.084)	(9.999)	(9.210)	(9.158)
ldc_csopct	-27.423	175.317***	98.498**	64.874	60.508	-21.804	124.200**	91.366**	76.795**	68.796*
	(59.494)	(64.055)	(45.097)	(43.429)	(42.844)	(52.099)	(53.799)	(38.582)	(37.708)	(37.423)
ldc_csoattend	-14.468	-19.014	-13.701	-15.884*	-15.050*	-20.21**	-12.871	-13.542	-16.479**	-16.335**
	(11.125)	(15.134)	(10.004)	(8.997)	(8.918)	(10.120)	(13.263)	(8.974)	(8.237)	(8.182)
ldc_csoassist	-10.084	9.071	1.800	-2.369	-9.049	-8.043	-1.040	-4.833	-4.849	-8.017
	(8.818)	(10.162)	(6.927)	(6.616)	(6.788)	(7.760)	(8.726)	(6.059)	(5.854)	(5.996)
ldc_csoplan	16.069	-1.099	9.982	12.031	8.735	15.270*	-26.741**	-4.292	2.585	3.026
	(9.941)	(14.036)	(8.830)	(8.078)	(8.028)	(8.956)	(11.991)	(7.731)	(7.246)	(7.227)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	17.899	-6.630	3.102	9.246	13.103	3.707	11.737	5.714	5.711	7.689
	(14.357)	(19.158)	(12.836)	(11.548)	(11.489)	(12.758)	(16.644)	(11.315)	(10.387)	(10.359)
Constant		103.021***	108.984***	117.608***	118.024***		-31.863	-27.970	-21.381	-10.056
		(25.686)	(18.355)	(17.518)	(20.161)		(37.135)	(25.917)	(25.086)	(26.598)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,956	1,652	2,956	2,956	2,956	2,956	1,652	2,956	2,956	2,956
R^2	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.009	0.004	0.274	0.333	0.287	0.276	0.265
Adjusted R^2	-1.264	0.003	0.001	0.007	0.002	-0.687	0.319	0.279	0.268	0.256
F Statistic	1.236 (df = 6; 1298)	1.691 (df = 6; 1645)	1.268 (df = 6; 2949)	7.436	8.235	14.993*** (df = 32; 1272)	23.102*** (df = 35; 1616)	33.644*** (df = 35; 2920)	1,095.7***	1,044.7***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results of Tests on y5h Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y5h.1	0.1672	0
y5h.2	0.0000	0

y5h = LDRRMF Per Capita, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:						
	y5_ldrrmfpercap						
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
csovar	-4.167	29.469	-0.539	-3.624	5.105	5.909	
	(6.193)	(33.145)	(6.080)	(5.110)	(6.776)	(6.868)	
ldc_csopct							55.630
							(149.079)
I(ldc_csopct2)							23.066
							(181.919)
Constant	2.288	-7.844	-0.487	1.212	-2.343	-6.430	-6.584
	(17.980)	(20.927)	(18.080)	(17.590)	(17.273)	(18.458)	(35.648)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,315	2,941	3,306	3,306	3,305	3,307	2,957
R^2	0.270	0.279	0.270	0.270	0.271	0.270	0.263
Adjusted R^2	0.263	0.271	0.263	0.264	0.264	0.264	0.255
F Statistic	1,206.810***	1,116.353***	1,203.683***	1,204.364***	1,207.924***	1,204.891***	1,037.778***
Note:							**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5h = LDRRMF Per Capita, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other (1/2)

	Dependent variable:																	
	y5_ldrrmfpercap																	
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
cso25pct	8.209	6.982	6.399	7.552	5.229	2.903	6.677	10.372	6.772	6.682	5.906	6.582	6.856	10.429	6.595	6.786	6.009	6.405
	(10.591)	(14.814)	(10.527)	(9.545)	(9.230)	(11.173)	(9.162)	(9.770)	(9.158)	(9.155)	(9.142)	(9.159)	(9.161)	(9.767)	(9.161)	(9.158)	(9.141)	(9.162)
csopct	69.237*	51.601	69.312*	69.400*	76.055**	69.281*	79.551*	40.046	80.867**	79.544**	76.559**	63.182	68.302*	51.024	69.389*	69.207*	75.977**	69.385*
	(37.461)	(39.507)	(37.430)	(37.428)	(37.407)	(37.425)	(41.711)	(52.899)	(40.398)	(38.435)	(37.749)	(42.300)	(37.469)	(39.488)	(37.431)	(37.423)	(37.399)	(37.424)
csoattend	-16.409**	-15.879*	-16.475**	-16.448**	-16.452**	-16.369**	-16.480**	-15.894*	-16.660**	-16.436**	-16.547**	-16.397**	-17.871*	-28.822**	-17.382*	-14.249*	-17.562**	-21.110**
	(8.190)	(8.600)	(8.187)	(8.185)	(8.170)	(8.186)	(8.189)	(8.600)	(8.187)	(8.183)	(8.172)	(8.189)	(9.823)	(14.580)	(9.669)	(8.638)	(8.268)	(10.349)
csoassist	-8.009	-10.989*	-7.993	-7.971	-7.565	-7.981	-8.026	-10.992*	-7.897	-7.955	-7.582	-7.992	-8.015	-10.908*	-8.014	-7.931	-7.502	-8.013
	(5.998)	(6.353)	(6.004)	(6.004)	(5.990)	(6.003)	(5.997)	(6.353)	(6.004)	(6.003)	(5.991)	(6.004)	(5.997)	(6.352)	(6.006)	(6.003)	(5.991)	(6.003)
csoplan	2.965	5.026	3.087	3.072	3.229	3.215	2.901	5.029	2.931	3.080	3.162	3.152	3.090	5.290	3.109	3.025	3.349	3.199
	(7.231)	(7.692)	(7.235)	(7.234)	(7.220)	(7.237)	(7.231)	(7.691)	(7.236)	(7.232)	(7.222)	(7.237)	(7.231)	(7.691)	(7.236)	(7.233)	(7.223)	(7.235)
ldrrmcreps	7.748	5.413	7.822	7.782	7.854	7.684	7.816	5.387	7.903	7.630	7.751	7.771	7.579	5.217	7.778	7.842	7.621	7.681
	(10.365)	(11.039)	(10.376)	(10.376)	(10.356)	(10.377)	(10.364)	(11.040)	(10.375)	(10.374)	(10.354)	(10.376)	(10.368)	(11.037)	(10.379)	(10.374)	(10.355)	(10.376)
csovar X cso25pct	-1.831	11.309	0.317	-1.934	4.046	4.480												
	(6.909)	(37.029)	(6.833)	(5.715)	(7.655)	(7.676)												
csovar X csopct							-12.091	37.996	-15.491	-19.925	0.182	7.138						
							(20.790)	(112.283)	(20.372)	(17.064)	(22.557)	(23.049)						
csovar X csoattend													1.964	42.159	1.196	-4.676	6.189	5.566
													(6.947)	(38.355)	(6.853)	(5.785)	(7.843)	(7.624)
csovar X csoassist																		
csovar X csoplan																		
csovar X ldrrmcreps																		
Constant	-10.087	-6.925	-10.344	-10.113	-12.449	-10.637	-10.213	-7.124	-10.033	-9.562	-12.342	-10.477	-9.933	-6.728	-10.347	-10.145	-12.364	-10.628
	(26.596)	(28.089)	(26.721)	(26.722)	(26.611)	(26.720)	(26.594)	(28.097)	(26.713)	(26.720)	(26.611)	(26.720)	(26.605)	(28.085)	(26.717)	(26.714)	(26.610)	(26.717)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,956	2,617	2,951	2,951	2,950	2,951	2,956	2,617	2,951	2,951	2,950	2,951	2,956	2,617	2,951	2,951	2,950	2,951
R^2	0.265	0.274	0.265	0.265	0.266	0.265	0.265	0.274	0.265	0.265	0.266	0.265	0.265	0.275	0.265	0.265	0.266	0.265
Adj. R^2	0.256	0.264	0.256	0.256	0.257	0.256	0.256	0.264	0.256	0.256	0.257	0.256	0.256	0.264	0.256	0.256	0.257	0.256
F Statistic	1,045***	968***	1,043***	1,043***	1,047***	1,043***	1,045***	968***	1,043***	1,044***	1,047***	1,043***	1,044***	969***	1,043***	1,043***	1,048***	1,043***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y5h = LDRRMF Per Capita, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other (2/2)

	Dependent variable:																	
	y5_ldrrmfpercap																	
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
cso25pct	6.688	10.371	6.727	6.661	5.914	6.626	6.843	10.456	6.470	6.665	6.030	6.637	6.733	10.373	6.599	6.661	6.091	6.463
	(9.161)	(9.774)	(9.157)	(9.157)	(9.142)	(9.158)	(9.161)	(9.770)	(9.167)	(9.156)	(9.146)	(9.156)	(9.161)	(9.769)	(9.160)	(9.157)	(9.143)	(9.161)
csopct	70.145*	51.947	68.926*	69.231*	76.316**	69.295*	69.211*	52.422	69.753*	68.867*	76.592**	69.736*	69.270*	51.468	69.480*	69.259*	75.760**	69.513*
	(37.434)	(39.492)	(37.427)	(37.427)	(37.404)	(37.427)	(37.443)	(39.487)	(37.444)	(37.428)	(37.395)	(37.430)	(37.451)	(39.500)	(37.440)	(37.427)	(37.406)	(37.426)
csoattend	-16.542**	-15.872*	-16.567**	-16.479**	-16.495**	-16.466**	-16.355**	-15.954*	-16.460**	-16.534**	-16.666**	-16.444**	-16.385**	-15.943*	-16.461**	-16.436**	-16.489**	-16.299**
	(8.186)	(8.600)	(8.185)	(8.185)	(8.170)	(8.185)	(8.185)	(8.599)	(8.184)	(8.184)	(8.174)	(8.184)	(8.185)	(8.600)	(8.185)	(8.185)	(8.168)	(8.189)
csoassist	1.638	-11.628	-2.890	-6.470	-8.214	-9.290	-8.069	-10.926*	-7.986	-8.043	-7.584	-7.912	-7.998	-10.956*	-8.021	-7.980	-7.508	-8.048
	(9.307)	(16.546)	(9.120)	(6.965)	(6.226)	(10.171)	(6.000)	(6.352)	(6.004)	(6.004)	(5.991)	(6.004)	(5.997)	(6.353)	(6.006)	(6.004)	(5.991)	(6.004)
csoplan	2.547	4.947	2.899	3.029	3.227	3.109	7.105	29.667	-1.221	7.435	4.226	-5.893	2.922	5.091	3.117	3.089	3.279	3.218
	(7.236)	(7.689)	(7.237)	(7.235)	(7.222)	(7.236)	(13.176)	(26.101)	(12.977)	(9.228)	(7.641)	(14.657)	(7.234)	(7.693)	(7.236)	(7.234)	(7.220)	(7.237)
ldrrmcreps	8.117	5.450	7.976	7.723	7.786	7.787	7.693	5.191	7.725	7.946	7.713	7.830	9.619	-0.193	6.841	8.775	6.695	3.735
	(10.367)	(11.040)	(10.376)	(10.378)	(10.356)	(10.378)	(10.363)	(11.041)	(10.378)	(10.375)	(10.355)	(10.374)	(11.692)	(15.852)	(11.584)	(10.715)	(10.445)	(12.182)
csovar X cso25pct																		
csovar X csopct																		
csovar X csoattend																		
csovar X csoassist	-12.056	2.090	-6.506	-3.145	3.735	1.552												
	(8.902)	(49.963)	(8.760)	(7.309)	(10.028)	(9.790)												
csovar X csoplan							-5.332	-82.812	5.709	-9.110	-7.380	10.987						
							(14.352)	(83.516)	(14.299)	(11.983)	(17.197)	(15.604)						
csovar X ldrrmcreps													-2.419	18.318	1.276	-1.980	5.698	4.800
													(6.776)	(36.964)	(6.654)	(5.607)	(7.476)	(7.486)
Constant	-10.738	-6.910	-10.420	-10.160	-12.385	-10.376	-10.418	-6.662	-10.408	-10.340	-12.326	-10.448	-10.061	-7.065	-10.460	-10.124	-12.337	-10.809
	(26.578)	(28.092)	(26.715)	(26.718)	(26.610)	(26.717)	(26.610)	(28.077)	(26.713)	(26.719)	(26.610)	(26.713)	(26.592)	(28.091)	(26.727)	(26.721)	(26.609)	(26.725)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Obs	2,956	2,617	2,951	2,951	2,950	2,951	2,956	2,617	2,951	2,951	2,950	2,951	2,956	2,617	2,951	2,951	2,950	2,951
R^2	0.265	0.274	0.265	0.265	0.266	0.265	0.265	0.275	0.265	0.265	0.266	0.265	0.265	0.274	0.265	0.265	0.266	0.265
Adj. R^2	0.256	0.264	0.256	0.256	0.257	0.256	0.256	0.264	0.256	0.256	0.257	0.256	0.256	0.264	0.256	0.256	0.257	0.256
F Statistic	1,047***	968***	1,043***	1,043***	1,047***	1,043***	1,045***	969***	1,043***	1,043***	1,047***	1,044***	1,044***	968***	1,043***	1,043***	1,048***	1,043***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Summary on Per Capita Spending

Using the nested random effects models with control variables, the following notable results can be observed:

1. As in the case of aggregate per capita expenditures, we found positive and statistically significant relationships between CSO participation and per capita spending on CO (CSO action plans), health (CSO proportion in the LDC), social services (CSO proportion in LDC and submission of action plans), economic services (proportion of CSOs in LDC), LDF (proportion of CSOs in LDC), and LDRRMF (proportion of CSOs in the LDC).

2. The effect of the proportion of CSOs in the LDC on per capita spending is potentially nonlinear and concave, particularly in the case of MOOE and CO where the nonlinearity was statistically significant. This mirrors the observation in the aggregate per capita expenditure.

3. There were also cases where CSO participation–particularly the CSO provision of technical assistance to LDCs–had a negative influence on per capita spending. These were true in the case of CO and economic services, where the relationship is statistically significant. This may be indicative of the tendency of CSOs to provide (and/or LGUs to seek) technical assistance to LGUs that have lower spending per capita.

4. It is noteworthy that per capita spending on education is not strongly influenced by CSO participation. It would be interesting to see if this lack of a relationship holds in the case of cities and provinces, which have the power to collect real property taxes and thus are able to allocate special education funds.

Summary: Per Capita Productive Expenditures Using Nested Random Effects

	Dependent variable:							
	y5_mooe percap	y5_cop ercap	y5_educp ercap	y5_health percap	y5_social percap	y5_econp ercap	y5_ldfp ercap	y5_ldrrmf percap
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cso25pct	56.580	9.412	2.861	-0.373	1.286	-7.620	15.550	6.799
	(39.217)	(25.304)	(4.067)	(7.397)	(4.748)	(12.477)	(14.327)	(9.158)
csopct	249.004	158.704	-19.784	72.507**	41.705**	171.920***	99.514*	68.796*
	(163.975)	(102.76)	(17.145)	(30.940)	(19.334)	(50.850)	(59.618)	(37.423)
csoattend	-13.589	2.495	0.302	-8.904	3.326	8.205	10.717	-16.335**
	(35.019)	(22.427)	(3.628)	(6.605)	(4.230)	(11.098)	(12.782)	(8.182)
csoassist	2.028	-40.812**	-3.075	-1.273	-3.460	-13.752*	-12.347	-8.017
	(26.014)	(16.528)	(2.703)	(4.940)	(3.118)	(8.204)	(9.469)	(5.996)
csoplan	33.432	36.487*	0.225	5.475	8.773**	1.862	15.105	3.026
	(31.179)	(20.055)	(3.241)	(5.892)	(3.767)	(9.936)	(11.348)	(7.227)
ldrrmc_cs								7.689
o4reps								(10.359)
Constant	-335.239***	-133.23*	-22.409*	-10.652	-8.229	-47.741	-79.656*	-10.056
	(123.204)	(71.194)	(11.745)	(23.921)	(14.030)	(35.384)	(42.225)	(26.598)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,953	2,949	2,945	2,950	2,953	2,946	2,953	2,956
R^2	0.353	0.227	0.289	0.456	0.395	0.252	0.328	0.265
Adj. R^2	0.345	0.218	0.280	0.450	0.388	0.244	0.320	0.256
F Statistic	1,521***	841***	1,164***	2,401***	1,891***	958***	1,415***	1,045***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

2.3 BUR of Productive Components of the Budget

To recall, CSO participation did not show any statistically significant relationship with the BUR in the base models. However, the stewpise regressions resulted in a positive and statistically significant relationship between the provision of technical assistance to the LDC and the BUR.

MOOE BUR

Across all panel linear models, the utilization rate of the MOOE budget is not affected by CSO participation in a statistically significant way. These results are also mirrored by the beta regressions as well as the stepwise regressions. The squared form of the proportion of CSOs in the LDC is not statistically significant.

In the interaction models, however, we see a positive and statistically significant relationship between CSOs' submission of action plans and MOOE BUR. There was also a negative interaction effect between CSO action plans and two other variables: meeting the minimum CSO membership threshold in the LDC and CSO attendance in the LDC. These two, taken on their own, do not have a statistically significant relationship with MOOE BUR. The net effects are also negative (interaction with minimum CSO membership) and positive (attendance in LDC meetings).

y6a = BUR of MOOE, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_mooe									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.259	-0.557	-0.303	-0.077	0.048	0.336	0.152	0.082	0.126	0.139
	(0.770)	(0.980)	(0.674)	(0.608)	(0.600)	(0.586)	(0.613)	(0.447)	(0.432)	(0.432)
ldc_csopct	-3.765	-0.700	-1.111	-2.177	-1.630	2.113	-2.478	-0.345	0.215	0.188
	(3.502)	(3.512)	(2.552)	(2.466)	(2.420)	(2.690)	(2.191)	(1.681)	(1.694)	(1.693)
ldc_csoattend	-0.349	-0.950	-0.792	-0.603	-0.394	-0.212	0.571	0.227	0.131	0.140
	(0.652)	(0.831)	(0.576)	(0.516)	(0.509)	(0.524)	(0.547)	(0.400)	(0.385)	(0.385)
ldc_csoassist	-0.223	-0.102	-0.452	-0.216	-0.362	-0.354	-0.006	-0.158	-0.166	-0.227
	(0.519)	(0.557)	(0.395)	(0.377)	(0.385)	(0.398)	(0.353)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.270)
ldc_csoplan	-0.505	0.732	0.336	-0.023	-0.322	0.192	0.604	0.411	0.326	0.325
	(0.572)	(0.762)	(0.504)	(0.456)	(0.452)	(0.453)	(0.483)	(0.339)	(0.331)	(0.331)
Constant		6.275***	6.136***	6.131***	6.123***		16.034***	19.632***	21.940***	22.245***
		(1.243)	(0.918)	(0.883)	(1.081)		(3.320)	(2.591)	(2.702)	(2.721)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,660	1,555	2,660	2,660	2,660	2,658	1,554	2,658	2,658	2,658
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.447	0.633	0.581	0.558	0.551
Adjusted R^2	-1.412	-0.001	-0.000	0.005	0.002	-0.368	0.625	0.575	0.553	0.546
F Statistic	0.515 (df = 5; 1100)	0.573 (df = 5; 1549)	0.952 (df = 5; 2654)	3.195	3.070	28.026*** (df = 31; 1073)	77.060*** (df = 34; 1519)	106.810*** (df = 34; 2623)	3,296.9***	3,194.8***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y6a Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6a.1	0.7304	0
y6a.2	0.0000	0

y6a = BUR of MOOE, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_mooe			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.062	-0.036	-0.044	-0.025
	(0.098)	(0.058)	(0.098)	(0.058)
ldc_csopct	-0.113	-0.034	-0.430	-0.216
	(0.380)	(0.225)	(0.378)	(0.224)
ldc_csoattend	0.026	0.020	0.084	0.050
	(0.090)	(0.053)	(0.090)	(0.053)
ldc_csoassist	0.011	0.007	-0.052	-0.033
	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.069)	(0.041)
ldc_csoplan	-0.004	-0.007	-0.043	-0.032
	(0.076)	(0.045)	(0.079)	(0.046)
Constant	0.922	0.489	1.798***	0.954***
	(0.565)	(0.332)	(0.637)	(0.370)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	643	643	643	643
R^2	0.546	0.589	0.606	0.641
Log Likelihood	459.972	451.840	521.552	512.653
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6a = BUR of MOOE, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_mooe					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.001	-0.075	0.009	-0.007	-0.004	
	(0.013)	(0.066)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.014)	
ldc_csopct						0.147
						(0.310)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.239
						(0.374)
Constant	0.771***	0.829***	0.760***	0.776***	0.771***	0.595***
	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.131)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	706	643	706	706	706	643
R^2	0.703	0.726	0.703	0.703	0.703	0.708
Adjusted R^2	0.689	0.713	0.690	0.690	0.690	0.694
F Statistic	1,383.212***	1,415.016***	1,386.882***	1,387.243***	1,384.851***	1,310.616***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y3 = BUR of MOOE, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_mooe																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.013	0.009	-0.020	-0.009	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.011	-0.014	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012	-0.011	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.010	-0.013	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
csopct	-0.033	-0.088	-0.031	-0.035	-0.033	-0.023	-0.048	-0.042	-0.027	-0.026	-0.032	-0.089	-0.031	-0.033	-0.031	-0.034	-0.089	-0.026	-0.033	-0.033	-0.036	-0.093	-0.025	-0.034	-0.034
	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.104)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
csoattend	0.009	0.014	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.013	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.004	0.026	0.001	0.013	0.011	0.009	0.013	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.012	0.010	0.007	0.009
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
csoassist	-0.002	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.009	0.004	-0.020	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
csoplan	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.059*	-0.050	-0.051*	-0.018	-0.007
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.017)
csovar X	0.000	-0.065	0.009	-0.005	-0.005																				
cso25pct	(0.015)	(0.076)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.015)																				
csovar X						-0.011	-0.133	0.012	-0.021	-0.030															
csopct						(0.044)	(0.221)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.047)															
csovar X											0.007	-0.041	0.010	-0.008	-0.014										
csoattend											(0.015)	(0.076)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)										
csovar X																0.009	-0.013	0.023	-0.002	-0.003					
csoassist																(0.020)	(0.085)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.020)					
csovar X																					0.066*	0.166	0.060*	0.027	0.024
csoplan																					(0.036)	(0.165)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Constant	0.631***	0.691***	0.628***	0.634***	0.631***	0.630***	0.692***	0.630***	0.635***	0.631***	0.630***	0.693***	0.628***	0.634***	0.628***	0.632***	0.692***	0.620***	0.631***	0.632***	0.632***	0.690***	0.618***	0.634***	0.634***
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	643	584	643	643	643	643	584	643	643	643	643	584	643	643	643	643	584	643	643	643	643	584	643	643	643
R^2	0.708	0.734	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.707	0.735	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.733	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.736	0.709	0.708	0.708	0.711	0.738	0.710	0.708	0.708
Adj. R^2	0.691	0.717	0.691	0.691	0.691	0.690	0.718	0.691	0.691	0.691	0.691	0.716	0.691	0.691	0.691	0.691	0.719	0.692	0.691	0.691	0.694	0.721	0.693	0.691	0.692
F Statistic	1,287***	1,336***	1,290***	1,289***	1,286***	1,285***	1,339***	1,289***	1,288***	1,286***	1,286***	1,329***	1,291***	1,290***	1,288***	1,288***	1,343***	1,297***	1,288***	1,288***	1,308***	1,357***	1,304***	1,287***	1,290***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

CO BUR

Similarly, there was no statistically significant relationship between the utilization of CO budgets and CSO participation, in all of the base panel linear models except the fixed effects model where the attendance of CSOs in the LDC is negatively correlated with CO BUR. The lack of a statistically significant effect of CSO participation on CO BUR is validated by the beta regression model, the stepwise regressions, as well as the nonlinear form. As such, there were also no notable interaction effects among the CSO participation variables.

y6b = BUR of CO, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_co									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.009	-0.033	-0.016	-0.015	-0.015	-0.005	-0.035	-0.024	-0.019	-0.017
	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
ldc_csopct	-0.244**	-0.042	-0.055	-0.118	-0.104	-0.177	-0.033	-0.044	-0.081	-0.082
	(0.120)	(0.112)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.119)	(0.108)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.078)
ldc_csoattend	-0.043*	0.023	0.002	-0.015	-0.011	-0.041*	0.001	-0.019	-0.026	-0.023
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
ldc_csoassist	-0.013	0.014	0.003	0.001	-0.003	-0.014	-0.007	-0.014	-0.010	-0.009
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)
ldc_csoplan	0.041**	0.055**	0.050***	0.048***	0.038**	0.047**	-0.002	0.011	0.024	0.024
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant		0.543***	0.561***	0.594***	0.591***		1.122***	1.126***	1.137***	1.103***
		(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.036)		(0.145)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.113)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,687	1,566	2,687	2,687	2,687	2,685	1,565	2,685	2,685	2,685
R^2	0.012	0.006	0.004	0.010	0.010	0.072	0.131	0.108	0.091	0.079
Adjusted R^2	-1.377	0.003	0.002	0.008	0.008	-1.288	0.112	0.096	0.079	0.067
F Statistic	2.815** (df = 5; 1116)	1.919* (df = 5; 1560)	2.288** (df = 5; 2681)	14.602**	10.013*	2.716*** (df = 31; 1089)	6.781*** (df = 34; 1530)	9.411*** (df = 34; 2650)	255.9***	200.5***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y6b Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6b.1	0.1392	0
y6b.2	0.0000	0

y6b = BUR of CO, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_co			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.077	-0.048	-0.025	-0.017
	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.045)
ldc_csopct	-0.167	-0.099	-0.408	-0.255
	(0.270)	(0.168)	(0.270)	(0.167)
ldc_csoattend	0.015	0.009	0.051	0.031
	(0.065)	(0.041)	(0.065)	(0.040)
ldc_csoassist	-0.032	-0.019	-0.049	-0.030
	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.031)
ldc_csoplan	0.002	0.000	-0.014	-0.010
	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.035)
Constant	2.795***	1.728***	3.690***	2.273***
	(0.395)	(0.243)	(0.459)	(0.280)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,495	2,495	2,495	2,495
R^2	0.121	0.124	0.206	0.210
Log Likelihood	202.759	202.128	336.271	335.045
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6b = BUR of CO, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_co					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.007	0.027	-0.013	0.013	0.015	
	(0.011)	(0.057)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	
ldc_csopct						0.031
						(0.255)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.102
						(0.305)
Constant	1.164***	1.168***	1.182***	1.159***	1.165***	1.101***
	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.109)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,754	2,495	2,753	2,753	2,752	2,496
R^2	0.105	0.109	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.104
Adjusted R^2	0.095	0.098	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.093
F Statistic	253.759***	234.266***	254.734***	255.207***	254.187***	231.217***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*					

y6b = BUR of CO, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_co																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.014	-0.010	0.009	-0.011	-0.008	-0.006	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
csopct	-0.040	-0.036	-0.043	-0.038	-0.043	-0.067	-0.053	0.005	-0.056	-0.052	-0.040	-0.036	-0.042	-0.037	-0.043	-0.041	-0.036	-0.044	-0.040	-0.044	-0.039	-0.036	-0.043	-0.041	-0.044
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.091)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
csoattend	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.001	-0.011	-0.006	0.016	-0.006	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
csoassist	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.010	-0.005	0.011	-0.006	-0.006	-0.002	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
csoplan	0.018	0.030**	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.030**	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.030**	0.017	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.030**	0.018	0.018	0.018	-0.029	0.015	-0.004	0.001	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.013)
csovar X	0.010	0.009	-0.017	0.010	0.014																				
cso25pct	(0.012)	(0.065)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)																				
csovar X						0.036	0.055	-0.058	0.047	0.059															
csopct						(0.037)	(0.192)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)															
csovar X											0.014	0.017	-0.019	0.015	0.015										
csoattend											(0.013)	(0.064)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)										
csovar X																0.010	0.021	-0.016	0.010	0.024					
csoassist																(0.016)	(0.085)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)					
csovar X																					0.059**	0.049	0.027	0.031	0.069**
csoplan																					(0.026)	(0.127)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.027)
Constant	1.119***	1.084***	1.118***	1.114***	1.118***	1.119***	1.084***	1.117***	1.111***	1.117***	1.118***	1.084***	1.119***	1.111***	1.117***	1.119***	1.084***	1.116***	1.115***	1.116***	1.118***	1.083***	1.118***	1.117***	1.116***
	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,495	2,260	2,494	2,494	2,493	2,495	2,260	2,494	2,494	2,493	2,495	2,260	2,494	2,494	2,493	2,495	2,260	2,494	2,494	2,493	2,495	2,260	2,494	2,494	2,493
R^2	0.105	0.110	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.110	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.110	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.110	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.106	0.110	0.105	0.105	0.106
Adj. R^2	0.092	0.096	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.096	0.093	0.093	0.092	0.092	0.096	0.093	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.096	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.094	0.096	0.092	0.092	0.094
F Statistic	233***	224***	235***	233***	233***	234***	224***	235***	235***	234***	234***	224***	235***	235***	233***	233***	224***	233***	233***	234***	238***	224***	233***	235***	238***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Education BUR

CSO attendance in LDC meetings was found to be positively correlated with the utilization of education budgets in the fixed effects model with covariates. The other panel linear models particularly nested random effects do not show a statistically significant effect of CSO participation on education BUR. The beta regression model as well as the stepwise regressions also validate the lack of significant relationships between education BUR and CSO participation. The squared form of CSO membership in the LDC as well as the interaction effects among CSO participation variables were also not statistically significant.

y6c = BUR of Education, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_educ									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	0.030	0.019	0.031	0.028	0.029	0.026	0.003	0.019	0.019	0.024
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
ldc_csopct	0.006	0.003	0.011	0.006	0.003	0.040	-0.046	-0.028	-0.019	-0.030
	(0.119)	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.120)	(0.098)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.074)
ldc_csoattend	0.062**	0.018	0.024	0.037**	0.036**	0.057**	-0.012	0.009	0.023	0.023
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
ldc_csoassist	-0.038**	0.014	0.001	-0.008	-0.009	-0.034*	0.000	-0.008	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
ldc_csoplan	0.018	0.011	0.020	0.018	0.015	0.015	-0.010	-0.000	0.002	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant		0.680***	0.670***	0.666***	0.670***		0.965***	0.974***	1.017***	1.017***
		(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)		(0.123)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.100)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,847	1,154	1,847	1,847	1,847	1,847	1,154	1,847	1,847	1,847
R^2	0.018	0.003	0.004	0.034	0.060	0.073	0.078	0.067	0.083	0.114
Adjusted R^2	-1.635	-0.002	0.001	0.032	0.058	-1.585	0.050	0.049	0.066	0.097
F Statistic	2.516** (df = 5; 688)	0.585 (df = 5; 1148)	1.502 (df = 5; 1841)	9.868*	9.316*	1.680** (df = 31; 662)	2.783*** (df = 34; 1119)	3.815*** (df = 34; 1812)	112.0***	115.8***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*									

Results of Tests on y6c Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6c.1	0.3053	0
y6c.2	0.1663	0

y6c = BUR of Education, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_educ			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.040	0.025	0.056	0.039
	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.052)
ldc_csopct	-0.184	-0.103	-0.303	-0.177
	(0.322)	(0.193)	(0.322)	(0.192)
ldc_csoattend	0.079	0.049	0.044	0.028
	(0.079)	(0.048)	(0.080)	(0.048)
ldc_csoassist	-0.021	-0.012	-0.016	-0.009
	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.034)
ldc_csoplan	0.056	0.035	0.006	0.005
	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.067)	(0.040)
Constant	2.625***	1.595***	3.190***	1.915***
	(0.398)	(0.240)	(0.507)	(0.298)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,682	1,682	1,682	1,682
R^2	0.081	0.084	0.188	0.189
Log Likelihood	559.295	559.720	664.460	664.093
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6c = BUR of Education, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_educ					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	-0.008	-0.014	-0.001	0.003	0.005	
	(0.012)	(0.062)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.012)	
ldc_csopct						0.012
						(0.281)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.033
						(0.342)
Constant	1.150***	1.137***	1.143***	1.142***	1.141***	1.075***
	(0.082)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.104)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,863	1,683	1,863	1,863	1,862	1,683
R^2	0.133	0.137	0.133	0.133	0.133	0.130
Adjusted R^2	0.119	0.122	0.119	0.119	0.119	0.114
F Statistic	125.443***	113.324***	124.937***	125.019***	124.781***	122.250***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6c = BUR of Education, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_educ																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.041*	0.045	0.028	0.025	0.021	0.022	0.016	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.016	0.023	0.023	0.022	0.022	0.016	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.017	0.023	0.023	0.023
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
csopct	-0.047	-0.045	-0.047	-0.047	-0.046	-0.002	0.008	-0.042	-0.047	-0.056	-0.045	-0.044	-0.047	-0.046	-0.046	-0.047	-0.045	-0.047	-0.047	-0.046	-0.046	-0.044	-0.047	-0.046	-0.046
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.096)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
csoattend	0.015	0.017	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015	0.017	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.028	0.033	0.017	0.012	0.012	0.015	0.017	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.016	0.015	0.015	0.015
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
csoassist	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013	-0.013	-0.014	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013	-0.013	-0.014	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013	-0.014	-0.014	0.004	0.023	-0.014	-0.019	-0.014	-0.013	-0.011	-0.013	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
csoplan	-0.001	0.004	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.024	0.002	-0.022	-0.000
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.014)
csovar X	-0.022*	-0.093	-0.006	-0.004	0.009																				
cso25pct	(0.013)	(0.071)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)																				
csovar X						-0.054	-0.177	-0.006	0.001	0.047															
csopct						(0.040)	(0.211)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.040)															
csovar X											-0.016	-0.053	-0.002	0.005	0.013										
csoattend											(0.013)	(0.070)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.014)										
csovar X																-0.021	-0.112	0.001	0.012	0.005					
csoassist																(0.018)	(0.090)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)					
csovar X																					-0.005	0.089	-0.005	0.044*	-0.006
csoplan																					(0.031)	(0.145)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Constant	1.074***	1.093***	1.071***	1.071***	1.070***	1.073***	1.093***	1.071***	1.070***	1.072***	1.071***	1.091***	1.071***	1.071***	1.069***	1.071***	1.091***	1.070***	1.072***	1.070***	1.071***	1.091***	1.071***	1.076***	1.069***
	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	1,682	1,515	1,682	1,682	1,681	1,682	1,515	1,682	1,682	1,681	1,682	1,515	1,682	1,682	1,681	1,682	1,515	1,682	1,682	1,681	1,682	1,515	1,682	1,682	1,681
R^2	0.134	0.137	0.133	0.132	0.132	0.133	0.136	0.132	0.132	0.133	0.133	0.136	0.132	0.132	0.133	0.133	0.137	0.132	0.133	0.132	0.132	0.136	0.132	0.134	0.132
Adj. R^2	0.116	0.116	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.115	0.116	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.115	0.116	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.115	0.116	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.116	0.114	0.116	0.114
F Statistic	129***	121***	126***	126***	126***	128***	120***	126***	126***	127***	127***	120***	126***	126***	127***	127***	121***	126***	127***	126***	126***	120***	126***	130***	126***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Health BUR

CSO participation did not have any statistically significant relationship with the utilization of health budgets, under both nested random effects and fixed effects models. This was also shown in the beta regression model. The stepwise regressions, meanwhile, showed a very small negative effect of the submission of CSO plans on health BUR. The squared proportion of CSOs in the LDC was not statistically significantly correlated, and there was no notable interaction effect found between the CSO participation variables.

y6d = BUR of Health, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_health									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.013	-0.011	-0.010	-0.012	-0.012	-0.010	-0.002	-0.005	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csopct	-0.059	-0.011	-0.005	-0.031	-0.034	-0.038	-0.028	-0.017	-0.034	-0.039
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
ldc_csoattend	0.006	-0.006	-0.002	0.002	0.002	0.008	-0.015	-0.007	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csoassist	-0.009	0.020***	0.012**	0.005	0.001	-0.007	0.016**	0.009*	0.004	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	0.002	0.018*	0.015**	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.008	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant		0.887***	0.886***	0.897***	0.903***		1.233***	1.220***	1.261***	1.272***
		(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)		(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.053)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,270	1,366	2,270	2,270	2,270	2,270	1,366	2,270	2,270	2,270
R^2	0.009	0.011	0.006	0.286	0.213	0.117	0.145	0.129	0.350	0.297
Adjusted R^2	-1.501	0.007	0.004	0.284	0.211	-1.295	0.123	0.116	0.340	0.286
F Statistic	1.670 (df = 5; 899)	2.959** (df = 5; 1360)	2.726** (df = 5; 2264)	9.331*	7.927	3.738*** (df = 31; 873)	6.620*** (df = 34; 1331)	9.715*** (df = 34; 2235)	263.2***	254.0***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y6d Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6d.1	0.0153	0
y6d.2	0.0000	0

y6d = BUR of Health, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_health			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	B. Logit FE	B. Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.040	-0.021	0.007	0.004
	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.065)	(0.034)
ldc_csopct	0.035	0.020	0.095	0.052
	(0.246)	(0.130)	(0.242)	(0.128)
ldc_csoattend	-0.065	-0.034	-0.030	-0.017
	(0.060)	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.031)
ldc_csoassist	0.041	0.022	-0.009	-0.005
	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.023)
ldc_csoplan	0.022	0.012	0.051	0.027
	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.051)	(0.027)
Constant	4.397***	2.507***	5.115***	2.876***
	(0.358)	(0.197)	(0.422)	(0.227)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,089	2,089	2,089	2,089
R^2	0.110	0.124	0.221	0.244
Log Likelihood	2,356.598	2,357.235	2,517.795	2,519.662
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6d = BUR of Health, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_health					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.006	-0.008	0.000	0.002	-0.009*	
	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
ldc_csopct						-0.162
						(0.115)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.126
						(0.136)
Constant	1.265***	1.241***	1.271***	1.270***	1.272***	1.262***
	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.059)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,301	2,090	2,301	2,301	2,300	2,090
R^2	0.292	0.307	0.291	0.291	0.292	0.283
Adjusted R^2	0.283	0.297	0.282	0.282	0.282	0.272
F Statistic	224.611***	220.127***	223.089***	223.429***	226.058***	223.347***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6d = BUR of Health, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_health																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.014	-0.011	-0.009	-0.009	-0.007	-0.008	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csopct	-0.046	-0.049	-0.045	-0.046	-0.046	-0.066*	-0.038	-0.047	-0.048	-0.043	-0.046	-0.049	-0.045	-0.047	-0.045	-0.046	-0.048	-0.044	-0.046	-0.046	-0.045	-0.052	-0.045	-0.046	-0.045
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
csoattend	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.008	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
csoassist	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.012	-0.012	-0.007	-0.002	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
csoplan	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.009	-0.001	-0.028	0.001	-0.002	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.006)
csovar X	0.007	0.009	0.000	0.001	-0.006																				
cso25pct	(0.006)	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)																				
csovar X						0.025	-0.031	0.003	0.004	-0.019															
csopct						(0.017)	(0.087)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)															
csovar X											0.008	0.002	0.000	0.006	-0.004										
csoattend											(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)										
csovar X																0.016**	0.051	0.010	0.005	-0.005					
csoassist																(0.008)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)					
csovar X																					0.012	0.114*	0.010	0.024**	0.008
csoplan																					(0.013)	(0.066)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Constant	1.244***	1.228***	1.246***	1.246***	1.245***	1.244***	1.228***	1.246***	1.246***	1.245***	1.245***	1.228***	1.246***	1.247***	1.245***	1.243***	1.229***	1.245***	1.246***	1.245***	1.246***	1.230***	1.245***	1.247***	1.246***
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,089	1,890	2,089	2,089	2,088	2,089	1,890	2,089	2,089	2,088	2,089	1,890	2,089	2,089	2,088	2,089	1,890	2,089	2,089	2,088	2,089	1,890	2,089	2,089	2,088
R^2	0.286	0.294	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.286	0.294	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.294	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.287	0.295	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.285	0.295	0.285	0.286	0.285
Adj. R^2	0.274	0.281	0.273	0.272	0.272	0.274	0.281	0.273	0.272	0.273	0.273	0.281	0.273	0.273	0.272	0.274	0.281	0.273	0.273	0.272	0.273	0.282	0.273	0.274	0.272
F Statistic	228***	213***	226***	226***	227***	229***	213***	226***	226***	227***	228***	213***	226***	228***	227***	231***	215***	228***	227***	226***	227***	216***	227***	233***	226***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Social Services BUR

CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the utilization of social services budgets under both the nested random effects model and the fixed effects model. This result is confirmed by the beta regression model and the stepwise regressions.

CSOs' provision of technical assistance to the LDC has a positive and statistically significant effect on the BUR of social services. This is however washed out in the stepwise regressions. Likewise, the squared proportion of CSOs in the LDC did not correlate with Social Services BUR. There were also no notable interaction effects among the CSO participation variables.

y6e = BUR of Social Services, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_social									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.003	-0.021	-0.013	-0.010	-0.010	-0.003	-0.017	-0.011	-0.009	-0.007
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
ldc_csopct	-0.111	0.148**	0.110**	0.037	0.032	-0.089	0.107*	0.070	0.012	0.005
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)
ldc_csoattend	0.005	-0.015	-0.010	-0.004	-0.005	0.005	-0.019	-0.011	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
ldc_csoassist	0.012	0.020*	0.018**	0.017**	0.011	0.010	0.014	0.015**	0.015**	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ldc_csoplan	0.001	0.013	0.010	0.007	0.004	0.009	0.002	-0.001	0.003	0.002
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Constant		0.823***	0.825***	0.841***	0.847***		1.621***	1.669***	1.764***	1.788***
		(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)		(0.094)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,426	1,455	2,426	2,426	2,426	2,426	1,455	2,426	2,426	2,426
R^2	0.004	0.007	0.005	0.098	0.087	0.181	0.159	0.157	0.228	0.220
Adjusted R^2	-1.499	0.004	0.003	0.096	0.085	-1.112	0.138	0.145	0.217	0.209
F Statistic	0.857 (df = 5; 966)	2.095* (df = 5; 1449)	2.478** (df = 5; 2420)	6.746	3.286	6.715*** (df = 31; 940)	7.868*** (df = 34; 1420)	13.057*** (df = 34; 2391)	417.1***	422.3***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y6e Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6e.1	0.1022	0
y6e.2	0.0002	0

y6e = BUR of Social Services, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_social			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.097	-0.048	-0.080	-0.035
	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.042)
ldc_csopct	0.438	0.226	0.503*	0.249
	(0.282)	(0.155)	(0.285)	(0.155)
ldc_csoattend	-0.010	-0.003	0.053	0.028
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.038)
ldc_csoassist	0.043	0.025	-0.058	-0.031
	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.051)	(0.029)
ldc_csoplan	-0.033	-0.012	-0.023	-0.007
	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.032)
Constant	6.353***	3.608***	6.941***	3.938***
	(0.427)	(0.243)	(0.492)	(0.276)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,178	2,178	2,178	2,178
R^2	0.126	0.148	0.217	0.245
Log Likelihood	1,978.518	1,972.979	2,104.353	2,097.682
Note:		**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*		

y6e = BUR of Social Services, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_social					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.009	-0.031	-0.003	0.003	0.013	
	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
ldc_csopct						-0.063
						(0.198)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.108
						(0.241)
Constant	1.865***	1.874***	1.877***	1.871***	1.868***	1.802***
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.090)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,392	2,179	2,391	2,391	2,390	2,179
R^2	0.227	0.233	0.227	0.227	0.227	0.214
Adjusted R^2	0.218	0.223	0.217	0.217	0.218	0.203
F Statistic	455.538***	416.149***	454.153***	454.150***	456.173***	396.607***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*					

y6e = BUR of Social Services, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_social																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.018	-0.003	-0.010	-0.015	-0.014	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
csopct	0.041	0.057	0.039	0.040	0.037	0.028	0.092	0.051	0.034	0.027	0.041	0.056	0.038	0.039	0.036	0.040	0.057	0.038	0.039	0.038	0.040	0.058	0.039	0.040	0.038
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
csoattend	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.003	0.014	0.007	-0.000	-0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
csoassist	0.012	0.014	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.014	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.014	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.009	0.020	0.019	0.012	0.009	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.013	0.013*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
csoplan	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.006	-0.004	0.007	-0.012	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.010)
csovar X	0.007	-0.031	-0.003	0.005	0.012																				
cso25pct	(0.009)	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)																				
csovar X						0.017	-0.114	-0.016	0.013	0.041															
csopct						(0.028)	(0.145)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.028)															
csovar X											0.005	-0.043	-0.008	0.002	0.016*										
csoattend											(0.010)	(0.048)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)										
csovar X																0.004	-0.020	-0.008	0.001	0.024**					
csoassist																(0.012)	(0.060)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.012)					
csovar X																					0.006	0.020	-0.010	0.025	0.046**
csoplan																					(0.019)	(0.108)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Constant	1.787***	1.779***	1.788***	1.785***	1.785***	1.787***	1.779***	1.789***	1.786***	1.785***	1.787***	1.780***	1.789***	1.786***	1.785***	1.787***	1.780***	1.790***	1.787***	1.789***	1.788***	1.781***	1.786***	1.789***	1.791***
	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,178	1,978	2,177	2,177	2,176	2,178	1,978	2,177	2,177	2,176	2,178	1,978	2,177	2,177	2,176	2,178	1,978	2,177	2,177	2,176	2,178	1,978	2,177	2,177	2,176
R^2	0.216	0.214	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.214	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.214	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.213	0.216	0.216	0.217	0.216	0.213	0.216	0.216	0.217
Adj. R^2	0.203	0.199	0.203	0.203	0.203	0.203	0.199	0.203	0.203	0.203	0.203	0.199	0.203	0.203	0.204	0.203	0.199	0.203	0.203	0.204	0.203	0.199	0.203	0.204	0.204
F Statistic	400***	346***	399***	400***	401***	400***	346***	400***	400***	401***	400***	347***	400***	400***	402***	400***	346***	400***	399***	403***	400***	346***	400***	402***	404***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Economic Services BUR

Under the nested random effects model, CSO technical assistance to the LDC is positively correlated with the BUR for Economic Services. This is, however, washed out in the fixed effects model, the beta regression model, and the stepwise regressions. The squared form of the proportion of CSOs in the LDC as well as the interaction effects were not statistically significant.

y6f = BUR of Economic Services, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_econ									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.018	-0.023	-0.025	-0.022	-0.018	-0.020	-0.002	-0.012	-0.012	-0.008
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
ldc_csopct	-0.025	0.019	0.059	0.014	0.006	0.057	-0.084	-0.024	-0.040	-0.051
	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)
ldc_csoattend	0.013	-0.050***	-0.028**	-0.013	-0.013	0.011	-0.042**	-0.020	-0.008	-0.006
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
ldc_csoassist	0.022*	0.024*	0.024**	0.024***	0.019**	0.014	0.019*	0.020**	0.021***	0.015*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
ldc_csoplan	-0.000	0.040**	0.027**	0.016	0.013	0.014	0.009	0.011	0.010	0.010
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant		0.827***	0.801***	0.800***	0.804***		1.923***	1.929***	2.054***	2.079***
		(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)		(0.097)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.082)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,449	1,474	2,449	2,449	2,449	2,449	1,474	2,449	2,449	2,449
R^2	0.005	0.011	0.007	0.064	0.046	0.330	0.320	0.309	0.333	0.325
Adjusted R^2	-1.510	0.007	0.005	0.062	0.044	-0.738	0.303	0.300	0.324	0.315
F Statistic	1.029 (df = 5; 970)	3.200*** (df = 5; 1468)	3.554*** (df = 5; 2443)	12.465**	7.892	14.984*** (df = 31; 944)	19.875*** (df = 34; 1439)	31.820*** (df = 34; 2414)	1,006.7***	993.9***
Note:										**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Results of Tests on y6f Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6f.1	0.1017	0
y6f.2	0.0000	0

y6f = BUR of Economic Services, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_econ			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.048	0.026	0.071	0.041
	(0.073)	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.042)
ldc_csopct	-0.318	-0.173	-0.322	-0.171
	(0.271)	(0.156)	(0.273)	(0.156)
ldc_csoattend	-0.058	-0.032	-0.034	-0.016
	(0.065)	(0.038)	(0.066)	(0.038)
ldc_csoassist	0.103**	0.062**	0.034	0.021
	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.029)
ldc_csoplan	0.020	0.013	0.020	0.013
	(0.056)	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.033)
Constant	6.171***	3.640***	6.967***	4.086***
	(0.393)	(0.231)	(0.461)	(0.266)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,245	2,245	2,245	2,245
R^2	0.220	0.262	0.292	0.333
Log Likelihood	1,405.372	1,398.767	1,513.801	1,507.254
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6f = BUR of Economic Services, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_econ					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.013	0.014	0.005	0.002	0.005	
	(0.009)	(0.047)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
ldc_csopct						-0.145
						(0.207)
I(ldc_csopct2)						0.099
						(0.249)
Constant	2.017***	2.003***	2.024***	2.027***	2.027***	2.045***
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.092)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,474	2,246	2,474	2,474	2,473	2,246
R^2	0.342	0.342	0.341	0.342	0.341	0.331
Adjusted R^2	0.334	0.333	0.333	0.333	0.332	0.321
F Statistic	1,078.077***	960.018***	1,075.526***	1,075.282***	1,069.958***	949.486***
Note:						**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6f = BUR of Economic Services, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_econ																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	-0.006	-0.007	0.000	0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.008	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.008	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.007	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
csopct	-0.063	-0.047	-0.063	-0.062	-0.063	-0.085	-0.045	-0.063	-0.058	-0.065	-0.064	-0.046	-0.063	-0.063	-0.063	-0.063	-0.047	-0.063	-0.064	-0.063	-0.063	-0.047	-0.064	-0.063	-0.065
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
csoattend	-0.004	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.016	0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
csoassist	0.015*	0.021**	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.021**	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.021**	0.015*	0.015*	0.015*	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.013	0.014	0.015*	0.021**	0.015*	0.015*	0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
csoplan	0.010	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.007	0.003	0.039*	0.014	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.011)
csovar X	0.005	-0.001	-0.002	-0.005	0.003																				
cso25pct	(0.010)	(0.054)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)																				
csovar X						0.026	-0.004	-0.000	-0.007	0.012															
csopct						(0.030)	(0.158)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.031)															
csovar X											0.014	-0.011	0.003	-0.000	0.007										
csoattend											(0.010)	(0.055)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)										
csovar X																0.015	0.020	0.000	0.004	0.003					
csoassist																(0.013)	(0.069)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)					
csovar X																					0.004	0.016	-0.035	-0.008	0.050**
csoplan																					(0.022)	(0.121)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Constant	2.029***	1.992***	2.030***	2.030***	2.028***	2.028***	1.992***	2.030***	2.029***	2.028***	2.028***	1.992***	2.029***	2.029***	2.028***	2.029***	1.993***	2.030***	2.029***	2.029***	2.029***	1.992***	2.032***	2.030***	2.030***
	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,245	2,035	2,245	2,245	2,244	2,245	2,035	2,245	2,245	2,244	2,245	2,035	2,245	2,245	2,244	2,245	2,035	2,245	2,245	2,244	2,245	2,035	2,245	2,245	2,244
R^2	0.332	0.332	0.332	0.332	0.331	0.332	0.332	0.332	0.332	0.331	0.333	0.332	0.332	0.332	0.331	0.333	0.332	0.332	0.332	0.331	0.332	0.332	0.333	0.332	0.332
Adj. R^2	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.322	0.321	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.320	0.322	0.322	0.322
F Statistic	953***	853***	953***	954***	947***	954***	853***	953***	953***	947***	956***	853***	953***	953***	947.792***	955***	853***	953***	953***	947***	953***	853***	957***	953***	954***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

LDF BUR

In the nested random effects model, CSOs' submission of action plans was found to be positively related with the utilization of the LDF. This result was mirrored by the fixed effects model. Under the beta regression model, however, the proportion of CSOs in the LDC has a negative effect on the LDF BUR, and the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings is positively correlated. These effects were all washed out in the stepwise regressions. The squared form of *csopct* as well as the interaction effects did not show any statistically significant correlation with the LDF BUR.

y6g = BUR of LDF, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_ldf									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.003	-0.002	0.007	-0.001	0.005	-0.006	-0.015	-0.008	-0.007	-0.000
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.017)
ldc_csopct	-0.21**	-0.030	-0.079	-0.115	-0.109	-0.21**	-0.003	-0.046	-0.077	-0.086
	(0.101)	(0.104)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.069)
ldc_csoattend	0.014	0.042*	0.028	0.024	0.027*	0.022	0.010	0.001	0.009	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)
ldc_csoassist	-0.019	0.001	-0.003	-0.007	-0.014	-0.013	-0.017	-0.018	-0.011	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
ldc_csoplan	0.024	0.086***	0.064***	0.047***	0.037***	0.033*	0.006	0.014	0.022*	0.022*
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Constant		0.529***	0.561***	0.584***	0.581***		0.968***	0.937***	0.998***	0.971***
		(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.036)		(0.158)	(0.125)	(0.134)	(0.133)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,392	1,452	2,392	2,392	2,392	2,390	1,451	2,390	2,390	2,390
R^2	0.010	0.014	0.010	0.018	0.014	0.041	0.178	0.127	0.095	0.070
Adjusted R^2	-1.531	0.011	0.008	0.016	0.012	-1.524	0.158	0.115	0.082	0.056
F Statistic	1.920* (df = 5; 935)	4.102*** (df = 5; 1446)	4.719*** (df = 5; 2386)	19.500***	16.008***	1.247 (df = 31; 908)	9.006*** (df = 34; 1416)	10.105*** (df = 34; 2355)	234.5***	148.7***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*									

Results of Tests on y6g Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6g.1	0.0607	0
y6g.2	0.0000	0

y6g = BUR of LDF, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_ldf			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.045	-0.028	0.052	0.031
	(0.077)	(0.048)	(0.075)	(0.046)
ldc_csopct	-0.440	-0.271	-0.628**	-0.384**
	(0.297)	(0.184)	(0.291)	(0.179)
ldc_csoattend	0.109	0.067	0.136**	0.083**
	(0.069)	(0.043)	(0.068)	(0.042)
ldc_csoassist	-0.061	-0.038	-0.069	-0.042
	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.032)
ldc_csoplan	0.022	0.014	0.022	0.015
	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.036)
Constant	2.285***	1.412***	2.587***	1.586***
	(0.498)	(0.307)	(0.545)	(0.330)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,207	2,207	2,207	2,207
R^2	0.112	0.115	0.256	0.261
Log Likelihood	217.200	217.096	417.110	416.381
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6g = BUR of LDRF, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:					
	y6_bur_ldf					
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
csovar	0.001	0.021	-0.010	-0.011	-0.005	
	(0.011)	(0.059)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	
ldc_csopct						-0.025
						(0.266)
I(ldc_csopct2)						-0.094
						(0.324)
Constant	0.970***	0.946***	0.980***	0.977***	0.968***	0.941***
	(0.121)	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.138)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,433	2,207	2,432	2,432	2,431	2,208
R^2	0.082	0.091	0.082	0.083	0.082	0.080
Adjusted R^2	0.071	0.078	0.071	0.071	0.071	0.067
F Statistic	145.837***	142.050***	146.386***	147.481***	145.925***	134.670***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*					

y6g = BUR of LDF, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other

	Dependent variable:																								
	y6_bur_ldf																								
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
cso25pct	0.001	-0.006	0.007	0.010	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
csopct	-0.103	-0.096	-0.103	-0.102	-0.102	-0.118	-0.076	-0.085	-0.086	-0.096	-0.104	-0.095	-0.103	-0.103	-0.103	-0.105	-0.095	-0.102	-0.102	-0.105	-0.104	-0.097	-0.103	-0.103	-0.103
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.092)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
csoattend	0.026*	0.025	0.026*	0.026*	0.026*	0.027*	0.025	0.026*	0.026*	0.026*	0.018	0.011	0.032*	0.031**	0.027*	0.027*	0.025	0.027*	0.026*	0.027*	0.027*	0.025	0.026*	0.026*	0.026*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
csoassist	-0.017	-0.011	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.011	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.011	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.038**	-0.033	-0.027*	-0.014	-0.020*	-0.017	-0.011	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
csoplan	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.015	0.015	0.015	-0.013	0.006	0.027	0.014	0.016
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.013)
csovar X cso25pct	0.003	0.022	-0.005	-0.013	-0.007																				
	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)																				
csovar X csopct						0.017	-0.072	-0.022	-0.031	-0.024															
						(0.037)	(0.204)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.037)															
csovar X csoattend											0.010	0.047	-0.007	-0.011	-0.002										
											(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)										
csovar X csoassist																0.026	0.072	0.013	-0.006	0.018					
																(0.016)	(0.088)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.016)					
csovar X csoplan																					0.034	0.023	-0.016	0.001	-0.008
																					(0.026)	(0.149)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.028)
Constant	0.936***	0.906***	0.936***	0.934***	0.935***	0.937***	0.906***	0.936***	0.935***	0.934***	0.936***	0.907***	0.937***	0.937***	0.935***	0.934***	0.909***	0.933***	0.935***	0.935***	0.934***	0.906***	0.938***	0.936***	0.935***
	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,207	2,001	2,206	2,206	2,206	2,207	2,001	2,206	2,206	2,206	2,207	2,001	2,206	2,206	2,206	2,207	2,001	2,206	2,206	2,206	2,207	2,001	2,206	2,206	2,206
R^2	0.083	0.092	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.092	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.092	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.084	0.093	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.092	0.083	0.083	0.083
Adj. R^2	0.068	0.076	0.068	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.076	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.076	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.069	0.076	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.069	0.076	0.068	0.068	0.068
F Statistic	141***	140***	141***	143***	141***	141***	140***	141***	142***	141***	141***	141***	141***	142***	141***	143***	141***	141***	141***	142***	142***	140***	141***	141***	141***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

LDRRMF BUR

No CSO participation variable–including CSO representation in the LDRRMF–was found to be statistically significantly related with the utilization of the LDRRMF. This is true under the nested random effects model, the fixed effects model, and the beta regressions. This lack of statistically significant effects is also validated by the stepwise regressions and the nonlinear form. There were also no notable interaction effects.

y6h = BUR of LDRRMF, All LGUs

	Dependent variable:									
	y6_bur_ldrrmf									
	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested	Fixed	Between	Pooling	Random	Nested
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.018	-0.022	-0.017	-0.019	-0.014	-0.019	-0.028	-0.026	-0.024	-0.022
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
ldc_csopct	0.035	0.185	0.150	0.132	0.121	0.073	0.193	0.159*	0.147	0.130
	(0.158)	(0.122)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.161)	(0.119)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.094)
ldc_csoattend	0.007	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.006	0.008	-0.024	-0.020	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
ldc_csoassist	-0.013	-0.015	-0.016	-0.014	-0.011	-0.013	-0.036*	-0.032**	-0.025*	-0.019
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
ldc_csoplan	0.012	0.066**	0.051***	0.040**	0.032*	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	0.016	0.025	0.026	0.023	0.030	0.015	0.020	0.014	0.013	0.014
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant		0.524***	0.536***	0.543***	0.539***		0.603***	0.532***	0.543***	0.589***
		(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.046)		(0.156)	(0.129)	(0.134)	(0.136)
Control Variables	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,338	1,428	2,338	2,338	2,338	2,336	1,427	2,336	2,336	2,336
R^2	0.001	0.007	0.005	0.014	0.014	0.019	0.111	0.075	0.065	0.052
Adjusted R^2	-1.583	0.003	0.002	0.011	0.011	-1.611	0.088	0.061	0.051	0.038
F Statistic	0.150 (df = 6; 904)	1.637 (df = 6; 1421)	1.841* (df = 6; 2331)	8.070	6.729	0.545 (df = 32; 877)	4.948*** (df = 35; 1391)	5.299*** (df = 35; 2300)	141.9***	87.9***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*									

Results of Tests on y6h Model Specifications (p-values)

Model Specification	Hausman Test	Breusch-Pagan LM Test
y6h.1	0.7909	0
y6h.2	0.0102	0

y6h = BUR of LDRRMF, All LGUs, Beta Regressions

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_ldrrmf			
	Beta Logit	Beta Probit	Beta Logit FE	Beta Probit FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.083	-0.050	-0.026	-0.014
	(0.088)	(0.054)	(0.088)	(0.054)
ldc_csopct	0.430	0.265	0.129	0.074
	(0.340)	(0.211)	(0.343)	(0.212)
ldc_csoattend	0.007	0.004	0.022	0.013
	(0.080)	(0.050)	(0.080)	(0.050)
ldc_csoassist	-0.100*	-0.061*	-0.076	-0.046
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.062)	(0.038)
ldc_csoplan	0.060	0.036	0.080	0.048
	(0.068)	(0.042)	(0.070)	(0.043)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	0.139	0.085	0.157	0.097
	(0.106)	(0.066)	(0.106)	(0.066)
Constant	0.757	0.430	1.488***	0.897**
	(0.471)	(0.290)	(0.572)	(0.350)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Dummy Variables	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,972	1,972	1,972	1,972
R^2	0.068	0.071	0.160	0.167
Log Likelihood	138.266	137.691	243.678	243.005
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6h = LDRRMF Per Capita, All LGUs, Stepwise Regression of CSO Participation Variables including Squared % CSO Members in LDC

	Dependent variable:						
	y6_bur_ldrrmf						
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	sq.csopct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
csovar	0.004	-0.028	-0.002	-0.003	0.000	-0.023	
	(0.015)	(0.077)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.017)	
ldc_csopct							-0.049
							(0.358)
I(ldc_csopct2)							0.146
							(0.442)
Constant	0.663***	0.633***	0.668***	0.668***	0.666***	0.683***	0.559***
	(0.112)	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.139)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,157	1,971	2,156	2,156	2,156	2,156	1,972
R^2	0.066	0.068	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.067	0.067
Adjusted R^2	0.053	0.054	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.054	0.053
F Statistic	85.734***	81.237***	85.683***	85.738***	85.639***	87.534***	82.421***
Note:	**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*						

y6h = LDRRMF Per Capita, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other (1/2)

	Dependent variable:																	
	y6_bur_ldrrmf																	
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
cso25pct	-0.014	-0.021	-0.010	-0.013	-0.013	0.005	-0.012	-0.023	-0.012	-0.011	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.022	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
csopct	0.089	0.083	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.091	0.100	0.125	0.102	0.102	0.087	0.155	0.089	0.082	0.089	0.087	0.089	0.091
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.118)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
csoattend	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.015	0.012	0.008	0.004	0.025
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.026)
csoassist	-0.025*	-0.031**	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.031**	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.031**	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.026*
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
csoplan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
ldrrmcreps	0.024	0.033	0.024	0.024	0.025	0.024	0.024	0.032	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.023	0.024	0.033	0.024	0.024	0.025	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
csovar X cso25pct	0.003	-0.004	-0.002	0.002	0.010	-0.020												
	(0.016)	(0.086)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.019)												
csovar X csopct							-0.013	-0.137	-0.016	-0.037	0.011	-0.069						
							(0.048)	(0.248)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.058)						
csovar X csoattend													0.001	-0.045	-0.008	-0.007	0.009	-0.022
													(0.017)	(0.083)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.019)
csovar X csoassist																		
csovar X csoplan																		
csovar X ldrrmcreps																		
Constant	0.523***	0.478***	0.522***	0.522***	0.521***	0.518***	0.522***	0.477***	0.522***	0.523***	0.522***	0.518***	0.523***	0.476***	0.523***	0.523***	0.520***	0.521***
	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	1,972	1,793	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,972	1,793	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,972	1,793	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
R^2	0.070	0.073	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.073	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.073	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070
Adj. R^2	0.052	0.054	0.052	0.052	0.053	0.053	0.052	0.054	0.052	0.053	0.052	0.053	0.052	0.054	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.053
F Statistic	87***	83***	87***	87***	87***	88***	87***	84***	87***	88***	87***	88***	87***	83***	87***	87***	87***	88***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

y6h = LDRRMF Per Capita, All LGUs, Interaction of CSO Participation Variables With Each Other (2/2)

	Dependent variable:																	
	y6_bur_ldrrmf																	
	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps	cso25pct	csopct	csoattend	csoassist	csoplan	ldrrmcreps
	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	(34)	(35)	(36)
cso25pct	-0.012	-0.023	-0.012	-0.013	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.022	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.022	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
csopct	0.088	0.082	0.089	0.088	0.089	0.090	0.088	0.082	0.086	0.088	0.089	0.088	0.089	0.081	0.089	0.086	0.089	0.091
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
csoattend	0.005	0.001	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
csoassist	-0.016	-0.019	-0.016	-0.008	-0.025*	-0.003	-0.025*	-0.031**	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.031**	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*	-0.025*
	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
csoplan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.023	0.021	0.022	0.008	0.005	0.037	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
ldrrmcreps	0.024	0.032	0.024	0.025	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.033	0.025	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.022	0.052	0.027	0.029	0.024	0.042
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)
csovar X cso25pct																		
csovar X csopct																		
csovar X csoattend																		
csovar X csoassist	-0.011	-0.038	-0.011	-0.034**	-0.002	-0.025												
	(0.021)	(0.107)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.025)												
csovar X csoplan							-0.023	-0.053	-0.023	-0.008	-0.005	-0.039						
							(0.036)	(0.172)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.038)						
csovar X ldrrmcreps													0.003	-0.065	-0.004	-0.011	0.004	-0.021
													(0.016)	(0.083)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Constant	0.521***	0.478***	0.520***	0.522***	0.523***	0.518***	0.524***	0.477***	0.523***	0.523***	0.523***	0.523***	0.523***	0.477***	0.522***	0.522***	0.522***	0.517***
	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes						
Obs	1,972	1,793	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,972	1,793	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,972	1,793	1,971	1,971	1,971	1,971
R^2	0.070	0.073	0.070	0.072	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.073	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.073	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070
Adj. R^2	0.053	0.054	0.053	0.055	0.052	0.053	0.053	0.054	0.053	0.052	0.052	0.053	0.052	0.054	0.052	0.053	0.052	0.053
F Statistic	87***	83***	87***	91***	87***	88***	87***	83***	87***	87***	87***	88***	87***	84***	87***	88***	87***	88***

Note: **p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Summary on Productive BUR

Using the nested random effects models with covariates, the findings here are largely consistent with the observation that CSO participation did not show any statistically significant relationship with the BUR.

1. There were however important exceptions: BUR of social services (provision of technical assistance, positive); economic services (technical assistance, positive); LDF (action plans, positive). It is worth noting that these CSO participation indicators are higher up in the ladder of participatory governance and imply more capacitated CSOs.

2. The stepwise regressions also showed some interesting, albeit at times contradictory results. For one, the stepwise regressions wash out the statistically significant relationships of CSO participation with the BUR of social services and LDF. However, these surface new and positive relationships between CSO participation and economic services BUR (proportion of CSOs in LDC and submission of CSO action plan).

3. The interaction effects were largely absent except in a few cases: the BUR of MOOE (interaction between CSO action plan submission and three other lower-level variables, negative effect); economic services (between CSO technical assistance and three other participation variables, positive effect); LDF (between proportion of CSOs in LDC and attendance of CSOs in LDC, positive); and LDRRMF (minimum CSO membership and attendance in LDC meetings, positive).

Summary: BUR of Productive Expenditures Using Nested Random Effects

	Dependent variable:							
	y6_bur_moo	y6_bur_co	y6_bur_educ	y6_bur_healthy	y6_bur_social	y6_bur_econ	y6_bur_ldf	y6_bur_ldrrmf
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cso25pct	0.139	-0.017	0.024	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008	-0.000	-0.022
	(0.432)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)
csopct	0.188	-0.082	-0.030	-0.039	0.005	-0.051	-0.086	0.130
	(1.693)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.069)	(0.094)
csoattend	0.140	-0.023	0.023	-0.000	-0.003	-0.006	0.012	-0.013
	(0.385)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.021)
csoassist	-0.227	-0.009	-0.013	0.002	0.012	0.015*	-0.017	-0.019
	(0.270)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)
csoplan	0.325	0.024	0.001	0.009	0.002	0.010	0.022*	0.012
	(0.331)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.018)
ldrrmc_								0.014
cso4reps								(0.028)
Constant	22.245***	1.103***	1.017***	1.272***	1.788***	2.079***	0.971***	0.589***
	(2.721)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.053)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.133)	(0.136)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,658	2,685	1,847	2,270	2,426	2,449	2,390	2,336
R^2	0.551	0.079	0.114	0.297	0.220	0.325	0.070	0.052
Adj. R^2	0.546	0.067	0.097	0.286	0.209	0.315	0.056	0.038
F Statistic	3,194.8***	200.5***	115.8***	254.0***	422.4***	993.9***	148.7***	87.9***
Note:								**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Summary: BUR of Productive Expenditures Using Beta Regression (Probit)

	Dependent variable:							
	y6_bur_moo	y6_bur_co	y6_bur_educ	y6_bur_healthy	y6_bur_social	y6_bur_econ	y6_bur_ldf	y6_bur_ldrrmf
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cso25pct	0.139	-0.017	0.024	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008	-0.000	-0.022
	(0.432)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.024)
csopct	0.188	-0.082	-0.030	-0.039	0.005	-0.051	-0.086	0.130
	(1.693)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.069)	(0.094)
csoattend	0.140	-0.023	0.023	-0.000	-0.003	-0.006	0.012	-0.013
	(0.385)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.021)
csoassist	-0.227	-0.009	-0.013	0.002	0.012	0.015*	-0.017	-0.019
	(0.270)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)
csoplan	0.325	0.024	0.001	0.009	0.002	0.010	0.022*	0.012
	(0.331)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.018)
ldrrmc_								0.014
cso4reps								(0.028)
Constant	22.245***	1.103***	1.017***	1.272***	1.788***	2.079***	0.971***	0.589***
	(2.721)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.053)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.133)	(0.136)
Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Obs	2,658	2,685	1,847	2,270	2,426	2,449	2,390	2,336
R^2	0.551	0.079	0.114	0.297	0.220	0.325	0.070	0.052
Adj. R^2	0.546	0.067	0.097	0.286	0.209	0.315	0.056	0.038
F Statistic	3,194.8***	200.5***	115.8***	254.0***	422.3***	993.9***	148.7***	87.9***
Note:								**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

C.2. Regression Analyses By LGU Type

In Annex C.1., we have undertaken regression analysis for All LGUs in order to understand the relationship between citizens' participation and fiscal outcomes. In the sections that follow, we undertake regression analysis for each LGU Type.

The regressions analyses per LGU type will focus on the use of the nested random effects model. This is because we are interested only in detecting any difference in results between the regressions covering all LGUs and for each LGU type. The following modifications were also made:

1. Key control variables that cause issues related to multicollinearity (city and municipality dummies and lag of budgets) have been removed. The control variables will not anymore be presented in the tables.
2. Especially with the analyses covering Cities and Provinces, which have fewer observations than Municipalities, the nested random effects panel regressions may cause singularity errors. Thus, additional variables may be removed (applied to all to ensure uniformity).

Other Notes on Variables Removed: The log of budgets by sector, which have been causing "zero non-NA observations" errors in many regressions involving cities and provinces. To ensure uniformity, we will remove these in all the models. This modification is also implemented for a regression analysis covering all LGUs to have a point of comparison. The dummy variable on having adverse audit findings by COA was also removed has also been creating errors in the regressions covering provinces (no province had an adverse audit observation in 2018).

Dependent variables that risk causing multicollinearity, per LGU type

Description	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
Causes high correlations with independent variables	coa_unqualified, log_econbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, sglg_disaster, sglg_overall	log_gpsbudget, log_socialbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget	coa_unqualified, log_gpsbudget, log_drrfund, log_mooebudget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_educbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget
Highly correlated with independent variables above	log_socialbudget, log_gpsbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, log_psbudget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_devfund, sglg_overall, sglg_financial, sglg_disaster	log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, log_gpsbudget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget	log_econbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_devfund, log_gpsbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_devfund
With VIF > 5 in the 'kitchen sink' model	log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget	log_gpsbudget, log_healthbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget	log_gpsbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_drrfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_educbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget,

Dependent variables that risk causing multicollinearity, per LGU type

Description	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
			laglog_devfund, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget
With VIF > 2.5 in the 'kitchen sink' model	log_gpsbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_devfund, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, sglg_disaster, sglg_overall	log_gpsbudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_drrfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, log_debtbudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_educbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_devfund, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, laglog_debtbudget, sglg_financial, sglg_disaster, sglg_social, sglg_overall, pop_density_2018, pop_urbanpct_2018	ldc_cso25pct, fdp_posting, fdp_portal, budget_percapita, log_gpsbudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_drrfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, log_debtbudget, laglog_budget, laglog_gpsbudget, laglog_educbudget, laglog_healthbudget, laglog_socialbudget, laglog_econbudget, laglog_devfund, laglog_drrfund, laglog_psbudget, laglog_mooebudget, laglog_cobudget, laglog_debtbudget, sglg_financial, sglg_disaster, sglg_social, sglg_overall, poverty_2018, pop_urbanpct_2018
With VIF > 2.5 if without lagged budgets	log_gpsbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget,	log_gpsbudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget, log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_psbudget,	fdp_posting, fdp_portal, budget_percapita, log_gpsbudget, log_educbudget, log_healthbudget,

Dependent variables that risk causing multicollinearity, per LGU type

Description	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	sglg_disaster, sglg_overall	log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, sglg_financial, sglg_disaster, sglg_social, sglg_overall, pop_density_2018, pop_urbanpct_2018	log_socialbudget, log_econbudget, log_devfund, log_drrfund, log_psbudget, log_mooebudget, log_cobudget, sglg_financial, sglg_disaster, sglg_social, sglg_overall, pop_urbanpct_2018
With VIF > 2.5 if without other controls	none	none	none

1. How CSO Participation Affects Broad Budget Outcomes, Per LGU Type

1.1 y1 = Local Revenue Growth

Like in the case of all LGUs, the regression analysis covering municipalities and provinces show no CSO participation variable that was related to local revenue growth in a statistically significant way. In the analysis covering cities, however, the provision of CSO technical assistance to the LDC has a positive and statistically significant effect on local revenue growth. For this outcome, model fit remains very weak across all LGU types.

y1 = Local Revenue Growth, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y1_locrevgrowth			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.033	0.039	-0.008	-0.014
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.169)
ldc_csopct	-0.097	-0.125	-0.170	0.207
	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.184)	(0.433)
ldc_csoattend	-0.002	-0.000	-0.016	-0.011
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.040)	(0.130)
ldc_csoassist	0.016	0.013	0.058**	0.038
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.080)
ldc_csoplan	0.007	0.003	0.018	-0.013
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.100)
Constant	0.179***	0.187***	0.069	1.372
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.118)	(1.902)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,924	2,515	260	149
R^2	0.014	0.015	0.099	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.004	-0.001	-0.143
F Statistic	41.551**	37.263*	26.071	7.476
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.2 y2 = Transfer Dependence

Like in the case of all LGUs, municipalities' NTA dependence are positively influenced by the proportion of CSOs in the LDC. A positive relationship also exists in provinces between the attendance of CSOs in the LDC and NTA dependence. For cities, in contrast, CSO provision of technical assistance is negatively associated with NTA dependence. For this outcome, model fit is lowest among provinces (adjusted R^2 of 33%) and highest among cities (adjusted R^2 of 62%)

y2 = Transfer Dependence, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y2_ntadepend			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.002	-0.003	0.002	0.002
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.036)
ldc_csopct	0.054*	0.061*	0.004	0.094
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.083)	(0.107)
ldc_csoattend	-0.006	-0.008	0.009	0.043*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.025)
ldc_csoassist	-0.005	-0.004	-0.018*	-0.016
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.017)
ldc_csoplan	0.002	0.003	-0.004	0.017
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.020)
Constant	0.778***	0.784***	0.745***	0.849***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.056)	(0.112)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,927	2,515	257	155
R^2	0.459	0.382	0.656	0.445
Adjusted R^2	0.454	0.375	0.618	0.332
F Statistic	1,866.717***	1,072.241***	374.678***	82.010***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.3 y3 = Share of Productive Expenditures: MOOE + CO

Similar to the case for all LGUs, the share of productive expense classes for municipalities, cities, and provinces are not correlated with CSO participation in a statistically significant way. Adjusted R^2 ranges from 32% (municipalities) to 45% (provinces).

y3 = Share of Productive Expense Classes, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y3_prodshare1			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.010	0.008	0.020	-0.022
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.031)
ldc_csopct	0.001	0.007	0.024	0.046
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.113)	(0.085)
ldc_csoattend	-0.003	-0.006	0.021	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.022)
ldc_csoassist	-0.001	0.001	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.015)
ldc_csoplan	0.000	0.000	-0.018	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Constant	0.067*	0.003	-0.269	0.298
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.263)	(0.385)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,702	2,308	240	154
R^2	0.317	0.324	0.441	0.540
Adjusted R^2	0.310	0.316	0.373	0.445
F Statistic	1,102.949***	955.870***	131.971***	146.137***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.4 y4 = Share of Productive Sectors (Net of General Public Services & Others)

Similar to the case for all LGUs, the share of productive sectors in municipalities' budgets is negatively associated with CSO provision of technical assistance to the LDC. Meanwhile in cities and provinces, the budgetary shares of their productive sectors are not influenced by CSO participation in a statistically significant way. In this outcome, model fit is weak ranging from 5% (municipalities) to 12% (cities).

y4 = Share of Productive Sectors, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_prodshare2			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.004	-0.004	-0.038	0.058
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.045)
ldc_csopct	-0.019	-0.020	-0.111	0.030
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.159)	(0.133)
ldc_csoattend	-0.001	-0.002	0.049	0.023
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.032)	(0.031)
ldc_csoassist	-0.011**	-0.015***	0.017	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.021)
ldc_csoplan	-0.003	0.004	-0.027	-0.016
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Constant	0.329***	0.404***	0.916**	0.870***
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.379)	(0.141)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,680	2,284	241	155
R^2	0.079	0.065	0.211	0.256
Adjusted R^2	0.070	0.054	0.116	0.104
F Statistic	126.393***	60.914***	44.642**	30.613
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.5 y5 = Per Capita Spending

Like in the case of all LGUs, spending per capita in municipalities is positively associated with the proportion of CSOs in the LDC. In cities, there are two variables with statistically significant coefficients but have different signs: *csoattend* (negative) and *csoassist* (positive). In provinces, CSO participation has no statistically significant relationship with spending per capita. Adjusted R^2 ranges from a weak 36% in municipalities to a strong 74% in cities.

y5 = Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_spendpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	132.367	92.257	452.268	-116.899
	(92.606)	(94.442)	(309.901)	(295.484)
ldc_csopct	1,009.233***	1,181.899***	-1,301.759	-996.407
	(391.090)	(403.100)	(1,351.002)	(787.082)
ldc_csoattend	-41.070	-18.494	-446.580*	-260.663
	(82.677)	(85.461)	(268.245)	(217.273)
ldc_csoassist	-56.748	-102.523	-56.993	-35.318
	(59.833)	(62.550)	(169.616)	(140.435)
ldc_csoplan	43.974	-4.679	471.735**	129.351
	(73.340)	(77.515)	(190.815)	(173.942)
Constant	-186.547	-77.801	609.980	964.293
	(251.002)	(258.506)	(828.763)	(985.575)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,952	2,538	261	153
R^2	0.343	0.361	0.744	0.644
Adjusted R^2	0.337	0.354	0.716	0.571
F Statistic	1,458.801***	1,354.879***	670.726***	229.503***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

1.6 y6 = Budget Utilization Rate

It must first be noted that because of the modification of the set of control variables, the regression analysis for all LGUs now shows that the submission of CSO plans is positively correlated–albeit with a small effect size and weak statistical significance–with BUR. The original model, in contrast, did not show any statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and BUR.

Having noted this, the proportion of CSOs in LDCs in municipalities is positively associated with the BUR. In cities, there are two variables that have statistically significant coefficients: *csoattend* (negative) and *csoplan* (positive). In provinces, CSO participation was not a statistically significant determinant. Adjusted R^2 remains low.

y6 = Budget Utilization Rate, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.010	-0.008	0.029	-0.081
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.050)
ldc_csopct	0.044	0.060*	-0.183	-0.138
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.155)	(0.142)
ldc_csoattend	0.002	0.007	-0.056*	-0.031
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.035)
ldc_csoassist	0.002	0.006	-0.010	-0.033
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.023)
ldc_csoplan	0.011*	0.002	0.061***	0.020
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Constant	0.767***	0.710***	0.744***	0.775***
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.140)	(0.157)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,701	2,306	242	153
R^2	0.289	0.286	0.372	0.387
Adjusted R^2	0.283	0.278	0.296	0.260
F Statistic	683.683***	545.455***	114.642***	67.688***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

2. *How CSO Participation Influences Function-Specific Outcomes, Across LGU Types*

In this section, we undertake regression analyses on the disaggregation of our outcomes of interest: budgetary share of productive expenditures, spending per capita, and budget utlization. The dissagregations are by the following: key expense classes, i.e., (a) maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE) and (b) capital outlays (CO); and key sectors or functions, i.e., (c) education sector, (d) health sector, (e) social services, (f) economic services, (g) the Local Development Fund (LDF) and (h) the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF). For the last function, the model will include an additional explanatory variable on the presence of at least four CSO representatives to the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF).

2.1 Shares of Productive Expenses

To recall, there was no statistically significant relationship between the share of productive expense classes and CSO participation, but there was a negative and statistically significant relationship between the share of productive budgetary sectors and CSO assistance to the LDC. We find out below how the shares of specific expense classes, sectors, and funds are influenced by CSO participation.

MOOE Share

For municipalities, the proportion of CSO members in the LDC is positively correlated with the share of MOOE in the budget. For cities, the submission of CSO plans is positively associated with the budgetary share of MOOE. These deviate from the analysis for all LGUs and for provinces where CSO participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with the share of MOOE in the budget.

y3a = Share of MOOE, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y3_mooeshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.001	0.001	0.003	-0.020
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.020)
ldc_csopct	0.017	0.040*	0.032	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.095)	(0.059)
ldc_csoattend	0.003	0.005	-0.031	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.014)
ldc_csoassist	0.002	0.005	-0.005	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.010)
ldc_csoplan	0.007	-0.002	0.026*	0.011
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Constant	-0.469***	-0.949***	-0.852***	0.224
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.228)	(0.280)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,697	2,303	241	153
R^2	0.420	0.482	0.571	0.831
Adjusted R^2	0.415	0.476	0.518	0.796
F Statistic	1,740.868***	1,945.969***	271.759***	594.582***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

CO Share

The lack of a statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and the share of CO that was seen in all LGUs was also seen for municipalities and provinces. For cities, there were two CSO participation variables that were statistically significantly related with CO share but have opposite directions.

y3b = Share of CO, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y3_coshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.003	0.004	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.036)
ldc_csopct	-0.006	-0.010	0.017	0.113
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.105)	(0.093)
ldc_csoattend	-0.003	-0.007	0.042*	0.024
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.026)
ldc_csoassist	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	0.011
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.017)
ldc_csoplan	0.001	0.007	-0.039**	-0.016
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.021)
Constant	-0.004	-0.000	0.079	0.156
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.100)	(0.120)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,726	2,328	244	154
R^2	0.410	0.411	0.477	0.434
Adjusted R^2	0.405	0.404	0.414	0.318
F Statistic	1,862.041***	1,594.910***	180.340***	98.043***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Education Sector Share

Here, the results of the per-LGU regression analyses deviate from that covering all LGUs, where the submission of CSO action plans was negatively associated with the budgetary share of education. For municipalities and cities, there were two CSO participation variables that had statistically significant effects on the budgetary share of education but had different directions. For provinces, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the outcome variable.

y4c = Share of Education, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_educshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.002	-0.004**	0.023**	0.007
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.010)
ldc_csopct	0.003	0.009	-0.075	-0.019
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.049)	(0.029)
ldc_csoattend	0.002	0.003*	-0.002	-0.011
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.007)
ldc_csoassist	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.005)
ldc_csoplan	-0.003**	-0.002	-0.011*	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	0.013**	0.016**	-0.080	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.127)	(0.031)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,727	2,335	237	155
R^2	0.187	0.103	0.252	0.322
Adjusted R^2	0.179	0.092	0.160	0.185
F Statistic	609.438***	254.704***	67.711***	59.813***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Health Sector Share

The result for all LGUs–where CSO particiation did not have a statistically significant effect on the share of health in the budget–were mirrored by the results in municpities and cities. In contrast, in provinces, two variables had positive and statistically significant relationships with the budgetary share of health.

y4d = Share of Health, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_healthshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.002	-0.001	0.005	0.103***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.030)
ldc_csopct	0.001	0.005	-0.067	0.093
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.043)	(0.082)
ldc_csoattend	0.002	0.003	-0.002	-0.025
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.019)
ldc_csoassist	0.000	-0.001	-0.004	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.013)
ldc_csoplan	0.001	0.000	-0.002	0.035**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.016)
Constant	0.003	0.020*	-0.017	0.152*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.082)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,729	2,350	242	137
R^2	0.096	0.084	0.319	0.258
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.074	0.237	0.083
F Statistic	252.320***	171.423***	90.072***	39.989**
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Social Services Share

It must first be noted that the result for all LGUs here differed from the original regression results: in the latter, *cso25pct* had a negative coefficient; while in the former, *csoplan* had a positive coefficient. Both had weak statistical significance of *p<0.1*. Considering these, the results for the three LGU types differed from each other. For municipalities, the submission of CSO plans had a positive effect on the budgetary share of social services. There was no statistically significant CSO participation variable in cities. Meanwhile, in provinces meeting the minimum proportion of CSOs in the LDC had a negative relationship with the share of social services.

y4e = Share of Social Services, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_socialshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.006	-0.038***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.013)
ldc_csopct	0.003	0.002	-0.001	-0.040
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.040)
ldc_csoattend	0.000	0.000	0.007	-0.010
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.009)
ldc_csoassist	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.006)
ldc_csoplan	0.002	0.003*	-0.002	-0.010
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Constant	0.024***	0.026***	-0.025	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.040)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,732	2,341	241	150
R^2	0.028	0.029	0.179	0.307
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.018	0.079	0.160
F Statistic	65.793***	62.025***	42.294**	53.945***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Economic Services Share

Like in all LGUs, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the share of economic services in the budget of municipalities. For cities, the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings had a positive effect. Finally in provinces, the submission of CSO plans was negatively correlated with the budgetary share of economic services.

y4f = Share of Economic Services, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_econshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.005	-0.004	-0.047	0.015
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.047)
ldc_csopct	0.006	-0.000	0.109	0.017
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.144)	(0.131)
ldc_csoattend	0.003	-0.000	0.075***	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.034)
ldc_csoassist	-0.004	-0.003	-0.027	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.022)
ldc_csoplan	-0.005	-0.002	0.001	-0.055**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.027)
Constant	-0.043**	0.002	-0.170	-0.023
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.126)	(0.153)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,727	2,333	242	152
R^2	0.068	0.055	0.214	0.170
Adjusted R^2	0.059	0.045	0.119	-0.002
F Statistic	194.876***	130.474***	57.195***	25.600
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDF Share

It must first be noted that the result for all LGUs here (*csoplan* was positively correlated with the share of LDF in the budget) deviate from the original results (no statistically significant CSO variable). Having noted this, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the budgetary share of LDF in municipalities and provinces. In cities, CSOs' provision of assistance to the LDC had a positive effect on the share of LDF.

Y4g = Share of LDF, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_ldfshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.005	-0.007	0.013	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.025)
ldc_csopct	-0.007	0.003	-0.079	-0.083
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.074)	(0.071)
ldc_csoattend	0.002	0.003	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.017)
ldc_csoassist	-0.001	-0.004	0.033***	0.017
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.012)
ldc_csoplan	0.006*	0.005	0.023**	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Constant	0.064***	0.049***	0.144**	0.524
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.073)	(0.339)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,728	2,332	243	153
R^2	0.123	0.116	0.312	0.219
Adjusted R^2	0.114	0.106	0.230	0.058
F Statistic	305.898***	235.460***	97.408***	30.923
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDRRMF Share

Like in all LGUs, the share of the LDRRMF in municipalities' budgets did not have a statistically significant relationship with CSO participation. In cities, there were two CSO participation variables that had statistically significant relationships with the budgetary share of LDRRMF but with different directions. In provinces, the proportion of CSO members in the LDC had a negative effect on the share of LDRRMF.

y4h = Share of LDRRMF, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y4_ldrrmfshare			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.001	-0.000	-0.018**	0.013
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.016)
ldc_csopct	-0.003	0.001	-0.030	-0.088**
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.043)
ldc_csoattend	-0.004	-0.004	0.004	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.011)
ldc_csoassist	-0.002	-0.002	0.003	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)
ldc_csoplan	0.002	0.001	0.007	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	0.005	0.004	0.021**	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Constant	0.045***	0.039***	0.017	0.137***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.050)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,732	2,335	242	155
R^2	0.100	0.108	0.113	0.212
Adjusted R^2	0.091	0.098	0.002	0.044
F Statistic	282.063***	264.148***	27.258	31.947
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

2.2 Per Capita Productive Expenses

To recall, the proportion of CSOs in the LDC has a positive and statistically significant relationship with per capita expenditures.

MOOE Per Capita

It must first be noted that in the original regression analysis there was no statistically significant relationship between CSO participation and MOOE per capita, but here *cso25pct* had a statistically significant, albeit weak, and positive effect. Having noted this, the three LGU types showed different results. For municipalities, the proportion of CSOs in the LDCs was positively correlated with MOOE per capita. A positive relationship was also seen in cities but with the submission of CSO action plans. In provinces, there was no statistically significant CSO participation variable.

y5a = MOOE Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_mooepercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	65.689*	43.671	211.069	-98.057
	(39.824)	(40.001)	(172.215)	(188.007)
ldc_csopct	263.231	327.892*	104.617	-620.282
	(167.585)	(169.451)	(753.543)	(491.721)
ldc_csoattend	-20.183	-12.262	-207.861	-100.646
	(35.591)	(36.200)	(149.172)	(139.463)
ldc_csoassist	13.026	-3.398	-18.115	4.516
	(25.691)	(26.358)	(94.203)	(89.367)
ldc_csoplan	38.398	24.913	302.831***	66.524
	(31.549)	(32.750)	(107.530)	(111.069)
Constant	-318.324***	-208.235*	-656.809	153.719
	(107.259)	(108.218)	(457.478)	(636.083)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,953	2,541	259	153
R^2	0.350	0.333	0.660	0.498
Adjusted R^2	0.344	0.326	0.622	0.394
F Statistic	1,522.320***	1,209.584***	431.955***	124.998***
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

CO Per Capita

The analyses for each LGU type differed from the results of the regressions covering all LGUs, where two variables had statistically significant coefficients but had different signs (negative for *csoassist* and positive for *csoplan*). In municipalities, there were also two but different variables that had counteracting relationships with CO per capital (positive for *csopct* and negatigve for *csoassist*). For cities, the submission of CSO action plans had a possitive effect on the outcome. For provinces, the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings had a negative effect.

y5b = CO Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_copercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	4.564	5.741	-47.700	-36.877
	(25.518)	(25.994)	(121.648)	(98.895)
ldc_csopct	170.008	201.560*	70.601	-34.156
	(103.781)	(106.067)	(536.159)	(273.680)
ldc_csoattend	-2.362	3.856	-8.544	-132.408*
	(22.627)	(23.328)	(104.328)	(70.023)
ldc_csoassist	-37.585**	-36.146**	-73.254	-53.809
	(16.175)	(16.771)	(66.909)	(46.634)
ldc_csoplan	34.072*	27.052	136.571*	26.250
	(20.145)	(21.180)	(74.873)	(57.145)
Constant	-96.022	-124.059*	313.957	337.731
	(66.963)	(68.173)	(328.592)	(320.523)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,949	2,533	261	155
R^2	0.230	0.236	0.420	0.630
Adjusted R^2	0.223	0.228	0.355	0.555
F Statistic	860.813***	768.897***	161.899***	220.156***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Education Spending Per Capita

The results of the regression analyses per LGU deviated from the results of the analysis covering all LGUs. For municipalities, the provision of CSO assistance to the LDChad a negative correlation with education spending per capita. Cities, meanwhile, have two variables which had statistically significant coefficients but had different signs (positive for *cso25pct* but negative for *csopct*). For provinces, two variables were negatively correlated with education spending per capita (*csoct* and *csoassist*).

y5c = Education Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_educpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	1.043	-3.273	57.162**	2.105
	(4.511)	(4.383)	(27.879)	(11.701)
ldc_csopct	-6.930	11.906	-265.783**	-64.371*
	(18.993)	(18.406)	(135.105)	(37.049)
ldc_csoattend	3.386	5.030	-38.043	-12.663
	(4.023)	(3.958)	(24.927)	(8.289)
ldc_csoassist	-3.570	-5.118*	13.831	-11.247**
	(2.953)	(2.911)	(16.468)	(5.371)
ldc_csoplan	-2.552	-2.237	4.756	0.347
	(3.589)	(3.598)	(17.761)	(6.537)
Constant	-11.952	-2.153	87.288	50.283
	(12.498)	(12.074)	(83.777)	(36.294)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,945	2,545	245	155
R^2	0.153	0.072	0.346	0.299
Adjusted R^2	0.146	0.062	0.267	0.156
F Statistic	508.400***	184.207***	107.370***	53.171***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Health Spending Per Capita

It must first be noted that in the original regression analysis *csopct* had a positive correlation with health spending per capita, but here after some control variables were removed the statistical significance was washed out. Having noted this, the share of CSO members in the LDC had the same positive and statistically significant effect in municipalities, but there was no statistically significant CSO participation variable in the model for cities and provinces.

y5d = Health Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_healthpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	4.060	-6.138	64.936	69.038
	(9.200)	(9.061)	(47.605)	(84.629)
ldc_csopct	57.353	79.786**	-217.176	86.827
	(38.554)	(38.053)	(207.652)	(244.247)
ldc_csoattend	0.461	1.307	-54.369	-41.215
	(8.220)	(8.202)	(41.240)	(60.862)
ldc_csoassist	-3.235	-7.252	-24.040	-7.706
	(5.984)	(5.998)	(26.459)	(40.142)
ldc_csoplan	5.783	10.238	-5.141	35.667
	(7.302)	(7.433)	(29.771)	(49.099)
Constant	8.724	19.840	-66.935	638.267**
	(25.142)	(24.700)	(126.834)	(272.771)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,950	2,545	255	150
R^2	0.198	0.196	0.354	0.415
Adjusted R^2	0.191	0.187	0.281	0.291
F Statistic	676.572***	576.577***	115.447***	82.157***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Social Services Spending Per Capita

Like in the case of all LGUs, municipalities' per capita spending on social services is positively affected by the share of CSO members in the LDC. In cities and provinces, however, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with economic services spending per capita.

y5e = Social Services Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_econpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-12.789	-13.012	-58.526	-22.433
	(11.075)	(10.823)	(64.238)	(51.980)
ldc_csopct	157.951***	149.027***	400.976	14.025
	(45.159)	(44.485)	(281.842)	(157.241)
ldc_csoattend	-3.810	-4.626	50.376	16.656
	(9.887)	(9.765)	(55.783)	(39.252)
ldc_csoassist	2.013	-5.222	46.559	-33.467
	(7.083)	(7.060)	(35.832)	(25.531)
ldc_csoplan	-3.488	-2.446	7.378	-5.587
	(8.820)	(8.889)	(40.477)	(30.263)
Constant	-30.989	8.565	-376.967**	203.630
	(29.148)	(28.671)	(172.667)	(161.661)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,914	2,524	243	147
R^2	0.158	0.157	0.425	0.278
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.148	0.356	0.122
F Statistic	515.445***	451.843***	150.490***	37.508*
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Economic Services Spending Per Capita

It must first be noted that in the original regression analysis *csopct* had a positive correlation with economic spending per capita while *csoassist* had a negative effect. Here, the statistical significance of *csoassist* was washed out. Municipalities' per capita spending on economic services is positively affected by the share of CSO members in the LDC. In cities and provinces, however, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with economic services spending per capita.

y5f = Economic Services Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_econpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-12.789	-13.012	-58.526	-22.433
	(11.075)	(10.823)	(64.238)	(51.980)
ldc_csopct	157.951***	149.027***	400.976	14.025
	(45.159)	(44.485)	(281.842)	(157.241)
ldc_csoattend	-3.810	-4.626	50.376	16.656
	(9.887)	(9.765)	(55.783)	(39.252)
ldc_csoassist	2.013	-5.222	46.559	-33.467
	(7.083)	(7.060)	(35.832)	(25.531)
ldc_csoplan	-3.488	-2.446	7.378	-5.587
	(8.820)	(8.889)	(40.477)	(30.263)
Constant	-30.989	8.565	-376.967**	203.630
	(29.148)	(28.671)	(172.667)	(161.661)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,914	2,524	243	147
R^2	0.158	0.157	0.425	0.278
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.148	0.356	0.122
F Statistic	515.445***	451.843***	150.490***	37.508*
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDF Spending Per Capita

Unlike the original regression analysis where *csopct* was positively associated with LDF spending per capita, the removal of some control variables in this instance washed out the statistical significance of the said variable's effect. In the three LGU types, CSO participation had varying effects on LDF spending per capita. In municipalities, *csoassist* has a negative effect on this outcome, while in cities *csoplan* had a positive effect. In provinces, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with LDF spending per capita.

y5g = LDF Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_ldfpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	7.577	9.730	-65.060	-33.494
	(16.434)	(16.833)	(84.268)	(63.843)
ldc_csopct	82.743	94.708	232.039	-256.055
	(68.211)	(70.804)	(353.884)	(175.957)
ldc_csoattend	6.212	7.681	22.022	-28.280
	(14.664)	(15.243)	(74.049)	(46.491)
ldc_csoassist	-9.346	-20.453*	56.816	10.320
	(10.536)	(11.091)	(45.019)	(30.357)
ldc_csoplan	24.194*	19.619	106.509**	23.149
	(12.961)	(13.753)	(52.401)	(37.231)
Constant	-39.433	-66.928	33.248	467.443**
	(43.964)	(45.651)	(221.435)	(207.555)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,953	2,537	262	154
R^2	0.151	0.169	0.322	0.572
Adjusted R^2	0.143	0.160	0.246	0.485
F Statistic	493.992***	486.261***	111.637***	165.857***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDRRMF Spending Per Capita

In the original regression analysis for all LGUs, *csopct* had a positive effect on LDRRMF spending per capita while *csoattend* had a negative effect. In this analysis where some control variables were removed, the statistical significance of the former was washed out. In municipalities, the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings continued to have a negative effect on LDRRMF spending per capita. Citizen participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with LDRRMF spending per capita in cities and provinces.

y5h = LDRRMF Spending Per Capita, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y5_ldrrmfpercap			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	3.145	6.766	-33.974	-23.383
	(10.079)	(10.792)	(41.526)	(39.161)
ldc_csopct	56.517	51.321	279.226	-97.045
	(41.388)	(44.922)	(171.355)	(106.084)
ldc_csoattend	-17.414*	-17.448*	-15.987	-0.621
	(9.013)	(9.796)	(36.088)	(26.855)
ldc_csoassist	-5.691	-7.746	11.631	5.891
	(6.413)	(7.053)	(21.771)	(17.636)
ldc_csoplan	8.005	5.246	38.604	0.823
	(7.925)	(8.776)	(25.433)	(21.709)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	10.664	8.124	23.162	-31.307
	(11.351)	(12.407)	(42.157)	(35.325)
Constant	-12.391	-31.606	181.904	107.069
	(27.520)	(29.768)	(112.417)	(118.829)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,956	2,542	260	154
R^2	0.121	0.132	0.181	0.334
Adjusted R^2	0.113	0.123	0.086	0.192
F Statistic	386.151***	367.821***	51.378***	59.113***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

2.3 BUR of Productive Components of the Budget

To recall, the budget utilization rate (BUR) of municipalities is positively influenced by the proportion of CSOs in the LDC.

MOOE BUR

Like in the analysis for all LGUs, municipalities' and cities' utilization of MOOE is not affected by CSO participation in a statistically significant way. In provinces, the attendance of CSOs in the LDC negatively affects the BUR of MOOE.

y6a = BUR of MOOE, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_mooe			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.124	0.174	0.037	0.351
	(0.432)	(0.478)	(0.557)	(0.903)
ldc_csopct	0.170	-0.486	-2.756	-0.699
	(1.693)	(1.903)	(2.147)	(2.411)
ldc_csoattend	0.122	0.093	0.021	-1.381**
	(0.385)	(0.433)	(0.482)	(0.661)
ldc_csoassist	-0.178	-0.287	0.251	-0.281
	(0.264)	(0.300)	(0.284)	(0.429)
ldc_csoplan	0.335	0.685*	-0.106	-0.301
	(0.330)	(0.377)	(0.343)	(0.530)
Constant	21.687***	38.052***	16.206***	4.152
	(2.658)	(3.580)	(4.919)	(10.640)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,658	2,265	240	153
R^2	0.557	0.574	0.703	0.629
Adjusted R^2	0.552	0.569	0.666	0.552
F Statistic	3,283.723***	2,997.627***	504.886***	212.560***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

CO BUR

In the original analysis for all LGUs, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the utilization of CO. After the removal of some control variables, *csoplan* had a positive relationship but of weak statistical significance. In municipalities, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant relationship with the BUR of CO. In cities, two variables had statistically significant effects on CO BUR but with different directions: negative for *csoattend* but positive for *csoplan*. In provinces, CSOs' provision of assistance to the LDC had a negative relationship with the utilization of CO.

y6b = BUR of CO, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_co			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.019	-0.016	0.007	-0.095
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.059)	(0.088)
ldc_csopct	-0.090	-0.083	-0.297	-0.082
	(0.079)	(0.087)	(0.261)	(0.265)
ldc_csoattend	-0.028	-0.023	-0.111**	-0.028
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.062)
ldc_csoassist	-0.009	-0.003	-0.010	-0.087**
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.041)
ldc_csoplan	0.025*	0.013	0.124***	0.080
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Constant	1.157***	1.068***	1.026	0.475
	(0.109)	(0.134)	(0.667)	(1.301)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,685	2,291	241	153
R^2	0.087	0.077	0.304	0.381
Adjusted R^2	0.079	0.067	0.219	0.254
F Statistic	246.069***	185.905***	95.468***	74.008***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Education BUR

The analysis for cities mirrors the results for all LGUs in that CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the BUR of education. Some variables had weak statistical signignificance on the utilization of education budgets in municipalities and cities: *cso25pct* had a positive effect while *csopct* had a negative coefficient.

y6c = BUR of Education, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_educ			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	0.023	0.037*	-0.107	0.005
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.072)	(0.097)
ldc_csopct	0.001	-0.026	0.316	-0.467*
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.292)	(0.265)
ldc_csoattend	0.021	0.030	-0.009	-0.128
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.059)	(0.082)
ldc_csoassist	-0.014	-0.008	-0.035	-0.035
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.039)	(0.046)
ldc_csoplan	0.005	0.004	0.034	-0.049
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.046)	(0.057)
Constant	0.741***	0.630***	0.566**	1.190
	(0.084)	(0.098)	(0.250)	(1.428)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,847	1,529	199	119
R^2	0.056	0.055	0.131	0.337
Adjusted R^2	0.042	0.038	0.000	0.149
F Statistic	54.906***	48.352***	29.215	39.812**
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Health BUR

Like in the analysis for all LGUs, in cities CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the utilization of health budgets. In municipalities, two variables had a weak statistical significance but with different signs: negative for *cso25pct*, positive for *csoplan*. In provinces, two variables had a negative effect on the BUR of health: *csopct* and *csoplan*.

y6d = BUR of Health, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_health			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.012	-0.014*	0.055	0.026
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.035)	(0.056)
ldc_csopct	-0.029	-0.040	0.142	-0.221*
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.167)	(0.122)
ldc_csoattend	-0.000	-0.001	-0.044	-0.012
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.030)	(0.029)
ldc_csoassist	0.003	0.006	-0.003	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.021)
ldc_csoplan	0.009	0.010*	0.011	-0.043*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Constant	0.896***	0.805***	0.485	2.744***
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.418)	(0.691)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,270	1,919	222	129
R^2	0.312	0.324	0.264	0.367
Adjusted R^2	0.304	0.314	0.166	0.205
F Statistic	115.679***	76.751***	30.538	37.978*
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Social Services BUR

In the original analysis for all LGUs, CSO participation did not have a statistically significant effect on the BUR of social services. After the removal of some control variables, *csoassist* emerged to have a positive relationship but with weak statistical significance. This is also the result in municipalities and cities. In provinces, the effect of the same variable is the inverse.

y6e = BUR of Social Services, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_social			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.007	-0.007	-0.022	0.027
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.055)	(0.094)
ldc_csopct	0.024	-0.007	0.295	0.361
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.231)	(0.249)
ldc_csoattend	-0.007	-0.010	-0.010	0.046
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.065)
ldc_csoassist	0.013*	0.018**	0.054*	-0.071*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.042)
ldc_csoplan	0.003	0.000	0.038	-0.037
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.052)
Constant	0.961***	0.844***	0.986	3.199***
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.644)	(1.180)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,426	2,052	223	151
R^2	0.132	0.130	0.217	0.199
Adjusted R^2	0.123	0.119	0.113	0.031
F Statistic	112.536***	77.407***	39.124**	27.776
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

Economic Services BUR

Like in the analysis for all LGUs, the utilization of economic services budgets in municipalities is positively affected by CSOs' provision of technical assistance to the LDC. In cities, CSO participation did not have an effect, while in provinces the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings had a negative coefficient.

y6f = BUR of Economic Services, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_econ			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.011	-0.011	0.028	-0.132
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.063)	(0.102)
ldc_csopct	-0.009	0.017	-0.450	-0.086
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.283)	(0.266)
ldc_csoattend	-0.011	-0.003	-0.088	-0.121*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.055)	(0.069)
ldc_csoassist	0.023**	0.024**	0.018	0.044
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(0.046)
ldc_csoplan	0.017	0.007	0.038	0.040
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.057)
Constant	1.042***	0.899***	1.364*	1.719
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.780)	(1.214)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,449	2,069	228	152
R^2	0.145	0.121	0.225	0.266
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.110	0.125	0.113
F Statistic	264.026***	140.818***	56.178***	40.866**
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDF BUR

The effect of CSO participation on the utilization of the LDF varied across the three LGU types. It did not have a statistically significant effect in municipalities, while in cities meeting the minimum 25% of CSOs in the LDC had a negative effect on the BUR of LDF In provinces, CSO technical assistance to the LDC also had a negative effect on the BUR of LDF.

y6g = BUR of LDF, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_ldf			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.006	0.001	-0.142*	0.049
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.083)	(0.119)
ldc_csopct	-0.070	-0.095	0.243	-0.260
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.344)	(0.345)
ldc_csoattend	0.005	0.005	0.095	-0.018
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.083)	(0.072)
ldc_csoassist	-0.011	-0.007	0.012	-0.086*
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.044)	(0.048)
ldc_csoplan	0.025*	0.022	0.035	0.049
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.059)
Constant	0.601***	0.518***	0.961	0.878***
	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.822)	(0.311)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,390	2,052	199	139
R^2	0.077	0.088	0.207	0.189
Adjusted R^2	0.066	0.076	0.087	0.000
F Statistic	182.004***	182.282***	45.051**	26.482
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*

LDRRMF BUR

Like in the analysis for all LGUs, the utilization of the LDRRMF in municipalities was not related to CSO participation in a statistically significant way. In cities, the presence of CSO representatives in the LDRRMC had a negative effect on the utilization of the LDRRMF. In provinces, the attendance of CSOs in LDC meetings had a positive effect.

y6h = BUR of LDRRMF, Comparison of Nested Random Effects Panel Models Across LGU Types

	Dependent variable:			
	y6_bur_ldrrmf			
	All LGUs	Municipalities	Cities	Provinces
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ldc_cso25pct	-0.023	-0.011	-0.064	-0.149
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.092)	(0.144)
ldc_csopct	0.135	0.098	0.603	0.235
	(0.095)	(0.101)	(0.377)	(0.391)
ldc_csoattend	-0.015	-0.015	-0.065	0.232**
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.093)	(0.090)
ldc_csoassist	-0.022	-0.014	0.001	-0.062
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.048)	(0.059)
ldc_csoplan	0.013	0.011	0.097	-0.033
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.061)	(0.071)
ldrrmc_cso4reps	0.014	0.021	-0.272***	-0.012
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.096)	(0.119)
Constant	0.601***	0.432***	2.712***	0.628
	(0.108)	(0.121)	(0.855)	(0.387)
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,336	1,993	202	141
R^2	0.059	0.065	0.210	0.425
Adjusted R^2	0.048	0.052	0.088	0.288
F Statistic	125.338***	114.342***	49.061***	84.663***
Note:				**p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01*