

VeriSmart

스마트 컨트랙트 안전성 검증기

오학주


고려대학교 정보대학 컴퓨터학과



10 Dec 2019 @KAIST 정보보호대학원

연구 분야

- Q) 어떻게 안전한 소프트웨어를 손쉽게 만들것인가?
- A) 소프트웨어 자동 분석, 패치, 합성 기술



스마트 컨트랙트

블록체인 1.0



블록체인 2.0



vs.

코인 거래만 가능

임의의 거래가 가능

스마트 컨트랙트



블록체인 2.0

vs.



코인 거래만 가능

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vs.



코인 거래만 가능

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스마트 컨트랙트



vs.

코인 거래만 가능

임의의 거래가 가능

Key: 스마트 컨트랙트

스마트 컨트랙트 생김새

```
1  contract Netkoin {  
2      mapping (address => uint) public balance;  
3      uint public totalSupply;  
4  
5      constructor (uint initialSupply) {  
6          totalSupply = initialSupply;  
7          balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;  
8      }  
9  
10     function transfer (address to, uint value) public  
11     returns (bool) {  
12         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
13         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
14         balance[to] += value;  
15         return true;  
16     }  
17  
18     function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {  
19         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21         totalSupply -= value;  
22         return true;  
23     }  
24 }
```

데이터


생성자

함수

함수

스마트 컨트랙트 생김새

```
1 contract Netcoin {  
2     mapping (address => uint) public balance; 사용자의 계좌 정보 데이터  
3     uint public totalSupply;  
4  
5     constructor (uint initialSupply) {  
6         totalSupply = initialSupply;  
7         balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;  
8     }  
9  
10    function transfer (address to, uint value) public  
11        returns (bool) {  
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23    }  
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```



스마트 컨트랙트 생김새

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1  contract Netkoin {  
2      mapping (address => uint) public balance; 사용자의 계좌 정보  
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24 }
```

데이터

생성자

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스마트 컨트랙트 생김새

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10     function transfer (address to, uint value) public 송금  
11        returns (bool) {  
12         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value); 잔고가 충분하면  
13         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
14         balance[to] += value;  
15         return true;  
16     }  
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19         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
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```

데이터

생성자

함수

함수

스마트 컨트랙트 생김새

```
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11        returns (bool) {  
12         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value); 잔고가 충분하면  
13         balance[msg.sender] -= value; 거래를 실행  
14         balance[to] += value;  
15         return true;  
16     }  
17  
18     function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {  
19         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
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데이터

생성자

함수

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
스마트 컨트랙트의 위험성

- 스마트 컨트랙트는 매우 엄밀한 수준의 안전성 검증이 필요
 - 공격에 성공하면 막대한 금전적 피해가 발생
 - 누구나 온라인에서 소스코드 열람 가능하지만 수정 불가

A \$50 MILLION HACK JUST
SHOWED THAT THE DAO WAS
ALL TOO HUMAN



The DAO (2016)
750억원



Parity Wallet (2017)
350억원

BatchOverflow Exploit Creates Trillions of
Ethereum Tokens, Major Exchanges Halt ERC20
Deposits



SmartMesh (2018)
전문학적 금액 인출 시도

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

- SmartMesh 토큰 스마트 컨트랙트의 정수 오버플로우 취약점 (CVE-2018-10376)을 이용하여 천문학적 금액의 토큰을 생성

<https://etherscan.io/tx/0x1abab4c8db9a30e703114528e31dee129a3a758f7f8abc3b6494aad3d304e43f>

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

- 정수 오버플로우 (integer overflow) 취약점
- 방어적으로 코드를 작성했음에도 문제가 된 경우

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4      revert();
5    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
7      revert();
8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;
11   return true;
12 }
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```

송금

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8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;
11   return true;
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```

보내는 사람의 잔고
가 충분한지 체크

송금

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

- 정수 오버플로우 (integer overflow) 취약점
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```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
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3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
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5
6    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
7      balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
8      revert();
9
10   balance[to] += value;
11   balance[msg.sender] += fee;
12   balance[from] -= value + fee;
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14   return true;
15 }
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송금

오버플로우
체크

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

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8          balance[to] += value;  
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10         balance[from] -= value + fee;  
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보내는 사람의 잔고
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송금

오버플로우
체크

(실질적) 오버플로우/언더플로우
발생하지 않음

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4      revert();
5    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
7      revert();
8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;
11   return true;
12 }
```

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

balance[from] = balance[to] = balance[msg.sender] = 0

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4      revert();
5    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
7      revert();
8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
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1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
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6         balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
7         revert();  
8     balance[to] += value;  
9     balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
10    balance[from] -= value + fee;  
11    return true;  
12 }
```

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3   if (balance[from] < fee + value) revert();  
4   if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5       balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6     revert();  
7   balance[to] += value;  
8   balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
9   balance[from] -= value + fee;  
10  return true;  
11 }
```

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3    false if (balance[from] < fee + value) 0!  
4    revert();  
5  
6    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
7      balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
8      revert();  
9  
10   balance[to] += value;  
11   balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
12   balance[from] -= value + fee;  
13  
14   return true;  
15 }
```

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

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6      balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
7    revert();  
8    balance[to] += value;  
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;  
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SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3    false if (balance[from] < fee + value) 0!  
4    revert();  
5    false if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
6      balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
7    revert();  
8    balance[to] += value; 8fffff...ff  
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;  
11   return true;  
12 }
```

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value) revert();  
4    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6      revert();  
7    balance[to] += value; // 8fffff...ff  
8    balance[msg.sender] += fee; // 700...00  
9    balance[from] -= value + fee;  
10   return true;  
11 }
```

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
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5        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6      revert();  
7    balance[to] += value; // 8fffff...ff  
8    balance[msg.sender] += fee; // 700...00  
9    balance[from] -= value + fee; // 0!  
10   return true;  
11 }
```

목표: 정수 오버플로우 취약점 검증

- Solidity에서는 정수를 256비트로 표현

```
uint public totalSupply;
```

- 정수 연산시 표현 가능한 범위를 넘어서는지 여부를 검증

```
totalSupply += value;      balance[msg.sender] -= value;
```

- 사람이 오버플로우 유무를 판단하기는 매우 까다로움
- CVE 등록된 취약점 대부분이 정수 오버플로우에서 비롯

| Arithmetic Over/underflow | Bad Randomness | Access Control | Unsafe Input Dependency | Others | Total |
|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|----------|-------|
| 487 (95.7 %) | 10 (1.9 %) | 4 (0.8 %) | 4 (0.8 %) | 4 (0.8%) | 509 |

(2019.05)

스마트 컨트랙트 자동 분석 기술

- 오류 검출기 (bug-detector)




Oyente



Mythril




manticore



Osiris

- 오류 검증기 (verifier)



현재 자동 분석 기술의 한계 (I)

- 오류 검출기(e.g., Mythril, Osiris, Oyente): 놓치는 취약점이 존재

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
2    if (balance[from] < fee + value) Osiris만 검출 가능
3      revert();
4    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
5        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
6      revert();
7    balance[to] += value;
8    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
9    balance[from] -= value + fee;
10   return true;
11 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

현재 자동 분석 기술의 한계 (I)

- 오류 검출기(e.g., Mythril, Osiris, Oyente): 놓치는 취약점이 존재

```
1  function multipleTransfer(address[] to, uint value) {  
2    require(value * to.length > 0);  
3    require(balances[msg.sender] >= value * to.length);  
4    balances[msg.sender] -= value * to.length;  
5    for (uint i = 0; i < to.length; ++i) {  
6      balances[to[i]] += value;  
7    }  
8    return true;  
9 }
```

앞의 경우와 비슷한 오류
이지만 검출 모두 실패

CVE-2018-14006

현재 자동 분석 기술의 한계 (2)

- 오류 검증기(SMTChecker, Zeus): 허위경보 존재

```
1  contract Netcoin {  
2      mapping (address => uint) public balance;  
3      uint public totalSupply;  
4  
5      constructor (uint initialSupply) {  
6          totalSupply = initialSupply;  
7          balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;  
8      }  
9  
10     function transfer (address to, uint value) public  
11         returns (bool) {  
12         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
13         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
14         balance[to] += value;           허위 경보 (False alarm)  
15         return true;  
16     }  
17  
18     function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {  
19         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21         totalSupply -= value;           허위 경보 (False alarm)  
22         return true;  
23     }  
24 }
```

VeriSmart

- 안전하면서 정확한 스마트 컨트랙트 취약점 자동 분석기

CVE-2018-10376


```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3   if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4     revert();
5   if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6     balance[msg.sender] + value > balance[msg.sender])
7     revert();
8   balance[to] += value;
9   balance[msg.sender] += value;
10  balance[from] -= value - fee;
11  return true;
12 }
```

CVE-2018-14006

```
1 function multipleTransfer(address[] to, uint value) {
2   require(value * to.length > 0);
3   require(balances[msg.sender] >= value * to.length);
4   balances[msg.sender] -= value * to.length;
5   for (uint i = 0; i < to.length; ++i) {
6     balances[to[i]] += value;
7   }
8   return true;
9 }
```



```
1 contract Netkoin {
2   mapping (address => uint) public balance;
3   uint public totalSupply;
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5   constructor (uint initialSupply) {
6     totalSupply = initialSupply;
7     balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;
8   }
9
10  function transfer (address to, uint value) public
11    returns (bool) {
12    require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
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14    balance[to] += value;
15    return true;
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19    require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
20    balance[msg.sender] -= value;
21    totalSupply -= value;
22    return true;
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24 }
```



모든 오류를 검출

허위 경보 최소화

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

| No. | CVE ID | Name | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | OSIRIS [7] | | | OYENTE [9], [26] | | | MYTHRIL [8] | | | MANCORE [10] | | |
|-----|------------|----------------|-----|----|-----------|-----|-----|------------|-----|-----|------------------|-----|-----|----------------|-----|-----|--------------------|-----|-----|
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE |
| #1 | 2018-10299 | BEC | 299 | 6 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #2 | 2018-10376 | SMT | 294 | 22 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #3 | 2018-10468 | UET | 146 | 27 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #4 | 2018-10706 | SCA | 404 | 48 | 33 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 4 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #5 | 2018-11239 | HXG | 102 | 11 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ |
| #6 | 2018-11411 | DimonCoin | 126 | 15 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ |
| #7 | 2018-11429 | ATL | 165 | 9 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #8 | 2018-11446 | GRX | 434 | 39 | 24 | 2 | ✓ | 8 | 2 | ✗ | 12 | 4 | ✗ | 4 | 2 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #9 | 2018-11561 | EETHER | 146 | 10 | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #10 | 2018-11687 | BTCR | 99 | 20 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 3 | 2 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #11 | 2018-12070 | SEC | 269 | 40 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #12 | 2018-12230 | RMC | 161 | 9 | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #13 | 2018-13113 | ETT | 142 | 9 | 2 | 0 | N/A | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| #14 | 2018-13126 | MoxyOnePresale | 301 | 5 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #15 | 2018-13127 | DSPX | 238 | 6 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #16 | 2018-13128 | ETY | 193 | 10 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #17 | 2018-13129 | SPX | 276 | 9 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #18 | 2018-13131 | SpadePreSale | 312 | 4 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #19 | 2018-13132 | SpadeIco | 403 | 9 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #20 | 2018-13144 | PDX | 103 | 5 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | internal error | | | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #21 | 2018-13189 | UNLB | 335 | 4 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #22 | 2018-13202 | MyBO | 183 | 17 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #23 | 2018-13208 | MoneyTree | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #24 | 2018-13220 | MAVCash | 171 | 15 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #25 | 2018-13221 | XT | 186 | 15 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #26 | 2018-13225 | MyYLCToken | 181 | 17 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #27 | 2018-13227 | MCN | 172 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #28 | 2018-13228 | CNX | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #29 | 2018-13230 | DSN | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #30 | 2018-13325 | GROW | 176 | 12 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 2 | ✓ | 1 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #31 | 2018-13326 | BTX | 135 | 9 | 2 | 0 | N/A | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| #32 | 2018-13327 | CCLAG | 92 | 5 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #33 | 2018-13493 | DaddyToken | 344 | 40 | 22 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #34 | 2018-13533 | ALUXToken | 191 | 23 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #35 | 2018-13625 | Krown | 271 | 22 | 9 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #36 | 2018-13670 | GFCB | 103 | 14 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 1 | ✓ | 3 | 1 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #37 | 2018-13695 | CTest7 | 301 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #38 | 2018-13698 | Play2LivePromo | 131 | 8 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✗ |
| #39 | 2018-13703 | CERB_Coin | 262 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #40 | 2018-13722 | HYIPToken | 410 | 8 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #41 | 2018-13777 | RRToken | 166 | 8 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #42 | 2018-13778 | CGCToken | 224 | 13 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #43 | 2018-13779 | YLCToken | 180 | 17 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #44 | 2018-13782 | ENTR | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #45 | 2018-13783 | JiucaiToken | 271 | 19 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #46 | 2018-13836 | XRC | 119 | 22 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | △ | 3 | 1 | ✓ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #47 | 2018-14001 | SKT | 152 | 19 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #48 | 2018-14002 | MP3 | 83 | 12 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | △ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #49 | 2018-14003 | WMC | 200 | 15 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #50 | 2018-14004 | GLB | 299 | 40 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #51 | 2018-14005 | Xmc | 255 | 29 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #52 | 2018-14006 | NGT | 249 | 27 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #53 | 2018-14063 | TRCT | 178 | 9 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 2 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #54 | 2018-14084 | MKCB | 273 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

| No. | CVE ID | Name | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | OSIRIS [7] | | | OYENTE [9], [26] | | | MYTHRIL [8] | | | MANCORE [10] | | |
|-----|------------|----------------|-----|----|-----------|-----|-----|------------|-----|-----|------------------|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----|--------------------|-----|-----|
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE |
| #1 | 2018-10299 | BEC | 299 | 6 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #2 | 2018-10376 | SMT | 294 | 22 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #3 | 2018-10468 | UET | 146 | 27 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #4 | 2018-10706 | SCA | 404 | 48 | 33 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 4 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #5 | 2018-11239 | HGX | 102 | 11 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ |
| #6 | 2018-11411 | DimonCoin | 126 | 15 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ |
| #7 | 2018-11429 | ATL | 165 | 9 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #8 | 2018-11446 | GRX | 434 | 39 | 24 | 2 | ✓ | 8 | 2 | ✗ | 12 | 4 | ✗ | 4 | 2 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #9 | 2018-11561 | EETHER | 146 | 10 | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #10 | 2018-11687 | BTCR | 99 | 20 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 3 | 2 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #11 | 2018-12070 | SEC | 269 | 40 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #12 | 2018-12230 | RMC | 161 | 9 | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #13 | 2018-13113 | ETT | 142 | 9 | 2 | 0 | N/A | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| #14 | 2018-13126 | MoxyOnePresale | 301 | 5 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #15 | 2018-13127 | DSPX | 238 | 6 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #16 | 2018-13128 | ETY | 193 | 10 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #17 | 2018-13129 | SPX | 276 | 9 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #18 | 2018-13131 | SpadePreSale | 312 | 4 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |

| | VERISMART | | | Osiris [43] | | | OYENTE [9, 34] | | | MYTHRIL [7] | | | MANCORE [2] | | | | | |
|-------|-----------|-----|-----------------------|-------------|-----|-----------------------|----------------|-----|------------------------|-------------|-----|-------------------------|-------------|-----|------------------------|----|---|-----------------------|
| | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | | | |
| Total | 12493 | 976 | ✓: 58 △: 0 ✗: 0 | 492 | 2 | ✓: 58 △: 0 ✗: 0 | 240 | 13 | ✓: 41 △: 0 ✗: 17 | 171 | 14 | ✓: 20 △: 15 ✗: 23 | 94 | 10 | ✓: 10 △: 1 ✗: 46 | 14 | 0 | ✓: 2 △: 0 ✗: 42 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|----------------|---------|----|----|---|-----|---|---|-----|---|---|-----|---|---|-----|--------------------|---|-----|
| #29 | 2018-13230 | DSN | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #30 | 2018-13325 | GROW | 176 | 12 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 2 | ✓ | 1 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #31 | 2018-13326 | BTX | 135 | 9 | 2 | 0 | N/A | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| #32 | 2018-13327 | CCLAG | 92 | 5 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #33 | 2018-13493 | DaddyToken | 344 | 40 | 22 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #34 | 2018-13533 | ALUXToken | 191 | 23 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #35 | 2018-13625 | Krown | 271 | 22 | 9 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #36 | 2018-13670 | GFCB | 103 | 14 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 1 | ✓ | 3 | 1 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #37 | 2018-13695 | CTest7 | 301 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #38 | 2018-13698 | Play2LivePromo | 131 | 8 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✗ |
| #39 | 2018-13703 | CERB_Coin | 262 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #40 | 2018-13722 | HYIPToken | 410 | 8 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #41 | 2018-13777 | RRToken | 166 | 8 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #42 | 2018-13778 | CGCToken | 224 | 13 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #43 | 2018-13779 | YLCToken | 180 | 17 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #44 | 2018-13782 | ENTR | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #45 | 2018-13783 | JiucaiToken | 271 | 19 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #46 | 2018-13836 | XRC | 119 | 22 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | △ | 3 | 1 | ✓ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #47 | 2018-14001 | SKT | 152 | 19 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #48 | 2018-14002 | MP3 | 83 | 12 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | △ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #49 | 2018-14003 | WMC | 200 | 15 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #50 | 2018-14004 | GLB | 299 | 40 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #51 | 2018-14005 | Xmc | 255 | 29 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #52 | 2018-14006 | NGT | 249 | 27 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #53 | 2018-14063 | TRCT | 178 | 9 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 2 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #54 | 2018-14084 | MKCB | 273 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #55 | 2018-14086 | SCO | 107 | 16 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 2 | ✓ | 5 | 2 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #56 | 2018-14087 | EUC | 174</td | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

| No. | CVE ID | Name | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | OSIRIS [7] | | | OYENTE [9], [26] | | | MYTHRIL [8] | | | MANCORE [10] | | |
|-----|------------|--------------|-----|----|-----------|-----|-----|------------|-----|-----|------------------|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----|--------------------|-----|-----|
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE |
| #1 | 2018-10299 | BEC | 299 | 6 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #2 | 2018-10376 | SMT | 294 | 22 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #3 | 2018-10468 | UET | 146 | 27 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #4 | 2018-10706 | SCA | 404 | 48 | 33 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 4 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #5 | 2018-11239 | HXG | 102 | 11 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ |
| #6 | 2018-11411 | DimonCoin | 126 | 15 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ |
| #7 | 2018-11429 | ATL | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #8 | 2018-11446 | GRX | | | | | | 8 | 2 | ✗ | 12 | 4 | ✗ | 4 | 2 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #9 | 2018-11561 | EET | | | | | | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #10 | 2018-11687 | BTC | | | | | | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | △ | 3 | 2 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #11 | 2018-12070 | SEC | | | | | | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #12 | 2018-12230 | RMC | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #13 | 2018-13113 | ETT | | | | | | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| #14 | 2018-13126 | Mox | | | | | | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #15 | 2018-13127 | DSP | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #16 | 2018-13128 | ETY | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #17 | 2018-13129 | SPX | | | | | | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | △ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #18 | 2018-13131 | SpadePreSale | | | | | | 312 | 4 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |

정확도: 99.5%
검출률: 100%

| | | VERISMART | | | OSIRIS [43] | | | OYENTE [9, 34] | | | MYTHRIL [7] | | | MANCORE [2] | | | | | |
|-------|--|-----------|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----------------------|----------------|-----|------------------------|-------------|-----|-------------------------|-------------|-----|------------------------|----|---|-----------------------|
| | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | | | |
| Total | | 12493 | 976 | | 492 | 2 | ✓: 58 △: 0 ✗: 0 | 240 | 13 | ✓: 41 △: 0 ✗: 17 | 171 | 14 | ✓: 20 △: 15 ✗: 23 | 94 | 10 | ✓: 10 △: 1 ✗: 46 | 14 | 0 | ✓: 2 △: 0 ✗: 42 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|----------------|-----|----|----|---|-----|---|---|-----|---|---|-----|---|---|-----|--------------------|---|-----|
| #29 | 2018-13230 | DSN | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #30 | 2018-13325 | GROW | 176 | 12 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 2 | ✓ | 1 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #31 | 2018-13326 | BTX | 135 | 9 | 2 | 0 | N/A | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A | 0 | 0 | N/A |
| #32 | 2018-13327 | CCLAG | 92 | 5 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #33 | 2018-13493 | DaddyToken | 344 | 40 | 22 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #34 | 2018-13533 | ALUXToken | 191 | 23 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #35 | 2018-13625 | Krown | 271 | 22 | 9 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #36 | 2018-13670 | GFCB | 103 | 14 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 1 | ✓ | 3 | 1 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #37 | 2018-13695 | CTest7 | 301 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #38 | 2018-13698 | Play2LivePromo | 131 | 8 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✗ |
| #39 | 2018-13703 | CERB_Coin | 262 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #40 | 2018-13722 | HYIPToken | 410 | 8 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #41 | 2018-13777 | RRToken | 166 | 8 | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #42 | 2018-13778 | CGCToken | 224 | 13 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #43 | 2018-13779 | YLCToken | 180 | 17 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #44 | 2018-13782 | ENTR | 171 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #45 | 2018-13783 | JiucaiToken | 271 | 19 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | |
| #46 | 2018-13836 | XRC | 119 | 22 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | △ | 3 | 1 | ✓ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #47 | 2018-14001 | SKT | 152 | 19 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #48 | 2018-14002 | MP3 | 83 | 12 | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | △ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #49 | 2018-14003 | WMC | 200 | 15 | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #50 | 2018-14004 | GLB | 299 | 40 | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #51 | 2018-14005 | Xmc | 255 | 29 | 11 | 0 | ✓ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | △ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #52 | 2018-14006 | NGT | 249 | 27 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | △ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | |
| #53 | 2018-14063 | TRCT | 178 | 9 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 2 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #54 | 2018-14084 | MKCB | 273 | 17 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ |
| #55 | 2018-14086 | SCO | 107 | 16 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 2 | ✓ | 5 | 2 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ |
| #56 | 2018-14087 | EUC | 174 | 15 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | |

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

| No. | CVE ID | Name | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | OSIRIS [7] | | | OYENTE [9, 26] | | | MYTHRIL [8] | | | MANCORE [10] | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------|--------------|------------------------|----|-----------|------------------|-----|-------------|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----|------------------------|-------------|-----|-------------------------|--------------------|-----|------------------------|----|---|-----------------------|
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | | | |
| #1 | 2018-10299 | BEC | 299 | 6 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | |
| #2 | 2018-10376 | SMT | 294 | 22 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | | | | |
| #3 | 2018-10468 | UET | 146 | 27 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | |
| #4 | 2018-10706 | SCA | 404 | 48 | 33 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 4 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | | | | |
| #5 | 2018-11239 | HXG | 102 | 11 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | | | |
| #6 | 2018-11411 | DimonCoin | 126 | 15 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | | | |
| #7 | 2018-11429 | ATL | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #8 | 2018-11446 | GRX | | | | | | 8 | 2 | ✗ | 12 | 4 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #9 | 2018-11561 | EET | | | | | | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #10 | 2018-11687 | BTC | | | | | | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #11 | 2018-12070 | SEC | | | | | | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #12 | 2018-12230 | RMC | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | | | | | | | | | |
| #13 | 2018-13113 | ETT | | | | | | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | | | | | | | | | |
| #14 | 2018-13126 | Mox | | | | | | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #15 | 2018-13127 | DSP | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #16 | 2018-13128 | ETY | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #17 | 2018-13129 | SPX | | | | | | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #18 | 2018-13131 | SpadePreSale | | | | | | 312 | 4 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 정확도: 99.5% | | | 정확도: < 94.6% | | | 검출률: 100% | | | 검출률: < 70.7% | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 312 | 4 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | VERISMART | | | Osiris [43] | | | OYENTE [9, 34] | | | MYTHRIL [7] | | | MANCORE [2] | | | | | |
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | | | |
| Total | | | | | 12493 | 976 | | 492 | 2 | ✓: 58 △: 0 ✗: 0 | 240 | 13 | ✓: 41 △: 0 ✗: 17 | 171 | 14 | ✓: 20 △: 15 ✗: 23 | 94 | 10 | ✓: 10 △: 1 ✗: 46 | 14 | 0 | ✓: 2 △: 0 ✗: 42 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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기존 취약점 검증기와 성능 비교

| No. | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | SMTCHECKER [12] | | | ZEUS [11] | |
|--------------|------|-----|-----------|-----|---------------|-----------------|-----|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | | | #Alarm | #FP | Verified | #Alarm | #FP | Verified | Verified | Verified |
| #1 | 42 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #2 | 78 | 2 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #3 | 75 | 7 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 5 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #4 | 70 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 7 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #5 | 103 | 8 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 6 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #6 | 141 | 5 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #7 | 74 | 6 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 5 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #8 | 84 | 6 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 4 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #9 | 82 | 6 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 6 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #10 | 99 | 2 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #11 | 171 | 15 | 9 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #12 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #13 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #14 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #15 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #16 | 141 | 16 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #17 | 153 | 5 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #18 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #19 | 113 | 4 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 4 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #20 | 40 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #21 | 59 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #22 | 28 | 3 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #23 | 19 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #24 | 457 | 30 | 13 | 6 | ✗ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #25 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Total | 2741 | 172 | 40 | 6 | ✓: 24 ✗: 1 | 55 | 50 | ✓: 1 ✗: 12 | ✓: 0 ✗: 25 | |

VeriSmart 핵심 차별점

- 트랜잭션 불변 성질 (Transaction invariant) 자동 추론

```
1  contract Netkoin {
2      mapping (address => uint) public balance;
3      uint public totalSupply;
4
5      constructor (uint initialSupply) {
6          totalSupply = initialSupply;
7          balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;
8      }
9
10     function transfer (address to, uint value) public
11     returns (bool) {
12         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
13         balance[msg.sender] -= value;
14         balance[to] += value;
15         return true;
16     }
17
18     function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {
19         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
20         balance[msg.sender] -= value;
21         totalSupply -= value;
22         return true;
23     }
24 }
```

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$$\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$$

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VeriSmart 핵심 차별점

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15        return true;  
16    }  
17  
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19        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
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```

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20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21        totalSupply -= value;  
22        return true;  
23    }  
24 }
```

$$\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$$

VeriSmart 핵심 차별점

- 트랜잭션의 불변 성질을 이용한 안전성 증명

```
require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
balance[msg.sender] -= value;
totalSupply -= value;
```

assert (totalSupply >= value)

totalSupply = \sum balance ... transaction invariant
≥ balance[msg.sender] ... def. of \sum balance
≥ value ... assumption (require)

VeriSmart 핵심 차별점

- 트랜잭션의 불변 성질을 이용한 안전성 증명

```
require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
balance[msg.sender] -= value;
totalSupply -= value;
```


assert (totalSupply >= value)

totalSupply = \sum balance ... transaction invariant
≥ balance[msg.sender] ... def. of \sum balance
≥ value ... assumption (require)


기존 취약점 검출기 / 검증기들은 이러한 추론을 못하고 FN / FP 발생

VeriSmart 검증 알고리즘

- Generator: 트랜잭션 불변 성질을 추론 시도
- Validator: 추론된 불변 성질을 이용하여 안전성 검증 시도



기반 기술: Software Verification




- 프로그램과 증명할 성질을 일차 논리식(first-order logic)으로 표현
- 논리식의 satisfiability 여부를 SMT solver로 판별

예제

```
int f(bool a) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (a) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```

예제

```
int f(bool a) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (a) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```




Verification Condition:

$$\begin{aligned} & ((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge \\ & ((a \wedge y) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg y)) \wedge \\ & \neg(x == y) \end{aligned}$$

예제

```
int f(bool a) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (a) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```



Verification Condition:


$$\begin{aligned} & ((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge \\ & ((a \wedge y) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg y)) \wedge \\ & \neg(x == y) \end{aligned}$$

②

SMT solver: unsatisfiable!

예제

```
int f(a, b) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (b) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```




Verification Condition:

$$\begin{aligned} & ((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge \\ & ((b \wedge y) \vee (\neg b \wedge \neg y)) \wedge \\ & \neg(x == y) \end{aligned}$$

예제

```
int f(a, b) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (b) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```




②

Verification Condition:
 $((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge$
 $((b \wedge y) \vee (\neg b \wedge \neg y)) \wedge$
 $\neg(x == y)$

SMT solver:
satisfiable when $a=1$ and $b=0$


반복문 불변 성질

```
i = 0;  
j = 0;  
while  
(i < 10) {  
    i++;  
    j++;  
}  
assert (i-j==0)
```




반복문 불변 성질

```
i = 0;  
j = 0;  
while @(i==j)  
(i < 10) {  
    i++;  
    j++;  
}  
assert (i-j==0)
```



반복문 불변 성질

```
i = 0;  
j = 0;  
while @(i==j)  
(i < 10) {  
    i++;  
    j++;  
}  
assert (i-j==0)
```



$$((i=0 \wedge j=0) \rightarrow (i=j)) \\ \wedge ((i=j) \rightarrow (i-j=0))$$

반복문 불변 성질

```
i = 0;  
j = 0;  
while @(i==j)  
(i < 10) {  
    i++;  
    j++;  
}  
assert (i-j==0)
```

증명에 실패하는 불변 성질은 무용지물
($i \geq 0, j \geq 0, i == j, \text{true}, \dots$)



$$((i=0 \wedge j=0) \rightarrow (i=j)) \\ \wedge ((i=j) \rightarrow (i-j))$$

소프트웨어 자동 검증의 어려움


```
@pre : ⊤
@post : sorted(rv, 0, |rv| - 1)
bool BubbleSort (int a[]) {
    int[] a := a₀
    @L₁ [ −1 ≤ i < |a|
          ∧ partitioned(a, 0, i, i + 1, |a| - 1)
          ∧ sorted(a, i, |a| - 1) ]
    for (int i := |a| - 1; i > 0; i := i - 1) {
        @L₂ [ 1 ≤ i < |a| ∧ 0 ≤ j ≤ i
              ∧ partitioned(a, 0, i, i + 1, |a| - 1)
              ∧ partitioned(a, 0, j - 1, j, j)
              ∧ sorted(a, i, |a| - 1) ]
        for (int j := 0; j < i; j := j + 1) {
            if (a[j] > a[j + 1]) {
                int t := a[j];
                int a[j] := a[j + 1];
                int a[j + 1] := t;
            }
        }
    }
    return a;
}
```

스마트 컨트랙트의 경우

- 상대적으로 코드가 단순하여 불변식 자동 추론이 가능

```
for (i = 0; i < x ; i++)
```

- 단, 반복문이 트랜잭션 호출로 주로 만들어지므로 트랜잭션 불변 성질 (Transaction invariant) 유추가 중요



탐색 기반 프로그램 합성을 이용

- 스마트 컨트랙트 불변식을 위한 도메인 특화 언어 설계
 - 단순한 형태의 연산식 $x = y, x \geq y, x = n, x \geq n, \dots$
 - 스마트 컨트랙트에서 자주 사용되는 데이터 특성 반영 (e.g. the sum of balance is equal to totalSupply)
 - quantifier-free, conjunctive formulas
- 모든 가능한 불변식을 크기순으로 탐색하면서 검증 시도

In the paper

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.11227.pdf>

VERISMART: A Highly Precise Safety Verifier for Ethereum Smart Contracts

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Abstract—We present VERISMART, a highly precise verifier for ensuring arithmetic safety of Ethereum smart contracts. Writing safe smart contracts without unintended behavior is critically important because smart contracts are immutable and even a single flaw can cause huge financial damage. In particular, ensuring that arithmetic operations are safe is one of the most important and common security concerns of Ethereum smart contracts nowadays. In response, several safety analyzers have been proposed over the past few years, but state-of-the-art is still unsatisfactory; no existing tools achieve high precision and recall at the same time, inherently limited to producing annoying false alarms or missing critical bugs. By contrast, VERISMART aims for an uncompromising analyzer that performs exhaustive verification without compromising precision or scalability, thereby greatly reducing the burden of manually checking undiscovered or incorrectly-reported issues. To achieve this goal, we present a new domain-specific algorithm for verifying smart contracts, which is able to automatically discover and leverage transaction invariants that are essential for precisely analyzing smart contracts. Evaluation with real-world smart contracts shows that VERISMART can detect all arithmetic bugs with a negligible number of false alarms, far outperforming existing analyzers.

I. INTRODUCTION

Safe smart contracts are indispensable for trustworthy blockchain ecosystems. Blockchain is widely recognized as one of the most disruptive technologies and smart contracts lie at the heart of this revolution (e.g., [1], [2]). Smart contracts are computer programs that run on blockchains in order to automatically fulfill agreed obligations between untrusted parties without intermediaries. Unfortunately, despite their potential, smart contracts are more likely to be vulnerable than traditional programs because of their unique characteristics such as openness and immutability [3]. As a result, unsafe smart contracts are prevalent and are increasingly becoming a serious threat to the success of the blockchain technology. For example, recent infamous attacks on the Ethereum blockchain such as the DAO [4] and the Parity Wallet [5] attacks were caused by unsafe smart contracts.

In this paper, we present VERISMART, a fully automated safety analyzer for verifying Ethereum smart contracts with a particular focus on arithmetic safety. We focus on detecting arithmetic bugs such as integer over/underflows and division-by-zeros because smart contracts typically involve lots of arithmetic operations and they are major sources of security

TABLE I
STATISTICS ON CVE-REPORTED SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF
ETHEREUM SMART CONTRACTS (AS OF MAY. 31, 2019)

| Arithmetic Over/underflow | Bad Randomness | Access Control | Unsafe Input Dependency | Others | Total |
|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------|-----------|-------|
| 487 (95.7 %) | 10 (1.9 %) | 4 (0.8 %) | 4 (0.8 %) | 4 (0.8 %) | 509 |

vulnerabilities nowadays. For example, arithmetic over/underflows account for 95.7% (487/509) of CVEs assigned to Ethereum smart contracts, as shown in Table I. Even worse, arithmetic bugs, once exploited, are likely to cause significant but unexpected financial damage (e.g., the integer overflow in the SmartMesh contract [6] explained in Section II). Our goal is to detect all arithmetic bugs before deploying smart contracts on the blockchain.

Unlike existing techniques, VERISMART aims to be a truly practical tool by performing automatic, scalable, exhaustive, yet highly precise verification of smart contracts. Recent years have seen an increased interest in automated tools for analyzing arithmetic safety of smart contracts [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. However, existing tools are still unsatisfactory. A major weakness of bug-finding approaches (e.g., [7], [9], [8], [10]) is that they are likely to miss fatal bugs (i.e., resulting in false negatives), because they do not consider all the possible behaviors of the program. On the other hand, verification approaches (e.g., [11], [12]) are exhaustive and therefore miss no vulnerabilities, but they typically do so at the expense of precision (i.e., resulting in false positives). In practice, both false negatives and positives burden developers with error-prone and time-consuming process for manually verifying a number of undiscovered issues or incorrectly reported alarms. VERISMART aims to overcome these shortcomings of existing approaches by being exhaustive yet precise.

To achieve this goal, we present a new verification algorithm for smart contracts. The key feature of the algorithm, which departs significantly from the existing analyzers for smart contracts [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], is to automatically discover domain-specific invariants of smart contracts during the verification process. In particular, our algorithm automates the discovery of *transaction invariants*, which are distinctive properties of smart contracts that hold under arbitrary interleaving of transactions and enable to analyze smart contracts exhaustively without exploring all program paths separately. A technical challenge is to efficiently discover precise invariants

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- VC 생성 & 불변식 유추
- VC 효율적으로 풀기
- 구현 이슈
- ...

실험

- 벤치마크 (<https://github.com/kupl/VeriSmart-benchmarks>)
 - CVE 취약점이 있는 60개 컨트랙트
 - Zeus (NDSS'18) 공개 데이터 25개
- 비교 대상 분석기
 - 오류 검출기: Oyente, Mythril, Manticore, Osiris,
 - 오류 검증기: Zeus, SMTChecker

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

| No. | CVE ID | Name | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | OSIRIS [7] | | | OYENTE [9], [26] | | | MYTHRIL [8] | | | MANCORE [10] | | | | | |
|-------------------|------------|--------------|------------------------|----|-----------|------------------|-----|-------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----|------------------------|-------------|-----|-------------------------|--------------------|-----|------------------------|----|---|-----------------------|
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | | | |
| #1 | 2018-10299 | BEC | 299 | 6 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | |
| #2 | 2018-10376 | SMT | 294 | 22 | 13 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 1 | 0 | ✗ | timeout (> 3 days) | | | | | |
| #3 | 2018-10468 | UET | 146 | 27 | 14 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 8 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | |
| #4 | 2018-10706 | SCA | 404 | 48 | 33 | 0 | ✓ | 9 | 0 | ✗ | 4 | 0 | △ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | internal error | | | | | |
| #5 | 2018-11239 | HGX | 102 | 11 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✓ | | | |
| #6 | 2018-11411 | DimonCoin | 126 | 15 | 7 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✗ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✓ | | | |
| #7 | 2018-11429 | ATL | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #8 | 2018-11446 | GRX | | | | | | 8 | 2 | ✗ | 12 | 4 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #9 | 2018-11561 | EET | | | | | | 4 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #10 | 2018-11687 | BTC | | | | | | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #11 | 2018-12070 | SEC | | | | | | 6 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #12 | 2018-12230 | RMC | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 5 | 0 | ✓ | | | | | | | | | |
| #13 | 2018-13113 | ETT | | | | | | 4 | 2 | N/A | 2 | 2 | N/A | | | | | | | | | |
| #14 | 2018-13126 | Mox | | | | | | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #15 | 2018-13127 | DSP | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #16 | 2018-13128 | ETY | | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #17 | 2018-13129 | SPX | | | | | | 5 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| #18 | 2018-13131 | SpadePreSale | | | | | | 312 | 4 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 3 | 0 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 정확도: 99.5% | | | 정확도: < 94.6% | | | 검출률: 100% | | | 검출률: < 70.7% | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | 312 | 4 | ✓ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | 0 | 0 | ✗ | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | VERISMART | | | Osiris [43] | | | OYENTE [9, 34] | | | MYTHRIL [7] | | | MANCORE [2] | | | | | |
| | | | | | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | #Alarm | #FP | CVE | | | |
| Total | | | | | 12493 | 976 | | 492 | 2 | ✓: 58 △: 0 ✗: 0 | 240 | 13 | ✓: 41 △: 0 ✗: 17 | 171 | 14 | ✓: 20 △: 15 ✗: 23 | 94 | 10 | ✓: 10 △: 1 ✗: 46 | 14 | 0 | ✓: 2 △: 0 ✗: 42 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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기존 오류 검출기들의 한계

- 총 37개의 허위 경보중 18개는 불변 성질 유추에 실패해서, 19개는 조건식을 정교하게 추적 못해서 발생

```
function transfer(address _to, uint _value) {
    if (msg.sender.balance < min)
        sell((min - msg.sender.balance) / sellPrice);
}
```

- 컨트랙트간 함수 호출로 발생하는 취약점 탐지에 주로 실패

```
function mint (address holder, uint value) {
    require (total+ value <= TOKEN_LIMIT); // CVE bug
    balances[holder] += value; // CVE bug
    total += value; // CVE bug
}
...
token.mint (...)
```

VeriSmart 한계

- 복잡한 불변 성질은 유추하지 못하고 허위 경보 발생

```
1 function unlockReward(address addr, uint value) {
2   require(totalLocked[addr] > value);
3   require(locked[addr][msg.sender] >= value);
4   if (value == 0) value = locked[addr][msg.sender];
5   totalLocked[addr] -= value; // false positive
6   locked[addr][msg.sender] -= value;
7 }
```

$$\forall x. \text{totalLocked}[x] = \sum_i \text{locked}[x][i]$$

잘못된 CVE 발견

- CVE를 부여받은 일부 취약점이 실제 취약점이 아님을 발견

| CVE ID | Name | #Incorrect Queries | #FP | | |
|------------|-------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------|
| | | | OSIRIS | OYENTE | VERISMART |
| 2018-13113 | ETT | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 2018-13144 | PDX | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 2018-13326 | BTX | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 2018-13327 | CCLAG | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |

- E.g.,

```
1 contract BTX {
2     mapping (address => uint) public balance;
3     uint public totalSupply;
4
5     constructor () {
6         totalSupply = 10000;
7         balance[msg.sender] = 10000;
8     }
9
10    function transfer (address to, uint value) {
11        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
12        balance[msg.sender] -= value;
13        balance[to] += value; // Safe
14    }
15
16    function transferFrom (address from, address to, uint
17                           value) {
18        require (balance[from] >= value);
19        balance[to] += value; // Safe
20        balance[from] -= value;
21    }
```

기존 취약점 검증기와 성능 비교

- 기존 검증기들은 스마트 컨트랙트 주요 성질 검증에 실패
- 트랜잭션 자동 유추 기능을 끄면 VeriSmart도 17개 실패

| No. | LOC | #Q | VERISMART | | | SMTCHECKER [12] | | | ZEUS [11] | |
|--------------|------|-----|-----------|-----|--------------|-----------------|-----|---------------|---------------|----------|
| | | | #Alarm | #FP | Verified | #Alarm | #FP | Verified | Verified | Verified |
| #1 | 42 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #2 | 78 | 2 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 2 | 1 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #3 | 75 | 7 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 5 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #4 | 70 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 7 | 7 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #5 | 103 | 8 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 6 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #6 | 141 | 5 | 2 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #7 | 74 | 6 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 5 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #8 | 84 | 6 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 4 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #9 | 82 | 6 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 6 | 6 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #10 | 99 | 2 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #11 | 171 | 15 | 9 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #12 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #13 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #14 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #15 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #16 | 141 | 16 | 10 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #17 | 153 | 5 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #18 | 139 | 7 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #19 | 113 | 4 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 4 | 4 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #20 | 40 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #21 | 59 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #22 | 28 | 3 | 1 | 0 | ✓ | 1 | 0 | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #23 | 19 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| #24 | 457 | 30 | 13 | 6 | ✗ | internal error | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| #25 | 17 | 3 | 0 | 0 | ✓ | 3 | 3 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Total | 2741 | 172 | 40 | 6 | ✓:24 ✗: 1 | 55 | 50 | ✓: 1 ✗: 12 | ✓: 0 ✗: 25 | |

다른 종류의 취약점 검출에 응용

- 일반적으로 임의의 assert로 표현된 성질 검증에 활용 가능
- 액세스 컨트롤 관련 취약점: e.g. CVE 2018-11329

```
function DrugDealer() public { ceoAddr = msg.sender; }
function buyDrugs () public payable {
    ceoAddr.transfer(msg.value); // send Ether to ceoAddr
    drugs[msg.sender] += ...; // buy drugs by paying Ether
}
```

- 액세스 컨트롤 관련 모든 CVE 검출 (CVE-10666, 2018-10705, 2018-11329)
- 60개 중 55개 컨트랙트에 대해서 안전성 검증 성공

마무리

- 스마트 컨트랙트는 보안취약점 검증이 필수
- 현재 스마트 컨트랙트 분석 기술은 성능이 제한적
 - 안전성과 정확성 둘 중 하나를 포기
- VeriSmart: 안전하면서 정확한 스마트 컨트랙트 자동 검증기
 - 트랜잭션 불변 성질을 자동 추론하며 검증하는 첫 사례
 - 소프트웨어 검증 기술을 자동으로 유용하게 사용한 사례

Thank you!

- **Research areas:** programming languages, software engineering, software security
 - program analysis and testing
 - program synthesis and repair
- **Publication:** top-venues in PL, SE, Security, and AI:
 - PLDI('12,'14), OOPSLA('15,'17a,'17b,'18a,'18b,'19), TOPLAS('14,'16,'17,'18,'19), ICSE('17,'18,'19,'20), FSE('18,'19), ASE'18, S&P('17,'20), IJCAI('17,'18), etc



<http://prl.korea.ac.kr>