

스마트 컨트랙트 취약점 검증 기술

오학주


고려대학교 정보대학

April 25, 2019


스마트 컨트랙트의 안전성 문제

- 스마트 컨트랙트는 매우 엄밀한 안전성 검증이 필요
 - 누구나 온라인에서 소스코드 열람 가능하며 수정 불가
 - 공격에 성공하면 막대한 금전적 피해가 발생

A \$50 MILLION HACK JUST
SHOWED THAT THE DAO WAS
ALL TOO HUMAN




The DAO (2016)
750억원



Parity Wallet (2017)
350억원

BatchOverflow Exploit Creates Trillions of
Ethereum Tokens, Major Exchanges Halt ERC20
Deposits



SmartMesh (2018)
천문학적 금액 인출 시도

정수 오버플로우 취약점 검증기

- Solidity에서는 정수를 유한한 비트로 표현

```
uint public totalSupply;
```

256bit

- 정수 연산시 표현 가능한 범위를 넘어서는 문제가 발생 가능

```
totalSupply += value;      balance[msg.sender] -= value;
```

- 오버플로우 유무를 판단하기가 매우 까다로움
- CVE 등록된 취약점 대부분이 정수 오버플로우에서 비롯

Arithmetic Over/underflows	Predictable Random	Access Control	Replay Attack	Reentrancy Attack	Denial of Service	Total
487 (95.8 %)	10 (2.0 %)	8 (1.6 %)	1 (0.2 %)	1 (0.2%)	1 (0.2%)	508

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

- SmartMesh 토큰 스마트 컨트랙트의 정수 오버플로우 취약점 (CVE-2018-10376)을 이용하여 천문학적 금액의 토큰을 생성

5499035 (1348012 Block Confirmations)

227 days 10 hrs ago (Apr-24-2018 07:16:19 PM +UTC)

0xd6a09bdb29e1eafa92a30373c44b09e2e2e0651e

Contract [0x55f93985431fc9304077687a35a1ba103dc1e081](#) (SmartMeshICO)

▶ From 0xdf31a499a5a8358... To 0xdf31a499a5a8358... for

▶ From 0xdf31a499a5a8358... To 0xd6a09bdb29e1ea... for

0 Ether (\$0.00)

<https://etherscan.io/tx/0x1abab4c8db9a30e703114528e31dee129a3a758f7f8abc3b6494aad3d304e43f>

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

- 정수 오버플로우 (integer overflow) 취약점
- 방어적으로 코드를 작성했음에도 문제가 된 경우

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4      revert();
5    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
7      revert();
8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;
11   return true;
12 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

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송금

CVE-2018-10376

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7      balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
8      revert();
9
10   balance[to] += value;
11   balance[msg.sender] += fee;
12   balance[from] -= value + fee;
13
14   return true;
15 }
```

보내는 사람의 잔고
가 충분한지 체크

송금

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

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12   balance[from] -= value + fee;
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오버플로우
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송금

오버플로우
체크

오버플로우/언더플로우
발생하지 않음

6

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4      revert();
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6        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
7      revert();
8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;
11   return true;
12 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

balance[from] = balance[to] = balance[msg.sender] = 0

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2    value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3    if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4      revert();
5    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
7      revert();
8    balance[to] += value;
9    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
10   balance[from] -= value + fee;
11   return true;
12 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

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1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2     value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
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6         balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
7         revert();  
8     balance[to] += value;  
9     balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
10    balance[from] -= value + fee;  
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CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2     value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3     if (balance[from] < fee + value) revert();  
4     if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5         balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6         revert();  
7     balance[to] += value;  
8     balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
9     balance[from] -= value + fee;  
10    return true;  
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CVE-2018-10376

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1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
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6         balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
7         revert();  
8     balance[to] += value;  
9     balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
10    balance[from] -= value + fee;  
11    return true;  
12 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

`balance[from] = balance[to] = balance[msg.sender] = 0`

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2     value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
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4     if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5         balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6         revert();  
7     balance[to] += value;  
8     balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
9     balance[from] -= value + fee;  
10    return true;  
11 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

`balance[from] = balance[to] = balance[msg.sender] = 0`

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3   if (balance[from] < fee + value) revert();  
4   if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5       balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6     revert();  
7   balance[to] += value; // 8fffff...ff  
8   balance[msg.sender] += fee;  
9   balance[from] -= value + fee;  
10  return true;  
11 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

`balance[from] = balance[to] = balance[msg.sender] = 0`

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2     value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3     if (balance[from] < fee + value) revert();  
4     if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5         balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6         revert();  
7     balance[to] += value; // 8fffff...ff  
8     balance[msg.sender] += fee; // 700...00  
9     balance[from] -= value + fee;  
10    return true;  
11 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

SmartMesh 사례 (2018)

`balance[from] = balance[to] = balance[msg.sender] = 0`

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint  
2   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {  
3   if (balance[from] < fee + value) revert();  
4   if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||  
5       balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])  
6     revert();  
7   balance[to] += value; // 8fffff...ff  
8   balance[msg.sender] += fee; // 700...00  
9   balance[from] -= value + fee; // 0!  
10  return true;  
11 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

기존 스마트 컨트랙트 분석기술의 한계

- 오류 검출기 (e.g., Mythril, Osiris [ACSAC'18], Oyente [CCS'16])

```
1  function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
2    if (balance[from] < fee + value) Osiris만 검출 가능
3      revert();
4    if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
5        balance[msg.sender] + fee < balance[msg.sender])
6      revert();
7    balance[to] += value;
8    balance[msg.sender] += fee;
9    balance[from] -= value + fee;
10   return true;
11 }
```

CVE-2018-10376

기존 스마트 컨트랙트 분석기술의 한계

- 오류 검출기 (e.g., Mythril, Osiris [ACSAC'18], Oyente [CCS'16])

```
1  function multipleTransfer(address[] to, uint value) {  
2    require(value * to.length > 0);  
3    require(balances[msg.sender] >= value * to.length);  
4    balances[msg.sender] -= value * to.length;  
5    for (uint i = 0; i < to.length; ++i) {  
6      balances[to[i]] += value;  
7    }  
8    return true;  
9 }
```

앞의 경우와 비슷한
오류이지만 검출 실패

CVE-2018-14006

기존 스마트 컨트랙트 분석기술의 한계

- 오류 검증기 (SMTChecker, Zeus [NDSS'18])

```
1  contract Netcoin {  
2      mapping (address => uint) public balance;  
3      uint public totalSupply;  
4  
5      constructor (uint initialSupply) {  
6          totalSupply = initialSupply;  
7          balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;  
8      }  
9  
10     function transfer (address to, uint value) public  
11         returns (bool) {  
12         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
13         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
14         balance[to] += value;    허위 경보 (False alarm)  
15         return true;  
16     }  
17  
18     function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {  
19         require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20         balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21         totalSupply -= value;    허위 경보 (False alarm)  
22         return true;  
23     }  
24 }
```

VeriSmart

- 목표: 안전하면서 정확한 스마트 컨트랙트 정적 분석기

CVE-2018-10376

```
1 function transferProxy (address from, address to, uint
2   value, uint fee) public returns (bool) {
3   if (balance[from] < fee + value)
4     revert();
5   if (balance[to] + value < balance[to] ||
6     balance[msg.sender] + value < balance[msg.sender])
7     revert();
8   balance[to] += value;
9   balance[msg.sender] += value;
10  balance[from] -= value - fee;
11  return true;
12 }
```

CVE-2018-14006

```
1 function multipleTransfer(address[] to, uint value) {
2   require(value * to.length > 0);
3   require(balances[msg.sender] >= value * to.length);
4   balances[msg.sender] -= value * to.length;
5   for (uint i = 0; i < to.length; ++i) {
6     balances[to[i]] += value;
7   }
8   return true;
9 }
```

```
1 contract BTX {
2   mapping (address => uint) public balance;
3   uint public totalSupply;
4
5   constructor () {
6     totalSupply = 10000;
7     balance[msg.sender] = 10000;
8   }
9
10  function transfer (address to, uint value) public
11    returns (bool) {
12   require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
13   balance[msg.sender] -= value;
14   balance[to] += value; // Safe
15   return true;
16 }
17  function transferFrom (address from, address to, uint
18    value) public returns (bool) {
19   require (balance[from] >= value);
20   balance[to] += value; // Safe
21   balance[from] -= value;
22 }
23 }
```

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

No.	CVE ID	Name	LOC	#Q	VERISMART			OSIRIS [43]			OYENTE [9, 34]			MYTHRIL [7]			MANTICORE [2]		
					#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE
#1	2018-10299	BEC	299	6	2	0	✓	1	0	✓	1	0	△	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#2	2018-10376	SMT	294	22	13	0	✓	1	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	timeout (> 3 days)		
#3	2018-10468	UET	146	27	14	0	✓	9	0	✗	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	0 0 ✗		
#4	2018-10706	SCA	404	48	34	0	✓	9	0	✗	4	0	△	0	0	✗	internal error		
#5	2018-11239	HGX	102	11	7	0	✓	6	0	✓	2	0	✗	3	0	✓	0 0 ✗		
#6	2018-11411	DimonCoin	126	15	7	0	✓	5	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#7	2018-11429	ATL	165	9	4	0	✓	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#8	2018-11446	GRX	434	39	24	2	✓	10	2	✗	11	4	✗	2	1	✗	0 0 ✗		
#9	2018-11561	EETHER	146	10	5	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	△	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#10	2018-11687	BTCR	99	20	4	0	✓	2	0	✓	2	0	△	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#11	2018-12070	SEC	269	40	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	4	0	✗	3	1	✗	0 0 ✗		
#12	2018-12230	RMC	161	9	5	0	✓	3	0	✓	5	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#13	2018-13113	ETT	142	9	2	0	N/A	3	2	N/A	2	2	N/A	0	0	N/A	0 0 N/A		
#14	2018-13126	MoxyOnePresale	301	5	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#15	2018-13127	DSPX	238	6	4	0	✓	3	0	✓	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#16	2018-13128	ETY	193	10	4	0	✓	3	0	✓	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#17	2018-13129	SPX	276	9	6	0	✓	5	0	✓	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#18	2018-13131	SpadePreSale	312	3	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#19	2018-13132	Spadeico	403	8	6	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#20	2018-13144	PDX	103	5	2	0	✓	2	1	✓	2	1	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#21	2018-13189	UNLB	335	4	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	3	0	✓	1	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#22	2018-13202	MyBO	183	17	11	0	✓	4	0	✗	3	0	✗	0	0	✗	internal error		
#23	2018-13208	MoneyTree	171	17	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#24	2018-13220	MAVCash	171	15	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	internal error		
#25	2018-13221	XT	186	15	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	2	0	✗	internal error		
#26	2018-13224	VEU	244	16	9	0	✓	5	0	✓	4	0	✗	1	0	✗	internal error		
#27	2018-13227	MCN	172	17	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#28	2018-13228	CNX	171	17	10	0	✓	3	0	✗	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#29	2018-13230	DSN	171	17	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#30	2018-13325	GROW	176	12	5	0	✓	3	0	✗	1	0	✗	2	0	✗	0 0 N/A		
#31	2018-13326	BTX	135	9	2	0	N/A	3	2	N/A	2	2	N/A	0	0	N/A	internal error		
#32	2018-13327	CCLAG	92	5	2	0	✓	2	1	✓	2	1	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#33	2018-13493	DaddyToken	344	40	22	0	✓	8	0	✗	2	0	✗	1	0	✗	internal error		
#34	2018-13533	ALUXToken	191	23	15	0	✓	7	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#35	2018-13625	Krown	271	22	9	0	✓	1	0	✗	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#36	2018-13670	GFCB	103	14	11	0	✓	5	1	✓	3	1	✓	1	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#37	2018-13695	CTest7	301	17	9	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	1	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#38	2018-13698	Play2LivePromo	131	8	7	0	✓	7	0	✓	7	0	✓	5	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#39	2018-13703	CERB_Coin	262	17	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#40	2018-13722	HYIPToken	410	8	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#41	2018-13777	RRToken	166	8	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#42	2018-13778	CGCToken	224	13	6	0	✓	4	0	✓	4	0	✓	1	0	✗	internal error		
#43	2018-13779	YLCToken	180	17	11	0	✓	4	0	✓	6	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#44	2018-13782	ENTR	171	17	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#45	2018-13783	JiucaiToken	271	19	12	0	✓	6	0	✓	4	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#46	2018-13836	XRC	119	22	7	0	✓	5	0	✗	3	0	△	0	0	✗	0 0 ✗		
#47	2018-14001	SKT	152	19	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	3	0	△	1	0	✓	0 0 ✗		
#48	2018-14002	MP3	83	12	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	2	0	△	0	0	△	timeout (> 3 days)		
#49	2018-14003	WMC	200	15	6	0	✓	3	0	✓	2	0	△	1	0	✗	internal error		
#50	2018-14004	GLB	299	40	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	1	0	△	0	0	✗			

기존 취약점 검출기와 성능 비교

No.	CVE ID	Name	LOC	#Q	VERISMART			OSIRIS [43]			OYENTE [9, 34]			MYTHRIL [7]			MANTICORE [2]		
					#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE
#1	2018-10299	BEC	299	6	2	0	✓	1	0	✓	1	0	△	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#2	2018-10376	SMT	294	22	13	0	✓	1	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	timeout (> 3 days)		
#3	2018-10468	UET	146	27	14	0	✓	9	0	✗	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	0	0	✗
#4	2018-10706	SCA	404	48	34	0	✓	9	0	✗	4	0	△	0	0	✗	internal error		
#5	2018-11239	HGX	102	11	7	0	✓	6	0	✓	2	0	✗	3	0	✓	0	0	✗
#6	2018-11411	DimonCoin	126	15	7	0	✓	5	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#7	2018-11429	ATL	165	9	4	0	✓	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#8	2018-11446	GRX	434	39	24	2	✓	10	2	✗	11	4	✗	2	1	✗	0	0	✗
#9	2018-11561	EETHER	146	10	5	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	△	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#10	2018-11687	BTCR	99	20	4	0	✓	2	0	✓	2	0	△	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#11	2018-12070	SEC	269	40	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	4	0	✗	3	1	✗	0	0	✗
#12	2018-12230	RMC	161	9	5	0	✓	3	0	✓	5	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#13	2018-13113	ETT	142	9	2	0	N/A	3	2	N/A	2	2	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A
#14	2018-13126	MoxyOnePresale	301	5	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#15	2018-13127	DSPX	238	6	4	0	✓	3	0	✓	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#16	2018-13128	ETY	193	10	4	0	✓	3	0	✓	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#17	2018-13129	SPX	276	9	6	0	✓	5	0	✓	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#18	2018-13211	CardanoDeFi	212	2	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗


	VERISMART			Osiris [43]			Oyente [9, 34]			Mythril [7]			Manticore [2]					
	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE	#Alarm	#FP	CVE			
Total	12556	973	✓: 58 ✗: 0	496	2	△: 0	234	11	△: 0 ✗: 16	164	13	△: 11 ✗: 24	51	4	△: 3 ✗: 49	0	0	△: 0 ✗: 33

#29	2018-13230	DSN	171	17	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#30	2018-13325	GROW	176	12	5	0	✓	3	0	✗	1	0	✗	2	0	✗	0	0	✗
#31	2018-13326	BTX	135	9	2	0	N/A	3	2	N/A	2	2	N/A	0	0	N/A	0	0	N/A
#32	2018-13327	CCLAG	92	5	2	0	✓	2	1	✓	2	1	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#33	2018-13493	DaddyToken	344	40	22	0	✓	8	0	✗	2	0	✗	1	0	✗	internal error		
#34	2018-13533	ALUXToken	191	23	15	0	✓	7	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#35	2018-13625	Krown	271	22	9	0	✓	1	0	✗	3	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#36	2018-13670	GFCB	103	14	11	0	✓	5	1	✓	3	1	✓	1	0	✗	0	0	✗
#37	2018-13695	CTest7	301	17	9	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗	1	0	✗	0	0	✗
#38	2018-13698	Play2LivePromo	131	8	7	0	✓	7	0	✓	7	0	✓	5	0	✗	0	0	✗
#39	2018-13703	CERB_Coin	262	17	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	2	0	✗	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#40	2018-13722	HYIPToken	410	8	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#41	2018-13777	RRToken	166	8	3	0	✓	2	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#42	2018-13778	CGCToken	224	13	6	0	✓	4	0	✓	4	0	✓	1	0	✗	internal error		
#43	2018-13779	YLCToken	180	17	11	0	✓	4	0	✓	6	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#44	2018-13782	ENTR	171	17	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	2	0	✓	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#45	2018-13783	JiucaiToken	271	19	12	0	✓	6	0	✓	4	0	✓	0	0	✗	internal error		
#46	2018-13836	XRC	119	22	7	0	✓	5	0	✗	3	0	△	0	0	✗	0	0	✗
#47	2018-14001	SKT	152	19	10	0	✓	4	0	✓	3	0	△	1	0	✓	0	0	✗
#48	2018-14002	MP3	83	12	4	0	✓	2	0	✗	2	0	△	0	0	△	timeout (> 3 days)		
#49	2018-14003	WMC	200	15	6	0	✓	3	0	✓	2	0	△	1	0	✗	internal error		
#50	2018-14004	GLB	299	40	8	0	✓	5	0	✓	1	0	△	0	0	✗	internal error		
#51	2018-14005	Xmc	255	29	11	0	✓	8	0	✓	1	0	△	0	0	△	internal error		
#52	2018-14006	NGT	249	27	11	0	✓	1	0	✗	5	0	△	0	0	✗	timeout (> 3 days)		
#53	2018-14063	TRCT	178	9	1	0	✓	1	0	✓	1	0	✓	4	2	✓	0	0	✗
#54	2018-14084	MKCB	273	17	10	0	✓	5	0	✓	4	0	✗	1	0	✗	internal error		
#55	2018-14086	SCO	107	16	14	0	✓	7	2	✓	5	2	✗	0	0	✗	internal error		

기존 취약점 검증기와 성능 비교

No.	Contract Address	LOC	#Q	VERISMART				SMTCHECKER [13]				ZEUS [31] Verified
				#Alarm	#FP	#FN	Verified	#Alarm	#FP	#FN	Verified	
#1	0xc98f5c1b3b783794e646a8a29e2916668b7d9606	42	3	0	0	0	✓	1	1	0	✗	✗
#2	0xa1b43b46befb2387d2df46cde82c3d454ef33c66	78	2	1	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#3	0xd41f3b51e0c2d825a1178582d27c84dbfe48d1af	75	7	2	0	0	✓	2	0	0	✓	✗
#4	0x8a70cf25cf32e728be9e30c20b2781f60cb0ed6d	70	7	0	0	0	✓	2	2	0	✗	✗
#5	0xcf185ce294b443c16dd89f00527d8b25c45bf9d	103	8	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#6	0xd9f7cd813983bd89d18015cc3022f7b9b97d26d4	141	5	2	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#7	0x218e5ea7e104385b0b91097519dfde91f15613c7	74	6	1	0	0	✓	1	0	0	✓	✗
#8	0x4993CB95c7443bdC06155c5f5688Be9D8f6999a5	84	6	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#9	0xf48cf5ad04afa369fe1ae599a8f3699c712b0352	82	6	0	0	0	✓	1	1	0	✗	✗
#10	0x168296bb09e24a88805cb9c33356536b980d3fc5	99	2	1	0	0	✓	2	1	0	✗	✗
#11	0x8c6589ccea73209f579653fa5523b7b13972bd	171	15	9	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#12	0xe57a41170f18fab3248d623f06bd92b32260fae2	139	7	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#13	0xE01B770235Bc5db653604e5519F048dF54490B5f	139	7	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#14	0xd23f2533B726C9Cb1Fb9ed109b82e5A8F01c881e	139	7	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#15	0x3ff8c78e266395d08f41ef1631391f0050d48081	139	7	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#16	0x45d147c800d401350b24fc1cd5fbc98040b177c8	141	16	10	0	0	✓	9	0	1	✗	✗
#17	0x3B6d241e1b38776C2eFE944E7012239ed59334c1	153	5	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#18	0x873c58020bcb114b4fea456cef93aa58e8e305d	139	7	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#19	0x08711d3b02c8758f2fb3ab4e80228418a7f8e39c	113	4	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#20	0xd7bf41bbc8979b3821851b871f055f4ae62b2299	40	3	0	0	0	✓	1	1	0	✗	✗
#21	0x8a772004af0b8fca5e7093c6f277ba7b0e8fa97a	59	3	0	0	0	✓	internal error				✗
#22	0x8d2c532d7d211816a2807a411f947b211569b68c	28	3	1	0	0	✓	2	1	0	✗	✗
#23	0xeb41d678879c735f22fce499d891d44c288829ea	19	3	0	0	0	✓	1	1	0	✗	✗
#24	0xcd3e727275bc2f511822dc9a26bd7b0bbf161784	457	30	13	6	0	✗	internal error				✗
#25	0xDea48D521832780f5e437F7f744c94d2CdA85Af9	17	3	0	0	0	✓	1	1	0	✗	✗
Total		2741	172	40	6	0	✓: 24 ✗ : 1	23	9	1	✓: 2 ✗ : 9	✓: 0 ✗: 25

Software Verification 기술 활용



- 프로그램과 증명할 성질을 일차 논리식으로 표현
- 논리식의 satisfiability 여부를 판별

예제

- 증명할 성질을 assert 문으로 표현

```
int f(bool a) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (a) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```

예제

- 프로그램과 증명할 성질의 반대(negation)를 논리식으로 표현

```
int f(bool a) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (a) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```

((a ∧ x) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬x)) ∧
((a ∧ y) ∨ (¬a ∧ ¬y)) ∧
¬(x == y)

예제

- 프로그램과 증명할 성질의 반대(negation)를 논리식으로 표현

```
int f(bool a) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (a) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```

$$\begin{aligned} & ((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge \\ & ((a \wedge y) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg y)) \wedge \\ & \neg(x == y) \end{aligned}$$

SAT/SMT solver: unsatisfiable!

예제

- 증명이 불가능한 경우에는 반례를 생성

```
int f(a, b) {  
    x = 0; y = 0;  
    if (a) {  
        x = 1;  
    }  
    if (b) {  
        y = 1;  
    }  
    assert (x == y)  
}
```

$$\begin{aligned} & ((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge \\ & ((b \wedge y) \vee (\neg b \wedge \neg y)) \wedge \\ & \neg(x == y) \end{aligned}$$

예제

- 증명이 불가능한 경우에는 반례를 생성

```
int f(a, b) {  
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        y = 1;  
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}
```

$$\begin{aligned} & ((a \wedge x) \vee (\neg a \wedge \neg x)) \wedge \\ & ((b \wedge y) \vee (\neg b \wedge \neg y)) \wedge \\ & \neg(x == y) \end{aligned}$$


SAT/SMT solver:
satisfiable when $a=1$ and $b=0$

정수 오버플로우 안전성 명세

- $a + b \rightarrow assert (a + b \geq a)$
- $a * b \rightarrow assert ((a * b) / a == b)$
- $a - b \rightarrow assert (a \geq b)$

정확한 검증의 핵심

- 트랜잭션의 불변 성질 (Transaction invariant)을 유추하고 이를 검증에 활용하는 것이 필요
- 트랜잭션 불변 성질의 조건:
 - 생성자 실행후 성립
 - 각 트랜잭션의 실행전/후에 변함없이 성립



Netkoin 예제

```
1 contract Netkoin {
2     mapping (address => uint) public balance;
3     uint public totalSupply;
4
5     constructor (uint initialSupply) {
6         totalSupply = initialSupply;
7         balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;
8     }
9
10    function transfer (address to, uint value) public
11        returns (bool) {
12        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
13        balance[msg.sender] -= value;
14        balance[to] += value;
15        return true;
16    }                                오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움
17
18    function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {
19        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;
21        totalSupply -= value;
22        return true;
23    }                                언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움
24 }
```

Netkoin 예제

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19        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;
21        totalSupply -= value;
22        return true;
23    }
24 }
```

트랜잭션 불변 성질:
totalSupply = \sum balance

오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

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21        totalSupply -= value;  
22        return true;  
23    }  
24 }
```

트랜잭션 불변 성질:
 $\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

$\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

Netkoin 예제

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11        returns (bool) {  
12        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
13        balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
14        balance[to] += value;  
15        return true;  
16    }  
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19        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21        totalSupply -= value;  
22        return true;  
23    }  
24 }
```

트랜잭션 불변 성질:
 $\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

$\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

Netkoin 예제

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20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;
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23    }
24 }
```

트랜잭션 불변 성질:
 $\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

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오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

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16    }  
17  
18    function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {  
19        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21        totalSupply -= value;  
22        return true;  
23    }  
24 }
```

트랜잭션 불변 성질:
 $\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

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오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

$\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

Netkoin 예제

```
1 contract Netkoin {  
2     mapping (address => uint) public balance;  
3     uint public totalSupply;  
4  
5     constructor (uint initialSupply) {  
6         totalSupply = initialSupply;  
7         balance[msg.sender] = totalSupply;  
8     }  
9  
10    function transfer (address to, uint value) public  
11        returns (bool) {  
12        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
13        balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
14        balance[to] += value;  
15        return true;  
16    }  
17  
18    function burn (uint value) public returns (bool) {  
19        require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);  
20        balance[msg.sender] -= value;  
21        totalSupply -= value;  
22        return true;  
23    }  
24 }
```

트랜잭션 불변 성질:
 $\text{totalSupply} = \sum \text{balance}$

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오버플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

언더플로우로 착각하기 쉬움

Netkoin 예제

- 트랜잭션의 불변 성질을 이용한 안전성 증명


```
require (balance[msg.sender] >= value);
balance[msg.sender] -= value;
totalSupply -= value;
```

```
assert (totalSupply >= value)
```

totalSupply = \sum balance ... transaction invariant
 \geq balance[msg.sender] ... def. of \sum balance
 \geq value ... assumption (require)

VeriSmart 검증 알고리즘

- 프로그램 증명과 불변 성질 합성을 동시에 진행



Summary

- VeriSmart: 안전하고 정확한 스마트 컨트랙트 안전성 분석기
- Future work
 - 정교한 트랜잭션 불변 성질 추론 $\forall x. \text{totalLocked}[x] = \sum_i \text{locked}[x][i]$
 - 일반 취약점 검출기로 확장 (Reentrancy, access control, DDoS etc)
 - 취약점 익스플로잇 자동 생성