

Project ASEK – Atlantic Security and European Crisis Management

America's Grand Strategy

Implications for Sweden

Ingemar Dörfer



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| Abstract (not more than 200 words) <p>This is a study of America´s Grand Strategy, its components and its implications for Sweden. The relationship between grand strategy, empire and geopolitics is studied. Analyzing post cold war America as an empire we argue that Sweden is one of the fourty nations belonging to that empire. The geopolitics of the empire is expressed in its global presence and the changes in this world wide deployment.</p> <p>The new national security strategy of 2002 forms the basis of the new grand strategy of the United States. It is contrasted with the cold war strategy. Specific weaknesses of the American Empire and the challenge to its legitimacy are analyzed.</p> <p>The national security policy of Sweden fits well with its role in the empire since it is consistent with its policy within the EU. Since almost all candidates have joined NATO Sweden´s membership in Partnership for Peace will not prevent its marginalization in euroatlantic affairs.</p> | | |
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| Sammanfattning (högst 200 ord) <p> Detta är en studie av Amerikas <i>grand strategy</i>, dess komponenter och konsekvenser för Sverige. Förhållandet mellan <i>grand strategy</i>, imperium och geopolitik studeras. Genom att analysera Amerika efter det kalla kriget som ett imperium argumenterar vi att Sverige är en av de fyrtio nationer som tillhör imperiet. Imperiets geopolitik uttrycks i dess globala närvaro och förändringarna i denna runt världen. </p> <p> Den nya nationella säkerhetsstrategin från 2002 bildar basen för Förenta Staternas nya <i>grand strategy</i>. Den jämförs med strategin under det kalla kriget. Specifika svagheter hos det amerikanska imperiet och utmaningar mot dess legitimitet undersöks. </p> <p> Sveriges säkerhetspolitik stämmer bra med dess roll i imperiet eftersom den sammanfaller med dess politik inom EU. Eftersom nästan alla kandidater nu är NATO medlemmar hindrar inte Sveriges medlemskap i partnerskap för fred att landet marginaliseras i den euroatlantiska säkerhetspolitiken, </p> | | |
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Preface

The FOI project ASEK (Atlantic security - European Crisis Management) aims at analyzing the European Union (EU) and its Common Foreign and Security Policy (ESDP), NATO, and U.S. foreign and security policy. Concerning the latter topic, the European and transatlantic aspects of American policy are of highest importance for the project. ASEK is conducted on behalf of and financed by the Department for International and Security Affairs at the Swedish Ministry of Defence.

This report analyzes American "grand strategy", a central part of this broad complex of transatlantic security issues. The U.S. interest for and engagement in European security has waxed and waned historically, and this situation will most likely continue in the future. However, since the transatlantic interdependence in security policy is huge, insights in the ideas and driving factors behind U.S. foreign and security policy are necessary for any analysis of European security. Through this report, the ASEK project aims at enhancing these insights.

Mike Winnerstig
Project leader

Introduction

This is a study of America's Grand Strategy, what it is and what it means for Europe in general and Sweden in particular. It is nowadays impossible to have a foreign and security policy without relating it to the only superpower – the United States of America.

The study is based on extensive knowledge of the American scene, its politics, personalities and main stream ideas. My sources are the obvious ones, statements by the administration, congressional hearings, and speeches. There is already a large and sophisticated analytical literature in the form of books and articles in quality periodicals such as *The National Interest*, *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. With a few exceptions I have stayed with American sources simply because the Americans best know how to analyze their own policies even if some of them as in all empires come from a foreign background originally – Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Nial Ferguson and Owen Harries to mention immigrants from Germany, Poland, Scotland and Australia. Thus my ambition is to show how the strategy and its implications are seen in America, not in Sweden.

I begin by defining the three concepts of grand strategy, empire and geopolitics. Of the possible grand strategies of America I conclude that the grand strategy of empire now better than others cuts to the chase. I define why America is an empire and how, indeed, Sweden together with forty other nations is a part of that empire. Geopolitics is the analytical method used by almost all scholars dealing with American strategy and I demonstrate how the geopolitical dimension of the Empire is shown in American presence around the world now and in the foreseeable future.

The new national security strategy of 2002 is contrasted with the containment, deterrence and defense strategy of the cold war – the continuity and change of the new grand strategy. The study proceeds to show some weaknesses in the Empire and the problem of legitimacy, especially in Europe. I maintain that America now cares less about the European sense of legitimacy than before since the action has shifted from Europe to Asia and Europe itself has much less a stake in the outcome.

The implications for Sweden come last. Sweden itself often vastly overestimates its importance on the Washington horizon. During the cold war Sweden was a precious piece of real estate on the Eurasian rimland, but now it is a friendly and effective partner inside the empire. Like the rest of Europe it can influence America only through cooperation and like the European Union at large it does so best through a division of labour, contributing more soft than hard power. By

adhering to the Security Strategy of the European Union formulated by Javier Solana (ie. Robert Cooper) Sweden like America puts mega terrorism and weapons of mass destruction at the top of the list of threats. Swedish action within the framework of the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, Partnership for Peace or bilaterally are all in harmony with American interests and appreciated accordingly. As long as the coalition of the willing is as good as NATO operations Sweden is in good shape. Like America Sweden insists that NATO, not the EU, is the important national security institution in Europe. The reasoning is different but the result is the same, Swedish scepticism of the EU in general is noted in Washington that in the future may embark upon a divide and rule policy in Europe. In the long run Partnership for Peace is marginalized since all qualified members have joined NATO. Outside NATO Sweden will have great difficulties to influence the transatlantic agenda.

Grand Strategy

The concept of grand strategy has many definitions. In his book on the subject Robert Art defines it as “how a nation should wield its military instruments to realize its foreign policy goals”.¹ This is a more narrow definition than most others. Art goes on to define eight possible grand strategies.²

- Dominion – aims to rule the world.
- Global collective security – to keep the peace everywhere.
- Regional collective security – to keep the peace in some places.
- Cooperative security – to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting the offensive military capabilities of states.
- Containment – to hold the line against a specific aggressor state.
- Isolationism – to stay out of most wars and to keep a free hand for the United States.
- Offshore balancing – to do that and, in addition, to cut down any emerging Eurasian hegemon.
- Selective engagement – to do a selected number of critical tasks.

Of these the first four cannot be obtained and the last four are feasible according to Art. Containment, the grand strategy of the cold war, is feasible but can be subsumed under selective engagement. The entire book is then dedicated to prove that selective engagement is the grand strategy to be chosen. Dominion is impossible because states with nuclear weapons cannot be militarily defeated, because allies are needed for overseas campaigns and because military actions will lead to coalitions of countervailing forces to check the United States that build up their armed forces to compete with the United States.

Art's book had been in the making for a long time when it was published in 2003. He mentions the big geopolitical tradition of Spykman, Lippman and Tucker as his inspiration.³ Indeed there is a new tension between strategists who claim that 9-11 and terrorism completely has changed American priorities and those who maintain that good old geopolitics still is the basis of all national security analysis. Not having absorbed all implications of 9-11 Art belongs to the latter school. But one might claim, he has not absorbed the lessons of American increased primacy since 1989 either. The grand strategy of the

¹ Robert J. Art. *A Grand Strategy for America*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2003, p. 2.

² Ibid, p.82.

³ Ibid p. XV. Nicholas J. Spykman *America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power* 1942 Walter Lippman: *U.S. Foreign Policy. Shield of the Republic* 1942 Robert W. Tucker: *A New Isolationism, Threat or Promise* 1972.

predominant power in world politics is different from the grand strategy of empire.

One of Robert Art's predecessors was an article in *International Security* published in 1996. Here Barry Posen and Andrew Ross distinguish between four grand strategies for the United States.⁴

- Neo-isolationism
- Selective engagement
- Liberal internationalism
- Primacy

To these four I would add a fifth: – Empire

According to Posen and Ross the Clinton administration was borrowing from all the strategies except neo-isolationism and the result is selective (but cooperative) primacy.⁵

But the grand strategies formulated during the Clinton years become more interesting if we compare them to the strata of the American public and elites identified by Walter Russel Mead.⁶

| | |
|---------------|----------------------------|
| Jeffersonians | isolationists |
| Wilsonians | idealist internationalists |
| Hamiltonians | economic internationalists |
| Jacksonians | populist nationalists |

Not many Jeffersonians exist in America today – the followers of Patrick Buchanan.⁷

In red America, the heartland that voted for George W. Bush, many are Jacksonians. The revival Jacksonians are anti establishment and had their first taste of power with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. The period of state control and regulation inaugurated by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 was coming to an end. In this new America the revival Hamiltonians had a central position because they represented the military industrial complex in a nation winning the cold war. Hightech industry and the revolution in military affairs, RMA, gave the New Hamiltonians power even if the high tech entrepreneurs of

⁴ Barry R. Posen & Andrew L. Ross "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy" *International Security*. Winter 1966/97.

⁵ Ibid p. 44.

⁶ Walter Russel Mead: *Power, Terror, Peace and War America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2004.

⁷ Patrick J. Buchanan: *A Republic. Not an Empire. Reclaiming America's Destiny*. Washington DC: Regnery Publishing Inc. 1999.

Silicon Valley were mostly Democrats and the aerospace tycoons of California, Texas and Arizona Republicans.

The most interesting transformation is, however, carried out by assertive Wilsonians. The old idealist Wilsonians were overwhelmingly Protestant and possessed by the Christian missionary spirit- The new assertive Wilsonians are not religiously based and as a consequence the Neoconservatives can be identified in this group that wants to spread democracy rather than Christianity. "Wilsonianism in boots" is the best catch phrase. Henry Kissinger has characterized Wilsonians as persons who see American foreign policy "as a struggle between good and evil, in each phase of which it is in America's mission to help defeat the evil foes challenging the peaceful order. – Wilsonianism rejects peace through balance of power in favour of peace through moral consensus".⁸

Certainly Paul Wolfowitz and most of the time, George W. Bush fit that bill. But Bush is also a Jacksonian. Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld are Hamiltonians but also Jacksonians. Colin Powell was a selective internationalist and this was his only intellectual bond with his otherwise distant president.

⁸ Henry Kissinger: *Years of Renewal*. New York: Simon & Schuster 1999, p. 97.

Empire

Beginning in the mid 1970s scholars predicted the decline of American power relative to the rest of the world. The exception had been Jean-Jacques Servan-Schriber and his *The American Challenge* in 1967. But most of the literature was declinist culminating with two major works published in 1987, two years before the victory in the cold war, Paul Kennedy's *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* and David Calleo's *Beyond American Hegemony*. Half a generation later the hegemony of America is plain for all to see. An increasing number of scholars have even moved their mind frame from hegemony to empire. As early as in November 2000 Richard Haass, speaking at a conference in Atlanta argued that Americans needed to reconceive their global role from one of traditional Nation-state to an imperial power.⁹ Of these analysts Niall Ferguson is by far the most exciting¹⁰ but William Odom and Robert Dujarric are more thorough and give us a better definition of what they call *America's Inadvertent Empire*.¹¹

This empire is, of course, led by the United States but contains another forty nations including Sweden. In the words of Geir Lundestad it is an "empire by invitation", America has been invited into Europe by the Europeans. In the words of Odom it is a Liberal Empire with three features.¹²

1. It is an ideological empire, not a territorial one
2. It is a wealth-generating empire, not a wealth-squandering one
3. Countries struggle to join it, not to counterbalance it.

The Liberal Empire has liberal capitalist institutions and its member states have all experienced a Constitutional Breakthrough.¹³ Liberal institutions have been founded and kept; laws that restrict the power of the state over the freedom and rights of the individual and decide how the laws are created and implemented. In this order of things free elections do not automatically lead to a constitutional breakthrough. India and Russia has not achieved it, despite recent free elections and thereby "democracy". For the same reason Iraq will not be part of the Empire for a long time, even if the elections of January 2005 are free.

⁹ Andrew Bacevin: *American Empire*. Cambridge MA Harvard University Press, 2002 p. 219.

¹⁰ Niall Ferguson: *Colossus. The Rise and Fall of the American Empire*. London: Allen Lane 2004.

¹¹ William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric: *America's Inadvertent Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press 2004. See also Robert W. Merry: *Sands of Empire*, New York: Simon & Schuster 2005 and an entire section on imperialism in *Daedalus* Spring 2005.

¹² Odom p.40.

¹³ Ibid p. 40-44.

Economic, Military and Political Membership Status in the American Empire. 2002. ¹⁴

| Country | GDP in Billion U.S.\$ | Military Ally | Constitutional Breakthrough |
|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| North America | | | |
| 1. U.S.A | 10,894 | ----- | Yes ^a |
| 2. Canada | 760 | NATO | Yes |
| 3. Mexico | 664 | No | No |
| Europe | | | |
| 4. Belgium | 226 | NATO | Yes |
| 5. Czech Republic | 85 | NATO | Uncertain ^a |
| 6. Denmark | 190 | NATO | Yes |
| 7. France | 1,531 | NATO | Yes |
| 8. Germany | 2,145 | NATO | Yes |
| 9. Greece | 146 | NATO | Uncertain |
| 10. Hungary | 64 | NATO | Uncertain |
| 11. Iceland | 9 | NATO | Yes |
| 12. Italy | 1,278 | NATO | Yes |
| 13. Luxembourg | 24 | NATO | Yes |
| 14. Netherlands | 456 | NATO | Yes |
| 15. Norway | 188 | NATO | Yes |
| 16. Poland | 196 | NATO | Uncertain |
| 17. Portugal | 130 | NATO | Yes |
| 18. Spain | 710 | NATO | Yes |
| 19. Turkey | 185 | NATO | Uncertain |
| 20. United Kingdom | 1,646 | NATO | Yes |
| 21. Austria | 218 | Neutral | Yes |
| 22. Finland | 138 | Neutral | Yes |
| 23. Ireland | 132 | Neutral | Yes |
| 24. Sweden | 244 | Neutral | Yes |
| 25. Switzerland | 285 | Neutral | Yes |
| 26. Bulgaria | 17 | NATO in 2004 | No |
| 27. Estonia | 7 | NATO in 2004 | Uncertain |
| 28. Latvia | 9 | NATO in 2004 | No |
| 29. Lithuania | 13 | NATO in 2004 | Uncertain |
| 30. Romania | 47 | NATO in 2004 | No |
| 31. Slovakia | 25 | NATO in 2004 | No |
| 32. Slovenia | 23 | NATO in 2004 | Uncertain |
| Asia-Pacific | | | |
| 33. Australia | 436 | ANZUS | Yes |
| 34. Japan | 4,229 | Bilateral | Yes |
| 35. New Zealand | 62 | ANZUS ^b | Yes |
| 36. Philippines | 83 | Bilateral | Uncertain |

¹⁴ Ibid p. 38-39.

| | | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-----------|---------------|
| 37. Singapore ^c | 95 | Informal | Uncertain |
| 38. South Korea | 529 | Bilateral | Uncertain |
| 39. Taiwan ^c | 302 | Informal | Uncertain |
| 40. Thailand | 130 | Bilateral | No |
| Mideast | | | |
| 41. Israel ^c | 108 | Informal | Yes/Uncertain |

^a “Yes” means that constitutional orders are mature, at least twenty years old. “Uncertain” means that a country has a constitutional order less than twenty years old, or it appears to have achieved an initial constitutional breakthrough, but uncertainties about it persist.

^b The United States has suspended military relations with New Zealand until it reverses its policy on U.S. nuclear-power ship visits.

^c Taiwan, Singapore and Israel have strong informal military ties to the United States.

John Lewis Gaddis maintains that America has been an empire throughout its history. Through the end of the 1930s it was based on continental hegemony ideological example and commercial opportunity.¹⁵ After Pearl Harbor and throughout WWII and the cold war there was an informal American empire that was reconciled with liberty since there was always much more to fear from the outside. The third surprise attack after the burning of Washington in August 1814 and Pearl Harbor in December 1941 has redefined the liberal empire to seek securing liberty throughout the world. This, remarks Gaddis, reflects prudence, capability and arrogance. A twenty-first century empire of liberty should not only make the world safe for democracy or diversity or primarily for the United States. It should also make the world safe for federalism from which all the rest would flow.¹⁶ The American system of cold war alliances provided a way for America to wield power while minimizing arrogance, and this is the kind of federalism that John Gaddis now seeks.

Globalization is another concept that is best understood within the Empire than apart from it. Globalization transforms economics, produces unprecedented levels of wealth as a kind of invisible hand in the marketplace writ large, transcending individual states and washing over the entire globe. Its only mechanisms are part of the American empire's institutions and apply mainly to the advanced and post-industrial societies of the world. Without the American empire there would be wars and anarchy and therefore no globalization. Globalization is an effect not a cause of the empire.¹⁷

Niall Ferguson's characterisation of the American Empire is as follows:¹⁸

¹⁵ John Lewis Gaddis: *Surprise, Security and the American Experiment* Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, 2004 p. 108.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 110.

¹⁷ Odom, p. 52-53.

¹⁸ Ferguson, p. 13.

It is a liberal democracy and market economy, though its policies has some illiberal characteristics and its economy a surprisingly high level of state intervention (mixed might be more accurate than market). It is primarily concerned with its own security and maintaining international communications and secondarily, with ensuring access to raw materials (principally, although not exclusively, oil). It is also in the business of providing a limited number of public goods: peace, by intervening against some bellicose regimes and in some civil wars; freedom of the seas and skies for trade; and a distinctive form of conversion called Americanisation which is carried out less by old-style Christian missionaries than by exporters of American consumer goods and entertainment. Its methods of formal rule are primarily military in character; its methods of informal rule rely heavily on nongovernmental organizations and corporations and, in some cases, local elites.

To be sure, one of the main authors of the new national security strategy, Philip Zelikow, warns us of “the distraction of empire”.¹⁹

Real imperial power is sovereign power. Sovereign rule, and a ruler is not just the most powerful among diverse interest groups. Sovereignty means a direct monopoly control over the organization and use of armed might. It means direct control over the administration of justice and the definition here of. It means control over what is bought and sold, the terms of trade, to the limit of the ruler's desires and capacities. In the modern, pluralistic world of the 21st century, the United States does not have anything like such direct authority over other countries, nor does it seek it.²⁰

With this rigorous definition only the Soviet Empire qualifies. In the modern pluralistic world of the 21st century America is now an empire more than just another hegemonic state.

¹⁹ Philip Zelikow ”The Transformation of National Security”. *The National Interest*. Spring 2003, p. 17.

²⁰ Ibid p. 18-19.

Geopolitics

“Geopolitics is relating international political power to the geographical setting”²¹ says Colin Gray. As he points out, America has been better at formulating doctrines than strategies. We have the Truman Doctrine (a global commitment to support “free peoples”), the Eisenhower Doctrine (for the Middle East), the Nixon doctrine (announcing U.S. preparedness to support only those countries willing and able to make a major effort to defend themselves on the ground), the Carter Doctrine (declaring the Persian Gulf area a vital interest to the United States) and the Reagan Doctrine (the United States will endeavour to roll back Soviet influence in the third world).²² We even had, for a while, the Powell Doctrine (do not enter a war without a clear exit strategy).

Given the purpose of these doctrines some are hard to operationalize. Given the pragmatic nature of American policy they offer scant guidance to American action.

Yet the over all grand strategy of the cold war, containment, worked. The United States has produced five decades of net security along the rimland of Eurasia. Writing in 1988, basing his quest for a maritime US strategy against an aggressive Soviet land power, Gray puts it:²³

The answers lie in denying prompt acquisition of important territorial “prizes”, supporting, reviving or creating continental distraction; gaining leverage through seizing or threatening seizure of important assets; shifting the balance of forces progressively in the alliance’s favor; developing flexibility and surprise in applications of force from the sea; and eroding the enemies confidence in the likelihood of victory.

Grand strategy is always carried out from a geopolitical base. In its history the American Empire has been interested in different geopolitical regions at different times. At the beginning of the twentieth century Central America and the Caribbean was the focus. During the cold war Europe and the Far East, the rimlands of the Eurasian continent were to be protected and nourished. Now the arch of instability from Magrebh to Indonesia poses the greatest challenge to American national security policy. Despite new challenges of mega terrorism and weapons of mass destruction geopolitical analysis remains the basis for evaluating the American Empire and its future.

²¹ Colin S. Gray. *The Geopolitics of Superpower*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky 1988, p. 43.

²² Ibid, p. 53.

²³ Ibid, p.52.

In his writings Henry Kissinger has consistently taken a geopolitical approach. In *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (2002) four out of seven chapters are pure geopolitics. There now exists, Kissinger asserts, four international systems at the same time. The US, the Western Hemisphere and Europe; Asia; the Middle East; and Africa.²⁴ The first international system minus the Western Hemisphere plus essentially Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand belong to the Empire as we define it in this study.

Zbigniew Brzezinski is the other current great American geopolitician. In *The Great Chessboard* (1997) and *The Geostrategic Triad* (2001) he demonstrates his mastership. When it comes to American-European-Russian-Chinese relations his analysis is as relevant as ever also after 9-11. In *The Choice*, 2004 he still sticks to geopolitics with a modification. Terrorism has mainly to do with American involvement with the Middle East.²⁵ The war against terror is a misnomer, he says. Terrorism like Blitzkrieg is a technique. To fight the terrorists you have to look at the causes.²⁶ Here he is supported by Helmut Schmidt who proclaims "the war on terrorism" to be an empty phrase.²⁷ In Kissinger-like fashion Schmidt has organized his book to survey world politics the geopolitical way.

Thus, the Empire is not just a state of mind. Its geopolitical dimension is expressed in its global presence.

²⁴ Henry Kissinger: *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* London: Simon & Schuster 2004, p. 25-26.

²⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski: *The Choice. Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York: Basic Books 2004, p.30.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 38.

²⁷ Helmut Schmidt: *Die Mächte der Zukunft*. München: Siedler Verlag 2004, p.101.

Global presence

Before the invasion of Iraq America had 752 military installations in 130 countries.²⁸ On August 16, 2004 President Bush announced that the United States will alter its overseas basing structure in the coming years. 70 000 servicemen stationed abroad will be affected. At the same time an Overseas Basing Commission began hearings in Congress. The Commission is due with its report in the fall of 2005.

In 2004 there were 388 000 troops abroad of a total of 1 434 000 in the US armed forces,²⁹ or 27 percent. The Iraq war with 122 000 troops inflated that figure. During the 1950-2000 year period the US Armed Forces had been an average 2,3 million men with 535 000 abroad or 22 percent.³⁰ Throughout the cold war there had been 250 000 troops in Germany. 10 million American soldiers had served in Germany during this half century, and the American knowledge of Germany in the US had increased accordingly. Up till 1965 50 000 American troops were stationed in France. More than 500 000 soldiers were in Vietnam in 1968. In 2004 the US armed forces counted 1,4 million, a mere 62 percent of the 1950-2000 average of 2,3 million.

Often forgotten in these statistics are the persons outside the armed forces. In 2001 there were 251 000 military, but in addition there were 34 000 civilians employed by the Department of Defense and 189 000 dependents, 474 000 in all, doubling the number of individuals. In Europe there were 116 000 military in 2003, 46 000 DoD employees and 125 000 dependents, 286 000 in all.³¹

All Americans abroad were distributed as follows in 2002:³²

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|
| ▪ Europe | 1 000 000 + |
| ▪ Mexico | 1 000 000 |
| ▪ Canada | 687 000 |
| ▪ Asia, Australia, Latin America | 700 000 |
| ▪ Israel | 180 000 |
| ▪ Arabian Middle East | 110 000 |
| ▪ Africa | 38 000 |

²⁸ Ferguson, p. 16.

²⁹ *The Military Balance 2004-05*. London: The ISSS 2004.

³⁰ Tin Kane: *US Troop Deployment 1950-2000*. Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2004.

³¹ Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire, Militarism, Security and The End of the Republic*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004, p. 160.

³² *International Herald Tribune*, 16-17 October, 2002.

3,8 million Americans, 1,4 percent of all, lived abroad. At the same time 32 million, 11 percent of all, had been born abroad.³³

The armed forces were distributed with 100 000 each in Europe and Eastern Asia plus temporarily 150 000 in the Middle East.

In 2004 they were based as follows: outside CONUS.³⁴

- Iraq 122 000
- Germany 70 000
- Japan 44 000
- South Korea 35 000
- Kuwait 25 000
- Hawaii 24 000
- Afghanistan 18 000
- Alaska 15 000
- 6th fleet in the Mediterranean 14 000
- UK 12 000
- Italy 10 000

In January 2005, 150 000 troops were in Iraq, 120 000 Army and 30 000 from the other services. Of the Army personnel 50 percent came from the field Army and 50 percent from the reserve forces. In the summer of 2005 that proportion is to change to 70-30. 14 brigades of the National Guard have served in Iraq, are there now or are due there in 2006. According to the plans an Army division based in the United States is to spend two years at home for every year spent abroad. Yet the 3rd infantry, the 4th infantry, the 101 airborne division and the First Marine Expeditionary Force have all been back in Iraq within this time frame.³⁵ Over the course of 2003-2004 virtually all the Army's 33 brigades were deployed overseas.³⁶ In 2005 the number of brigades in the Army will be increased from 36 to 39.³⁷ Even so the US Forces worldwide are stretched thin.³⁸

Naval overseas presence

In 1945 the US Navy deployed 40 carriers, 24 battleships, 24 000 combat aircraft, 3 million sailors and 0,5 million Marines.³⁹ In case of WWII these forces were to reconquer the Eurasian rimland from bases in Britain, North

³³ Ferguson, p. 209.

³⁴ *The Militar Balance 2004-05*. London: The IISS 2004.

³⁵ *New York Times*, 25 January 2005.

³⁶ Michael E. O'Hanlon: *Defence Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era*. Washington DC: Brookings 2005 p. 42-43.

³⁷ *Atlantic News*, February 1, 2005, p. 4.

³⁸ Lawrence J. Korb "Fixing the Mix", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2004.

³⁹ Richard J. Kugler, "Naval Overseas Presence in the New U.S. Defense Strategy" in Sam J. Tangredi ed.: *Globalization and Maritime Power* Washington DC: National Defense University 2002, p. 283.

Africa and Japan. In the 1980s the maritime strategy invented by the Reagan administration was to achieve a 600 ship Navy.⁴⁰ Sealift and airlift improved immensely while US military resources were positioned in allied nations around the world. In Norway, for instance, nine air bases were prepared for American combat aircraft under the COB (Co-located Operating Bases) agreements from 1974 -94.⁴¹ Following the loss of Iran, the Persian Gulf With its oil resources became a vital American strategic area in the 1980s. As a rule the US 5th Fleet had one carrier stationed in the Indian Ocean together with one carrier from the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and one carrier from the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific.

In the early 1990s military planning assumed that the armed forces were to handle two major conflicts at the same time – the Middle East and Korea were the likely places of conflict. Although that still is the general assumption the threat scenario has become more complicated. There is no main antagonist such as the Soviet Union was during the cold war. Instead there are multiple threats: terrorists and other non state actors, failing states and ethnic conflict, regional rogues armed with asymmetric strategies and WMD systems, and big powers with newly assertive geopolitical agendas of their own.

A new strategy of homeland defense and assertive security policy abroad leads to strategic changes. Overseas presence will be seen as a global asset in force planning and no longer an instrument of local forward defense but a tool of power projection.⁴² The shift of focus from Europe to Asia in American security policy makes the Navy more important. In Asia with its wide spaces, its antagonistic states of considerable military capability, its lack of American land bases on the Eurasian rimland, its absence of regional security arrangements, the Navy is the most flexible and useful instrument of American military power.

The future Navy has 36 battle groups for world wide deployment. 11 carrier strike groups, 12 expeditionary strike groups with 2 300 Marines each, 9 strike/missile defense groups and 4 converted Ohio submarines with 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each.⁴³ All places in the world can be reached in seventeen days at a speed of 25 knots.⁴⁴ In the summer of 2004 the Navy showed its proficiency by deploying 7 of its 12 carriers at the same time.

⁴⁰ John Lehman: *Command of the Seas*. New York: Scribners 1988. Norman Friedman: *The US Maritime Strategy*. London: Jane's 1988.

⁴¹ Rolf Tamnes: *Oljealder 1965-95*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1997, p. 82-83.

⁴² Kugler, p. 293.

⁴³ Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, "Global Concepts of Operations". *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 2003.

⁴⁴ Roger Cliff & Jeremy Shapiro, "The Shift to Asia: Implications for U.S. Land Power" in Lynn E. Davis & Jeremy Shapiro eds. *The US Army and the New National Security Strategy*. Santa Monica: RAND 2003, p. 97. Paul Bracken argues that the rise of Asian military power should lead America to restructure its armed forces for the basing in CONUS of mobile forces using speed, stealth and deception. (Paul Bracken: *Fire in the East* New York, Harper & Collins 1999, p.164).

Future overseas deployment

In the fall of 2004 the Commission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States began holding hearings. The change in deployment is to take place over ten years and will not begin until 2007-10. The reasons for redeployment are obvious. Until now the US forces overseas have been deployed against a potential Russian enemy in Eurasia, whereas current threats demand flexibility and adaptability. Manpower alone no longer equals American commitment, although boots on the ground always matter. Efficient global basing actually frees manpower for other tasks while new technology can move more manpower longer and faster than before. A surge capability in crisis areas is an important new goal.

The Quadrennial Defense Review QDR of September 2001 laid out four goals of the new defense policy:⁴⁵

- Assuring allies and friends of the United States steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfil its security commitments.
- Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of its allies and friends.
- Deterring aggression and coercion by forward employing the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capacity and supporting infrastructure.
- Decisively defeating any adversary, if deterrence fails.

Instead of the existing threat based model for force planning an enemy capability based approach was introduced. The goal is to transform the US military so they can⁴⁶

- Defend the United States.
- Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions.
- Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option for the president to call for a decisive victory in one of these conflicts – including the possibility of regime change and occupation.
- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

President Bush proclaimed a decisive victory over Iraq aboard the *Abraham Lincoln* on May 1, 2003. Regime change and occupation was taking place but it was, alas, not enough.

⁴⁵ *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001, p. 11-13.

⁴⁶ *Quadrennial Defense Review*, p. 17.

In 2001 QDR put it:⁴⁷

Based on changes in the international security environment, DoD's new strategic approach, and this transformed concept of deterrence, the U.S. global military posture will be reoriented to:

- Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.
- Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable U.S. forces to conduct training and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges and bases.
- Redistribute forces and equipment based on regional deterrence requirements.
- Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, prepositioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations, to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theatres against adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction and other means to deny access to U.S. forces.

Accordingly, the Department has made the following decisions:

- The Secretary of the Army will accelerate the introduction of forward-stationed Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to strengthen deterrence and improve U.S. strategic responsiveness on a global basis. In consultation with its European Allies, the United States envisages that an IBCT should be stationed in the European area by 2007. In addition, the Secretary of the Army will explore options for enhancing ground force capabilities in the Arabian Gulf.
- The Secretary of the Navy will increase aircraft carrier battle group presence in the Western Pacific and will explore options for home porting and additional three to four surface combatants, and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), in that area.
- The Secretary of the Air Force will develop plans to increase contingency basing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as in the Arabian Gulf. The Secretary of the Air Force will ensure sufficient en route infrastructure for refuelling and logistics to support operations in the Arabian Gulf or Western Pacific areas.
- The Secretary of the Navy will develop new concepts of maritime prepositioning, high-speed sealift, and new amphibious capabilities for the Marine Corps. The Secretary of the Navy will develop options to shift some of the Marine Corps' afloat pre-positioned equipment from the

⁴⁷ *Ibid Review*, p. 26-.27.

Mediterranean toward the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf to be more responsive to contingencies in the Middle East. In consultation with U.S. allies and friends, the Secretary of the Navy will explore the feasibility of conducting training for littoral warfare in the Western Pacific for the Marine Corps.

- DoD will also recommend changes in the worldwide alignment of special operations forces assets to account for new regional emphases in the defense strategy.
- The United States will maintain its critical bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, which may also serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world.

The next QDR in February 2006 will be broader and prepare for four kinds of warfare: irregular warfare, traditional warfare, disruptive threats and catastrophic attacks. In the new world US forces are to go anywhere in the world in ten days, defeat the enemy in thirty, and be ready to fight again in another thirty. The old basing system is to be divided into three kinds of bases.⁴⁸

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| – Main operating base | – personnel on the premises. |
| – Forward operating base | – small permanent presence. |
| – Cooperative security location | – prepositioned equipment, logistical arrangements. |

The US overseas military presence costs 10-15 billion dollars a year when the nation is not at war.⁴⁹ The Iraq operation costs 1 billion a week in comparison.

Of the testimony given to the Overseas Basing Commission in the fall of 2004, John Hamre's was the most realistic.⁵⁰ Military effectiveness is not the primary consideration, he cautioned. Overseas bases last for a generation. During the cold war the strategic framework incorporated the strategic interest of the host nation. "The global war on terrorism" is a context not widely shared by other nations. During the friendlier times of the cold war Americans were trusted and status of force agreements, SOFA, were easily obtained. Not so any more; there is no SOFA between the US and the interim Iraq government. The costs of Iraq will, indeed, lead to a much smaller and slower rebasing than was originally envisaged.

⁴⁸ *The Military Balance*, 2004-05, p. 16.

⁴⁹ Kugler, p. 292.

⁵⁰ John J. Hamre, "Overseas Basing", Testimony before the Commission on the *Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States*, Washington DC: CSIS, November 9, 2004.,

In 2005 the planned changed deployment is to be implemented between 2007 and 2017.⁵¹ The number of troops in Europe will go from 62 000 to 28 000.⁵²

Germany

| <i>Leaving</i> | <i>New troops</i> |
|--|------------------------------|
| 2 brigades from 1 st Armored division | 1 Stryker brigade in Bavaria |
| 2 brigades from 1st Infantry division | |
| 13 installations including Rhein Main air base | |
| 1 F 16 squadron at Spangdahlem air base? | |

United Kingdom

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| U.S Naval Headquarters Europe | |
|-------------------------------|--|

Italy

| | |
|--|---|
| | U.S Naval Headquarters Europe at Naples |
|--|---|

Turkey

| | |
|--|------------------|
| | 1 F-16 squadron? |
|--|------------------|

Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| | Bases and 10 000 troops? |
|--|--------------------------|

Iraq

| | |
|--|----------------------------|
| | Four main operating bases? |
|--|----------------------------|

Japan

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Marines in Okinawa | 13 th Air Force Command at Guam merged with 5 th Air Force Command at Yukota air base. US Army Corps Headquarters in Tokyo area. Two aircraft carriers instead of one? Missile defense destroyers. |
|--------------------|---|

Korea

| | |
|--|---|
| 12 500 troops including one brigade from 2 nd Infantry division | Move of US forces to two bases south of Han river |
| 19 US installations of 41 | |

Guam

| | |
|--|--|
| | Heavy bombers, strike fighters, Carrier battle group? Marines from Okinawa ? |
|--|--|

Australia

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| | Training ranges |
|--|-----------------|

⁵¹ Peter Spiegel "US revamp cold war military infrastructure", *International Herald Tribune*, August 17, 2004.. Andrew Koch "US Troops on the move towards faster and more flexible deployment", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 august 2004. *The Military Balance 2004-05*, p. 16-17.

⁵² *Atlantic News*. 14 April, 2005.

In the Army the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be the most mobile brigades. The brigade is to be moved in C-130 transport planes and cannot have armed vehicles weighing more than 20 tons.

The deployment schedule is:⁵³

| | |
|------|--|
| 2003 | 3 rd brigade, 2 nd infantry division, Fort Lewis, Washington |
| 2004 | 1 st brigade, 25 th - “ - - “ - |
| 2005 | 172 nd brigade Alaska |
| 2006 | 2 nd armored cavalry regiment Fort Polk, Louisiana |

Critics maintain that too much reliance on airlift will prevent a sound mix of light and heavy army units.

On Iceland 4 unarmed F-15 Eagle fighters and 4 air force helicopters, altogether 1450 troops, stay.

In Asia many future deployments are still not settled. The Navy will seek more presence in Singapore. The Marine Corps will train in Australia and possibly again in the Philippines. The Guam and Diego Garcia bases will be strengthened. In Africa the presence of 1 200 troops in Djibouti is complemented by supply arrangements in Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, Uganda, Zambia and Namibia. An anti-terrorism center is planned in Algeria.

The geographical shift from Europe to Asia is obvious in this planned distribution of US forces world wide. With the current situation in Iraq the Middle East comes first in importance, Asia second and Europe third. The planned distribution of US forces reflects the geopolitical aspects of American grand strategy, the aspects that matter most for Sweden.

How that geopolitical landscape evolves till 2020 is the subject of a major CIA study published in December 2004. The predictions most relevant for our study are:⁵⁴

- Globalization largely irreversible, is likely to become less Westernized
- Rise of Asia – China and India – and advent of possible new economic middle-weights
- Aging population in established powers, EU no superpower, Russia and Japan decline in importance
- Political islam remains a potent force, al Qaeda superceded by similarly inspired extremist groups, increasingly decentralized terrorist threat
- Improved WMD capabilities of some states, nuclear proliferation, terrorists with biological agents or nuclear weapons.

⁵³ John Gordon & David Orletsky” Moving Rapidly to the Fight” in Davis *op cit*, p. 201.

⁵⁴ *Report of the National Intelligence Council's, 2020 Project*. Washington DC: CIA 2004, p. 8-15.

- Arch of instability spanning Middle East, Asia, Africa
- Great power conflict escalating into total war unlikely
- US will remain single most powerful actor, economically, technologically and militarily.

The new grand strategy of America takes account of all these factors. In particular, it concentrates on the new alarming elements: Muslim extremists possessing weapons of mass destruction inhabiting the arch of instability.

Involved in the study have been many Americans and Europeans who do not share the ideology of the Bush administration. That is why the consensus on the conclusions is so interesting. The West, ie. The Euroatlantic community sees the same challenges. It is how they propose to deal with them that makes a difference, where America and many Europeans part company.

The National Security Strategy

The strategy of the Bush administration was conceived between January and September 2002 immediately after 9-11. The first draft composed by the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department was rejected by Condoleezza Rice as too tame.⁵⁵ Instead she brought in Robert Zelikow, her former colleague in the first Bush administration and co-author of *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*.⁵⁶ He, Rice and Stephen Hadley, her successor at the National Security Council, formulated the doctrine.

Defending, preserving and extending peace is the main task.⁵⁷ Free trade, free markets and foreign aid are tools in this effort. America is to work with its traditional allies – NATO nations, Australia, Japan and South Korea. But it is also to cooperate with traditional great powers and former adversaries: Russia, China and India. The main threat to American security is terrorism and in particular terrorism armed with weapons of mass destruction. Since these terrorists cannot be deterred pre-emption and even preventive war may be used. In Robert Litwak's words:⁵⁸

Prevention is a series of strategies to prevent the possession of WMDs, including, under extreme circumstances, the use of military force. Pre-emption is the use of military forces when an adversary's use of weapons of mass destruction is imminent.

This kind of action is not to be used lightly. As Condoleezza Rice puts it:⁵⁹

This approach must be used with great caution. The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light – to the United States or any other nation – to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Pre-emptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very great. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action.

The clear break with the cold war doctrine depends on the nature of the main adversary. Containment, deterrence and defense worked because the Soviet Union possessed a distinct territory as a target of retaliation. To the Soviet leaders nuclear weapons were the weapons of last resort. The terrorists, on the

⁵⁵ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Viking 2004, p. 316.

⁵⁶ Harvard University Press, 1995.

⁵⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States* Washington DC: The National Security Council, September 17, 2002.

⁵⁸ Robert S. Litwak. "The new calculus for pre-emption", *Survival*, Winter 2002-03, p. 54.

⁵⁹ Philip Zelikow, "The Transformation of National Security". *The National Interest*, Spring 2003, p.27.

other hand, possess no territory, are not deterred and will use weapons of mass destruction at the first available opportunity.

It is instructive to compare the Bush doctrine to the Clinton national security strategy published in December 1999:⁶⁰

| <i>Bush</i> | <i>Clinton</i> |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Defend the peace | Enhance American security |
| Preserve peace | Bolster American prosperity |
| Extend peace | Promote democracy and human rights. |

While the Clinton administration assumes that peace has arrived and the march toward democracy is inevitable the Bush administration sees the need to fight for it. Inherent in the Bush grand strategy is the plan to transform the Muslim Middle East, to bring it into the modern world. Condoleezza Rice had compared the moment to the 1945-47 period when Truman, Acheson and Kennan had seized the moment to bring democracy to Germany and Japan. This was to be the creation of the Bush contribution to world politics.

The grand strategy of the cold war has been contrasted with great sharpness by John Ikenberry with the new grand strategy of Bush. The cold war harbingered two American strategies simultaneously. One was realist organized around containment, deterrence and the maintenance of the global balance of power against the Soviet Union. The other one was liberal. It sought to build order around institutionalized political relations among integrated market economies, supported by an opening of economies. This strategy was to avoid the return of the 1930s with its regional blocks, trade conflict and strategic rivalry. Open trade, democracy and institutional relations were the goals. A rule-based international order, where the United States has large influence over making the rules serves America best:⁶¹

This international order was built on two historic bargains. One was the US commitment to provide its European and Asian partners with security protection and access to American markets, technology and supplies within an open world economy. In return, those countries agreed to be reliable partners providing diplomatic, economic and logistical support for the United States as it lead the wider Western post-war order.

The other is the liberal bargain that addressed the uncertainties to American power. East Asian and European states agreed to accept American leadership and operate within an agreed upon political-economic system. The United States, in response, opened itself up and bound itself to its partners. In effect,

⁶⁰ Gaddis, p. 83.

⁶¹ S. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambitions", *Foreign Affairs*, September/February 2002, p. 46-47.

the United States built an institutionalized coalition of partners and reinforced the stability of these mutually beneficial relations 'by making itself more user friendly' that is by playing by the rules and creating on – going political processes that facilitated consultation and joint decision making. The United States made its power safe for the world, and in return the world agreed to live within the US system.⁶²

This grand strategy that has served America so well is now superceded by a new policy. Obviously many elements of the old strategies are kept but the new strategy breaks with tradition in the following respect, according to Ikenberry:⁶³

1. Keep a unipolar world without any rival to America.
2. The largest new threats, terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, cannot be deterred and leave no margin for misjudgement.
3. Deterrence is a past stage, defence and attacks including preventive attack are necessary means.
4. A new concept of sovereignty. The possession of weapons of mass destruction by dangerous nations is unacceptable and must be met if necessary by violating old concepts of state sovereignty.
5. Many international rules, treaties, security partnerships change character and have to be broken if necessary.
6. In responding to threats the mission determines the coalition.
7. Strategic stability is no goal as such, and is not important. Russia is for instance down and China is up in the hierarchy of great powers. You cannot freeze the distribution of power in the world through ABM or START treaties, to take two examples.

Ikenberry predicted that this approach was fraught with peril and likely to fail. It was not only politically unsustainable but diplomatically harmful. It would trigger antagonism and resistance that will leave America in a more hostile and divided world.

In the spring of 2004 he again announced that American grand strategy has failed in Iraq and everywhere else.⁶⁴ Other scholars like John Lewis Gaddis beg to differ.

Other analysts agree on the strategy but not necessarily on the outcome. To Robert Jervis the strategy offers four points:⁶⁵

- This is an opportune time to transform international politics.

⁶² Ibid, p. 48-49.

⁶³ Ibid, p. 49-53.

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 45. S. John Ikenberry, "The end of the neoconservative movement". *Survival*, Spring 2004.

⁶⁵ Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine". *Political Science Quarterly*, 3. 2002.

- Great threats can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, even preventive war.
- There is a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary.
- Thus, peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.

John Lewis Gaddis is the most consistent defender of the strategy outside the administration.

It rejects the Clinton administration's assumption that because the movement towards democracy and capitalism had become irreversible all the United States had to do was to 'engage' with the rest of the world to 'enlarge' that process.⁶⁶

On the contrary democracy has to be fought for and the new strategy is now to democratize the Muslim world, where, of course, most terrorists are to be found.

In a summing up of the situation in late 2004 Gaddis says.⁶⁷ There has been several successes. Another terrorist attack against America has not occurred since September 2001. America has taken the offensive against the terrorists. Chock and awe has changed the status quo in the Middle East and all Arab and Muslim nations are more impressed by American power. But the record is mixed. Preventive and pre-emptive war against rogue states is supported by very few nations. There was no planning for the occupation of Iraq. The US military are overstretched and the obligations under funded. The language, the tone has been wrong.

In the nuclear weapons field Libya and Pakistan may be American victories but Iran and North Korea could still be failures. The grand strategy shows the way here, but only when used with moderation. Finally Gaddis calls for moderation and careful planning. Bismarck stopped after Denmark, Austria and France and created a great power Germany. Bush should stop after Afghanistan and Iraq.

Walter Russel Mead also emphasizes the traditional elements of the new American grand strategy. Preventing hostile hegemonic powers from establishing themselves in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, protecting the freedom of the seas and skies and especially securing the safe passage of oil to the world markets.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Gaddis, p. 90.

⁶⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, "Grand Strategy in the Second Term", *Foreign Affairs*. January/February, 2005.

⁶⁸ Walter Russel Mead *Power, Terror, Peace and War. America's Grand Strategy in a world at Risk*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p.109.

Many of these methods are traditional and spell continuity. Free trade, free markets and foreign aid is embraced. America is to cooperate with friends in NATO, with Japan, South Korea and Australia. But Russia and China are no longer considered to be enemies but important partners of cooperation. Together with India they are to eliminate terrorists, states that harbour terrorists and weapons of mass destruction in their countries.⁶⁹ And here is the new reason for a new strategy. 9-11 shows that the world has changed. It is now possible for terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction to carry out attacks with colossal consequences for the Western world. A changing strategic situation calls for a changing strategy. The old strategy, good for traditional goals that still exist, is not sufficient for the new era. The old strategies have to be superseded with new ones, suitable for the new situation in world politics.

The transformative power of American values signifies the soft power behind the strategy. When it comes to the war against terror Walter Russel Mead maintains that this phase used by the Bush administration is necessary for domestic political reasons. The American people in general and the neo-Jacksonian Republicans in particular will settle for nothing less.⁷⁰ The invasion of Iraq had many reasons in addition to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. To the neo-Jacksonians it was bringing the war to the enemy, just as in the case of Afghanistan. This is a warning to all potential enemies in the area, the chock and awe, pointed to by Gaddis. To the neo-conservatives in the form of neo-Wilsonians it was an attempt to build democracy in the Middle East.

⁶⁹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington DC: National Security Council, September, 2002. NATO gets 57 lines, Russia 68, China 60 and India 22.

⁷⁰ Walter Russel Mead p. 113

The American Empire and grand strategy: Three complications

The three weaknesses of the American empire are deficiencies in the field of economics, manpower and attention.⁷¹ In 2003 the gross foreign debt of the United States is 8 trillion dollars, 5 percent of GDP. Having long been a net investor abroad the net liabilities investment are 23 percent. The reason why so many foreign investors prefer America is, of course, that because it is an empire, the investments are safe even if the yield may be less than in some other places. The enormous debt is however not so alarming and for geopolitical reasons. China holds most of it and thereby finances American domestic reforms. A dollar devaluation would hurt China in several ways. The Chinese assets in dollars would be less valuable and the big Chinese exports to America would suffer. So would the Chinese economy. As long as America and its dollar is the locomotive in the world economy the American foreign debt will not hamper its foreign policy and capabilities.⁷²

The manpower shortage is both in military and civil personnel. The Iraq occupation shows the US armed forces overstretched. Unlike the British Empire America has so far not been dependent on colonial troops. One third of the Commonwealth troops in WWI and almost half in WWII were not British-Canadian, Australian, New Zealanders, South African, Indian etc.⁷³ There is, of course, no reason why the US armed forces could not be increased. They were at the average 2.3 million with 535 000 abroad during the 1950-2000 period. That is 0.9 million respectively 300 000 more than at the current stage. In addition the coalition of the willing will take the place of the old British colonial troops. Earlier thoughts that the Revolution in Military Affairs would save on overseas troop deployment have been proven wrong.⁷⁴ Boots on the ground is still what matters.

The civil personnel needed abroad are businessmen and civil servants. Like in the British Empire there is no lack of businessmen in the American Empire. The difference is recently a reluctance of the best and the brightest to venture abroad for a longer time. With modern communications top executives prefer to stay in the big metropolises of the States.

The British Empire had what America lacks – an international civil service. Seventyfive percent of the elite Indian Civil Service in the 1930s were Oxford or

⁷¹ Ferguson, p. 290.

⁷² Ibid, p. 279-285.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 292.

⁷⁴ Michael O'Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring the US Troops Home?". *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1988/89

Cambridge graduates.⁷⁵ Even the Colonial Service for service in the other colonies, Africa et.al. had a rate of almost 50 percent Oxbridge graduates. Especially Scots found this route to upward social mobility. Of course, the US Peace Corps is nothing like this, nor does it have similar functions. The closest thing to an American international civil service has been found by James Kurth.⁷⁶ America is a multicultural and transnational (that includes Latin America) Empire, he claims. The civil imperial class of the American Empire is different. They are the foreign students who come to American universities and learn American principles and practices. The foreign students are both imperial immigrants – when they arrive in America for their studies – and imperial emigrants – when they return home for their careers. Those who stay form a *corpus colosseum* between the American metropolis and the hinterland. This has been important in many post WWII nations. In Germany many hundred members of the *AtlantikBrücke* published full page ads in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *New York Times* in the winter of 2003 pledging their allegiance to the American foreign policy line.

But new factors will mitigate the effect of this colonial class. As Henry Kissinger notes “there is a generation shift in Europe”.⁷⁷ Young Europeans no longer have memories of WWII and its aftermath with all their emotional repercussions. In addition the number of foreign students in America has decreased after 9-11. There are still far more foreign students in the United States than in any other country. But the number is declining and thereby the number of these unconventional civil servants in the American Empire.

“Imperialism in a hurry”, Michael Ignatieff calls the third problem. Iraq was an eminent example of two generic deficiencies: Inadequate post war resources and too little planning for the post war situation.⁷⁸ The Bush administration that had come to power rejecting nation building as a task has been forced to indulge in nation building both in Afghanistan and Iraq. As Christopher Coker points out, “the American way of warfare is not conducive to imperial rule”.⁷⁹

Where the United States has been impatient and withdrawn the result has not been democratic nations. Cuba and Haiti in the early twentieth century are two examples. The formal occupation of Germany lasted seven years, of Japan ten

⁷⁵ Ferguson, p. 207.

⁷⁶ Jams Kurth, “Migration and the Dynamics of Empire”. *The National Interest*, Spring 2003.

⁷⁷ Kissinger, p. 41-42.

⁷⁸ James Dobbins and his team published *America's Role in Nation building from Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation 2003. The Rumsfeld Pentagon did not care to listen, not least because Dobbins had been one of Madelaine Albright's favourite diplomats.

⁷⁹ Christopher Coker: *Empires in Conflict*. London: Royal United Services Institute 2003, p. 22-29.

and the presence in Korea now fifty. There stable democracies have emerged. It remains to be seen how Iraq will develop.

Imperial overstretch is the problem that now most observers connect with the Empire. Overstretch in finances, in dedicated manpower and in lack of attention or impatience. Of these the economy is the most dangerous one.

A drastic deterioration of relations with China could be both the cause and effect of such a rupture. Despite the new found concern with terrorism China remains the largest challenge on the American horizon one generation from now, the only future potential hostile superpower.

The problem of perceptions

The European perception of the new grand strategy may not complicate the policy of the Empire. But the perceptions shape the impression of American legitimacy and if that legitimacy is challenged by the US allies it could be a problem.

John Ikenberry contrasts the old and the new grand strategy. His whole scholarship concerns the pre 9-11 Empire and how it was formed. But his harmonious consensual empire is lost. Unilateralism and arrogance has replaced consulting and consensus. For some important states that is not such a bad thing. Unlike the post modern nations of the European Union, Russia and China are modern nations, just like America.⁸⁰

For China and Russia the American attitude has changed from antagonism and hostility during the cold war to arrogance. For India from coolness and aloofness to arrogance and partnership. As Kagan points out, it is in Europe that American unilateralism evokes the strongest emotions.⁸¹ During the cold war America consulted with its European allies on all major issues since Europe was usually the subject and the Soviet Union the enemy. Now when the issues are different Europe has lost control over the US and in addition to the loss of leverage Europeans suspect that America might drag them into dangerous situations against their will. If there is no common strategic outlook the American need and propensity to consult its allies diminish. Hence the renewed European interest in the United Nations and its Security Council. During the Cold War the United Nations was paralyzed in all major conflicts, except the Korean war when the USSR was absent from the UN. Neither America nor Europe referred to the Security Council when they made war, in Europe's case in Suez, Vietnam and the Falklands. It is only with the disappearance of the Soviet Union that the United Nations in the eyes of France and Germany has become such a moral authority.

Still the lack of support from its main allies leads to a lack of legitimacy that over time can become a problem. The new American attitude to these complaints is rather tough. As Timothy Garton Ash points out, it is the American European experts who often are the most suspicious of Europe and its motives.⁸² When it comes to Asia the view is that since Europe cannot

⁸⁰ Robert Cooper: *The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty first Century*. London: Atlantic Books 2003. Chapter 2. The new world order.

⁸¹ Robert Kagan "America's Crisis of Legitimacy". *Foreign Affairs*. March-April, 2004 p. 71.

⁸² Timothy Garton Ash *Free World. America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West*. New York: Random House 2004, p. 112.

contribute anything it does not deserve to be heard.⁸³ The American attitude attracts less support for the American policy in Europe but that support is considered far less important when almost all issues at stake are found outside Europe. Robert Kagan's advice is astute:⁸⁴

But Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans even when bearing gifts. Rather than viewing the United States as a Gulliver tied down Lilliputian threads, American leaders should realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States. If the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this inaccurate sense of constraint it could begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others, a little more of the generosity of spirit that characterized American foreign policy during the Cold War. It could pay its respects to multilateralism and the rule of law, and try to build some international political capital for those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable. It could, in short, take more care to show what the founders called a "decent respect for the opinion of mankind". This was always the wisest policy. And there is certainly benefit in it for the United States. Winning more material and moral support of friends and allies, especially in Europe, is unquestionable preferable to acting alone in the face of European anxiety and hostility.

Writing one year after the invasion of Iraq, Kagan is pessimistic, fearing the Europeans are looking at the wrong danger. "To address today's global dangers Americans will need the legitimacy that Europe can provide, but Europeans may well fail to grant it. In their effort to constrain the superpower, they may lose sight of the mounting dangers in the world, which are far greater than those posed by the United States".⁸⁵ In other words, because of the American victory in the cold war Europe now lives in a post modern world where war is obsolete. America, on the other hand, has to remain in the modern world where wars still are fought, won and lost, especially in Asia. Europe should not use its elevated position in world politics, created by the United States to constrain its mentor in its further endeavours. Here I agree with Kagan. European leaders have not cared to tell their electorate some new hard facts of life. The quality of leadership is, with very few exceptions, dismal compared to the great post war generation that built the new Europe. A whole and free Europe is watching America from the sidelines not as a player ready to move in but as a spectator sometimes indifferent to the outcome.

⁸³ Walter Russel Mead p. 125.

⁸⁴ Robert Kagan *Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order*. London: Atlantic Books 2003 p. 102-103.

⁸⁵ *Foreign Affairs*. March-April 2004, p.87.

Implications for Sweden

Throughout the entire cold war and afterwards Sweden has been a solid member of the American Empire. The definition provided by Odom and Dujarric fits perfectly as it does for the other ex-neutrals in Europe, Finland, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland. The Swedish policy was to stay neutral and therefore outside a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. In all military planning there was only one enemy – the Soviet Union.⁸⁶

How compatible is Sweden's security policy with America's and how interesting is Sweden in American national security policy? From the cold war we know that Sweden gets four (very negative) lines in Henry Kissinger's memoirs of 4 000 pages. It gets one sentence in Bill Clinton's memoirs of 1 000 pages. In Row Asmus rendering of the expansion of NATO to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic Sweden is issued four lines.⁸⁷

Even so Sweden got more attention six years ago than now. In 1999 the Council on Foreign Relations published a Task Force Report. *US Policy Toward Northeastern Europe*. Since the 84 pages report was published just weeks before the Kosovo war it immediately fell into obscurity. The seventeen person task force was bipartisan and very timid in its conclusions. Of six main recommendations only two were heeded – to generate support for NATO expansion in Congress and to develop support for this policy among America's NATO allies.

Although bipartisan the report is a clear product of a Clinton era. Northeastern Europe is a social political laboratory; a test case for policy towards Russia. Because Russia is not to be irritated and because two Nordic nations do not want to join NATO only small steps are to be taken. In 1999 European geopolitics still mattered. During the cold war Sweden had been an important territorial piece on the Eurasian Rimland, to quote Colin Gray. In 1999 Sweden's and Finland's accession to NATO would have been an American success, although the report only dared to refer to a burgeoning debate on the subject.

In 2005 the situation is different. Under the Bush administration the Baltic states have joined NATO and Russian sensitivities have been snubbed in many ways. Europe is finally whole and free and as a result Russia is no longer so important in European geopolitics, according to Washington. The geopolitical position of Europe is secured and there is little incentive to deal with it in a new grand

⁸⁶ *Om kriget kommit*. SOU 1994:11. *Fred och Säkerhet. svensk säkerhetspolitik 1969-1989*, SOU 2002:108.

⁸⁷ Ronald D. Asmus: *Opening NATO's Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself For a New Era*. New York: Columbia University Press 2003.

strategy; it is simply treated as a given and a very favourable one for America at that. The arch of instability from Maghreb to Indonesia is now the main American target in geopolitics. During these six years the relations between America and some European states deteriorated due to their different stance in the war on Iraq. In 2005 all of Europe was prepared to support the building of a democratic Iraq in various ways and a varied intensity. Zbigniew Brzezinski's words summarize the situation:⁸⁸

Only the two sides of the Atlantic working together can chart a truly global course that may significantly improve the worldwide state of affairs. To do so, Europe must wake up from its current coma, realize that its security is even more inseparable from global security than is America's, and draw the inevitable practical conclusions. It cannot be secure without America, it cannot unite against America, and it cannot significantly influence America without being willing to act jointly with America.

In this spirit Sweden has decided to cooperate with the United States on a whole range of national security issues.

The American interest in Sweden has other dimensions than traditional geopolitics. The war on terrorism and the threat of weapons of mass destruction are the two big new elements in the Bush grand strategy. The third element is one of means; to defeat these new threats, pre-emption if necessary. Sweden agrees that the two threats are becoming more important than before. When it comes to pre-emption and preventive war there is no official position. The European Security Doctrine formulated by Javier Solana in December 2003 includes pre-emption in the possible European methods of defense.⁸⁹ "The first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic – conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early".

A hypothetical Swedish list of actions relevant for the American grand strategy could look as follows:

- Arms control to curb weapons of mass destruction
- Tough anti-terrorist measures
- Stabilization of Russia, the Ukraine, Belarussia, Moldavia, South Caucasus
- Peace-support missions in Afghanistan
- PFP cooperation including all operations except territorial defence

⁸⁸ Brzezinski, p. 220.

⁸⁹ *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy*. Brussels: European Council, 12 December 2003, p.11. The non-official White Paper on European defense spends great effort explaining how the American concepts of prevention and pre-emption differ from the European ones and how harmful they therefore must be to transatlantic collaboration as the European Union sees it. (*European defence. A proposal for a White Paper. Report of an independent task force*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, May 2004, p. 30-35).

- Crisis management and peace-support in the Balkans and Africa.
- More intensive relations with the Muslim world including Turkey

Some of these actions are under way. Others are future options. The policies are under the auspices of the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, the Partnership for Peace or carried out bilaterally with other nations. They enhance the security of Sweden and the European Union. Since the European Union and the United States for many years will have compatible security goals, the policies will also be advantageous to America.

There are American doubts concerning the anti-terrorist measures. In many quarters Europe is considered irrelevant to the war on terror because it lacks cultural ruthlessness, argues Christopher Coker.⁹⁰ If that is true in ex colonial nations it should be even more true in Sweden that tries to achieve cultural integration.

The stabilization program is touted by the e-pine initiative, the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe cooperative process launched by the Bush administration. But as Ron Asmus, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration puts it "I feel that E-Pine has deteriorated into a mechanism searching for a mission" – "the key question over the longer term would be whether you and we could keep a modest degree of the strategic attention of the United States focused on this (Nordic-Baltic) region".⁹¹ The Asmus agenda may be too ambitious for the Nordic nations – reach out to Ukraine, take the lead in a new strategy toward Belarus, develop a Black Sea strategy particularly with an eye towards the southern Caucasus. It is not an official policy of the Bush administration.

So, how is Sweden to behave?

In the Pentagon of Bush Mach II the coalition of the willing is often better than the NATO alliance. If the mission determines the coalition, Sweden may often fit the bill. But the current popularity of this concept may be short lived. A joint NATO culture reflects the observation that it is better to be a willing and efficient ally than a willing straggler out of touch with the machinery. Small nations prefer alliances to coalitions of the willing where they inevitably be marginalized.⁹² Thus NATO membership or not is less important to Washington.

⁹⁰ Christopher Coker "A Marriage of Inconvenience", *Royal United Service Institute Journal*, February 2005 p. 31.

⁹¹ *Advancing Cooperation Between Northern Europe and the United States*. Proceedings from a Transatlantic Conference, Washington DC, October 14, 2004.

⁹² Ingemar Dörfer, "The US Globalised Military" in Terhi Suominen & Eero Kytömaa, eds.: *The United States in the world*, Helsinki: The Atlantic Council of Finland, 2004, p. 49.

It is more felt in Stockholm in the form of lack of access and influence.⁹³ Through its membership in Partnership for Peace, Sweden participates in many actions ultimately decided in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, “diverting the historic Alliance missions into a plethora of multilateral collective security enterprises of vague purpose”⁹⁴ according to Kissinger. Over time the Partnership for Peace has changed character. In the beginning it was seen as an avenue for the ex-communist states to join NATO. And indeed, many of them have: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania Slovenia and Slovakia. There remains the five European ex neutrals, Russia and its friends, some Balkan states and states in the Caucasus and Central Asia that can never aspire to join NATO. A NATO of 26 nations is now so big that less time and attention is given outsiders. Sweden like Finland is marginalized; its access to the transatlantic security debate is limited. Within the European Union Sweden's voice is heard but here too contributions to forces in the field as well as NATO membership counts.

Paradoxically inside the European Union, Sweden's aversion to the military aspects of the Union also favors America. The defense organization of Europe, its instrument of collective defense, should be NATO, Sweden maintains. And so does the United States.

Sweden vastly prefers the Ikenberry version of the empire, the pre 9-11 consensus of the Western world. But its actions if not words, in 2005 are remarkably consistent with the new grand strategy, helping out at the margin, finding niches of Swedish competence of world class. Multilateralism, international law and the United Nations are Sweden's favourite institutions in world politics that it will not abandon. But international law is developing in new ways. The two new interesting concepts are “The responsibility to protect” in 1991 on humanitarian intervention and “A duty to prevent” in 2004 on preventive action.⁹⁵

Everyone agrees that the United Nations needs to be reformed. Unilateralism is an element of the new grand strategy, but the one most likely to be humbled by the facts of international life.

As during the cold war Sweden is part of the empire but now more at ease since there is no need to speak of an outside enemy. Traditional public goods such as nuclear deterrence and now missile defence are provided as always and never

⁹³ Ingemar Dörfer, “The Reluctant Partners”, in Birthe Hansen ed., *Good Cop. Bad Cop.*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2003.

⁹⁴ Kissinger, p. 44.

⁹⁵ Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Duty to Prevent”. *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2004. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004.

mentioned in polite company.⁹⁶ Swedish scepticism towards the EU endears Sweden to Washington that in the future may adopt a divide and rule attitude to the EU as a European international security institution.

Swedish non-alignment is no longer a disadvantage in America that sometimes prefers the coalition of the willing and that essentially believes that Sweden is in NATO. Not words but deeds count. Sweden itself however, will suffer since non membership of NATO will cramp its diplomatic style. No greater equalizer exists than the Washington bureaucracy that gives Italy and Ecuador the same amount of attention, I wrote twenty two years ago.⁹⁷ There Swedish influence is up for grabs. So, grabbed or not? That will depend on the relevance and quality of the initiatives and the people who present them.

⁹⁶ The Scandinavian attitude to nuclear weapons is best analyzed in Johan Jörgen Holst's seminal "The Pattern of Nordic Security". *Daedalus*, Spring 1984.

⁹⁷ Ingemar Dörfer. *Arms Deal. The Selling of the F-16*. New York: Praeger 1983, p.207.

A note on future research

To better understand the United States and Sweden's relations with America serious research on the cold war is needed. Despite two official commission reports in 1994 and 2002 no equivalent exists to the excellent Norwegian and Danish series of books on the period. The well known dichotomy between the Pentagon's friendly and the State Department's cool attitude towards Sweden, its causes and results, is a fruitful area of investigation. Especially interesting is the field of defense technology where Sweden sometimes managed to acquire American weapon systems before NATO nations.

Finally, the field of international law is developing fast and in new directions. Since this is an old Swedish field of excellence, it behooves Swedish scholars and officials to follow these developments closely.

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