


Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and
Leonard Adleman



CS 553

CRYPTOGRAPHY

Lecture 24

RSA

Instructor
Dr. Dhiman Saha

- ▶ In 1977, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman proposed a scheme which became the most widely used asymmetric cryptographic scheme, RSA.

RSA Key Generation

Output: public key: $k_{pub} = (n, e)$ and private key: $k_{pr} = (d)$

1. Choose two large primes p and q .
2. Compute $n = p \cdot q$.
3. Compute $\Phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$.
4. Select the public exponent $e \in \{1, 2, \dots, \Phi(n) - 1\}$ such that

$$\gcd(e, \Phi(n)) = 1.$$

5. Compute the private key d such that

$$d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{\Phi(n)}$$

Given the public key $(n, e) = k_{pub}$ and the plaintext x , the encryption function is:

$$y = e_{k_{pub}}(x) \equiv x^e \bmod n$$

Here where $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

- ▶ RSA encrypts plaintexts x , where we consider the bit string representing x to be an element in $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$.
- ▶ As a consequence the binary value of the plaintext x must be less than n .
- ▶ The value e is sometimes referred to as **encryption exponent** or **public exponent**

Given the private key $d = k_{pr}$ and the ciphertext y , the decryption function is:

$$x = d_{k_{pr}}(y) \equiv y^d \pmod{n}$$

Here $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

- ▶ The private key d is sometimes called **decryption exponent** or **private exponent**

Alice

message $x = 4$

$$y = x^e \equiv 4^3 \equiv 31 \pmod{33}$$

$\xleftarrow{k_{pub}=(33,3)}$

$\xrightarrow{y=31}$

Bob

1. choose $p = 3$ and $q = 11$
2. $n = p \cdot q = 33$
3. $\Phi(n) = (3 - 1)(11 - 1) = 20$
4. choose $e = 3$
5. $d \equiv e^{-1} \equiv 7 \pmod{20}$

$$y^d = 31^7 \equiv 4 = x \pmod{33}$$

RSA Parameters for 1024 bit-length modulus

$p = E0DFD2C2A288ACEBC705EFAB30E4447541A8C5A47A37185C5A9$
 $CB98389CE4DE19199AA3069B404FD98C801568CB9170EB712BF$
 $10B4955CE9C9DC8CE6855C6123_h$

$q = EBE0FCF21866FD9A9F0D72F7994875A8D92E67AEE4B515136B2$
 $A778A8048B149828AEA30BD0BA34B977982A3D42168F594CA99$
 $F3981DDABFAB2369F229640115_h$

$n = CF33188211FDF6052BDBB1A37235E0ABB5978A45C71FD381A91$
 $AD12FC76DA0544C47568AC83D855D47CA8D8A779579AB72E635$
 $D0B0AAAC22D28341E998E90F82122A2C06090F43A37E0203C2B$
 $72E401FD06890EC8EAD4F07E686E906F01B2468AE7B30CBD670$
 $255C1FEDE1A2762CF4392C0759499CC0ABECFF008728D9A11ADF_h$

$e = 40B028E1E4CCF07537643101FF72444A0BE1D7682F1EDB553E3$
 $AB4F6DD8293CA1945DB12D796AE9244D60565C2EB692A89B888$
 $1D58D278562ED60066DD8211E67315CF89857167206120405B0$
 $8B54D10D4EC4ED4253C75FA74098FE3F7FB751FF5121353C554$
 $391E114C85B56A9725E9BD5685D6C9C7EED8EE442366353DC39_h$

$d = C21A93EE751A8D4FBFD77285D79D6768C58EBF283743D2889A3$
 $95F266C78F4A28E86F545960C2CE01EB8AD5246905163B28D0B$
 $8BAABB959CC03F4EC499186168AE9ED6D88058898907E61C7CC$
 $CC584D65D801CFE32DFC983707F87F5AA6AE4B9E77B9CE630E2$
 $C0DF05841B5E4984D059A35D7270D500514891F7B77B804BED81_h$

To Show

Decryption is the inverse function of encryption

$$d_{k_{pr}}(e_{k_{pub}}(x)) = x$$

- ▶ $d \xleftarrow{\text{Computationally Infeasible}} (e, n)$
- ▶ Since x is only unique up to the size of the modulus n , we cannot encrypt more than l bits with one RSA encryption, where l is the bit length of n .
- ▶ Easy encryption/decryption
 - ▶ Implies need for fast exponentiation
- ▶ For a given n , there should be **many** private-key/public-key pairs, otherwise an attacker might be able to perform a brute-force attack.

Setup Let p and q be large primes, let $n = pq$, and let e and y be integers

Problem Solve the congruence $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ for the variable x .

Easy Bob, who knows the values of p and q , can easily solve for x

Hard Eve, who does not know the values of p and q , cannot easily find x .

Trapdoor Solving $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ is **easy** for a person who possesses certain **extra** information, but it is apparently **hard** for all other people.

Setup Let p and q be large primes, let $n = pq$, and let e and y be integers

Problem Solve the congruence $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ for the variable x .

Easy Bob, who knows the values of p and q , can easily solve for x

Hard Eve, who does not know the values of p and q , cannot easily find x .

Trapdoor Solving $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ is **easy** for a person who possesses certain **extra** information, but it is apparently **hard** for all other people.

Setup Let p and q be large primes, let $n = pq$, and let e and y be integers

Problem Solve the congruence $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ for the variable x .

Easy Bob, who knows the values of p and q , can easily solve for x

Hard Eve, who does not know the values of p and q , cannot easily find x .

Trapdoor Solving $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ is **easy** for a person who possesses certain **extra** information, but it is apparently **hard** for all other people.

Setup Let p and q be large primes, let $n = pq$, and let e and y be integers

Problem Solve the congruence $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ for the variable x .

Easy Bob, who knows the values of p and q , can easily solve for x

Hard Eve, who does not know the values of p and q , cannot easily find x .

Trapdoor Solving $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ is **easy** for a person who possesses certain **extra** information, but it is apparently **hard** for all other people.

Setup Let p and q be large primes, let $n = pq$, and let e and y be integers

Problem Solve the congruence $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ for the variable x .

Easy Bob, who knows the values of p and q , can easily solve for x

Hard Eve, who does not know the values of p and q , cannot easily find x .

Trapdoor Solving $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ is **easy** for a person who possesses certain **extra** information, but it is apparently **hard** for all other people.

Setup Let p and q be large primes, let $n = pq$, and let e and y be integers

Problem Solve the congruence $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ for the variable x .

Easy Bob, who knows the values of p and q , can easily solve for x

Hard Eve, who does not know the values of p and q , cannot easily find x .

Trapdoor Solving $x^e \equiv y \pmod{n}$ is **easy** for a person who possesses certain **extra** information, but it is apparently **hard** for all other people.

- ▶ Crucial to RSA's security

Why?

Finding $\Phi(n) \implies$ breaking RSA

- ▶ Thus p, q must be **secret**
- ▶ As knowing $p, q \implies$ knowing $\Phi(n)$

-
- ❶ sage: `p = random_prime(2^32); p`
1103222539
 - ❷ sage: `q = random_prime(2^32); q`
17870599
 - ❸ sage: `n = p*q; n`
c
 - ❹ sage: `phi = (p-1)*(q-1); phi`
36567230045260644
 - ❺ sage: `e = random_prime(phi); e`
13771927877214701
 - ❻ sage: `d = xgcd(e, phi)[1]; d`
15417970063428857
 - ❼ sage: `mod(d*e, phi)`
1
-

-
- ❶ sage: `x = 1234567`
 - ❷ sage: `y = power_mod(x, e, n); y`
19048323055755904
 - ❸ sage: `power_mod(y, d, n)`
1234567
-

How hard is it to find x without the **trapdoor** d ?

- ▶ An attacker who can **factor** big numbers can break RSA by recovering p and q and then $\Phi(n)$ in order to compute d from e .
- ▶ An attacker's ability to compute x from $x^e \bmod n$, or e^{th} roots modulo n , **without necessarily factoring** n .

Both risks seem closely connected, though we don't know for sure whether they are equivalent.

RSAs security level depends on three factors

- ▶ The size of modulus n
- ▶ The choice of p and q , and
- ▶ How the trapdoor permutation is used.

- ▶ What if n is too small?
- ▶ What if p, q are related of very different sizes?
- ▶ What if p, q are too close/small?
- ▶ Should the RSA trapdoor permutation be used directly for encryption or signing?

Textbook RSA Encryption

Used to describe the simplistic RSA encryption scheme

- ▶ The plaintext contains **only** the message you want to encrypt

Textbook RSA Encryption is **deterministic**

- ▶ Same plaintext \implies same ciphertext

Malleability

Informally, ability to generate related ciphertexts without actually querying the encryption oracle.

Given two textbook RSA ciphertexts

- ▶ $y_1 = x_1^e \bmod n$
- ▶ $y_2 = x_2^e \bmod n$

What can you say about the ciphertext of $(x_1 \times x_2)$?

Multiplying the ciphertexts

$$y_1 \times y_2 \bmod n = x_1^e \times x_2^e \bmod n = (x_1 \times x_2)^e \bmod n$$

Malleability

Informally, ability to generate related ciphertexts without actually querying the encryption oracle.

Given two textbook RSA ciphertexts

- ▶ $y_1 = x_1^e \bmod n$
- ▶ $y_2 = x_2^e \bmod n$


What can you say about the ciphertext of $(x_1 \times x_2)$?

Multiplying the ciphertexts

$$y_1 \times y_2 \bmod n = x_1^e \times x_2^e \bmod n = (x_1 \times x_2)^e \bmod n$$

Strong RSA Encryption: OAEP

Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP)



RSA-OAEP

This scheme involves creating a bit string as large as the modulus by **padding** the message with extra data and **randomness** before applying the RSA function.