

Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem

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Abstract

Discrimination, defined as differential treatment by group identity, is widely studied in economics. Its source is often categorized as taste-based or statistical (belief-based)—a valuable distinction for policy design and welfare analysis. However, in many situations individuals may have inaccurate beliefs about the relevant characteristics of different groups. This paper demonstrates that this possibility creates an identification problem when isolating the source of discrimination. A review of the empirical discrimination literature in economics reveals that a small minority of papers—fewer than 7%—consider inaccurate beliefs. We show both theoretically and experimentally that, if not accounted for, such *inaccurate statistical discrimination* will be misclassified as taste-based. We then examine three alternative methodologies for differentiating between different sources of discrimination: varying the amount of information presented to evaluators, eliciting their beliefs, and presenting them with accurate information. Importantly, the latter can be used to differentiate whether inaccurate beliefs are due to a lack of information or motivated factors.

KEYWORDS: Discrimination, Inaccurate beliefs, Model misspecification

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1 Introduction

Economists define discrimination as differential treatment of otherwise identical individuals from different social groups (i.e. race, gender, age, etc.). Discrimination has been shown to be prevalent in many important economic settings, including labor markets, housing markets, credit markets, and online consumer markets.¹ In addition to establishing a causal link between group identity and differential treatment, economists also seek to identify its source. Sources are typically categorized into one of two forms. In the case of taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), an individual has animus towards members of a particular group and discriminates against them because he receives disutility from providing services to or interacting with members of this group. In the case of accurate statistical discrimination, differential treatment occurs because productivity is unobserved and a particular group is *correctly* perceived to have lower average productivity, differential variance of productivity (Aigner and Cain, 1977), or differential precision in information about productivity relative to an alternative group.²

The current paper examines inaccurate beliefs as a source of discrimination. We present a systematic review of the discrimination literature in economics to demonstrate that a small minority of empirical work considers the possibility of such *inaccurate statistical discrimination*. We then develop a theoretical framework to show how allowing for this possibility leads to an identification problem when using typical methods to distinguish between different sources, and failing to allow for it leads to a potential misclassification of source. We then consider three alternative methods for identifying the source and illustrate our key theoretical findings in an experimental labor market.

Distinguishing between the different potential sources of discrimination is important for several reasons. First, designing an effective policy intervention to reduce discrimination crucially depends on the source of discrimination. Second, welfare and efficiency analyses differ as a function of the source. For example, accurate statistical discrimination is sometimes referred to as “efficient discrimination” in that it is the optimal response to a signal-extraction problem. Finally, the extent to which competitive markets will eliminate discrimination depends on its source (see Fang and Moro (2011) for review).

¹A variety of empirical techniques have been used to document discrimination, including audit studies, correspondence studies, and outcomes-based tests. For recent reviews of the discrimination literature, see Bertrand and Duflo (2017) and Charles and Guryan (2011).

²Differences in the productivity distribution may be due to exogenous differences (Phelps, 1972) or part of a self-fulfilling equilibrium (Arrow, 1973).

Although statistical discrimination is typically assumed to be driven by rational expectations, a large literature in psychology and economics has shown that people’s beliefs are often incorrect.³ Additionally, not only will incorrect beliefs about differences in the productivity distributions lead to discrimination directly, but such beliefs will also have a negative spillover on the discrimination exhibited by *other* evaluators who learn from the decisions of these discriminatory evaluators but are unaware of their bias. For this reason, as well as the policy design and welfare analysis motivations discussed above, it is critically important to also separate inaccurate statistical discrimination from accurate statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination.⁴

This paper builds a framework for studying discrimination that allows for the possibility of inaccurate beliefs, and explores the impact of inaccurate beliefs on identifying the source of discrimination. We show that allowing beliefs to be inaccurate generates an identification problem for methods commonly used to isolate the source of discrimination, such as outcomes-based tests. Moreover, failing to allow for inaccurate beliefs when using such methods can lead to a misclassification of inaccurate statistical discrimination as stemming from taste-based sources. Using this framework, we then explore two methods—belief elicitation and information manipulation—that can distinguish between this expanded set of sources.

Two broad causes may lead to inaccurate beliefs that drive discrimination. First, research in psychology and economics has shown that heuristics and biases may generate beliefs that are systematically incorrect, leading to inaccurate stereotypes about certain groups.⁵ Second, inaccurate beliefs may arise due to a lack of information—the relevant information necessary to form correct beliefs may not be available to a decision-maker.

³Inaccurate beliefs have been documented in a variety of important domains, including the value of human capital formation (Jensen, 2010), the prevalence of affirmative action (Kravitz and Platania, 1993), and the extent of wealth inequality in the US (Norton and Ariely, 2011).

⁴For example, if discrimination stems from inaccurate beliefs, an effective policy response could be providing individuals with information about the correct distributions, whereas such a policy would have no effect when discrimination stems from the other two sources. See for example, Jensen (2010) in the case of inaccurate beliefs about the returns to education, or Bursztyn, González, and Yanagizawa-Drott (2018) in the case of inaccurate beliefs about the beliefs of others, i.e. pluralistic ignorance.

⁵See Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth (1979); Judd and Park (1993); Hilton and Hoppel (1996) and Fiske (1998) for review. Bordalo, Coffman, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2016) present a formal model for inaccurate stereotype formation based on the representativeness heuristic. Evaluators overweight the prevalence of characteristics that differ most between groups, and end up believing that the ‘representative’ type is more prevalent than it actually is. Biased beliefs can also arise in a dynamic learning setting when individuals use updating rules that depend on group identity (Albrecht, Von Essen, Parys, and Szech, 2013), are selective regarding which information they attend to (Schwartzstein, 2014), or have incorrect models of how others evaluate workers (Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg, 2019).

For example, an employer may have an unbiased prior belief about the productivity distributions of two groups but lack information about how selection into the job application process differs across groups, leading to inaccurate beliefs about productivity differences in the realized applicant pool. Failing to account for selection effects can also be a form of bias, as in [Hübert and Little \(2020\)](#) in the case of discrimination in policing. Learning will eventually mitigate inaccurate beliefs in some settings. But in other situations, there will be little or no feedback on the decisions being made, leading to learning traps in which inaccurate beliefs can persist in the long-run.⁶ Further, learning may not lead to correct long-run beliefs if information is filtered through a misspecified model of the world.⁷

Although the potential for inaccurate beliefs has been discussed in theoretical discrimination research ([Arrow, 1973, 1998](#); [Schwartzstein, 2014](#)), the vast majority of empirical work relies on the assumption that beliefs are correct. To quantify the extent to which inaccurate beliefs have been considered as a source of discrimination in empirical work, we conducted an in-depth review of the economics literature on discrimination, spanning ten journals and nearly three decades (1990-2018). [Section 2](#) presents our findings. The vast majority of papers found evidence for discrimination (97.1%) and a large plurality (61.9%) differentiated between taste-based versus statistical motives when discussing its source. However, only a small proportion (10.5%) make the distinction between accurate and inaccurate beliefs, and a smaller fraction still (6.7%) incorporated this distinction into the analysis.

Motivated by these findings, we formalize how the possibility of inaccurate beliefs impacts identifying the source of discrimination. We model a simple hiring decision in which an evaluator observes the group identity of a worker as well as a signal about her productivity, then decides whether to hire the worker. *Discrimination* occurs when two workers generate identical signals but are evaluated differently based on their group identity. Partiality refers to the source of this disparity based on model primitives: belief-based partiality corresponds to evaluators having different beliefs about decision-relevant

⁶For example, if employers face a trade-off between learning about the productivity distribution of groups or maximizing cost-effectiveness in hiring, this can prevent full learning even though the employers are not inherently biased ([Lepage, 2020](#)).

⁷For example, confirmation bias ([Rabin and Schrag, 1999](#)), overreaction to signals ([Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni, 2010](#)), and misattribution of reference dependence ([Bushong and Gagnon-Bartsch, 2019](#)) all lead to incorrect learning in the long-run. The presence of biased agents can also lead to incorrect long-run beliefs for unbiased agents who learn from the evaluations of the biased agents but are unaware of their bias ([Bohren and Hauser, 2021](#)).

attributes (e.g. productivity) depending on group identity, while preference-based partiality corresponds to evaluators having different preferences over hiring workers of a given productivity depending on group identity. The former is typically referred to as statistical discrimination, while the latter is referred to as taste-based discrimination, prejudice, or animus. We expand the standard framework for studying discrimination by considering both accurate belief-based partiality (traditional statistical discrimination) and *inaccurate* belief-based partiality (inaccurate statistical discrimination).

We first characterize *isodiscrimination sets*, which are the sets of preferences and beliefs that lead to the same pattern of discrimination. From this characterization, it is readily apparent that equivalent discrimination can stem from a continuum of preference and belief combinations.⁸ Data on evaluation decisions, e.g. hiring as a function of group identity and signals, can be used to identify the isodiscrimination set.⁹ However, this does not identify the source or even rule out any form of partiality: we show that given an evaluator with any level of preference partiality and no belief partiality, there exists a continuum of evaluators with belief-based partiality and lower (or no) preference-based partiality that exhibit the same pattern of observed discrimination. This includes belief-based partiality due to different perceived means of the relevant distribution, perceived variances, or perceived precision of signals of the relevant characteristic. In turn, additional data is necessary to isolate the source of discrimination.

In addition to evaluation decisions, researchers may also have access to the underlying outcome distributions. In such cases, studies attempt to identify the source of discrimination through a technique often referred to as an outcomes-based test, which compares evaluation decisions to the true underlying distribution of the relevant characteristics for these decisions. This commonly-used technique has been employed in many domains, including lending, policing and bail decisions (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 2001; Antonovics and Knight, 2009). For example, a researcher may compare differences in lending rates between two groups to differences in their loan default rates. When maintaining the assumption that evaluators have accurate beliefs, this technique

⁸Manski (2004) first illustrated that observed choice behavior could be consistent with multiple sets of preferences and subjective beliefs, and hence, identification of preferences from choice data required strong assumptions, such as rational expectations. He proposed that data on expectations could be used to validate or relax the rational expectations assumption.

⁹For example, the correspondence study method uses an experimental technique where evaluators receive identical signals from people of different group identities. Perhaps the most famous example is the resume study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), where experimenters sent out identical resumes to potential employees—where the only thing that differed was whether the group identity associated with the applicant’s name—and looked at call-back rates as a measure of discrimination.

identifies the isodiscrimination set and pins down the exact source of discrimination. However, identification depends critically on this assumption: without it, a *continuum* of preference and belief combinations can generate equivalent discrimination, regardless of the underlying outcome distribution. We show that the only source that it may be possible to rule out is accurate statistical discrimination, i.e. an evaluator with accurate beliefs and no preference partiality.¹⁰

Moreover, we show that erroneously assuming that an evaluator has accurate beliefs when using the outcomes-based method leads a researcher to mistakenly attribute the share of discrimination arising from inaccurate beliefs to preference partiality. Depending on whether an evaluator’s inaccurate beliefs increase or decrease discrimination relative to an evaluator with accurate beliefs and the same preferences, the researcher will over- or underestimate the degree to which the evaluator has preferences that favor one of the groups. As an example of this misidentification, consider a study that measures productivity outcomes and finds evidence for discrimination. If the researcher observes that both groups have identical distributions of productivity and assumes that evaluators have correct beliefs, she concludes that the source of the observed discrimination must be preference-based, since accurate statistical discrimination cannot explain the behavior. However, an alternative explanation is that evaluators have incorrect beliefs which lead to inaccurate statistical discrimination. Without further data, it is impossible to distinguish between these two explanations. Alternatively, suppose a study finds evidence for discrimination and the underlying distributions do differ in a way that can explain the differential treatment. If the researcher assumes correct beliefs, then she will conclude that there is no evidence for prejudice. But as we show, any departures from correct beliefs implies that prejudice *does* play a role in the observed discrimination.

Finally, we outline what type of data can be used to identify the source of discrimination in this expanded framework. One method, as proposed by [Manski \(2004\)](#), is to collect data on the subjective beliefs of evaluators. Combined with observing the evaluation decisions and signals, we show that this identifies the level of preference and belief

¹⁰Other papers have highlighted additional identification challenges for outcomes-based tests, including the problems of infra-marginality ([Ayres, 2002](#); [Simoiu, Corbett-Davies, and Goel, 2017](#)) and relying on administrative data that may condition on a post-treatment outcome ([Knox, Lowe, and Mummolo, 2020](#)). We raise a complementary concern that remains even if these other issues are solved. In contemporaneous theoretical work, [Hull \(2021\)](#) shows that marginal outcome tests, which are increasingly being used to study racial bias in criminal justice settings ([Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang, 2018a](#); [Grau, Vergara et al., 2020](#)), can similarly distinguish between accurate statistical discrimination and other sources. These tests require additional assumptions in order to separate taste-based discrimination from inaccurate beliefs (see, for example, the structural model developed in [Arnold et al. \(2018a\)](#)).

partiality. Data on the true outcome distributions is also required in order to determine whether beliefs are accurate. We illustrate this method in [Section 4](#).¹¹

In many settings, it will not be feasible to elicit subjective beliefs. An alternative method is to manipulate the precision of information by varying the number of signal draws observed by evaluators. We demonstrate that this method can partially identify the source of discrimination: it identifies the extent of preference-based partiality but cannot distinguish between different forms of belief-based partiality (i.e. belief partiality stemming from differential perceived means versus variances or signal precisions). Importantly, this method requires multiple signals from the same domain (e.g. number of positive reviews); if the multiple signals are from different domains (e.g. SAT scores and education history), then the identification problem persists.¹²

We next demonstrate these identification issues in a stylized hiring experiment. We recruited participants and assigned them to either the role of “worker” or “employer”. Workers created profiles that included a variety of worker-specific characteristics, such as their country of origin (US vs. India), gender, and age, interspersed amongst other information such as their beverage and movie preferences. They then completed a series of logical reasoning questions. Importantly, profiles do not include any information about performance on the question task. Employers were shown the profiles of 20 workers and asked the maximum wage they would be willing to pay to hire each worker. One worker profile is then selected for payment. If the offered wage is above a randomly determined threshold, then the employer hires the worker; the worker earns a bonus and the employer is paid proportional to how many questions the worker answered correctly. If the offered wage is below the threshold, the worker is not hired.

We find that employers discriminate based on the worker’s country of origin and gender: Americans and females receive systematically lower wage offers than Indians and males. We find little evidence for age discrimination. According to the standard classi-

¹¹A growing empirical literature elicits expectations to separate preferences from subjective expectations, including birth control choices ([Delavande, 2008](#)), college major choices ([Wiswall and Zafar, 2015](#)), and secondary education choices ([Giustinelli, 2016](#)).

¹²Another approach which we do not study in this paper derives predictions from a specific structural model of biased beliefs and takes these predictions to the data. For example, [Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang \(2018b\)](#) compare the distributions of pre-trial misconduct of marginal black and white defendants. They argue that the distributional differences are consistent with bail judges holding incorrect stereotypes about the release risk of black defendants. [Bohren et al. \(2019\)](#) model how discrimination evolves across evaluation rounds in a social learning setting, and argue that the observed dynamics are consistent with discrimination driven by inaccurate belief partiality but inconsistent with accurate belief partiality or preference partiality.

fication, the observed discrimination is generated by two potential sources. Employers may offer lower wages to American and female workers because they believe that members of those groups answer fewer questions correctly on average than Indian and male workers. Since they lack information on the productivity of any given worker, employers use these group statistics to inform their compensation decisions. Alternatively, employers may be prejudiced towards members of the discriminated group and offer them lower wages because they do not want to reward them.

As discussed above, outcomes-based tests are often used to distinguish between these sources by comparing the compensation decisions to the “ground truth”—the true performance distributions by group. Our experiment allows us to measure the “ground truth” by comparing the number of questions answered correctly across the various groups. We find that, if anything, Americans slightly outperform Indians on the task (although the difference is not statistically significant), while females perform less well than males. Under the assumption of accurate beliefs, we would conclude that the discrimination against Americans is due to preference partiality. Further, because the level of discrimination against females is substantially smaller than the actual gap in performance, this approach would conclude that evaluators have preference partiality against men.

However, an alternative explanation is that individuals have no preference partiality towards or against a particular group, but rather, have inaccurate beliefs about the respective performance distributions. To identify this channel, we elicited the beliefs of employers and compared them to the “ground truth.”. Consistent with inaccurate statistical discrimination, employers mistakenly predicted that American workers perform much worse than their Indian counterparts, and that female workers only slightly underperform relative to males. Accounting for these inaccurate beliefs substantially changes the inferred source of discrimination. What was originally classified as preference-based discrimination *in favor of* Indians is mostly explained by mistaken beliefs—if anything, the preference-based channel goes slightly *against* Indian workers. Similarly, a large portion of the gender gap in wages can be explained by inaccurate statistical discrimination.

The line between inaccurate beliefs and animus may sometimes be blurry. For example, individuals may develop inaccurate beliefs *because* they have animus against members of a particular group. We propose that these channels can be separately identified through the provision of information. Specifically, if agents are provided with credible information on the relevant distributions, those with inaccurate beliefs should update their beliefs and adjust their behavior accordingly. However, if mistaken beliefs merely mask

an underlying animus, then agents are unlikely to change their behavior in response to such information. We implement this method in our experiment by providing employers with information on average performance by gender, nationality, and age. After receiving this information, participants were asked to make wage offers to 10 additional workers. We find that employers significantly changed their wage offers in the direction consistent with correcting their beliefs. This methodology is portable outside of our stylized experimental setting as a way to identify animus-driven inaccurate beliefs.

The paper proceeds as follows. [Section 2](#) presents a review of the economics literature on discrimination, demonstrating that few papers consider mistaken beliefs when attempting to isolate its source. [Section 3](#) outlines our theoretical framework and results. [Section 4](#) illustrates these findings in a stylized hiring experiment. [Section 5](#) concludes.

2 Survey of the Literature

We conducted a systematic survey of the economics literature on discrimination in order to determine: (1) how often papers seek to distinguish between taste-based and belief-based (statistical) sources of discrimination; (2) how often papers seek to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate beliefs for belief-based sources of discrimination. [Table 1](#) tabulates the 105 papers published in 10 top economics journals between 1990 and 2018 that test for evidence of discrimination. Most papers that met our inclusion criteria (outlined below) found evidence of discrimination: 102 out of 105 papers, or 97.1% documented evidence for discrimination against at least one group that was considered in the paper. The majority of papers (61.9%) discussed the source of discrimination as being driven by either preferences (taste-based) or beliefs (statistical), and nearly half of the papers (46.7%) attempted to distinguish between these two sources through a formal test. However, very few papers even discussed the possibility that beliefs may be inaccurate (10.5%), and fewer still examined whether beliefs were accurate or inaccurate (6.7%).¹³ Despite the lack of discussion and explicit tests, we would argue that inaccurate statistical discrimination is a reasonable alternative to the interpretation chosen by the authors in nearly all of these cases.

We classified papers as “discuss taste-based versus statistical source” if preference

¹³The papers that tested for inaccurate beliefs include [List \(2004\)](#); [Hedegaard and Tyran \(2018\)](#); [Mobius and Rosenblat \(2006\)](#); [Fershtman and Gneezy \(2001\)](#); [Arnold et al. \(2018a\)](#); [Agan and Starr \(2017\)](#). We discuss the methods and findings of these papers further in the Supplemental Material. [Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, and Topalova \(2009\)](#) use the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to elicit a ‘taste’ against female politicians, though the authors also interpret IAT scores as a measure of implicit beliefs. We include this paper on the list as well.

Table 1. Summary of Literature Review on Discrimination

	All: 1990 - 2018		Recent: 2014 - 2018	
	<i># Papers</i>	<i>% Total</i>	<i># Papers</i>	<i>% Total</i>
Papers meeting inclusion criteria	105	100.0%	31	100.0%
Evidence of discrimination	102	97.1%	31	100.0%
Discuss taste-based versus statistical source	65	61.9%	23	74.2%
Test for taste-based versus statistical source	49	46.7%	16	51.6%
Discuss accurate versus inaccurate beliefs	11	10.5%	5	16.1%
Test for inaccurate beliefs	7	6.7%	3	9.7%
Measure beliefs	7	6.7%	3	9.7%

versus belief-based motives for the documented discrimination were discussed in the text, and as “test for taste-based versus statistical source” if the paper either explicitly tested between different models of preference versus belief-based discrimination or implicitly tested the predictions of a belief-based model while taking the taste-based model as the null hypothesis. If a paper mentioned inaccurate or biased beliefs as a potential source of discrimination, it was classified as “discuss accurate versus inaccurate beliefs.” Papers that tested whether inaccurate beliefs could be driving discrimination, either by directly eliciting beliefs or through other tests, were classified as “test for inaccurate beliefs.” Finally, papers that elicited beliefs were classified as “measure beliefs.” Three of the seven papers in this category did not test whether these elicited beliefs were accurate.

Method. In this section, we outline the method that we used to determine which papers to include in the survey and the data that we collected for each paper.

Inclusion Criteria. We focused on empirical papers published between 1990 and 2018 in the following journals: American Economic Journal: Applied, American Economic Journal: Policy, American Economic Review (excluding the Papers & Proceedings issue), Econometrica, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, and Review of Economics and Statistics. We acknowledge that the economics literature on discrimination includes important contributions from other journals. We restricted attention to these ten journals as a representative sample in order for the scope of the survey to include a manageable number of papers.

We proceeded in two steps to determine whether to include a paper published in the relevant time frame and journals. First, in each journal, we searched for all empirical papers that had at least one of the search terms *{discrimination, prejudice, bias, biases,*

Table 2. Publications by Journal and Decade

	<i>Number of Papers</i>			Total
	1990-99	2000-09	2010-2018	
AEJ: Applied	0	1	7	8
AEJ: Policy	0	0	2	2
AER	4	7	6	17
EMA	0	0	0	0
JEEA	0	1	1	2
JLE	2	8	12	22
JPE	2	6	1	9
ReStud	1	2	3	6
ReStat	5	6	11	22
QJE	4	4	9	17
Total	18	35	52	105

biased, disparity, disparities, stereotype, stereotypes, premium} in the title, or at least one of the search terms *{discrimination, prejudice}* in the abstract, or at least one of the search terms from *{racial, race, gender, sex, ethnic, religious, beauty}* and *{bias, biased, disparity, stereotype, stereotypes, premium}* in the abstract. Second, we restricted attention to papers that attempted to causally document differential treatment of individuals based on their group identity. This eliminated papers on unrelated topics, including the industrial organization literature on *price* discrimination, the financial literature on the *risk* premium, theoretical models, and the experimental literature that documents behavioral differences such as gender differences in risk preferences.¹⁴

Data Collection. For each paper that met our inclusion criteria, we recorded the following information: data source (laboratory experiment, field experiment, audit or correspondence study, observational data study, other), empirical method (reduced form analysis, structural analysis), group identity of interest (race, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, class/income, other), domain of study (labor market, legal, education, financial, consumer purchases—non-financial, evaluations, other), measure of discrimination (i.e. difference in call back rates), whether the paper distinguishes between taste-based

¹⁴We also excluded some papers that met our objective criteria but which we viewed as not relevant to the spirit of the exercise. More specifically, we excluded papers that could not be classified as either a “Yes” or “No” for the criteria outlined in Table 1. For example, [Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini \(2003\)](#) examine behavioral differences between men and women but do not study discrimination per se. Similarly, [Cameron and Heckman \(2001\)](#) examine the extent to which the racial and ethnic gap in college attendance can be explained by long-run versus short-run factors but do not address discrimination.

and statistical discrimination, whether the paper distinguishes between accurate and inaccurate statistical discrimination, whether discrimination was documented, whether the study identified the source of discrimination, and whether the study measured beliefs about an individual’s predicted attribute by group identity.

Summary Statistics. We found 105 papers that met our inclusion criteria. [Table 2](#) lists the number of papers broken down by journal and decade of publication. The full list of papers is included in the [Supplemental Material](#). Out of the papers surveyed, 11 conducted audit or correspondence studies, 7 conducted another type of field experiment, 3 conducted a laboratory experiment and 84 analyzed observational data.

Discrimination was studied for a variety of group identities and in a variety of domains. The most frequent group identities were race (58 papers) and gender (37 papers), followed by physical traits / appearance (7 papers) and ethnicity (6 papers). The most frequent domain was labor markets (58 papers), followed by legal contexts (12 papers), education (9 papers), non-financial consumer markets (6 papers) and financial markets (5 papers). [Table 3](#) summarizes the papers by group identity and domain. Some papers in the survey studied multiple group identities or domains; therefore, some papers are counted in multiple rows of the table.

Table 3. Type and Domain of Discrimination

	All Papers	Evidence of Discrimination	
	<i># Papers</i>	<i># Papers</i>	<i>% Total</i>
Group Identity			
Race	58	56	96.6%
Gender	37	35	94.6%
Ethnicity	6	6	100.0%
Religion	1	1	100.0%
Sexuality	1	1	100.0%
Class/Income	1	1	100.0%
Physical Traits / Appearance	7	7	100.0%
Other	5	5	100.0%
Domain of Discrimination			
Labor Market	58	57	98.3%
Legal	12	12	100.0%
Education	9	9	100.0%
Financial	5	4	80.0%
Consumer Markets (not financial)	6	6	100.0%
Other	17	16	94.1%

3 A Model of Discrimination with Inaccurate Beliefs

In this section, we develop a model of discrimination with inaccurate beliefs. An evaluator learns about a worker’s productivity from a signal, then decides whether to hire the worker. Inaccurate beliefs refer to the possibility that the evaluator misperceives key population statistics, such as how the distribution of productivity varies by group identity. We use this model to explore how a researcher can identify the source of discrimination. We first show that many different preferences and beliefs generate an identical pattern of discrimination, creating an identification challenge. We then show that, when allowing for inaccurate beliefs, the commonly used outcomes-based method can only reject accurate statistical discrimination—the method cannot separate whether discrimination stems from preferences or inaccurate beliefs, and therefore, it cannot identify the source. Further, erroneously assuming accurate beliefs and using the outcomes-based method leads to a misclassification of discrimination driven by inaccurate beliefs as arising from preferences. We conclude by outlining two methods—eliciting beliefs and manipulating information—that can be used to determine whether discrimination stems from prefer-

ences or beliefs.

3.1 Set-up

3.1.1 Model

Worker. Consider a worker who has observable group identity $g \in \{M, F\}$ and unobservable productivity a drawn from normal distribution $N(\mu_g, 1/\tau_g)$, with mean $\mu_g \in \mathbb{R}$ and concentration $\tau_g > 0$. The worker completes a task, such as an interview or test, that generates a signal of productivity $s = a + \epsilon$, where $\epsilon \sim N(0, 1/\eta_g)$ with precision $\eta_g > 0$. Without loss of generality, we focus on discrimination against workers from group F .

Evaluator. An evaluator decides whether to hire the worker, $v \in \{0, 1\}$ where 1 corresponds to hire and 0 corresponds to do not hire. Before making this decision, the evaluator observes the worker's group identity g and signal s . We model inaccurate beliefs as a misspecified model of the group-specific productivity and signal distributions. Namely, the evaluator holds subjective beliefs $\hat{\mu}_g \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\hat{\tau}_g > 0$ about the mean and concentration of productivity for group g , and subjective belief $\hat{\eta}_g > 0$ about the precision of the signal for group g . Inaccurate beliefs corresponds to the case in which these subjective distributions differ from the true distributions.¹⁵

Given these subjective distributions, the evaluator uses Bayes rule to update her belief about the worker's productivity. She hires the worker if her subjective posterior belief about expected productivity is above a group-specific hiring threshold $u_g \in \mathbb{R}$. This threshold is a reduced form representation of how the evaluator's preferences depend on productivity and group identity.¹⁶ We refer to the evaluator's preferences and subjective beliefs as her type, denoted by $\theta \equiv (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$. Let $v(s, g, \theta) \equiv \mathbb{1}\{\hat{E}_\theta[a|s, g] \geq u_g\}$ denote the optimal hiring decision by an evaluator of type θ who observes a worker from group g with signal s , where \hat{E}_θ denotes the expectation taken with respect to θ 's subjective beliefs.

¹⁵An additional form of inaccurate beliefs that we do not discuss is the possibility that an evaluator believes that the mean of the signal differs by group identity. For example, all signals for group F are inflated by a constant $b > 0$ i.e. $s = a + b + \epsilon$, and therefore, the evaluator discounts a signal to $s - b$ for group F .

¹⁶The microfoundation for this reduced form is as follows. If the evaluator hires the worker, she earns a payoff that is linear in productivity and also depends on group identity, $m_g a + b_g$, where $m_g > 0$ is a group-specific marginal value of productivity and $b_g \in \mathbb{R}$ is a group-specific taste parameter. If she does not hire the worker, she earns outside option \underline{u} . The evaluator maximizes her expected payoff. She hires the worker if and only if $\hat{E}[m_g a + b_g | s, g] > \underline{u}$, or $\hat{E}[a | s, g] > (\underline{u} - b_g)/m_g \equiv u_g$, where \hat{E} denotes the expectation with respect to the evaluator's subjective beliefs. Therefore, u_g is a reduced form representation of the evaluator's payoff.

We next categorize different forms of preferences and beliefs. We use the term *partiality* to refer to properties of these model primitives. An evaluator with preference partiality sets different thresholds for hiring workers from groups F and M .

Definition 1 (Preference Partiality). *An evaluator has preference partiality against group F if $u_F > u_M$, preference partiality against group M if $u_M > u_F$, and preference neutrality if $u_F = u_M$.*

Preference partiality leads the evaluator to make different hiring decisions even when she has the same posterior belief about the expected productivity of a worker from each group.

An evaluator with belief partiality has different subjective beliefs about the productivity and/or signal distributions for each group.

Definition 2 (Belief Partiality). *An evaluator has belief partiality if $(\hat{\mu}_F, \hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) \neq (\hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M)$ and belief neutrality if $(\hat{\mu}_F, \hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) = (\hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M)$. This belief partiality stems from (i) lower expected productivity if $\hat{\mu}_F < \hat{\mu}_M$; (ii) lower (higher) concentration if $\hat{\tau}_F < \hat{\tau}_M$ ($\hat{\tau}_F > \hat{\tau}_M$); and (iii) lower (higher) signal precision if $\hat{\eta}_F < \hat{\eta}_M$ ($\hat{\eta}_F > \hat{\eta}_M$). Belief partiality is accurate if $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g) = (\mu_g, \tau_g, \eta_g)$ for $g \in \{M, F\}$ and otherwise is inaccurate.*

Adopting terminology from [Bartoš, Bauer, Chytilová, and Matějka \(2016\)](#), we define how the evaluator's type informs her perception of the market. An evaluator believes the market is *lemon-dropping* for a group if the hiring threshold is low relative to perceived average productivity, $u_g < \hat{\mu}_g$, while she believes it is *cherry-picking* if the hiring threshold is high relative to average productivity, $\hat{\mu}_g < u_g$. In the former case, the evaluator wants to hire a worker from group g in the absence of a signal while in the latter case, she does not. A market is *mixed* if the evaluator believes it is cherry-picking for one group and lemon-dropping for the other group.

Discrimination. Discrimination captures the causal effect of group identity on hiring. Let $D(s, \theta) \equiv v(s, M, \theta) - v(s, F, \theta)$ denote the difference between the hiring decision for a worker from group M versus F by an evaluator of type θ who observes signal s . *Discrimination* occurs at signal s when two workers are evaluated differently based on their group identity, $D(s, \theta) \neq 0$; it occurs against group F if $D(s, \theta) > 0$ and against group M if $D(s, \theta) < 0$. Discrimination *exists* if there is an s such that $D(s, \theta) \neq 0$, and there is *no discrimination* if $D(s, \theta) = 0$ for all $s \in \mathbb{R}$. When different sets of beliefs and

preferences give rise to the same discriminatory behavior at all signals, we refer to this as *equivalent discrimination*.

Definition 3 (Equivalent Discrimination). *Two evaluators of types θ and θ' exhibit equivalent discrimination if $D(s, \theta) = D(s, \theta')$ for all $s \in \mathbb{R}$.*

While partiality refers to evaluators' preferences and beliefs, *discrimination* is a property of behavior and a consequence of these primitives. Identifying the source of discrimination refers to determining which form(s) of partiality generate the observed discrimination. Using this terminology, what the literature often refers to as taste-based discrimination corresponds to differential treatment stemming from preference partiality, while what is often referred to as statistical discrimination corresponds to differential treatment stemming from belief partiality. We define *inaccurate statistical discrimination* as differential treatment stemming from inaccurate belief partiality.

Discussion of Model. We focus on binary evaluations for a population of workers with normally distributed productivity and signals. This simple set-up allows us to illustrate how inaccurate beliefs impact discrimination in a tractable and succinct way. Our main insights are robust to alternative forms of evaluations—i.e. selecting a wage offer or a rating from an interval—and to other productivity and signal distributions.

3.1.2 The Optimal Hiring Rule

In this section we derive how the optimal hiring rule depends on preferences and beliefs. Given signal s and group identity g , the evaluator's posterior belief about productivity is normally distributed with mean $\hat{\mu}_g(s, \theta) \equiv (\hat{\tau}_g \hat{\mu}_g + \hat{\eta}_g s) / (\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g)$ and variance $1 / (\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g)$. Since the posterior mean is monotonic with respect to s , the optimal hiring rule can be represented as a cut-off with respect to the signal.

Lemma 1 (Optimal Hiring Rule). *A type θ evaluator hires a worker from group g who generates signal s , $v(s, g, \theta) = 1$, if and only the signal is weakly greater than*

$$\bar{s}(\theta, g) \equiv \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g}{\hat{\eta}_g} \right) u_g - \frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{\hat{\eta}_g} \hat{\mu}_g. \quad (1)$$

The signal required to hire a worker is increasing in the evaluator's hiring preference u_g and decreasing in the prior belief about average productivity $\hat{\mu}_g$. In a cherry-picking market, it is increasing in the concentration of productivity $\hat{\tau}_g$ and decreasing in the

signal precision $\hat{\eta}_g$. Intuitively, when the evaluator seeks workers in the top tail of the distribution, a higher signal realization is required to offset higher concentration. In contrast, when the evaluator would not hire a worker in the absence of a signal, the evaluator is willing to hire at lower signal realizations when the signal is more precise. These comparative statics reverse in a lemon-dropping market: when seeking to avoid workers in the bottom tail, the evaluator is willing to hire at lower signal realizations when productivity is more concentrated, while when the evaluator would hire a worker in the absence of a signal, the evaluator is willing to hire at lower signal realizations when the signal is less precise.

From [Lemma 1](#), an evaluator of type θ discriminates against group F if she sets a higher signal threshold for group F , $\bar{s}(\theta, F) > \bar{s}(\theta, M)$. When this is the case, discrimination occurs on the interval of signals that lie between the two hiring thresholds, $s \in [\bar{s}(\theta, M), \bar{s}(\theta, F))$.

3.1.3 Equivalent Discrimination and Isodiscrimination Sets

We next derive the sets of beliefs and preferences that give rise to equivalent discrimination. From [Lemma 1](#), types exhibit equivalent discrimination when they have preferences and beliefs that lead to the same signal thresholds for each group. Combining this observation with [Eq. \(1\)](#) yields the following characterization.

Proposition 1 (Equivalent Discrimination). *For any constants $(s_M, s_F) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ with $s_F > s_M$ ($s_M > s_F$), the set of types*

$$\left\{ (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}} \left| \begin{array}{l} \frac{\hat{\tau}_M + \hat{\eta}_M}{\hat{\eta}_M} u_M - \frac{\hat{\tau}_M}{\hat{\eta}_M} \hat{\mu}_M = s_M \\ \frac{\hat{\tau}_F + \hat{\eta}_F}{\hat{\eta}_F} u_F - \frac{\hat{\tau}_F}{\hat{\eta}_F} \hat{\mu}_F = s_F \end{array} \right. \right\} \quad (2)$$

exhibit equivalent discrimination against group F (M). For each $(s_M, s_F) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ such that $s_M = s_F$, the set of types that satisfy [Eq. \(2\)](#) exhibit no discrimination.

We can represent the sets of types that exhibit equivalent discrimination as a pair of level sets, which we refer to as an *isodiscrimination set*. Fixing a level set for group M , each level set for group F corresponds to a different degree of discrimination. The isodiscrimination set is parameterized by signal thresholds $(s_M, s_F) \in \mathbb{R}^2$, with discrimination against group F corresponding to $s_F > s_M$, no discrimination corresponding to $s_F = s_M$, and discrimination in favor of group F corresponding to $s_F < s_M$.




Figure 1. Isodiscrimination Sets

$$(u_M, \hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M) = (6, 5, .5, 2), (\hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) = (.5, 2)$$

Fig. 1 illustrates several isodiscrimination sets in two-dimensions. Fixing the other parameters, each curve plots the continuum of preferences and perceived average productivities for group F that lead to a given level of discrimination. For example, an evaluator with mild preference partiality and extreme belief partiality exhibits equivalent discrimination to an evaluator with more extreme preference partiality and mild belief partiality. The red line traces out the isodiscrimination set corresponding to no discrimination. Isodiscrimination sets above this line correspond to discrimination against group F , while isodiscrimination sets below this line correspond to discrimination against group M . Moving northwest from the line of no discrimination, i.e. increasing the preference against group F and the decreasing perceived average productivity of group F , leads to discrimination on a larger set of signals. The blue dotted line traces out preference neutrality (i.e. $u_F = u_M$) and the green dotted line traces out belief neutrality (i.e. $\hat{\mu}_F = \hat{\mu}_M$). The quadrant above and to the left of these lines corresponds to the region in which there is preference and belief partiality against group F , the quadrant

below and to the left corresponds to the region in which there is belief partiality against group F and preference partiality in favor of group F , while the the quadrant above and to the right corresponds to the region in which belief partiality favors group F and preference partiality favors group M . As can be seen in the figure, a given level of discrimination can stem from both preference and belief partiality against group F , belief partiality that is somewhat offset by more favorable preferences, or vice versa. Finally, the quadrant below and to the right of the lines of neutrality corresponds to the region in which there is preference and belief partiality against group M . All isodiscrimination sets in this region correspond to discrimination against group M .

3.2 Identifying the Source of Discrimination.

Researchers are often interested in identifying the *source* of discrimination i.e. the form of partiality that generates the observed discriminatory behavior. Informally, identifiability means that the property of interest can be backed out from available data.¹⁷ [Manski \(2004\)](#) first observed that choice behavior could be consistent with multiple sets of preferences and subjective beliefs, and hence, lead to difficulties when using choice data to identify preferences and beliefs. In this section we explore how the possibility of inaccurate beliefs impacts such identification in relation to discrimination.

We first illustrate several difficulties that arise when allowing for inaccurate beliefs. Specifically, it is not possible to reject either preference based partiality or any of the forms of belief based partiality from observing solely the isodiscrimination set. Further, the traditional outcomes-based method used to classify source under the assumption of accurate beliefs can only be used to reject accurate statistical discrimination when beliefs are inaccurate—erroneously assuming accurate beliefs leads to a misclassification of source. We then present two methods that can separate preferences from beliefs.

To proceed, we assume that the researcher observes the group identity g , signal s and hiring decision v for each worker, and that the dataset includes a sufficiently rich set of workers such that the signal thresholds, and therefore, the isodiscrimination set, are identified.¹⁸

¹⁷More formally, a property is *identified* if there exists an injective relationship between the observed data and the property ([Haavelmo, 1944](#)).

¹⁸In practice, observing signals directly may not be possible. An alternative method is a *correspondence study*, which randomly assigns group identity and signals to a set of fictitious workers, then elicits hiring decisions (for example, the classic resume study of [Bertrand and Mullainathan \(2004\)](#)). This ensures that workers from each group in the fictitious sample have the same distribution over signals, and therefore, any differences in hiring can be causally attributed to group identity. An audit study uses a similar randomized procedure to identify discrimination—experimental confederates with different

3.2.1 An Identification Challenge

It is well known that identifying the existence or even the extent of discrimination (e.g. the extent to which workers who generate similar signals receive different evaluations) cannot distinguish between preference-based partiality and accurate belief-based partiality about the distributions of productivity (see for example [Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004](#)). The same insight extends to inaccurate beliefs and belief-based partiality about the signal distributions. To formalize this insight, we show that for each isodiscrimination set, each form of partiality in isolation can generate the given pattern of discrimination. Therefore, identifying the signal thresholds does not identify the source of discrimination or even rule out any of the potential sources.

Proposition 2 (Equivalent Sources). *Any isodiscrimination set $(s_M, s_F) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ with $s_F > s_M$, contains a continuum of types that exhibit equivalent discrimination, including:*

1. *A type with preference partiality against group F and belief neutrality, $u_F > u_M$ and $(\hat{\mu}_F, \hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) = (\hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M)$;*
2. *A type with preference neutrality and belief partiality due to lower expected productivity, $\hat{\mu}_F < \hat{\mu}_M$ and $(u_F, \hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) = (u_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M)$;*
3. *A type that believes the market is cherry-picking (lemon-dropping) and has preference neutrality and belief partiality due to higher (lower) concentration of productivity, $\hat{\tau}_F > \hat{\tau}_M$ ($\hat{\tau}_F < \hat{\tau}_M$) and $(u_F, \hat{\mu}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) = (u_M, \hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\eta}_M)$;*
4. *A type that believes the market is cherry-picking (lemon-dropping) and has preference neutrality and belief partiality due to lower (higher) signal precision, $\hat{\eta}_F < \hat{\eta}_M$ ($\hat{\eta}_F > \hat{\eta}_M$) and $(u_F, \hat{\mu}_F, \hat{\tau}_F) = (u_M, \hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M)$.*

From [Proposition 2](#), when all other parameters are equal, a higher preference parameter or a lower perceived average productivity for group F relative to M generates discrimination against group F . For the other parameters, the direction of partiality that leads to discrimination against group F depends on the type of market: all else equal, a higher perceived concentration of productivity or a lower signal precision for group F generate discrimination against F in a cherry-picking market, while the opposite holds in a lemon-dropping market. This stems from the comparative static in [Eq. \(1\)](#) for the parameter of interest: as discussed following [Lemma 1](#), how the parameter impacts the signal thresholds, and therefore, the pattern of discrimination, depends on the type of market.

group identities interact with evaluators while following the same script.





Figure 2. Equivalent Sources

Isodiscrimination set $(s_M, s_F) = (6.25, 6.75)$; $(u_M, \hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M) = (6, 5, .5, 2)$; red asterisks denote types with single form of partiality from Proposition 2.

Fig. 2 illustrates the evaluator types constructed in Proposition 2. Fixing an isodiscrimination set and holding the other parameters equal across groups, the first panel illustrates the continuum of preference parameters and perceived average productivity for group F that exhibit pattern of discrimination. This includes the type with belief neutrality described in part (i), denoted by the asterisk where the isodiscrimination set intersects the line of belief neutrality, and the type with preference neutrality described in part (ii), denoted by the asterisk where the isodiscrimination set intersects the line of preference neutrality. Panel (b) repeats this exercise for the continuum of preference parameters and perceived concentrations of productivity, illustrating the types described in parts (i) and (iii), while panel (c) does so for the continuum of preference parameters and perceived signal precisions, illustrating the types described in parts (i) and (iv).

Given Proposition 2, additional data is necessary in order to identify the source of discrimination. We next explore several methods

3.2.2 Outcomes-based Test.

A common method to identify the source of discrimination is to compare evaluations to the outcome distribution for each group. In the current framework, this corresponds to comparing hiring decisions to the true productivity and signal distributions.

When implementing an outcomes-based test, the literature typically assumes accurate beliefs. Under this assumption, observing the signal thresholds and the parameters (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) for $g \in \{M, F\}$ for the true distributions identifies the evaluator's type, and therefore, the source(s) of discrimination.¹⁹ Differential treatment and identical true distributions implies preference partiality, whereas different true distributions implies belief partiality (potentially coupled with preference partiality). This is illustrated in Fig. 3: the unique preference parameters that are consistent with the observed signal thresholds and true distributions are $u_F = 6.3$ and $u_M = 6$. Since $\mu_F = 4.5$ and $\mu_M = 5$, this evaluator has both preference partiality and accurate belief partiality.

We first show that the validity of the accurate beliefs assumption is crucial: erroneously imposing this assumption misidentifies the source of discrimination. To formalize this insight, we first define how inaccurate beliefs impact the degree of discrimination. We say a type's inaccurate beliefs increase (decrease) discrimination if the type discriminates against group F on a strictly larger (smaller) set of signals than the type with accurate beliefs and the same preferences.

¹⁹See Lemma 2 in Appendix A for a formal statement of this insight.




Figure 3. Outcomes-based Test

Isodiscrimination set $(s_M, s_F) = (6.25, 6.75)$; true distributions $(\mu_M, \tau_M, \eta_M) = (5, .5, 2)$, $(\mu_F, \tau_F, \eta_F) = (4.5, .5, 2)$; $(u_M, \hat{\mu}_M, \hat{\tau}_M, \hat{\eta}_M) = (6, 5, .5, 2)$; blue dotted line: preference neutrality ($u_F = u_M$); green dotted line: belief neutrality ($\hat{\mu}_F = \hat{\mu}_M$).

Definition 4. Suppose type θ^* has accurate beliefs and type θ has the same preferences as θ^* but inaccurate beliefs. Then θ 's inaccurate beliefs increase discrimination against group F if, relative to θ^* , $\bar{s}(\theta, F) \geq \bar{s}(\theta^*, F)$ and $\bar{s}(\theta, M) \leq \bar{s}(\theta^*, M)$, with one inequality strict. The definition of decrease is analogous with the inequalities reversed.

The following result establishes that the researcher mistakenly attributes discrimination stemming from inaccurate belief-based partiality to a preference-based source. Depending on whether the inaccurate beliefs increase or decrease discrimination, the misidentified preference parameters will over- or underestimate the level of preference partiality.

Proposition 3 (Misidentified Source). Suppose a researcher incorrectly assumes an evaluator has accurate beliefs and uses the outcomes-based method to identify the evaluator's type. For a generic set of types and true distributions, the researcher misidentifies the evaluator's type. If inaccurate beliefs increase discrimination against group F , then the

researcher overestimates the evaluator’s preference partiality against group F , while if inaccurate beliefs decrease discrimination, then the researcher underestimates preference partiality.

Fig. 3 illustrates this result. If the evaluator believes that the average productivity for group F is $\hat{\mu}_F = 3$ when in fact it is $\mu_F = 4.5$, then incorrectly assuming accurate beliefs will lead a researcher to conclude that $u_F = 6.3$ and $u_M = 6$. Therefore, the researcher attributes discrimination stemming from the inaccurate belief to preference partiality when in actuality, the evaluator has preference neutrality, $u_F = u_M = 6$. In contrast, if the evaluator believes that the average productivity is the same for both groups, $\hat{\mu}_F = \hat{\mu}_M = 5$ when in fact $\mu_F = 4.5$, then assuming accurate beliefs will lead the researcher to underestimate the evaluator’s preference partiality against group F , concluding $u_F = 6.3$ when in fact it is equal to 6.4.

We next show that when one allows for the possibility of inaccurate beliefs, the source is no longer identified: a researcher cannot separate preference partiality from inaccurate belief partiality. When the true distributions are the same, differential treatment may be due to preferences, inaccurate beliefs, or a combination of the two. Similarly, when the true distributions differ, differential treatment may stem from accurate beliefs about these differences or inaccurate beliefs coupled with preference partiality. One source of discrimination that the outcomes-based method *can* potentially rule out is *accurate statistical discrimination*—that is, discrimination stemming from accurate belief partiality and preference neutrality. This source is of particular interest because it is often viewed as efficient from an informational perspective and has been used to justify social stereotyping and rationalize discriminatory behavior (Tilcsik, 2021).²⁰ The following result shows that the outcomes-based test can rule out accurate statistical discrimination by showing that the observed pattern of discrimination is inconsistent with accurate beliefs and preference neutrality. Ruling out this source establishes that the observed discrimination either stems from animus towards a group or inaccurate beliefs about them.

Proposition 4 (Rejecting Accurate Statistical Discrimination). *Suppose a researcher identifies the signal thresholds (s_M, s_F) and observes (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) for $g \in \{M, F\}$. This*

²⁰The main argument is that, if an evaluator is applying differential treatment to groups when underlying differences do exist, then this evaluator is simply using information in an optimal way and engaging in profit-maximizing behavior.

does not identify the evaluator's type, but if

$$\frac{\tau_M \mu_M + \eta_M s_M}{\tau_M + \eta_M} \neq \frac{\tau_F \mu_F + \eta_F s_F}{\tau_F + \eta_F},$$

then the evaluator is not an accurate statistical discriminator.

In Fig. 3, there are a continuum of evaluator types that exhibit discrimination consistent with the observed signal thresholds, regardless of the true average productivity. However, the preferences and beliefs of an accurate statistical discriminator are not consistent with the observed signal thresholds, and therefore, are not consistent with the observed pattern of discrimination.

Of course, when the observed pattern of discrimination is consistent with accurate statistical discrimination, this does not identify the evaluator as an accurate statistical discriminator: there are many other types that could also generate the observed behavior. Importantly, even if a combination of preference partiality and inaccurate belief partiality yields equivalent discrimination to an accurate statistical discriminator for the current hiring decision, inaccurate beliefs are not innocuous. These inaccurate beliefs may negatively affect the worker in future performance evaluations and promotions. For example, consider an evaluator with beliefs that overestimate the differences in productivity between groups and preferences that somewhat favor the disadvantaged group for entry-level positions. Suppose this yields equivalent discrimination to an accurate statistical discriminator. Then if the evaluator only feels compelled to favor the disadvantaged group for entry-level hiring, these inaccurate beliefs will lead to persistently lower rates of promotion and advancement for the disadvantaged group.

3.2.3 Eliciting Beliefs.

Given the difficulty of using the outcomes-based method to identify the source of discrimination, we next explore other possible methods. If it is possible to collect data on the evaluator's subjective beliefs, then comparing hiring decisions to these beliefs can identify the source of discrimination.²¹

Proposition 5 (Identifying Preferences from Beliefs). *Suppose a researcher can identify the signal thresholds, i.e. from observing v , g , and s . Observing $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)$ identifies u_g , and therefore, the evaluator's type.*

²¹Manski (2004) first proposed combining data on expectations with choice data to identify preferences without assuming rational expectations.

Importantly, observing subjective beliefs does not identify whether they are accurate—additional data, such as outcomes, is necessary to determine this.²²

In practice, this method will be difficult in certain settings—both due to the complexity and reliability of methods for eliciting beliefs about higher moments and due to the feasibility of collecting such information (for example, it may not be possible to collect beliefs in certain settings such as on an online platform). The next method provides an alternative, simpler way to partially identify the source of discrimination.

3.2.4 Manipulating Information.

Suppose it is possible to manipulate the amount of information presented to evaluators. For example, one could compare discrimination in a treatment in which only one customer review is revealed to a treatment in which five customer reviews are revealed. In the current set-up, we model this as varying the number of signal draws that the evaluator observes for a worker. If an evaluator believes that a single draw of the signal has precision $\hat{\eta}_g$, then she believes that observing $x > 1$ draws of this signal has precision $x\hat{\eta}_g$. The characterization of the optimal hiring rule and the isodiscrimination sets for x draws are identical to the case of a single draw, substituting $x\hat{\eta}_g$ for $\hat{\eta}_g$.

This method can be used to partially identify the source of discrimination. The following result establishes that there is a unique set of preference parameters that yield equivalent discrimination across multiple informational treatments. Therefore, manipulating the number of signal draws can identify the level of preference partiality. However, it is not possible to identify the form of belief partiality: given an evaluator of type θ , the result show that there are a continuum of distinct belief profiles that exhibit equivalent discrimination to θ across all informational treatments.

Proposition 6 (Identifying Preferences from Manipulating Information). *Suppose an evaluator of type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ observes either $x_1 \geq 1$ or $x_2 \neq x_1$ signal*

²²An alternative methodology involves eliciting beliefs about group performance and comparing evaluations when the same groups are identified either using labels subject to stereotypes (e.g. gender) or not (e.g. birth month) (Coffman, Exley, and Niederle, 2021). Since the performance distributions are the same regardless of the label, any differences in evaluations between the two treatments can be assigned to tastes rather than beliefs. As the authors note, creating equivalent evaluation settings for both types of labels requires that the methodology be implemented in a controlled laboratory environment.

draws for each worker. Then the set of types

$$\left\{ \theta' = (u_g, \hat{\mu}'_g, \hat{\tau}'_g, \hat{\eta}'_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}} \left| \hat{\mu}'_g = u_g - \frac{\hat{\tau}_g / \hat{\eta}_g}{\hat{\tau}'_g / \hat{\eta}'_g} (u_g - \hat{\mu}_g) \right. \right\} \quad (3)$$

exhibit equivalent discrimination to θ across both informational treatments. This set of types also exhibit equivalent discrimination for any number $x \geq 1$ of signal draws. Therefore, identifying the signal thresholds for at least two informational treatments identifies the evaluator's preferences u_g , but does not identify beliefs $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)$.

Fig. 4 illustrates how it is possible to identify a unique preference parameter by varying the number of signal draws. Only a type with preference parameter $u_F = 6.2$ exhibits the observed discrimination for both informational treatments. The other types in the isodiscrimination set for one draw exhibit equivalent discrimination to the type with $u_F = 6.2$ when there is a single draw. But these types do *not* exhibit equivalent discrimination to the type with $u_F = 6.2$ when there are two signal draws, as they do not have the same isodiscrimination set for two draws. While it may look like the perceived average productivity $\hat{\mu}_F = 4$ is also identified, this is just the belief for a type θ with perceived concentration $\hat{\tau}_F = .5$ and signal precision $\hat{\eta}_F = 1$. There are other types with different values of $(\hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F)$ that exhibit equivalent discrimination across all informational treatments, and these types will have different values of $\hat{\mu}_F$ (but the same preference $u_F = 6.2$). For example, from Eq. (3), a type θ' with $u_F = 6.2$, $\tau'_F = .4$, $\eta'_F = 1$ and $\hat{\mu}'_F = 6.2 - \frac{.5/1}{.4/1}(6.2 - 4) = 3.45$ will exhibit equivalent discrimination to θ for any number of signal draws.

A crucial feature of this information manipulation is that the multiple signals are drawn from the same distribution. In other words, for each group, the evaluator has the same model of the precision for each draw of the signal. This contrasts with an information manipulation in which additional signals from other domains are included – for example, comparing discrimination in a treatment in which education is revealed to a treatment in which education and SAT score are revealed. In this case, the evaluator may have a different group-specific model of the signal distribution for each type of signal—for example, the evaluator believes that education is more informative for group M , while SAT score is more informative for group F . It is not possible to identify the evaluator's preference partiality—or any other aspect of her type—from varying the set of observed signals across different domains.




Figure 4. Information Manipulation
Isodiscrimination sets for $(u_F, \hat{\mu}_F, \hat{\tau}_F, \hat{\eta}_F) = (6.2, 4, .5, 1)$

Taken together, either the belief elicitation or information manipulation method can separate preference partiality from belief partiality. If it is possible to elicit an evaluator’s beliefs for all parameters of the relevant distributions, then it is possible to fully identify the evaluator’s type. If not, then the information manipulation method provides an alternative, simpler way to identify preferences and “aggregate” belief partiality—although it comes at the cost of not being able to separate the different ways that beliefs can be inaccurate.

4 Identifying the Source of Discrimination in a Hiring Experiment

In this section, we employ a stylized experimental setting to demonstrate the pitfalls of the identification problem posed by inaccurate beliefs—in particular, how assuming accurate beliefs can lead to erroneous conclusions—and propose a potential methodology to solve it. The experiment allows us to perform the accounting exercise employed in outcomes-based tests and to also elicit beliefs about relevant characteristics. We show

that average beliefs are incorrect, violating the accurate beliefs assumption typically made when considering statistical discrimination, and that ignoring these inaccurate beliefs leads to a false identification of the source of discrimination. We also demonstrate how informational interventions can be used both to separate inaccurate beliefs from underlying animus and to correct these inaccurate beliefs. Specifically, we inform individuals of the true group-specific average productivities. Participants adjust their behavior significantly in the direction of the information, suggesting that at least some of the observed discrimination is driven by inaccurate beliefs rather than animus.

4.1 Experimental Design

In this section, we provide a short summary of the pre-registered experimental design; we outline the design in detail in [Appendix B](#).²³ We recruited two samples of subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk (participants) to complete either a work task (Survey 1) or a hiring task (Survey 2). In the first survey, we recruited 589 participants to create a population of “workers” (392 from the US and 197 from India). These participants answered a set of demographic questions, followed by 50 multiple-choice math questions. They were told that their performance would not affect their payment. This design provided for relatively continuous and precise measures of productivity, and allowed us to study discrimination without using deception.

In the second survey, we recruited 577 different participants to create a population of “employers” (392 from the US, 185 from India). These participants were told about the task assigned to “workers” (they were shown five examples of the questions), that the average score was 36.95 out of 50, and that they would serve as an “employer” who could potentially hire one of the workers. The hiring task involved multiple stages. In the first stage, each employer was shown 20 profiles of potential workers, randomly selected from the bank, and made a wage offer for each worker. The profiles included demographic variables which could be informative for forming beliefs about productivity (age, gender, and nationality), or over which employers may hold taste-based motives, as well as potentially irrelevant information (favorite high school subject, sport, color, movie, and coffee/tea preference); see [Fig. B1](#) for an example. One of these workers was selected and their wage offer was accepted or rejected according to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism to incentivize truthful reporting. Specifically, if the wage offer was larger than a randomly generated number, then it was ‘accepted’—the employer paid

²³The experiment was pre-registered on AsPredicted ([#8678](#))

the random number as a bonus to the selected worker and the employer received 1 cent for each question answered correctly, minus this random number (in addition to a \$2 participation payment); if the wage offer was smaller than the random number, it was ‘rejected’—the employer paid nothing and the worker did not receive a bonus.²⁴

In the second stage, we elicited employers’ beliefs about the average productivity of different groups (men/women, residents from the US/India, people above/below the median age of 33), randomizing whether or not this was incentivized.²⁵ The third stage involved the informational intervention, which provided employers with average productivity data for each of the six groups. As discussed in Section 1, providing accurate information about group-level statistics is one potential method for differentiating between inaccurate beliefs and “animus-driven” beliefs. While the former should shift in the direction of the information, the latter are unlikely to be moved because the errors are due to non-informational factors. Finally, the fourth stage of the experiment involved a second set of hiring decisions for 10 worker profiles, which was conducted in the same way as the first stage.

4.2 Experimental Results

A necessary prerequisite to study the source of discrimination is to find a context and a population in which discrimination occurs. Ex-ante, it was not obvious that our stylized hiring experiment would satisfy this requirement. The employers knew that they were being observed as part of a research study and the relevant group information was represented abstractly (e.g. written text) rather than viscerally (e.g. a picture). All of these factors may attenuate the influence of animus.²⁶

Despite these attenuating factors, we did find evidence of discrimination with respect to two out of three group identities: gender and nationality. Panel A of Table 4 presents the differences in average wages paid by employers to worker profiles from each group. With respect to gender, male profiles were paid on average 31.90 cents, while female

²⁴Employers saw examples of the mechanism and passed comprehension checks before making wage offers.

²⁵We only elicited beliefs about the first moment of the performance distribution. While participants may also have inaccurate beliefs about other statistics, demonstrating a difference in perceived versus actual means is sufficient to falsify the assumption that beliefs are correct, which was the primary goal of the illustrative experiment. Eliciting other moments of the distribution, e.g. variance, is more complex for participants relative to eliciting the mean. Given the multiple stages in the study, we sought to keep the belief elicitation task as simple as possible in order to curtail potential confusion and minimize noise.

²⁶For example, Bar and Zussman (2019) argue that a lack of interaction may attenuate the extent of taste-based discrimination in driving test examinations.

Table 4. Wages and “Productivities”, by Employee Characteristics (Hiring Task 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Group 1	Group 2	Diff.	p-val	#Obs. G1	#Obs. G2
Panel A: Employers’ Wage WTP, by Employee Characteristics						
Gender (1 = Male , 2 = Female)	31.90 (12.07)	30.85 (12.23)	1.05	0.01	6,306	5,234
Country (1 = US , 2 = India)	30.71 (12.20)	32.85 (11.95)	-2.14	0.00	7,700	3,840
Age (1 = Under 33 , 2 = Over 33)	31.67 (12.00)	31.14 (12.33)	0.54	0.17	6,139	5,401
Panel B: Employee Productivity, by Employee Characteristics						
Gender (1 = Male , 2 = Female)	38.30 (8.55)	34.98 (8.73)	3.32	0.00	6,306	5,234
Country (1 = US , 2 = India)	37.01 (8.93)	36.36 (8.49)	0.65	0.41	7,700	3,840
Age (1 = Under 33 , 2 = Over 33)	36.96 (8.62)	36.60 (8.98)	0.37	0.63	6,139	5,401

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. One observation per worker-employer combination. Column (4) shows the p-value from a regression of the outcome on a dummy variable for group membership, with standard errors two-way clustered by employer and worker.

profiles were paid 30.85 cents, a significant 3.4% difference ($p < 0.01$). With respect to nationality, profiles from India were favored, earning an average of 32.85 cents, while profiles from the U.S. earned 30.71 cents, a significant 7.0% difference ($p < 0.01$). Finally, there was no statistically significant evidence of age discrimination: subjects at or below age 33 were paid an average of 31.67 cents and those above age 33 were paid 31.14 cents, a 1.7% difference ($p = 0.17$). [Table C1](#) demonstrates that these results are robust to demographic controls and employer fixed effects.

To examine the possibility of in-group bias, we run similar regressions controlling for the employer belonging to the group of interest (e.g. female) and the interaction of the two indicators to measure in-group bias (see [Table C2](#)). We find that the interaction is insignificant for gender and marginally significant for nationality, although in the direction of favoring the out-group. For age, we find a significant interaction effect. This suggests that the null effect in [Table C1](#) masks in-group bias by both older and younger employers. [Antonovics and Knight \(2009\)](#) use a similar set of regressions to test for taste-based discrimination. This specification is motivated by the assumption that animus varies between groups (i.e. there is less animus toward one’s in-group than out-group), but that beliefs are similar across groups (since they are taking a “standard model of statistical discrimination” as the benchmark and note that “these beliefs must be correct

in equilibrium”). In [Table C3](#), we test this assumption in our experimental environment. We find that beliefs about the gender performance gap are identical among both female and male employers. However, for nationality, we find a significant difference in beliefs, namely, Indians hold beliefs that more strongly favor the out-group (Americans).

Having demonstrated moderate levels of discrimination in hiring, we now examine the “ground truth” in actual productivity differences between groups. The typical outcomes-based test of statistical discrimination requires mapping disparities between groups in the evaluators’ relevant decision (e.g. the wages offered to employees) to disparities in an outcome in the evaluators’ objective function (e.g. the employees’ productivity).²⁷ In our context, this requires mapping disparities in the employers’ stated wages to disparities in group-specific productivity differences, i.e. the number of questions answered correctly. The commonly used outcome method compares disparities in wages to disparities in performance to measure the relative role of (accurate) statistical versus taste-based discrimination (in the context of our framework, accurate belief-based versus preference-based partiality). For simplicity, we will refer to both disparities as measured in “points.”

Panel B of [Table 4](#) shows the average number of correct answers by each sub-group (see [Fig. C1](#) for probability density functions). As shown in Panel A of [Table 4](#), the gap in average wages for men and women was lower than the gap in average performance (1.05 points versus 3.32 points).²⁸ Therefore, if we used the standard outcome method to separate statistical and taste-based discrimination, we would conclude that the entire 1.05 point disparity in wages is due to (accurate) statistical discrimination—the remaining 2.27 point difference in performance would be attributed to taste-based prejudice against men. Turning to nationality-based discrimination, there was a wage gap of -2.14 points in favor of Indians, compared to a performance gap of 0.65 points in favor of Americans. Under the standard approach, we would conclude that the -2.14 point disparity in wages, when compared to the +0.65 point difference in performance, suggests

²⁷Translating the two measures may require strong modeling assumptions (e.g. whether there is heterogeneity in the search costs faced by evaluators). For discussions of these assumptions in the context of the hit-rate tests, see [Antonovics and Knight \(2009\)](#); [Dharmapala and Ross \(2004\)](#); [Anwar and Fang \(2006\)](#).

²⁸We calculate productivity differences using the full sample of profiles observed in hiring task 1. This is a weighted sample of the original population of 577 workers (since each of the 589 employers saw independent random samples of 20 of the 577 workers). Due to the random variation in the profiles observed, the group-level averages slightly differ from those found in [Table B1](#). For example, the male-female performance gap is 3.04 points in [Table B1](#) and 3.32 points in this weighted sample. Note that the averages in [Table B1](#) are the basis for the informational intervention.

Table 5. Beliefs about Productivity by Employee Characteristics

	Group 1	Group 2	Diff.	p-val
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gender (1=Male, 2=Female)	34.04 (8.26)	32.14 (8.41)	1.89	0.00
Country (1=US, 2=India)	32.08 (8.56)	34.80 (9.44)	-2.72	0.00
Age (1=Under 33, 2=Over 33)	33.41 (8.97)	31.57 (9.00)	1.84	0.00

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. One observation per employer combination. Column (4) shows the p-value from one-sample t-tests for the equality of columns (1) and (2). # Observations = 577.

taste-based prejudice against Americans.²⁹

We now proceed to examine whether inaccurate beliefs can explain the disparities in compensation. As an initial check to see whether employers’ decisions were guided by the elicited beliefs, we correlate wages with their beliefs about group-specific productivities. We find positive correlations for all six groups of workers (Female: 0.12, Male: 0.12, India: 0.15, U.S.: 0.12, Over 33: 0.12, Under 33: 0.10). Given that we elicited beliefs after the hiring task, it is possible that part of these correlations are due to rationalization (e.g. an individual first discriminates against women when setting wages, then chooses beliefs to justify this decision), or audience effects (e.g. an individual falsely reports beliefs that justify the discriminatory decision to the experimenter). To test for this, we provided half of the employees with large incentives for belief accuracy. In [Table C4](#), we show that beliefs are nearly identical across both incentive conditions, with none of the six comparisons being significantly different from one another. Together these findings suggest that the employers’ group-specific performance predictions provide meaningful information about their true beliefs.

In [Table 5](#), we present employer beliefs about the group-specific average performance, which can be compared directly to the actual group-specific performance reported in [Table 4](#), Panel B. Predictions about performance are lower than actual performance for

²⁹While we document significant discrimination by gender (i.e. men are paid more than women), the outcome method reveals that the performance gap exceeds the pay gap. This leads to the conclusion that there is taste-based discrimination *against* men. While the literature often equates taste-based discrimination with animus or prejudice, this link is inappropriate when discrimination manifests as an equalizing action. For example, people may be equalizing wages between two groups despite differences in productivity due to fairness concerns. We discuss the implications of this distinction further in the conclusion.

all six groups. This overall underestimation is consistent with risk aversion (recall that employers face the potential of a negative payment, taken from their \$0.50 bonus, if they overestimate performance). Consistent with this, gaps in beliefs about performance are larger than gaps in wage payments. Using employers’ actual beliefs to identify the source of discrimination leads to substantially different conclusions than the outcomes-based method outlined above. Looking at nationality, the wage gap is -2.14 points and the performance gap is +0.65 points; the gap in beliefs is -2.72 points. Thus, the *entire* wage gap can be explained by inaccurate beliefs. In contrast to the outcome method which infers taste-based discrimination in favor of Indian workers, the remaining 0.58 point difference between the belief and wage gaps suggests prejudice *against* them. Looking at gender, the wage gap is 1.05 points, the performance gap is 3.32 points, and the belief gap is 1.89 points. The majority of the wage gap can be explained by inaccurate beliefs: the residual attributed to preference-based sources shrinks from 2.27 to 0.84 points. Finally, despite the minimal gap in wages and performance based on age, employers believed that young workers will significantly outperform older ones. This suggests some preference-based partiality against younger workers. Together these results highlight that a failure to account for inaccurate statistical discrimination may lead to the wrong conclusion on the source of treatment disparities.³⁰

To identify whether the observed disparate treatment was driven by inaccurate statistical discrimination or animus-driven beliefs, we examined how behavior would respond to an informational intervention. Table 6 compares the differences between the two hiring rounds (“Post-Info”), the differences between wages assigned to profiles of each demographic group (e.g. “Female”), and the difference-in-differences (e.g. “Female X Post-Info”). The coefficients on “Post-Info” suggests substantial belief updating across all demographic groups, partially correcting the large level differences in the first hiring task between wages and actual group-specific productivity (a gap of roughly 5 points on average). The effect of the informational intervention on hiring decisions suggests that the majority of initial discrimination was driven by inaccurate beliefs rather than accurate statistical or preference-based sources.³¹

³⁰In Table C5, we show that the differences in beliefs are quite similar after trimming the top and bottom five percent of the distributions of belief differences by each group. Consistent with Fig. C2, differences in beliefs about group productivities are driven by a large mass of employers with biased beliefs rather than a few employers with extreme beliefs.

³¹There are several caveats to note when interpreting these results. Beliefs were not measured a second time. Additionally, experimenter demand may have played a role, though recent work suggests that this factor is likely small (De Quidt, Haushofer, and Roth, 2018). Finally, the change in wages could

Table 6. Effect of Information: Difference-in-Differences by Hiring Task

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Post-Info	1.53*** (0.31)	1.60*** (0.27)	1.06*** (0.31)	1.97*** (0.39)	2.33*** (0.34)
Female	-1.05*** (0.38)			-0.66* (0.37)	-0.80** (0.33)
Female X Post-Info	-0.64* (0.38)			-0.89** (0.38)	-1.01*** (0.29)
Indian		2.14*** (0.41)		2.01*** (0.43)	2.02*** (0.38)
Indian X Post-Info		-1.07** (0.43)		-1.20*** (0.44)	-1.65*** (0.33)
Over 33			-0.54 (0.39)	0.06 (0.39)	0.29 (0.35)
Over 33 X Post-Info			0.41 (0.42)	0.12 (0.42)	-0.21 (0.31)
N	17,310	17,310	17,310	17,310	17,310
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.48
DepVarMean	31.90	30.71	31.67	30.71	30.71
Employer FE?	No	No	No	No	Yes

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered by employer and worker. “DepVarMean” is the mean of the dependent variable (wage WTP) in the omitted group (e.g. Male Workers in Hiring Task 1 for column (1)). “Post-Info” is an indicator for whether a profile came in the second hiring task (i.e. profiles 21-30 of the 30 total profiles evaluated). The observed performance (trivia score) averages for the sample of profiles observed in Hiring Task 2 are: 38.13 (Male), 35.13 (Female), 36.95 (US), 36.53 (India), 36.84 (Under 33), 36.77 (Over 33), 36.81 (Prefer Coffee), 36.79 (Prefer Tea).

5 Conclusion

The study of discrimination and its motives has a rich history in economics. Separating out statistical and taste-based drivers of discrimination is a useful exercise, but as our survey of the literature illustrates, the empirical literature has thus far relied heavily on the assumption of accurate beliefs. There are many reasons to suspect that beliefs

reflect an experience effect between assigning wages in the first and second hiring task. To investigate this channel, we perform a test comparing the average wages assigned in the first 10 profiles and the second 10 profiles during the initial task. We do not find evidence for an experience effect (36.86 vs. 36.72; $p=0.39$). While we cannot fully rule out all these possible confounds, we view the information intervention as a proof of concept for the type of methodology that can be used as both an intervention for correcting beliefs and identifying belief-based discrimination from preference-based motives (e.g. animus-driven beliefs).

may not always be accurate. This paper formally outlines the identification problem inherent in distinguishing between belief-based and preference-based motives. A stylized experiment is used to highlight the pitfalls of not accounting for inaccurate beliefs when attempting to identify the source of discrimination, and illustrates a potential methodology for improved identification.

The results of the information intervention suggest that identifying inaccurate beliefs may have immediate policy implications for reducing discrimination. However, there are some important caveats to keep in mind when considering how this type of intervention would be implemented outside of the stylized exercise. First, such an intervention is likely feasible only in contexts where the underlying target outcome (e.g. productivity) is reliably measured and reflects the appropriate counterfactual outcome for all groups. To the first point, the accuracy of the underlying outcomes may differ by group; for example, police officers have been shown to be more likely to discount the recorded speed of a white driver than a minority driver ([Goncalves and Mello, 2019](#)). To the latter point, there are contexts in which discrimination at (often unobserved) intermediate stages renders final productivity measures unreliable due to behavioral responses. For example, minority pitchers correctly anticipate discrimination by umpires and modify their behavior, resulting in a downward bias for performance measures ([Parsons, Sulaeman, Yates, and Hamermesh, 2011](#)). Studies have also documented that bias at intermediate stages can skew final productivity measures among grocery store workers ([Glover, Pal-lais, and Pariente, 2017](#)) and academic economists ([Hengel, 2019](#)). It is important to also take into account the underlying psychology of how people will respond to the information. Selection decisions such as hiring are rarely one-dimensional. Drawing attention to a (smaller than expected) productivity gap could correct beliefs, while nonetheless increasing discrimination if it increases the salience of the gap as an input into the hiring decision. These concerns highlight the need for future tests that operationalize and examine similar informational interventions in field contexts.

Throughout the paper, we document discrimination in wages by gender (i.e. men paid more than women). Carrying out the standard outcomes-based method reveals that the gap in performance exceeds that of the gap in pay. This leads to the conclusion that there is preference-based partiality against the group that received higher wages—male workers. While taste-based discrimination is often used as a synonym for animus or prejudice against a group, this link seems misplaced when discrimination manifests as an equalizing actions (e.g. equalizing wage rates). For example, people may treat

groups similarly regardless of actual or believed productivity differences due to fairness concerns. Additionally, there is often an equity-efficiency trade-off to discrimination, such that even in the absence of legal or social sanctions, an employer may wish to equalize wages across groups (for a theoretical discussion of these trade-offs in the context of racial profiling, see [Durlauf \(2005\)](#)). Such a concern may be especially pronounced for wages, where even abstracting away from group-level attributes, there is evidence that fairness norms may contribute to observed wage compression (e.g. [Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani \(2018\)](#))

Just as decomposing the nature of belief-based discrimination has implications for policy, the same may be true for preference-based partiality. For example, if the basis for preference-based partiality is animus or prejudice, then a policy that increases contact between groups may reduce disparities ([Dobbie and Fryer, 2015](#); [Paluck, Green, and Green, 2018](#); [Rao, 2019](#)). By contrast, if the behavior is instead sanction- or value-oriented, then such interventions will likely have little impact. While it is difficult to imagine a simple elicitation that would allow for a parsimonious quantitative decomposition of “tastes”, survey measures may be able to make some headway in this endeavor. Such a decomposition is outside of the scope of this paper, but future work along these lines would enrich our understanding of discrimination, and help in the development of tools used to identify it and design policy.

Lastly, our findings speak to the need for continued work such as [Bordalo et al. \(2016\)](#) that may help to identify situations when inaccurate beliefs are especially likely to be prevalent. As research begins to identify situations where inaccurate beliefs are a driving factor for discrimination, future work will hopefully also begin to develop policy interventions that are able to effectively correct beliefs and reduce discrimination as a result.

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Appendix A. Proofs from Section 3

Proof of Lemma 1. The normal distribution is the conjugate prior to a normal likelihood function. Therefore, the evaluator’s posterior belief about productivity is normally distributed with mean $(\hat{\tau}_g \hat{\mu}_g + \hat{\eta}_g s)/(\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g)$ and variance $1/(\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g)$ and the optimal decision rule is $v(s, g, \theta) = 1$ iff $(\hat{\tau}_g \hat{\mu}_g + \hat{\eta}_g s)/(\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g) \geq u_g$. Rearranging terms yields Eq. (1). \square

Proof of Proposition 1. The characterization of the set of types that exhibit equivalent discrimination follows from Eq. (1) and the discussion in the text. If two types do not discriminate, which corresponds to setting the same thresholds for each group, then trivially they exhibit equivalent discrimination, even when they set different signal thresholds from each other. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. Consider an evaluator of type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ who discriminates against group F . This evaluator generates discrimination that lies in isodiscrimination set $(s_F, s_M) = (\bar{s}(\theta, F), \bar{s}(\theta, M))$. Given that θ discriminates against group F , $s_F > s_M$. It is immediately apparent from Eq. (2) that there are a continuum of other types that exhibit equivalent discrimination. We next construct types with a single form of partiality.

Part (1): Consider a type θ' with belief neutrality, $(\hat{\mu}'_F, \hat{\tau}'_F, \hat{\eta}'_F) = (\hat{\mu}'_M, \hat{\tau}'_M, \hat{\eta}'_M)$. Let $(\hat{\mu}', \hat{\tau}', \hat{\eta}')$ denote the type’s subjective beliefs for a worker from either group. Given preference parameters (u'_F, u'_M) , this type hires members of group g with signals above

$\bar{s}(\theta', g) = \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}' + \hat{\eta}'}{\hat{\eta}'} \right) u'_g - \frac{\hat{\tau}'}{\hat{\eta}'} \hat{\mu}'$. This type exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ if $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = s_g$ for each $g \in \{M, F\}$. Rearranging terms, this corresponds to preference parameter

$$u'_g = \left(\frac{\hat{\eta}'}{\hat{\tau}' + \hat{\eta}'} \right) s_g + \frac{\hat{\tau}'}{\hat{\tau}' + \hat{\eta}'} \hat{\mu}'$$

for group g . Note $u'_F > u'_M$ since $s_F > s_M$, so there is preference partiality against group F .

Part (2): Consider a type θ' with preference neutrality, $u'_F = u'_M$ and belief neutrality with respect to concentration and signal precision, $(\hat{\tau}'_F, \hat{\eta}'_F) = (\hat{\tau}'_M, \hat{\eta}'_M)$. Let $(u', \hat{\tau}', \hat{\eta}')$ denote these common parameters. Given perceived means $(\hat{\mu}'_M, \hat{\mu}'_F)$, this type hires members of group g with signals above $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}' + \hat{\eta}'}{\hat{\eta}'} \right) u' - \frac{\hat{\tau}'}{\hat{\eta}'} \hat{\mu}'_g$. This type exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ if $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = s_g$ for each $g \in \{M, F\}$. Rearranging terms, this corresponds to perceived mean

$$\hat{\mu}'_g = \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}' + \hat{\eta}'}{\hat{\tau}'} \right) u' - \frac{\hat{\eta}'}{\hat{\tau}'} s_g$$

for group g . Note $\hat{\mu}'_F < \hat{\mu}'_M$ since $s_F > s_M$, so there is belief partiality in the form of lower expected productivity against group F .

Part (3): Consider a type θ' with preference neutrality, $u'_F = u'_M$ and belief neutrality with respect to average productivity and signal precision, $(\hat{\mu}'_F, \hat{\eta}'_F) = (\hat{\mu}'_M, \hat{\eta}'_M)$. Let $(u', \hat{\mu}', \hat{\eta}')$ denote these common parameters. Given perceived concentration of productivity $(\hat{\tau}'_M, \hat{\tau}'_F)$, this type hires members of group g with signals above $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}'_g + \hat{\eta}'}{\hat{\eta}'} \right) u' - \frac{\hat{\tau}'_g}{\hat{\eta}'} \hat{\mu}'$. This type exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ if $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = s_g$ for each $g \in \{M, F\}$. Rearranging terms, this corresponds to perceived concentration

$$\hat{\tau}'_g = \hat{\eta}' \left(\frac{s_g - u'}{u' - \hat{\mu}'} \right)$$

for group g . Given $s_F > s_M$, $\hat{\eta}'(s_F - u') > \hat{\eta}'(s_M - u')$. Therefore, whether $\hat{\tau}'_F$ is greater than or less than $\hat{\tau}'_M$ depends on the sign of $u' - \hat{\mu}'$.

If θ' believes the market is lemon-dropping, i.e. $u' - \hat{\mu}' < 0$, then $\hat{\tau}'_F < \hat{\tau}'_M$ and a less concentrated perceived productivity distribution generates the discrimination against group F . The fatter low productivity tail for F relative to M means that a larger share of workers from group F fall below the threshold ex-ante. We also need to check that $\hat{\tau}'_F > 0$ for these to both be a valid precisions. This will be the case for $u' > s_F$, so

that the numerator is also negative. In summary, any type with $\hat{\mu}' > s_F$, $u' \in (s_F, \hat{\mu}')$ and $\hat{\tau}'_g = \hat{\eta}' \left(\frac{s_g - u'}{u' - \hat{\mu}'} \right)$ has belief partiality in the form of lower perceived concentration for group F and exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ .

If θ' believes the market is cherry-picking, i.e. $u' - \hat{\mu}' > 0$, then $\hat{\tau}'_F > \hat{\tau}'_M$ and a more concentrated perceived productivity distribution generates the discrimination against group F . The thinner high productivity tail for F relative to M means that a smaller share of workers from group F lie above the threshold ex-ante. We also need to check that $\hat{\tau}'_M > 0$ for these to both be valid precisions. This will be the case for $s_M > u'$, so that the numerator is also positive. In summary, any type with $\hat{\mu}' < s_M$, $u' \in (\hat{\mu}', s_M)$ and $\hat{\tau}'_g = \hat{\eta}' \left(\frac{s_g - u'}{u' - \hat{\mu}'} \right)$ has belief partiality in the form of higher perceived concentration for group F and exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ .

Part (4): Consider a type θ' with preference neutrality, $u'_F = u'_M$ and belief neutrality with respect to average productivity and concentration, $(\hat{\mu}'_F, \hat{\tau}'_F) = (\hat{\mu}'_M, \hat{\tau}'_M)$. Let $(u', \hat{\mu}', \hat{\tau}')$ denote these common parameters. Given perceived signal precision $(\hat{\eta}'_M, \hat{\eta}'_F)$, this type hires members of group g with signals above $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}' + \hat{\eta}'_g}{\hat{\eta}'_g} \right) u' - \frac{\hat{\tau}'}{\hat{\eta}'_g} \hat{\mu}'$. This type exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ if $\bar{s}(\theta', g) = s_g$ for each $g \in \{M, F\}$. Rearranging terms, this corresponds to perceived signal precision

$$\hat{\eta}'_g = \hat{\tau}' \left(\frac{u' - \hat{\mu}'}{s_g - u'} \right)$$

for group g . Given $s_F > s_M$, $s_F - u' > s_M - u'$. We need $\hat{\eta}'_g > 0$ for each g in order for these to be valid precisions. This is the case when (i) $u' - \hat{\mu}' < 0$ and $s_F - u' < 0$, which also implies $s_M - u' < 0$, or (ii) $u' - \hat{\mu}' > 0$ and $s_M - u' > 0$, which also implies $s_F - u' > 0$.

First consider case (i). In this case, θ' believes the market is lemon-dropping since $u' < \hat{\mu}'$. Further, $0 > s_F - u' > s_M - u' \Rightarrow 1/(s_M - u') > 1/(s_F - u') \Rightarrow (u' - \hat{\mu}')/(s_M - u') < (u' - \hat{\mu}')/(s_F - u')$. Therefore, $\hat{\eta}'_M < \hat{\eta}'_F$ and a higher perceived signal precision generates the discrimination against group F . In summary, any type with $\hat{\mu}' > s_F$, $u' \in (s_F, \hat{\mu}')$ and $\hat{\eta}'_g = \hat{\tau}' \left(\frac{u' - \hat{\mu}'}{s_g - u'} \right)$ has belief partiality in the form of higher perceived signal precision for group F and exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ .

Next consider case (ii). In this case, θ' believes the market is cherry-picking since $u' > \hat{\mu}'$. Further, $s_F - u' > s_M - u' > 0 \Rightarrow 1/(s_M - u') > 1/(s_F - u') \Rightarrow (u' - \hat{\mu}')/(s_M - u') > (u' - \hat{\mu}')/(s_F - u')$. Therefore, $\hat{\eta}'_M > \hat{\eta}'_F$ and a lower perceived signal precision generates the discrimination against group F . In summary, any type with $\hat{\mu}' < s_F$, $u' \in (\hat{\mu}', s_M)$

and $\hat{\eta}'_g = \hat{\tau}' \left(\frac{u' - \hat{\mu}'}{s_g - u'} \right)$ has belief partiality in the form of lower perceived signal precision for group F and exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ . \square

Lemma 2. *Assume an evaluator has accurate beliefs and suppose a researcher can identify the signal thresholds. Observing (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) for $g \in \{M, F\}$ identifies the evaluator's type, and therefore, the source(s) of discrimination.*

Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the evaluator has type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$. This evaluator exhibits discrimination that lies in isodiscrimination set $(s_F, s_M) = (\bar{s}(\theta, F), \bar{s}(\theta, M))$. Suppose the researcher identifies the signal thresholds (s_F, s_M) and the true productivity and signal distributions (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) for each group g . Under the assumption of accurate beliefs, i.e. $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g) = (\mu_g, \tau_g, \eta_g)$, solving Eq. (2) for u_g uniquely identifies the preference parameters as

$$u_g = \left(\frac{\eta_g}{\tau_g + \eta_g} \right) s_g + \left(\frac{\tau_g}{\tau_g + \eta_g} \right) \mu_g. \quad (4)$$

Therefore, the evaluator's type is identified. \square

Proof of Proposition 3. Given true productivity and signal distributions $(\mu_g, \tau_g, \eta_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$, suppose the evaluator has type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ with inaccurate beliefs, $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g) \neq (\mu_g, \tau_g, \eta_g)$. This evaluator exhibits discrimination that lies in isodiscrimination set $(s_F, s_M) = (\bar{s}(\theta, F), \bar{s}(\theta, M))$. Suppose a researcher identifies the signal thresholds (s_F, s_M) and the true productivity and signal distributions (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) for each group g . When the researcher assumes belief are accurate, i.e. the evaluator is a type θ' with beliefs $(\hat{\mu}'_g, \hat{\tau}'_g, \hat{\eta}'_g) = (\mu_g, \tau_g, \eta_g)$, then from Lemma 2, the researcher concludes that the evaluator has preference parameter

$$u'_g = \left(\frac{\eta_g}{\tau_g + \eta_g} \right) s_g + \left(\frac{\tau_g}{\tau_g + \eta_g} \right) \mu_g. \quad (5)$$

In contrast, the the true preference parameter satisfies

$$u_g = \left(\frac{\hat{\eta}_g}{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g} \right) s_g + \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g} \right) \hat{\mu}_g. \quad (6)$$

When beliefs are inaccurate, this identified preference parameter is equal to the true parameter, $u'_g = u_g$, if and only if

$$\mu_g = \left(\frac{\tau_g + \eta_g}{\tau_g} \right) \left[\left(\frac{\hat{\eta}_g}{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g} \right) s_g - \left(\frac{\eta_g}{\tau_g + \eta_g} \right) s_g + \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g} \right) \hat{\mu}_g \right]. \quad (7)$$

Therefore, the preference parameter is misidentified for a generic set of true beliefs (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) and evaluator types $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$, $u'_g \neq u_g$.

Let $\theta^* = (u_g, \mu_g, \tau_g, \eta_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ denote the type with accurate beliefs and the same preferences as θ . Suppose type θ 's inaccurate beliefs increase discrimination against group F , i.e. $\bar{s}(\theta, F) \geq \bar{s}(\theta^*, F)$ and $\bar{s}(\theta^*, M) \geq \bar{s}(\theta, M)$ with at least one strict inequality. Then given the observed signal thresholds are consistent with type θ , i.e. $s_F = \bar{s}(\theta, F)$, $s_F \geq \bar{s}(\theta^*, F) = \frac{\tau_F + \eta_F}{\eta_F} u_F - \frac{\tau_F}{\eta_F} \mu_F$. Combining this inequality with Eq. (5) establishes that

$$u'_F = \left(\frac{\eta_F}{\tau_F + \eta_F} \right) s_F + \left(\frac{\tau_F}{\tau_F + \eta_F} \right) \mu_F \geq u_F. \quad (8)$$

Similarly, $u'_M \leq u_M$, with a strict inequality for at least one of the expressions. Therefore, the researcher overestimates the preference parameter for group F and/or underestimates the preference parameter for group M , leading her to overestimate the preference partiality against group F . The proof for the case of decreasing discrimination is analogous. \square

Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose the researcher identifies the signal thresholds (s_F, s_M) and the true productivity and signal distributions (μ_g, τ_g, η_g) for each group g . From Eq. (2), for any $u \in \mathbb{R}$, the corresponding accurate statistical discriminator with preferences $u_M = u_F = u$ lies in isodiscrimination set (s'_F, s'_M) with $s'_g = \left(\frac{\tau_g + \eta_g}{\eta_g} \right) u - \frac{\tau_g}{\eta_g} \mu_g$. If $\frac{\tau_M \mu_M + \eta_M s_M}{\tau_M + \eta_M} \neq \frac{\tau_F \mu_F + \eta_F s_F}{\tau_F + \eta_F}$, then there is no u such that $(s'_F, s'_M) = (s_F, s_M)$, i.e. an accurate statistical discriminator exhibits discrimination that is consistent with the observed signal thresholds.

Suppose the evaluator has type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ such that $\bar{s}(\theta, F), \bar{s}(\theta, M) = (s_F, s_M)$. From Eq. (2), it is clear that when beliefs may be inaccurate, this provides no additional information about $(u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)$ for each group g —any type that satisfies Eq. (2) for the observed signal thresholds can exhibit the observed behavior. \square

Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the evaluator has type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$. This evaluator exhibits discrimination that lies in isodiscrimination set $(s_F, s_M) = (\bar{s}(\theta, F), \bar{s}(\theta, M))$. Suppose the researcher identifies the signal thresholds (s_F, s_M) and the perceived productivity and signal distributions $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)$ for each group g . Solving

Eq. (2) for u_g uniquely identifies the preference parameters (u_F, u_M) as

$$u_g = \left(\frac{\hat{\eta}_g}{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g} \right) s_g + \left(\frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{\hat{\tau}_g + \hat{\eta}_g} \right) \hat{\mu}_g. \quad (9)$$

Therefore, the evaluator's type is identified. \square

Proof of Proposition 6. Given a signal with precision $\eta > 0$, observing $x \geq 1$ draws of the signal is equivalent to observing a single signal that is normally distributed with precision $x\eta$. Suppose the evaluator has type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$. From the signal thresholds in Eq. (1), if a type $\theta' = (u'_g, \hat{\mu}'_g, \hat{\tau}'_g, \hat{\eta}'_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ when observing $x \geq 1$ signal draws, then

$$\frac{\hat{\tau}_g u_g + x \hat{\eta}_g u_g - \hat{\tau}_g \hat{\mu}_g}{x \hat{\eta}_g} = \frac{\hat{\tau}'_g u'_g + x \hat{\eta}'_g u'_g - \hat{\tau}'_g \hat{\mu}'_g}{x \hat{\eta}'_g} \quad (10)$$

for $g \in \{M, F\}$. Rearranging terms, this is equivalent to

$$\frac{\hat{\tau}_g(u_g - \hat{\mu}_g)}{\hat{\eta}_g} - \frac{\hat{\tau}'_g(u'_g - \hat{\mu}'_g)}{\hat{\eta}'_g} = x(u'_g - u_g). \quad (11)$$

Suppose θ' exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ when observing $x_1 \geq 1$ and $x_2 > x_1$ signal draws. Then Eq. (11) must be simultaneously satisfied at $x = x_1$ and $x = x_2$. Since the left hand side of Eq. (11) is independent of x , this requires $x_1(u'_g - u_g) = x_2(u'_g - u_g)$. Given $x_1 \neq x_2$, it must be that $u'_g = u_g$. Therefore, all types that exhibit equivalent discrimination to θ in both informational treatments have the same preferences as θ , $u'_F = u_F$ and $u'_M = u_M$. The right hand side of Eq. (11) is equal to zero for these types. Therefore, all types that exhibit equivalent discrimination to θ in both informational treatments have beliefs and preferences that satisfy $\hat{\tau}_g(u_g - \hat{\mu}_g)/\hat{\eta}_g = \hat{\tau}'_g(u_g - \hat{\mu}'_g)/\hat{\eta}'_g$. Solving for $\hat{\mu}'_g$, the set of types that exhibit equivalent discrimination to θ corresponds to Eq. (3). If $\hat{\mu}'_g = \hat{\mu}_g$, this corresponds to the set of types that preserve the ratio of the precisions. If the perceived precisions are equal across groups, i.e. $\hat{\tau}'_g = \hat{\tau}_g$ and $\hat{\eta}'_g = \hat{\eta}_g$, then it must be that $\hat{\mu}'_g = \hat{\mu}_g$, which means $\theta' = \theta$. In this case, θ is identified from observing discrimination for two informational treatments.

Suppose θ' exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ for two informational treatments, denoted x_1 and x_2 . Then $u'_F = u_F$ and $u'_M = u_M$, so Eq. (11) is satisfied for any other informational treatment $x \notin \{x_1, x_2\}$, i.e. θ' also exhibits equivalent discrimination for informational treatment x . Therefore, if type θ' exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ

for two informational treatments, θ' also exhibits equivalent discrimination to θ for all possible informational treatments.

Given the evaluator has type $\theta = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$, let $\theta(x) = (u_g, \hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, x\hat{\eta}_g)_{g \in \{M, F\}}$ denote a type with the same preferences and beliefs about the productivity distribution as θ and perceived signal precision $x\hat{\eta}_g$. When type θ observes x draws of the signal, it behaves as if it is type $\theta(x)$. Therefore, it exhibits discrimination that lies in isodiscrimination set $(\bar{s}(\theta(x), F), \bar{s}(\theta(x), M))$. Suppose the researcher identifies the signal thresholds for θ when it observes x_1 and $x_2 \neq x_1$ signal draws, $(s_{F,1}, s_{M,1}) \equiv (\bar{s}(\theta(x_1), F), \bar{s}(\theta(x_1), M))$ and $(s_{F,2}, s_{M,2}) \equiv (\bar{s}(\theta(x_2), F), \bar{s}(\theta(x_2), M))$. Then from [Eq. \(2\)](#), we know

$$\frac{\hat{\tau}_g + x_i \hat{\eta}_g}{x_i \hat{\eta}_g} u_g - \frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{x_i \hat{\eta}_g} \hat{\mu}_g = s_{g,i}. \quad (12)$$

for $i = 1, 2$. Rearranging terms,

$$\left(\frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{\hat{\eta}_g} + x_i \right) u_g = x_i s_{g,i} + \frac{\hat{\tau}_g}{\hat{\eta}_g} \hat{\mu}_g. \quad (13)$$

Subtracting [Eq. \(13\)](#) evaluated at x_2 from [Eq. \(13\)](#) evaluated at x_1 yields $(x_1 - x_2)u_g = x_1 s_{g,1} - x_2 s_{g,2}$. Solving for u_g uniquely identifies the evaluator's preferences,

$$u_g = \frac{x_1 s_{g,1} - x_2 s_{g,2}}{x_1 - x_2}. \quad (14)$$

However, as shown in [Proposition 6](#), multiple sets of beliefs $(\hat{\mu}_g, \hat{\tau}_g, \hat{\eta}_g)$ can satisfy [Eq. \(13\)](#) for x_1 and x_2 . Therefore, the evaluator's beliefs are not identified. \square

Appendix B. Experimental Design

Our experimental design includes two separate, pre-registered surveys: (1) a work task (math quiz) performed by 589 Amazon Mechanical Turk subjects (MTurkers), who comprise the prospective “workers” for the second survey, (2) a hiring task in which each of 577 different MTurkers, who comprise the “employers,” stated a wage (willingness to pay) for 20 prospective worker profiles.³² The second survey also contains a belief elicitation

³²We pre-registered the study on AsPredicted.org. There are two minor differences between the pre-registration plan and the actual study. First, we pre-registered that we would recruit 400 employers in the hiring task survey, but decided to recruit closer to 600. Second, we did not pre-register sample restrictions due to completing the task too quickly or slowly. We dropped 12 subjects in the work task survey and 5 in the hiring task survey due to these restrictions.

and an information intervention followed by a second hiring task. The full surveys are in the [Supplemental Material](#). We describe the experimental design and provide summary statistics below.

Survey 1 (Work Task): We recruited 589 subjects from MTurk on February 23, 2018 for the first survey.³³ The survey was posted with the title “Math Questions and Demographics” and the description “A 20-minute task of answering math questions.” We paid \$2 (i.e. a projected \$6/hour wage) and recruited a subject pool of 392 from the United States and 197 from India, all of whom had completed at least 500 prior tasks and had an 80% or higher approval rate for these tasks.³⁴ After starting the survey, subjects were informed that they would first answer demographic questions and then answer 50 multiple choice math questions. They were told that their performance would not affect their payment, and were asked not to use a calculator or any outside help, but just to do their best. This was followed by seven questions that provided the information used for their profiles in the second survey: favorite color, favorite movie, coffee vs. tea preference, age, gender, favorite subject in high school, and favorite sport. The math test included a mix of arithmetic (e.g. “ $5 * 6 * 7 = ?$ ”), algebra (e.g. “If $(y + 9) * (y^2 - 121) = 0$, then which of the following cannot be y ?”), and more conceptual questions (e.g. “Which of the following is not a prime number?”). Finally, subjects were thanked for their participation and informed that they may receive a small bonus based on a different experiment, for reasons unrelated to their performance on the task. We describe the basis for such bonuses in the description of Survey 2.

The purpose of the first survey was to create a bank of “workers” who could be hired by the “employers” in the second survey. This novel design has several advantages over the existing paradigms for studying discrimination in the field. First, in contrast to correspondence studies, we did not employ deception at any point—all profiles shown to employers corresponded to actual workers who would in fact be paid as described in the following paragraph. However, similar to a correspondence study, we were able to control the information seen by an employer about a prospective worker by constructing worker profiles that included information that is ostensibly relevant for animus and/or

³³We received 604 responses in total, but dropped 12 responses that corresponded to the top 1% (< 227 seconds) and bottom 1% (> 3274 seconds) in terms of survey duration. Of the remaining 592 responses, we dropped 3 whose Qualtrics survey responses could not be matched to their MTurk records, leaving 589 final respondents.

³⁴This geographic restriction is based on the addresses MTurkers used to register on Amazon. The survey was posted as two tasks on MTurk, with one only eligible for Indian workers and one only eligible for U.S. workers.

beliefs about productivity (e.g. age, gender, and nationality), as well as other irrelevant information (e.g. tea preference). The irrelevant information ensures that the relevant information is not the only salient information provided to the employer (this mimics the irrelevant information contained on a CV). Finally, instead of the coarse measures of discrimination used in many other studies (e.g. callback or stop rates), we elicit relatively continuous and precise measures of productivity and discrimination that are tightly linked.

Survey 2: We recruited 577 different MTurk subjects on February 26, 2018. We used the same hiring criteria as the first survey (392 from U.S., 185 from India, $\geq 80\%$ approval rate).³⁵ The survey was posted with the title “20-Minute Survey about Decision-Making” and the description “20-Minute Survey about Decision-Making.” We paid \$2 (i.e. a projected \$6/hour wage). Subjects were first asked to report their gender, age, and education level. Subjects were then presented with the first hiring task portion of the survey.

First Hiring Task: We informed subjects that we had previously paid other subjects (“workers”) to answer 50 math questions, showed them five examples of the math questions, and told them that on average, participants answered 36.95 out of 50 questions correctly. They were then told that they would act as an employer and hire one of these workers by stating a wage (paid as a bonus to the worker). In return, they would receive a payment based on how many questions their hired worker answered correctly. This was followed by a more detailed description of the assignment. Each “employer” would view 20 profiles of potential workers and state the highest wage (between 0 to 50 cents) they were willing to pay to each worker. The employer would be paid 1 cent for each question answered correctly by the hired worker. We next described the mechanism (Becker-DeGroot-Marschak) used to assign payment. We would randomly select a profile from the 20 potential workers. We would then draw a random number from 0 to 50. If the wage the employer stated for the worker was equal or greater than that number, then the worker would receive the random number as a bonus and the employer would receive a “profit” equal to the worker’s performance minus the random number. If instead the employer stated a wage for the worker that was lower than the random number, then neither the worker nor the employer would receive a payment.

To ensure comprehension, we showed subjects an example profile (see [Fig. B1](#)) and

³⁵We recruited 587 subjects in total, but dropped 7 whose surveys were completed in under 300 seconds and 3 whose stimuli (the profiles they evaluated) could not be matched to the first survey.

stated wage. We gave examples of actual performance and randomly generated numbers that would produce positive profit, negative profit, and no hiring. Having highlighted the possibility of negative profit, we then noted that all employers would automatically be paid a \$0.50 bonus in addition to any money made through the hiring task, so that no employers would owe money. Finally, we ran a comprehension check with the same example profile, a specific wage (43), a random number (18), and an actual performance (10). We required the employer to correctly state how many cents they would have to pay the worker (18) and how many cents the employer would be paid before subtracting off the amount they would pay the worker (10).³⁶ Finally, employers were presented with a second wage (15), and answered the same questions. They were then presented with 20 profiles, each randomly selected with replacement from the bank of 589 profiles produced by the first survey.

Figure B1. Example Profile Used in First Hiring Task Description

Country:	United States
Gender:	Female
Age:	63
Favorite High School Subject:	English
Favorite Sport:	Gymnastics
Favorite Color:	Sea Green
Favorite Movie:	Overboard
Prefers Coffee/Tea:	Tea

Belief Elicitation Task: Next, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two different conditions: an incentivized or un-incentivized belief elicitation. Across both conditions, subjects were reminded that the full sample answered 36.95 out of 50 questions correctly. They were then asked to answer six questions of the form, “On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think X answered correctly?” where X corresponded to the groups “women”, “men”, “people from the United States”, “people from India”, “people below or at the age of 33,” and “people above the age of 33.” In the incentivized condition, prior to the six questions, subjects were told that they could earn a significant bonus for an accurate prediction. One of the six questions would be randomly

³⁶Entering an incorrect an answer would generate a pop-up with “Wrong Answer” and restrict the individual from moving to the next page.

selected and they would be paid \$5 minus their deviation from the question (bounded below by \$0). For example, if they answered 40 and the true average was 37, they would receive a \$2 bonus. Finally, they were asked to “please answer the questions as carefully as possible so that you can potentially win a large bonus.”

Information Intervention & Second Hiring Task: After completing the belief elicitation, subjects were shown the correct answer for all six groups: women (35.28), men (38.32), people from the U.S. (37.14), people from India (36.58), people below or at the age of 33 (37.10), and people above the age of 33 (36.79). Following this information, we stated, “Now that you have learned those facts, we would like you to work on 10 more profiles.” We noted that, as in the first hiring task, we would randomly select one profile and a number, and pay bonus and wages accordingly (with an additional \$0.50 automatic bonus to ensure no negative payments). After employers reviewed the 10 additional worker profiles, we thanked them for their participation, noted that we would calculate bonuses and pay them within a week, and allowed subjects the option to leave comments.

Summary Statistics: [Table B1](#) provides summary statistics for the full sample of subjects that completed surveys 1 and 2 (Column (1)), as well as these statistics for each of the 6 demographic groups used in the second survey. On average, the work task (survey 1) took subjects 19 minutes to complete, while the hiring task took 23 minutes. There is variation in this timing across groups. Subjects from the U.S. took an average of 19 minutes to complete the hiring task, while subjects from India took 31.60 minutes; a difference also reflected in their median times (15.8 vs. 25.6). Another large difference between the U.S. and India samples is the average age of participants; the average Indian subject in the work task is approximately 8 years younger than the average American subject. This gap shrinks to 4 years for the hiring task. The Indian sample also skews more male than the U.S. sample (68.5% vs. 48.2% and 76.8% vs. 51.4% for survey 1 and 2, respectively) and is more likely to have a college education or above (90.3% vs. 56% in survey 2; the question was not asked in survey 1). While we primarily focus on simple comparisons between each demographic group, these observed differences motivate our use of multivariate regressions as well.

Table B1. Summary Statistics

	Total	Male	Female	US	India	Under 33	Over 33
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Worker							
Trivia Score	36.95 (8.73)	38.32 (8.52)	35.28 (8.70)	37.14 (8.93)	36.58 (8.31)	37.10 (8.55)	36.79 (8.94)
Survey Duration (Minutes)	18.82 (10.39)	19.03 (10.52)	18.56 (10.25)	16.19 (8.12)	24.04 (12.31)	20.25 (11.82)	17.18 (8.20)
Prefer Tea (Yes=1)	0.39 (0.49)	0.38 (0.49)	0.41 (0.49)	0.37 (0.48)	0.44 (0.50)	0.42 (0.49)	0.36 (0.48)
Age (Worker)	35.89 (11.57)	35.30 (11.27)	36.62 (11.91)	38.55 (12.16)	30.61 (8.01)	27.38 (3.50)	45.61 (9.76)
Female (Yes=1)	0.45 (0.50)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.52 (0.50)	0.32 (0.47)	0.43 (0.50)	0.48 (0.50)
From India (Yes=1)	0.33 (0.47)	0.42 (0.49)	0.23 (0.42)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.47 (0.50)	0.18 (0.39)
# Observations	589	324	265	392	197	314	275
Panel B: Employer							
Survey Duration (Minutes)	23.09 (17.23)	23.59 (15.57)	22.37 (19.43)	19.08 (11.70)	31.60 (23.04)	22.53 (19.00)	23.87 (14.44)
College Education or Above	0.67 (0.47)	0.70 (0.46)	0.62 (0.49)	0.56 (0.50)	0.90 (0.30)	0.67 (0.47)	0.67 (0.47)
Age (Employer)	34.36 (11.02)	32.66 (9.92)	36.88 (12.07)	35.73 (11.63)	31.46 (8.96)	27.09 (3.59)	44.36 (9.91)
Female (Yes=1)	0.40 (0.49)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.49 (0.50)	0.23 (0.42)	0.34 (0.47)	0.49 (0.50)
From India (Yes=1)	0.32 (0.47)	0.41 (0.49)	0.19 (0.39)	0.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.40 (0.49)	0.29 (0.41)
# Observations	577	344	233	392	185	334	243

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. One observation per worker (survey 1) or employer (survey 2).

Appendix C. Additional Tables and Figures

Figure C1. Kernel Densities of Productivities (Trivia Scores) by Group




Figure C2. Kernel Densities of Beliefs about Differences by Group (Within-Employer)




Table C1. Discrimination in Wages, by Employee Characteristics (Hiring Task 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female	-1.05*** (0.38)			-0.66* (0.37)	-0.78** (0.33)
Indian		2.14*** (0.41)		2.01*** (0.43)	2.03*** (0.38)
Over 33			-0.54 (0.39)	0.06 (0.39)	0.31 (0.35)
N	11,540	11,540	11,540	11,540	11,540
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.49
DepVarMean	31.90	30.71	31.67	30.71	30.71
Employer FE?	No	No	No	No	Yes

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered by employer and worker. “DepVarMean” is the mean of the dependent variable (wage WTP) in the omitted group (e.g. Male Workers for column (1)).

Table C2. In-Group Bias Test (Hiring Task 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Female Worker	-1.42*** (0.37)			-1.20*** (0.37)
Female Employer	1.78** (0.69)			1.91*** (0.72)
Female Worker X Employer	0.26 (0.44)			0.41 (0.44)
Indian Worker		2.04*** (0.44)		1.88*** (0.45)
Indian Employer		0.99 (0.71)		1.70** (0.75)
Indian Worker X Employer		-0.79 (0.51)		-0.82 (0.51)
Over 33 Worker			-0.86** (0.37)	-0.39 (0.37)
Over 33 Employer			0.31 (0.69)	0.22 (0.71)
Over 33 Worker X Employer			1.10*** (0.40)	1.19*** (0.40)
N	17,310	17,310	17,310	17,310
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02
DepVarMean	31.90	30.71	31.67	31.67

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered by employer and worker. “DepVarMean” is the mean of the dependent variable (wage WTP) in the omitted group (e.g. Male Workers evaluated by Male Employers for column (1)).

Table C3. In-Group vs. Out-Group Beliefs about Productivity by Employee Characteristics

	Out Group	In Group	Diff.	p-val	#Obs. Out	#Obs. In
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Prediction for Female Workers	31.70 (8.78)	32.79 (7.81)	-1.09	0.13	344	233
Prediction for Male Workers	34.68 (6.59)	33.60 (9.20)	1.09	0.12	233	344
Prediction for Indian Workers	36.09 (7.10)	32.06 (12.67)	4.04	0.00	392	185
Prediction for US Workers	30.46 (12.04)	32.84 (6.15)	-2.38	0.00	185	392
Prediction for Over 33 Workers	30.92 (9.82)	32.47 (7.66)	-1.55	0.04	334	243
Prediction for Under 33 Workers	33.85 (7.03)	33.09 (10.14)	0.77	0.31	243	334

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. “In-Group” refers to a match in the characteristic between the employer and the group of workers over which they are making a prediction, e.g. column (1), row 1 is the average prediction made by female employers about the average productivity of female workers.

Table C5. Beliefs about Productivity by Employee Characteristics, Trimmed

	(1) Group (1 or 2) 1	(2) 2	(3) Diff. [(1)-(2)]	(4) P-Val
Gender (1 = Male , 2 = Female)	34.26 (8.23)	32.30 (8.20)	1.96	0.00
Country (1 = US , 2 = India)	32.00 (8.49)	35.21 (8.85)	-3.22	0.00
Age (1 = Under 33 , 2 = Over 33)	33.42 (8.84)	31.78 (8.83)	1.64	0.00

Notes: This table repeats Table 5 after trimming the top and bottom 5 percent of observations by the within-employer difference in beliefs about the two groups (e.g. on the Male - Female difference for the first row). Standard deviations in parentheses. One observation per employer combination. Column (4) shows the p-value from regression of the outcome on a dummy variable for group membership, with standard errors two-way clustered by employer and worker. # Observations = 528 (Gender), 541 (Country), and 528 (Age).

Table C4. Effects of Large Incentives for Accurate Predictions

	Incentivized?		Diff.	p-val
	<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prediction for Female Workers	32.36 (7.71)	31.93 (9.08)	0.44	0.53
Prediction for Male Workers	34.22 (7.37)	33.86 (9.08)	0.36	0.60
Prediction for Indian Workers	35.29 (8.49)	34.31 (10.30)	0.98	0.21
Prediction for US Workers	32.28 (8.21)	31.87 (8.90)	0.41	0.56
Prediction for Over 33 Workers	31.95 (8.39)	31.19 (9.58)	0.75	0.32
Prediction for Under 33 Workers	33.73 (8.58)	33.09 (9.35)	0.64	0.39
# Observations	290	287		

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. One observation per employer. The joint f-statistic from regression of an indicator for the “Incentivized” treatment on set of employer observable characteristics in [Table B1](#), Panel B (duration, education, age, female, from India) is 1.25 (p=0.286).

Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem

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July 26, 2021

Supplemental Material: Literature Survey

This file further discusses empirical work from the literature survey in [Section 2](#) that considers inaccurate beliefs and then lists the citation for each paper included in the survey.

Review of Papers Discussing Inaccurate Beliefs

Of the papers that consider inaccurate beliefs in identification, [List \(2004\)](#); [Hedegaard and Tyran \(2018\)](#); [Mobius and Rosenblat \(2006\)](#) measure beliefs either directly or indirectly. [List \(2004\)](#) studies discrimination in bargaining and negotiations in the context of a sports card market. Dealer perceptions of buyers' reservation prices (RPs) are assessed by presenting them with actual RP distributions and asking them match the distributions to buyer sub-groups. The paper argues that observed disparities in bargaining outcomes are due to statistical discrimination because the dealers' matching rates are significantly higher than chance, with higher accuracy for more experienced dealers. [Mobius and Rosenblat \(2006\)](#) investigate the beauty premium in a laboratory experiment. Workers are hired by employers to solve maze puzzles. Despite no productivity differences on the task based on attractiveness, the authors document a significant beauty premium. Eliciting beliefs shows that both visual and oral interactions lead employers to form mistaken perceptions that attractive workers are more productive. [Hedegaard and Tyran \(2018\)](#) study preferences for co-workers as a function of their group identity and productivity. They find that people have a significant preference for working with a member of the same ethnicity. To provide evidence that this is due to taste-based discrimination, the authors elicit productivity beliefs from a separate group of subjects and show that beliefs are qualitatively accurate, and thus cannot explain the observed differential treatment. [Agan and Starr \(2017\)](#); [Arnold et al. \(2018a\)](#) derive predictions from a specific structural model of biased beliefs and takes these predictions to the data. [Agan and Starr \(2017\)](#) run a correspondence study to examine how ban-the-box policies affect call back rates for minority applicants. They use a model to estimate employer priors of criminality by group identity and compare those estimates to actual criminality estimates found in the literature. The discrepancy between those statistics is used

to argue that employers have incorrect stereotypes. [Arnold et al. \(2018a\)](#) examine racial bias in judicial decisions by comparing release tendencies and pretrial misconduct rates as a function of group identity. Comparing pretrial misconduct rates of the marginal defendant suggests racial bias. To explore the source of this bias, the authors estimate the misconduct risk distributions by group identity, arguing that if judges are subject to the representativeness heuristic as in [Bordalo et al. \(2016\)](#), then bias against Black defendants are likely due to stereotypes. Finally, [Fershtman and Gneezy \(2001\)](#) use a laboratory experiment to study discrimination in Israel. Behavior in the trust game—where payment is based on the actions of one’s partner—versus a dictator game—where payment is strictly a function of one player—is used to study the source of discrimination. Differential treatment is observed in the former game but not the latter, which is used to argue that discrimination is due to mistaken stereotypes rather than animus.

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Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem

J. Aislinn Bohren, Kareem Haggag, Alex Imas, and Devin G. Pope.

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Supplemental Material: Qualtrics Surveys

This file includes the Qualtrics survey used in the MTurk worker math trivia task, followed by the survey used in the MTurk employer hiring task. Survey block titles (not shown to participants) are in bold and underlined.

CHICAGO BOOTH



The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Intro

Thank you for participating in this survey!

The survey has two parts. In the first part you will answer some very basic demographics questions. In the second part you will answer 50 multiple-choice math questions.

We are interested in determining how many of these math questions you can get right without any help. So please **do not** use a calculator or look up the answers online, but rather just do your best. The number of questions you answer correctly will not affect your payment in any way.

Demographics

Please answer the personal profile questions below:

What is your favorite color?

What is your favorite movie?

Do you prefer coffee or tea?

☐ Tea

☐ Coffee

What is your age?

What is your gender?

☐ Female

☐ Male

What is your favorite subject in high school?

What is your favorite sport?

Math

Q1. What is the square root of 289?

☐ 17

☐ 19

☐ 15

☐ 21

Q2. $4 - 8 \cdot 9 / 2 = ?$

☐ -6

☐ -32

☐ -18

☐ -12

Q3. $3^5 = ?$

☐ 243

☐ 405

☐ 729

☐ 81

Q4. $5 \cdot 6 \cdot 7 = ?$

☐ 233

☐ 210

☐ 240

☐ 180

Q5. What is the reduced form of the fraction $70/42$?

☐ $7/5$

☐ $14/10$

☐ $5/3$

☐ $10/6$

Q6. What is the cubic root of 64?

☐ 4

☐ 6

☐ 5

☐ 3

Q7. $(4+5)/5 = ?$

☐ 6.25

☐ 1

☐ 1.8

☐ 5

Q8. $x+2 < 18/3$. Which of the following is necessarily **false**?

☐ $x > 4$

☐ $x < 3$

☐ $x > 3$

☐ $x < 4$

Q9. $x^5 * x^8 = ?$

- ☐ x^{11}
 - ☐ x^{14}
 - ☐ x^{13}
 - ☐ x^{12}
-

Q10. Which of the following is approximately equal to 0.833?

- ☐ $5/6$
 - ☐ $4/5$
 - ☐ $6/7$
 - ☐ $3/4$
-

Q11. $x=5, y=6, z=7$, then what is $xy/(z-4)$?

- ☐ 8
 - ☐ 10
 - ☐ 6
 - ☐ 4
-

Q12. Which of the following is the closest integer to $45/7$?

- ☐ 6
 - ☐ 5
 - ☐ 7
 - ☐ 8
-

Q13. Which of the following is an integer multiple of 9?

- ☐ 3618
 - ☐ 3619
 - ☐ 3617
 - ☐ 3620
-

Q14. $10/5+34-4 = ?$

- ☐ 32
 - ☐ 34
 - ☐ 30
 - ☐ 36
-

Q15. $(x-1)*(x^2-4)=0$, then which of the following **cannot** be x ?

- ☐ 2
 - ☐ -2
 - ☐ -1
 - ☐ 1
-

Q16. What is the square root of 196?

- ☐ 12
 - ☐ 13
 - ☐ 15
 - ☐ 14
-

Q17. $5-6/(18/9) = ?$

- ☐ 2
 - ☐ -2
 - ☐ -0.5
 - ☐ 0.5
-

Q18. $(y+9)*(y^2-121)=0$, then which of the following **cannot** be y ?

- ☐ 11
 - ☐ 9
 - ☐ -9
 - ☐ -11
-

Q19. Which of the following is an integer multiple of 11?

- ☐ 133
 - ☐ 130
 - ☐ 132
 - ☐ 131
-

Q20. $5+6+7+8+9+10 = ?$

- ☐ 45
 - ☐ 51
 - ☐ 42
 - ☐ 48
-

Q21. What is the binary form of 7?

- ☐ 101
 - ☐ 100
 - ☐ 111
 - ☐ 110
-

Q22. $35/7+1 = ?$

- ☐ 6
 - ☐ 4
 - ☐ 7
 - ☐ 5
-

Q23. $24/4/3 = ?$

- ☐ 4
 - ☐ 3
 - ☐ 1
 - ☐ 2
-

Q24. Which of the following is an integer multiple of 4?

- ☐ 66
- ☐ 62

☐ 56

☐ 74

Q25. Which of the following is **not** a prime number?

☐ 4

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 5

Q26. $2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 = ?$

☐ 720

☐ 24

☐ 240

☐ 120

Q27. $6^3 = ?$

☐ 216

☐ 432

☐ 36

☐ 128

Q28. $(4 \times 2 + 7 \times 8) / 4 = ?$

☐ 20

☐ 24

☐ 16

☐ 12

Q29. Which of the following is a prime number?

☐ 23

☐ 27

☐ 21

☐ 25

Q30. $16 < x+8 < 26$. Which of the following could x be?

☐ 23

☐ 18

☐ 13

☐ 8

Q31. $45+3-1 = ?$

☐ 48

☐ 46

☐ 47

☐ 49

Q32. $x^6 + x^6 = ?$

☐ x^{12}

☐ x^{36}

☐ $(2x)^6$

☐ $2x^6$

Q33. Which of the following fractions cannot be further reduced?

☐ $7/35$

☐ $46/2$

☐ $3/5$

☐ $3/6$

Q34. Which of the following numbers has an integer square root?

☐ 40

☐ 48

☐ 32

☐ 36

Q35. $5 \cdot (7+3) + 5 - 4 = ?$

- ☐ 51
 - ☐ 55
 - ☐ 39
 - ☐ 32
-

Q36. Which of the following is **not** a factor of 30?

- ☐ 3
 - ☐ 5
 - ☐ 2
 - ☐ 4
-

Q37. $x^6 / x^4 = ?$

- ☐ x^{24}
 - ☐ x^{10}
 - ☐ x^2
 - ☐ $x^{(2/3)}$
-

Q38. $56/8 = ?$

- ☐ 6
 - ☐ 5
 - ☐ 7
 - ☐ 8
-

Q39. $2^4 - 3^3 = ?$

- ☐ 11
 - ☐ 9
 - ☐ -11
 - ☐ -9
-

Q40. $(18+19+20)/3 = ?$

- ☐ 20
 - ☐ 21
 - ☐ 19
 - ☐ 18
-

Q41. Twenty **cannot** be divided by which of the following?

- ☐ 5
 - ☐ 3
 - ☐ 2
 - ☐ 4
-

Q42. $4+8+12+16 = ?$

- ☐ 40
 - ☐ 20
 - ☐ 25
 - ☐ 45
-

Q43. $(x^5)^3 = ?$

- ☐ $5x^3$
 - ☐ $3x^5$
 - ☐ x^{15}
 - ☐ x^8
-

Q44. Which of the following is the correct factorization of 36?

- ☐ $4 * 9$
 - ☐ $2^2 * 3^2$
 - ☐ $4 * 3^2$
 - ☐ $2^2 * 9$
-

Q45. $3^2 * 2 = ?$

- ☐ 18
- ☐ 42

- ☐ 81
- ☐ 24

Q46. $-2*(-3-8) = ?$

- ☐ -14
- ☐ 14
- ☐ 22
- ☐ -22

Q47. Which of the following is an integer multiple of 5?

- ☐ 44
- ☐ 46
- ☐ 43
- ☐ 45

Q48. $x^4 = 81$. What is x ?

- ☐ 9
- ☐ 20.5
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 6

Q49. $76/4 = ?$

- ☐ 18
- ☐ 19
- ☐ 17
- ☐ 20

Q50. Which of the following is negative?

- ☐ 2^2
- ☐ $(-2)^2$
- ☐ $(-2)^3$

○ 2^3

Final

Thank you for your participation. In addition to your base payment, we may put a small bonus into your account sometime in the next few weeks. Who receives the bonus payment is determined by a different experiment that we are doing and is unrelated to how well you did in the task. Please just think of it as an additional appreciation for your efforts.

Powered by Qualtrics

CHICAGO BOOTH



The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Introduction

Thank you for participating in this survey.

The survey has four parts. You will first answer some simple demographic questions. Then you will answer three sets of questions related to people's performance in math questions.

The survey will take approximately 20 minutes.

Please enter your M-Turk ID:

What is your gender?

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
-

What is your age?

Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed.

- ☐ Less than High School
- ☐ High School or equivalent
- ☐ Vocational/Technical School (2 year)

- ☐ Some College
 - ☐ College Graduate (4 year)
 - ☐ Master's Degree (MS)
 - ☐ Doctoral Degree (PhD)
 - ☐ Professional Degree (MD, JD, etc.)
 - ☐ Other
-

Setup

We recently paid many people to answer 50 math questions each. Here are some examples of the types of math questions we asked:

Question 1: What is the square root of 289?

Choices: 15, 17, 19, 21

Question 2: $4 - 8 * 9 / 2 = ?$

Choices: -6, -12, -18, -32

Question 3: What is the reduced form of the fraction 70/42?

Choices: 5/3, 10/6, 7/5, 14/10

Question 4: $x^5 * x^8 = ?$

Choices: x^{11} , x^{12} , x^{13} , x^{14}

Question 5: What is the binary form of 7?

Choices: 100, 101, 110, 111

On average, participants answered 36.95 out of 50 questions correctly.

Today, you are going to be an employer. You will hire one of the people who answered our math questions. The person you hire will be given a bonus (the wage that you choose to pay them) and in return you will receive money based on how many of the math questions they answered correctly.

Specifically, we are going to provide you with the profiles of 20 people (potential

Specifically, we are going to provide you with the profiles of 20 people (potential employees) who answered our math questions. For each of the 20 people that we present, you will indicate what is the highest wage (between 0 and 50 cents) you would be willing to pay that person. In return, you will be paid 1 cent for every question that the person you end up hiring answered correctly.

After you indicate the highest wage you would be willing to give to each employee, we will randomly draw a number between 0 and 50. If the wage you chose for the employee is equal to or higher than the randomly-drawn number, then that employee will receive the random number as a bonus, and you will receive a profit equal to the number of correct answers given by the individual minus the random number that was drawn. If the highest wage you were willing to pay the individual is lower than the random number, you will not hire the employee and neither you nor the employee will receive a bonus.

Let's walk through an example of how this works. Below is an example of a potential employee profile that you might see:

Country:	United States
Gender:	Female
Age:	63
Favorite High School Subject:	English
Favorite Sport:	Gymnastics
Favorite Color:	Sea Green
Favorite Movie:	Overboard
Prefers Coffee/Tea:	Tea

We will ask you the highest amount you would be willing to pay this employee. Let's imagine that you say you would be willing to pay this employee 40 cents.

We will then select a random number between 0 and 50. Let's say the randomly-selected number is 20. Because the highest wage you are willing to pay that person is more than 20, you will "hire" this person and they will receive 20 cents. You will then be paid based on the number of correct answers this person gave. If the person answered 30 questions correctly, you will be paid 10 cents (30-20). If the person answered 10 questions correctly, you will be paid -10 cents (10-20).

Imagine instead that the randomly-drawn number is 45. Then you will not "hire" the person and neither you nor the person will receive a bonus.

In today's task, you will actually only hire 1 person. After you decide the most you would be willing to pay to each of the 20 people we present, we will randomly select one profile to use as the actual hiring decision. We will then draw the random number between 0 and 50 and pay you the profit you've earned for that profile and pay the wage to the person whose profile you pick. We are going to automatically give you a \$0.50 bonus in addition to what money you make with your hiring decision (so that there is no way you end up owing us any money after doing this task).

Just to make sure you understand, imagine you saw a profile and entered **43** as the highest amount you would be willing to pay. Now imagine the random number generated was **18** and the individual answered **10** questions correctly.

How many cents would you have to pay the individual?

How many cents would you be paid based on the individual's performance (before subtracting the wage you have to pay the individual)?

Suppose instead that you had reported **15** as the highest wage you would pay, and everything else stayed the same:

How many cents would you have to pay the individual?

How many cents would you be paid based on the individual's performance (before subtracting the wage you have to pay the individual)?

Hidden Generator

Required

You have completed $\$ \{ \text{Im://Field/1} \}$ of 20 required profiles.

Please indicate the **highest wage** you would be willing to pay this employee in the text box below.



Enter the highest wage you would be willing to pay this individual (between 0 and 50 cents):

Prediction

Thank you for completing part 2 of 4 of this survey. As promised, we will randomly select one profile and pay you your \$0.50 bonus plus whatever money you make

based on the hiring of the randomly-selected profile.

For the third part of this survey, please answer the six questions below. Please remember that people answered **36.95** questions correctly on average.

On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think **women** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think **men** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think **people from the United States** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think **people from India** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think **people below or at the age of 33** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50 do you think **people above the age of 33** answered correctly?

Thank you for completing part 2 of 4 of this survey. As promised, we will randomly select one profile and pay you your \$0.50 bonus plus whatever money you make based on the hiring of the randomly-selected profile.

For the third part of this survey, please answer the six questions below. Please remember that people answered **36.95** questions correctly on average.

You have the chance to earn a significant bonus if you answer these questions correctly. We will randomly pick one question and pay you \$5 minus your deviation from the correct answer. For example, if your answer for the randomly picked question is 40 and the truth is 37, then you will get a \$2 bonus. You cannot receive a negative bonus. So, please answer the questions as carefully as possible so that you can potentially win a large bonus.

On average, how many math questions out of 50

do you think **women** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50
do you think **men** answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50
do you think **people from the United States**
answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50
do you think **people from India** answered
correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50
do you think **people below or at the age of 33**
answered correctly?

On average, how many math questions out of 50
do you think **people above the age of 33**
answered correctly?

Truth

Here are the correct answers for the 6 questions you have answered above. On average:

- Women got **35.28** questions right.
- Men got **38.32** questions right.
- People from the U.S. got **37.14** questions right.
- People from India got **36.58** questions right.
- People below or at the age of 33 got **37.10** questions right.
- People above the age of 33 got **36.79** questions right.

Now that you have learned those facts, we would like you to work on 10 more profiles.

As before, after you finish working on those 10 additional profiles, we will randomly select one profile and randomly select a number between 0 and 50. If your highest wage is more than the randomly-selected number, we will pay you the profit you've earned for that profile as a bonus and pay the wage to the person who answered the math questions.

Extra

You have completed \${Im://Field/1} of 10 additional profiles.

Please indicate the **highest wage** you would be willing to pay this employee in the text box below.



Enter the highest wage you would be willing to pay this individual (between 0 and 50 cents):

Final

Thank you for your participation. We will calculate your bonus based on the rules specified in each part above, and pay the bonus to your account within a week.

If you have any additional comments about this survey, please provide them below. (Optional)
