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Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis

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International Journal

of

Politics,

Culture and

Society,

Vol.

16,

No.

2,

Winter

2002

(?

2002)

Globalization, Culture,  
and Identities

in

Crisis

Robert J. Lieber\*

\*

and

Ruth

E.  
Weisbergf  
Culture  
in  
its various forms  
now serves as  
a  
primary  
carrier of  
globalization  
and  
modern  
values,  
and  
constitutes  
an  
important  
arena  
of  
contestation for  
national,  
religious,  
and ethnic  
identity. Although  
reactions in  
Europe,  
Japan,  
and other societies where modern values  
prevail,  
tend  
to  
be  
symbolic,  
in  
areas  
of the  
developing  
world,  
especially  
in Muslim  
countries where  
traditional  
values and  
radically  
different notions of  
identity

and  
society  
predominate,  
reactions tend  
to  
be  
very  
intense and redirected  
at  
external  
targets  
through  
forms of transference  
and  
scapegoating.

Ultimately,  
this is  
not  
so  
much  
a  
clash between  
civilizations  
as  
a  
clash within  
civilizations.

KEY

WORDS:

culture;  
globalization;  
identity;  
transference;  
backlash.

GLOBALIZATION AND  
CULTURE

Globalization and its discontents  
has  
taken  
on  
huge  
significance  
in  
the  
aftermath of  
September

11th. Driven  
by  
the  
end  
of  
the  
Cold  
War,  
a  
dramatic  
surge  
in  
international  
trade,  
investment and  
finance,  
and the  
onset  
of  
the  
information  
revolution,  
the  
subject  
had  
attracted  
growing  
attention for  
more  
than  
a  
decade.  
However,  
the  
traumatic  
events  
of  
9/11,  
the  
nihilistic  
rage  
evident  
in the  
destruction  
of  
the World

Trade  
Center,  
and  
the  
issues that  
have  
arisen  
in  
its  
aftermath  
provide  
an  
enormous  
new  
impetus.  
Until  
very  
recently,  
analyses  
of  
globalization  
have  
emphasized  
eco  
nomics  
and  
politics  
rather  
than  
culture. Definitions  
of  
globalization  
abound,  
\*

Professor of  
Government  
&  
Foreign  
Service,  
Department  
of  
Government,  
Georgetown  
Uni  
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of Fine  
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273  
0891-4486/02/1200-0273/0  
?

2002 Human  
Sciences  
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Lieber and

Weisberg

but for

our

purposes

it

can

be described

as

the

increasing

global integra

tion of

economies,

information

technology,

the

spread

of

global

popular

culture,

and

other forms of human

interaction.<sup>1</sup>

In

the

polarized

discus

sion of the

subject,

one

side has tended

to

be

relentlessly optimistic

and,

at

least until the

September

attacks,

enthusiasm about

globalization

as

a  
whole  
was  
sometimes  
accompanied  
by  
an  
almost blissful  
naivete about the  
information revolution  
as  
an  
unalloyed  
blessing.  
In the  
words  
of Bill  
Clinton  
shortly  
before  
leaving  
the  
presidency,  
"In the  
new  
century,  
liberty  
will be  
spread  
by  
cell  
phone  
and cable  
modem."<sup>2</sup>  
On the other  
side,  
globaliza  
tion  
inspires  
dire  
warnings  
about its  
disruptions  
or  
dangers  
as



well  
as or  
ganized  
protests,  
editorials  
and  
marches  
against  
its  
perceived inequities  
and  
abuses.

As  
an  
artist  
and  
a  
political  
scientist,  
our  
contribution  
to  
this discussion  
is  
to  
probe  
the intersection  
of  
culture and  
politics.

The effect is  
synergis  
tic,  
in that  
by doing  
so we  
gain  
insights  
that neither  
a  
focus  
on  
culture  
nor  
politics  
alone

can  
provide.  
An  
apt  
analogy  
exists with  
the  
study  
of  
political  
economy,  
which  
explores  
the  
interplay  
of  
politics  
and  
economics  
in  
shaping  
international  
affairs.  
Often,  
examining  
events  
through  
a  
combination  
of  
two  
disciplines  
provides  
texture  
and  
understanding  
in  
ways  
that  
an  
exclusive  
disciplinary  
view does  
not  
allow.<sup>3</sup>

As  
a  
result,  
the combination of  
perspectives  
from  
culture  
and  
politics  
can  
offer  
comparably  
rich  
insights.  
While  
others  
have made reference  
to  
culture,  
they  
have  
tended  
to  
privilege  
politics  
and  
economics.  
One  
author who has  
emphasized  
culture  
is  
Samuel  
Huntington.  
In  
his  
writing  
on  
the "Clash of  
Civilizations,"<sup>4</sup>  
he has  
argued  
that  
with the end  
of the Cold  
War and its

contest of  
ideologies,  
and  
as  
a  
result  
of  
disruptions  
brought  
by  
modernization,  
urbanization  
and  
mass  
communications,  
the  
fundamental  
source  
of international  
conflict will  
not  
be  
primarily  
ideological  
or  
economic but  
cultural.  
However,  
our  
own  
view of culture  
is  
broader  
than  
that  
of  
Huntington  
and  
encompasses  
folk  
and  
high  
culture  
as  
well

as  
pop  
ular  
culture.  
Moreover  
in  
our  
judgment,  
the ultimate  
clash is less between  
civilizations  
than  
within them.  
The  
impact  
of  
globalization  
on  
culture  
has been  
viewed  
primarily  
as  
a  
side  
effect.  
Nonetheless,  
for those absorbed  
with  
the  
subject,  
reactions  
tend  
to  
be  
deeply  
divided.  
For  
example,  
one  
observer  
has  
asserted  
that,  
"...  
globalization

promotes  
integration  
and  
the removal  
not  
only  
of  
cultural  
barriers  
but  
many  
of the  
negative  
dimensions of  
culture. Globalization  
is  
a  
vital  
step  
toward  
both  
a  
more  
stable  
world and better  
lives  
for the  
people  
within  
it."5  
Others,  
however,  
have treated  
globalization  
of culture  
as  
an  
evil  
because  
of their  
fears  
of  
the  
pervasive  
power  
and

duplicity  
of multinational  
corporations  
or  
international  
institutions  
such  
as  
the International  
Monetary  
Fund  
(IMF).

In  
recent  
years,  
this reaction  
has  
been manifest  
in  
sometimes  
violent  
demonstrations  
when the leaders  
of the world's  
richest countries

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Globalization,  
Culture,  
and Identities  
in  
Crisis 275  
(e.g.,  
the  
G-8,  
the  
European  
Union)  
have held their  
meetings?as  
evident  
in  
the  
streets  
of

Seattle,  
Washington,  
Genoa  
and Barcelona.  
And  
who  
among  
us  
would  
not  
be disturbed  
by,  
for  
example,  
the  
echo  
of  
rap  
music  
in  
an  
old Barcelona  
neighborhood,  
the demise of local food  
products  
and  
neighborhood shops,  
or  
the  
proliferation  
of  
the  
same  
brands  
and chain  
stores  
from San  
Francisco  
to  
Santiago  
to  
Shanghai?  
Yet  
beyond  
unwarranted  
optimism



or  
equally  
exaggerated negativity  
there is  
an  
under  
lying dynamic.  
We seek  
to  
explicate  
the  
deeper  
reasons  
for  
these  
strong  
but  
often  
oppositional  
reactions that  
people  
have  
to  
the effects of  
globalization  
on  
what  
they identify  
as  
their culture.  
By  
integrating  
perspectives  
from both  
culture  
and  
politics,  
we  
find  
that in  
an  
increasingly globalized  
world,  
culture  
has become  
a

central  
arena  
of  
contestation.  
Culture takes  
on  
this  
pivotal  
position  
not  
only  
because  
of its  
intrinsic  
significance,  
but  
precisely  
because  
it has become  
so  
bound  
up  
with  
the  
most  
fundamental  
questions  
of human  
identity  
in its  
many  
dimensions:  
personal,  
ethnic,  
religious,  
social and  
national. As  
a  
result,  
controversies about culture often have less  
to  
do  
with  
surface level  
phenomena:

McDonalds,  
American  
tastes  
in  
music,  
language,  
art  
and  
lifestyle,  
than with  
deeper  
forms of alienation  
that  
owe more  
to  
the  
changes  
and  
disruptions  
brought  
by  
modernization and  
globalization.  
In  
some  
cultures,  
especially  
in  
parts  
of the Middle  
East,  
South Asia and  
Africa,  
there  
is  
an  
important  
added dimension of existential  
rage  
against corrupt  
and  
authoritarian  
regimes  
that,  
with  
the breakdown of older

traditional  
social,  
political  
and  
economic  
relationships,  
have  
failed  
to meet  
the  
needs of their  
own  
societies. In these  
regions,  
resentments  
expressed  
about  
modernity,  
the  
West  
or  
America  
are  
often  
a  
sublimation of  
rage  
against  
more  
deep  
rooted  
problems  
of  
identity.  
In the  
western  
world and  
in  
more  
prosperous  
regions  
of  
East  
Asia and  
Latin  
America,

where domestic  
problems  
of  
acculturation  
are  
much less  
acute,  
cultural alienation tends  
to  
be based  
primarily  
on  
an  
uneasiness about  
the  
ubiquity  
of  
American culture and influence  
as  
well  
as on  
U.S.  
primacy  
more  
generally.  
These  
resentments  
often  
are  
less  
the  
preoccupation  
of  
the  
general  
public  
than  
of  
intellectual  
elites,  
who react  
against  
cultural  
intrusions  
into their  
own

established realms  
and  
prerogatives.  
At  
times,  
such  
reactions  
can  
approach self-parody,  
as  
in  
the assertion  
that  
"resistance  
to  
the  
hege  
monic  
pretenses  
of  
hamburgers  
is,  
above  
all,  
a  
cultural  
imperative."6 Specific  
criticisms  
thus  
can  
have  
more  
to  
do with what  
the  
U.S.,  
seems  
to  
symbol  
ize than with  
any  
specific  
characteristic of American  
culture  
or  
policy

in  
itself.  
We  
begin  
this  
essay  
by  
analyzing  
the  
impact  
of  
a  
virtually  
unprece  
dented  
degree  
of  
American cultural  
primacy.  
We  
next  
consider culture  
as an  
arena  
of  
contestation,  
noting  
the  
contradictory  
impulses  
of  
both attraction  
and  
repulsion  
as  
well  
as  
the  
phenomena  
of  
differentiation  
and  
assimilation.

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Weisberg  
These reactions  
can  
be observed  
across  
the  
range  
of  
mass  
culture,  
folk cul  
ture  
and  
high  
culture.  
We  
then  
examine culture  
as a  
problem  
of  
identity  
in  
an era  
of  
globalization.  
We find  
that  
although  
both  
globalization  
and  
American  
primacy  
evoke cultural  
backlash,  
the reaction takes  
very  
dif  
ferent forms  
in modern societies than  
elsewhere. We  
explore  
two  
distinct



causes  
of cultural  
anxiety  
and turmoil. One of  
these,  
the material effects  
of  
globalization  
and  
modernity,  
including  
the  
consumer  
economy,  
the in  
formation revolution  
and the  
mass  
media,  
provides  
both  
a  
window  
to the  
wider world  
and  
a  
challenge  
to  
traditional  
ways  
of  
doing  
things.  
The  
other,  
Western  
values,  
is  
often  
more  
profound  
in its  
impact,  
even  
though

more  
intangible.  
Cultural  
reactions  
to  
globalization  
in  
Europe, Japan  
and  
elsewhere  
where modern  
values  
prevail,  
tend  
to  
be  
more  
symbolic  
and  
less  
extreme  
and often have  
more  
to  
do  
with  
status resentments  
than with  
disagreements  
about fundamental  
values.  
But in  
large  
areas  
of the  
developing  
world  
and  
especially  
in  
many  
Muslim  
countries,  
reactions  
to  
globalization

and  
to  
the  
U.S.  
as  
the  
embodiment  
of  
capitalism, modernity  
and  
mass  
culture  
tend  
to  
be much  
more  
intense. We  
posit  
that in these  
societies,  
radically  
different  
notions of  
values and  
identity  
are  
played  
out  
in the cultural  
realm,  
with much  
of  
the  
impetus  
stemming  
from  
rage  
at  
corrupt  
regimes  
and failed  
societies,  
which is  
then redirected  
at  
external

targets through  
forms of transference.

By  
transference  
we  
are  
referring  
to  
the  
process  
by  
which  
group  
fears  
or  
resent  
ments  
are  
shifted  
onto  
other entities  
or  
groups.  
Intense cultural  
resentments  
thus  
come  
to  
be  
focused  
upon  
actors,  
especially  
the  
U.S.,  
the West and  
Israel,  
that  
bear  
little  
relationship  
to  
the  
problems  
at  
hand

yet  
provide  
convenient  
scapegoats.

## CULTURE AND AMERICAN PRIMACY

In  
the 21st  
century,  
the United  
States  
enjoys  
a  
degree  
of international  
preponderance  
that has  
rarely  
been  
seen  
in  
any  
era.

Historians,  
strate  
gists,  
journalists  
and  
cultural  
observers  
have called attention  
to  
the  
phe  
nomenon  
in  
increasingly  
hyperbolic  
terms.

In the words of  
one  
recent  
ob  
server,

"We  
dominate  
every  
field  
of human endeavor  
from fashion  
to  
film  
to  
finance.  
We  
rule the world  
culturally, economically,  
diplomatically  
and  
militarily  
as  
no one  
has since  
the Roman  
Empire."<sup>7</sup>  
The United  
States,  
with less than  
5% of  
the  
world's  
population,  
accounts  
for  
at  
least  
one  
fourth of its economic  
activity.  
It  
leads in the  
information revolution.  
It  
accounts  
for  
some  
75% of  
the  
Nobel  
prizewinners

in  
science,  
medicine  
and  
economics.<sup>8</sup>

It  
predominates  
in  
business  
and  
banking  
and in the number and  
quality  
of its research  
universities.  
Its defense  
budget  
is  
larger  
than those

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Globalization,  
Culture,  
and Identities  
in  
Crisis  
277  
of  
the  
next  
fifteen  
countries  
combined. And there  
are  
few  
signs  
that  
any  
other  
international  
actor  
will  
soon  
become

a  
true  
competitor  
of the  
United  
States.  
This American  
primacy  
is  
the  
product  
of the  
country's  
own  
attributes  
(population,  
economic  
strength, technology, military  
preponderance,  
social  
dynamism),  
as  
well  
as  
of the demise  
of  
the Soviet Union  
in  
1991.  
With the  
collapse  
of the  
USSR and  
the end  
of the Cold  
War,  
the U.S.  
no  
longer  
faces  
any  
country  
possessing  
even  
remotely  
comparable



power.  
For much  
of  
the  
period  
since  
at  
least the mid-17th  
century,  
international  
politics  
had been  
characterized  
by  
balance of  
power  
rivalry  
involving  
competition  
among  
a  
number of  
great  
powers  
(typically  
France, Britain, Russia,  
Spain,  
Austria,  
Prussia and later  
Germany.)  
After  
World  
War  
II,  
world  
politics  
became  
bipolar  
with the  
onset  
of  
the Cold War and the  
superpower  
confrontation  
between the US and  
USSR.

Since the early 1990s, however, the United States has occupied a unique position, and its degree of primacy has grown rather than diminished with time. Moreover, the very scale of America's relative power compared to other countries tends to discourage challenges from other would-be world powers.<sup>9</sup> Influence in the cultural arena is more difficult to gauge than in

the  
economic  
or  
military  
realms.  
Although  
many  
of the  
criteria  
are  
less  
specific  
and  
more  
subjective,  
here  
too  
American  
preponderance  
is  
evident.  
An astute  
German  
diplomat,  
Karsten  
Voight,  
long  
acquainted  
with the  
United  
States,  
has  
aptly  
characterized the  
pervasiveness  
of  
this influence in the  
cultural  
realm:  
The USA has  
long  
been  
setting  
standards  
on  
a

worldwide  
basis,  
not  
just  
for the  
general  
populace,  
but has  
been  
leading  
the field in  
the  
classic  
cultural  
spheres,  
for  
example  
in  
research  
and  
teaching,  
or  
film  
and modern  
art.  
Its  
global  
role  
is  
rooted  
in  
a  
hitherto unknown blend  
of economic  
power,  
the  
ability  
to set  
the  
global  
cultural  
agenda  
and  
military  
superiority.<sup>10</sup>  
Moreover,

this  
influence is evident  
not  
only  
in  
what  
Voight  
refers  
to  
as  
the  
classic  
cultural  
spheres,  
but  
is  
even  
more  
pronounced  
in  
mass  
culture,  
where  
American  
popular  
music,  
casual  
clothing,  
movies,  
advertising  
media,  
fast  
food and  
sports  
(notably  
basketball)  
have become  
pervasive.  
A  
particularly  
ubiquitous  
feature that  
confers  
enormous  
influence is  
the

spread  
of  
American  
English  
as an  
international  
lingua  
franca. A  
century  
ago,  
French  
was  
the  
language  
of  
diplomacy  
and  
German  
was  
the  
leading  
scientific  
language  
as  
well  
as  
extensively  
used  
in  
Central  
and Eastern  
Europe.  
By  
the mid 20th  
century,  
Russian  
was  
the  
predominant  
second  
language  
throughout  
the  
Soviet  
sphere

in  
Central Asia  
and in  
Eastern  
Europe.  
Now,  
however,  
it  
is  
English  
that  
prevails.  
For  
example,  
at  
the  
United  
Nations,  
120  
countries  
specify  
English  
as  
the  
language  
in  
which  
correspondence  
to  
their  
missions  
should be  
addressed.  
By  
contrast  
some  
forty  
countries  
(mostly

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278  
Lieber and  
Weisberg  
former

French  
colonies)  
choose  
French,  
while  
twenty  
designate  
Spanish.<sup>11</sup>  
In  
much  
of the  
world,  
English  
has become  
widely  
used and  
is  
by  
far  
the  
leading  
choice  
for  
those who  
aspire  
to  
communicate  
outside  
their  
own  
local  
ity. English  
is  
the  
language  
shared  
by  
the  
different  
communities  
of India  
(or  
at  
least  
by  
their



educated,  
commercial  
or  
political  
elites),  
it is  
over  
whelmingly  
the second  
language  
in China  
and is often  
taught  
as  
a  
required  
subject  
in  
primary  
or  
secondary  
schools  
throughout  
Europe  
and Asia.  
Stories abound of  
bilateral  
meetings  
of  
foreign  
leaders who  
are  
not  
fluent in  
each  
other's  
languages,  
conversing  
in  
English  
which  
they  
share  
as a  
second

tongue.  
The  
inroads  
made  
by  
American  
English  
have  
been  
growing  
with  
glob  
alization  
and  
as  
a  
consequence  
of  
America's  
power  
and influence.  
Approximately  
380  
million  
people  
use  
English  
as  
their  
first  
language  
and  
another  
250 million  
as  
their  
second  
language.  
A  
billion  
people  
are  
learning  
English,  
and  
approximately

one-third  
of  
the  
world's  
population  
have  
some  
exposure  
to  
it.  
English  
is the  
predominant  
language  
of  
the  
European  
Union,  
and  
more  
than  
85%  
of  
international  
organizations  
employ  
it  
as one  
of their  
official  
languages.<sup>12</sup>  
To  
the intense  
irritation  
of French  
cultural  
and  
political  
elites  
and  
despite  
annual  
expenditures  
of  
some  
\$1

billion  
per  
year  
to  
promote  
that  
country's  
language  
and  
culture,  
French  
is  
now  
ranked  
only  
ninth  
among  
the  
world's  
most  
widely  
spoken  
languages.  
And  
four  
of France's  
most  
im-  
portant  
and  
dynamic  
international  
businesses,  
Alcatel,  
Total-FinaElf,  
Airbus  
and  
Vivendi,  
have  
made  
English  
their  
official  
language.<sup>13</sup>  
Entertainment  
is another

cultural  
realm  
in  
which American  
influence  
is  
pervasive.  
This  
takes  
various  
forms.  
Hollywood  
films  
capture  
more  
than  
70%  
of  
the Western  
European  
audience  
and  
have  
a  
huge  
market  
share  
elsewhere,  
in  
some  
cases  
as  
much  
as  
90%.<sup>14</sup>  
Here  
too,  
France  
has  
sought  
to  
stem  
the  
tide  
through  
regulations

and  
subsidies.  
Paris has  
ardently  
as  
serted  
a  
"cultural  
exception"  
in  
trade  
negotiations,  
and  
under  
prevailing  
international  
agreements  
the  
countries  
of  
the  
European  
Union  
can  
impose  
quotas  
on  
imported  
American  
music  
and  
television  
programs  
as  
well  
as  
movies.  
France  
requires  
that  
at  
least  
40%  
of  
TV  
and radio

programs  
be  
made  
domestically  
and  
maintains  
an  
elaborate  
system  
for  
subsidizing  
its  
movie  
industry.<sup>15</sup>  
The  
results,  
however,  
are  
modest.  
In  
2001,  
only  
four  
of  
the  
top  
ten  
films  
at  
the  
French  
box  
office  
were  
French,  
led  
by  
the  
light  
comedy  
"Amélie."<sup>16</sup>  
Yet  
this  
was  
an  
improvement

on  
the  
previous  
year,  
when  
only  
one  
out  
of  
twenty  
French-made  
films  
was a  
hit and  
Hollywood  
swept  
91%  
of the  
country's  
film  
revenues  
among  
summer  
audiences.<sup>17</sup>  
The  
heyday  
of  
French  
cinema  
in the  
1930s  
and  
again  
in  
the late  
1950s and  
the  
1960s,  
when  
its  
directors,  
actors  
and  
films  
were  
a



significant  
presence  
in world  
cinema,  
is  
a  
fading  
memory.  
When  
French  
films have  
been  
at  
all  
competitive,  
this  
is  
mostly  
a  
result  
of

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Globalization, Culture,  
and Identities  
in  
Crisis  
279  
Table  
1. Western  
European  
Film  
Statistics  
(1999)  
Host  
country  
American market share  
Germany  
76.0%  
Spain  
64.2  
France  
54.1  
Italy  
53.6

U.K. 86.0\*

Denmark

58.7

\*Data

for UK for 1998.

SOURCE:

Media

Sales,

Milan

Italy,

[www.mediasalles.it](http://www.mediasalles.it),

adapted

from tabular data

in

Tyler

Cowen,

"Why Hollywood

Rules the

World

(and

Should We

Care?)"

in

Correspondence,

Summer/Fall

2001,

p.

7.

embracing

those features for which

Hollywood

has

been

criticized.

In the

words of

one

French critic:

French cinema

is

allowing

itself

everything

American cinema used

to

be

blamed  
for:  
sex,  
violence,  
epic-scale  
historical reconstruction.  
All  
that  
distinguishes  
France's  
biggest  
hits of 2000 from  
some  
American B-movie is that the  
car  
chase is  
happening  
in  
Marseille,  
not  
Los  
Angeles,  
among  
Peugeots,  
not  
Chryslers.  
And  
the  
repetitiveness  
we  
once  
condemned in such hit film  
series  
as  
Rocky,  
Rambo,  
and  
Halloween,  
is  
becoming  
a  
more  
French  
practice  
too..  
,18

Elsewhere  
in  
Europe,  
the  
pervasiveness  
of  
American films is  
even more  
evident.  
For  
example  
in  
Berlin,  
following  
the  
opening  
of  
a  
huge  
business  
and  
entertainment  
complex  
at  
the Potsdammer  
Platz,  
a  
multiplex  
cinema there  
featured  
Hollywood  
films  
on  
eight  
of its  
nine  
screens.  
The  
sole  
exception  
was a  
German action film with  
an  
English  
title,  
"Crazy,"

clearly comparable  
in  
content to  
the French movies cited  
above in their  
embrace  
of  
Hollywood  
click?s.19

Overall,  
in  
five  
leading  
countries  
of  
the  
EU,  
the  
U.S.  
market share  
of the  
cinema audience has  
ranged  
from  
just  
under  
54% in  
Italy  
to  
76% in  
Germany  
and  
86%  
in  
the United  
Kingdom. (See  
Table  
1.)

#### CULTURE AS AN ARENA OF CONTESTATION

As  
we  
have  
previously  
suggested,

culture  
understood  
as  
popular,  
folk  
or  
high  
art  
has  
become  
a  
major  
arena  
of  
contestation  
as  
conflicts of  
national  
ism and  
ethnicity  
are  
played  
out  
in  
the cultural  
realm.  
Certain  
concepts  
are  
especially  
illuminating  
in the  
analysis  
of  
cultural  
conflict and  
change.  
First,  
attraction and  
toleration  
as  
contrasted  
to  
repulsion  
and  
suppression

of cul  
tural  
expression;  
and  
second,  
the  
sometimes  
simultaneous  
impulses  
toward  
differentiation and  
assimilation.

In  
regard  
to  
the  
first  
dynamic,  
in  
the  
spring  
of  
2001,  
the world  
learned of  
the  
deliberate  
demolition of  
two  
5th  
to  
7th  
century  
giant  
cliff side  
carvings

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280  
Lieber  
and  
Weisberg  
of the Buddha.  
Although  
these

artifacts had been  
designated  
a  
World His  
toric  
Monument  
by  
the  
UN,  
Afghanistan's  
Taliban rulers and  
other Is  
lamic militants used  
artillery  
and  
explosives  
to  
demolish them.  
They  
also  
destroyed  
with  
sledgehammers  
much of the  
Buddhist  
patrimony  
stored  
or  
displayed  
in  
Afghan  
museums.  
This  
was  
especially  
shocking  
for  
contempo  
rary  
Westerners,  
who tend  
to  
value  
cultural artifacts  
very  
highly



and who  
generally  
neutralize the  
ideology  
or  
beliefs inherent  
in  
sculpture  
or  
painting  
by redefining  
it  
as  
belonging  
to  
the  
category  
of  
art,  
where it tends  
to  
acquire  
great  
secular and  
monetary  
value.  
However,  
20th  
century  
Western  
history  
also includes  
haunting episodes  
of the  
symbolic  
destruction of  
culture,  
most  
notably  
in the Nazi book  
burnings.  
The  
destruction of the ancient  
Buddhas is  
a  
dramatic

and  
appalling  
episode  
of  
cultural  
suppression.  
Indeed it has been  
referred  
to  
as  
"a  
cultural  
and historical Hiroshima"  
in  
a  
Washington  
Post article. The  
same  
story quotes  
notes  
from  
a  
meeting  
between Taliban officials and  
Islamic militants: "The  
Taliban authorities  
agreed  
the  
destruction of  
[the statues]  
is  
an  
Islamic  
act  
that would make the Islamic world  
happy."<sup>20</sup>  
The  
spectrum  
of  
responses  
to  
cultural  
phenomena  
is  
very  
broad.

It  
ranges,  
at  
one  
end,  
from the  
extreme  
just  
cited,  
through hostility  
to  
toleration  
and  
attraction  
at  
the  
other  
end. Most  
interestingly,  
attraction  
and  
repression  
can  
happen  
simultaneously.  
Human  
beings  
seem  
to  
respond  
to  
a  
number  
of  
siren  
songs  
in  
this  
area:  
enforced  
rarity,  
the  
exotic,  
the  
transgressive  
and

the  
forbidden  
among  
others. Dick  
Hebdige's  
book about the  
way  
subcultures  
affect  
the dominant  
culture,  
especially  
in  
regard  
to  
the  
cycling  
of  
styles  
and  
artifacts of  
subcultures into the  
mainstream,  
is  
pertinent  
here.<sup>21</sup>  
There  
are  
many  
historical  
examples.  
For  
instance,  
in 18th  
century  
Spain,  
the colorful  
world of  
the  
Maja,  
with its  
brigands  
and  
courtesans,  
influenced the  
high

cul  
ture of  
the  
court  
in  
the time of  
Goya.  
In  
the  
late 19th  
century,  
the  
demimonde  
in Paris  
made  
a  
huge  
imprint  
on  
popular  
culture and  
the  
Impressionist  
and  
Post-Impressionist  
art  
movements  
as  
well,  
particularly  
in  
the works of  
Degas  
and Toulouse-Lautrec.  
A  
dynamic  
of  
attraction/repulsion  
between  
high  
cul  
ture  
and associated elites  
and  
transgressive  
outsiders is

a  
phenomenon  
that  
periodically  
emerges.  
The  
popularity  
of movies about  
gangsters  
and  
outlaws  
is  
no  
accident.  
What is  
the mechanism  
at  
work  
here? Reason  
may argue  
for  
one  
set  
of  
choices,  
and  
emotion  
or  
a  
deep-seated  
sense  
of attraction  
or  
identity  
may press  
for another.  
Samuel  
Huntington  
has written that "cultural char  
acteristics and  
differences  
are  
less  
mutable and hence less  
easily  
compro

mised and resolved  
than  
political  
and economic ones."22

This  
may  
help  
ex  
plain why  
nations,  
and ethnic and  
religious  
groups  
as  
well  
as  
individuals  
sometimes  
make  
choices that  
appear  
so  
irrational and  
against  
their best  
interests.

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Globalization, Culture,  
and  
Identities  
in  
Crisis  
281  
The other  
pair  
of  
often simultaneous  
tendencies that  
characterize  
the  
reception  
of culture  
involves  
impulses

toward  
differentiation and  
assimila  
tion.  
Both  
tendencies  
are  
dynamic.  
We  
are  
constantly borrowing, imitating  
and  
incorporating just  
as we are  
distinguishing  
and  
differentiating  
ourselves  
by  
innovative,  
exclusive  
or  
singular expressions.  
When culture is  
discussed  
in relation  
to  
globalization,  
it  
is  
most  
of  
ten  
American  
popular  
or mass  
culture  
that is the  
referent,  
and the rhetoric  
about it is  
highly charged.  
For  
example,  
Louis Hebron and John F  
Stack



describe the negative view of the globalization of mass culture in this way:  
"This foreign invasion and assimilation of cosmopolitan consumerism with its materialistic orientation, indulgent values, moral bankruptcy and fraternizing of nationalities is a prescription of cultural genocide because of the process' potential to vulgarize and/or destroy the rich diversity of human civilizations."<sup>23</sup>  
This is similar to

the  
argument  
of  
antiglobalization  
advocates  
alleging  
the destruction of  
biodiversity by  
American  
corporate  
interests. In the view  
of  
these  
critics,  
part  
of  
the  
richness of human culture  
is  
its  
variety,  
its  
trueness  
to  
its  
own  
cultural  
roots,  
but  
global popular  
culture dominated  
by  
American  
products  
and  
ideas  
destroys  
this  
diversity  
of cultural  
production.  
So there  
is  
fear  
and  
backlash

against  
what is viewed  
as a  
leveling  
force,  
a  
sweep  
ing  
homogeneity  
or  
Disneyfication  
of  
culture. The  
rhetoric  
surrounding  
the  
globalization  
of  
culture,  
sometimes  
compares  
it  
to  
colonialism,  
as  
evident  
for  
example,  
in the  
criticism  
by  
President  
Mohammed  
Khatami of  
Iran:  
[Globalization is]  
a  
destructive force  
threatening dialogue  
between cultures. The  
new  
world order and  
globalization  
that  
certain  
powers

are  
trying  
to  
make  
us  
accept,  
in  
which  
the culture of the  
entire world is  
ignored,  
looks  
like  
a  
kind of  
neocolonialism.  
This  
imperialism  
threatens  
mutual  
understanding  
between  
nations  
and  
communica  
tion and  
dialogue  
between  
cultures.<sup>24</sup>  
Rather than  
mounting  
a  
critique  
of  
the  
globalization  
of  
culture,  
we  
pro  
pose  
to  
analyze  
historical  
and  
political

causes  
which make  
culture  
a  
major  
arena  
of  
contestation for  
nationalism  
and  
ethnicity.  
Three  
partially  
overlap  
ping  
cultural  
arenas are  
encompassed  
in  
this  
analysis,  
first and  
most  
obvi  
ously, popular  
culture; second,  
folk  
or  
indigenous  
culture;  
and  
lastly,  
an  
arena  
that is  
not  
often  
discussed  
in  
this  
context,  
high  
culture.  
Popular  
culture is  
the

most  
obvious realm  
because  
there  
is  
a  
pervasive  
influence of  
American  
music,  
fashion,  
food, movies, TV,  
all  
tied  
to  
open  
markets  
and  
global  
consumerism.  
This  
influence is in  
part  
a  
reflection of  
what is  
often called  
"soft  
power."<sup>25</sup>  
The  
U.S.  
does  
not  
force  
anyone  
to  
use  
these American  
products,  
but  
they  
have,  
nevertheless,  
enormous  
popularity  
and

consumer  
attraction.  
Although  
U.S.  
products  
have  
the  
advantage  
of well  
capitalized  
production  
and  
distribution,  
as  
Richard  
Pells  
indicates,  
American  
capitalism  
is  
not  
the  
only  
or  
even  
the  
most  
important explanation  
for the  
"soft

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282  
Lieber  
and  
Weisberg  
power"  
of  
the United States.  
In  
Pell's  
words,  
"What  
Americans  
have done

more  
brilliantly  
than  
their  
competitors  
overseas  
is  
repackage  
the  
cultural  
products  
we  
receive from abroad  
and then  
transmit them  
to  
the  
rest  
of  
the  
planet."<sup>26</sup>  
Our  
history  
as  
a  
nation  
of  
immigrants  
has  
taught  
us  
to  
synthesize  
and  
incorporate  
the  
cultural and  
popular  
expressions  
of  
a  
wide  
range  
of  
nationalities and ethnicities.  
We



are  
the  
consumers  
of  
foreign  
intellectual  
and  
artistic  
influences  
par  
excellence.  
"American"  
is  
as  
much  
a  
style  
as  
a  
point  
of  
origin.  
Many  
"American"  
products  
are  
made  
elsewhere,  
and there  
is also the  
influence of  
French,  
British,  
Japanese,  
and German  
products  
or  
imitations of them.  
Japan  
is  
per  
haps  
the  
most  
distinctive  
global

alternative  
to  
American culture.  
An  
exam  
ple,  
is the "Hello  
Kitty"  
phenomenon.  
There  
are  
shops  
in malls  
across  
the  
United States that have "Hello  
Kitty"  
products,  
which  
were  
originally  
de  
signed  
for  
little  
Japanese girls. They  
are  
by design  
sentimental,  
plastic  
and  
pink  
and  
quite popular  
with little  
girls  
in  
the  
United  
States,  
many  
of  
whose  
backpacks  
and  
pencil

cases are  
part  
of  
the "Hello  
Kitty"  
line. And  
fascinat  
ingly,  
there is  
a  
subculture  
on  
the  
West Coast with its  
own  
flagship magazine  
called  
Giant  
Robot,  
which  
comments  
on  
this and  
similar  
phenomena  
of  
re  
verse  
cultural influence.  
Although,  
as  
noted  
above,  
American  
movies  
have  
a  
huge  
influence  
abroad,  
the  
action films that dominate  
international markets  
represent  
the  
reverse

phenomenon.

They  
are  
manifestations  
of  
a  
global  
market  
affecting  
the  
production  
of American  
film  
making.

Half  
or  
more  
of the  
gross  
rev  
enues  
for  
some  
Hollywood  
films  
come  
from  
foreign  
audiences.

As  
a  
result,  
and  
because  
younger  
moviegoers  
make  
up  
a  
disproportionate  
share  
of  
the  
audience,  
American  
action

movies,  
especially  
those aimed  
at  
Asian  
markets,  
are  
characterized  
more  
by  
their violence  
or  
explosiveness  
(which  
requires  
little  
translation)  
than  
by  
their  
dialogue.  
The  
de-emphasis  
on  
language  
and  
the  
tendency  
toward  
highly  
demarcated  
good  
and  
evil is  
appealing  
across  
many  
cultures.  
Folk  
or  
indigenous  
culture  
is  
another  
arena  
where

observers lament  
the  
effects  
of  
globalization  
as  
damaging  
to  
indigenous  
cultural  
production.  
Yet  
the  
concerned  
parties  
are  
often  
not  
from the cultures in  
question.  
There is  
a  
great  
deal of  
idealization of the cultures  
involved,  
as  
folkways  
tend  
to  
be  
viewed  
as  
pure,  
authentic and  
unchanging.  
Folk  
art,  
rather than demonstrating  
purity, provides  
an  
excellent  
case  
study  
of the  
dynamics

of assimilation  
and  
differentiation  
as  
it  
is  
usually  
a  
mixture of local  
production  
and  
aes  
thetics  
with  
outside  
influences. Two instances from  
Navajo  
culture  
illustrate  
this  
point.  
The  
rugs  
we  
view  
as so  
characteristic of the  
Navajos  
were  
greatly  
influenced  
by  
the late 19th  
century  
discovery  
on  
the  
part  
of the  
Navajos  
of German aniline  
dyes.  
If  
we  
examined the  
rugs

made before the  
Navajos  
adopted  
the  
use  
of  
these  
dyes,  
they  
would  
not  
seem  
to  
us  
to  
be  
Navajo  
rugs

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Globalization,  
Culture,  
and  
Identities  
in  
Crisis 283  
because of their subdued  
appearance,  
a  
consequence  
of  
the  
more  
limited  
color  
range  
obtained  
by  
dying  
the wool with  
vegetable  
matter.  
Another  
ex  
ample



is the  
great  
bifurcation of  
design  
in  
Navajo jewelry  
which  
was  
heavily  
influenced  
by  
native aesthetics  
on one  
hand and  
tourist  
preferences  
on  
the  
other. What  
they  
did for themselves  
tended  
to  
be  
very  
heavy  
and bold  
be  
cause  
they  
were  
designing jewelry  
emblematic  
of  
power.  
The  
more  
delicate,  
graceful,  
somewhat subdued  
jewelry  
was  
geared  
to  
tourist  
preferences.

The Navajos were quite willing to create two modes of production geared to two different audiences, which is a sophisticated marketing technique. These are clear examples of cultural output influenced by foreign technology and tourist preferences. Among other things, we thus ought to view folk culture as more complex and more calculated than it is generally

conceived.

While popular culture dominates the public discourse about globalization, high culture also acts as an arena of contestation. An additional reason for focusing on high culture is its connection to the governing elites in any country.

A smaller number of influential people involved in international or global dynamics can weigh more than a

larger  
number  
involved in  
popular  
culture.  
There  
are  
numerous  
focal  
points  
for  
international cultural  
presentation, exchange  
and  
collaboration.  
They  
include  
biennials,  
festivals,  
architectural  
competitions  
and the internet.  
One of the  
most  
visible sites for  
global  
high  
culture is the  
museum,  
which  
has  
traditionally  
been  
seen  
as an  
aid  
to  
civic, national,  
or  
ethnic  
identity.  
Typically,  
museums came  
into  
being  
through

the  
secularization of  
royal,  
court  
or  
church  
collections,  
which  
were  
made  
public  
in national  
or  
municipal  
forums.

The  
history  
of the  
Museum  
Bilbao  
in the  
Basque region  
of northern  
Spain  
illustrates

a  
number of the issues  
we are  
addressing,  
such  
as  
identity  
formation  
and  
assimilation  
versus  
differentiation.

In  
the  
late 19th  
century,  
the elites of  
Bilbao  
were  
in  
intellectual

ferment,  
characteristic  
of  
that  
era,  
concerning  
what  
they  
viewed  
as a  
choice between their  
local  
folkloric  
legacy  
and the  
cosmopolitan  
culture  
of  
the late  
19th  
century.  
Very  
similar tensions  
developed  
in  
different locales around the  
world.  
Nations  
were  
becoming  
much  
more aware  
of  
their folkloric  
heritage  
and the field of  
ethnography  
was  
expanding.  
In  
Germany,  
where  
the  
subject  
had  
already

become well  
established  
as  
an  
aspect  
of  
the Romantic  
movement  
of  
the  
1830s,  
people  
increasingly  
collected and valued folk  
material  
as  
a  
source  
of  
local  
or  
ethnic  
pride.  
At the  
same  
time,  
because of  
a  
number of  
different  
phenomena  
in  
cluding  
world  
fairs,  
there  
was  
a  
growing  
sense  
of  
positive  
identification  
with  
national  
cultural

production.  
And  
beyond  
the  
nation-state,  
a  
cosmopolitan art  
world  
was  
coming  
into  
being.  
One result of this  
more  
international  
awareness  
and  
diffusion  
of  
information  
was  
the  
rapid spread,  
for  
instance,  
of  
French  
Impressionism  
as  
it  
came  
to  
influence  
American,  
Spanish  
and Italian  
art  
by  
the  
last decade of the  
19th  
century.

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284 Lieber and

Weisberg

Note that

there

are

at

least three

related

terms

pertinent

to

this

dis

cussion that

seem

to

overlap

in

meaning

but have different valences and

connotations. These

are

the words

cosmopolitan,

international,

and

global.

They

can

all be

applied

to

culture and

they

all

carry

different

baggage.

The

term

cosmopolitan, arising

in

the

second

half

of the 19th

century,  
had  
a  
worldly,  
urbane,  
sophisticated  
sense  
to  
it.  
It  
was  
associated with  
high  
culture  
and  
particularly  
with  
things  
French.  
Cosmopolitanism  
in  
Iran,  
Russia  
and  
the  
United States  
in  
the 19th  
century  
embodied French cultural dominance.  
In  
the 20th  
century,  
that mutated  
into  
a  
negative  
connotation,  
especially  
within the  
Communist  
world,  
as  
in  
"rootless  
cosmopolitan,"

while  
lately  
it  
seems  
back  
in favor  
as a  
term  
of  
approbation.  
Internationalism,  
while identified  
with Western  
culture,  
is  
not  
dominated  
by  
one  
particular  
country.  
It is  
also  
a  
word  
more  
applicable  
to  
the  
20th  
century.  
In the  
art  
world,  
it referred  
to  
the  
elite  
style  
of  
a  
period,  
although  
it also had  
an

idealistic  
connota  
tion. In  
architecture,  
the "international  
style"  
was a  
manifestation of 20th  
century  
modernism,  
and in the realm  
of  
painting,  
abstract  
expressionism  
exemplified  
internationalism  
in  
the immediate  
post-World  
War Two  
period.  
Globalization,  
in  
turn,  
has  
recently acquired  
more  
negative  
connotations  
and is  
less  
strictly  
tied  
to  
high  
culture,  
as  
it  
has  
come  
to  
be  
identified with  
consumerism  
and

Disneyfication.  
The  
Basques,  
with their distinctive  
culture and  
language,  
were,  
and still  
are,  
a  
particular  
blend  
of  
ethnicity,  
cosmopolitanism,  
anti-Spanish,  
and  
anti  
Madrid sentiments.  
In the late  
19th  
century,  
their choice  
was  
between  
a  
strong  
ethnic  
identity  
and  
a more  
cosmopolitan  
one,  
and oscillation  
between  
those  
two  
poles  
has characterized  
their  
situation  
throughout  
the  
20th  
and  
into

the  
21st  
century.  
In  
the  
1990s,  
a  
group  
of  
industrial and  
civic leaders from  
the  
region  
decided  
that  
internationalism  
was  
the  
best choice for  
Bilbao,  
and  
became  
very  
interested  
in  
having  
their  
city  
become  
the  
site for  
a  
new  
European  
Guggenheim  
Museum.  
To  
quote  
Selma  
Holo's  
Beyond  
the  
Prado:  
It would enable  
the civic  
leaders,

with the assistance  
of  
a  
small  
group  
of  
advocates  
to  
convince  
enough  
of  
the elite  
population  
of the  
city  
that  
rejection  
of the  
Guggenheim  
Museum  
Bilbao,  
would  
be  
tantamount  
to  
scuttling  
any  
chance for  
Bilbao  
to  
assume  
a  
modern  
identity  
or  
protect  
the  
regional  
identity.  
These  
new  
institutions  
were  
meant  
to  
prove

that  
the intent of  
the  
politicians  
to  
support  
internationalism  
would  
not  
preclude  
their  
aggressive  
support  
for  
Basque  
cultural  
identity  
reinforcement.<sup>27</sup>

So  
Basque  
identity  
and  
a  
modern  
identity  
became  
linked:  
the Museum  
would solve  
both  
problems.

As  
in  
the  
19th  
Century,  
much of  
this attitude  
was  
fueled  
by  
a  
rejection  
of Central  
Spain  
and



Spanish  
identity.  
Ironically,  
Basque  
elites  
traded  
off  
centralist  
Spain  
for centralist  
New York.  
In the end  
the  
Guggenheim  
Bilbao  
adopted  
an  
internationalist  
program  
for  
the  
museum,  
and  
regional  
artists of  
some  
quality  
were  
not  
shown  
there.  
The idea that  
Basque  
cultural  
identity  
would  
be  
promoted  
and  
supported  
was  
forgotten

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Globalization,

Culture,  
and  
Identities  
in  
Crisis  
285  
once  
the  
spectacular building designed  
by  
Frank  
Gehry  
became  
a  
reality.  
However,  
the  
payoff  
for Bilbao has been  
an  
extraordinary  
surge  
in  
cul  
tural  
tourism.  
Bilbao  
provides  
a  
perfect  
illustration of the late  
20th-early  
21st  
century  
importance  
of  
museums as  
branding  
a  
city through  
a  
cultural  
attraction  
and,  
in  
the

case  
of  
the  
Guggenheim  
in  
Bilbao,  
giving  
it  
a  
global  
presence.  
The  
Guggenheim  
with its  
various branches  
worldwide had  
approx  
imately  
three million visitors  
in  
2001,  
which  
compares  
favorably  
with  
giants  
like  
the Louvre  
with  
some  
six  
million  
visitors.  
Biennials,  
music  
festivals,  
international architectural  
competitions,  
and  
cultural tourism  
are  
among  
the  
many ways  
nations  
or

cities  
project  
them  
selves into the  
international  
art  
world.  
In contrast to  
the  
jockeying  
for  
po  
sition  
among  
cultural elites  
of  
many  
nations,  
there  
are more  
radical forms  
of  
contestation.  
As  
noted  
above,  
the  
Taliban  
banned culture  
altogether  
and  
severely  
punished  
transgressors,  
destroying  
an  
estimated  
80  
%  
of  
Afghan  
cul  
tural artifacts in the  
process.  
They  
burned

more  
than  
1000 reels of  
Afghan  
films,  
and  
a  
prominent  
musician who  
was  
caught  
playing  
his  
instrument  
was  
warned that  
if he  
were  
caught again, they  
would  
cut  
off his  
hands.<sup>28</sup>

Afghanistan  
is  
an  
extreme  
case,  
but  
it  
shows how  
virulent cultural  
contesta  
tion  
can  
become.

CULTURE AS A  
PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN AN ERA  
OF  
GLOBALIZATION

Both  
globalization  
and American  
primacy  
evoke  
cultural

backlash. But the character and magnitude of this reaction differ greatly depending on the societies in which they occur. Moreover, this reaction takes very different forms in the West and in other modern societies than in the developing world and especially in Muslim countries. The reason is that cultural anxiety and turmoil are

a  
consequence  
of  
two  
related  
but  
distinct  
phenomena.  
First,  
there  
are  
the  
material  
and  
economic  
effects  
of  
globalization  
and  
moder  
nity.  
Among  
these  
are  
urbanization,  
the  
appearance  
of  
modern  
consumer  
goods,  
and the  
impact  
of  
the  
mass  
media,  
including  
satellite  
television,  
movie  
cassettes  
and the  
internet. These  
provide  
a

window  
to?and  
sometimes dis  
torted  
impressions  
of?the outside  
world.

A  
second  
element,  
western  
values,  
is  
more  
intangible  
but often  
more  
profound  
in  
its  
impact.

These  
values in  
clude,  
among  
others,  
scientific  
reasoning,  
secularism,  
religious  
toleration,  
in  
dividualism,  
freedom  
of  
expression,  
political pluralism,  
the  
rule of  
law,  
equal  
rights  
for  
women  
and  
minorities,



and  
openness  
to  
change.  
As  
one  
widely  
re  
spected  
observer  
has  
commented,  
the result  
for much of  
the  
Islamic world  
is  
an  
"intractable  
confrontation  
between  
a  
theistic,  
land-based  
and  
traditional

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286  
Lieber  
and  
Weisberg  
culture,  
in  
places  
little  
different  
from  
the  
Europe  
of  
the  
Middle  
Ages,  
and

the  
secular material values  
of  
the  
Enlightenment."29  
In  
Europe,  
Canada,  
Japan  
and other  
societies,  
where  
modern values  
prevail,  
cultural  
reactions  
to  
globalization  
and  
to  
American  
predominance  
tend  
to  
be  
more  
nuanced.  
Intellectual,  
literary,  
artistic and  
political  
elites  
often seek  
ways  
to  
define  
or  
reassert  
their  
own  
identities  
and  
importance  
and their  
national cultures  
by

confronting  
the  
policies  
and the  
material and  
cultural  
influences of the  
United  
States. In  
part,  
these  
reactions  
have less  
to  
do with  
Washington's policies  
than  
with the  
inbalance of  
power  
and  
influence  
between  
their  
own  
countries  
and the  
United  
States.  
However,  
there  
are  
indications  
that the  
European  
public  
as  
a  
whole  
may  
not  
share  
these  
views  
to  
the

same  
degree,  
and  
public  
opinion  
polls  
in  
France,  
whose  
intellectuals and  
officials  
are  
among  
Europe's  
most  
strident  
critics,  
indicate  
possibly  
as  
little  
as  
10%  
of  
the  
public  
is  
anti-American.<sup>30</sup> The  
critiques  
can  
become  
heated,  
but  
they  
remain  
largely  
symbolic  
and  
are  
often  
ephemeral.  
Indeed,  
in  
their  
use  
of

hyperbole,  
they  
can  
approach  
caricature,  
at  
least in the  
case  
of the  
French,  
where  
they  
can  
take  
on  
the  
appearance  
of  
an  
elaborate  
verbal and  
aesthetic  
game,  
for  
example,  
in  
denunciations  
of  
Eurodisney  
as  
a  
"cultural  
Chernobyl."<sup>31</sup>  
Among  
the  
different  
forms of cultural  
reaction,  
scapegoating  
and  
trans  
ference  
are  
especially  
evident,  
whereby

cultural and  
economic  
resentments  
are  
deflected from the  
original systemic  
causes  
such  
as  
globalization,  
mod  
ernization,  
urbanization,  
and  
economic  
rationalization,  
onto  
convenient  
symbolic  
targets.  
In  
France  
these  
phenomena  
have been evident in  
the  
highly  
publicized exploits  
of Jose  
Bove,  
an  
antiglobalization  
activist who  
learned his  
tactics while  
a  
foreign  
student  
at  
the  
University  
of  
California  
at  
Berkeley,  
and

who  
in  
1999  
drove  
a  
tractor  
into  
a  
McDonald's  
restaurant  
in  
the  
provincial  
town  
of  
Millau.  
However,  
the  
presence  
of  
more  
than 700 of these  
fast  
food  
restaurants  
in  
the  
country suggests  
that French  
consumers  
in  
large  
numbers  
find their  
own  
reasons  
to  
patronize  
the franchise.  
While  
Europe  
and the United States  
share  
many  
cultural  
values

and  
have  
a  
rich  
history  
of  
cross-fertilization,  
a  
contrasting  
component  
of Euro  
pean  
cultural  
reaction  
is evident  
in  
distrust of other facets of  
modernity.  
In  
Britain and  
France,  
as a  
result  
of  
deadly  
medical fiascos in  
the  
1980s  
and  
1990s,  
a  
degree  
of  
cynicism  
and  
suspicion  
has  
developed  
toward  
experts  
in modern  
science and  
technology.  
In  
the French  
case,



the  
reaction  
stems  
from the  
government's  
deliberate  
delay  
in  
licensing  
an  
American  
test  
for  
the  
HIV/AIDS  
virus in donated blood  
in  
order  
to  
await  
a  
French-made  
product.  
As  
a  
consequence,  
hundreds of  
people  
who received  
transfusions  
during  
this  
period  
became  
infected with the  
deadly  
virus.  
In  
Britain,  
public  
distrust  
reflects  
the "Mad Cow" disease  
experience  
in  
1996,

when  
public  
health  
officials  
mistakenly  
assured  
the  
public  
that there  
was no  
danger  
in

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Globalization,  
Culture,  
and Identities in Crisis  
287  
eating  
beef  
from  
diseased  
animals.  
The  
backlash has  
recently  
been  
apparent  
in the refusal of  
many  
British  
parents  
to  
have their  
infants inoculated  
for  
measles,  
mumps  
and  
rubella,  
not  
because  
of  
scientific  
evidence,

but due  
to  
the  
speculation  
of  
a  
single  
doctor that the vaccine  
might  
cause  
autism.<sup>32</sup>

Re  
actions  
of  
this kind  
are  
also  
manifest,  
for  
example,  
in  
a  
European  
consumer  
backlash  
against genetically  
modified  
(GM)  
crops.  
Evidence  
of  
harm from  
products  
available  
to  
the  
public  
has  
never  
been documented.  
Nonetheless,  
without  
any  
scientific  
confirmation,  
the

European  
Union has halted  
approval  
of  
new  
GM  
crops  
for  
use or  
import  
into the  
EU.<sup>33</sup>

In the  
United  
States,  
globalization  
has had  
notable effects  
on  
basic  
values  
and beliefs.

Paul  
Cantor,  
in  
his  
book  
Gilligan  
Unbound:  
Pop  
Culture  
in  
the  
Age  
of  
Globalization,<sup>3A</sup>  
explores  
four television series  
over  
the  
course  
of  
four decades  
(Gilligan's  
Island,  
Star

Trek,  
The  
Simpsons,  
and The  
X  
Files)  
to  
demonstrate  
how  
globalization  
has undermined  
traditional  
attitudes  
concerning  
power,  
authority  
and the role  
of  
the  
state.<sup>35</sup>  
Cantor  
argues  
that  
the traditional  
importance  
of the  
state  
and  
of  
other national  
institutions has  
given  
way  
in the  
consciousness of  
most  
people  
(as represented,  
e.g.,  
in The  
Simpsons)  
to  
focus  
on  
the  
family, neighbors

and the marketplace.  
Indeed,  
Cantor maintains that  
as a  
result of the  
economic and  
cultural effects of  
globalization,  
together  
with the  
impact  
of  
mass  
media such  
as  
cable  
TV,  
the  
centrality  
of the  
nation-state  
in  
American life  
may  
be  
giving  
way  
to  
the  
family  
and other basic  
social  
units.  
Whether this trend  
will  
persist  
is another  
matter.  
In  
part,  
it  
reflects the  
effects of  
a  
post-Cold

War decade in which  
the absence  
of  
an  
external  
threat  
on  
the scale  
of World War  
Two  
or  
the Cold  
War,  
coupled  
with the  
impact  
of  
the information revolution  
and  
an  
extraordinary period  
of  
economic  
growth  
and lavish  
consumer  
spending  
caused  
Americans  
and  
the  
media  
to  
focus  
on  
ephemeral  
domestic stories about  
celebrities,  
life  
style,  
crime,  
and the  
sexual  
peccadillos  
of  
prominent personalities.

The  
focus,  
magnified by  
cable  
television  
(all-Monica-all-the-time)  
on  
the sordid  
Clinton  
scandals,  
the  
O.J.  
Simpson  
trial,  
the  
lifestyles  
of dot.com  
billionaires,  
and  
celebrity  
gossip  
were  
among  
the  
most  
prominent  
cultural  
symbols  
of the  
1990s.  
However,  
this  
absorption, together  
with  
waning public  
confidence in  
government,  
was  
the  
product  
of  
an era  
in which  
the role of the  
state  
at



home  
and  
abroad  
seemed  
less essential.  
In  
the aftermath of  
the  
September  
11th  
terror  
attacks,  
the  
persistence  
of  
these  
trends is much less  
certain. The  
unprecedented  
nature  
and  
scope  
of the  
assault  
on  
the  
US.  
homeland,  
the  
mass  
murder  
of  
3000  
Americans,  
the  
very  
real threat from  
terror  
and  
weapons  
of  
mass  
destruction,  
and the  
effect  
on

the  
US.  
economy  
have  
impacted  
the  
lives  
of  
ordinary  
Americans  
and  
may  
have transformative  
effects.

The  
cultural  
impact  
of  
9/11  
can  
be  
gauged  
in  
many  
ways,  
big  
and  
small. One is the  
outpouring  
of  
unabashed

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288  
Lieber  
and  
Weisberg  
patriotic  
sentiment  
in  
response  
to  
the destruction of the World Trade  
Cen  
ter

and  
the  
bravery  
of  
passengers  
who  
fought  
with their  
hijackers  
on  
the  
doomed  
American  
Airlines  
flight  
#93. Other  
measures can  
be  
found  
in  
increased  
volunteerism,  
the broad-based and unselfconscious  
display  
of the  
flag,  
and in  
dramatic  
changes  
in  
public opinion.  
For  
example,  
trust  
in  
govern  
ment  
and confidence  
in  
national  
institutions,  
including  
the  
presidency  
and  
Congress,

has  
surged?at  
least  
temporarily?to  
the  
highest  
levels  
since  
the  
mid-1960s.<sup>36</sup>  
There has also been  
a  
perceptible  
shift  
in  
media  
tastes  
and  
in  
magazines  
and books. One  
straw  
in  
the  
wind is  
the  
collapse  
of Talk  
mag  
azine,  
the brain  
child of  
celebrity  
editor Tina  
Brown.<sup>37</sup> Another  
was  
evi  
dent  
in the list of nonfiction best sellers.  
Illustratively,  
six months  
after  
the  
September  
11th  
attacks,

six of the  
top  
ten  
books  
were  
traditional  
or  
culturally  
conservative  
works.

The list  
included,  
at  
#1 Tom  
Clancy's  
Shadow  
Warriors  
(US.  
special-operations forces);  
#2

Bernard  
Goldberg's  
Bias  
(liberal  
bias  
in  
news  
media);  
David  
Vise's,  
The Bureau and the Mole  
(Soviet  
spy  
Robert  
Hanssen);

#6  
David  
McCullough's  
John  
Adams  
(biography  
of the second  
president);  
#7 Bernard Lewis's What Went  
Wrong  
(failures

of  
the  
Islamic  
world);  
#8 One  
Nation  
(photos  
and  
essays  
on  
September  
11th  
by  
the editors  
of  
Life)',  
and  
#10  
Pat  
Buchanan's Death  
of  
the  
West  
(a  
warning  
about  
threats  
to western  
civilization  
by  
a  
right-wing  
columnist.)<sup>38</sup>  
The  
impact  
of  
globalization  
on  
American  
culture and the  
United  
States  
more  
broadly  
has had  
a

number  
of  
contradictory  
effects.  
Until  
recently,  
glob  
alization,  
along  
with the end of  
the  
Cold  
War,  
the information revolution  
and  
an  
economic  
boom  
fostered  
the kind of shifts described  
by  
Cantor.  
But  
especially  
since  
September  
11, 2001,  
Americans  
have  
discovered  
that  
key  
components  
of  
globalization (technology,  
openness,  
cell  
phones,  
the  
Inter  
net,  
financial  
flows,  
modern air  
travel)  
could be

used  
to  
murderous effect  
against  
modern  
society,  
and  
public  
attitudes  
have  
shown  
signs  
of  
shifting  
in  
the direction  
of  
more  
traditional cultural  
values.  
Reaction  
to  
globalization  
and  
America's role  
as  
the  
symbol  
of  
capital  
ism,  
modernity  
and  
mass  
culture  
takes  
a  
very  
different  
and  
more  
intense  
form  
in  
large  
areas



of the  
developing  
world and  
especially  
in  
Muslim  
countries.  
Here,  
the  
intrusion  
of  
modern  
western  
values combined  
with  
the  
crisis  
of traditional  
societies  
in  
coping  
with economic and  
social  
change  
fosters  
a  
sometimes  
bitter  
backlash  
and  
periodically  
virulent forms  
of  
transference  
and  
scapegoating.  
Often,  
the forces of both attraction  
and  
repulsion  
are evident  
at  
the  
same

time.  
This  
outlook,  
a  
kind  
of "cultural  
schizophrenia,"  
is  
vividly  
evident  
in the television  
viewing  
habits of Middle Eastern  
youths,  
as  
described  
by  
a  
close  
observer:  
Young  
people  
in  
particular...  
are  
simultaneously  
seduced and  
repelled  
by  
Ameri  
can  
culture.  
The  
most  
popular  
show  
on  
MBC  
[the  
most  
popular  
Arab  
satellite  
TV  
channel]  
is Who

Wants  
to  
be  
a  
Millionaire!  
The  
same  
youths  
who  
shout 'death  
to

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Globalization, Culture,  
and  
Identities in Crisis  
289  
America'  
go  
home  
to  
read  
contraband  
copies  
of  
Hollywood  
magazines.  
What the  
Iranian  
philosopher  
Daryush Shayegan  
refers to  
as  
Islam's 'cultural  
schizophrenia'?  
the  
struggle  
between tradition  
and Western  
secular  
modernity,  
between fundamen  
talism and  
globalization?haunts  
the

soul of  
many  
Muslims..  
,"39  
As  
another  
example,  
on  
September  
11th,  
patrons  
at  
a  
trendy  
Beirut  
coffee  
house  
applauded  
the televised  
pictures  
of the World  
Trade Center's destruc  
tion,  
while  
dressed  
in American  
style clothing  
and  
gathering  
in  
an  
establish  
ment  
that would  
have fit within  
any  
upscale  
American  
neighborhood.<sup>40</sup>  
Major  
conflicts  
that  
ultimately  
concern  
radically  
different visions of

so  
ciety  
and  
identity  
are  
thus  
played  
out  
in  
the cultural realm.  
Though  
a  
great  
deal of  
comment  
has been devoted  
to  
these  
reactions  
as  
stemming  
from  
problems  
of  
poverty,  
environmental  
degradation,  
or  
in  
response  
to  
Ameri  
can  
policies,  
the  
root  
causes  
lie elsewhere.  
The  
most  
intense  
resentment  
of  
the United States  
is  
expressed

by  
proponents  
of militant Islam. The words  
of Osama  
bin Laden  
are  
chilling  
in their unabashed  
hatred,  
as  
expressed,  
for  
example,  
in his  
February  
1998  
fatwa  
proclaiming,  
"The  
killing  
of  
Amer  
icans and  
their civilian  
and  
military  
allies is  
a  
religious duty  
for each and  
every  
Muslim  
to  
be carried  
out  
in  
whichever  
country  
they  
are  
found."<sup>41</sup>  
But,  
as  
Fouad  
Ajami  
has

observed,  
what  
really  
motivates bin Laden and his  
followers  
is  
rage  
over  
their  
inability  
to  
overthrow the  
existing  
Arab  
ruling  
order,  
which  
they  
redirect  
at  
America.  
Ajami  
captures  
both the  
paradoxical  
attraction  
and  
repulsion  
toward  
the  
United  
States  
and the bitter  
resent  
ment  
of  
Arabs  
at  
their  
own  
broken  
societies and  
corrupt  
and authoritarian  
regimes:  
Nothing

grows  
in  
the  
middle  
between  
an  
authoritarian  
political  
order  
and  
populations  
given  
to  
perennial  
flings  
with  
dictators,  
abandoned  
to  
their  
most  
malignant  
hatreds.  
Something  
is amiss  
in  
an  
Arab  
world  
that  
besieges  
American  
embassies  
for  
visas  
and  
at  
the  
same  
time  
celebrates  
America's  
calamities.<sup>42</sup>  
This  
rage  
embodies both



an  
historical  
and  
a  
modern  
component.  
There  
is frustration  
at  
the  
loss of  
grandeur  
for  
a  
civilization  
that  
once  
far  
outpaced  
Europe  
in  
its  
achievements  
but  
has in  
recent  
centuries  
fallen into  
anger  
and  
despair.  
There is  
a  
flavor of  
this  
in  
a  
bin  
Laden video  
aired in October  
2001,  
which  
reveals  
in the destruction  
of  
the World Trade Center

and  
calls  
upon  
Muslims  
to  
wage  
war  
against  
America. The  
Al  
Qaeda  
leader invokes the  
memory  
of  
past  
Arab  
indignities:  
W^hat  
America is  
tasting  
now  
is  
something insignificant compared  
to  
what  
we  
have  
tasted  
for  
scores  
of  
years.  
Our  
nation  
[the  
Islamic  
world]  
has  
been  
tasting  
this  
humil  
iation  
and this  
degradation  
for

more  
than 80  
years.<sup>43</sup>  
The reference  
to  
"80  
years"  
would be obscure  
for  
most  
western  
audiences  
but  
readily  
understood  
in  
the  
Arab world.  
The  
year,  
1921,  
marked  
the col  
lapse  
of the Ottoman  
Empire,  
and  
thus the ultimate  
demise  
of the

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290  
Lieber  
and  
Weisberg  
Caliphate? Muslim  
civil and  
religious  
rule  
by  
the  
successors  
of  
Muhammad,

which had  
lasted,  
at  
least  
symbolically,  
for  
nearly  
1300  
years.  
Documents  
found  
at  
sites  
in  
Afghanistan  
abandoned  
by  
Al  
Qaeda  
fighters  
contained  
even  
more  
explicit  
reference  
to  
the  
Caliphate,  
as  
in the  
words of  
one  
of the  
recovered  
texts:  
[The  
Caliphate]  
is the  
only  
and best solution  
to  
the  
predicaments  
and  
problems  
from

which  
Muslims  
suffer  
today  
and indubitable  
cure  
to  
the  
turbulence and  
internal  
struggles  
that  
plague  
them.

It  
will  
remedy  
the  
economic  
underdevelopment  
which  
bequeathed  
upon  
us a  
political dependence  
on an  
atheist East and  
infidel  
West.<sup>44</sup>

What is  
revealing  
about reference  
to  
the  
Caliphate  
is  
not  
only  
its irrele  
vance  
to  
the  
"predicaments  
and  
problems  
from

which Muslims  
suffer  
today,"  
but also  
the notion that reestablishment of the  
Caliphate  
could  
somehow  
solve  
contemporary  
problems  
of economic  
development.  
Moreover,  
while  
bin Laden's  
October video  
laments  
the  
carving  
up  
of the  
Middle  
East into  
a  
series of  
separate  
states  
that have  
largely  
failed  
to  
cope  
with  
the  
challenges  
of  
modernity,  
it  
ignores  
the  
fact that the United  
States had  
little  
to  
do

with  
the Ottoman  
breakup  
and  
the  
drawing  
of  
borders. That  
legacy  
is  
shared  
by  
France  
and  
Britain,  
as  
the  
prevailing  
colonial  
powers  
of  
the  
day.  
Moreover,  
the  
events  
took  
place  
a  
quarter-century  
before  
the  
United States  
became  
a  
superpower  
in the  
aftermath of  
World War  
Two,  
and  
long  
before the  
cre  
ation of the  
state

of Israel in  
1948. But bin  
Laden's  
focus  
upon  
America  
is  
evidence  
of  
how this  
rage  
has  
been  
redirected  
at  
the  
United  
States  
as  
the  
most  
powerful symbol  
of  
western  
values  
and  
modern  
economic,  
military  
and  
cultural  
influence.<sup>45</sup>  
Ultimately,  
the  
resentment  
and  
hostility  
is  
driven far  
less  
by  
poverty  
than  
by  
issues of  
identity,



and its  
proponents  
are  
mostly  
from  
the  
university  
educated  
professional  
and  
middle classes  
who  
comprise  
an  
embittered  
counter-elite  
within  
their  
own  
societies.  
Martin Kramer  
observes  
how this  
resentment  
is  
embodied  
by  
militant Islam:  
[It is]  
the vehicle  
of  
counter-elites,  
people  
who,  
by  
virtue  
of  
education  
and/or  
in  
come,  
are  
potential  
members  
of  
the

elite,  
but  
who for  
some  
reason or  
another  
get  
excluded. Their  
education  
may  
lack  
some  
crucial  
prestige-conferring  
element;  
the  
sources  
of their wealth  
may  
be  
a  
bit tainted.  
Or  
they  
may  
just  
come  
from the  
wrong  
background.  
So while  
they  
are  
educated and  
wealthy, they  
have  
a  
grievance:  
their  
ambition is  
blocked,  
they  
cannot  
translate  
their  
socio-economic

assets  
into  
political  
clout.  
Islamism is  
particularly  
useful  
to  
these  
people,  
in  
part  
because  
by  
its  
careful  
manipulation,  
it  
is  
possible  
to  
recruit  
a  
following  
among  
the  
poor,  
who make  
valuable  
foot-soldiers.<sup>46</sup>  
This is  
not  
an  
entirely  
new  
development.  
Some  
two  
decades  
ago,  
an  
Egyptian  
study  
found that  
jailed  
Islamists in

that  
country  
were  
mostly  
of  
middle class  
origins,  
highly  
motivated,  
and  
often  
educated  
in  
engineering  
or  
science.

In  
deed,  
fifteen of the  
nineteen  
September  
11th  
hijackers  
came  
from  
Saudi

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Globalization,  
Culture,  
and  
Identities  
in  
Crisis  
291  
Arabia,  
one  
of the Muslim  
world's  
wealthiest  
countries.  
Moreover,  
the  
two  
top

leaders  
of Al  
Qaeda  
are  
bin  
Laden,  
the  
son  
of  
a  
Saudi  
billionaire,  
and  
Ayman  
al-Zawahiri,  
a  
wealthy  
Egyptian  
doctor.  
Indeed,  
militant Islam's  
ability  
to  
attract  
such  
competent,  
well  
motivated  
and  
ambitious  
people  
re  
sembles  
that of fascism and  
Marxism-Leninism in their  
day.<sup>47</sup>  
Not  
only  
are  
these traits of Islamic  
extremists evident in  
their  
own  
coun  
tries,  
but

they  
are  
also  
apparent  
among  
some  
Islamic and  
Arab  
emigres  
in  
Europe.  
For  
example,  
Mohamed  
Atta,  
the Saudi  
who  
piloted  
the  
hijacked  
airliner  
that slammed into the North  
Tower of the  
World Trade  
Center  
and  
is  
believed  
to  
be the  
ringleader  
of the  
hijackers,  
had  
lived with several  
of the  
terrorists  
in  
Germany  
and  
appears  
to  
have become  
increasingly  
alienated  
by

his  
inability  
to  
find  
a  
place  
and  
purpose  
in that  
society  
despite  
his  
graduate  
education  
in  
urban  
planning.  
As Fouad  
Ajami  
has  
eloquently  
observed,  
"The modern world unsettled  
Atta... The  
magnetic  
power  
of  
the  
American  
imperium  
had fallen  
across  
his  
country.  
He arrived  
here with  
a  
presumption  
and  
a  
claim. We had intruded into  
his  
world;  
he would  
shatter the

peace  
of  
ours.  
The  
glamorized  
world couldn't be  
fully  
had;  
it  
might  
as  
well be  
humbled  
and taken  
down."<sup>48</sup>  
In  
essence,  
an  
indigenous  
rage  
stemming  
from social  
disruption,  
oppression and alienation becomes transferred  
or  
redirected  
onto  
targets  
that have  
little  
to  
do  
with the  
sources  
of discontent.  
In  
its  
most  
nihilistic  
expressions,  
it takes the form of  
delusional  
conspiracy  
theories directed  
at



the  
United  
States,  
the  
West,  
or  
Israel. As  
evidence,  
a  
Gallup  
survey  
of  
public opinion  
in  
nine Muslim countries  
found  
only  
18% of  
respondents  
believe  
that Arabs  
carried  
out  
the  
September  
11th  
attacks.<sup>49</sup>  
More  
blatantly,  
Arab  
and Muslim  
media  
disseminated  
conspiracy  
theories  
claiming  
a  
Jewish  
or  
Israeli hand  
behind  
the  
attack  
on  
the World Trade  
Center,

and  
leading  
Saudi,  
Egyptian and  
Syrian  
papers  
have carried crude  
anti-Semitic  
stories?essentially  
a  
form of  
political pornography?including  
the old  
Czarist  
forgery,  
"The  
Protocols  
of the Elders of Zion" and the ancient libel that  
Jews  
use  
the  
blood  
of non-Jewish children  
in  
food  
prepared  
for Purim  
or  
Passover.<sup>50</sup>

## CONCLUSION

In  
an  
increasingly globalized  
world,  
culture has  
emerged  
as a  
central  
arena  
of  
contestation.  
Other  
issues  
on

the  
globalization agenda, especially  
economic  
problems  
of  
trade, aid,  
investment and  
poverty,  
are more  
read  
ily  
subject  
to  
negotiation  
and  
compromise.  
But  
precisely  
because culture  
has become  
a  
signifier  
for other  
more  
deep-seated  
and intractable  
issues,  
the  
problems  
it  
poses  
are  
harder  
to  
resolve. Culture  
in its various forms  
serves as  
a  
primary  
carrier of  
globalization  
and modern  
values,  
and cultural issues  
are

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Lieber and

Weisberg

so

fraught

precisely

because of their

impact

on

both individual and national

identity.

The

idea

that modernization

often

proves

disruptive

to

traditional

soci

eties and that

this

can cause

revolutionary

turmoil is

not

new.

In

the mid-19th

century,

Alexis de

Tocqueville

concluded

that

rage

and

political upheaval

stemmed

not

from

poverty

and

deprivation

or

from the exercise  
of  
power  
itself,  
but from  
more  
symbolic  
causes  
including rising expectations, feelings  
of  
humiliation,  
and reactions  
against  
a  
ruler considered  
"illegitimate...  
and  
oppressive."<sup>51</sup>  
A  
century  
later,  
a  
leading  
social  
scientist,  
Seymour  
Martin  
Lipset,  
identified  
relative  
deprivation  
as a source  
of  
upheaval  
and  
found  
that  
disruptions  
caused  
by  
economic  
and  
social modernization could radi-  
calize sections of the middle  
and  
professional

classes and  
cause  
them  
to  
be  
attracted  
to  
extremist movements.<sup>52</sup>

But what is  
increasingly  
evident  
today  
is the  
key  
role  
played by  
culture,  
for it  
serves as  
the  
transmission belt  
by  
which  
so  
much  
of the  
impact  
of  
globalization  
and modern values is  
con  
veyed  
to  
foreign  
audiences,  
and  
through  
which identities  
are so  
profoundly  
challenged.  
The  
animus  
directed  
against  
the United States is

by  
no means  
uniform.  
And,  
as  
we  
have  
observed,  
expressions  
of it in  
Europe  
are  
much  
more  
mod  
est  
and  
symbolic  
because  
globalization  
there  
(and  
in  
other  
regions  
where  
modern values  
prevail)  
does  
not  
dictate  
a  
profound  
cultural clash with  
pre  
modern values.  
Moreover,  
in  
the  
post  
9/11  
world,  
basic  
European solidarity  
with the United States has been  
reinforced,

along  
with  
a sense  
that  
Europe  
continues  
to  
require  
close links with America  
as  
insurance  
in  
a  
dangerous  
world.  
Elsewhere,  
although  
American  
policies  
and  
practices  
can  
be  
a  
source  
of  
resentment,  
and  
primacy  
can  
readily  
translate into bruised  
feelings  
about  
the  
exercise  
of  
American  
power,  
the  
predominant  
sources  
of  
anti-Americanism  
are  
deep-seated



and structural  
and  
only  
secondarily  
due  
to  
specific policies.  
This  
was  
especially  
evident in  
the aftermath  
of  
September  
11th. A  
statement  
by sixty leading  
American scholars  
makes  
a  
telling point  
when it observes  
the  
way  
bin Laden and the attackers  
directed their  
hatred  
against  
the  
United  
States itself  
rather  
than  
make  
any  
specific policy  
demands:  
...  
the  
killing  
was  
done for its  
own  
sake. The leader of Al  
Qaeda  
described the

"blessed  
strikes" of  
September  
11  
as  
blows  
against  
America,  
"the  
head of world  
infidelity."  
Clearly,  
then,  
our  
attackers  
despise  
not  
just  
our  
government,  
but  
our  
overall  
society,  
our  
entire  
way  
of  
living.  
Fundamentally,  
their  
grievance  
concerns  
not  
only  
what  
our  
leaders  
do,  
but also who  
we  
are.<sup>53</sup>  
The transference of  
deep-seated  
rage  
about

turmoil and  
humiliation  
within their  
own  
societies into bitter  
attacks  
upon  
the  
United  
States  
can  
be  
understood  
in  
many  
ways,  
but  
above all it  
represents  
a  
sublimation  
of  
anger

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and  
Identities in Crisis  
293  
and  
its redirection toward  
a  
source  
that  
has little to  
do  
with the  
problem  
in the first  
place.  
Deliberate  
scapegoating  
is  
increasingly  
evident

too.  
The  
author  
Salman  
Rushdie,  
himself  
a  
target  
of  
a  
fatwa  
calling  
for his death  
as  
punishment  
for  
supposed blasphemy,  
captures  
this  
phenomenon  
when  
he  
writes that  
even  
if  
a  
Middle  
East  
peace  
settlement  
were  
achieved,  
anti  
Americanism would be  
likely  
to  
continue unabated:  
It has  
become  
too  
useful  
a  
smokescreen for Muslim  
nations'  
many  
defects?their

cor  
ruption,  
their  
incompetence,  
their  
oppression  
of their  
citizens,  
their  
economic,  
scien  
tific and cultural  
stagnation. America-hating  
has become  
a  
badge  
of  
identify,  
making  
possible  
a  
chest-beating, flag-burning  
rhetoric of word and  
deed that makes  
men  
feel  
good.  
It contains  
a  
strong  
streak of  
hypocrisy,  
hating  
most  
what it  
desires  
most,  
and  
elements  
of  
self-loathing.  
(‘We  
hate America because it has  
made  
of  
itself what

we  
cannot  
make  
of  
ourselves.')

What America is  
accused  
of?closed-mindedness,  
stereotyping, ignorance?is  
also what its  
accusers  
would  
see  
if  
they  
looked into  
a  
mirror.<sup>54</sup>

This transference  
is driven  
by  
several mechanisms: the desire of  
au  
thoritarian  
regimes  
to  
deflect criticism  
away  
from their  
own  
corrupt  
rule,  
the  
agendas  
of  
virulently  
antimodernist  
movements  
which  
can  
now,  
para  
doxically,  
utilize  
television  
and the Internet

to  
disseminate their  
views,  
and  
widespread  
frustration and alienation. Yet  
Islamic radicalism is  
by  
no means  
dominant,  
and it remains contested within  
these  
societies,  
not  
least  
(as  
Afghanistan  
under  
Taliban  
rule  
demonstrated)  
because its  
antirational,  
theo  
cratic and  
misogynist  
values do  
not  
provide  
a  
viable  
option  
for  
successfully  
confronting  
the tasks of  
modernization.  
Moreover,  
hostility  
to  
the  
U.S. is  
not  
universal and  
successful exercise  
of

power  
can  
actually  
discourage  
opposi  
tion.  
For  
example,  
demonstrations  
against  
the  
initial American  
intervention  
in  
Afghanistan  
quickly  
subsided  
as  
U.S.  
and  
anti-Taliban  
forces  
gained  
the  
upper  
hand  
and it became evident  
that much  
of  
the  
Afghan  
population  
was  
celebrating  
its  
liberation from  
an  
oppressive  
regime.  
In  
important  
parts  
of  
the  
Muslim  
world in



the  
aftermath of  
September  
11th  
and  
the defeat  
of  
the  
Taliban,  
moderate views  
have  
surfaced  
to  
contest  
the  
radical  
Islamist vision.  
In  
at  
least  
some  
cases,  
journalists,  
intel  
lectuals  
and  
government  
leaders have  
condemned the  
9/11  
attacks,  
spoken  
out  
against  
extremism and the  
search for  
scapegoats,  
and  
have  
challenged  
the notion that  
returning  
to  
practices  
of the  
distant

past  
can  
solve  
practical  
problems  
of  
society  
and  
economy.

Thus,  
as a  
former  
Libyan  
Prime  
Minister  
has  
observed,  
"Perhaps  
most  
of  
the  
things  
we  
complain  
of... stem  
from  
our  
own  
flaws."<sup>55</sup>

Ultimately,  
the  
causes  
of  
fanaticism  
and cultural  
backlash  
lie  
not  
within  
the  
United States and  
the  
West,  
but  
inside the  
troubled

societies  
themselves.

In  
these  
situations,  
culture is  
a  
mode  
of self  
and  
group  
expression  
and  
a  
source  
of  
upheaval  
and  
contestation. There is less  
a  
"clash of  
civilizations" than  
a

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294 Lieber and  
Weisberg  
clash within civilizations.  
Outsiders  
can  
take  
steps  
to  
encourage  
moderate  
elements within these  
societies,  
but  
much  
more  
depends  
on  
developments  
inside the countries  
concerned. The

outcome  
of  
this  
competition  
may  
ulti  
mately  
determine  
whether  
globalization  
itself  
continues  
or  
instead  
is  
vio  
lently  
overturned?much  
as  
the  
guns  
of  
August  
1914 touched off  
a  
World  
War  
and reversed  
a  
century  
of  
increasing  
openness,  
integration  
and  
interdependence.

#### ENDNOTES

1.  
Among  
other definitions of  
globalization,  
Thomas Friedman describes  
it  
as,  
"...  
the inte

gration  
of  
everything  
with  
everything  
else" He adds  
that,  
"Globalization enables each  
of  
us,  
wherever  
we  
live,  
to  
reach  
around the world  
farther,  
faster and  
cheaper  
than  
ever  
before  
and  
at  
the  
same  
time allows  
the  
world  
to  
reach into each of  
us  
farther,  
faster,  
deeper,  
and  
cheaper  
than  
ever  
before."  
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3. Robert

Gilpin

makes this

point

well in

observing

that

political  
scientists tend  
to  
overlook  
the  
role of  
markets,  
while economists  
often  
neglect  
the  
political  
context  
of  
events  
and the  
important  
role  
of  
power.

See U.S. Power  
and the Multinational  
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is that of  
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who  
emphasizes  
the tensions between  
global  
and  
parochial  
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as  
increasingly  
central  
to  
world



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Voight,  
a  
German  
foreign  
ministry  
official and influential  
figure  
in  
the  
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minister  
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information and  
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Said  
Makhtoum  
Rahim,  
estimated  
that the Taliban had  
destroyed  
"about 80%  
of  
our  
cultural  
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figure  
was  
used  
by  
French  
foreign  
minister Hubert  
V?drine,  
cited  
in  
David  
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However,  
different  
polling  
questions provide  
a  
range  
of numbers. One  
poll  
taken  
during  
the  
spring  
2002 Presidential election  
found 31% of  
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the U.S. in  
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issue is  
compelling,  
and he also  
notes  
that the  
de facto ban has blocked  
corn  
imports  
from the United States worth  
roughly  
\$200  
million  
annually  
to  
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another  
example,  
Osama bin  
Laden in  
his  
video  
denunci  
ations of the

United States

seems

to

be

wearing

a

Timex Ironman Triathlon watch.

See

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Lieber and

Weisberg

Edward Rothstein.

"Damning (Yet Desiring)

Mickey

and

the

Big

Mac:

It

Isn't

Imperialism

but Freedom That Makes

Pop

Culture

So

Appealing

Even

Among

America's

Enemies,"

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government,  
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for the  
Terrorist  
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to  
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by

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this

point,

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East  
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at  
p.  
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was  
conducted in 1980  
by  
a  
respected Egyptian  
scholar,  
Said  
Eddin

Ibrahim,  
and is cited in  
Pipes,  
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should  
be noted that in  
the late  
1990s,  
Ibrahim  
himself  
was  
jailed  
as a  
result of his  
vigorous  
efforts  
to  
promote  
democratic  
freedoms within  
Egypt.  
Daniel  
Pipes  
makes  
a  
compelling  
argument  
that  
militant Islam is  
not  
a  
response  
to  
poverty  
and  
has often  
surged  
in countries  
experiencing  
rapid  
economic  
growth.  
He concludes  
that  
militant Islam has far

more  
to  
do with issues of  
identity  
than with  
economics.

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Ajami,

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Man,"

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data,

in

a

survey

done

by

Gallup

for

USA

Today

and

CNN,

should be

regarded

with

some

caution.

Although Gallup polled nearly

10,000

respondents

in nine

countries

(Pakistan,

Iran, Indonesia,

Turkey,

Lebanon,

Morocco,

Kuwait,

Jordan and Saudi

Arabia),  
the  
percentages  
reported  
may  
not  
be  
reliable.  
Summary  
data  
for  
the entire  
group  
were  
not  
weighted by  
size of  
population,  
non-citizens  
were  
included,  
and the  
political  
cultures  
in  
most  
of the countries would  
make  
respondents  
wary  
of  
expressing  
their  
views  
candidly.  
See,  
Richard  
Morin  
and Claudia  
Dean,  
"The Poll That Didn't  
Add  
Up:  
Spin  
on  
Data

Blurs  
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newspaper,  
the  
government  
daily,  
Al-Riyadh.  
In  
a  
two  
part  
series,  
a  
columnist,  
Dr.  
Umayma  
Ahmad Al-Jalahma  
of  
King Faysal University

in  
Al-Damman,  
wrote  
on  
the "Jewish  
Holiday  
of  
Purim,"  
stating  
that,  
"For  
this  
holiday,  
the Jewish  
people  
must  
obtain human blood  
so  
that their clerics  
can  
prepare  
the  
holiday  
pastries."  
The article  
is  
translated  
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