Interpretations of the Opium War (1840-1842): A Critical Appraisal

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

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Interpretations of the Opium War (1840-1842)
A Critical Appraisal

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Interpretations of the Opium War have primarily emphasized the role of cultural conflict between China and Britain. The exponents of this school range from John Quincy Adams (1767-1848), the sixth U.S. president, old China hands like W. A. P. Martin (1827-1916), H. B. Morse (1855-1934), to the dean of modern Western scholarship on China, John King Fairbank. The most articulate theory of cultural conflict is, however, provided by Li Chien-nung whose unabashed plagiarism of E. H. Pritchard's ideas on Sino-Western relations, and unscrupled application of classical Chinese terms and phrases out of context are only exceeded by his English translators' transgressions in truly rendering his widely-read book on modern Chinese history.[1] That the conflict could have been a trade war or more particularly a war due to the rise and growth of the opium trade has received, if at all, a secondary emphasis in the scholarly literature.

The cultural conflict theory has evolved from instinctive prejudice -- like Adams's condemnation of China's "arrogant and insupportable pretensions," Martin's approbation of "the progressive spirit of the Western world," and disapprobation of "the conservatism of the extreme orient"[2] to a deliberate distortion of history. In the view that the Opium War was basically a punitive expedition against China's laggard politico-socio-ethico-economic institutions, the following issues have surfaced: the perception of "universal Kingship," the "tributary system," stigmatizing of the foreigner, aversion to exotic products, "anti-commercial" tradition, antipathy to foreign trade, and judicial eccentricity. Closely

related is the theory of "Sinocentrism" propounded by J. K. Fairbank and elaborated upon by Mark Mancall and John Cranmer-Byng.[3]

Much of the confusion about Chinese perception of "universal Kingship" is caused by the Chinese terms t'ien-tzu and t'ien-hsia, and the Confucian maxim of "T'ien wu erh jih, min wu erh wang" (天無二日，民無二王). That the maxim has been grossly misunderstood is exemplified by its English translation,[4] transforming wang, a prince or a chieftain among hundreds during Confucius's time, into "emporer" which was first instituted in China in 221 B.C. -- some 258 years after Confucius's death. This anachronism beclouds the true meaning of the maxim, which only metaphorically likens a wang's absolute lordship over his subjects to a single celestial body's shining upon the earth.

Fairbank has interpreted the traditional Chinese political conception of a "Son of Heaven" as presiding over the "universe" (t'ien-hsia),[5] overlooking the important transformation of Chinese polity from a pre-221 B.C. mini-world confederation with t'ien-tzu as a tutelar leader of numerous autonomous, absolute rulers (wang) to a post-221 B.C. centralized, unitary empire reigned by a single absolute ruler who was styled t'ien-tzu as a matter of convention. Neither Fairbank nor any other scholar who thinks that imperial China was a Middle Kingdom (chung-kuo) rather than a typical pre-modern world empire has systematically examined and convincingly demonstrated the institutional differences between the two. Actually, Chung-kuo and its synonyms, Chung-t'u (中土) and Chung-yuan (中原) as well as the term t'ien-hsia, were terms of the pre-imperial Chinese confederation, with Chung-kuo denoting the tutelar leader t'ien-tzu's domain, and t'ien-hsia denoting all dominions within the confederation. After 221 B.C., the two became synonymous. In the pre-221 B.C. context, the concept of Chung (center) was applied in the political sense. After 221 B.C. as Chung-kuo became a misnomer, the concept of political "center" was totally lost. There was no trace of any established theory among Chinese political thinkers that China

occupied the "center" of the universe and hence the name of Chung-kuo. Only under Buddhist influence did the Chinese become more direction-conscious in coining geo-political terms: calling India "Western Heaven" (hsi-t'ien 西天) and China "Eastern Earth" (tung-t'u 東土).[6]

"Tribute System" is more of a Fairbankian conception than a historical reality. There was only a convention that certain neighbors of China regularly sent tributary missions to her. The convention cannot be taken as a system because it had no binding force. The China-tributaries entente during Ming, Ch'ing and earlier dynasties was an ancient Chinese version of modern NATO or Warsaw Pact entente minus the formal treaty agreements. Even if this should be deemed a system, this system never involved China's relations with distant countries, notwithstanding the fact that the Chinese imperial records indiscriminately counted all foreign delegations received by her emperors as "tributary missions." There is no theoretical basis for a "tributary system" in any study of pre-Opium War Sino-British relations. When the Ch'ing government included England and excluded France and U.S.A. as a "tributary state" in 1815, it only meant that an English "tributary mission" (led by Macartney) had visited China and no similar missions had ever been sent by France and U.S.A.

Fairbank believes that by calling the English barbarian, yi (夷), the Chinese sinned in "prejudging" and "stigmatizing" the proud bearers of the White man's burden.[7] But yi, a word etymologically free from derogatory connotation, was not a stigma. The Jesuits who commanded high respect in Peking from the 16th century onwards were yi. Macartney and his entourage enjoyed a very comfortable stay at Canton in a yi-guest-house (Yi-kuan 夷館) where they were received, on their arrival, by all the top-ranking officials present at Canton, including the Cabinet-ranking Canton viceroy.[8] Macartney felt that the Englishmen at Canton were so much liked by the Chinese that they could even become hong merchants "if possessed of money and address."[9] This clearly shows

that they were neither "prejudged" nor "stigmatized."

Furthermore, after King George III had received Ch'ien-lung emperor's letter in 1793, no one ever pointed out that the word yi, which appeared fifteen times in the letter, had a derogatory connotation. The first Englishman who had doubts about the respectability of yi was the sinologue-missionary, Dr. Robert Morrison, who pointed out in 1827 that it was "a dubious word, never used by ourselves."[10] The fact, which must have been known to the East India Company's Chinese interpreter at Canton, was that in every petition written in Chinese which the Company submitted to the Canton authorities and was duly signed by the President of the Company's Canton Committee, the word yi was invariably used to designate the British traders. I have reproduced elsewhere one such petition signed by J. W. Roberts in 1809 which used yi on five occasions to qualify England and the English traders.[11] That the learned English writers continued to indiscriminately render the classical Chinese terms for "foreign/foreigner/foreign country" (yi, fan 蕃, hu 胡, etc.) into "barbarian," is probably the worst example of translation abuse, considering the misperceptions it produced, in history.

Li Chien-nung quotes maxims like "pu kuei chen-ch'i" (不貴珍奇) and "pu pao yuan-wu" (不宝遠物) as proofs of Chinese dislike of exotic products. Any one who has studied China's historical contacts with foreign peoples can detect the Chinese predilection for foreign products and the extraordinary Chinese quests for imported curiosities at great costs. Examples stretch from the Chou King Wu's (conventionally dated 1122-1116 B.C.) fondness for foreign gifts to the 19th century opium-mania. The two maxims cited by Li were the very words which the Grand Duke Shao voiced to admonish the Chou King Wu.[12] They were repeatedly cited to serve as an antidote against the prevalent craze for foreign imports. The Ch'ien lung emperor's reference to one of the maxims in his letter to King George only betrayed his own obsession with European

luxuries which even a casual foreign visitor like Macartney could discern.[13] Ch'ien-lung and his successors' foreign trade policies were more influenced by the Chinese top brass's demand for imported luxuries from sing-songs to opium rather than the empty professions of "not treasuring exotic products."

The general notion of traditional Chinese anti-commercialism relies on a Chinese phrase "Shih nung kung Shang" (士農工商) and a Chinese slogan "Chung-nung ch'ing-shang" (重農輕商). The phrase has been mistaken as the hierarchical order of traditional Chinese society with the gentry (shih) at the apex and the merchants (shang) at the very bottom even below the social positions of the farmers (nung) and workers (kung). In reality, the traditional Chinese society had all the sharp contradictions between the exploiting and exploited strata. Shang, the merchants, were an exploiting and upwardly-moving class, while nung and kung held ambiguous positions, with nung embracing various exploiting and exploited strata connected with farming, and kung included those connected with handicraft industries. The slogan, no sociological analysis, was simply a preference among China's upwardly mobile for particular professions, like being a scholar-official was preferable to being a landlord (nung), an artisan (kung), and a merchant. The bottom of the social hierarchy was occupied by the teeming landless peasants and industrial and urban workers who had nothing to do with the nung and kung of the slogan. "Chung-nung ch'ing-shang" originated with the Han emperor Wen's (179-157 B.C.) new policy of curbing the dominating influence of the big and speculative merchants.[14] Under the influence of this policy, there emerged a tradition generally characterised by the maxim of "chung-nung ch'ing-shang" (which should read as "enhancing the importance of agriculture and reducing the dominance of the merchants") -- the Chinese prototype of the "physiocracy" programs that dominated the 18th-century French politics. This was no more anti-commercial than the French physiocrats were.

Li Chien-nung finds in mo-tso (末作) an additional proof of Chinese

prejudice against commerce. His translators go a step further by rendering this Chinese term as "trifle." They ignore the fact that mo-tso and its synonym, mo-yeh (末業), were meaningful only in the company of their antonym pen-yeh (本業) with pen (本) (written as a horizontal stroke on the lower part of a tree) and mo (末) (a horizontal stroke on the top of a tree) connoting "primary" and "secondary" respectively. In China's physiocratic tradition, agriculture was logically regarded as the "primary profession" and commerce and industry the "secondary professions," without necessarily implying any more "prejudice" than was set in the choice of the priority.

China's reputation in foreign trade was widespread enough to persuade Queen Elizabeth I to address a letter to the Chinese emperor on July 16, 1596, asking for the secret of China's success in trade.[15] This seems not to have impressed Li Chien-nung and others who believe that the Chinese were inherently suspicious of foreign traders, and hence their antipathy to foreign trade during the 18th and 19th centuries. Li particularly twists the famous Chinese maxim, Hua-yi t'ien hsien (華夷天限), which originated from one of the T'ang Dynasty Prime Ministers, Ti Jen-chieh (607-700), meaning that the natural boundaries between China and the foreign countries should and could be respected.[16] That the Chinese seemed somewhat obsessed with the Hua-yi boundaries was the outcome of repeated foreign invasions which periodically threatened China. But this should not be confused with the triple fear that afflicted the Manchu government.

First, there was the Manchu minoritarian fear of the Han Chinese subject majority. This was demonstrated in the maintenance of a separate Manchu army, the Eight Banners, above the Chinese provincial forces the Green Camps; in the discrimination against and distrust of Han officials; prohibitions against Manchu officials' fraternizing their Han colleagues efforts in preserving Manchu identity and resisting the assimilative force of the Han culture and enforcement of Manchu hair style on Han male subjects. Secondly, the Manchu fear of the

sea was exhibited in a total ban on maritime activities from the early 1650's to 1681; a total evacuation of coastal inhabitants of Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsu in order to create a 25-kilometer no-man's belt along the coast during 1661-9; an embargo on Chinese ships sailing to Southeast Asia during 1717-1729; and in the stringent regulations on Chinese maritime shipping. Thirdly, there was the Manchu (and Chinese) fear of the Europeans, particularly the latter's giant ships and lethal fire power, and their tendencies of tzu-shih (滋事), trouble-making.

Arising from this triple fear, the Manchu government was particularly afraid of a collusion between the rebellious elements of the Chinese and the European trouble-makers through the opportunity of trade contacts. It adopted an ostrich-like policy with the following components: restraint on Chinese maritime activities; abandonment of building a strong naval force; adoption of the strategy of yu hai-fang erh wu hai-ohan (有海防而無海戰), having coastal defence but avoiding sea battle; restrictions on contacts between Chinese and foreign citizens; and curtailment of the non-commercial activities of the foreign visitors. It was this policy which manifested in the restriction of foreign trade at Canton in addition to the notorious "Eight Regulations" at the lone trading port.

Those who cite the Chinese judicial eccentricity fail to place it in the context of the fact that China was a pioneer in legalist studies and in establishing the rule of law in government. The quality of Chinese justice during the 18th and early 19th century was not altogether inferior to that administered in contemporary Europe.[17] Legal conceptions and practices always differ among nations and when one country wishes to change the judicial tradition of another by force, the cultural conflict theory that tends to support it sounds more like a ruse than an explanation.

Cultural conflict theory posits seven pre-Opium War Sino-British tension

areas: cultural differences, judicial disputes, Canton restrictions, British desire for a foothold in China, hong debts to British citizens, unsettled mode of diplomatic ties between the two governments, and British opium trade offensive against China vis-a-vis the Chinese response. A process of elimination will lead us to the root cause of the war.

Cultural differences might create difficulties in international contacts, but seldom ignite an international war, which results from a clash of interests, not that of cultures. The pre-Opium War documentary evidence does not suggest that London, at any stage, intended to solve Sino-British cultural difficulties by either peaceful or military means. During the post Opium War era the British government policy was to perpetuate the traditional Chinese superstructure in preference to the insurgent movement of the Taipings which was culturally more akin to the Western values. All this precludes cultural differences, however inevitable, as a root cause.

The major pre-Opium War Sino-British judicial disputes and the issues were: 1781, Captain John McClary's plunders at Macao and Whampoa (issue: collective responsibility); 1784, Lady Hughes affair (issue: "a life for a life"); 1800, Providence affair (issue: dignity of British naval officer); 1807, Neptune affair (issue: judicial proceedings); 1810, Huang A-hsing tragedy (issue: judicial procedure); 1814, British reprisal against U.S. ships (issue: Chinese sovereignty); 1821-2, Topaze affair (issue: dignity of British navy vis-a-vis Chinese sovereignty); 1830, Mrs. Baynes episode (issue: violation of Canton restrictions); and 1839, Lin Wei-hsi tragedy (issue: Chinese sovereignty).

The first dimension of these disputes was the British doubts as to the rationality of Chinese judicial conceptions and practices, especially that of collective responsibility and "a life for a life" principle.[18] A second dimension was the sacrosanctness of the Royal Navy before the Chinese justice, and the inadmissibility of Chinese justice to British citizens in general, and British

government officials in particular. However, the British side had shown ample restraint to ensure the smooth running of the Chinese trade while the Canton authorities had been conciliatory enough to allow the British offenders to get away while the Chinese "face" (dignity) was maintained. In spite of these disputes, the British did not miss a single trading season before 1839. And the circumstances which seriously interrupted the British trade in 1839-40 had very little to do with the Lin Wei-hsi tragedy. All this helps us to eliminate the judicial disputes as the root cause of the war.

There was a huge gap between the British traders' expectations in non-Christian countries and the treatment meted out to them by the Chinese authorities, especially through the Canton restrictions. This gap created a British urge for a foothold on Chinese soil which would be under British naval protection and beyond Chinese government interference. One such foothold already existed, in Macao, which ironically belonged to a second-class European power, Portugal. London hoped that Peking might cede another foothold after realizing that Britain was the strongest power on earth. The three embassies in 1787-8, 1792-3 and 1816, especially the former two led by Lt. Col. Charles Allan Cathcart and Lord Macartney, had the foothold ("Grand Depot") as their main aim. After Macartney had failed in achieving it, London tried an alternative in taking over Macao in 1802 and 1808, attempts that were frustrated by the Sino-Portuguese opposition. Through all this London became aware of the Chinese sensitivity to territorial integrity and virtually dropped the demand for foothold in its dealings with China in order to avoid Chinese annoyance, and disruption of the British trade This shows that the foothold issue was no longer a major tension area and that the Canton restrictions were not a major obstacle in trade relations between the two countries.

Was the Opium War a trade war? The two important scholars who read "Opium" as "trade" are Michael Greenberg, author of British Trade and the Opening of

China, 1800-42 (Cambridge University, 1951) and Hsin-pao Chang, author of Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (Harvard, 1964). Chang's opinion is typical, attributing the "inevitable" clash to the basic conflict between "the British commercial expansion" and the Chinese "containment" of it. Opium was a "vehicle" of the "vital force" of British commercial expansion. If it had not been so, there would still have been war between the two countries caused by such other vehicles like "rice" or "molasses." Thus, the Opium War was actually an X war, with the algebraic symbol standing for any commodity.[19]

It is not difficult to prove that the British commercial expansion in China was never contained at any stage by the Chinese government. In the first quarter century of the Canton trade period (1760-1784) the average bilateral trade was £619,876 per annum.[20] This increased to £2,231,369 in 1815,[21] and to over three million pounds a year on an average during 1817-1835.[22] British export of Merchandise to China increased from £60,019 (1760), to £925,575 (1800), and to £1,326,388 (1836)[23] Much more substantial was the British import of Chinese tea which increased from 2,911,231 lbs. (1761) to 8,961,687 lbs (1771), to 11,423,896 lbs. (1781) to 22,183,204 lbs. (1791), to 29,804,739 lbs (1801), to 32,856,997 lbs (1821) and to 48,520,508 lbs (1836)[24]

But the spectacular expansion of trade was in the Britain-China-India trade triangle in the last two decades of the Canton trade period. The trade triangle was formed by the following staples: British woolens for China, Chinese tea for Britain and India, Indian cotton for China, and Indian opium for China. Below is a quantitative survey of the staples:

Value in Spanish $

Periods	British Woolens		Chinese Tea		Indian Cotton		Indian Opium	
	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%	Value	%
1817-1820	11,272	13.1	28,654	33.4	22,828	26.5	23,175	27.0
1821-1825	13,437	11.0	44,345	36.3	23,531	19.3	40,757	33.4
1826-1830	12,875	8.9	44,815	31.1	29,315	20.3	57,096	39.7
1831-1835	10,870	7.0	50,609	32.3	32,834	21.0	62,151	39.7

Sources: Morse: III, IV, passim; Chang, pp. 226-7.

Only woolens represented the "vital force" of Britain's industrial-commercial expansion which Hsin-pao Chang considers irresistible. That the woolen trade in China began to decline after the middle of the 1820's cannot be attributed to the non-opening of northern ports in China. The ups and downs of British woolens in China were closely connected with the rise and fall of the Devonshire interests in Britain's China trade. Under the dominating influence of brothers John and Francis Baring, the East India Company went to the extent of suffering heavy losses to barter long ells for tea to prolong the survival of Devonshire's pre-Industrial Revolution worsted industry.[25] Such patronage collapsed with the conclusion of East India Company's China trade monopoly in 1833. Whereas more than 200,000 pieces of long ells used to reach the Chinese buyers in the hey-day of British trade in woolens in China during the 1820's, its sale in China reached a new low of only 50,000 pieces in 1837, 1839, 1841 and 1842.[26]

The quantitative expansion of Britain's import of Chinese tea defies the logic of Industrial-Revolution-made-British-commercial-expansion-in-China-inevitable. But the stable weightage of tea in the chart above provides a clue to the mystery of British obsession with the ever-expanding import-oriented China trade. The "vital force" of this expansion was generated by the last two staples, i.e. Indian cotton and Indian opium, particularly the latter. The crux of the question lies in the fact that the entire trade triangle was essentially a form

of remittance of the "surplus" Indian revenue to Britain via China. Opium was a systematically-devised funnel of this surplus revenue.[27] By just depriving Bengal several tens of thousands of bighas of fertile land for the cultivation of poppy, the East India Company reaped a revenue of several tens of lakhs of rupees a year. 52 lakhs in 1801-1810, 74 lakhs in 1811-1820, 71 lakhs in 1821-1830 and 1 crore 43 lakhs in 1831-1840.[28]

The Canton System with its loopholes allowed for this incredible growth of Indian opium trade in China. The hong merchants, who were few in number but shared the monopoly rights over some of the world's largest international transactions, could not surmount the difficulties of finding ready cash to support their huge and complex trading operations (bringing large quantities of teas from distant hills on human and animal backs and then to load them onto British and other foreign ships on schedule), in addition to satisfying the Manchu government's demands for tax remittance and innumerable compulsory "donations." In the absence of modern banking and credit institutions, the hong merchants were driven to surviving on East India Company's tea advances and on the usury of British traders. The first made them divide their loyalty, turning them into facilitators between British-Indian opium traders and Chinese smugglers, a travesty of the role which the Chinese government had assigned them; the second made them the prey of British loan-sharks, creating a huge debt to private British traders which was ultimately settled in the Treaty of Nanking.

The issue of debt settlement, however, was not the one that ignited the war. Although it had been an issue as long-standing as the Canton trade period, the British government showed little sympathy for the loan-sharks during the pre-war years. When hard-pressed by petitions to liquidate the debts, Henry Dundas, in his instructions to the ambassador-designate, Lt. Col. Cathcart, on the eve of the latter's departure for China, tacitly agreed that "the debts were contracted directly against the Laws and authority of the Chinese Government."[29]

A crucial factor which often escapes the attention of Opium War scholars is the fact that instead of the very unstable and unsatisfactory state-to-state relations between China and Britain, and despite loud protests of the British hawks that the Chinese insolence had gone beyond British capacity of stomaching insults,[30] London's China policy was well summed up by Sir James Graham, First Lord of British Navy (1830-4) in these words:

> Our grand object is to keep peace, and...by a plastic adaptation of our manners to those of the Chinese to extend our influence in China with the view of extending our commercial relations.[31]

Empirical evidence bears out the fact that not only Britain was satisfied with her pre-war China trade, but that this trade had provided a tensile strength to neutralize the antagonistic forces in all the tension areas excepting the last, i.e. the British opium trade offensive against China and the increasing weight of the Chinese protest against it.

Hsin-pao Chang, in advancing the X-war theory, underplays all that his painstaking research has succeeded in demonstrating: the antagonistic Sino-British contradiction was indeed caused by the opium trade. He has clearly shown that when the Chinese had exhausted their tolerance towards the opium evil, they launched an anti-Opium War in 1839, with Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu confining and deporting British opium traders; destroying three million pounds of opium, most of which was British property; and imposing a penalty-bond on British traders. The consequence of this "war" was the total collapse of the opium trade, which in turn threatened to deprive the British of the valuable instrument in creating and remitting "surplus" Indian revenues for Britain as well as offsetting the multiple advantages of the China trade. In response to this anti-Opium War, the British government decided in 1840 (not in 1839) to wage an anti-anti-opium war which fulfilled its aims in 1842. The two negative prefixes cancel each other out and the Sino-British conflict in 1840-2 becomes, by all means, an Opium War.

FOOTNOTES

1. Li Chien-nung 李劍農 Chung-Kuo Chin-pai-nien cheng-chih shih 中國近百年政治史 (Taipei, 3rd ed. 1962), "translated and edited" by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls, The Political History of China, 1840-1928. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956.

2. John Quincy Adams Memoirs, II, 30 and Martin's The Awakening of China (London, 1907), p. 155 respectively.

3. See Fairbank, ed. The Chinese World Order (Harvard, 1968); Mancall: "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 349 (Sept., 1963), pp. 14-26; Cranmer-Byng, ed. An Embassy to China. Lord Macartney's Journal, 1793-1794 (Longmans, 1962), Introduction: idem: "The Chinese Attitude towards External Relations," International Journal, XXI:1 (Winter, 1955-6): 57-77; idem: "The Chinese View of Their Place in the World," The China Quarterly, No. 53 (Jan./March 1973), pp. 67-79.

4. Teng and Ingalls: p. 43.

5. Fairbank: Chinese World Order, p. 2.

6. For more discussions of the meanings behind Chung-Kuo and t'ien-hsia see Tan Chung: "On Sinocentrism: A Critique," China Report, IX:5 (Sept.-Oct., 1973): 43-50

7. Fairbank: Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Harvard, 1964), p. 9.

8. See Macartney's journal ed by Cranmer-Byng, pp. 203-4.

9. Ibid., p. 234.

10. H. B. Morse: The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China (Oxford, 1926), IV. 152.

11. See Tan Chung: loc. cit., IX:6 (Nov.-Dec. 1973): 36.

12. Shu-ching 書經. Ch. 13.

13. Cranmer-Byng: Embassy, p. 61.

14. Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng 古今圖書集成 (reprint, Taipei. 1964), vol. 677, p. 38.

15 M. E. Wilbur: The East India Company and the British Empire in the Far East (Stanford University, 1945), p. 318.

16. Chiu t'ang-shu 舊唐書, Chuan 89.

17. As a modern English scholar points out that while the Chinese emperor personally scrutinized every case of death sentence before its execution, a poor Englishman in the 19th century could be put to death for stealing five shillings while his rich compatriots evaded punishment even after committing murders. See Austin Coates: Prelude to Hong Kong (London, 1966), p. 67-9.

18. The Killer of human life should be punished to death disregarding the intentions of killing.

19. Chang: p. 15.

20. Calculation based on statistics in the Irish University British Parliamentary Papers (Dublin, 1971), vol. 40, p. 20; Pritchard, p. 39.

21. Morse: III, 226-7.

22. Ibid., III, IV, passim; Chang: pp. 225-8; Irish University Parliamentary Papers (IUPP), vol. 40, p. 186, 281.

23. IUPP, vol. 40, p. 20, 281.

24. Ibid., vol. 37, App. p. 88; vol. 40, p. 296; E. B. Schumpeter: English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697-1808 (Oxford, 1960) passim.

25. W. G. Hosking: Industry, Trade and People in Exeter, 1688-1800 (Manchester, 1935). p. 85; Morse: passim.

26. Irish University Parliamentary Papers, vol. 38, p. 146, 147.

27. See Tan Chung: "The Britain-China-India Trade Triangle (1771-1840)," Indian Economic and Social History Review, XI: 4 (Dec., 1974).

28. Bengal Commercial Reports, Vols. 30-52. 1 lakh = 100,000; 1 crore = 100 lakhs.

29. Morse: II, 243.

30. "The Commission of one twentieth part of [insult] by any other nation would have carried fire and sword through its provinces," said Bengal Commercial Reports, Vol. 31.

31. Cited in Edgar Holt: Opium Wars in China (London, 1964), pp. 47-8.