FROM EMPIRE TO NATION

THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES

Rupert Emerson

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CHAPTER X

The West and Non-Western Nationalism

NATIONALISM WHEREVER IT manifests itself is in essence a response to the forces which in recent centuries have revolutionized the West and have penetrated in successive waves to the farthest corners of the earth. Despite vast differences in time, place, and setting, characteristic threads of circumstance and development bring a measure of common identity to all emergent nationalisms. One can trace also significant elements of a common chronology, to be reckoned not by the calendar but in relation to the changes taking place within each society as it comes within the orbit of the expanding Western revolution. National awareness and nationalist agitation have regularly followed close on the heels of the intrusion of modernity.

The matter may be approached from many angles. The rise of nationalism may be ascribed to the spread of the ideas which have marked the growth of the modern world or more particularly to such economic aspects as the introduction of a money economy or the coming of age of the machine. It may be linked to the idea of progress and to the substitution of dynamic change for acquiescence in the existing order, or to such special factors as the growth of urbanism of which one feature in the colonies is a closer contact with the white man and his ways. Nationalism is a product of the breach with the old order of which a part is the disruption of traditional communities and their ties of kinship and custom. In the dramatic version of this negative aspect which Robert Montagne has presented, the modern state blindly and inadvertently destroys tribes, chieftainships, theocratic fiefs, and the patriarchal family:

> Finally the inhabitants of the new state cease to belong to these traditional, coherent and ordered societies, every one of which had its part to play in the collective life. They become grains of dust driven in the wind of circumstance. Their mass, ever growing but discrete, congregates around the modern towns created by the West. The proletariat appears in the towns of Egypt, on the coasts of Africa, whenever modern economic effort creates new possibilities of work outside the customary bounds. In these overcrowded neighborhoods, where patriarchal discipline disappears so rapidly, Africa and the East are in decomposition; they are dying of a gigantic moral disaster, before the West has succeeded in building the order which it has designed.[1]

Leaving aside the dubious closing proposition that the West had in its pocket any design of an order for Asia and Africa, positive aspects of the Western imperial sweep must also be recognized. Not all was destruction. The atomization of the traditional societies in the teeming urban centers was often met, as in West African cities, by the spontaneous generation of a host of associations of all kinds, based on geographical, tribal, occupational, or other ties. Another counterpart of destruction was the mobilization of different strata of people into a greater or less degree of participation in the new world which was being pressed upon them. From this mobilization and from the ideas and instrumentalities which the West brought the countries it overran, there emerged the nationalism which was to be the rallying cry of the rising generations. For those whose traditional communities were crumbling or had vanished the nation offered a new community on the grand scale in which they could again find a social identity and in whose service they could regain dignity and purpose as they struggled to get rid of the alien overlords.

Despite all the learned speculation which has been devoted to the question, disagreement continues as to where and when nationalism got under way. Its starting points are surely to be located in space in Western Europe and in time in the checkered transition from medievalism to its unmistakable flowering in the nineteenth century. The French Revolution has with good reason been widely accepted as the conventional watershed marking the turn to the age of nationalism, but a number of nationalist phases and elements can be found far earlier. In England, for example, the era

between Henry VIII and the Glorious Revolution produced fundamental changes, marking the transition toward a modern national as contrasted with a medieval feudal society. During this period, even though the Industrial Revolution still lay ahead, the English economy broke loose from its old moorings, the middle class began to establish its claims, and a strong sense of the existence of the English nation reached far into the people.[2]

It was, however, not until the French Revolution had explicitly challenged all the foundations of the older Europe that nationalism really came into its own. Weaving into its fabric many strands derived from the past, nationalism was now driven forward by the revolutionary force both of the great slogan, *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, and of the new industrialism. For the first time the idea that the nation has a natural right of its own and that it is the nation which legitimizes the state began to be put forward in the nineteenth century as a proposition of universal validity. Where before it was taken as no more than a happy coincidence that in some instances the state rested upon the congenial foundation of a single homogeneous people, as in England, France, and Spain, such a merger of state and nation now came to be the goal toward which all eyes were increasingly turned. In the new dispensation the nation which did not have its own state was seen as missing its destiny, and the state which embraced either more or less than a nation was an anachronism.

The French Revolution presented the challenge — to be ignored by others at their peril — of a state which was no longer the king but the people, and thrust across the face of Europe the power of a nation in arms. Even when Napoleon in a sense became France, it was no longer the France of Louis XIV but of the French nation. Across the Atlantic the peoples of the Americas were likewise sorting themselves out on national lines and asserting their national claims, although in the case of the United States the Declaration of Independence and other formulations of the American case were, in good eighteenth-century fashion, couched in terms of the natural rights of individuals (and of Englishmen) and not in the next century's terms of the rights of nations.

The highway to the future was already clearly marked out, even though neither the American nor the French Revolution nor

the appearance of the nineteenth century produced a universal sweep into nationalism or even a prompt general acceptance of it within Europe itself. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars the ruling elements among the victorious powers struggled to hold nationalism in check, or to pretend to ignore its existence, as one of the more dangerous manifestations of the revolutionary devil which had just been exorcised. It was well recognized that the national principle was itself a revolutionary one, intimately bound up with the democratic aspirations of the masses for whom the troublesome bourgeoisie appeared as self-appointed spokesmen.

In addition to their desire to safeguard positions of power and privilege, the statesmen gathered at the Congress of Vienna sought to restore a stable Europe, unimperiled by the new legitimacy of the nation. Where nation and state already coincided, as in Britain and France, the threat was primarily the domestic one of the bourgeois-democratic drive (with the specter of the mob in the background) against anachronistic rank and privilege; elsewhere the threat cut to the roots of the international system since a wholesale redrawing of the political map was inescapable if the nations were to take over. The ability of the guiding spirits at Vienna to impose their will and to reconstruct Europe with only scant regard for the national principle must be attributed in considerable part to the fact that in eastern and southern Europe the ground was not yet adequately prepared for nationalism. Greece, remembering ancient glories, rose to seek its freedom and there were other nationalist stirrings, but Germany and Italy were both several decades removed from the full flowering of national fervor and other European countries were generally even further away. Leading German spokesmen, for example, were quite prepared to accept a Germany loosely composed of a number of small states placed in some part under the protection of the greater European powers.

Suggestive parallels can be found between the situation in Europe at the close of the Napoleonic Wars and that in Asia and Africa a century later. At the earlier time, although Western Europe was already largely parceled out on a national basis, the application of the idea of nationality could still be denied to most of the rest of Europe. In the corresponding World War I settlement, the statesmen at Versailles were confronted by a Europe in

which the peoples had already risen to determine themselves. The universal proclamation of the doctrine of self-determination notwithstanding, however, the problems of Asian nationalism could for the most part still be passed by in silence. The Japanese were nominally equal partners in the peacemaking, although Wilson brushed off their demand for racial equality, but even in the Washington Conference of 1921–22 China remained essentially a passive object for the solicitude of the powers, not unlike Germany in 1815. At Versailles many importunate spokesmen pleaded for the Asian and Middle Eastern peoples, as at Vienna others pleaded for European national causes. In both instances they could be largely ignored for the moment because the societies they claimed to represent had not yet moved over the threshold into full-fledged nationalism.

The attitudes of the conservative leaders in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars were closely akin to those of their counterparts who in the first decades of the twentieth century sought to hold together the increasingly unstable overseas empires or to maintain imperial prestige and outposts in China and other quasi-colonial countries. The issue was not only the maintenance of favored positions, but also the protection of the established order against revolutionary clamor which threatened to undermine all its foundations. There is a striking similarity in the two periods in the views that were widely held as to the relative capabilities of the populace at large as compared with their properly ordained superiors. In each instance other arguments for the status quo were effectively buttressed by the strong paternalistic sense that, in the earlier nineteenth-century Europe, the aristocracy and upper elements of the bourgeoisie, and, in twentieth-century Asia and Africa, the imperial powers and colonial administrators, knew better than did the people themselves what was really in the popular interest. The white man's burden of imperialism had its intimate counterpart in the earlier nineteenth-century belief that the people, when anyone bothered to concern himself with them, were an ignorant and helpless mass requiring enlightened guidance. That guidance might, like the harsher phases of imperialism, have its unpalatable aspects, as in the practical deductions drawn from the iron laws of economics, but consolation was sought in both instances in the thought that the

people were being led in the direction of their own good, whether or not they recognized it. To contend that the people should speak for themselves was to propose a dangerous heresy which, in addition to being against the nature of things, could only result in a worsening of their lot. And, perhaps the most surprising feature of all, for a considerable time in both periods the people on the whole humbly acquiesced in their own inferiority, passively accepting the established patterns of status as men have generally accepted them through the ages.

With the coming of the era of nationalism, precisely this unquestioning acceptance of the hierarchical ordering of society as a fact of nature beyond the will of man to change gave way as the new forces swung into operation. In the early decades of both centuries those interested in preserving the status quo identified in substantially the same fashion the persons and groups who needed the most careful watching as irresponsible agitators challenging the stability of society. If Metternich may be taken as a shrewd and not unrepresentative spokesman for views that prevailed widely in the first half of the nineteenth century, an impressive coincidence links those whom he and the later imperialists condemned as threats to the established order. As the colonial administrator esteemed the unspoiled and trusting native, so Metternich was persuaded of the natural goodness and trustworthiness of *the true people* — whom Metternich himself italicized. These latter, desiring only a strong authority over them to enable them to enjoy the fruits of their labor in peace, were good but also childish and in need of constant protection against the demagogues who betrayed their real interests. The essential enemy, in the eyes of the Viennese statesman, was the spirit of presumption, deriving from the whole train of developments since the Renaissance and Reformation. This had produced the presumptuous man who sought to make himself the measure of all things and embraced "the idea — absurd in itself — of the emancipation of the peoples," although his real goal was an anarchic freeing of all individuals. It was, as Metternich saw it, principally the middle classes, placed between the kings and the peoples, which succumbed to this moral gangrene, while the great mass of the people, too busy with their daily work, offered no hold for the disease.

Of the categories of Western European troublemakers whom Metternich specially singled out in his "Profession de Foi Politique" for Tsar Alexander in 1820, perhaps only the men of money, whom he described as cosmopolitans putting their profits ahead of all other concerns, would not figure prominently in a list of twentieth-century Asian and African nationalists. For the rest the listing fits with precision: the salaried employees of the state, the men of letters, the lawyers, the individuals in charge of public education. A year earlier, writing to Gentz, Metternich had somewhat surprisingly played down the role of the students as revolutionaries, although he saw a whole generation of revolutionaries being produced by the universities unless the evil was checked, but he continued to lay emphasis on the professors and intellectuals and even more upon the dangerously practical lawyers who were always meddling in other people's property.[3] The one point at which Metternich's appraisal of the presumptuous in the Europe of his day needs basic correction to bring it in line with contemporary Asia and Africa is in connection with the great development of the Communist movement, complexly cutting across and intertwining with nationalism. Otherwise, given a few unessential changes and additions, where might one turn for a better inventory of the major nationalist disturbers of imperialism's peace and tranquillity?

From its early European beginnings nationalism throughout the world has derived its first formulation and drive from the middle class elements which are so evidently a creation of the ferment of Western modernity. Arnold Toynbee has, indeed, suggested that the word "modern" in "modern Western civilization" can be translated as "middle-class," and that the ability of alien recipients of modern Western culture to make it their own may be tested by their capacity to enter the middle class Western way of life.[4] As nationalism progresses, the middle class elements are increasingly joined, in Asia and Africa as in Europe, by other layers of society as these are in their turn divorced from their traditional communal roots and mobilized into the new era: the lower white collar and clerical groups, the urban workers in shops and factories, and the growing proletariat of mines and modern agricultural enterprises. As compared with the Western European model the

tempo of the development of nationalism in Asia and Africa is usually speeded up, but the general sequence is the same.

Paradoxically, the one place where the nationalists are characteristically not found is in those parts of the society which are most obviously representative of the heritage of the past, although these must furnish much of the claim to national distinctiveness. In Asia and Africa it is the disruptive force of the alien imperial encroachment which has brought new communities to birth out of the old societies, and the prime movers have been the people who represent rather the new than the old. The elements of society which can probably be taken as the most authentic heirs of the "national" culture and tradition are the rural peasantry, who everywhere constitute the great mass of the population, and such of the old aristocracy as have been able to hold on. These elements have, however, contributed neither the leadership nor the active rank and file partisans of Asian and African nationalism.

As far as the peasantry is concerned this is, of course, not to say either that no fringe segments of it have been drawn actively into the nationalist movements or that, as nationalism has progressed and established itself, the peasantry has not come to accept it. But in general the rural masses have been indifferent to the new currents or, at the best and belatedly, passive adherents to the nationalist creed.[5] The typical peasant movement or revolt is likely to be little concerned with the issues which most stir the nationalists. More frequently it is a protest against local grievances that are felt to be intolerable or an effort to maintain the customary way of life against alien encroachments. From time to time and place to place the nationalists, and the Communists as well, have been able to make highly effective use of peasant grievances and upheavals for their own ends, but with no necessary implication, even taking into account the peasant-based strategy of the Chinese Communists, that the peasant actors were themselves significantly imbued with either nationalism or Communism. Except where the special circumstances inciting to peasant revolt happened also to be present, the typical focal points of nationalist agitation have been urban centers.[6]

Of the old aristocracy or elite it may similarly be said that the more it maintained its traditional position and culture, with the

tacit or explicit blessing of the colonial regime, the less it was able or willing to play a role in the developing nationalisms. In many instances, of course, persons stemming from families high in the traditional social scale — Nehru's Kashmiri Brahmin descent is an obvious case in point — took leading parts in nationalist movements, but these are uniformly men who had been exposed to a Western type of education and experience. Their numbers can be explained in part by the fact that the upper elements of any society are likely to be those wealthy enough to travel and study abroad.

In principle the nationalists were all men who had become familiar with the West in one or another fashion, but not all those who had had even full-scale exposure to the West were nationalists. Considerable numbers of the Western-educated were drawn into the civil service and were thus at least partially neutralized. For the few who belonged to the upper crust and whose privileged position depended to a substantial degree on the maintenance of the social-political balance established by colonialism, Western education might merely serve to tie them more closely to the ruling aliens. In the 1920's and 1930's the son of an Indian Rajah, returning to India from Oxford or Cambridge, was unlikely to desert his comfortable life to become a disciple of Gandhi; although there would always be some who would do so, moved by patriotism or indignation, eccentricity or the search for adventure. The men who turned to political action were more frequently those who were in some degree disinherited or whose place was on the fringes of the upper crust rather than solidly within it, such as the lower samurai who figured so importantly in the transition of Japan into the modern world.

It is not the Indian princes, Malay Sultans, or African chiefs who have typically taken the lead in the nationalism of their countries. The quarrel between the native ruler and his entourage, often sustained by the colonial administration, and the newly rising Westernized middle class elements has become a commonplace of the literature dealing with colonial problems. When E. M. Forster served in the court of Dewas Senior in India in 1921, he reported: "There is no anti-English feeling. It is Gandhi whom they dread and hate." [7] Even where, as in Morocco and Uganda, traditional rulers

have become symbols of nationalist aspirations, the formulation and driving force of nationalism has rested in the main with the new middle class schooled in the West. Furthermore, the position which the upper class Western-trained elite attained in the new type of political activity appeared to derive more from their personal abilities and from their mastery of the ideas and techniques of the West than from their inherited traditional status, although the latter might also contribute to their prestige. Certainly their nationalist associates were likely to be men drawn from the lower ranks of society who had been able to rise through missionary or other education or to amass wealth from the new types of enterprise.

Of the Indian nationalist movement Nehru has said that "the backbone and leadership were always supplied by the middle classes," even though the direct action struggles were based on the masses and especially the peasantry. Finding the middle class an inchoate group, too much tied up with property and at the top allied with British imperialism, he still asserted that "paradoxically, it is only from the middle class intellectuals that revolutionary leadership comes." [8]

Any sample of the leading figures in the nationalist movements would demonstrate the immense preponderance of men who went through the processes of Western education and who may decently be assigned to the middle class.

Sun Yat-sen was a doctor who secured his lower education in Hawaii and his higher medical training in Hong Kong. Gandhi and Jinnah were British-educated lawyers, and Nehru was an Oxford man. In the Philippines Quezon and Osmena were both lawyers with extensive experience of the West. Luang Pradit in Thailand was a Paris-trained lawyer and Pibul Songgram studied military affairs in France. Among the Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh lived long abroad in France, the Soviet Union, and other parts of the world, and Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic, graduated from the French civil service school at Hanoi and also lived abroad for many years. The assassinated Burmese leader, Aung San, was a product of Rangoon University and a law student; Ba Maw studied at Cambridge and obtained a French law degree; U Nu studied at the University of Rangoon, turned writer, and — a somewhat odd occupation

for a devout Buddhist statesman — translated Dale Carnegie's *How to Win Friends and Influence People* into Burmese. In Indonesia, Sukarno was an engineer by training, Mohammad Hatta a university student in Holland, and Sutan Sjahrir a Dutch-trained intellectual and writer with an intimate acquaintance with the Western world and its thought. Ceylon's S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was an Oxford-educated barrister. Among West Indian leaders Luis Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico attended Georgetown University in Washington, D. C., while Eric Williams of Trinidad, Norman Manley of Jamaica, and Sir Grantley Herbert Adams of Barbados, first Prime Minister of the West Indian Federation, were all Oxford men. The latter two were also British-trained lawyers.

If one turns to Africa the situation is the same. Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia is a Paris-trained lawyer, married to a French woman. Both Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana studied at Lincoln University and elsewhere in the United States. Obafemi Awolowo, Premier of Nigeria's Western Region, studied in England and became a barrister. Among other leaders in Ghana, Kojo Botsio took his B.A. at Oxford, J. B. Danquah was a lawyer and holder of a doctorate from Cambridge, while K. A. Busia secured his Ph.D. from Oxford. In French West Africa Léopold Senghor, a product of the Sorbonne, is a Parisian intellectual and poet of distinction, while Félix Houphouet-Boigny was trained in medicine. Sékou Touré, who took Guinea out of the French Union, had only a limited formal education, partially in French schools in Guinea, but has traveled in both Western and Eastern Europe. In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta studied extensively in both London and Moscow, and Tom Mboya spent a year at Oxford; Julius Nyerere, head of the Tanganyika African National Union, is a product of Edinburgh University.

Such a listing as this, representing an arbitrary selection of a few key figures, covers only a fraction of the names which might be brought forward. In West Africa, for example, it ignores completely the impressive list of those who have secured their training at such institutions as Achimota College or the University College at Ibadan. It should, however, serve to establish beyond a shadow of doubt that the revolution against imperialism has been carried

on primarily under the leadership of Asians and Africans in whose intellectual formation the West itself had a very large share.[9]

The strength of the West was something to be studied and copied, and a major component of that strength was the existence of integrated nations. For Asians and Africans who underwent a Western type of education at home or abroad, this lesson was sharply emphasized by the body of doctrine which was thrust upon them. Since it was an age of nationalism in the West the achievement and maintenance of national unity and independence were central themes of the literature, history, and political tradition to which they were exposed. The praise of freedom and equality, and of the patriots who fought for national honor and integrity were basic assumptions of their new intellectual milieu. The writings of Rousseau, Burke, Fichte, and Mazzini, or their intellectual descendants became familiar to them and exercised among them the influence which they had first exercised in the West itself. They came to an acquaintance with the great figures of American independence, with Cavour, Garibaldi, and Bismarck, and with the new doctrines of social Darwinism, not to mention the later nationalist vehemence of Hitler and Mussolini. The academic fare which was laid before them and the climate of ideas and expectations in which they came to live formulated for them their own grievances and aspirations and pointed the paths they might follow. Though the differences were great — as, for example, between Catholic missionary schooling in French Africa, the Sorbonne, the London School of Economics, Oxford, and Lincoln University in Pennsylvania — common elements of the Western tradition still pointed in the same direction. In the more recent phase a variant strand of Western thought and political action has made its impact through the revolutionary doctrines of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and their followers.

To stress the Western origins of nationalism is not, of course, to deny that the interactions of the Asian nationalists on each other and the stimulus given to one country by a neighbor were of great importance; but even here the original spark was derived from Europe and was passed on through an Asian or African intermediary, suffering, perhaps, some sea change on the way. As the

nationalist spark moved eastward and southward in Europe, with each country in some measure influencing the developments in others as they caught fire, so in the rest of the world the interactions of peoples have been a significant element.

The rise of Japan gave new hope to Asia and set a model which might be followed elsewhere. Sun Yat-sen pointed to the fact that the new Japan, transformed into a first-class power and victor over a great European state, had caught up with Europe and given inspiration to the rest of Asia: "We once thought that we could not do what the Europeans could do; and we see now that Japan has learned from Europe and that, if we follow Japan, we, too, will be learning from the West as Japan did." [10] But it is obvious from Sun's words that it is Europe which is the true and original model, and he was not averse to drawing directly on it and later on Communist Russia which gave him both economic guidance and the political technique of the centralized one-party state. Particularly for the Vietnamese, so much more influenced by China than the rest of Southeast Asia, Sun himself, the Kuomintang, and later the Chinese Communists became sources of nationalist and organizational inspiration; and Sukarno has paid tribute to the teaching of Sun for its contribution to the growth of Indonesian nationalism. Throughout Southeast Asia the nationalism of the Chinese immigrants has had a very real influence both through their example and even more through the strong local reactions to the political activism inspired in them by China's revolutions.

Almost everywhere, and most notably perhaps in Indonesia in the interwar decades, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress were models to be studied and followed with respect; but nowhere can the nationalism of Asia be traced to Europe with greater assurance than in India whose leaders were so profoundly affected by their British association. Indian independence has brought no lessening of Indian influence but rather an increase of it. Itself now freed from colonialism, India has felt the call to aid in breaking colonial chains elsewhere, particularly in Africa. Through many channels Nehru and other Indian spokesmen have expressed their devotion to the cause of African freedom; the Indian radio speaks directly to Africa; and considerable numbers of African students have been

encouraged to come to Indian universities. In the inter-Asian gatherings, in which India has played a leading role, the collaboration of the new nations to put an end to colonialism and to promote the right of self-determination has been a central theme.

With the exception of Gandhi, Nehru, and Sun Yat-sen, no single non-European individual has rivaled the influence of Ataturk, whose name has still not lost its magic. His was an uncompromising and sharply conceived nationalism which successfully challenged the European powers, united a dispirited and defeated people, and set in motion a drastic program of secular modernization. Particularly in the Islamic belt from Afghanistan to Morocco, although his fame and achievements were widely known as far afield as China, Ataturk's Westernizing reconstruction of Turkey on an explicitly national base set a pattern which many others have tried to imitate but which none has as yet effectively surpassed.

Within the Arab world it is presumably Egypt, both as an intellectual center and in terms of its own political experience and activity, which has had the largest influence in shaping nationalist movements and ideologies, although it was not until World War II that Egypt identified itself with the Arabs. Itself balanced uncertainly between the old and the new, Egypt has been able to play two roles which, sometimes blending harmoniously and sometimes clashing, reflect the inevitable Arab ambiguities. As the first of the Moslem countries to loosen its bonds to the Ottoman Empire and to come within the Western orbit, it served as a major center from which the new trends derived from Europe could radiate. At the same time that it was drawing on the French and British models it strengthened its position as a focal point for the reformulation of Islamic doctrines, most notably through the ancient university of Al Azhar, and for a regathering of the forces of Islam for both defensive and offensive operations. With the formation of the Arab League in 1945 and the location of its headquarters in Cairo, a new political instrument was created through which the Egyptians could spread their influence. The most dramatic phase of Egyptian leadership came, however, with the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser after the curt dismissal of Farouk in 1952. Hailed as the new Saladin, Nasser won wide popular acceptance

as the embodiment of the dual revolution against Western imperialism and against the anachronistic domestic forces of privilege and exploitation.

In Africa south of the Sahara the familiar processes of interaction are now repeating themselves. If Nigeria and the Gold Coast drew primarily on British and American sources, they have moved ahead to stimulate each other and to establish patterns and goals to which African eyes increasingly turn, focusing a reconsideration of fundamental policies by imperial authorities elsewhere. The mere fact that African peoples can achieve such advances is by itself of vast importance to others still in earlier stages of the colonial cycle.

The West has involuntarily contributed to this interaction of Asian and African peoples by attracting the potential leaders of the non-European world to its great metropolitan and academic centers. In Paris, Berlin, and Moscow, in London, Oxford, and Cambridge, and in American cities and universities the students and the intellectually and politically conscious from all the countries entering the modern world have gathered together and come to know each other, thus reversing the process of divorce from neighboring areas which is a usual consequence of imperial regimes. As in the nineteenth century the students, political leaders, and conspirators of Europe used London and Paris as the cosmopolitan headquarters in which they might establish contact and shape the revolutionary movements of that day, so in the twentieth century the colonial and quasi-colonial peoples have drawn upon these centers for the same purposes. Beyond the processes of formal education the ever-growing body of students learned of the Western world at first hand, were exposed to Communist and other indoctrination, and experienced both the intoxicating freedom and equality which the West offered and the racial discrimination, particularly in the United States, which sharpened their sense of national grievance and of solidarity against the imperialists.

Nor was the effect of this marshaling of forces abroad one which cut across only colonial and international frontiers. In many instances it also speeded the development of a sense of national identity for people coming from the same territory who had been separated from each other by internal barriers of many kinds. In-

dians of different castes and from different regions of the subcontinent were thrown together and became aware of the bonds which linked them to each other and distinguished them from their British colleagues. West Africans in England brought into being the important West African Students Union as well as groupings which reflected more local and traditional elements. The political parties of Indonesia in some part had their birth in the activities of Indonesian students in Holland and were carried back to the islands from abroad by Hatta, Sjahrir, and their associates. For considerable segments of the Middle East, Paris was a focal point of inspiration and agitation. What Ch.-André Julien has written of Paris is equally true of many other educational and political centers:

> It is not only in the shadow of the great mosque of Tunis but on the terraces of the cafes of the Latin Quarter that the symbiosis between the Mohammedan students of North Africa was effected. Paris, even more than Tunis, was the crucible where the nationalisms of the Maghreb were fused.[11]

In the new dispensation of independent Asian and African states the importance of the European capitals and universities as central world meeting points for the colonial and quasi-colonial peoples has somewhat declined or at least been supplemented by meeting points within the new states themselves. Asian-African solidarity was impressively displayed at Bandung in 1955, and again, with a strong leaning in the Communist direction, at the conference of 1957 in Cairo which has served as host to other Asian-African conferences as well. Accra has been the meeting place for African states and organizations, and is the seat of the permanent secretariat of the All-African People's Conference of 1958.

I have been contending that the leading nationalists have been drawn from those elements of the non-European societies which had the closest contact with the West and were therefore able to challenge it in its own terms. Nationalism in Asia and Africa has characteristically represented a drive toward modernization, constituting rather a breach with the past than its preservation or restoration. Western Europe has been the seedbed of the dynamic forces which have been at work revolutionizing mankind in the

last centuries and its imperial spread overseas set the present chain of events in motion. The nationalisms which have emerged are neither a spontaneous and self-generating movement among the Asian and African peoples nor merely an effort on their part to get rid of the alien intruder. Far more they are an assertion of their rediscovered or newly created individuality, already sharply influenced by the imperial impact, and an effort to adapt themselves to the new forces.

It is necessary to distinguish between the early instinctively defensive reactions, in which xenophobia played a considerable part, and the later nationalisms whose aims, structure, and leadership reflect the new trends. In the case of India an illuminating example is furnished by the contrast between the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the nationalist activities, centering around the Congress, of the period after World War I. The pre-nationalist nature of the Mutiny has been well brought out by Nehru:

> Essentially it was a feudal outburst, headed by feudal chiefs and other followers and aided by the widespread antiforeign sentiment. As such, inevitably it looked up to the relic of the Moghul dynasty, still sitting in the Delhi palace, but feeble and old and powerless. . . . There was hardly any national and underlying sentiment among the leaders, and a mere antiforeign feeling coupled with a desire to maintain their feudal privileges, was a poor substitute for this. . . . Nationalism of the modern type was yet to come; India had still to go through much sorrow and travail before she learned the lesson which would give her real freedom. Not by fighting for a lost cause, the feudal order, would freedom come.[12]

Three quarters of a century later, a similar example might be found in the Burma Rebellion of 1931, led by the ex-monk Saya San who claimed to be the destined King of Burma and asserted the possession of magical powers to protect himself and his followers. In its leadership as in the course it took, this expression of popular discontents and grievances, aggravated by the great depression, followed traditional Burmese patterns, drew little from Western models, and did not enlist the support of the educated Burmans. The application of Western ideas and techniques was to be the contribution of the new group of Burmese nationalists, the Thakins, then in process of gathering their forces. One Burman sees the Thakins as:

> the boys who had taken the disastrous result of Saya San's rebellion of 1930 seriously. They had left their colleges to go to the masses and teach them better ways of gaining independence than throwing away the lives of young Burmans fruitlessly. They believed that Burma was what she was because she had not kept pace with the West, and that she would never become "somebody" in this world by just living in the glories of her past. To keep abreast with the ever-moving West the Burmans must take long strides, and this could be done only with the help of books. So they adopted the slogan, "Write books, translate books and do it by the hundreds." They were out to educate the masses and stuff them with western ideas and ideals.[13]

In China, where the issue was complicated by the necessity of carrying on a two-front struggle against the alien Manchu dynasty as well as against the Western intruders, both the Taiping and the Boxer Rebellions resemble the Indian Mutiny in the sense of belonging rather to the old than to the new world. The earlier rebellion, despite its curious Christian trappings, was essentially a peasant movement which lacked any clear-cut political doctrine and suffered from inadequacies of political organization. The Boxer rising was the last great upsurge of the older China, seeking at once to dispose of the Manchus and to give expression to the xenophobic abhorrence of the ever-widening European penetration. The shock of the Japanese victory over China in 1895 gave the impulse which was needed to incite Chinese nationalism and to compel a basic reconsideration of the possibility of maintaining intact the traditional Chinese society, but the Boxers still represented far more a reaction against the alien forces than an adaptation to them. With Sun Yat-sen and his immediate intellectual predecessors China moved into an unmistakably nationalist phase.

In seeking to apply the same type of analysis to the development of nationalism in Africa south of the Sahara one must guard against the danger of being deceived by outward appearances and labels and of obscuring reality through adherence to inapplicable general categories derived from quite different situations. The course of African events, however, has in the main followed the same pattern as that evolved elsewhere, even though in the African case the brevity of the effective colonial contact, the less highly developed cultures, and the considerable areas of white settlement

confuse the picture.[14] Full-fledged nationalist movements were for a brief time limited to West Africa. They are now spreading to the rest of the continent at an almost incredible speed. With the appearance of a Western-educated intelligentsia and professional class, the inchoate compulsion to shake off the disturbing alien presence is transformed into a popularly based political movement seeking development on Western lines. There is sound truth in the comment of W. W. Macmillan that "the ferment in Africa today springs basically from the sometimes passionate effort of so many of its people to escape from their old life." [15]

In the large, nationalism in Asia and Africa, as in at least its initial phases in Europe and America, is a forward-looking and not a reactionary force, a spur to revolution and not a bulwark of the status quo. It is an inevitable concomitant of the rise of nationalism that an attempt should be made to glorify a real or mythical national heritage, presumably both to bolster collective self-esteem and to justify the claim to separate existence; but few among the nationalists have had their eyes upon a restoration of an Asian or African past rather than on the creation of a Western future. After the first instinctively defensive and xenophobic reaction has exhausted itself, the effort to reëstablish the old order has been replaced by a deliberate attempt to shape the society on the model of the Western intruders. Although the nationalists have often proclaimed the optimistic but unreliable slogan that the best of the old should be wedded to the best of the new, they have on the whole appeared unconcerned to preserve more of the ancient heritage than seemed compatible with a Western-style rebuilding of their societies. Or, to put it in more meaningful terms, where the old gets in the way of, say, a five-year plan, urban and rural development projects, the creation of modern armed forces, or the institution of Western political forms and controls, it is the old which must give way to make room for the new. The symbols of unity and the title to distinctive greatness may be sought in the past, but the present substance of action and desire is the transition to the modern world.[16]

Of the outstanding nationalist leaders it is really only Gandhi, with his unique mixture of the modern West and traditional India, who has pressed for a rejection in principle of characteristic elements of the West in terms of a reassertion of older and more indigenous values. This aspect of Gandhi's life and teaching has been carried on and distorted by right-wing Hindu groups, such as the Hindu Mahasaba. It is more properly reflected in the demand for concentration on the villages rather than on industrial development, in the Community Projects, and in the Bhoodan land gift movement of Vinoba Bhave; but it is the Westernism of Nehru which has set the official tone for independent India. In China Chiang Kai-shek preached something of a return to Confucianism and to the traditions of the older Chinese society, although he also saw the need to study Western civilization to make China strong; but the Communists who preached a strident and radical modernism drove him to Formosa. While one can find everywhere religious and other groups and movements which look backward rather than forward, such as those represented in Indonesia by Darul Islam, in Egypt by the Moslem Brotherhood, and in tropical Africa by unreconstructed chiefs of the old school, these are not the ones which have taken over command as the imperial controls gave way. Only in a few countries, such as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia, which had evaded colonial subjection or had no more than a passing experience of it, has nationalism tended to be more largely identified with traditional structures and values.

Far from seeking a return to the past the bulk of the nationalists have concentrated rather on bringing to their countries the dynamism, the Faustian drive, of the modern West. That there must be a certain ambivalence in their attitude lies at the heart of the paradox which envelops them. They are attacking the West and repudiate Western supremacy; yet it is the instruments and outlooks of the West which they would have their people master in order to substantiate their claim to an equal and independent place.[17]

Having come to intimate acquaintance with the West, the nationalist leaders found peculiarly humiliating their rejection as equals by the Westerners who had taken over their countries. From a Javanese prison cell to which he was consigned by the Dutch after his return from Holland, the distinguished Indonesian leader, Sjahrir, wrote of the isolation in his own country of the Western-trained intellectual. Few among his own people, Sjahrir

declared, had similar interests, and the path into the European community in Java was firmly blocked:

> For us that is as far away as Europe itself; indeed further away, because Europe can be reached by ship and plane, but the social barrier, the race division in the colonial society, is a great deal harder to bridge over.[17]

Nehru emphasized a different and more threatening aspect since it involved acceptance by the Indians themselves of the stigma of inferiority:

> We developed the mentality of a good country-house servant. Sometimes we were treated to a rare honor — we were given a cup of tea in the drawing room. The height of our ambition was to become respectable and to be promoted individually to the upper regions. Greater than any victory of arms or diplomacy was this psychological triumph of the British in India.[18]

In such situations the reaction might have been to shun everything Western, to refuse to try to cross the social barrier or gain admission to the drawing room. On the contrary, the turn was in fact toward an intensification of the drive to rival the West on its own terms and thus to demonstrate — if need be, to enforce — the equality which the West denied.

This modernizing drive of the nationalists, the heirs of the colonial regimes and of imperial predominance, is not one which could be expected to take over without encountering serious opposition. Even the new elites themselves are inevitably torn by spiritual discords. They cannot help but seek to reintegrate themselves in their national traditions at the same time that they seek to revolutionize their societies into Western modernity. In varying degree everywhere they are bound to be challenged by the representatives of the old order. The new Westernized elements still constitute only a thin upper crust, superimposed on societies the great mass of whose people have achieved only a meager acquaintance with the world into which their present leaders would take them. The latter have perhaps established themselves in the urban centers, but the great sweep of the countrysides is still only dimly aware of what is at stake. The rising nations of Asia and Africa are communities all too evidently headed in several directions at once,

built on a national unity which often has in it more of diversity than of oneness. In the first round of succession the nationalists of the Western school have taken power to themselves and won the allegiance of their people against the encroachments of the alien imperialism. It is not self-evident that they will be able both to maintain their power and to hold firm to their purpose as imperialism recedes and as other aspirants to power challenge their leadership.