THE SOCIALIST CAR

Automobility in the Eastern Bloc

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INTRODUCTION

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In March 1992, less than a year after Communism fell in Albania, Henry Kamm of the *New York Times* traveled to Noj, a "dirt-poor village" north of the capital, Tirana. There he encountered "shattered buildings, piles of rubble," and other signs of the wave of vengeful destructiveness that had swept through the village months earlier. "They felt they were destroying Communism," a young shopkeeper told him. But some, it turned out, regretted their actions, in particular sacking the local clinic to empty it of the medicines that had been delivered just the day before. "Under the Communist Government," Kamm reported, "even people in remote zones could count on a car from the cooperative to take them to the clinic. Now, as one resident told him, "no cooperative, no car."

It is not clear from Kamm's report whether the villagers regretted more the loss of the clinic or their access to the car. For under the Communists there were no privately owned cars in Albania, and by the time Kamm arrived, the drivers of collective vehicles had taken them over and were using them "as they see fit." The daily bus that used to link Noj with Tirana now came only when the driver "felt like it." Yet only five years later, the *Times* reported that "free" Albania had become "one of the best customers for Europe's stolen cars." Tirana, where "big sedans jostle[d] each other on potholed and dusty roads" as they whizzed by donkeys pulling carts, allegedly had more Mercedes per capita than most other European cities. The residents of Noj and most of the rest of the country, however, probably did not share in the bounty. At twenty-three per thousand people, Albania's passenger car density was still Europe's lowest.[1]

Albania under the dictator Enver Hoxha represents an extreme case—as it did in many other ways—in the awkward fit between cars and Communism. Only Kim Il Sung's Democratic People's Republic of Korea matched its ban on private

car ownership. Elsewhere in the socialist camp the situation was more complicated and, because of its many ambiguities, more fascinating too.[2] The principal objective of this book—the outgrowth if a workshop held in June 2008 at the Berlin School for Comparative European History (BKVGE)—is to explore the interface between the motor car and the state socialist countries of Eastern Europe, including the USSR. We posit a dynamic tension between these two artifacts of human invention—the car and socialism—each of which in its own way promised liberation from age-old constraints. This tension inhered in the Socialist Car.

The Socialist Car and Consumption

In this book "socialism" has two meanings. One is the project to transform society from its bourgeois past to its Communist future, a project embarked upon and guided by a supposedly far-sighted political party and its apparatus acting on behalf of all nonantagonistic social groups. The other refers to those actually existing societies under such tutelage, societies confronting problems unforeseen in their ambiguity, complexity, and even contradictoriness. The procedures for the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services comprised a significant zone of interaction between the project and the actuality of socialism, between its ideals defined in terms of an enlightened awareness of the collective interest and the reality of shortages, competing priorities, external pressures, privilege, venality, and desires for imagined comforts, bourgeois or otherwise.

Within this zone, the Socialist Car occupied an extremely important place. The Socialist Car was more than the metal, glass, upholstery, and plastic from which the Ladas, Dacias, Trabants, and other still extant and erstwhile models were fabricated; it also absorbed East Europeans' longings and compromises, their hopes and disappointments. The Socialist Car thus can be situated at the point of convergence between the state and the private sphere. It embodied aspirations for overcoming the gap in technology between the capitalist and socialist worlds, as well as for enhancing personal mobility, flexibility, and status in the latter. It brought those who possessed one a little closer to an imagined West even as its own limitations and those imposed on it frustrated the fulfillment of those imaginings. Because the Socialist Car competed for resources with other modes of transportation, and because it had to cope with certain ideologically driven notions questioning its appropriateness to the socialist project, it had to adapt even as it provoked adaptation. The question of the limits of those adaptations over time and from one country to another is a major focus of this book. If the particularities of state socialism can better inform us about the history of the automobile, then the Socialist Car can improve our understanding of state socialism in practice.

Our book interprets its subject broadly. Combining expertise in the history of technology and urban planning with social and cultural history, it reflects and at the same time seeks to advance recent scholarly interest in both the automobile and the consumer and material cultures of the socialist Second World countries. Commenting a decade ago on the material cultures of the former Eastern Bloc countries, the architectural historian Catherine Cooke asserted that "these materialized manifestations always seemed more revealing and enduring descriptors of their attributes and tensions than the ephemera of properly 'political' analysis."[3] Perhaps, but at the time she wrote those lines analyses of the material cultures and consumption practices in that part of the world were hardly abundant and certainly had not featured prominently in the theorization of either subject. Books on material culture and consumption, including an influential collection of articles edited by Arjun Appadurai, ranged far and wide across the globe and chronologically back to medieval Europe without touching down on the terrain of state socialism.[4] To some an oxymoron, socialist consumption remains underrepresented in this literature. It could be that the outsized role that the central administrative organs of the "command economies" played in predetermining social needs and substituting their decisions for market mechanisms obscured the extent to which consumption in the socialist world sometimes could assume unpredictable forms and often involved creative practices.[5] Whatever the cause of neglect, the present book's inquiry into the forms and practices that private car consumption assumed in the Eastern Bloc countries has much to offer students of consumer behavior, whether they understand consumption as a site of identity formation or view it as part of larger political struggles over the meaning of citizenship.[6]

Within Soviet and East European studies, consumption has been understood largely as an arena in which the state and its agents negotiated with hard-pressed though resourceful citizens. Among Soviet historians, rationing—the attempt to establish a "hierarchy of consumption" based on services rendered to the state—has received considerable attention, but so too has the proffering to privileged segments of society of "socialist luxuries" via "cultured trade" and the forging of a Big Deal with the new "Soviet middle class" after the Great Patriotic War.[7] The siphoning of scarce goods such as cars to underground markets, the mania for foreign-made goods, and the clever strategies for acquiring them so typical of Soviet consumers appear to have been no less common in Communist East Europe.[8] Aside from controlling the distribution of goods themselves, Communist authorities sought to shape desire through both "hard" and "soft" propaganda, that is, by denouncing Western "bourgeois" culture as wasteful and decadent and by instructing the masses in suitably modest tastes. But, as demonstrated by recent research on the *stiliagi* (the generic name for youth subcultures that flourished in

the larger Soviet cities from the late 1940s onward) and analogous nonconformist groups elsewhere in the bloc, not everyone bought this line.[9]

More collective and violent challenges to the stringency of Communist wage and distribution practices erupted in the years after Stalin's death—most notably in East Germany in 1953, in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and in the Soviet Russian city of Novocherkassk in 1962—persuading authorities to shift more resources to consumer goods production and correspondingly revise the basis of their own political legitimacy. Tito's Yugoslavia—and perhaps the memory of Lenin's New Economic Policy of the 1920s—paved the way for the adoption of market socialist policies known in Kadarist Hungary as the New Economic Mechanism (or more colloquially, "goulash Communism") and in Walter Ulbricht's GDR as the Neues Ökonomisches System (NÖS). Although the USSR also shifted gears, a considerable gap opened up in the 1950s and '60s between the more authoritarian "austere consumerism" of Khrushchev and the "consumer socialism" of much of the rest of the bloc.[10] Not until the 1970s under Brezhnev did the Soviet Union begin to catch up to its satellites. Western social scientists conceptualized this reorientation toward "acquisitive socialism" in transactional terms as a "Little Deal" or more generally a "social contract."[11] Much of the literature on the "second," "gray," or "parallel" economies in the Eastern Bloc at least implicitly understood their existence and functions in similar terms.[12]

On the other side of the state-consumer divide, scholars have explored the relationships between consumption, material culture, and everyday life. Some of the best of these draw on personal experiences or participant observation. Svetlana Boym's innovative archeology of domestic space in Moscow and Leningrad, for example, turns the Soviet intelligentsia's well-known disdain for kitsch on its head by celebrating "domestic trash" as "the secret residue of privacy that shielded people from imposed and internalized communality."[13] Susan E. Reid has made a similar point about the way that residents of the high-rise apartment buildings erected in the Khrushchev era defied the Soviet state's attempts to control the newly distributed space: they "contradicted the modernist norms promoted by taste professionals" by filling their flats with "incoherent bricolage" and engaging in handiwork and repair that also filled a privatizing need.[14] How such goods (and services) were obtained is the focus of Alena Ledeneva's sociological investigation of *blat*, or informal exchange in the late Soviet and post-Soviet decades, and Ina Merkel's ethnology of consumer culture in the GDR.[15]

Scholarship with respect to consumption regimes and responses to them in the Eastern Bloc is still unevenly developed, with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) probably best represented and the Balkan region least so, at least in English.[16] Moreover, though binaries of "the state and the people" and "oppression and resistance" continue to structure some work on the subject, one can discern an alternative approach. This posits the power of the state working through the modes of everyday life to intersect with the articulation of individual desires and needs. Official discourses are therefore understood as having been appropriated and reproduced in heterodox fashion such as to make real existing socialism coconstructed.[17] Still other emphases—including how catering to consumer desires sacrificed "systemic identity" and the peculiarities of leisure and luxury in the bloc—are evident in two new collections.[18] No pretense toward unanimity of approach is made in the present book, though contributors have benefited from sharing each other's frameworks.

With the exception of the Trabant, whose plastic body many regard as a symbol of the GDR's misplaced aspirations for modernity, the literature on consumption has had almost nothing to say about one of the most sought-after articles of consumption, the passenger car.[19] But if we can speak of a distinct socialist form of consumption, then no material object is more exemplary of that distinctiveness than the private car, beginning with how one went about obtaining it and extending through what was required to keep it in working order. Both in Poland and in Hungary—as Mariusz Jastrzab and György Péteri demonstrate here—coupons, waybills, and other techniques intended to maintain control over car ownership and use proved insufficient to accommodate well-placed individuals' desires for automobility. "Behind-the-scenes distribution" and "sneaking privatization" were the perhaps inevitable result. Our book thus expands upon discussions of socialist consumption by interrogating the role of cars in the evolution of state socialist law, ethics, and a great deal else.[20]

Entangled Modernities

The near absence of the car in studies of consumption and material culture in the Eastern Bloc countries is paralleled by the slim representation of the bloc in the burgeoning scholarship on cars and car cultures. "The historiography of automobilism is so far mostly a Western affair confined to the capitalist nations," Gijs Mom, one of the leading scholars in mobility studies, has noted. For Mom this historiography is dominated by a master narrative that begins with the automobile as the plaything of the well-to-do classes and proceeds to its increasing accessibility and "necessity." In this narrative, the United States is always in the forefront of innovation with Western Europe a distant second and the rest of the world (when mentioned at all) lagging farther behind.[21]

Of course, it would be foolish to deny the importance of techniques pioneered in the United States, techniques generally known as Taylorism and Fordism and including the assembly line, vertical integration of production, the interchange-

ability of workers, the standardization of parts, and the transformation of workers into the consumers of the products they make. Sloanism, the marketing techniques developed by Alfred P. Sloan during the Great Depression to keep General Motors afloat, would also spawn imitations worldwide. But two qualifying points need to be made here. First, no matter where techniques originated, their adoption elsewhere did not happen automatically or smoothly. In France, Taylorism had to contend with not only French auto workers but Fayolism (named after Henri Fayol), a more top-down approach to management that won fervent adherents at Renault and other French firms in the 1920s. In Germany, the debate about Fordism—its nature, appropriateness to German conditions, traditions, and workers—raged from 1924 until shortly before the Nazis came to power. Carmakers in particular resisted its application—probably at the expense of their profits—because of their insistence on the pursuit of quality work. Even within Ford's empire there were spectacular failures such as the vast Amazonian rubber plantation known as Fordlandia, as well as moderate successes. Elsewhere, including Soviet Russia, adaptations and emendations bore but scant resemblance to the original.[22]

Second, while American automakers undoubtedly led the way in technology, design, and marketing during the period when oil flowed cheaply, their supremacy did not go unchallenged. Certainly since the early 1970s the significant innovations such as just-in-time inventory, variable valve timing and lift, and hybrid cars have come from elsewhere in the world. Thus the master narrative might need revision. If, as Mom argues, it has seriously exaggerated American exceptionalism, that is not to say that the West should be homogenized any more than should the East. Rather than simply adding another quirky story to the master narrative, this book seeks to contribute to its disruption and replacement by a more complex understanding of the global dynamics of automobile production and reception. That understanding is derived from the notion, common in the above-mentioned literature on consumption and material culture, that what Eastern Bloc ideologues aspired to was an "alternative modernity," alternative to Western liberal democracy if not Western capitalist norms of development.[23]

Yet one of the themes threaded throughout our book is the multiplicity of ways that the West was implicated in the production and reception of the Socialist Car and hence of that alternative modernity. Michael David-Fox has theorized such a relationship as a transnational history of "entangled modernities." Instead of a comparative approach that would involve "joint analysis of national histories or elements thereof, transnational history," he writes, "focuses on features and aspects . . . that transcend internal or domestic phenomena and . . . explore specific links or connections with other countries and realms."[24] Several contributions to this book take this approach. Brigitte Le Normand, for example, discusses the first

postwar master plan for Belgrade's renovation as inspired by Le Corbusier's 1935 model of the Radiant City and conforming to the principles of the Athens Charter, the urban planning manifesto of the international modernist movement written by the Swiss-born architect and published in 1943. Le Corbusier also made his presence felt in Marzahn, the enormous housing settlement in the far northeast of Berlin, which is the subject of Eli Rubin's chapter. Marzahn's planners intended it to be, like Le Corbusier's City of Tomorrow, not just a housing settlement but "a total concept . . . with every conceivable need of the citizens planned in advance." However, the planners claimed as their inspiration not Le Corbusier himself but rather Bauhaus leftovers and Soviet literature influenced by the master's work, an interesting example of the complexity of transnational circuits. Finally, as Esther Meier points out in her chapter on Naberezhnye Chelny, the quintessentially Brezhnevite city from the 1970s, the idea for its linear design harks back to a nineteenth-century Spanish architect.

Valentina Fava's chapter illustrates another kind of transnational entanglement in the case of automotive engineering and production in postwar Czechoslovakia. The engineers and management at Mladá Boleslav initially inclined the factory toward the American mass-production model, ironically to realize the dream of a "people's car for a people's democracy." But by the end of the 1940s, the American assembly line had met the Communist Party line, and within a few years, Skoda was applying—however reluctantly—methods of work organization and incentive schemes developed in the Soviet Union during its industrialization drive in the 1930s. The story does not end here, though. In a fascinating case study of how national politics and labor practices intertwined, Fava shows how Skoda's technical experts took advantage of the long de-Stalinization process of the 1950s and '60s to reintroduce the original postwar program, only to be frustrated with the limits of socialist planning even before the Prague Spring and the Soviet-led invasion of their country.

Western automotive technology in fact cast a long shadow over the Socialist Car. The display of cars from Britain, France, Italy, and the United States at national and thematic exhibitions in the USSR during the late 1950s and early 1960s raised disturbing questions among the public about the capacity of the Soviet government to provide life's comforts. Luminita Gatejel's account of a retired Soviet car mechanic's strenuous efforts to acquire a decrepit Chevrolet exemplified the fanaticism such vehicles could inspire. Foreign trucks also intruded on the consciousness—or subconscious—of drivers, as suggested by their appearance and reappearance in the different versions of a folk song discussed by Lewis Siegelbaum. At the same time, Western automotive companies provided an essential shortcut to the production of the Socialist Car and, as Jastrzab points out

Table I.1 Private car density in Eastern Bloc countries (cars per 1,000 people)

Country	1970	1975	1980	1985	1989
Bulgaria	19.2	22.7	55.6	114.9	137.0
Czechoslovakia	55.6	101.0	149.2	172.4	200.0
GDR	66.7	111.1	151.5	200.0	232.6
Hungary	18.5	55.6	83.3	135.1	163.9
Poland	15.9	31.3	66.7	100.0	126.6
Romania	6.4	6.5	10.8	n.a.	n.a.
USSR	6.8	18.5	31.3	41.7	43.4
Yugoslavia	35.7	71.4	108.6	125.0	135.1

Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, *Motor Vehicle Facts & Figures* (Detroit: MVMA, 1990), which gives the data in terms of cars per person.

in relation to Poland's dependence on Fiat, to the fulfillment of hopes for material advancement, modernity, and comfort.

The constraints that Soviet political hegemony imposed on Skoda's technical experts point to another theme adumbrated above—the extent of coordination among bloc members toward automotive production, distribution, and other policies concerning the Socialist Car. Who decided how many Ladas would be exported to, say, Hungary or whether parts manufactured in one Eastern Bloc country would find their way into the engines or interiors of cars assembled in another? Presumably COMECON (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, founded in 1949) had something to say about this, but more definitive answers await further research.[25] Thirty years ago, seeking to explain the then near-contemporary turn toward pessimism among the Soviet middle class, John Bushnell noted inter alia that the increase in the number of Soviet tourists visiting other East Bloc countries gave rise to the perception that in standard of living and availability of consumer goods the bloc countries had surpassed the Soviets.[26] The data presented in table I.1 show that, with the exception of Romania, car availability certainly conformed to this generalization.

But if, as Wendy Bracewell has put it, Yugoslavia (or perhaps even more so, the GDR and Czechoslovakia) could be construed "as the West to the Soviet bloc's East," it is important to remember that the Soviet Union itself contained huge differences.[27] At eighteen cars for every thousand people in 1977, Azerbaijan placed in the bottom third of Union republics in terms of car density, whereas Lithuania's fifty and Estonia's sixty-one meant that those Baltic republics had a density greater than Poland's and Bulgaria's and roughly the same as Hungary's (as of 1975).

Table I.2 Density of automobile ownership by Union Republic

Union Republic	Cars/1,000 people	
	1977	1985
USSR	26	45
Estonia	61	96
Lithuania	50	93
Latvia	45	81
Georgia	35	71
Armenia	32	56
Turkmenistan	24	46
RSFSR	21	44
Ukraine	21	46
Belorussia	21	39
Kazakhstan	21	39
Azerbaijan	18	30
Kirgizia	17	34
Uzbekistan	16	36
Tadzhikistan	14	35
Moldavia	14	33

Sources: William Pyle, "Private Car Ownership and Second Economy Activity," *Berkeley-Duke Occasional papers on the Second Economy in the USSR*, no. 37 (1993), 49; and A. Arrak, "Ispol'zovanie avtomobilei lichnogo pol'zovaniia," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, no. 7 (1978): 134 (for 1977); *Izvestiia*, Aug. 14, 1988: 3 (for 1985).

Automobilities?

Car densities in the GDR and Czechoslovakia did not quite match Western European levels, though they approached them. There is another lens, however, through which to view the Socialist Car. Less quantitative than qualitative, it is called "automobility," a term that sociologists and geographers began employing in the 1990s to denote the private car's intrusion into and increasing domination over large sectors of the global landscape. John Urry, one of the first to use the term in its contemporary connotation, understood it as a "social and technical system . . . which links together cars, car-drivers, roads, petroleum supplies and other novel objects, technologies, and signs."[28] More recently, Robert Argenbright has distinguished "automobilization" from automobility by subsuming under the former "process, particularly the physical aspects (i.e., vehicles, infrastructure, service facilities)" and reserving for the latter "the culture of driving and its mentalities."[29]

The most elaborate definition of automobility to date is that of Steffen Böhm et al., who suggest three dimensions: first, "one of the principal socio-technical institutions and practices that seek to organize, accelerate and shape the spatial movements and impacts of automobiles, whilst simultaneously regulating their many consequences"; second, "an ideological or discursive formation, embodying ideals of freedom, privacy, movement, progress and autonomy"; and third, "a phenomenology, a set of ways of experiencing the world which serve both to legitimize its dominance and radically unsettle taken-for-granted boundaries separating human from machine."[30]

Of the three dimensions, the second is the only one that would have caused Communist political authorities some problems. Organizing and regulating were core values, after all, and as for unsettling conventional boundaries between humans and machines, the alchemy of transforming flesh into metal had a storied career in socialist realist art and literature.[31] While movement and progress certainly fell within the orbit of officially endorsed Communist values, freedom (of an individual kind) and autonomy were more problematic. Even after the mass production of cars had signaled the abandonment of ideological objections to private car ownership, their availability could not be taken for granted, and such accoutrements of car-driver mobility as limited-access highways, motels, dependable road maintenance and service stations, and a host of other features of the "roadscape" taken for granted in the West remained rudimentary in the Eastern Bloc.

Yet as the geographer Tim Edensor argues, "automobility . . . is always situated in contextual conditions," especially "the contextualizing matrix of the nation."[32] The cultural values and meanings of the things around us and with which we grow up are, he continues, "part of the *way things are*, yet this masks the social and cultural relations out of which they emerge."[33] Some of the culturally embedded associations Edensor mentions in connection with cars—desire and sexuality, mobility, status, family-related activity, independence, adventure, freedom, and rebellion—did not exist or did not exist to the same extent in the Eastern Bloc countries as in the West. But the shortages and privileges, the waiting lists and high prices, the (largely male) sociability, and the special role truck drivers and mechanics occupied appear generic to East Bloc automobility, part of what Gatejel calls its "common heritage."

Tinkering, the subject of Kurt Möser's chapter, also figured as a common element of East Bloc automobility. Cars everywhere throughout the bloc "were geared to cater to the needs of being serviced, repaired, or modified by nonprofessional users." In the GDR, looking after one's own car actually was invoked by ideologists as a contribution to building socialism because it supposedly raised the level of "craftsmanly and polytechnical knowledge." Seen from another perspective, which

Rubin discusses, this dependence on *Eigen-Sinn* ("individual initiative, creativity and self-taught know-how") worked symbiotically with the rationally organized, planned economy at the same time that it contradicted the same system's pretensions to superiority. Automobility in the Eastern Bloc thus came with full repair kits, the clearest possible message to new car owners that their relationship to their machines would be an intimate one.[34]

Möser also notes that although both boys and girls received polytechnic education, tinkering remained predominantly a male practice. This difference undoubtedly reflected larger gender-based distinctions, but what about driving? Both Corinna Kuhr-Korolev's and Siegelbaum's chapters take up this question in the Soviet context, one with respect to cars and the other to trucks. Few Soviet women drove, but, as Kuhr-Korolev demonstrates on the basis of fascinating "auto-biographies," even among those who did not but whose fathers, coworkers, suitors, or husbands did, cars played a major role in their lives. Whether as co-owners or merely passengers, they derived prestige from their association with a car. In the case of trucks, we enter the realm of a profession coded as male but vulnerable to intrusions by women—for example, during the Great Patriotic War, when many got behind the wheel of a ZIS-5, a GAZ AAA, or other Soviet-made vehicle, and in the fantasy world of folk song and legend.

In these cases, boundaries were being crossed either metaphorically or in reality. The theme of boundary crossing does not figure prominently in this book but is worth noting here in two connections. One is auto tourism, which road associations encouraged in a "know thy country" spirit but which could also involve visits to other countries in the bloc and even neighboring countries outside it—at least in the case of Yugoslavs, for whom visas were not required. By the same token, expanded motel and camping facilities also accommodated auto tourists from Western countries, though how many and to what effect awaits more research. A second kind of border crossing occurred when the Socialist Car was exported. As several contributors to this book have noted, cars produced in one country found their way to others irrespective of the lack of spare parts (which were not exactly thick on the ground in the country of origin) and repair services. Consignments of Ladas arrived in Yugoslavia as early as February 1971, and in Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR before the year was out; Trabants sold well in Hungary and Poland; and Skodas found eager buyers not only throughout the bloc but, as Valentina Fava notes, "in markets that followed the laws of capitalism." Along with the cars came scores of aphorisms and jokes about them, reflections perhaps of both wounded national pride and the captive nature of the market. "Why does a Skoda/Lada/Trabant have a heated rear window?" went one. "To keep your hands warm when pushing it." "Beware of loose women and cars made in Russia," East Germans told each other, and so forth.

Outside the bloc, probably no country had a higher proportion or range of socialist cars than Finland. Until the late 1950s, one could encounter East German IFAs and Wartburgs, Czechoslovak Skodas, Polski Fiats, and Soviet Pobedas and Moskviches on the streets of Helsinki and other Finnish cities. Largely because of severe restrictions on the import of Western cars, Soviet models made up about half of the total in the country. The Lada did fairly well in Finland during the 1970s, but by the beginning of the 1980s its reputation had plummeted (because of unflattering comparisons with its Western and Japanese competitors rather than any deterioration in quality).[35] The Lada's trajectory elsewhere in Europe resembled the Finnish experience except in Britain, where sales peaked in the late 1980s before succumbing to more stringent emission-control standards.[36] The off-road Niva and the Samara hatchback, both AvtoVAZ cars, struggled to find their niches. One would like to know more about the marketing of these and other Eastern Bloc vehicles not only in Western Europe but in the farther-flung countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Just as some in the Eastern Bloc countries felt their purchase of a Fiat- or a Renault-derived vehicle brought them a little bit closer to the West, did those who took the leap of faith in buying a car from the Second World experience a little bit of socialism?

Finally, does it make sense to refer to an Eastern Bloc automobility as distinct from that which Urry, Edensor, and other social scientists have been writing about? If we take the six components that according to Urry "generate and reproduce the 'specific character'" of automobility, we can see that we are dealing for the most part with transsystemic degrees in kind. The first, the "quintessential manufactured object" of twentieth-century capitalism and the industry from which the concepts of Fordism and post-Fordism emerged, would not seem to apply except that the Socialist Car owed its existence to Fordist (but not post-Fordist) technology. We should be more cautious about identifying the Socialist Car as the quintessential manufactured object of real existing socialism for the simple reason that with the possible exception of nondescript ferroconcrete apartment blocks, the Eastern Bloc probably did not have a quintessential manufactured object.[37] Urry's second component—"the major item of individual consumption after housing which provides status . . . and preoccupies criminal justice systems"—seems apposite, although given the generally lower rates of car ownership, criminal justice systems in the East did not preoccupy themselves with traffic violations. The linkages with other industries, services, design and planning operations, and "various oil-rich nations"—Urry's third component—obviously were weaker, though as Le Normand, Beyer, Meier, and Rubin emphasize, integrated urban (and suburban) planning did take the Socialist Car very seriously, and unlike in the West, oil continued to flow. Indeed, the discovery of new reserves in the Soviet interior and oil's export *to* the West were what made the Lada possible. Still, unlike cars in the West, the Socialist Car failed to generate a viable infrastructure around it; planned economies simply could not cope with all the details of such a highly sophisticated system. The fourth component—"quasi-private mobility"—is the only one of the six that probably should be weighted more strongly in the Eastern Bloc by virtue of the relative scarcity of other private or quasi-private venues. In fact, in addition to Möser's point that we need to view "usage" in a wider perspective, it should be acknowledged that the principal thing that is consumed in connection with cars is precisely this quasi-private mobility, and in the case of the Socialist Car that dimension loomed very large. The last two components—the cultural and environmental consequences of car use—though less extensive than in some Western countries, replicated Western patterns quite closely and, in the case of "major discourses of what constitutes the good life," obviously internalized them.[38]

The Eastern Bloc's version of automobility both replicated and departed from Western standards. So too did the car cultures and the "vernacular, generic motorscapes [that] stitch the local and the national together through their serial reproduction across space."[39] Refraining from wearing seat belts in order not to offend the driver (or if you *were* the driver, not wanting to appear unmanly); expecting to settle with the traffic police if stopped rather than going through complicated formal procedures; adorning one's car with bunting, dolls, or some other good-luck charm on the occasion of a wedding; removing windshield wipers after parking; being prepared to maintain one's own car; and a host of other practices comprised the cultures. The motorscapes ranged from isolated and dangerous to crowded and dangerous. In these respects, the world inhabited by the Socialist Car might be located conceptually somewhere between the First and Third Worlds, which is why the term "Second" seems appropriate.

Since the collapse of that world, the plants where workers toiled to produce the Socialist Car and the workers themselves generally have fallen on hard times. A few firms were swallowed by Western companies and modernized, but others have struggled to stay open, and still others succumbed to global competition and shut down. The cars themselves have achieved legendary status as objects of ridicule and nostalgia. In the case of the Trabant, the shift from one to the other happened "at an unbelievable pace and all at once" almost immediately after it had transported "Ossies" over the border.[40] *Kopeck*, a Russian film comedy about the original Lada (2101) that debuted in 2002, contains heavy doses of both.[41] In this collective history, the authors put aside both nostalgia and ridicule in the interest of trying to understand the Socialist Car in its own context.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Henry Kamm, "Noj Journal; Just Smashing Communism (Got Carried Away)," *New York Times*, April 1, 1992, http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch?query=Noj+Journal&srchst=cse; Jane Perlez, "Albania's Auto Industry: Dealing in Stolen Cars," *New York Times*, August 16, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/16/world/albania-s-auto-industry-dealing-in-stolen-cars.htm (accessed January 20, 2011).

2. With its ever-dwindling stock of vintage American cars sharing road and garage space with Soviet-built Ladas, Cuba deserves—and has received—special treatment elsewhere. See Richard Schweid, *Che's Chevrolet, Fidel's Oldsmobile: On the Road in Cuba* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). The People's Republic of China, where as late as 1990 only one in two hundred people owned a car, also falls outside our purview. For data see National Statistics Bureau, *A Statistical Survey of China, 1996* (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1996); for an analysis, see Li Gan, "Globalization of the Automobile Industry in China: Dynamics and Barriers in the Greening of Road Transportation" (CICERO Working Paper 9, 2001), http://www.cicero.uio.no/media/1381.pdf (accessed January 10, 2009).

3. Catherine Cooke, preface to *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe*, ed. Susan E. Reid and David Crowley (Oxford: Berg, 2000), vii.

4. Arjun Appadurai, ed., *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). See also Stephen Edgell, Kevin Hetherington, and Alan Warde, eds., *Consumption Matters: The Production and Experience of Consumption* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); John Storey, *Cultural Consumption and Everyday Life* (London: Arnold, 1999); Martyn J. Lee, ed., *The Consumer Society Reader* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000).

5. For the most sophisticated of such state-centered analyses, see Ferenc Fehér, Ágnes Heller, and György Márkus, *Dictatorship over Needs: An Analysis of Soviet Societies* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

6. Roberta Sassatelli, *Consumer Culture: History, Theory and Politics* (London: Sage, 2007); Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Vintage Books, 2003).

7. E. A. Osokina, *Ierarkhiia potrebleniia: O zhizni liudei v usloviiakh stalinskogo snabzheniia, 1928–1935 gg.* (Moscow: Izd-vo MGOU, 1993); Osokina, *Za fasadom "stalinskogo izobiliia": Raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii naseleniia v gody industrializatsii, 1927–1941* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998); Julie Hessler, "Cultured Trade: The Stalinist Turn towards Consumerism," in *Stalinism: New Directions*, ed.

Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), 182–209; Jukka Gronow, *Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia* (Oxford: Berg, 2003); Vera Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990).

8. See Mary Neuberger, "Inhaling Luxury: Lighting up in Socialist Bulgaria" (paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, November 15–18, 2007); and György Majtényi, "Socialist Luxury: Lifestyles of the Elite in Hungary during the 1950s and 1960s" (paper presented at conference on "Social Transformations and Social Identities in East-Central and Southeastern Europe under Socialism," Central European University, Budapest, September 28–30, 2007).

9. Mark Edele, "Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 50 (2002): 37–61; Juliane Fürst, "The Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture and Identity in Late Stalinism," in *Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention*, ed. Juliane Fürst (London: Routledge, 2006), 209–30; Roger P. Potocki, "The Life and Times of Poland's 'Bikini Boys,'" *Polish Review* 39, no. 3 (1994): 259–90.

10. David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, "Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe," in Reid and Crowley, *Style and Socialism*, 10–14.

11. James Millar, "The Little Deal: Brezhnev's Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism," *Slavic Review* 44, no. 4 (1985): 694–706. For varying use of the "social contract" metaphor, see Linda Cook, *The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers' Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), and with reference to "Soviet-style societies," James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Introduction: The Social Legacies and the Aftermath of Communism," in *The Social Legacy of Communism*, ed. James R. Millar and Sharon L. Wolchik (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), 2–10.

12. The literature was inaugurated by Gregory Grossman, "The Second Economy of the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* 26, no. 4 (1977): 25–40. For a bibliography, see Gregory Grossman, "The Second Economy in the USSR and Eastern Europe: A Bibliography," in *Berkeley-Duke Occasional Papers on the Second Economy in the USSR* (Washington, DC: WEFA Group, Special Projects, 1990). See also Anna Seleny, *Political Economy of State-Society Relations in Hungary and Poland* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 161–80.

13. Svetlana Boym, *Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 150.

14. Susan E. Reid, "The Meaning of Home: 'The Only Bit of the World You Can Have to Yourself,'" in *Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia*, ed. Lewis H. Siegelbaum (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 157–64.

15. Alena V. Ledeneva, *Russia's Economy of Favours:* Blat, *Networking and Informal Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Ina Merkel, *Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999). See also I. Merkel, "Consumer Culture in the GDR, or How the Struggle for Antimodernity Was Lost on the Battleground of Consumer Culture," in *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judt (Washington, DC: Publications of the German Historical Institute, 1998), 281–300.

16. In addition to previous citations, see Sandrine Kott, *Le communism au quotidien: Les entreprises d'état dans la societé est-allemande* (Paris: Belin, 2001); Philipp Heldmann, "Negotiating Consumption in a Dictatorship: Consumer Politics in the GDR in the 1950s and 1960s," in *The Politics of Consumption: Material Culture and Citizenship in Europe and America*, ed. Martin Daunton and Matthew Hilton (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 185–202; David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, eds., *Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc* (Oxford: Berg, 2002); Judd Stitziel, *Fashioning Socialism: Clothing, Politics, and Consumer Culture in East Germany* (Oxford: Berg, 2005); Eli Rubin, "East German Plastics: Technology, Gender and Teleological Structures of Everyday Life," *German History* 25, no. 4 (2007): 596–624; Eli Rubin, *Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Ferenc Hammer, "Sartorial Manoeuvres in the Dusk: Blue Jeans in Socialist Hungary," in *Citizenship and Consumption*, ed. Kate Soper and Frank Trentmann (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 51–68; Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, eds., *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

17. See, for example, Rubin, *Synthetic Socialism*, 225: "Plastics . . . formed a major middle ground where the needs of the regime and the needs of the population could meet." For a more extensive use of this framework, see Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

18. See György Péteri, ed., *Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010); and David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, eds., *Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010).

19. For a recent exception see Jukka Gronow and Sergei Zhuravlev, "Soviet Luxuries from Champagne to Private Cars," in Crowley and Reid, *Pleasures in Socialism*, 121–46. On the Trabant see Jonathan Zatlin, "The Vehicle of Desire: The Trabant, the Wartburg, and the End of the GDR," *German History* 15, no. 3 (1997): 358–80; Raymond G. Stokes, "Plastics and the New Society: The German Democratic Republic in the 1950s and 1960s," in Crowley and Reid, *Style and Socialism*, 65–80. The afterlife of the Trabant has inspired a good deal of analysis. See, for example, Ina Merkel, "From Stigma to Cult: Changing Meanings in East German Consumer Culture," in *The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World*, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 252–57; Daphne Berdahl, "Re-Presenting the Socialist Modern: Museums and Memory in the Former GDR," in Pence and Betts, *Socialist Modern*, 348–51.

20. See also Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Cars for Comrades: The Life of the Soviet Automobile* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

21. Gijs Mom, "Writing the History of Automobilism as a History of Consumption: Some Thoughts on the Future of Mobility History" (paper presented to the Socialist Car Conference, Berlin, June 12–14, 2008).

22. See, respectively, Rolf Torstendahl, *Bureaucratisation in Northwestern Europe, 1880–1985: Domination and Governance* (London: Routledge, 1991), 100–104; Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 30–57, 131–53; Greg Grandin, *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009), 11–15; Gérard Bordenave, "Ford of Europe, 1967–2003," in *Ford, 1903–2003: The European History*, ed. Hubert Bonin, Yannick Lung, and Steven Tolliday (Paris: PLAGE, 2003), 1:243–317; Paul Thomas, "Searching for Identity: Ford Motor Company in the German Market (1903–2003)," in Bonin, Lung, and Tolliday, *Ford*, 2:151–95; and Yves Cohen, "The Soviet Fordson: Between the Politics of Stalin and the Philosophy of Ford," in *Ford*, 2:531–58.

23. Pence and Betts, introduction to *Socialist Modern*, 11–15; Péteri, introduction to *Imagining the West*, 4–10.

24. Michael David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 55, no. 4 (2006): 535–55 (quotation on 550). See also Michael Werner and Bénédictine Zimmerman, "Beyond Comparison: *Histoire Croisée* and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45 (February 2006): 30–50, and Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 35: "To be sure, the image of the other is by now rather well explored, but the monstrous imbrications and entanglements of Nazism and Stalinism have yet to be fully recognized. For however we turn them, the past, present, and future of both regimes and what came of them are inseparable from their *histoire croisée*."

25. For a fascinating study of failed attempts (largely involving the GDR and Czechoslovakia) to produce a "COMECON car," see Burghard Ciesla, "Difficult Relations: German Automobile Construction and the Economic Alliance in Eastern Europe (1945–1990)," unpublished paper, n.d.

26. John Bushnell, "The 'New Soviet Man' Turns Pessimist," in *The Soviet Union since Stalin*, ed. Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch, and Robert Sharlet (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 191–94.

27. Wendy Bracewell, "Adventures in the Marketplace: Yugoslav Travel Writing and Tourism in the 1950s–1960s," in *Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism*, ed. Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane P. Koenker (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 264. Cf. Bushnell, "The 'New Soviet Man,'" 191: "For Soviet citizens, to arrive in East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest is to visit their own version of the West, prosperous but prosaic."

28. Mike Featherstone, "Automobilities, an Introduction," *Theory, Culture and Society* 21, no. 4–5 (2004): 2. This is a summary of Urry's understanding. See also John Urry, "The 'System' of Automobility," *Theory, Culture & Society* 21, nos. 4–5 (2004): 25–39.

29. Robert Argenbright, "*Avtomobilshchina:* Driven to the Brink in Moscow," *Urban Geography* 29, no. 7 (2008): 683–84.

30. Steffen Böhm et al., "Part One: Conceptualizing Automobility," *Sociological Review* 54, no. 1 (2006): 1–3.

31. Rolf Hellebust, *Flesh to Metal: Soviet Literature and the Alchemy of Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

32. Tim Edensor, "Automobility and National Identity: Representation, Geography and Driving Practice," *Theory, Culture & Society* 21, nos. 4–5 (2004): 102–3 (emphasis in original).

33. See also the remark of a Soviet sociologist—that "car owners involuntarily are compelled to raise their own technical culture which can be considered a positive development"—in V. T. Efimov and G. I. Mikerin, "Avtomobilizatsiia v razvitom sotsialicheskom obshchestve," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 1 (1976): 134.

34. Jukka Gronow, "Vzlet i padenie Lada ('Zhiguli') v Finliandii. Prodazhi, imidzh i otnoshenie k sovetskim avtomobiliam v Finliandii v 1970–1990-kh gg.," in *Istoriia OAO "AVTOVAZ": Uroki, problemy, sovremennost', Materialy II Vserossiiskoi nauchnoi konferentsii, 26–27 oktiabria 2005 g.*, ed. R. G. Pikhoia (Togliatti: OAO "AVTOVAZ," 2005), 268–70.

35. S. V. Zhuravlev et al., *AVTOVAZ mezhdu proshlym i budushchim: Istoriia volzhskogo avtomobil'nogo zavoda 1966–2005* (Moscow: RAGS, 2006), 172–81; Peter Hamilton, "The Lada: A Cultural Icon," in *Autopia: Cars and Culture*, ed. Peter Wollen and Joe Kerr (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 191–98.

36. Cf. Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 19: "The car *is* the commodity form as such of the twentieth century."

37. Urry, "The 'System' of Automobility," 25–26.

38. Edensor, "Automobility and National Identity," 108.

39. Merkel, "From Stigma to Cult," 254–55.

40. Ivan Dykhovichnyi, director. In 2000, more than eighty thousand readers of the Russian car magazine *Za rulem* voted for Russia's "best automobile of the twentieth century." The Lada 2101 received one quarter of all the votes, more than any other car. See Elena Varshavskaia, "Vy vybrali VAZ-2101," *Za rulem*, no. 1 (2000): 4–6.

1 The Elusive People's Car

1. Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds., *Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 2–3. By the American model of mass production the authors mean "high volume manufacture of standardized goods using special purpose machinery and predominantly unskilled labour—together with the host of systematic management techniques, organizational structures and research and marketing services developed for its efficient administration and effective exploitation." On the relevance of "practices" in the Americanization debate see Yves Cohen, "Administration, Politique et Techniques. Réflections sur la Matérialité des Pratiques Administratives dans la Russie Stalinienne, 1922–1940," *Cahiers du Monde Russe* 44, nos. 2–3 (2002): 269–307.

2. Tim Edensor, "Automobility and National Identity. Representation, Geography and Driving Practice," *Theory, Culture & Society* 21, nos. 4–5 (2004): 101–20, and John Urry, "The 'System' of Automobility," *Theory, Culture & Society* 21, nos. 4–5 (2004): 25–39. For a contribution to the issue of Czech national identity see Ladislav Holy, *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation: National Identity and the Post-Communist Social Transformation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

3. Sandrine Kott, "Pour une Histoire Sociale du Pouvoir en Europe Communiste: Introduction Thématique," *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 49, no. 2 (2002), 5–24, and Kott, *Le communisme au quotidien. Les entreprises d'état dans la societé est-allemande* (Paris: Belin 2001).

4. *Auto. Officielní orgán autoklubu RČS* was the monthly official magazine of the Czechoslovak Autoclub. In 1949 it was renamed *Motorista*.

5. Raymond Stokes, *Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany 1945–1990* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 112–13, and Stokes, "In Search of the Socialist Artefact. Technology and Ideology in East Germany, 1945–1962," *German History* 15 (1997): 221–39; see also Radovan Richta, *La Via Cecoslovacca. Civiltà al Bivio: Le Proposte di Praga per un Nuovo Socialismo* (Milan: Franco Angeli 1968).

6. Alice Teichová, "Czechoslovakia: The Halting Pace to Scope and Scale," in *Big Business and the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Alfred Chandler, Franco Amatori, and Takashi Hikino (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 447–61, and Teichova, *The Czechoslovak Economy 1918–1980* (London: Routledge, 1984), 150.

7. Jaroslav Frei, "Jaký bude osud našho automobilového prûmyslu" [What will be the future of our motor vehicle industry], *Auto*, no. A1 (1946): 1–6; Jaroslav Frei directed Jawa Motor, one of the main producers of cars and motorcycles in the interwar period that from 1946 specialized in the production of motorcycles.

8. Ibid.

9. František Kec, "Vyroba automobilu v nové republice" [The production of motor vehicles in the new Republic], *Auto*, no. A1 (1946): 6–7.

10. Karel Zámečník, "Význam znárodnení Československého automobilového prûmyslu" [The significance of nationalization of the motor vehicle industry], *Auto*, nos. A7–A8 (1946): 104–5.

11. Frei, "Jaký bude osud," and also Karel Výška, "Ještê k výrobê automobilû v nové republice" [Again concerning the production of automobiles in the new republic], *Auto*, no. B3 (1946): 50–51.

12. This was announced in the liberated city of Košice in East Slovakia on April 5, 1945. The programs had been agreed on by the government in exile in London with the Communists and had been heavily conditioned by them. For some contextualization, see Bradley F. Abrams, *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Teichova, "Czechoslovakia: The Halting Pace to Scope and Scale," 447–61; and Teichova, "For and against the Marshall Plan in Czechoslovakia," in *Le Plan Marshall et le Relèvement Economique de l'Europe. Colloque tenu à Bercy les 21, 22, 23 mars 1991*, ed. René Girault and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer (Paris: L'Imprimerie Nationale, 1993), 840.

13. Alexander Taub, responsible for engine construction at General Motors, was invited by the General Direction of the Mechanical and Steel Industry (Generální Ředitelství Kovodělného a Strojírenského Prûmyslu, KOVO). His reports were translated from English to Czech by Frei.

14. Alexander Taub, "A People's Technology," report to Dr. Ing. F. Fabinger, general director of KOVO, Prague, September 1946, Historical Archives Škoda Auto (AŠA), records of Automobilové Závody, Národní Podnik/p (AZNP/p), b. 4, 6; see also František Herbert Žalud, *Přežili jsme. Zkušenosti z Mého Života 1919–1993, Popsané pro Má Vnoučata a Jejich Generaci* [We have survived. My life experience written for my grandchildren and their generation] (Prague: Trilabit, 1998), and V. Fava, "Tecnici, ingegneri e fordismo. Škoda e Fiat nelle relazioni di viaggio in America," *Imprese e Storia* 22 (2000): 201–49.

15. Taub, "A People's Technology," 8.

16. "Soubor přednášek o poznatcích získaných v USA Přednášeno v AKRCs dne 2.února 1948" [File of lessons on experiences in the U.S. Presented on February 2, 1948, at the Czechoslovak Automobile Club], AŠA, AZNP/p, 4: the file includes the texts of the lessons of František Fabinger, Vladimír Matouš, Václav Křêmár, Richard Kneschik, Zdeněk Kejval. See also the complete reports: Vladimír Matouš, *Cestovní zprávy z USA, Výtah z cestovních zpráv od 31. srpna do 12. listopadu 1947* [Extract of the report of the trip to the U.S., from August 31, 1947, to November 12, 1947]; Václav Křêmár, *Automobilové továrny v USA, Zpráva z cesty konané v červenci-září 1947* [Automobile factories in the U.S. Report of the July–September 1947 trip], AŠA, AZNP/p, 4.

17. The debate about the future of automobile production emerges from the minutes of the meeting of the technical board of the AKRCs Czechoslovak Automobile Club published in *Svêt Motorû* between 1949 and 1950: see in particular "Nemístní luxus" [a senseless luxury], *Svêt Motorû*, no. 76 (1950): 164.