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Fundamentalism and globalism

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ABSTRACT *The religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all today undergoing a transformation known generically as 'fundamentalist'. Although this term is impossible any longer to define precisely, and although there are obvious differences between the movements to which the label is attached, numerous common features, including the original defining feature of fundamentalism—namely the idea of the inerrancy of a sacred text—remain. Together, these considerations justify an interpretation of contemporary religious transformations in a common framework of analysis, especially when account is taken of their global character. This paper develops such an interpretation by focusing on two aspects of the globalism of fundamentalist movements—their transnational reach and the role played by globalism in their imaginary projections across time and space. In addition the paper explains the movements' approaches to popular cultural traditions and to religious and sacred texts, and concludes by emphasising both their modernity and, through an account of their treatment of sexuality, the quasi-ethnic character of the multiple strategies of boundary maintenance which set them apart from other bearers of their own traditions and from the outside world generally.*

To speak of globalisation in the religious field, is hardly to speak of something new: the spread of systems of religious belief, ritual and authority across ethnic, national and linguistic boundaries is as old as religion itself: the history of Christianity and Islam has, of course, been marked by endless campaigns, violent and non-violent, of conversion and penetration, while its diasporic character and history has become a defining feature of Judaism. This paper is inspired by the truism that contemporary forms of religious expansion commonly, albeit crudely, known as 'fundamentalism', are also distinctively global in reach, and that they are global in several different and partially—but not wholly—overlapping ways because they are imbued with distinctive awareness of their own place in time and space and of the identity of the others among whom they exist and whom they often try to convert. The paper is based on extensive field work on Pentecostalism in Brazil and on the early stages of research on ultra-Orthodox Judaism in London, Rio, São Paulo and Santiago.

The starting point is a delineation of the way in which globalism has long manifested itself in Catholicism, used as a benchmark against which to set the forms it takes in the various revivals and/or fundamentalisms which have arisen in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The paper explains what these fundamentalisms have in common and also—not quite the same thing—in what sense they

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can be described as global at the level of organisation and also of the imaginary. In this way we may find out how they have developed and propagated interpretations of their own presence in different national and cultural milieux, in countries of quite different standards of living, in some cases of their own diasporic character, in such a way as to project an image of themselves in relation to other versions of their own religious traditions, and to the varied cultural spaces in which they have made themselves a niche. This interpretation thus goes beyond a notion of sects as blind to their surroundings, trying to preserve their traditions or customs in as pure a way as possible, by showing that they are acutely aware that their presence transcends established boundaries of linguistic and political space, and that this awareness is a central feature of their projection in the modern world.

An approximate definition of fundamentalism is offered, but the issue at hand is not whether, in a platonic sense, the movements described fit an acceptable definition of the word. Rather the paper asks whether there are features common to the movements mentioned which allow us to speak of a religious form which cuts across conventional religious boundaries and draws its particularity from its distinctive insertion in and interpretation of contemporary processes of economic and cultural globalisation.

Globalisation and cultural boundaries: two variants

Whereas economic globalisation is thought to bring about homogeneity and uniformity in methods of management, in economic policies, and above all in the rules of market relationships, cultural globalisation needs to be thought of as an altogether more reflexive, refracted, and multifaceted phenomenon.[1] The relationship between the two is not of the kind which would enable one to say that homogeneity in one sphere engenders homogeneity in the other. Utopias and arcadias, nostalgias and disappointments must be avoided, lest we mourn the loss of cultures without noticing how much in those cultures, indeed in all 'cultures', has been borrowed and lent in the past and survives in borrowed robes. There is now abundant criticism of those who would preach the pickling of objects we call 'the culture of the such-and-such' in the aspic of pop-anthropology or pop-environmentalism without realising that in the process of doing so they themselves are inevitably, through the preservation process, affecting those cultures. Usually they are bearers of a global social movement; as members of international indigenist or environmentalist networks of activists and NGOs, they are dealing with the conscious human bearers of those 'other' cultures, and thus their intentions and meanings—not to speak of their power and the way they wield it—will be read, marked, learnt and inwardly digested by those 'other' people and, once again, will undoubtedly have an effect on their culture.[2]

The transposing of images and messages across what were previously taken to be cultural boundaries does not imply that cultures on each side of those boundaries are coming to resemble each other more and more as cultural complexes, or complexes of symbols and shared meanings. Rapid and intense—or sometimes slow and more benign—transmission and adoption of cultural symbols transform the cultural complexes into which they are assimilated, and

then find their way out again in a new form on their way back to the place of origin or on to new locations.[3] The interchange of symbols, practices, rituals and ideas does not, in other words, occur in ready-made packages, but in the migration of those symbols, rituals and icons, variously distributed over time and space, so that the outcome of the mixture—even were they all to derive from the very same place of origin, which they do not—is bound to be different in each place of arrival, the place of 'arrival' being in any case but a staging post on an interminable journey. With the transmission of cultural symbols and practices comes a certain idea of their provenance, a projection of another culture, another place, which may be desired or feared, but is projected nonetheless.

Perhaps the earliest instance of how European thought has dealt with these issues is in the early history of Catholicism in Latin America: in the ferocious debates about the *indios* and the legitimacy of their conversion and their servitude, Spanish scholars recognised that they were entitled to the same rights as all other human beings, as Bartolomé de Las Casas argued in his defence of the *indios*. While others oppressed and killed on the hypocritical pretext that the indigenous peoples were idolaters or devil-worshippers, Las Casas described their pagan practices as their own way of adoring the same God as the Christians.[4] Las Casas gained some sympathy for the Indians' plight from the Spanish monarchy, but he lost his battle; yet over the succeeding centuries, the Church found ways of alternately co-opting and repressing practices considered alien to official ritual and theological acceptability, and found willing accomplices and partners within the indigenous populations. In the first half of the 16th century, in a context of war and epidemics, with their catastrophic effects on the demographics and social fabric of Indian society, Indians in what is now Mexico familiarised themselves with and lived up to the stereotypes the Spanish clergy and conquerors had of them: under threat of torture or worse they readily admitted to being idol-worshippers and even fashioned images and idols out of precious stones and gold so as to satisfy the preying curiosity of the Conquerors and their priests. This at least enabled some of them to put an end to their maltreatment, albeit at the cost of severe internal division. Thus in settling their internal disputes, groups of villagers might betray one another to their new masters with accusations of idolatry.[5]

The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe, which dates from the 1650s, bears witness to this continuing negotiation. It is not in any sense an accident that it was an *indio*, Juan Diego, who was said to have had the original vision of the Virgin. Over centuries the cult was managed in such a way as to project a special relationship between the Mexican people and the Church, the figure of Christ and above all the Virgin herself. Proclaimed Patron by church delegates from all the dioceses of New Spain in 1746, and confirmed as such by the Pope in 1754, the Insurgents of 1810 went to battle under her banner.[6] Guadalupe still today fulfils numerous symbolic and thaumaturgic or curative functions for the Mexican population, and is often said to be the one symbolic representation on which they can all—even the ferociously anti-clerical twentieth-century revolutionaries—agree. In the (probably apocryphal) Papal words which adorn every image of the Virgin, *non fecit taliter omni nationi*—'He did not do likewise for

nation'.[7] In other words, the Virgin of Guadalupe is particular to the Mexican people, identified in this tradition with the Indian population, a recognition of their difference and distinctiveness, of their special devotion to the Virgin and to this image of her.

The Virgin of Guadalupe is but the most celebrated of innumerable local cults, all of which bear witness to something broader and deeper than a political tactic on the part of the Church to retain the allegiance of indigenous populations, for it forms part of a pervasive dialectic of the erudite, or the official, and the popular in Latin Catholicism. The notion of a dialectic is proposed as an alternative to the terms 'popular religion' or 'popular culture' and arises from a dissatisfaction with the 'untouched' or autonomous concept of popular culture.[8]

The intellectual construction of 'the popular' itself finds a response among those to whom it is directed—as we can see in the way the new ritual and symbolic—and power—systems were confronted and absorbed by indigenous populations (or what remained of them) in 16th century Mexico. There is a specifically Catholic aspect to this, which chimes with what we shall explain as the Church's *cosmopolitanism* but stands in contrast to the *globalism* we find in contemporary charismatic and evangelical movements such as the Pentecostals. By 'cosmopolitan' I refer to a response to cultural differences which recognises those differences, legitimises rather than denigrates them and responds to them by creating mechanisms of accommodation or coexistence, for example by co-opting 'other' practices, symbols and rituals. Inevitably, this is a process with a certain 'power content'—as illustrated by the Mexican example—but it serves to mark an important distinction between Catholic and fundamentalist responses to culture clashes and cultural difference. The distinction also allows us to speak of globalisation with respect both to its homogenising facet ('Coca-Cola', 'McDonalds', the culture of financial markets) and to the facet which exalts and dramatises difference. This latter facet is demonstrated in innumerable ways—for example the disembedding of indigenist medical and religious practices, as in Buddhism or New Age, the proliferation of international movements in support of indigenous and ecological survival, the fashion for 'ethnic' styles in music, art, architecture and dress, and so on.

The idea of cosmopolitanism in this sense also chimes with the project of a 'People's Church'(*Iglesia Popular*) as propagated by grassroots movements in Catholicism in Latin America and the Philippines, inspired in a loose way by the Theology of Liberation. These movements and those who speak on their behalf sometimes caricature the history of the Church since the Conquest as one of persistent neglect of material and political needs of the poor and of indigenous peoples, but they cannot accuse the institution of ritual or aesthetic neglect of the other, or of pursuing a policy of cultural or religious exclusion—on the contrary the Church enters into a multifaceted, often inconsistent, relationship with indigenous cultures and religions and the result is the syncretism we so often observe.[9] It is hardly a meeting of equals—on the contrary the realities of inequality, cultural dominance and intellectual hegemony all shape the syncretism—but in no way can they be said to destroy indigenous culture, save by those who conceive culture as immobile, unchanging and impervious to 'its' environment. It is in this perspective that we can grasp one significance of

Gruzinski's hints that the pervasive belief in, and invocation of, spirits observed in the Andes and in Mexico can be traced back to the time when indigenous rituals were forced into clandestinity by the persecution of the Church.[10]

To clarify the difference between global and cosmopolitan approaches to 'the other', contrast the policies towards paganism and witchcraft in a later period in (Protestant) British colonial Africa and the Brazilian state. Following Yvonne Maggie and Peter Fry, we find that the British prohibited witchcraft and penalised it severely, viz the Rhodesian Witchcraft Suppression Law of 1896. In stark contrast, in the application of Brazil's 1890 Penal Code, the suppression of witchcraft was founded on the very efficacy of such accusations, and thus on an assumption that witchcraft itself was efficacious. In Brazil witchcraft was to be condemned only when used to take advantage of people's credulity and especially to extract money from them, or when usurping the medical profession's well protected monopoly.[11] Maggie's book chronicles—inevitably—the extreme difficulty of achieving convictions under the Brazilian Law. Likewise, at the turn of the century, the Brazilian Church was particularly shrill in its condemnation of 'pagan' practices, i.e. possession cults; but this shrillness has fluctuated over the decades since then, and the reality is that the Church—in tune with the cosmopolitanism described above—has never enforced its anathema through measures against practitioners or beneficiares of witchcraft.

Today the relationship between dominant cultures and their 'others' is scarcely the same as it was in 16th century Spain or even 19th century Brazil or colonial Rhodesia—but some of the themes will not go away. Within Catholic culture and within global social movements—grassroots-orientated NGOs, the People's Church, environmental movements, movements for the protection of threatened civilisations and the like—a reverential respect for the other, for popular culture and for indigenous societies is cultivated. This occurs in a context where globalisation brings the 'other', in this case especially the 'distant other', into ever closer contact with the bearers of dominant cultural forms such as the English language, the habits of bureaucracy, and information technology. But like their 16th century forebears, modern cosmopolitans have a *theory* about their relationship with the other, and it centres on notions of authenticity: the destiny, the survival of others depends on their ability to hold together as an integral whole, which can then imperceptibly become an integrated cultural package, labelled and categorised and theorised by the spokespeople of international social movements. And although the 16th century friars and bishops did not want to preserve their others, they were the great pioneers of a concept of authenticity in this sense, as evidenced in Las Casas' interpretation of human sacrifice.[12]

The specificity, therefore, of the cosmopolitan variant of cultural globalisation lies not in the continued acceleration of processes of cultural change and interchange whose history goes back a long way in time, but rather in the awareness of otherness which they bring with them, the elements of mimicry, mimetism, irony, self-conscious imitation, revived authenticity—in short in some sense a theory of history which calls upon people of very different language, religion and economic status to think about themselves in relation to others.

This is more than simply the intensification of culture contact. The very notion

that cultures have borders can be questioned, and questioned not only for the modern period in which these interchanges have evidently intensified so much. Cultural differences between groups in space are not distributed in clusters: differences in language are not correlated with, or superimposed upon, differences in religion, in cuisine or in mechanisms of political allegiance, let alone in spatial location.[13] Those who would trace or circumscribe patterns of behaviour so as to trace boundaries around group identities are trying to 'encage the wind'.[14]

So the notion that 'cultures' have 'boundaries' makes sense only in the context of a notion of the self-representation of collectivities as cultural entities or their representation as such by others. This self-representation in its turn is elaborated, developed and propagated by elites and intellectual authorities speaking on their behalf, in an endless dialectical process whereby shared images and practices are transformed, idealised, momentarily frozen but never fossilised, as they are exchanged between different groups, whose ideologies nevertheless proclaim cultural boundaries as utterly real, tangible and self-evident.

This endless interchange is not, to be sure, 'power-free': to convince others of their identity is itself to exercise power over them—perhaps not overwhelming or exclusive power, but power nonetheless. To attempt to convince them is to make a bid for influence over their lives, even their livelihoods. In a search for and legitimisation of authenticity, of faithfulness to roots and origins, the intelligentsia have a prominent role to play—indeed the intelligentsia are usually the main protagonists of this type of search. They reinvent the history, they write it up, popularise, transform it into slogans, emblems and banners; or, as in the case of the People's Church movement, they write the handbooks, the guides and the manuals, they lead seminars and networks, and they raise funds in far-off places. They even adopt practices or rituals in a self-conscious manner across cultures, claiming to preserve respect for the other culture and conserve a conception of the other culture as a unified complex whole.[15]

There is the cultivation of authenticity and there is kitsch, and though neither earns high marks for faithfulness of reproduction, the mode of reception differs between them: the Pentecostals' evocation, visual and verbal, of the United States depicts a legendary place, an earthly paradise—complete with tinsel and lace.[16] In contrast, when Catholic priests in Africa, and now increasingly in Latin America, adopt practices inspired by a doctrine of inculturation, involving the incorporation of indigenous religious rituals or artefacts into the Catholic ritual, they are linking those practices explicitly with a people, a place and a society, seeking, in the words of the late Superior of the Jesuits, Pedro Arrupe, not only to express the Christian message in elements proper to that culture, but also to transform it and remake it so as to bring about a 'new creation'.[17]

In contrast to the cosmopolitan version outlined above, fundamentalist and evangelical religious movements present a quite different variant on cultural globalisation, on the representation of the other, on dealing with cultural boundaries. They are disconcerting because they seem to cross cultural boundaries with enormous facility yet have no 'theory', they give little thought to the issues which so bedevil cosmopolitans and followers of modern global

social (not religious) movements, such as for example, the networks of indigenist, ecological, even eco-feminist NGOs.[18]

Fundamentalists borrow profusely but in a manner utterly bereft of the reflexive echoing described here: their implicit rejection of any notion of the wholeness of cultural complexes shocks Western and Westernised liberal or populist intellectuals, and indeed anyone with a strong sense of history and authenticity, because of the promiscuity of their borrowing and also because they rip the historical dimension out of their account of their own practices and origins while still claiming access to a traditional identity. Thus Pentecostals totally reject the contextual/historical approach to scriptural interpretation, while at the same likening themselves to the early church; ultra-nationalist/orthodox groups in Israel rewrite the history of the Jews in such a way as to reduce the entire diaspora experience to a mere parenthesis. Signs and signified are promiscuously detached from context and recombined across time and space. This may be offensive to intellectuals—and may even be intended to be so—but its roaring success on the ground raises a question about the extent to which the cosmopolitan variant as I have described it might indeed be a feature of 'high culture', concerned to project and even idealise 'popular culture' while remaining apart from 'mass culture'.

The point can be illustrated by the high-profile and rapidly growing Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, once Brazilian and now an apparently thriving multinational organisation. In Brazil this Church is engaged in a war against the possession cults, which it portrays as perpetrators of witchcraft and paganism; for the preachers of the Universal Church, the followers, or better clients, of *candomblé* and *umbanda* are possessed by the devil as a result of the machinations of the practitioners of those cults. Yet at the same time the Universal Church recognises, and indeed proclaims, the efficacy of the cults, of the possession, and of the witchcraft—in tune, incidentally, with the Brazilian legal tradition noted above.[19] In its services the Universal Church—like other 'neo-Pentecostal' churches, adopts imprecations, gestures and symbols drawn directly from the possession cults, but without the slightest hint of a theory of identity or autochthony. It simply borrows them because the leadership or the preachers believe they will work.[20] The contrast between this and the usage of similar ritual borrowings from either Brazilian possession cults or—to take a quite different context—Mexican indigenous religion, by adherents of the 'People's Church' tendency within the Catholic Church, or the practitioners of the indigenist theology or of inculturation, cannot be exaggerated. Those tendencies, which I have generically described as *basista*, because of their 'faith in the faith of the poor', or the grassroots, develop their theory about the proper place of indigenous practices in order to place the use of indigenous practices at second remove, in order to set them up as an authentic performance of something 'other', to use a now-tired expression. The Universal Church and similar bodies are simply not bothered by the question of authenticity or difference: theirs is certainly a performance, and a most dramatic one, complete with deliverance, summoning of devils and healing of all manner of ailments. But it is a performance of their own devising, not an enactment of someone else's performance.[21] The intellectual elite are, predictably, horrified, because this disembedded

symbolic manipulation offends their ideas of context and propriety and exploits the ignorance of the poor—while the Universal Church seems to thrive on the scandals it provokes in the media.[22]

The Mexican illustration comes from Oaxaca where Kristin Norget describes how the 'Indigenous Pastoral Centre in Oaxaca ... devotes much of its activity to the reinforcement of indigenous identity through the translation of Catholic rituals, sacraments and celebrations into indigenous languages, organizing workshops on popular religiosity, on traditional medicine, and on indigenous "social memory", encouraging activities like the transcription of local myths, songs and folktales'. Also 'all of the Church's projects ... refer to "traditional" indigenous social structure and attendant customs of communal labour and values to inform their models for organization'.[23] The organisers of these projects are engaged in a project of recovered identity, and are thus concerned to historicise and contextualise—precisely the opposite of what was observed in the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.

A final example of cosmopolitan responses to globalisation, that is of the projection of historicised identities, comes from a conflict in Chile over the construction of a dam on land owned by Mapuche peoples. This is a particularly interesting case because until quite recently the Mapuche had a low public profile and a very discrete presence in the country's self-imagining: the indigenous issue was regarded as one of land confined to a small section of the southern part of the country where, over more than a century, their lands had been usurped, poorly protected in homesteads (*comunidades*), partially recovered during the Land Reform (1964–73) and then threatened with dismemberment through privatisation under the Pinochet dictatorship.[24] Since about 1990 the law has been amended to protect Mapuche land, and there has been a political awakening among the vast majority of Mapuche who live in cities and not on the demarcated lands. Now in the mid 1990s, a severe conflict has arisen over the proposed removal of members of the small Pewenche group of Mapuche to make way for the Ralco dam. In the resulting conflict, activists operating with an eye to the wider Chilean and international public have encouraged the revival of ceremonies designed to establish clear demarcation lines between who is and who is not a Pewenche, using the 'cultural logic' of *winka* society—*winka* being the Mapuche term for their Chilean compatriots.[25] Thus a Mapuche New Year is now commemorated, the institution of the feminine shaman, or *machi*, has been revived, and a public presentation of a ceremony (*gillatun*) associated with dispelling the ravages of nature was enacted to prevent the construction of the dam. But the ceremony went badly wrong because of the tensions arising from the use of this identity-reinforcing occasion to build bridges with political society. In McFall and Morales' words, the boundary that is

> created between Mapuche and non-Mapuche is an exaggerated one which does not exist in the day-to-day relations of mixed marriages and identity switching but it is expressed forcefully at these politically motivated ceremonies and can lead to tension and sometimes to violence.

In terms of the terminology developed here, the revival of an indigenous identity takes places ineluctably in the context of modern Western concepts of nation-

hood and ethnic identity, and fits into the cosmopolitan response to cultural globalisation. This dialectic, in which the popular is at once shaped by and shaping erudite projections and conceptions, has no end: as in the case of the Kayapó in Brazil in an earlier debate/dispute,[26] the disputed popular identity is further dramatised by the involvement of the international anthropological community, transnational indigenist pressure groups and NGOs. In contrast the combination of techniques of mass marketing with an unselfconscious use of the popular, as in Brazilian neo-Pentecostalism, is not beset by any such self-doubt.

Scope of the term 'fundamentalism'

The scope of the term fundamentalism as used here evidently goes beyond strict definitions which tend to exclude charismatic and Pentecostal sects. In order to justify the characterisation of fundamentalism as a global phenomenon in any more than a trivial sense, it is necessary first to establish that confronting cultural difference and the crossing of cultural boundaries are central features in the growth of fundamentalist and evangelical movements and, second, to point out the similarities which exist between fundamentalist movements in the different world religions. But whatever the importance of global reach and transcultural presence, it will in the end be necessary to return to the level of the imaginary, if we are to establish the analytical importance of globalism in the interpretation of fundamentalism.

In using the term 'fundamentalism', I refer to charismatic and Pentecostal or evangelical forms of Christianity, to ultra-Orthodox Judaism and to Islamic revival or renewal (what the French call *intégrisme*). This is not an analytical definition, and it differs from traditional definitions because, as far as Christianity is concerned, scholars have habitually distinguished quite firmly between sects which insist principally on the absolute inerrancy of the Biblical text, and the Pentecostals, who give priority to the gifts of the Spirit. However, today this difference is more one of degree than of kind, since Pentecostals and Evangelicals routinely invoke the Bible as an inerrant text worldwide, while comparison of churches and movements shows that questions of doctrine are of small significance when distinguishing between them. Although there are still some divisions, at least in the United States,[27] the days when sects split from one another for reasons of doctrinal detail (often a thin disguise for arguments over power or money), as was so common in the United States in the early part of this century, are long since gone.[28] Doctrine is now, and probably was then, much less important than ritual, symbolism, conversion experiences and the 'change of life' that goes with them. For all their theological significance (though this may stretch the meaning of the word 'theology') and formal institutional reality, doctrinal distinctions are blurred in everyday evangelical rhetoric and apologetics: what counts is the force (not the content) of the invocation of the text, the force of the accusatory evangelical epithet 'anti-biblical', and the punctuation of prayer, sermons and diatribes with chapter and verse references (with or without mention of the contents of chapter and verse, which somehow seem to be secondary). The attachment to textual finesse, the rituals of

quotation and esoteric expertise predominates over the content of the finesses themselves.

Fundamentalism is in constant, often bewildering, flux, staying somehow 'ahead of the game' as observers (generally accustomed to thinking of religion as a conservative, stable affair and highly resistant to change) struggle to keep up with the mercurial inventiveness of religious entrepreneurship and organisational dynamics. This comes from growing political involvement within all three major religious traditions, bringing with it the need for coalition building, and also from developments 'on the ground'. In Latin American terms such 'believers' (*crentes* in Portuguese, *creyentes* in Spanish or simply *evangélicos*) have come to denote an entire new identity covering a multitude of churches, small and large, and denoted by distinctive modes of dress and speech and a distinctive way of life. The political dynamics are much in evidence: we have seen the creation of a joint Association of Brazilian Evangelicals and we know of the growing presence of Evangelicals in politics in numerous Latin American countries, not to speak of the Christian Coalition in the US. In Judaism the difference between religious ultra-orthodoxy and religiously inspired Zionist ultra-nationalism, especially territorial nationalism, is blurring, not least because the two tendencies are themselves undergoing important transformations. In Israel, the religious parties all support territorial expansion and the paraphernalia of punctilious religious observance are a prominent feature of irredentist West Bank settlement. In Islam likewise, 'traditionalist' fundamentalism sponsored by Saudi Arabia and concerned principally with the prevalence of *shar'ia* in the spheres of civil and criminal law, private morality and marriage shades off into the much more political Islam originating with the Muslim Brotherhood.[29] However, some distinctions remain highly important; a contrast must be drawn between the Iranian case, in which a clergy has seized power and there has therefore been no revolution against the religious establishment, and the Islamic fundamentalism of North Africa, where a primarily lay movement has over the past 50 years conducted a gradual revolution against the institutions of Islam and its links with the state. Among the defining features which separate fundamentalism in both Christianity and Islam from its opponents is hostility to establishment clerical personnel and their wisdom, and the penetration of society through proselytising campaigns from the grassroots. On this basis Iran does not qualify.[30] In Judaism this is more complicated because, until the creation of the State of Israel, there was no concept of an establishment or official clergy (save the peculiarly Anglo-Jewish institution of the Chief Rabbi).

Islamic revival movements encompass far more than headline-hitting fundamentalism. In the Middle East the movements of revival are by no means predominantly committed to the overthrow, let alone violent overthrow, of the state. Most Islamist activism is at the grassroots: NGO-type activity, involving health care, basic education, and the proliferation of 'non-governmental'—ie non-officially certified—mosques, youth associations, cooperatives, athletic clubs and only a very limited amount of paramilitary activity organisation.[31] In Western Europe there is widespread activism and revival among second and third generation Muslim immigrants: their parents or grandparents came from the Indian subcontinent, from North Africa and from Turkey, and tended to move

away from adherence to the prescribed ways of life towards assimilation, but this new generation has been returning to a more orthodox way of life. This seems to be related to the dramatic deterioration in employment opportunities and the serious problems of marginality, in France especially, which arise from the restructuring of the European economy. The European Islamic movements, in contrast to North Africa and the Middle East, are for the most part not political at all in the conventional sense of the word, but resemble both the renewal of Jewish ultra-orthodoxy and, in their 'targetting' of those suffering from social exclusion, the Pentecostals of South America[32] and Africa. The Jewish ultra-Orthodox renewal embodies a similar recovery of tradition and of identity among the children and grandchildren of immigrants, though it can hardly be said to be a response to economic deprivation.

One can divide the common features of these fundamentalisms into three broad categories: the sociological, the doctrinal and the imaginary. The first comprises the capacity to carry the message and forms of organisation across cultural frontiers; the obsession with drawing boundaries between the believers and others, one aspect of which is the control of women and of male and female sexuality; the use of modern techniques of organisation and communication; and the 'grassroots', or 'bottom-up' approach to proselytism and organisational expansion.[33] The second includes the propagation of the idea of scriptural inerrancy and its anti-intellectual corollary, namely hostility to modern forms of analysis of the Bible and of religious history. But it is the imaginary dimension sketched out in the preceding paragraphs which distinguishes contemporary charismatic and fundamentalist movements from earlier forms: the imaginary, convinced that it is recapturing disembedded rituals and symbols, 'cages' them through the use of mechanisms of social and institutional approval and disapproval, precisely through a self-conscious awareness of that disembedding. Thus a system of rules and regulations is created which fits in with contemporary notions of what constitutes religious institutionality. But furthermore, this element of disembedding in the derivation and formulation of rules and rituals also fits in with the global, as distinct from the cosmopolitan, version of cultural globalisation. For whereas the eco-feminists and the eco-indigenists are seeking to preserve the other, the fundamentalists do not recognise a distinction with their historic other—on the contrary they are the heirs to communities which existed in the time of the Prophet or in the Jewish world of Eastern Europe. The Pentecostals for their part cannot be said to attach enormous importance to their resemblance to early Christians, though they do draw that parallel. Their imaginary globalism resides in the proliferation of decontextualised borrowings from local and global cultures in the development of ritual practices—as mentioned above in the case of the Universal Church.

The role of the text

Much is made of the place of biblical inerrancy in fundamentalism, not least by fundamentalist groups themselves, but it is extremely difficult to provide an exclusively doctrinal account of the place of the text in them and in their culture without taking into account the question of interpretative authority and thus the

quintessentially political character of textual interpretation. The reason is that there is no such thing as a single self-evident reading of a sacred text: part of the very definition of the sacred character of a text is the existence of authoritative interpretations of it, and the existence of authoritative interpretations brings with it the issue of who, or what institution, confers the authority to interpret.[34] This is not merely a general point about the impossibility of a single reading of texts in general, but a particular point about texts regarded as sacred. If there were no political issue concerning their interpretation, sacred texts would not be sacred—whereas this is obviously not the case of texts in general.[35] Mainstream Protestant Churches and the Catholic Church in particular all have elaborate institutional arrangements to provide the authorized reading. Priests and pastors are qualified to preach in churches after studying at approved institutions and receiving a qualification. Although professional theology is to some extent a speculative discipline, where it takes place in approved institutions, such as Catholic Universities for example, it must respect certain limits. In Islam the position is not dissimilar, as in the centres of learning at Qum in Iran, except that the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which is the leading centre of training and learning in Sunni Islam, has for long been subject to varying degrees of state control. In Judaism the production and dissemination of rabbinical training and learning is far more dispersed and also fractious, but it is nevertheless institutionalised: a *yeshiva* (rabbinical training school) can only exist if there is a community which funds it and accepts its pupils as rabbis, and rabbis enjoy a recognised, institutionalised authority.[36]

In contrast, the doctrine of inerrancy dispenses with the need for professional theological expertise or even official authoritative interpretation: if the truth is there in the text and if no other text can add to the sacred text, then the truth is available to any individual who cares to look with faith and without evil intention. Brazilian Pentecostals, who carry their Bibles as they attend church, are transmitting this message, and they often say proudly that their reading is unmediated by experts, academics, scholars or professional theologians. This strong anti-intellectualism is much in evidence also in the bitter rhetoric employed by North American fundamentalists against 'egg-heads', 'leftists', 'liberals' and the like, and it goes back all the way to 19th century disputes about the 'higher criticism'.[37]

The purer fundamentalists have experts, but not theologians, whose knowledge is more esoteric than erudite or analytical: they produce a single authorised reading and their followers must accept it. Here we do find a distinction between Pentecostals and traditional Christian fundamentalists. As far as the Pentecostals are concerned the Bible is used as a vast concordance—a repertoire of quotations and stories suitable for the illustration of moral teaching or of practical instruction in the rituals of everyday life. Now the social scientist's job is not to decide whether one or another church or movement qualifies doctrinally as fundamentalist, but rather to delineate the culture of the institution, and the Pentecostals' culture of chapter-and-verse quotation highlights well the talismanic use they make of the sacred text. Traditional fundamentalists might well be shocked at the creative use of miracle stories, for example, in the preaching of Pentecostal pastors, but that is of no sociological importance: what counts is

the presumption among the faithful that the lessons being drawn come directly from the text. This is helped by the directness of the preachers' language—which, in my experience among Brazilian Pentecostals, has nothing of the formalism or learned character of the language of Catholic priests, even of the Catholic priests who follow the line of the 'People's Church' and seek to convey their message in a 'popular' language.[38]

There are then two dimensions, at least, to the issue of a fundamentalist treatment of texts: is it authoritarian and does it encourage individuals to read and learn from the texts on their own? In answer to the first question, it must be clear that it is authoritarian in the sense that there is no debate about the meaning of the texts: such debate would lead immediately to schism, however trivial the disagreements. As for the second question, if any believer could read what he or she cared to read 'into' a text then there would be no church or movement based on that text. So the question then is 'what is a reading?'

Here a 'reading' is one which is politically or institutionally sensitive for the movement or church in question, and therefore there is potentially plenty of room for interpretation by preachers and individuals who recognise themselves and each other as being part of the movement and its culture. Evidently not every word can be controlled, so in addition to control in certain sensitive areas, what is required is a training process whose graduates all share a common language, discourse and values, and command the requisite personal authority—thus using the text to reinforce membership or participation, to reaffirm belonging. So apart from politically sensitive issues, a close inspection reveals much latitude in precise interpretations, and the same can be seen with great clarity among the Chassidim, for whom disagreement is at the heart of the study of Biblical and Talmudic texts. Commitment to the inerrancy of the text does not guarantee a single uniform interpretation—rather it is expressed in the social context of study and interpretation, just as indigenous healing is embedded in a social context. Among evangelical Christians, the social context is framed by the relationship between a preacher and a following; among Jews, by the study group gathered on a regular basis around a Rabbi or teacher, moving between different languages, debating points of law or esoteric correspondence. Membership of the group, and thus observance of the rituals of everyday life prescribed by the community, qualifies a person to join in and express opinions. Theological questions in the usual sense of the word are never raised.

The idea that adherence to a culture rather than to a specific message or interpretation of individual passages, is the characteristic of these movements' approach to texts, can be illustrated with reference to Jewish ultra-orthodoxy, customarily referred to as fundamentalist. When Chassidim, for example students in a *yeshiva*, discuss and interpret texts, they do not look for a message so much as hidden correspondences and the intentions behind them. Since the Torah—the Pentateuch—is for them divinely 'authored', they cannot strictly speaking discuss it in terms of an author's intentions, but they allow themselves extensive latitude in discussing what might 'lie behind' a passage, why it is written one way and not the other, and so on: the text has an existence which transcends authorship and in a sense is its own author, concealing meanings within itself and behind the apparent meaning, in hidden correspondences and

coincidences. The discussions are endless and they draw indistinguishably on an infinity of texts written down any time between about 500 BCE and today. Stories have been invented over the centuries as illustrations of points of morality or belief, and they are told as fables or cautionary tales. There is also a vast array of mystical or Kabbalistic speculations which are almost parallel to the Torah—as for example in accounts of the Creation of the World—yet which raise no doubts at all in anyone's mind that they may be rivalling the Torah. Their *esprit de corps* and their common lifestyle obviates the need among Chassidim for an interpretative orthodoxy. Mutual trust is sustained by a common setting and a shared symbolic, esoteric and analogical reasoning.

As has already been said, Judaism has no theology in the Christian sense of the word: it simply has a tradition—indeed many traditions—and learned men are called Rabbis because of their erudition or the respect they command: the appearance of certified institutions of learning and recognised Rabbinical offices is a modern invention which arose only in Britain—where the Chief Rabbinate was established in the 19th century—and of course in Israel—and in both places these are eminently political offices.[39] Sunni Islam is little different, while in Sh'ia Islam there is indeed a clerical hierarchy. Also, in both Judaism and Islam, the twentieth century has seen the emergence of truly charismatic religious figures who have extended their influence far beyond the realms which were those of the Rabbi or Mullah in Eastern European towns and villages since the 18th century or, so far as the Middle East and North Africa are concerned, in the Ottoman Empire. Menachem Schneerson, the leader of the Lubavitch movement, was one example, as is Mawdala Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the *jama'at al tablighi* (Society for the Propagation of the Faith) which, from its beginnings in British India, has now become a worldwide community of millions of followers.[40]

So when, under the guidance of a Rabbi, these innumerable study groups dispersed across the world discuss texts and rabbinical teaching and mystical speculations, they are not reiterating unchanging truths of doctrine. Much of what they say is not doctrinal at all. Some of it has to do with the minutiae of rules governing everyday conduct—what can one eat, what can one cook, and what is the textual or rabbinic justification for these rules? Some has to do with 'comments on comments' about the intricacies of the text itself—why what is there is there and why what is not there is not there—and since there is always an absence—an alternative question—there is always a point for discussion. The discussion does not have a beginning, a middle and an end; it simply elaborates correspondences and correlations, and comes to an end not when the matter is settled but when it is time for the next activity.

There is therefore, paradoxically, no way in which Jewish textual learning can be described in terms of its doctrine, or even of its content: although the Torah is taken to be the original foundational text, there are innumerable additional ones and there is no common rule which privileges some over others: Lubavitchers privilege the writings of their leaders, others maybe do not read those writings at all. The appropriate characterisation is in terms of a style or method of argument and above all in the simple fact of being together and being aware that in coming together one is sustaining a tradition: together with the attention

to the text, then, is the attention to the routine of assembling to study it. Merely by doing so, at certain times, in certain places, sometimes in certain types of dress, those involved are making a statement. Learning, then, is a ritual of learning, and it is not surprising that so much of the learning in ultra-orthodox *yeshivas* is learning by rote. The young men who emerge from these centres are fearfully erudite, knowing acres of Torah and Rabbinic teachings from memory, but their analytical training is in language rather than in textual understanding. They use a vast linguistic repertoire, stretching across Old Testament Hebrew, Aramaic, Modern Hebrew, the rabbinic Hebrew ('Holy Speech') developed in the 18th and 19th century to discuss religious and textual matters, Yiddish, medieval Hebrew interspersed with French;[41] plus a repertoire of abbreviations and a range of scripts. They use their perhaps intuitive analytic understanding of languages to undertake a purely text-based reading of the Torah—a text which serves as a springboard for both legal and esoteric speculation.

The distinctiveness of fundamentalist movements, then, as far as their approach to texts is concerned, lies in their treatment of authority and in the ritual character of their approach to the text. We have seen in a little detail how this functions in Christianity and Judaism. In Islam the pattern is much the same: 'those who master the texts and the traditional forms of exegesis become the knowledgeable'.[42] The term 'inerrancy', with its implications that the interpretation is single and consistent, is anthropologically naive.

The control of female sexuality and other mechanisms of drawing boundaries

The prudishness which pervades movements of renewal and return to tradition in the three world religions under consideration is well known[43]—and of course this issue has, together with political nationalism and revolution, dominated media coverage. It is a difficult subject to research simply because the movements themselves hide women from prying observers; yet there is reason to ask whether it is adequate to offer a blanket characterisation of them as repressive of women and as movements in which marginalised men seek to reaffirm their power and masculinity.

In the case of Pentecostalism, many observers remark on the predominance of women in churches and also on the extent to which women claim that conversion has been followed by their empowerment in the home.[44] Within Chassidic Judaism observe, for example, the Lubavitch movement, the most 'modern' of them all in its emphasis on outreach and 'conversion' through the return of secularised Jews to a traditional way of life, or 'Jewishness'. The Lubavitcher provide for separate women's education, through schools, adult education and even seminaries. Jews and Pentecostals accord a prominent role to the wife of the Rabbi and the Pastor, which goes beyond the domestic to include leading women's study and social welfare groups. Among the urban poor in Brazil and Latin America, women find themselves caught in a home environment from which it is impossible to escape. They are frequently the principal providers, being unable to rely on the contribution of husbands and partners to the feeding and education of their children, and relying instead on networks of female

relatives and *comadres* (godparents of their children); they are vulnerable to abuse and worse by husbands, partners or even strangers; street life is dangerous for them. The church, local social movements or community-management organisations (so frequently female-led) are the only channels through which they can participate in the public sphere. But the social movements are not ubiquitous and often survive only thanks to support from local priests or NGOs. Compared to Pentecostal churches and chapels, they are thin on the ground. The Catholic Church remains far behind—church building, priestly vocations and pastoral provision having failed visibly to keep up with headlong urban growth.

The Pentecostal church, as observed in my Brazilian research, has become a place where women can have a role in the public sphere without incurring risks, and also where they can go without the men and children who otherwise leave them little or no time or space to themselves. For the churches are adept at treating their members not just as followers but also as active members—as minor officiants, maybe to start with simply as attendants or street missionaries, but later allowing them to proceed up the hierarchy, at least to a certain point. There is, however, little doubt that women are either excluded from the rank of pastor or have extreme difficulty in reaching that status, to the point where it is almost impossible, and so the puzzle remains: why, if they are badly treated in this respect, do women join churches in such vast numbers?[45]

These elements of doubt about women's exclusion overlook the underlying issue, which is not one of opportunities or exclusion, but one of sex. Brazilian Pentecostals summon a rich store of images to portray the woman as temptress, as an instrument of the devil, and also, if it is a man who is speaking, to portray men as somehow feminised by conversion: the image is of a man who has abandoned the world of *macho* behaviour, of drink, violence and fornication. The woman in ultra-Orthodox Judaism is loaded with the imagery not of the devil but of uncleanness related especially to menstruation: Chassidic men live in a constant state of anxiety that they might come into contact with a woman during her menstrual period in a public place like a bus, for example, for no contact of any sort is allowed with a woman during that time.

Some observers sense that sexual restraints have tended to become more severe among Chassidim and in other fundamentalist cultures, compared with the past, for example among North American Chassidim.[46] Among Pentecostals there have emerged obsessively prudish churches such as the Brazilian Deus é Amor, and the Mexican La Luz del Mundo,[47] where women have to wear a very modest uniform. The urge to invent ever more restrictions seems to know no limits: the movement within the sects is constantly towards more, not less, restriction of women, or towards new mechanisms of restriction as they adapt to changing circumstances—public transport for example, or opportunities in education or business. Small groups do not necessarily, or even usually, break away but they form little informal nuclei within the sects, practising just that much more restriction, whether sexual, or dietary or ritual. Thus the 'average'—if such a word makes any sense in this connection—becomes ever more restricted.[48]

It is possible that within these movements and communities there is more

prudishness than there was a few generations ago. But to make empirical, let alone statistical, sense of that statement, with evidence to hand, is more or less impossible. What counts rather is the constant pressure to draw and tighten the lines, the thresholds, the boundaries. When the majority of Jews in a vast swathe of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea were living in communities and keeping to their rituals as members of those communities, then the vigilance which the boundaries now require would not have made any sense: society itself was drawing boundaries around them—boundaries which eventually turned into the barbed wire fences of concentration camps. There were no non-Jewish boys and girls to marry; there was no unclean meat, there was no consumer society. Islamic revival expresses this difference more visibly precisely because the discriminations inflicted on Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe were not present in the Ottoman Empire against Muslims—or against Jews for that matter ...[49] Under the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt before the Revolution of the 1950s 'popular' or 'folk' Islam was practised in villages, with its Sufi healers and seers, and they too were subject to attack by the more worldly *ulema* and the government.[50]

Both religions have since been through traumas of different kinds. In Algeria the *déracinés*, those uprooted by war and urbanisation, retreated into a 'regressive traditionalism', while the *évolués*, the Algerian equivalent of the successful second and third generation Jews in America and Israel, acquired what Kepel has occasionally called a *métissage culturel*, they became local scions of European culture.[51] After Independence in Algeria, much as in Egypt, Islamism took the form of a purified Islam developing in opposition both to the arthritic and moribund official Islam and the 'uncontrollably magical' variant in the villages.[52] Once again boundaries had to be drawn in new circumstances in a manner reminiscent of—though hardly identical to—ultra-Orthodox Jewry after the Holocaust. As has already been said here, cultural boundaries are never 'natural', nor are they ever timeless and unchanging; but in the postwar and post-Independence situation the orthodox, and eventually fundamentalist, tendencies in both Islam and Judaism were evidently in a new situation and both found a way, through the invocation of tradition and the reinterpretation of rituals of exclusion and inclusion, of preserving themselves through boundary-maintenance based on a reference to tradition. Circumstances had changed so profoundly, however—as a result of the Holocaust and emigration for the Jews, as a result of ferocious national independence struggles and modernisation in the Muslim case—that now tradition was not just being maintained, it was being reconstructed and thus also constructed through a prism of memory, recall and violent transplantation—from the countryside to the city in North Africa, from Eastern Europe to the United States, Western Europe and Israel among the Jews. For all the crises of Latin America, it is evident that the region's recent history has been less extreme and less violent than that of the Muslims in North Africa or of the Jewish people, and so it may not be entirely surprising that we do not observe there a comparable attempt to reconstruct tradition, even though the tension between erudite and popular forms within Catholicism is not without parallels to those which have existed for centuries in Islam.[53]

Thus the prescriptions and restrictions have acquired a projective

character in which faithfulness to tradition—to 'Jewishness' or *Yiddishkeit* as Jews call it—is a value in itself involving construction of a certain notion of what that tradition is: no longer simply 'doing as it has always been done', but rediscovering how it used to be done and doing it in utterly hostile circumstances.

This explanation is necessary for even beginning to understand any set of restrictions in Islam and Judaism, including the question of female sexuality. Christian Pentecostalism presents different characteristics because it does not draw on a rooted tradition embedded over generations or centuries in a particular time, place and set of social arrangements—indeed in many ways it has a vocation of undoing traditions at various levels—that of ritual, that of the habits of daily life, that of the celebrations of 'faithfulness to origins' embedded in the 'popular culture' sponsored by official and semi-official Catholicism.

The literature on these subjects is on the whole unsatisfactory: as far as the notion of tradition is concerned authors simply take it for granted and do not begin to consider its projective character. And as far as female sexuality is concerned, there is a judgmental literature which either praises or condemns the seclusion and restrictions to which women are subject,[54] or is too involved with the author's own experience,[55] and then there are the majority of analyses which, surprisingly, simply do not attempt to tackle the issue.[56] None is illuminating.

It would be too simplistic to say that these are religious movements led by men whose position is threatened in many ways by the onset of modernisation and who find in the restrictions imposed by fundamentalist interpretation upon their wives and women a coping strategy for their frustration and humiliation. And even if this is appropriate in many individual cases, it still does not exhaust any effort to interpret the movements, nor, above all, does it explain the willing, sometimes enthusiastic, compliance of women themselves—though not of all women, obviously—in the movements.

The restrictions on women must be viewed anthropologically, and should be related to the ethnic or quasi-ethnic character of the movements. Chassidic rules of separation prohibit almost all social contact between unmarried men and women after puberty: the women are separated by a screen (sometimes a one-way mirror) in synagogue or in any place of prayer so that, although they may watch the proceedings, the men cannot see them; men and women sit on opposite sides of the table at meals, sit in different rooms at weddings, attend different study sessions, enter buses by separate doors, and are separated by a wall on the rare occasions when they might attend the same study session. The explanation offered by the Chassidim themselves for this punctilious, not to say obsessive, concern with purity of descent, is that unregulated sexual conduct can lead to illegitimacy and thus to uncertainty of a person's entitlement to membership in the Jewish community.[57] When we note that in Pentecostal movements there are also rigorous restrictions on sexual conduct, so that in some churches men and women are seated apart, and that in admittedly extreme cases (the Deus é Amor Church in Brazil is one) they prohibit marriage to non-members; or that in Islamist movements, as is well known, women (already when young) are enjoined to wear a headscarf comparable to the wig worn (after marriage) by Chassidic women, we are obliged to ask whether the control of

female sexuality is not, in addition a mechanism for drawing and reinforcing boundaries.

Indeed, since neither Pentecostalism nor Islam has the same doctrinal problems of 'ethnic purity', there is reason to ask whether, in the Jewish case, the issue is less one of 'purity of blood' than of accentuating the boundaries and differences separating the community from all outsiders, Jewish or non-Jewish. This receives further support when one notes that the various Chassidic and other ultra-orthodox groups practise a *de facto* endogamy, or even discourage (and therefore pre-empt) marriage outside the limits of the particular sect. In this case purity of blood is less important than purity of ritual practice and customs or the solidity of the boundaries drawn around the sect or community.[58]

The repression of women's sexuality is one of innumerable devices separating the community from 'the world' (to use a Pentecostal turn of phrase), and from others. It goes together with forms of dress and more generally with the rituals of everyday life. The Chassidim wear self-consciously dated and 'located' clothes—for example fur-lined hats in sweltering Jerusalem or in the tropics; the Pentecostals often wear sober grey suits and black ties; the French—and doubtless many other—followers of the *jama'at al talblighi* are led by bearded activists wearing a long light-coloured *djellaba* and turban, and the followers themselves always wear a white skull cap.[59]

The careful attention to drawing boundaries is expressed not only in dress and sexual control but also in the proclamation of a different way of life, of a transformation brought about in the lives of the convert, or of those—in Judaism and Islam—who have been brought back to the proper practise of the faith and of the tradition. Kepel quotes a preacher describing 'the others' (Muslims or non-Muslims) as 'lost souls' (*égarés*) with their wealth, their power, their video machines, their wine and their women.[60] Breaking the rules of conventional society takes innumerable forms: on the one hand, there are ways of scandalising the public, for example by conducting street campaigns to convert lost Jews and Muslims—a practice common to the followers of *jama'at al tablighi*, of Lubavitch and also of many Pentecostal organisations—or by wearing distinctive, even self-consciously outlandish, clothing. On the other hand, charismatic and fundamentalist movements may break the rules precisely by behaving in exaggeratedly 'conventional' manner or advocating extreme 'conventional' moral codes, as in prohibitions on tobacco and wine, or on public depictions of the body in advertisements, for example, or on artistic presentations: in response to the 'scandal' of permissiveness they themselves create an even bigger 'scandal'.

The form of boundary maintenance changes, but its quasi-ethnic character and its function remain, and this construction of a quasi-ethnicity is all the more striking when we note the racial blindness of at least the Pentecostal and Islamic variants. In Brazil, Pentecostal churches seem to create a space in which racial discrimination is simply absent—even though the churches do not 'make an issue' of opposing racial prejudice.[61]

Recent trends among neo-Pentecostals cast sexuality and femininity in a new light: in Brazil, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God takes a more tolerant line on women's dress and is trying to appeal to a younger, perhaps

more middle class clientele than for example the Deus é Amor ('God is Love') Church or the Assemblies of God from which Deus é Amor is descended. The Universal Church deals with the devilishness of sex in a different way, by propagating a rich imagery (drawn in no small measure from the possession cults) to depict sexual temptation and threatened family ties. In the process, the popular imaginary undergoes a striking inversion. Whereas traditional Latin and Mediterranean imagery portrays the woman as a weak link in the defence of family honour in the face of predatory men, and the man as defender of the family honour, if necessary by violence, in Pentecostal discourse it is the men who are weak and vulnerable to temptation at the hands of powerful women or women possessed by diabolical forces or endowed with magical powers (like *mães de santo*, mediums and priestesses in possession cults), in addition, of course, to the temptations of the bottle and the street. The wife, or 'female household-head' (since so many are unmarried or for whatever reason are in sole charge of their dependents) is empowered, and responsible, especially if she joins the Church, and portrays herself or is portrayed as a woman who can assert herself over her men.

This particular development is unique to the neo-Pentecostals in Brazil, but it does illustrate the mercurial and dynamic character of these movements, and their readiness to take advantage of opportunities—a reality which is difficult for outsiders to reconcile with their perception of backward-looking traditionalism and puritanism. Tradition has to be marketed—even at the risk of turning it into kitsch.

The Universal Church, as so often, provides an unexpected angle on the ways in which fundamentalists exploit scandal in the name of boundary maintenance: its leaders seem to want to create a scandal, as in the notorious incident on their own nationwide television station in 1994 when one of their leading pastors maltreated an effigy of Brazil's patron, the Madonna of Aparecida.[62] The performative aspect of their challenge to existing cultural elites is expressed in the high-profile use of imagery from possession cults, the confrontational posture *vis-à-vis* those same cults, in barefaced calls for donations, and in the construction of monumental-style churches in central urban locations. All this can have many purposes, but one is to enable the Church to delineate a profile of its own: it may differ in its methods of drawing boundaries from preceding generations of Pentecostals, but the adoption of new methods for this purpose shows the ability of this church and others like it to adapt their methods to changing cultural and economic patterns.

Methods of organisation and proselytism

To develop a movement of any kind in the twentieth century requires twentieth century methods—even if that movement is trying to bring about a return to a way of life which proclaims itself to be traditional. Pentecostal churches in Latin America are at a great advantage with respect to the Catholic Church simply through the fact that they are not burdened with the weight of an ancient institutional apparatus. The larger ones, like the Assemblies of God and the neo-Pentecostals like the Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, have set up training systems which enable even the humblest members to acquire

a role in the institution, and to make some progress in the hierarchy. There are limits to this advancement, since the ranks of fully-fledged pastors are small and to reach them in the Assemblies requires substantial investment of time and money for many years. Also, the Conventions which govern the Assemblies seem to be self-perpetuating oligarchies led by individuals who keep their positions for decades—until they die and are often replaced by one of their sons. Neo-Pentecostal organisations are extremely centralised and led by hand-picked members of the leader founder's entourage. Whereas in the Assemblies of God a pastor may remain identified with his chapel or area for a long time, neo-Pentecostal organisations rotate them in order presumably to prevent them becoming too closely identified with particular communities. Neo-Pentecostal churches, which place an enormous emphasis on financial contributions by members, offer more explicit financial incentives to those in positions of responsibility, and do not encourage the proliferation of chapels as is the established Pentecostal practice. The principle of heredity and centralisation combined with a personality cult is found in an extreme form in the Luz del Mundo church, based in Guadalajara, Mexico.

We have noted the frequency with which succession to office in the Assemblies of God and other Pentecostal (but not neo-Pentecostal) churches is, in effect, by inheritance. A similar pattern is observed among the leaders of Chassidic sects. This principle ran into severe difficulties, however, in the case of the Lubavitch sect, because of their distinctive mission and the ultra-charismatic, almost messianic aura which they conferred, and still confer, upon their Rebbe, or supreme leader, who died in 1994. The Rebbe died childless and in any case he had built up for himself an unprecedented and irreplaceable position which had more in common with that of an evangelical leader than of a traditional Eastern European Rebbe. The resultant power structure is shrouded in mystery, but it must be assumed that it has led to a degree of institutionalisation and routinisation of power within this sect. In contrast with other Chassidic communities, the Lubavitch have a worldwide network of missionaries and *yeshivas* and their missionaries gather annually in New York at Lubavitch Headquarters. The training they give to young men in their schools is designed to produce not just Rabbis but, indeed, missionaries. And their missionaries build outreach programmes to bring secularised Jews back into the fold, back to a Jewish way of life, emphasising not so much learning as the practice of the rituals of daily life. Their hope, no doubt, is that the children of those they bring back to the fold will undergo the rigorous religious education which will make them into truly learned and practising Jews.

The worldwide organisation is bound together also by a vast kinship network, which operates like the 'spinal chord' of Lubavitch. They mostly come from large families in which the children are educated from the cradle for the rabbinate, or to be the wives of Rabbis. Their secular education is the essential minimum and from the age of about 16 the children of activists (mostly qualified Rabbis) study only religious matters and Rabbinical texts. Since they themselves and their parents come from large families, in which it is usual to have more than 10 children, they have a vast array of cousins spread across the world, and these cousins are likely to be part of the organisation. With their publishing,

travelling, missions and much else besides, the Lubavitch represent a modernisation within Chassidism. Yet on the other hand they seem to rely on family ties to hold much of it together. The precise character of these family ties is itself unusual given the superimposition of kinship and organisational bonds: the full-timers are not wealthy, and when they are spread across the world they may well live in houses or apartments owned by the organisation. Children are sent to study away from home if there is not a suitable school in the vicinity, and so they live with cousins, uncles, aunts and the like.

There is much in common between Lubavitch and the *jama'at al tablighi* described by Kepel in his study of Islam in France. Both are worldwide proselytising organisations trying to bring the faithful back to the fold. Both place strong emphasis on the practice of the rituals of everyday life; both tend to occupy spaces in urban niches such as the (formerly Jewish) neighbourhood of Belleville in Paris and Stamford Hill in London—which the Lubavitch share with other Chassidic communities. Both also cultivate a devoted core of activists whose lives are entirely devoted to the organisation and the cause, at the centre of a movement which pays much attention to the regulation of its followers' daily lives. Thus the movement provides the social, commercial and physical infrastructure necessary to sustain a way of life, in the shape of mosques and synagogues (in both cases often utterly simple and unadorned, even dingy in character), specialised or ritually clean shops, and neighbourhoods to which the faithful are drawn. In this last respect, the Pentecostals are not the same, at least in predominantly Christian countries. It would not be surprising, though, if, in countries where Christianity is in a minority, such patterns of residential concentration do develop among Pentecostals as well.

Conclusion

The overall picture is a tantalizing one: a large number of movements, which on account of their genealogy and common culture can be grouped into a handful of tendencies within the world religions, seem to merit the epithet 'fundamentalist', so long as one does not try to define it too tightly. There seem also to exist a series of characteristics which are not exactly common to all these movements but are widely shared among many of them. This paper has mentioned some of these but there are many more—for example the influences of New Age ideas and practices, as in the occasional conflation of the role of religious leader and healer in Pentecostal and Chassidic circles. It would be foolish to claim that all fundamentalist movements are the same, or even that they have common causes; but to deny that they have striking similarities would be to flee from a highly creative challenge to social and anthropological analysis.

The interpretation of these similarities is in its infancy. The study of the subject still tends to be in the hands of either specialists lacking a comparative approach or comparativists lacking religious or linguistic insight. In the current fashion for inserting globalism into all explanations, the interest of this subject is not so much that it can be explained by globalisation, but rather that those involved in these religious movements themselves have a distinctive perception

and awareness of their own affinity with distant brethren—distant across time and space. In contrast to the cosmopolitanism of the Catholic tradition, this is a religious form in which rituals and symbols are disembedded and readopted across time and space; in Judaism and Islam especially, a mechanism of projection operates whereby discursive constructions enable individuals, institutions and movements to identify with imagined correligionaries who are separated from them by generations or by thousands of kilometres. Thus Pentecostal and Islamist movements which proclaim themselves to be ferociously traditional are at the same time engaged in an onslaught against local, historically or traditionally constructed popular cultures; thus also archipelagos of common allegiance, replete with common texts, rhetorical techniques and organisational methods can arise, stretched across a multicultural world.

All this cannot be explained by structural factors: the notion that displaced, deracinated populations are particularly open to the proselytism of these movements is inadequate, not only because there are innumerable displaced and deracinated people who are not converted, but also because these phenomena are present in so many different cultural settings and so many different socioeconomic strata. Thus the explanation must also have recourse to the use of modern methods of organisation and marketing, and indeed of the use of targetting in reaching particular social groups—students from migrant families in Cairo, young Jews in London, the elderly and extremely poor in the great conurbations of Brazil. These differences exist within and between religious traditions, and between social classes within individual countries, further underlining the global character of the phenomenon.

Finally, the movements have in common a variety of mechanisms which serve to draw and strengthen the boundaries which separate them off from neighbouring groups and from the rest of society. Although there is no doubt that the control of female sexuality has been an important feature apparently of all fundamentalisms, there is reason to believe that in different ways some groups are finding roles for women and that some neo-Pentecostal churches are contributing to women's empowerment in the home or family context. More to the point, though, is the observation that such restrictions must be seen in the context of this boundary maintenance which makes of fundamentalist movements a quasi-ethnicity—racially blind but nevertheless an ethnicity of a different hue.

In recent years the theme of nationalism has become prominent in the study of politics worldwide, with a strong emphasis on the retreat to traditional, autochthonous, defensive and inward-looking community and identity. This retreat is often interpreted as resistance to or flight from modernity and globalisation[63] or, as in Huntington's view, a rejection of 'Westernisation' combined with an acceptance of modernisation.[64] Often too this 'trend' has been bracketed with the spread of fundamentalism as equally defensive and inward-looking, but that view is being displaced: thus the editors of the 'Fundamentalism Project' set out by defining it as the refuge of 'beleaguered' people looking for certainty in a rapidly changing world, but their own team found that all manner of fundamentalisms 'were establishing "progressive", world-creating and world-conquering movements' which look to the past for inspiration but not for

a blueprint, so that they become important political 'players' as a result of 'their ability to adapt to modern organizational imperatives, political strategies, communications advances and economic theories'.[65] This paper has likewise shown that, far from being a flight from modernity, fundamentalist movements are a quintessentially modern phenomenon—not because they constitute a reaction against modernity but, on the contrary, because they are bearers *of* modernity. This is particularly true on account of their global character, and the paper has tried to explain how their particular brand of globalism is distinct from the more postmodern brand which we observe in the the more populist, indigenist and environmentalist sections of the international NGO movement, in eco-feminism, or in radical Christian (especially Catholic) movements devoted to the preservation of and even the imitation of indigenous cultures.[66] The paper has also drawn a distinction between the disembedding of traditional practices and rituals which takes place in what I have called a cosmopolitan response to globalism—where the preservation of context and history is all-important—and the globalist response, of which Protestant and Islamic fundamentalism, probably more than their Jewish counterpart, are examples, and in which context and history are denied, and rituals and practices are knitted together and recombined with little regard for authenticity. In place of a search for authenticity, fundamentalists adopt a twofold strategy which is at once global and inward-looking. It is global because their movements have astonishing success in breaching institutionalised cultural and national frontiers and spreading their influence across the globe, producing strikingly similar rituals and doctrines in widely dissimilar cultural contexts. It is inward-looking because of their elaborate attention to boundary maintenance, creating a quasi-ethnicity through the control of sexual behaviour and the propagation of distinctive modes of dress and speech. And it is modern on account of their use of modern methods of communication, organisation, training and marketing, and of course of the evident parallels, both structural and imaginary, between their own expansion and penetration, and the expansion and penetration of the world market.

Fundamentalist movements also imitate capitalism in their ability to change, adapt and move on: they are paying increasing attention to the problems of women followers, especially their domestic and emotional problems and the need to provide women with the means and channels of participation. They have broken into politics in the United States, in Israel, in Latin America, in Africa, while Islamic fundamentalists are adopting the methods of the NGO movement and expanding 'from below' in addition to their established institutional approach to the state. They are also breaking into the media, especially in Latin America. This modernity is linked to the central role of expansion and proselytism in all fundamentalisms, and also to their capillary method of expansion from below through the interstices of society. To be a fundamentalist, then, is one way—though hardly the only way—to be modern, and those who would dismiss fundamentalism as nothing more than a flight from or refuge against modernity, or for that matter as a reactionary political movement, are merely treating it as a screen onto which they project their fears of a threatened ideological cosiness.

Notes

I am heavily indebted and grateful to David Simon for his meticulous and insightful comments on a previous draft.

[1] A Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 2(3), 1990, pp 295–310.

[2] See the criticisms of Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995 in David Lehmann, 'An opportunity lost: Escobar's deconstruction of development', *Journal of Development Studies*, 33(4), 1997, pp 568–578. Other examples include Jackson's critique of Vandana Shiva's mixture of feminism and environmentalism. Cecile Jackson, 'Rescuing gender from the poverty trap', *World Development*, 24(3), 1996 pp 489–504.

[3] A wonderful example is the way in which African habits of body movement when praying or imprecating divine entities found its way into American evangelical practice, first as 'shuffling', later as shaking, quaking or simply body movement, and then on into twentieth century evangelical churches and now back to Africa and populations of African origin in the Americas, borne by largely white missionaries. See Albert J Raboteau, *Slave Religion: The 'Invisible Institution' in the Antebellum South*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Françoise Barbira-Friedman, in 'Shamanism as practical religion', a paper delivered at the Meeting of the Society of Latin American Studies, St Andrew's March 1997, describes how shamans in the Peruvian Amazon, whose practices are as much Spanish-colonial as indigenous in origin, are teaching Californians the secrets of their trade. In her *Book of Middle Eastern Food*, London, Penguin, 1968 and *The Book of Jewish Food*, New York: Knopf, 1996, Claudia Roden has shown how cooking thought of as 'Jewish' deserves that title only because the Jews in their migrations have brought it from one place to the other: it is 'really' Polish, Russian, Yemeni, etc.—but of course in New York, São Paulo or Johannesburg it is 'truly' Jewish. In Israel it is nothing—indeed it is barely edible at all. Ritual acceptability is a necessary but by no means a sufficient condition for the description; 'food' is kosher, cuisine is Jewish. In religion the examples of borrowing are infinite and endless: from the churches of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in Brazil, which seem designed to imitate the Temple at Jerusalem, to the adoption of Anglican-style choirs and organs by British Jewry in the 19th century, to the complex and multi-levelled interchanges between Pentecostals and Catholicism on the one hand or possession cults (in Brazil or indeed among indigenous groups elsewhere) on the other. See various sources, including Patricia Birman, 'Médiation féminine et identités pentecôtistes', *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine*, 24, 1997 (translation forthcoming in *Cambridge Anthropology*, 1998).

[4] David Brading, *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriotism and the Liberal State*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Gustavo Gutierrez, *En Busca de los pobres de Jesucristo: el pensamiento de Bartolomé de las Casas*, Salamanca, Sígueme, 1993. (English translation: *Las Casas: in search of the poor of Jesus Christ*, trans Robert R Barr, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993.)

[5] Serge Gruzinski, *La guerre des images: de Christophe Colomb à Blade Runner*, Paris: Fayard, 1989, pp 95–96.

[6] Félix Báez-Jorge, 'La Virgen de Guadalupe', in Enrique Florescano (ed), *Mitos Mexicanos*, Mexico: Aguilar, 1990.

[7] Brading, *The First America*, p 348. The phrase is from Psalm 147,20: 'He has not done this for any other nation'.

[8] David Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit: Religious Transformation and Popular Culture in Brazil and Latin America*, Oxford: Polity, 1996, pp 163–173.

[9] The days when this symbolic and ritual profusion could be dismissed as ideological manipulation—as theologians of liberation used to do—are long since passed.

[10] Thus the 'hommes-dieux dont les noms évoquent les grandes divinités' and who 'guérissent, agissent sur les éléments et reçoivent les honneurs d'ordinaire destinés aux dieux de pierre'. Gruzinski, *La guerre des images*, p 98. In the place of idols (gods of stone) proto-shamans or mediums (man-gods).

[11] Yvonne Maggie, *Medo do feitiço: relacões entre magia e poder no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 1992; Peter Fry, *Spirits of Protest: Spirit-Mediums and the Articulation of Consensus among the Zezeru of Southern Rhodesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

[12] Las Casas argued that the practice of human sacrifice by the Aztecs was their way of expressing their adoration of God, by offering up what was most precious to them, namely human life. See Gutierrez, *En Busca de los pobres de Jesucristo*, 1993.

[13] An analogy could be drawn with languages. From the second half of the 19th century Finnish and Hungarian were regarded as part of a single 'Finno-Ugric/Uralic' family, which through a succession of bifurcations had given rise to various other non-Indo-European languages. But according to some linguists this was 'based on a nationalistic Finnish view which wanted to see Finnish language as the highest spring of the sacred family-tree'. T. Salminen, 'Facts and myths about Uralic studies', *Sprachtypologie und Universalien-forschung*, 50, 1997. Likewise with Hungarian, whose uniqueness was a product of late 19th-century nationalism. Recently researchers have come up against a particularly strong version of cultural homogeneity

among Hungarian linguists—some of whom are probably quite unaware that the doctrine of Hungarian uniqueness was encouraged by Stalin, as against alternative theories, for geopolitical purposes. The new research is showing that Hungarian is part of a family of Altaic languages and that, far from being an isolated and homogeneous development, it can largely be described in terms of elements deriving from various members of that family—itself part of a larger Eurasiatic family. (With thanks to Angela Marcantonio, of the Universitá La Sapienza, Rome.)

[14] John Borosky, 'Cultural possibilities', in *World Culture Report 1998: culture, creativity and markets*, Paris: UNESCO, 1998, p 64.

[15] Examples of this range of practices abound in day-to-day and journalistic information, but are also now being more systematically documented. Thus a recent article describes the establishment (by an anthropologist) of a shamanistic centre in the US using techniques or procedures borrowed from the Shuar people, but simultaneously imperceptibly shifting the accompanying discourse into the language of psychotherapy and New Age incantation. See Paul C Johnson: 'Shamanism from Ecuador to Chicago: a case study in New Age ritual appropriation', *Religion*, 25(2), 1995.

[16] See Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*.

[17] Aylward Shorter, *Towards a Theology of Inculturation*, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1988, p 11.

[18] For a statement of the assumptions behind this idea of global social movements, see Tony Bebbington & David Lehmann: 'NGOs, the state and the development process; dilemmas of institutionalization', in Menno Vellinga (ed), *The Changing Role of the State in Latin America*', Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1998.

[19] For a general account see André Corten, *Le Pentecôtisme au Brésil*, Paris: Karthala, 1995; and David Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*, Corten is particularly informative on the discursive dimension which heralds an irruption of the poor in politics and indeed the scandals provoked, unrepentantly, by the Universal Church bear him out.

[20] For an excellent analysis of the implications of such borrowing within the households of the Church's followers, see Birman; 'Médiation féminine et identités pentecôtistes'.

[21] For a somewhat disillusioned account of the reaction of the 'people on the ground' to the use of 'indigenous' motifs in Catholic ritual, see John Burdick, *Looking for God in Brazil: The Progressive Catholic Church in Urban Brazil's Religious Arena*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.

[22] See Patricia Birman & David Lehmann, 'Religion and the media in a battle for ideological hegemony: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and *TV Globo* in Brazil', Unpublished manuscript, 1997.

[23] Kristen Norget, 'Religion as "Ethnopolitics": modernization, globalization and the Catholic Church in Mexico', mimeo, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, 1998.

[24] José Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche: Siglos XIX y XX*, Santiago: ediciones Sur, 1985.

[25] Sara McFall & Roberto Morales, 'The ins and outs of Mapuche culture in Chile', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Latin American Studies, Liverpool, March 1998.

[26] Terence Turner, 'Representing, resisting, rethinking: historical transformation of Kayapo culture and anthropological consciousness', in G W Stocking (ed), *Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualisation of Ethnographic Knowledge*, Madison, WI University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.

[27] Jerry Falwell, leader of the 'Moral Majority' which was so influential in US politics in the 1980s, was notorious for his mockery of speaking in tongues, for example.

[28] See the labyrinthine intrigues in Robert Mapes Anderson, *Vision of the Disinherited: The Making of American Pentecostalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

[29] Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, London: IB Tauris, 1994.

[30] Asef Bayat, 'Revolution without movement, movement without revolution: comparing Islamic activism in Iran and Egypt', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(1), 1998.

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*, contains a detailed appendix summarising statistical evidence on the socioeconomic base of Pentecostalism in Latin America.

[33] This feature is given much importance by Gilles Kepel (ed), *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World*, trans. Alan Braley, Cambridge: Polity, 1994.

[34] This is argued in detail by Kathleen C Boone, *The Bible tells Them so: The Discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989. Boone applies modern literary criticism and Foucault's idea of discourse to demonstrate that 'Fundamentalists must resort to some form of institutional authority, unless they want to grant authority to the interpretations of any reader whatsoever who espouses the inerrancy doctrine' (p. 72).

[35] This is where I part company with Boone. However, she describes convincingly the social and discursive mechanisms used in fundamentalist churches and schools to enforce what is, in effect, and has to be, an official interpretation. Her conclusion is that fundamentalists lose their following when they stray from the text because, *à la* Foucault, she takes the view that discourses (in this case the discourse of fundamentalism) have an endogeously generated power of their own.

[36] As shall be shown below, Judaism is not strictly comparable because the notion of an established *doctrinal* corpus is foreign to the Jewish tradition. A Rabbi is more an expert in exegesis and a virtuoso in his command of biblical and rabbinic texts. His traditional role therefore is that of teacher rather than of an authority in stating what is doctrinally correct and what is not.

[37] This was the school which pioneered the historical and linguistic analysis of the Bible.
[38] see Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*, pp 178–181. This use by educated priests and religious of a popular language fits well into the 'cosmopolitan' approach to the other outlined above.
[39] From 1845 the Chief Rabbi of the Great Synagogue in London was designated 'Chief Rabbi of the Hebrew Congregations of the British Empire' and the institution of two Chief Rabbis—one each for the Jews of European and Mediterranean tradition—was given legal status by a 'mandatory ordinance' in 1920. Analogous offices existed in Castile and Portugal pre-1492 and in the Ottoman Empire but carried no theological authority, having as their function that of collecting taxes or representing the Jewish community and in any case being designated by the secular authority. *Encyclopedia Judaica*, Jerusalem, 1971, Vol 5.
[40] Gilles Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam: naissance d'une religion en France*, Paris: Seuil, 1987.
[41] This refers to the language used by one of the most revered commentators, Rashi (Troyes, 1040–1105), which is also written in a distinctive script.
[42] Samuel C Heilman, 'Parallels between Islam and Judaism', in Martin Marty & R Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended* (*The Fundamentalism Project*, Vol 5), Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
[43] See the descriptions in my own work on Brazilian Pentecostals; also, in Kepel, *The Revenge of God* and in Jerome Mintz, *Hasidic People: A Place in the New World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.
[44] Lehmann, *Struggle for the Spirit*; and Elizabeth Brusco, 'The reformation of machismo: asceticism and masculinity among Colombian evangelicals', in David Stoll & Elizabeth Garrard-Burnett (eds), *Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America*, Philadephia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993. See also Burdick, *Looking for God in Brazil*.
[45] Of course, the same could be said of the Catholic and mainstream Protestant Churches—but these carry a heavy weight of a long tradition of male domination which makes their present situation understandable, whereas the Pentecostal churches are new and in many respects stand in opposition to existing dominant cultural elites and norms.
[46] Mintz, *Hasidic People*, p 60.
[47] Angela Renée de la Torre, *Los Hijos de la Luz: discurso, identidad y poder en la Luz del Mundo*, Guadalajara: ITESO/CIESAS, 1995.
[48] 'From the time I can first remember I heard [my father] repeat the phrase—"it is forbidden" '. Isaac Bashevis Singer, *Shosha*, London: Penguin, 1980.
[49] More than half the population of Salonica was Jewish from the expulsion from Spain in 1492 until the First World War. Edgar Morin, *Vidal et les siens*, Paris: Seuil, 1989. In the late 19th century the Jews formed almost 40% of the urban population of what is today Lithuania. See Yves Plasseraud & Henri Minczeles (eds), *Lituanie Juive, 1918–1940*, Paris: Editions Autrement–Collection Mémoires, no 40, 1996. In the Pale of Settlement, the zone to which Jews in Russia were restricted, stretching from the Baltic to Moldavia, about 10% of the population were Jewish in 1897, but since only some 100 000 Jews lived in the countryside, and since this was still a heavily rural society, their proportion in urban areas, especially small cities, was far greater. In 'Congress Poland' (under Russian domination from 1815 until the Russian Revolution) half the urban population of 2.75 million were Jewish in the early 19th century. See Rachel Ertl, *Le Shtetl:la bourgade juive en Pologne*, Paris: Payot, 1982.
[50] Michael Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam: an antropologist's introduction*, London: Croom Helm, 1983, p 113.
[51] Kepel, *The Revenge of God*, p 215ff.
[52] Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam*, p 150ff.
[53] *Ibid.* This tension in Islam is a constant theme in Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, and of course it echoes the popular Catholicism evoked earlier in this paper.
[54] Fatima Mernissi, *Beyond the Veil: Male–Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society*, London: Al Saqi, 1985; and Brusco, 'The reformation of machismo'.
[55] Tamar El-Or, *Educated and Ignorant: Ultraorthodox Jewish Women and their World*, Boulder, Co: Lynne Riener, 1994.
[56] It would be demagogic to suggest that this is because the authors are mostly men. The real reason is more likely that observers are truly disconcerted by the treatment of women in fundamentalist Judaism and Islam especially, and prefer to pigeon-hole the entire issue as one of ideology rather than analysing its place in the social construction and delimiting of fundamentalist culture. Cf Samuel Heilman, *Defenders of the Faith: Inside Orthodox Jewry*, New York: Schocken Books, 1992; and Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam*. Even in a chapter devoted to the controversy of the wearing of the headscarf in French schools, Kepel does not ask any questions about the place of women in Islam or among the resurgent Islamists in France, restricting himself to a discussion of the issue in terms of its political repercussions for inter-communal relations and ideological positions in France. Gilles Kepel, *A l'Ouest d'Allah*, Paris; Seuil, p 252 ff.
[57] Or rather, to membership without prior conversion. Ultra-orthodox Jewish communities and sects regard conversion as an exceptional case, and some may absolutely prohibit it, while others allow and even conduct it. The point here, though, is that knowledge of a person's descent is absolutely essential, and starts with knowledge of their name. In this world-view, there are 'Jewish' family names, and 'non-Jewish' ones.
[58] Many would question this attitude on the grounds that belief or practice is not strictly speaking a

qualification for being a Jew. But that is to overlook the social function of the rules: they are a social resource to be interpreted according to the needs and desires of particular individuals, groups, communities and institutions, and in some cases the choice is to interpret them in this very strict way. Modern Chassidic communities would evidently change rapidly and in directions their members would oppose if their children married 'any' Jew. Therefore they tighten up their interpretation of the marriage rules.

[59] Kepel, *Les banlieues de l'Islam* p 177–178.

[60] *Ibid*, p 197.

[61] This point is emphasised, with field data in support, by Burdick, *Looking for God in Brazil.*

[62] For a full account see Birman & Lehmann, 'Religion and the media in a battle for ideological hegemony', forthcoming, *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 1999.

[63] Cf Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, Vol II of *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

[64] Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

[65] Martin Marty & R Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, p 2. See also their Introduction to Vol 1, *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1991.

[66] The merits and limitations of a postmodern approach to development are well laid out in David Simon: 'Rethinking (post)modernism, postcolonialism and posttraditionalism: South–North prespectives', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 16 (2), 1998, pp 219–245. Simon treads a careful path between the excessive emphasis on colonialism in some postmodern contributions and the need to recapture 'subordinated and lost voices'.