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Chapter 5

Against Holism: Rethinking Buddhist Environmental Ethics

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1.

Two assumptions are often made in studies of the environmental implications of Buddhism: (1) that Buddhism is an environmentally friendly religion, and (2) that this is because of the stress placed, in its teachings, on the 'oneness' of humans and nature. In this paper I argue that while (2) is false, (1) is true, that (to be more precise) Buddhism is environmentally friendly, not on account of its endorsing some notion of the 'oneness' of humans and nature (which it doesn't), but because of its distinctive conception of the good life.

Before setting out this argument, however, it is necessary both to clarify what it might mean to say that humans and nature are 'one' and to explain why anyone might think that Buddhists endorse such a view. A good place to begin in doing this is with the concept of nature, the realm that, according to (2), humans are supposed to be 'one' with. It might seem appropriate, then, to begin with a question such as the following:

Q1. What do Buddhists believe nature is?

This, however, is a poorly formed question, and for several reasons. For one thing, it is not clear who the 'Buddhists' referred to are. Buddhism is, after all, a broad church, and Buddhists from different traditions often believe different things about nature.

> Indeed it cannot be assumed at the outset of our inquiry that their comportment towards nature is best understood in terms of *belief*.[1] A further complication is that it is not obvious what, in this context, the term 'nature' means. It is not clear, for example, whether Q1 is meant to refer to nature-as-opposed-to-the-supernatural or to nature-as-a-realm-relatively-unaffected-by-human-activity, or to some other conception. Moreover, even if *we* can specify what we mean by nature in the present context, it is a further question whether any traditions of Buddhism have entertained such a conception. For instance, one would not be justified in assuming that Buddhists have subscribed to the notion that reality can be divided into two realms, the supernatural and the natural.

I will engage with some of these issues below. For the moment, however, I would like to consider one answer to Q1 that is often implied in discussions of the topic:

A1. Buddhists believe that all things are empty.
The argument I intend to refute runs, therefore, as follows. Since they believe in the emptiness of all things, Buddhists are committed to the view that humans are in some sense 'one' with nature; moreover, it is because they believe this that they tend to act well in their relations with the natural world.

2.

Before considering the teaching of emptiness (Sanskrit: *śūnyatā*), some qualifications are in order. First, the teaching is understood in several different ways within the broad tradition of Buddhism, with the result that it can be misleading to speak of *the* teaching of emptiness at all (see, for instance, Harvey, 1990: 104–118). I will be treating the teaching of emptiness as it has been articulated in the Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism. Moreover, in the interests of keeping my account as accessible as possible, I will be presenting a very simplified account of that teaching.

Second, it must be borne in mind that, according to Buddhists, emptiness, whatever it is (and, indeed, regardless of whether it can properly be said to *be* anything at all), is not something that can be adequately understood in a merely intellectual way, but that it has rather to be experienced. So it is important at the outset that one be

aware of how much—or rather, how little—any intellectual account of emptiness, such as the one I will be presenting below, might be able to achieve.

How, then, is one to understand the teaching of emptiness? As so often in the study of Buddhism, it is best to begin with the 'Noble Truths' identified by the Buddha. The first of these Truths states that our lives aren't as satisfying as they might be, are always marked, that is, by *duhkha* or suffering. The second identifies the cause of this disease, namely, our inveterate tendency to crave things, to lust after them or to seek obsessively to be rid of them.[2] Accordingly, the purpose of some of the most important Buddhist teachings is to undermine our attraction or attachment to the things we crave. And this, indeed, is the basic purpose of the teaching of emptiness: to loosen the hold things have upon us. As the Zen teacher Yasutani puts it, 'Once you realize the world of [emptiness] you will readily comprehend the nature of the phenomenal world and cease clinging to it' (quoted in Kapleau 1985: 79).

According to the emptiness teaching, we crave things (using this term in its widest sense) because we tend to see them as existing in themselves, independent both of their relations to other things and of their relation to us. This is not to say that the world is merely nothing, an absence of things. The claim is, rather, that whatever exists cannot do so on account of its possessing a non-relational essential nature: things, as Buddhists say, are empty (*śūnya*) of 'self-existence' or 'own-being' (*svabhāva*). Instead, it is said that any particular thing is what it is because of the coincidence of certain conditioning factors. So on this account, the mug of coffee on my desk, say, is the particular thing it is, not because it is imbued with an inherent nature, but because of the relations it bears both to other things and to me, the perceiver. If I could perceive it as such, if, that is, I could see it for what it is—conditioned, impermanent, a partial reflection of my own caffeine-addled mind—it, like anything, would have less of a hold on me.

3·

This is of course the barest sketch of the teaching of emptiness. I will have more to say about it below. For the moment, it will suffice to note that, condensed into such a brief summary, the teaching might seem to have something in common with the positions espoused by modern proponents of environmental holism ('ecological holists', as I shall refer to them).

The reasons for this conclusion are not hard to discern. Ecological holists such as Aldo Leopold and Arne Naess are defined as such on account of their commitment to a holistic conception of the natural world, according to which any element of that world can only be adequately understood in terms of its relations to other elements. And, in this, they would seem to be of a piece with Buddhist thinkers. For to say, with Naess for example, that organisms—or more generally, things—must be conceived as 'knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations' (1999: 3) is (one might suppose) to concur with the Buddhist's view that all things are what they are on account of certain conditioning factors. One might expect the ecological holist and the Buddhist to agree that a tree, say, is not a hard-edged, independent object but a nexus in a web of relations including, not just so many tons of wood and leaf, but the soil, sky, and sun—even, perhaps, the natural environment as a whole. More generally, one might conclude that Bill Devall is right in suggesting that 'Buddhist wisdom, including the awareness that everything is related to everything else . . . is echoed in the modern science of ecology' (1990: 161).

And one might, indeed, be tempted to go further. For if these conclusions are well taken, one might expect Buddhists to endorse what, for ecological holists, is often regarded as the central lesson of holism: that we—i.e., us humans—should be regarded as *one with* nature, not necessarily *in tune* with it, but *parts of* or even *identical with* it. One might therefore expect Buddhist thinkers to endorse the view here summarized by one ecological holist:

> [T]he central intuition of deep ecology . . . is the idea that there is no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. In other words, the world is simply not divided up into independently existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality between the human and nonhuman realms. Rather all entities are constituted by their relationships. (Fox, 1999: 157: emphasis removed)

Furthermore, one might conclude that *this* is why Buddhism is an environmentally friendly religion: that the Buddhist, like the ecological holist, considers nature worthy of some kind of positive moral concern because she regards it as a holistic system with which she, and indeed all other natural things, are in some sense 'one'. Indeed one might be tempted to endorse the view espoused by one commentator, that the teaching of emptiness (interpreted as the view that 'nothing has a separate existence'), when internalized through practice, enables us humans to 'experience ourselves and nature as

one' and so fosters 'respect for the beauty and power of nature' and the flowering of an innate 'biospirituality' (Badiner, 1990: xvi–xviii).

4.

The argument implied here (I will call it The Unity Thesis) runs roughly as follows:

- Premise 1. A holistic view of the world, according to which humans are regarded as being 'one' with nature, will necessarily engender environmental concern.
- Premise 2. The Buddhist teaching of emptiness represents just such a holistic view of the world.
- Therefore, Buddhism is an environmentally friendly religion.

The argument is valid (or rather, it could easily be made valid were it to be formulated in a more careful but more cumbersome manner). But is it sound?

Premise 1, for its part, is often assumed to be true, especially by writers towards the dark green pole of the environmental spectrum. And this assumption is also made in much of the literature devoted to 'Green Buddhism'. So, to give one of many examples, the Zen teacher Thich Nhat Hanh claims that since 'human beings and nature are inseparable', we should deal with nature the way we should deal with ourselves . . . we should not harm nature' (quoted in Harvey, 2000: 151). But this does not follow; indeed, Premise 1 is false.

Its falsity might not, however, be obvious. After all, there are no doubt some people, perhaps many, who believe that they and perhaps humans in general are in some sense one with nature, and who are thereby moved to act well in relation to the natural (roughly, non-artefactual) environment. But there is no reason to conclude that someone who subscribes to such a view must, of necessity, adopt an environmentally friendly attitude. Consider a proponent of materialism, someone (let us suppose) who subscribes to the notion that everything, she included, is made of matter. Such an individual clearly believes that we are one with nature (for her, the material universe), but there is no good reason to think that she must be moved by a positive moral regard for the natural world. She *might* be. But she might be a terrible scourge of the environment.

Or consider Spinoza's conviction that humans, and indeed all things, are parts of a single reality, 'God or Nature' (*Deus sive*

Natura). Despite believing that humans are in this special sense 'one' with nature, Spinoza himself was an inveterate anthropocentrist. Here he is:

> . . . Not that I deny that the lower [i.e., nonhuman] animals have sensations. But I do deny that we are therefore not permitted to consider our own advantage, use them at our pleasure, and treat them as is most convenient for us. (1996: 135)[3]

Despite his conviction that humans are 'one' with nature, Spinoza maintains that we are justified in doing whatever we like with our cousins in the animal world.

The salient point here is that general claims about humanity's continuity or identity with the rest of nature can, in different hands, generate diametrically opposed prescriptions for how one ought to treat the natural world.[4] And the upshot of this is that *even if* it turned out that Buddhist references to the emptiness of all things signaled a holistic view of the world, according to which humans are 'one' with nature, that in itself would not suffice to demonstrate that Buddhism is environmentally friendly.

5.

There are therefore grounds for denying that the teaching of emptiness, even if it did entail the oneness of humans and nature, would necessarily engender any kind of positive regard for the natural world. There are good reasons, that is, for thinking that Premise 1 is false.

What, though, of Premise 2, the claim that the teaching of emptiness indicates an 'ecological' variety of holism? One thing to note, in judging the veracity of this claim, is that, for many ecological holists, to say that humans are 'one' with the world that surrounds them is to say that they are subject to the same ecological laws, of energy transfer and the like, as everything else. This, for instance, is part of Aldo Leopold's point in claiming that we ought to regard ourselves as 'plain member[s] and citizen[s]' of the 'land-community' (1949: 204).

The Buddhist account is, however, quite different. For one thing, to say that all things are empty of self-existence is not to say, in the manner of the ecological scientist, that all things are causally connected, for such talk would imply precisely that degree of distinctness among things that the teaching of *śūnyatā* is meant to undermine (Cooper, 2003: 48). For according to that teaching, the relations between things (again, using the term in its widest sense)

are internal, which is to say that any particular thing would not be the thing it is in the absence of certain relations between it and other things. As David E. Cooper explains, 'Just as the relatives in a family require one another in order to be the cousins, brothers or whatever which they are, so [according to the emptiness teaching] things . . . in general require one another in order to be what they are' (2003: 49).

This observation does not, in itself, fatally undermine all attempts to ground some conception of the unity of humans and nature on the emptiness teaching. Indeed, that teaching *does* entail that, in one quite particular sense, humans and the world (if not, perhaps, nature) are inseparable. For it is said that to fully appreciate the teaching of emptiness is to realize, not just that things 'out there' in the world, are bound together by internal relations, but that what we take to be the world is internally related to *us*, to those human concerns, perspectives and 'conceptual proliferations' that are brought into play in its presenting itself to us as a world in the first place (Burton, 2001: 179). Hence, picking up, presumably, from such scriptural remarks as 'it is in . . . perceptions and thoughts that there is the world, the origin of the world' Nyanaponika Thera and Bhikkhu Bodhi, 1999: 90), *The Diamond Sūtra* maintains that material objects are 'a convention of language' (Iyer, 1983: 27) and the Sixth Patriarch of Ch'an (Zen) that 'all things were originally given rise to by man' (Yampolsky, 1967: 151). This anti-realist tendency certainly furnishes a sense to the proposition that the world is not separate from human existence, but this is evidently not the sense intended by ecological holists such as Leopold.

And there are still other differences between ecological holism and the teaching of emptiness. Consider, for example, what the world of emptiness must actually be like. There is, of course, a limit to how far reflection can get you here: emptiness, recall, is something to be experienced, rather than merely pondered. Indeed, the world of emptiness, the world as it appears in awakening, is said to be ineffable. The upshot of this is that any world that can, as it were, be 'effed' cannot, on the Buddhist account, be the world of awakening but must instead (in line with the anti-realist conclusions canvassed above) reflect certain unawakened concerns, perspectives, and so forth. This, in turn, means that the world of ecological science, precisely because it is *not* ineffable, must to a certain extent reflect our state of unawakened ignorance (*avidya*). Indeed, on the Buddhist view, any world we can capture in words, whether natural or urban, is considered to belong to *samsāra*, the realm of craving and delusion. And this, for its part, is said to be a realm from which the wise will seek *liberation*. Hence

the liberated person, far from celebrating his or her oneness with the realm of nature, is one who is said to have 'overcome the world', to have overcome nature (Mascaró 1986: 72).[5]

The views of the ecological holist and the Buddhist are in this respect quite different. It is certainly not the aim of Buddhist practice to realize that we are one with nature in anything like the sense identified by ecological scientists. But although the arguments developed above may suffice to demonstrate this, they do not, in themselves, refute Premise 2. For, after all, not all ecological holists seek to ground their ideas in science. While, as we have noted, many follow Leopold in appealing to the findings of ecology, many others follow Naess in looking to holistic metaphysical systems of the kind articulated by thinkers such as Spinoza and Whitehead. 'We have seen that references to emptiness bear scant resemblance to the holistic views espoused by scientifically-minded ecological holists such as Leopold. Might they have more in common with these metaphysical conceptions of ecological holism? Indeed, might the ultimate aim of Buddhist practice be to realize, not one's continuity with the natural world as described by ecological science, but one's unity or even identity with Nature, conceived as reality as a whole?

Suggestions of this kind certainly have a popular appeal. It is often supposed that to awaken to Nirvana is to realize one's unity with the universe. (The notion is there, for example, in the joke about the Zen master and the hot-dog seller. 'What can I get you?' asks the latter. 'Make me one with everything,' the Master replies.) Popular they may be, but claims to this effect are false. For talk of becoming one with everything encourages the idea that the 'everything' referred to is some kind of self-existent metaphysical whole, one that exists 'through itself', like Spinoza's *Deus sive Natura*. But for Buddhism any such talk of self-existent Absolutes evinces a failure fully to appreciate the universality of the teaching of emptiness. For to say that all things are empty is not to say that they are what they are in relation to some self-existent absolute, Emptiness. On the contrary, the emptiness teaching holds true of all 'things', so that even *śūnyatā* is said to be devoid of self-existence.[6]

So Buddhists do not aspire to realize their 'oneness' with the nature described by ecological science nor, indeed, with the Nature referred to by holistically-inclined metaphysicians such as Spinoza. But there are yet more reasons for doubting the veracity of Premise 2. For consider, once again, the ecological holist's position. The crucial thing to note here is that it is precisely that, a position: the ecological holist is clearly committed to a particular view (that the world is a network

of interrelated elements, and so on). Buddhist references to the emptiness of things, however, must be interpreted differently. To be sure, one might be suspicious of claims, voiced by Zen Buddhists in particular, to the effect that such talk has *no* philosophical connotations; yet it must be admitted that its primary aim is not to articulate a position that could, as it were, be set down on paper and subjected to critical evaluation. Although talk of emptiness 'does work' in the teachings of Buddhism, its function is essentially practical. Its work, in the context of intellectual debate, is not to articulate a position but to expose the emptiness of, and thus to loosen one's attachment to, any particular position—not, one might say, to paint a picture of the world, but to loosen the grip any such pictures have on us. (Indeed, this was essentially the aim of the founding text of the Madhyamaka tradition, Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (Fundamentals of the Middle Way).)[7]

6.

Premises 1 and 2 of The Unity Thesis are therefore both false. Buddhist talk of emptiness does not imply a conception of holism of the kind espoused by modern-day ecological holists. Moreover, even if it *did* imply such a conception, that would not necessarily engender any kind of positive moral regard for the natural environment. What is more, even if the teaching of emptiness entailed ecological holism and ecological holism entailed some form of environmental concern, that would not justify the conclusion that Buddhism as a whole is environmentally friendly. For as I noted earlier, we have been considering the teaching of emptiness as it has been developed in one specific (yet influential) Buddhist tradition, the Madhyamaka, and the general conclusion would not therefore be warranted.[8]

Admittedly, other writers have criticized 'ecological' readings of Buddhism. Ian Harris, for one, has questioned whether the religion ought to be regarded as offering a form of ecological holism. ('[M]uch that masquerades under the label of ecoBuddhism . . .' he concludes, 'turns out to be an uneasy partnership between Spinozism, New Age religiosity and highly selective Buddhism'(2000: 132).) Yet for Harris these reflections cast doubt on the conclusion of The Unity Thesis, as well. He suggests, in other words, that because Buddhism is not presenting an environmentally friendly form of holism it should not be thought of as environmentally friendly at all (or at least, that it shouldn't be thought of as being as environmentally friendly as it is often supposed to be).

But this conclusion is unjustified. For one thing, Buddhists do have some interesting things to say about holism, and indeed some things that are relevant to environmental issues.[9] Furthermore, leaving aside the issue of holism, there is no need to conclude that because the premises of The Unity Thesis are false, Buddhism can have nothing to offer environmental thinkers. For perhaps Buddhism is, in some sense, environmentally friendly—just not for the reasons set out in The Unity Thesis.

7.

But if not to The Unity Thesis, where is one to turn? What other basis could there be for environmental concern in Buddhism?

Here it may be helpful to recall the question with which we began:

Q1. What do Buddhists believe nature is?
In trying to answer this question, and in trying to relate that answer to environmental matters, we have been led to what looks on the face of it to be a dead-end.

In view of this, it may be best to begin anew with a different question:

Q2. How do Buddhists think one should live?
This is a more promising beginning. After all, the Buddhist teachings do not focus on the nature per se. It is true that ancient sources provide an elaborate cosmology; however, nowhere in the scriptures can one find a 'theory of nature' in anything like the modern sense, one on a par with those offered by Neo-Darwinism or, earlier, by Aristotelian teleology. The focus is elsewhere, on the question of how one should live in order to attain freedom from *duhkha*. Speculations on nature are regarded as being worthwhile only to the extent that they bear upon this, more pressing issue.

So, how do Buddhists think one should live? This question can be approached from several angles; however, one especially illuminating response focuses on those traits of character that, according to Buddhism, one would do well to develop. Thus one answer to Q2 runs roughly as follows. For Buddhists, one should be generous, compassionate, mindful, and so on—one would do well to live a life exemplifying these 'virtuous' character traits. Furthermore, one should develop these particular traits because of their relation to the

ultimate goal of awakening from *samsāra*. So one should be generous, compassionate, etc., because these are the virtues by which an awakened life is marked.

The general claim here, then, is that Buddhism provides a conception of the good life (or what is equivalent, human well-being) as well as an account of the virtues by which such a life may be defined. The claim, in short, is that Buddhism can be framed as a (eudaimonist) virtue ethic, one similar, in certain formal respects, to Aristotle's ethics or that of the Stoics. Now this is a bold proposal, and one that would not be endorsed by all writers on the topic. But it is not my aim here to provide a thorough defense of it.[10] In the remainder of this paper, I will turn instead to the task of examining the 'environmental' implications of some candidate Buddhist virtues. My suggestions in this regard can therefore be regarded as contributions to the wider project of demonstrating that Buddhism can yield an 'environmental virtue ethic'.[11] I will not be able, in the few pages remaining, to provide an adequate defense of this larger claim. (I will not be able, for instance, to do justice to the differences between Buddhist traditions on these matters.) Nonetheless, I hope that I may be able to give some indication as to how such a virtue ethical treatment of Buddhist environmental ethics might proceed.[12]

8.

Let's begin with compassion (*karunā*). Translated into the idiom of virtue ethics, the Buddhist view is that a disposition to feel and act compassionately is an integral part of a good (i.e., awakened) life.[13] At first sight, this might seem a banal observation. After all, who, apart from Nietzscheans and sergeant majors, doesn't think compassion a good thing? Yet *karunā* is different from compassion of the common or garden variety, not least because it is said to be an occasion for bliss, rather than sorrow (Buddhaghosa, 1991: 310). This might seem surprising, given the Buddha's assessment of the amount of suffering in the world. Yet on the Buddhist account, the awakened individual is not depressed by the sufferings of others because his sympathy is always tempered by non-attachment. So although he feels for 'samsaric' beings, he does not, so to speak, feel their feelings in the same way they feel them. For the kinds of feelings we are here discussing are classified as *duhkha*, and this means that they are bound up with a host of self-centered delusions, Now an awakened individual must be able to recognize, in a comparatively detached and objective sense, that the feelings of whatever being he is faced with are deluded

in this way; however, in empathizing with 'samsaric' beings he does not find himself party to their delusions. Hence he does not suffer in the same way as those he aims to help (Gowans, 2003: 142).

But here is, perhaps, not the place for a detailed analysis of the concept of *karunā*. The important point for the present discussion is that if compassion is a virtue, then it is, on the Buddhist account, one that extends naturally to all sentient beings, not just to humans, so that someone who is compassionate in his dealings with other humans but not in his relations with nonhuman sentient beings would not be considered genuinely compassionate at all. Hence, assuming what seems obvious, that some non-human animals are sentient, *karunā* counts as an 'environmental' virtue, one, that is, that may be associated with a positive moral regard for the natural (roughly, non-artefactual) world.

As well as being compassionate, a good Buddhist is said to exemplify a certain gentleness of disposition—not timidity (think, for example, of the fearsome figures portrayed in some of the literature of Zen), but an unwillingness to stamp one's mark upon the world. This is partly a result of the great emphasis placed on abiding by the 'First Precept' of Buddhist practice, the injunction against intentionally killing—or more broadly, harming or injuring—sentient beings. The good Buddhist takes care not to harm her fellow travelers in *samsāra*, human or non-human. But this is not to say that she is gentle *only* in her relations with sentient beings. True, one would not expect her to spend her leisure time hunting foxes or shooting pigeons, but neither would one expect to find her tramping through the temple gardens, kicking up the carefully raked sand or carving her initials into the ornamental rocks. On the contrary, the woman who is non-violent in her relations with sentient beings would also be gentle in her dealings with non-sentient beings, with plants, even rocks, and not just with humans and foxes. She would, in the words of one commentator, have developed a 'delicacy' towards her surroundings (Herrigel, 1999: 79).

This gentleness, for its part, is intimately related to a third Buddhist virtue, the humility that, in the *sutrās*, is said to correspond to the 'destruction' of pride (*māna*) (e.g., Walshe 1995: 469). As with *karunā*, this differs from what one might ordinarily think of as humility. To be sure, the humble man does not regard himself as being superior to his fellows, but neither does he rank himself 'worse than, or equal to anyone' (Saddhatissa 1994: 107; cf. 110). To say that he is humble is, rather, to say that he has freed himself from the self-centeredness evident, amongst other things, in a preoccupation with such self-estimation. Indeed, no longer obsessed with the relation of things or

people to himself, the humble man finds himself able to 'see other things as they really are' (Murdoch, 1997: 385), in their 'thusness' (*tathatā*). It seems reasonable to suppose that such humility would counteract, not just egoism, but also that variety of anthropocentric conceit, epitomized in Spinoza's attitude towards animals, that reckons things only in relation to human satisfaction. Thus, in one Buddhist *sutrā*, we are encouraged to think of cows, not only as producers of milk and 'medicinal drugs', but as 'our great friends' and as beings endowed with their own 'beauty' and 'health'. A few verses later, those who kill and sacrifice cows are rebuked for regarding them as nothing more than 'appendage[s]' to our lives (Saddhatissa, 1994: 33–4).

A fourth Buddhist virtue is, perhaps, that of mindfulness (*smrti*)—an alert awareness of, amongst other things, feelings, thoughts and bodily sensations (the rise and fall of the breath, for instance). In the context of Buddhist practice, a dispassionate awareness of these factors is thought to foster a sense of their transience and, accordingly, freedom from attachment (see further, Gowans, 2003: 189–91). But as ever in Buddhism, the ability to do this is not regarded as being of benefit only to the practitioner. Mindfulness is thought to go hand in hand with a caring and attentive attitude towards others. And, indeed, the virtue would seem to bear upon one's comportment towards the natural world, as well. After all, many of us behave poorly in relation to the environment, not because we are uninformed about environmental issues, nor even because we don't care about them, but because we do not pay sufficient attention to how we are acting at any particular moment. I, for one, tend unthinkingly to leave lights on in my house, to throw beer cans in the trash, to leave the TV on 'standby', and so on. In doing these things I am like the novice who, in one Zen story, is scolded by his teacher for thoughtlessly pouring bathwater on the bare ground, rather than giving it to the plants (Senzaki and Reps, 1971: 83–4). Like compassion, gentleness and humility, the virtue lacking in such behavior clearly has implications for our moral relations to the natural world, even if more work would be needed to identify what precisely those implications are.

9.

As I have conceded, this is merely a thumbnail sketch of a Buddhist environmental virtue ethic.

Nonetheless, I hope that the general thesis I have defended in this paper is clear. To recap: I have suggested that Buddhism is, in certain respects, an environmentally friendly religion. But I have argued that

this is not on account of the fact that Buddhists believe we are 'one' with nature in anything like the ecological holist's sense (which they don't) and because such a belief necessarily engenders environmental concern (which it doesn't). Instead, I have made the tentative suggestion that Buddhism is environmentally friendly, not because of what it says about nature per se, but on account of its view of human life, and, in particular, because of what it says about the virtues an ideal such life would exemplify. The good Buddhist treats nature well, I have argued, not because she believes she is 'one' with the natural world, but because she has, through practice, come to develop certain virtues of character. She treats nature well, that is, because she is compassionate, gentle, humble, mindful, and so on, not just in relation to her fellow humans, but in her dealings with all things.

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Notes

1. The view that a religion must be defined in terms of the beliefs it embodies is culturally specific. Compare Ninian Smart's assessment of the importance of belief in Christianity (1989: 247) with Gavin Flood's account of the difficulties faced by any attempt to define Hinduism in terms of a set of beliefs (1996: 12).
2. Or more precisely, our tendency to crave what we take things to be. See Section 5 below. Furthermore, I am using the term 'things' here in a very broad sense to denote, not just material objects, but any object of craving.
3. Note 1 to Proposition 37 of Part 4. On the environmental implications of Spinoza's thought, see chapters 11—13 of Witoszek and Brennan, 1999.
4. It could be contended that environmental concern is engendered not merely by a commitment to the view that humans and nature are 'one', but by the feeling of being 'at one' with nature. This possibility is worth exploring: there are, no doubt, all manner of ways in which one might feel atone with nature, some of which might foster certain kinds of environmental concern. Whether any such experiences *necessarily* foster environmental concern is, however, another matter. After all, though talk of being 'at one' with nature tends to conjure up images of benign harmony, it is possible to conceive of someone who acts poorly with his dealings with nature but who nonetheless feels 'at one' with it. Think, for instance, of the trophy-seeking hunter's feeling that he is 'at one' with a nature red in tooth and claw.
5. Verse 254, See further, Harris. 2000: 122–123 and Schmithausen, 1991: 12–13. Such statements must be balanced against the view, embodied in traditions such as Zen, that the world of awakening is in some sense identical to the world as it appears to the unawakened. On the roots of such views in Madhyamaka thought, see Harvey, 1990: 103–104. On their implications for our relations with the natural world, see Eckel, 1997.
6. See further, Abe, 1989: 128–129 and Ryōen, 1999: 294. This is not to deny that some Buddhist traditions (notably, Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha) have been more amenable to 'metaphysical' readings of *śūnyatā*, according to which it is not simply an adjectival quality of things, but 'something' existing in its own right.

7. As Jonardon Ganeri notes, a metaphysical holism, according to which the world is 'like a net, where entities are merely the knots in interlocking ropes . . . acquiring whatever capacities they have by virtue of their relative position in the whole network and not in virtue of having intrinsic properties' 'sits ill' with Nāgārjuna's 'scepticism' (2001: 67).
8. Some ecological holists maintain that the Buddhist teaching of conditioned arising (*pratīya-samutpāda*), rather than that of emptiness, indicates a form of ecological holism. (The teachings are in fact intimately related—see further, Musashi (1993: 192–195).) On the differences between the teaching of conditioned arising and ecological holism, see Cooper and James, 2005: 111.
9. For a discussion of Buddhist holism and its implications for environmental ethics, see James, 2004: Chapter 4.
10. For a detailed defense of this claim, see Keown, 2001; Cooper and James, 2005: Chapter 4.
11. On environmental virtue ethics, see Sandler and Cafaro, 2005.
12. For a more detailed account, see Cooper and James, 2005.
13. Which is not to say, of course, that the genuinely compassionate person will be moved to develop such dispositions by a self-interested wish to better herself. On the relation between virtue ethics, environmental concern and self-interest, see James, 2006.

Chapter 6

Causation and 'Telos': The Problem of Buddhist Environmental Ethics

Ian Harris

Published material relating to Buddhism and environmental ethics has increased in a moderate fashion over the last few years and may be divided into four broad categories:

1. Forthright endorsement of Buddhist environmental ethics by traditional guardians of doxic truth, of whom HH Dalai Lama[1] is perhaps the most important representative.
2. Equally positive treatments by predominantly Japanese and North American scholar/activists premised on an assumption that Buddhism is blessed with the resources necessary to address current environmental issues. Generally this material limits itself to identifying the most appropriate Buddhist doctrinal bases from which an environmental ethic could proceed, e.g., the doctrines of interpenetration, *tathāgatagarbha*, etc. (e.g., Aramaki,[2] Macy,[3] and Brown[4]).
3. Critical treatments which, while fully acknowledging the difficulties involved in reconciling traditional Asian modes of thought with those employed by scientific ecology, are optimistic about the possibility of establishing an authentic Buddhist response to environmental problems (e.g., Schmithausen[5]).
4. Outright rejection of the possibility of Buddhist environmental ethics on the grounds that the otherworldliness of "canonical" Buddhism implies a negation of the natural realm for all practical purposes (e.g., Hakamaya[6]).

In this paper I shall move backwards and forwards between positions 3 and 4—my heart telling me that 3 makes sense with my mind more in tune with position 4. Category 1 material mainly relates to dialogue with other religions and aims to paint Buddhism in a favorable light. I shall have nothing further to say on this. I hope to show that work belonging to the second category, while superficially attractive, falls some way short of providing an adequate and rigorous basis for the erection of a thoroughgoing Buddhist environmental ethic. The minimum qualification for an authentic Buddhist ethics is that it is able to construe causation in such a way that goal-oriented activity makes sense. In other words, Buddhist causation must be shown to be teleologically meaningful. In our context a positive moral stance towards the environment is premised on the idea that one state of affairs can be shown to be preferable to another; for instance, that the world will be demonstrably worse if the black rhino becomes extinct. Now, I would not wish to argue against this in general terms, but I shall contend that it is difficult to ground such a view on a sound Buddhist footing, most importantly because any activity of this kind presupposes a certain teleology and an accompanying belief in the predictability of cause/effect relations.

Let us now examine the idea of causation in more detail. Yamada, in an article that draws on a very substantial body of prior Japanese scholarship, shows that the *pratītyasamutpāda* formula can be read in two significantly differing ways—the so-called "reversal" and "natural" sequences. The first he believes to be a characteristic of the *Abhidharma*, with the second more closely associated with the Buddha himself.[7] The reversal sequence, beginning with ignorance (*avijjā*) and ending with becoming-old and dying (*jarāmaraṇa*), is said to describe elements causally related in temporal succession. In this manner the time-bound and soteriologically meaningful, concepts of *karma*, *bhava*, *bhāvanā*, etc., so crucial to the whole idea of Buddhist *praxis* are made comprehensible. The natural sequence, by contrast, beginning with *jarāmaraṇa* and ending in *avijjā*, stresses non-temporal relations of interdependence, simultaneity, or mutuality. In this way:

> The twelve *angas* are not so much causal chains, in which the cause precedes the effect in rigid succession, but the factors of human existence which are interdependent upon each other simultaneously in a structural cross-section of human life.[8]

This typically *Mahāyānist* rendering, then, associates chronological causation with the *Abhidharma* of the old canon, while simultaneous relations (*akālika*) represent a complementary position implicit in the teachings of the Buddha yet only made explicit in the *Mahāyāna*. The implication here seems to be that the natural sequence, while obviously present in the writings of the old canon, was either consciously or unconsciously neglected.

For Yamada, *Abhidharmic* scholiasts deviated, for some inexplicable reason, from an atemporal understanding of causation to the extent that they came to adopt a theory of strict one-to-one cause-effect relations "along the flow of time"[9] known in Japanese as *gookan engi setsu* (karma activated dependent origination theory). I shall now suggest that the Abhidharmic adherence to asymmetry, i.e., to a strict temporal sequencing of *dharmas*, is not quite as strong as may have been expected from Yamada's treatment of the subject.

The *Sarvāstivāda* accepts six basic kinds of relation (*hetu*) between entities. Of these six, two—the simultaneous relation (*sahabhūhetu*) and the associated relation (*samprayuktahetu*)—suggest a roughly similar character of mutuality. In fact, the *Sarvāstivāda* came under attack from a variety of other Buddhist schools[10] under the suspicion that these two interrelated *hetu* undermined the basis of temporal causation understood as essential to the efficacy of ethical and soteriologically meaningful activity. It is clear, for instance, that Sanghabhadra was perfectly happy with the notion of mutuality in relations to the extent that he derives his simultaneously produced relation (*sahotpannahetu*) from the ancient "when this . . . that" formula.[11]

Some scholars[12] have attempted to show that simultaneous and temporal theories of causation are complementary. While the latter represents a unidirectional flow of causes and effects, the former points to the spatial relations that must also hold between co-existent entities. *Sahabhūhetu*, then, concerns relations in space, not in time. It indicates a principle of spatial unity or aggregation. Of the twenty-four modes of conditionality (*paccaya*) recognized by the Pali *Paṭṭhāna*, the sixth and seventh, in their traditional order, are closely related. These are, respectively, the co-nascence condition (*sahajātapaccaya*) and the mutuality condition (*aññamaññapaccaya*). The former condition occurs in four basic kinds of relation, i.e., those between mentals and mentals, mentals and physicals, physicals and physicals and physicals and mentals. So exhaustive is this list that we could be forgiven for thinking that the vast majority of the possible relations between the entities envisaged by *Theravāda* Buddhism

may be found under this heading. In fact, relations of the first type, i.e., mentals to mentals, are acknowledged, by a range of *Theravāda* thinkers, to be:

> . . . symmetrical. That is, the relation between the two terms A and B holds good as between B and A.[13]

Karunadasa accepts that, under certain circumstances, a relationship of pure reciprocity can apply, specifically in what he regards to be a special case of *sahajāta* defined in the traditional list of *paccayas* as no. 7—the mutuality condition (*aññamaññā*). Indeed, Ledi Sayadaw happily conflates these two *paccayas* and there is a widely held view, endorsed by Karunadasa, among others, that the *aññamaññā* condition is "the same as the *sahabhūhetu* of the *Sarvāstivādins*."[14]

Buddhaghosa in his *Vibhaṅga* commentary, *Sammohavinodanī*, distinguishes between a strictly *sutta*-based, temporal form of causation extending over many thought-moments (*nānācittakkhaṇika*) on the one hand, and an abhidhammic, non-temporal version said to occur in a single thought-moment (*ekacittakkhaṇika*), i.e., to all intents and purposes, instantaneously.[15] According to Buddhaghosa then, the *suttas* favor asymmetry with the *abhidhamma* plumping for a spatio-symmetric view of relations. This categorization differs sharply from Yamada's understanding of an *Abhidhamma* unequivocally promoting uni-directional causation, and, in my opinion, his less than enthusiastic support for non-*Mahāyānist* positions tends to make him uncritically conflate a great range of sources. In fact, the true situation on *sutta* and *abhidhamma* readings is probably somewhere between the positions of Buddhaghosa and Yamada. It seems that the Pali commentarial traditional never successfully managed to reconcile these two radically divergent readings and in the final analysis, elegant solutions to complex textual traditions are impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, it is obvious that *akālika* relations i.e. those not bound by time were not entirely overlooked by the *Theravāda* even though some modern apologists have been reluctant to admit this fact.[16]

The *Sautrāntika* school seems to have offered four basic objections to the *Sarvāstivādin* position on mutual relations not least because it seemed thoroughly imbued with a spirit of symmetry. The *Sautrāntika* also advanced a more radical theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇavāda*) by denying any element of stasis. For the *Sautrāntikas*, *dharmas* disappear as soon as they arise though this response to the problem of true causal efficiency is no more satisfactory than the position it sought to

replace. Nagao's rather flimsy defense of *kṣaṇavāda* fails to come to terms with this fact. He argues that the doctrine:

> does not mean the total extinction of the world; on the contrary, it is the way by which the world establishes itself as *full of life and spirit* (my emphasis).[17]

Now, though irresolvable differences remain, all three early schools of Buddhism exhibited a tendency to view causation in spatial/horizontal terms, even though this tendency was often obscured behind the lush vegetation of temporal/vertical thinking.

It looks likely that, as Buddhism developed, a gradual radicalization of the concept of impermanence occurred with rather more emphasis placed on symmetric relations between entities. The common sense view, perhaps related to the introspective/empirical observations of an early meditator's tradition that set a radically impermanent mental flux against the relative permanence of non-mental entities, was in time reformulated and rationalized by an emerging scholastic tradition.[18] These scholastic traditions, then, begin a process that results in the severing of links with common sense asymmetric causation to the extent that the temporal flow of a single chain of causes and effects was eclipsed by the space-like aspect of symmetry. In my view, the increasing dominance of symmetry in Buddhist thought provides a fertile breeding ground for the development of the *Avataṃsakasūtra* doctrine of the radical interpenetration of all things and this, in a circuitous manner, undoubtedly has come to influence the writings of many contemporary environmental thinkers.

Mahāyānists in general wish to preserve a time-like asymmetry of causation in its common-sense form, while negating it from the ultimate perspective. Nāgārjuna holds that four alternative positions, the tetralemma or *catuṣkoṭi*, logically exhaust the possible connections between causally related entities. Now, the dominant view within the *Mahāyānist* exegetical tradition is that Nāgārjuna's negation of the four alternatives is absolute. In other words, relations between entities can never be meaningfully articulated in terms of any of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*. Indeed, no other position is possible. Absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) in this case results in the total denial of causal relations between substantial entities. Using this as a starting point, Nāgārjuna moves on swiftly to propose that entities engaged in causal relations must be empty (*śūnya*). Of course, he has already underlined the centrality of *pratītyasamutpāda* as the bedrock,

the central authority from which all Buddhist thought must flow. This being so, the affirmation of causal relations leads inexorably to a negation of substantiality. Now, an empty entity has no distinguishing mark, its value is zero (*śūnya*). Furthermore, all conditioned entities must share this same null value and in this sense they are equivalent. If this is accepted Charles Hartshorne's intuition[19] that Nāgārjuna exhibits a prejudice in favor of symmetry is confirmed and we shall expect Nāgārjuna to experience some difficulty in accounting for any purposeful directionality of change, or "emergence into novelty" to use the jargon of process theology.

The earliest extant commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the *Akutobhayā*[20], is traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna, though this attribution tends to be rejected by modern scholarship. Interestingly, the use of absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) of the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi* is not one of the obvious features of this early text. In its treatment of *MMK*.XVI I I.8, the four *koṭis* are said to represent a series of graded steps related to the spiritual propensities of those engaged on the Buddhist path. This reading, in part confirmed by the later commentaries of Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka[21], singles out the fourth and final *koṭi* as the closest approximation, given the constraints of language, to the true nature of things. If we relate this to our earlier discussion of the four possible modes of production, it is apparent that the "neither different nor non-different" position, if is legitimate to invoke the law of the excluded middle here, reflects a rejection of both symmetric and asymmetric accounts of causation—a deeply puzzling notion. We might have expected a more satisfactory resolution of the problem, assuming of course that anyone in the early *Madhyamaka* was aware of, or indeed interested, in the matter. If so, we shall be disappointed, for the early *Madhyamaka* transcends, rather than resolves the tension. By retaining his strong adherence to the Buddha's teaching on *pratītyasamutpāda*, i.e. by insisting on the objectivity of the causal process, Nāgārjuna and his followers adopt a view of reality that, in so far as it can be articulated, is constituted by causally related and empty entities that are neither different nor non-different one from another. Elsewhere I have termed this outlook "ontological indeterminacy."[22] Naturally Ruegg is reluctant to accept that the *Madhyamaka* would have countenanced such an irrational depiction of reality as *coincidentia oppositorum* but what strikes one forcibly here is the parallel with the doctrine of symmetric interpenetration characteristic of some of the later phases of Buddhism, such as the Chinese Hua-Yen school.[23] In the *Yogācāra* again we find some

evidence of a distinction between *akālika* and unidirectional relations, even though the precise form of the distinction does not fully harmonize with that observed in other strands of the Buddhist tradition. As we would expect of a philosophical tradition with a specific interest in the mechanics of consciousness (*vijñāna*), the *Yogācāra* treatment of causation gives priority to the nontemporal factors that, as we have already seen in the Pali literature, apply to relations between mental entities.

Nagao goes on to suggest that the term *pratītyasamutpāda* is not intended to define causal relationships as customarily understood for it represents " . . . the realm of mutual relatedness, of absolute relativity [which] constitutes an absolute otherness over against selfhood and essence."[24] Chronological proliferation operates only from the perspective of conventional understanding, for, in reality, *pratītyasamutpāda* denotes "unity in a transhistorical realm."[25]

Returning now to Nāgārjuna's picture of causation and reality at *MMK*. XVI I I.9, we hear:

> Independent of another (*aparapratyaya*) (Ruegg's[26] rendering of this difficult term), at peace (*śānta*) not discursively developed through discursive developments, without dichotomizing conceptualisation, and free from multiplicity (*anānārtha*): this is the characteristic of reality (*tattva*)."[27]

This verse occurs in the context of a discussion of causal factors so we may, without doing violence to the text, conclude that *tattva* is inextricably related to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Comparison with the *maṅgalaśloka* reveals a number of parallels. *Tattva*, for instance, is said to be at peace, or still (*śānta*). The term *anānārtham* also occurs in *MMK*.XVI I I.9, although significantly *tattva* is not related to the usual binegation of positive and negative positions, i.e., neither without differentiation nor devoid of unity (the fourth *koṭi*), as one would expect by reference to the *maṅgalaśloka*. A consistent reading suggests that the quiescence and non-multiplicity of causally related entities is a function of their entirely symmetrical relations and one might be inclined to term this kind of relation "interpenetration". Ruegg, of course, rejects this interpretation. However, his treatment of the passages is ambiguous for he upholds Candrakīrti's view that a reality devoid of differentiation has the value of emptiness while, elsewhere in the same important article, he also wants to maintain that the *Madhyamaka* understanding of causal relations is "in a certain sense indeterminate and irrational."[28] In the less equivocal opinion

of la Vallee Poussin, Nāgārjuna holds only to the conventional expression of temporal causation, for: "There is, in absolute truth, no cause and effect."[29]

To summarize, the centrality of the notion of causation is non-negotiable, located, as it were, at the heart of the tradition. This seems to have led some early Buddhist schools to emphasize spatiality as against temporality, perhaps because this was perceived as entailing fewer intractable philosophical problems. The early *Madhyamaka* does not follow this lead preferring instead a transcendent approach to the problem of causation.

Conclusion

The gulf between spatial and temporal interpretations of causation was never satisfactorily reconciled in early Buddhism. An obvious starting point in any theoretical construction of an authentic Buddhist environmentalist ethic must be the doctrine of causation understood in its temporal sense yet, though the doctrine allows for a highly coherent account of the arising and cessation of suffering, and in particular of the interaction of mental factors, it has rarely been invoked as the basis of a "scientific" explanation of the natural world. This is, in good measure, because Buddhism has regularly embraced chronological causation at one moment only to reject it in the next. Here is an excellent example of the corrosive character of the "rhetoric of immediacy".

From the cosmological perspective Buddhism recognizes an *ad nauseam* unfolding and dissolution of worlds that act as receptacles for countless beings yet this picture is essentially anti-evolutionary or dysteleologic. All is in a state of flux yet all is quiescent for all forward movement lacks a sense of purpose. As Faure has made clear, the gulf between these two levels is not always easy to negotiate, even given the "teleological tendencies of controlled narrative"[30] that Buddhism has generally employed to minimize the incongruence of its various building blocks.

The theory of *karma* is clearly crucial to any Buddhist explanation of the world. On this account the "natural realm" is, at any point in time, regarded as a direct result of Stcherbatsky's "mysterious efficiency of past elements or deeds."[31] There is, then, no magnet at the end of history drawing events inexorably towards their ultimate goal, no supra-temporal *telos* directing events either directly or indirectly. The narrative and soteriological structure of Buddhism

appears, despite some recent attempts to indicate otherwise, essentially dysteleologic.[32]

Now, this need not preclude the possibility of purposiveness altogether, yet, when other available teleologies are considered, prospects are not especially encouraging. Woodfield, in an important study, shows that only two further positions remain for the Buddhist and one of these, the animistic alternative premised on the notion that entities are directed by the souls or minds that inhere within them, cannot possibly be appropriate. We are left then with the Aristotelian idea of immanent teleology in which objects behave teleologically because it is in their nature to do so. In other words the "source of a thing's end-directedness is to be found within the nature of the thing itself, not in some external agency."[33]

It is clear that, from the *Madhyamaka* perspective, no entity exists that could possibly possess a nature of this kind. The fact of *niḥsvabhāvatā* then precludes the possibility of immanent *tele*. The *Abhidharma* position, bearing in mind our earlier discussion, is perhaps more difficult to characterize. *Dharmas* are the ultimately unanalyzable constituents of nature but can *dharmas*, which are at least regarded as possessing own-natures (*svabhāva*), also be said to act as the source of their own end-directed movement? There is general agreement of all of the early schools of Buddhism that *dharmas* are simple and discrete entities. As such their capacity for internal relations with other *dharmas* makes no sense. Relationships must be of a purely formal kind. If this is accepted two things follow:

1. *dharmas* cannot mutually cooperate to bring about events on the macro scale—we may wish to compare this with process theology's[34] comparatively successful attempt to account for change, and even novelty, as the result of the prehension [i.e., serial co-operation] of internally related simples within an overarching Christian teleological structure.
2. *dharmas* do not possess *tele* though, on the level of convention, societies of such entities may be said to possess ends, though only in the most highly provisional sense.

The theory of *dharmas* represents a pseudo-explanation, a reformulation of the original insight of the Buddha into the fact that all things change. It gives no information on how this may occur. The theories of causation and of *karma* hover above all mechanical explanations and are never successfully earthed within them. In this

sense we can talk about an "ontological indeterminacy" at the heart of Buddhist thought. At best all we can say is that Buddhism accepts *de facto* change. It cannot account for it!

If we now root our discussion in the more concrete situation of environmental ethics we begin to see the difficulty in determining a coherent Buddhist approach. There are difficulties in determining how best to act with regard to the natural world, unless that response has been specifically authorized by the Buddha. The problem here is twofold. In the first place, few of the Buddha's injunctions can be used unambiguously to support environmentalist ends[35] and in the second, the dysteleological character of Buddhist thought militates against anything that could be construed as injecting the concept of an "end" or "purpose" into the world. It is, for example, very hard to see how a specifically Buddhist position on global warming or on the decrease in diversity of species can be made, unless of course one can appeal to the supranormal intelligence of a handful of contemporary Buddhist sages. In this connection, the Far-Eastern appeal to the Buddhist notion of the "interpenetration of all entities" will not do, for I hope that I have shown that the symmetric bias of this approach cannot even satisfactorily account for the raw fact of change itself, let alone for those aspects of change deemed harmful to the natural environment.

Schmithausen has observed that Buddhist spiritual and everyday practice may contribute to a sort of *de facto* environmentalism, though he's careful to point out that this does not, in itself "establish . . . nature . . . as a value in itself"[36]. It is worth pointing out that even in the realm of interpersonal relations, and in relations between humans and the higher animals, "commitment to extrapersonal welfare" is found only in a "highly qualified and rather paradoxical sense."[37] In this light Schmithausen's program for a reformation of Buddhism through de-dogmatization of the inconvenient Buddhist teachings on animals, etc. is little more than a bit of tinkering around on the margins. I hope that I have been able to show that it is the dysteleology deeply rooted within Buddhism that is the essential problem for any future Buddhist environmental ethic, not a bit of local difficulty with animals. It is not so much that Buddhism has a difficulty in deriving an ought from an is, it is that it faces the more fundamental difficulty of defining an "is" in the first place. On the theoretical level, then, the best Buddhism can offer at the moment is an endorsement of those aspects of the contemporary environmentalist agenda that do not conflict with its philosophic core. The future development of a

coherent and specifically Buddhist environmentalism, assuming that this is indeed possible, will be fraught with many difficulties.

Notes

1. For example, Tenzin Gyatso, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama "A Tibetan Buddhist Perspective on Spirit in Nature" in Rochefeller, Steven C. and John C. Elder (eds.) *Spirit and Nature: Why the Environment is a Religious Issue* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), pp. 109–123.
2. Noritoshi Aramaki, "*Shizen-hakai kara Shizen-sasei e—Rekishi no Tenkai ni tsuite*" (From destruction of Nature to Revival of Nature: On a Historical Conversion) *Deai*, 11.1 (1992), pp. 3–22.
3. Joanna Macy, "The Greening of the Self" in A. Hunt-Badiner (ed.) *Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology* (Berkeley: Parallax, 1990), pp. 53–63. Also, *Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural Systems* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).
4. Brian Brown, "Toward a Buddhist Ecological Cosmology" *Bucknell Review*, 37.2 (1993), pp. 124–137.
5. Lambert Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature. The Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the EXPO 1990 (An Enlarged Version with Notes)* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991 [Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series VI I]). Also, The Problem of the Sentience of Plants (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1991 [Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series VI]).
6. Noriaki Hakamaya, "*Shizen-hihan to-shite no Bukkyoo*" (Buddhism as a Criticism of *Physis/Natura*) *Komazawa-daiguku Bukkyoogakubu Ronshū*, 21 (1990), pp. 380–403. Also, "*Nihon-jin to animizmu*" *Komazawa-daiguku Bukkyoogakubu Ronshū*, 23 (1992), pp. 351–378.
7. I. Yamada, "Premises and Implications of Interdependence" in S. Balasooriya, et al (eds.) *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula* (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980), p. 279f.
8. Ibid., p. 271.
9. Ibid., pp. 272–273.
10. The main opponents to this apparent notion of simultaneous causation were the *Dārṣṭāntikas* (cf. *Mahāvibhāṣā* [*Taishoo* 27, p.79c7–8]) and the *Sautrāntikas* (Vasubandhu *Abhidharmakośa* 83.18-84.24). The *Sautrāntika* objections to the notion of mutual causality were fourfold.
11. See *Nyāyānusāra* [*Taishoo* 29.419b7–8] quoted in K.K. Tanaka, "Simultaneous Relation (*Sahabhū-hetu*): A Study in Buddhist Theory of Causation," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 8, 1 (1985), pp. 91–111; p.95.

12. Ibid.
13. Ledi Sayadaw "On the Philosophy of Relations II," Journal of the Pali Text Society, (1915–16), pp. 21–53; p.40. This reading is confirmed by W. M. McGovern's discussion of this matter in *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy* Vol. 1—Cosmology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1923), pp. 194–195.
14. Y. Karunadasa, *Buddhist Analysis of Matter* (Colombo: Dept. of Cultural Affairs, 1967), p. 131. Funnily enough Kalupahana takes a rather different line. For him, *sahajātapaccaya*, not *aññamaññapaccaya* is the correlate of *sahabhūhetu* while, on the authority of Haribhadra, *aññamaññā* is said to be the correlate of the *Sarvāstivāda sabhāgahetu*. See David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1975), pp. 167–168.
15. *Sammohavinodanī* pp. 199–209.
16. It is certainly curious that Ledi Sayadaw (op cit) fails to make any specific reference to *aññamaññā* in his treatment of the *paccayas*. Again, Nyanatiloka is extremely cautious in treatment of simultaneity in causal relations; see Nyanatiloka Mahāthera, *Guide Through the Abhidhamma-Pitaka: Being a Synopsis of the Philosophical Collection Belonging to the Buddhist Pali Canon* (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), p. 156.
17. Gadjin Nagao, "The Logic of Convertibility" in *Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies: Collected Papers of G.M. Nagao* [Edited, collated and translated by L.S. Kawamura in collaboration with G.M. Nagao] (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 130 [first appeared as "*Tenkan no Ronri*" in *Tetsugaku Kenkyu* (Journal of Philosophical Studies), 35.7 (1952), p. 405ff.
18. This distinction between cadres of spiritual praxis and philosophical reflection builds on the distinction first made by Lambert Schmithausen in "Spirituelle Praxis und Philosophical Theorie im Buddhismus," *Zeitschrift fur Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft*, 57.3 (1973), pp. 161–186 [Republished & translated into English as "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism" in German Scholars on India, Vol. II (New Delhi: Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1976. pp. 235–250].
19. Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* (London: SCM Press, 1970 [The Library of Philosophy and Theology]), pp. 205–226.
20. On the authorship, etc., of *Akutobhayā*, see C.W. Huntingdon, Jr., *The Akutobhayā and Early Indian Madhyamaka,* unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986.
21. See David S. Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoṭi* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 5 (1977–8), pp. 37ff.

22. Ian Charles Harris, *The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1991); especially see chapter 7.
23. See my "An American Appropriation of Buddhism" in T. Skorupski (ed.), *Buddhist Forum*, Vol. 3 (Tring: Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1994), forthcoming.
24. Gadjin M. Nagao, *The Foundational Standpoint of Madhyamika Philosophy* [translated by John P. Keenan] (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 8.
25. Ibid., p. 17.
26. Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoṭi* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism," p. 10.
27. *aparapratyayaṃ śāntam prapañcair aprapañcitaṃ. Nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇaṃ.*
28. Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Positions of the *Catuṣkoṭi* and the Problem of the Description of Reality in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism," p. 11 n. 44.
29. Louis de la Vallee Poussin, "Identity (Buddhist)" in J. Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), Vol. VI I, p. 100.
30. Bernard Faure, *The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 4.
31. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), p. 31.
32. The term "dysteleology" seems to have been coined by the Protestant theologian E. Heckel to denote the "purposelessness of nature".
33. Andrew Woodfield, *Teleology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 6.
34. For example, David Ray Griffin, "Whitehead's Deeply Ecological Worldview," *Bucknell Review* 37.2 (1993), pp. 190–206.
35. See my "How Environmentalist is Buddhism?" *Religion*, 21 (1991), pp. 101–114.
36. Lambert Schmithausen, "How can Ecological Ethics be Established in Early Buddhism", p. 15 (forthcoming).
37. David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, *Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 240.