

TIRAMISU: Black-Box Simulation Extractable NIZKs in the Updatable CRS Model

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

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Overview on Tiramisu & (Sub./Upd.) NIZKs in the CRS Model:



Sub: Subversion | **U**: Updatable
BB: Black-Box | **nBB**: non-Black-Box
ZK: Zero-knowledge | **SND**: Soundness | **KS**: Knowledge Sound | **SE**: Simulation Extractable

[PHGR13]
[BCG+15, ABL+19]

COCO
[KZM+15]

[Gro16]

[BFS16]
[ABLZ17]

[Fuc18]

[GM17, AB19]

[GKM+18]


[Bag19a]

[Bag19b]

Lamassu
[ARS20]

Tiramisu
[BS20]

Tiramisu: Building U-ZK and U-BB-SE NIZKs (zk-SNARKs)



- Given a language L with the NP relation R_L , define L' s. t. $((x, c, pk_i), (w, r)) \in R_{L'}$ iff:

$$c = \text{Enc}(pk_i, w; r) \bigwedge ((x, w) \in R_L)$$

- $\Pi_{\text{enc}} := (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is CPA secure public-key cryptosystem with *updatable keys* (pk_i, sk_i)
- Updatable public-key cryptosystems: can be constructed from key-homomorphic encryption schemes [AHI11] (a variation of El-Gamal [ElG84] instantiated in the pairing-based groups)
 - Similar to updatable NIZK arguments [GKM+18]
 - and updatable signatures [ARS20]

Tiramisu in Comparison with Current Constructions:



IN ITALIAN, TIRAMISÙ LITERALLY MEANS “LIFT ME UP”, OR MORE LITERALLY “PULL IT UP”.

- Upd. **BB** Sim. Ext. & **Upd**-ZK NIZKs (SNARKs) [**Tiramisu**, **BS20**]
- **Upd.** nBB Sim. Ext. & Sub-ZK SNARK [Lamassu, ARS20]
- nBB Sim. Ext. & **Sub**-ZK SNARK [**Bag19b**, Lip19]
- **BB** Sim. Ext. NIZKs (zk-SNARK) [KZM+15, **Bag19a**]
- nBB **Sim. Ext.** zk-SNARK [GM17, BG18, **AB19**]
- **nBB** Knowledge Sound zk-SNARKs [e.g. Gro16]

	Zero-Knowledge			Simulation Extractability			
	ZK	U-ZK	Sub-ZK	nBB-SE	BB-SE	U-nBB-SE	U-BB-SE
TIRAMISU	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	✓	✓
CØCØ [KZM ⁺ 15] Bag19a	✓	×	×	✓	✓	×	×
[GM17] BG18 [AB19]	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	×
[Bag19b] Lip19	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	×	×
[ARS20a]	✓	✓	✓*	✓	×	✓	×

Thank You!



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CØCØ Framework: Building BB-SE NIZKs (zk-SNARKs)



- Given a language L with the corresponding NP relation R_L , defines a new language L' such that $((x, c, \mu, pk_s, pk_e, \rho), (w, r, r_0, s_0)) \in R_{L'}$ iff:

$$\underbrace{c = \text{Enc}(pk_e, w; r)}_{\text{Black-Box Extraction}} \bigwedge \left((x, w) \in R_L \bigvee \underbrace{\left(\mu = f_{s_0}(pk_s) \bigwedge \rho = \text{Com}(s_0, r_0) \right)}_{\text{Simulation Sound or nBB Simulation Extractable}} \right)$$

- $\text{Enc}(\cdot)$ is a semantically secure encryption scheme,
- $f_{s_0}(\cdot): \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$ is a PRF family,
- $\text{Com}(\cdot)$ is a perfectly binding commitment scheme.

- Used in several UC-secure protocols [Gro06]: Hawk [KMS+16], Gyges [JKS16], Ouroboros Cryptosinous [KKKZ19], ...

[Bag19b, ARS20]: Building Sub-ZK & nBB-SE/U-nBB-SE zk-SNARKs



- Given a language L with the corresponding NP relation R_L , define a new language L' such that $((x, \epsilon, \mu, pk_s, pk_e, \rho), (w, r, r_0, s_0)) \in R_{L'}$ iff:

$$\epsilon = Enc(pk_e, w; r) \bigwedge \left((x, w) \in R_L \bigvee \left(\mu = f_{s_0}(pk_s) \bigwedge \rho = Com(s_0, r_0) \right) \right)$$



- Given a language L with the corresponding NP relation R_L , defines a new language L' such that $((x, cpk, pk), (w, csk - sk)) \in R_{L'}$ iff:

- (cpk, csk) of a key-homomorphic signature
- (pk, sk) of a one-time secure signature
- $\mu: SK \rightarrow PK$ (e.g. $pk = g^{sk}$).

$$(x, w) \in R_L \bigvee (cpk = pk \cdot \mu(csk - sk))$$