

# Impacts of Municipal Mergers on Pollution Control: Evidence of River Pollution in Japan

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## Introduction


- Municipal mergers have been widely adopted for improving efficiency and quality of public service provision.
- Municipal mergers can have **positive** impacts on environment through **internalizing pollution spillovers**.
- However, municipal mergers can **hamper** pollution control efforts due to **coordination costs and skewed distribution of political power** among pre-merger municipalities.

## Objectives

We examine whether **municipal mergers improve or worsen environmental quality** (river pollution) and investigate underlying mechanisms.

## Municipal Mergers in Japan

- Halve municipalities: **3,232 (1999) → 1,727 (2010)**
- **Staggered implementation** of municipal mergers in all prefectures from 1999 to 2011



## Data and Empirical Strategy

Panel data of **3,000** monitoring stations over **30** years

- BOD (Biological Oxygen Demand): water quality indicator
- Municipal merger history (timing, type, involved municipalities)

**Difference-in-differences (DID) model**

- Two-Way Fixed Effects DID

$$\ln(BOD_{i,t}) = \alpha + \beta_1 Merger_{i,t} + \lambda X_{i,t} + \delta_i + \theta_{b,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$


where  $i$  is monitoring station,  $t$  is year,  $b$  is basin.

- **Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) Estimator**

→ Robust to potential bias from negative weights in staggered DID design

## Results

Municipal mergers **increase river pollution by 6%**.



## Mechanisms

**Coordination Cost**

- The effect is salient in “equal-footing” mergers (among municipalities of similar size) with **higher coordination cost**.

**Political Economy**

- The effect is salient in “incorporated” municipalities (those incorporated by larger ones) with **smaller political power**.

	Coordination Cost		Political Economy	
	(1) Equal-footing	(2) Incorporating	(3) Incorporated	(4) Incorporating
Merger (= 1)	<b>0.063***</b> (0.019)	0.046* (0.027)	<b>0.091***</b> (0.034)	0.033 (0.028)
Observations	54,579	48,139	32,568	44,988
R <sup>2</sup>	0.885	0.886	0.891	0.887
# of Stations	2,373	2,093	1,416	1,956
# of Municipalities	813	598	541	593
Mean of Dep. Var.	2.671	3.033	3.130	3.144

**Null results on other potential mechanisms**

- Internalization of negative externality
- Change in land use

## Conclusion

- We find **negative effects** of municipal mergers on environmental outcomes in terms of river pollution.
- This finding **runs counter to the negative externality narrative** of pollution emphasized in past studies.
- The negative effects and relevant channels (coordination cost and political economy) should be carefully **considered in the cost-benefit analysis** of future municipal mergers.

\* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan.