PDR for k-safety

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Abstract. We introduce an algorithm for k-safety. Based on PDR.

1 Introduction

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we present notations and background that is required for the description of our algorithm.

Safety verification. A transition system T is a tuple (X, Init, Tr, Bad), where X is a set of variables that defines the states of the system (i.e., 2^X), Init and Bad are formulas with variables in X denoting the set of initial states and bad states, respectively, and Tr is a formula with free variables in $X \cup X'$, denoting the transition relation. A state $s \in 2^X$ is said to be reachable in T if and only if (iff) there exists a state $s_0 \in Init$, and $(s_i, s_{i+1}) \in Tr$ for $0 \le i \le N$, and $s = s_N$. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that the initial states do not include bad states, that is $Init \Rightarrow \neg Bad$.

An *inductive invariant* is a formula *Inv* that satisfied:

$$Init(X) \Rightarrow Inv(X)$$
 $Inv(X) \land Tr(X, X') \Rightarrow Inv(X')$ (1)

A transition system T is SAFE iff there exists an inductive invariant Inv s.t. $Inv(X) \Rightarrow \neg Bad(X)$. In this case we say that Inv as a *safe* inductive invariant. A formula Inv is said to be inductive *relative* to a formula F if Inv satisfies (1) with Tr(X, X') replaced by $F(X) \wedge Tr(X, X')$.

A transition system T is UNSAFE iff there exists a state $s \in Bad$ s.t. s is reachable. Equivalently, T is UNSAFE iff there exists a number N such that the following formula is satisfiable:

$$Init(X_0) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{i=0}^{N-1} Tr(X_i, X_{i+1})\right) \wedge Bad(X_N)$$
 (2)

where $X_i = \{a_i \mid a \in X\}$ is a copy of the variables used to represent the state of the system after the execution of i steps. We use BMC(T,k) to denote a procedure that checks satisfiability of Formula 2. When T is UNSAFE and $s_N \in Bad$ is the reachable state, the path from $s_0 \in Init$ to s_N is called a *counterexample* (CEX).

The *safety* verification problem is to decide whether a transition system T is SAFE or UNSAFE, i.e., whether there exists a safe inductive invariant or a counterexample.

Input: A safety problem $\langle Init(X), Tr(X, X'), Bad(X) \rangle$.

Output: Unreachable or Reachable

Data: A cex queue \mathcal{Q} , where $c \in \mathcal{Q}$ is a pair $\langle m, i \rangle$, m is a cube over state variables,

and $i \in \mathbb{N}$. A level N. A trace F_0, F_1, \ldots

Initially: $Q = \emptyset$, N = 0, $F_0 = Init$, $\forall i > 0 \cdot F_i = \emptyset$.

repeat

Unreachable If there is an i < N s.t. $F_{i+1} \subseteq F_i$ return *Unreachable*.

Reachable If there is an m s.t. $\langle m, 0 \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ return Reachable.

Unfold If $F_N \to \neg Bad$, then set $N \leftarrow N+1$.

Candidate If for some $m, m \to F_N \wedge Bad$, then add $\langle m, N \rangle$ to Q.

Predecessor If $\langle m, i+1 \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ and there are m_0 and m_1 s.t. $m_1 \to m, m_0 \wedge m_1'$ is satisfiable, and $m_0 \wedge m_1' \to F_i \wedge Tr \wedge m'$, then add $\langle m_0, i \rangle$ to \mathcal{Q} .

NewLemma For $0 \le i < N$: given a candidate model $\langle m, i+1 \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ and clause φ , such that $\varphi \to \neg m$, if $Init \to \varphi$, and $\varphi \land F_i \land Tr \to \varphi'$, then add φ to F_j , for $j \le i+1$.

ReQueue If $\langle m, i \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$, 0 < i < N and $F_{i-1} \wedge Tr \wedge m'$ is unsatisfiable, then add $\langle m, i+1 \rangle$ to \mathcal{Q} .

Push For $0 \le i < N$ and a clause $(\varphi \lor \psi) \in F_i$, if $\varphi \not\in F_{i+1}$, $Init \to \varphi$ and $\varphi \land F_i \land Tr \to \varphi'$, then add φ to F_j , for each $j \le i+1$.

until ∞ :

Algorithm 1: IC3/PDR.

An *inductive trace*, or simply a trace, is a sequence of formulas $[F_0, \dots, F_k]$ that satisfy:

$$Init \Rightarrow F_0 \qquad \forall 0 \le i < k \cdot F_i(X) \land Tr(X, X') \to F_{i+1}(X')$$
 (3)

An inductive trace is *monotone* if $\forall 0 \leq i < N \cdot F_i \Rightarrow F_{i+1}$ and safe when $\forall i \cdot F_i \Rightarrow \neg Bad$.

Note that for a monotone inductive trace $[F_0, \ldots, F_k]$, F_i is a bounded invariant w.r.t. i for all $0 \le i \le k$.

3 IC3 and PDR

The finite state model checking algorithm IC3 was introduced in [?] and its variant PDR in [?]. It maintains sets of clauses $F_0, \ldots, F_i, \ldots, F_N$, called a *trace*, that are properties of states reachable in i steps from the initial states Init. Elements of F_i are called *lemmas*. In the following, we assume that F_0 is initialized to Init. After establishing that $Init \rightarrow \neg Bad$, the algorithm maintains the following invariants (for $0 \le i < N$):

Invariant 1

$$F_i \to \neg Bad$$
 $F_i \to F_{i+1}$ $F_i \wedge Tr \to F'_{i+1}$

That is, each F_i is safe, the trace is monotone, and F_{i+1} is inductive relative to F_i . In practice, the algorithm enforces monotonicity by maintaining $F_{i+1} \subseteq F_i$.

Alg. 1 summarizes, in a simplified form, a variant of the IC3 algorithm. The algorithm maintains a queue of counter-examples Q. Each element of Q is a tuple $\langle m,i\rangle$ where m is a monomial over v and $0 \le i \le N$. Intuitively, $\langle m,i\rangle$ means that a state m can reach a state in Bad in N-i steps. Initially, Q is empty, N=0 and $F_0=Init$. Then, the rules are applied (possibly in a non-deterministic order) until either **Unreachable** or **Reachable** rule is applicable. **Unfold** rules extends the current trace and increases the level at which counterexample is searched. **Candidate** picks a set of bad states. **Predecessor** extends a counter-example from the queue by one step. **NewLemma** blocks a counterexample and adds a new lemma. **ReQueue** moves the counterexample to the next level. Finally, **Push** generalizes a lemma inductively. A typical schedule of the rules is to first apply all applicable rules except for **Push** and **Unfold**, followed by **Push** at all levels, then **Unfold**, and then repeating the cycle.

Oueue. The queue is ordered by the level:

$$\langle m, i \rangle < \langle n, j \rangle \iff i < j$$
 (4)

This drives the algorithm to the shortest counterexample.

Inductive Generalization. The **NewLemma** and **Push** rules are based on the principle of inductive generalization. Let $F_0, \ldots, F_i, \ldots, F_N$ be a valid trace, and let φ be a clause that is relatively inductive to F_i :

$$Init \implies \varphi \qquad \qquad \varphi \wedge F_i \wedge Tr \implies \varphi' \qquad \qquad (5)$$

Let $G = G_0, \dots, G_N$ be defined as follows:

$$G_j = \begin{cases} F_j \cup \{\varphi\} & \text{if } j \le i+1\\ F_j & \text{if } i+1 < j \le N \end{cases}$$
 (6)

Then G is a valid trace. The proof is by induction on i and follows from monotonicity of the trace.

Generalizing predecessors. The **Predecessor** rule picks a predecessor m_0 in Tr of some (partial) state m. While it is possible to simply pick a predecessor state, the rule attempts to find a generalized predecessor instead. The conditions of the rule is sufficient to ensure that m_0 is an implicant of $\psi = (F_i \wedge \exists X' \cdot (Tr \wedge m'))$. Finding a prime implicant of ψ would have been even better, but is too expensive in practice.

Propagating lemmas. The **Push** rule propagates lemmas to higher level, optionally generalizing them as possible. This makes the trace "more" inductive, eventually leading to convergence.

Long counterexamples. The **ReQueue** rule lifts blocked counterexamples to higher levels. As a side-effect, it makes it possible to discover counterexamples longer than the current exploration bound N. For example, assume that m is blocked at level i. This means that there is a path of length N-i from m to Bad (but no path of length at most i from Init to m). Assume that **ReQueue** lifted m to level j>i, and then m was reachable from Init. Then, the discovered counterexample is a concatenation of a path of length k from Init to m and a path of length N-i from m to Bad. The total length of the counterexample is (N-i+k) which is bigger than N.

We present a variant of PDR which is designed for k-safety verification. For simplicity, we present the algorithm for k = 2. However, the extension to any k is natural.

Our goal is information flow analysis, we therefore first go over the definition of self-composition.

When using self-composition, information flow is tracked over an execution of two copies of the transition system, T and T_d . Let us denote $X_d := \{x_d \mid x \in X\}$ as the set of variables of T_d . Similarly, let $Init_d(X_d)$ and $Tr_d(X_d, X_d')$ denote the initial states and transition relation of T_d . Given a formula φ over a set of variables V, $\varphi[V \leftarrow U]$ denotes the substitution of V with U in φ . Note that $Init_d$ and Tr_d are computed from Init and Tr by means of substitutions. Namely, substituting every occurrence of $x \in X$ or $x' \in X'$ with $x_d \in X_d$ and $x'_d \in X'_d$, respectively. Formally, $Init_d := Init[X \leftarrow X_d]$ and $Tr_d[X \leftarrow X_d, X' \leftarrow X'_d]$. We formulate information flow over a self-composed program as a safety verification problem: $M_d := \langle Z, Init_d, Tr_d, Bad_d \rangle$ where $Z := X \cup X_d$ and

$$Init_d(Z) := Init(X) \wedge Init(X_d) \wedge \left(\bigwedge_{x \in L} x = x_d\right)$$
 (7)

$$Tr_d(Z, Z') := Tr(X, X') \wedge Tr(X_d, X'_d)$$
(8)

$$Bad_d(Z) := \left(\bigvee_{x \in L} Obs_x(X) \wedge Obs_x(X_d) \wedge \neg (x = x_d) \right) \tag{9}$$

In order to track information flow, variables in L_d are initialized to be equal to their counterpart in L, while variables in H_d remain unconstrained. A leak is captured by the bad states (i.e. Bad_d). More precisely, there exists a leak iff there exists an execution of M_d that results in a state where $Obs_x(X)$, $Obs_x(X_d)$ hold and $x \neq x_d$ for a low-security variable $x \in L$.

The algorithm for kIC3 is summarized in Algorithm 2. Since this version aims at information flow analysis, the definition of Bad and Init are incorporated implicitly into the algorithm as shown in the **Candidate**, **Predecessor**₀ and **Unfold** rules.

The main difference between IC3 and kIC3 is that the latter maintains a different queue, which tracks pairs (k tuple) of states.

Input: A transition system $\langle Init(X), Tr(X, X') \rangle$, a set of high vars $H \subseteq X$ and low variables $L = X \setminus H$.

Output: Secure or Unsecure

Data: A cex queue \mathcal{Q} , where $c \in \mathcal{Q}$ is a tuple $\langle m, n, i \rangle$, m and n are a cubes over state variables, and $i \in \mathbb{N}$. A level N. A trace F_0, F_1, \ldots

Initially: $Q = \emptyset$, N = 0, $F_0 = Init \land \bigwedge_{x \in L} x = x_d$, $\forall i > 0 \cdot F_i = \emptyset$. repeat

Unreachable If there is an i < N s.t. $F_{i+1} \subseteq F_i$ return Secure.

Reachable If there is an m and n s.t. $\langle m, n, 0 \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ return Unsecure.

Unfold If $F_N(X) \wedge F_N(X_d) \to \bigwedge_{x \in L} x = x_d$, then set $N \leftarrow N + 1$.

Candidate If for some m and n, $m(X) \wedge n(X_d) \to F_N(X) \wedge F_N(X_d) \wedge \bigvee_{x \in L} x \neq x_d$, then add $\langle m, n[X_d \leftarrow X], N \rangle$ to \mathcal{Q} .

Predecessor If $\langle m, n, i+1 \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ and there are (m_0, m_1) and (n_0, n_1) s.t. $m_1 \to m$ and $n_1 \to n$, $m_0 \land m_1'$ and $n_0 \land n_1'$ are satisfiable, and $m_0 \land m_1' \to F_i \land Tr \land m'$ and $n_0 \land n_1' \to F_i \land Tr \land n'$, then add $\langle m_0, n_0, i \rangle$ to \mathcal{Q} .

Predecessor₀ If $\langle m,n,1\rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ and there are (m_0,m_1) and (n_0,n_1) s.t. $m_1 \to m$ and $n_1 \to n, m_0 \land m_1'$ and $n_0 \land n_1'$ are satisfiable, and $m_0 \land m_1' \to F_0 \land Tr \land m'$ and $n_0 \land n_1' \to F_0 \land Tr \land n'$, and $m_0|_L = n_0|_L$, then add $\langle m_0,n_0,0\rangle$ to \mathcal{Q} .

NewLemma For $0 \le i < N$: given a candidate model $\langle m, n, i+1 \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$ and clause φ , such that $(\varphi \to \neg m) \lor (\varphi \to \neg n)$, if $Init \to \varphi$, and $\varphi \land F_i \land Tr \to \varphi'$, then add φ to F_j , for $j \le i+1$.

ReQueue If $\langle m, n, i \rangle \in \mathcal{Q}$, 0 < i < N and $F_{i-1} \wedge Tr \wedge (m \vee n)'$ is unsatisfiable, then add $\langle m, n, i+1 \rangle$ to \mathcal{Q} .

Push For $0 \le i < N$ and a clause $(\varphi \lor \psi) \in F_i$, if $\varphi \not\in F_{i+1}$, $Init \to \varphi$ and $\varphi \land F_i \land Tr \to \varphi'$, then add φ to F_j , for each $j \le i+1$.

until ∞ ;

Algorithm 2: kIC3.