<center>Ex-ante Lobbying</center>

- Need to convey the possibilities of this set-up for capturing the real life dynamics of shocks integrated with lobbying dynamics, how that interacts with enforcement and administered protection

- Supply air tight argument / reference about $C + aW$ being equivalent to γ increasing everywhere

  - CAN'T! It's not true! Only microfound a version with $1 + a$ on those who lobby, a on those who don't

- perhaps re-emphasize that gov't can't completely control lobbying: can't make it higher than lobby's optimal. But this is b/c there's only one lobby

- finish escape clause result

- pg. 24 calculations

  - Decide where political objective fcn. section goes now

- re-write intro

  - MRC-style results survive incorporation of ex-ante lobbying. TA still works to restrict lobbying in many cases, but also to keep lobbyists "in the game"

  - Baldwin-style gov't welfare function works for a set of questions, but not for this one

    * Need to be able to say which predictions/design questions are okay: those that don't change lobbying incentives

  - Coates and Ludema (2001)—endogenous (add to list of GH, MRC)

  - How do I want to sell the paper? In relation to what literature? (what lit does endogenous? what lit doesn't?)

  - What if the WTO actually *did* what the literature says it does? It wouldn't work

  - Be more explicit about relationship between $\gamma(e)$ and $\gamma(s)$

For after this draft

- Could escape clause be made to work with some kind of dynamic use constraint?

<center>1</center>

- – When would lobby exert effort to top up?

- What units are $\pi(\tau)$ and e measured in? (no numeraire)

- existence proofs