Ex-ante Lobbying

- Conclusion

  - perhaps re-emphasize that gov't can't completely control lobbying: can't make it higher than lobby's optimal. But this is b/c there's only one lobby

- finish escape clause result

- intro

  - MRC-style results survive incorporation of ex-ante lobbying. TA still works to restrict lobbying in many cases, but also to keep lobbyists "in the game"

    * Nuanced view of domestic commitment motive: it's there in ex-post, but they lose control in ex-ante. Still, with ex-ante TA helps to screen out some lobbies for whom ex-ante is too expensive

  - Baldwin-style gov't welfare function works for a set of questions, but not for this one

    * Need to be able to say which predictions/design questions are okay: those where it doesn't matter whether government cares if it encourages/discourages lobbying: e.g. already described (ms2011), ms2012a,

  - In MRC, weight on lobby's profits is $1 + a$ no matter what. Doesn't vary in lobby's efforts. GH not really microfoundations for flexible model as in Long and Vousden (1991) / Baldwin (1987) model; microfoundations for more restrictive version with fixed weights ($1 + a$ on those who lobby, a on those who don't); then decide τ to change PS, CS, etc. (p. 481 GH94). Can't get shocks as in this literature

  - How do I want to sell the paper? In relation to what literature? (what lit does endogenous? what lit doesn't?)

  - What if the WTO actually *did* what the literature says it does? It wouldn't work

  - Be more explicit about relationship between $\gamma(e)$ and $\gamma(s)$

  - Need to convey the possibilities of this set-up for capturing the real life dynamics of shocks integrated with lobbying dynamics, how that interacts with enforcement and administered protection

For after this draft

- Could escape clause be made to work with some kind of dynamic use constraint?

- – When would lobby exert effort to top up?

- What units are $\pi(\tau)$ and e measured in? (no numeraire)

- existence proofs