

Ex-ante Lobbying

- Conclusion
 - perhaps re-emphasize that gov't can't completely control lobbying: can't make it higher than lobby's optimal. But this is b/c there's only one lobby
- finish escape clause result
- intro
 - MRC-style results survive incorporation of ex-ante lobbying. TA still works to restrict lobbying in many cases, but also to keep lobbyists "in the game"
 - Baldwin-style gov't welfare function works for a set of questions, but not for this one
 - * Need to be able to say which predictions/design questions are okay: those that don't change lobbying incentives
 - In MRC, weight on lobby's profits is $1 + a$ no matter what. Doesn't vary in lobby's efforts. GH not really microfoundations for flexible model as in Long and Vausden (1991) / Baldwin (1987) model; microfoundations for more restrictive version with fixed weights ($1 + a$ on those who lobby, a on those who don't); then decide τ to change PS, CS, etc. (p. 481 GH94). Can't get shocks as in this literature
 - Coates and Ludema (2001)—endogenous (add to list of GH, MRC)
 - How do I want to sell the paper? In relation to what literature? (what lit does endogenous? what lit doesn't?)
 - What if the WTO actually *did* what the literature says it does? It wouldn't work
 - Be more explicit about relationship between $\gamma(e)$ and $\gamma(s)$
 - Need to convey the possibilities of this set-up for capturing the real life dynamics of shocks integrated with lobbying dynamics, how that interacts with enforcement and administered protection

For after this draft

- Could escape clause be made to work with some kind of dynamic use constraint?
 - When would lobby exert effort to top up?
- What units are $\pi(\tau)$ and e measured in? (no numeraire)
- existence proofs