- Take out renegotiation

  – Add more basic tradeoff

  – (??) Draw inverted U for lobby

  – Now my short punishments don't rest on renegotiation

    * So now, for main analysis, must assume that we're constraining attention to a certain class of punishments: symmetric, and "Punish for T periods then go back to cooperation"

      · Go back to start if deviate should work for governments, but I think I need something else for lobbies since they would like that

    * Can I show that mine are optimal in this class?

    * Will look at asymmetric punishments in later section

- New section on asymmetric punishments (addresses, in part, Giovanni's #7)

  – Constrain to T-period class, now asymmetric—punish deviator more

  – There is literature on this

  – In this setting, can you achieve lower τ^A with asymmetric?

  – Have to check lobby conditions

    *

    * Do they change over the course of the punishment?

      · Joel thinks they'll be tightest at beginning of punishment phase

    * How asymmetric can they get?

      · Is it hard to make punishment really asymmetric b/c of presence of lobby?

      · If so, this puts some constraint on asymmetry of punishment

- #2 is not what I thought it was

  – Sweep through to make sure all analysis takes account of this concern

  – Maybe need to change notation on $\tau^B(\gamma(e))$ to be clear

  – Need to explain mechanics of $\bar{e}(\tau^B)$ relationship MUCH better

- email Giovanni

  – How to satisfy an author who thinks the results are not "particularly interesting or surprising" and has not given a clear indication of what it is he wants

- Should I try going to linear supply/demand system?

  - thank him

  - "I want to be very clear that I understand that my previous discussion did not make clear [sic]"

  - "I just want to know if this is along the right lines"

Smaller points

- Reviewer 1, #2 goes away with renegotiation

- Need thorough lit review of finite punishments

  - Green Porter in game theory

  - Is there anything in trade?