## Equilibrium Strategy Profiles (For JLEO Revision)

First, need to get timing clear for evolution of state variable. Take state variable to be  $q_{st}$ .

- $q_{s1}$ : beginning of the world (or,  $Q_{s0} \mu = q_{s1}$ )
- $Q_{s1} = q_{s1} + R_{p1} + R_{c1}$

$$-q_{s2} = Q_{s1} - \mu$$

Strategies

- For patron: function of  $q_{st}$
- For c: function of  $q_{st} + R_{pt}$
- For s: function of  $Q_{st} = q_{st} + R_{pt} + R_{ct}$
- For g: not a function of  $q_{st}$  at all

For Markov-perfect equilibrium, strategy profile must be dependent on state variable,  $q_s$  only.

Note that patron will never invest to augment  $l_s$  or  $w_g$ . This leave four state varibles in which the patron may invest:  $q_s$ ,  $q_g$ ,  $l_g$  and  $w_s$ .

- Also, Gov't / Secessionists: Choose unilateral, simultaneous best responses depending on magnitudes of  $Q_{i1}$ ,  $L_{i1}$  and  $\omega_{i1}$ 
  - Game only continues if (SQ,SQ) or (Cede, Cede) was played

## Period 1

- 1. Patron:  $R_{p1} = \frac{\beta}{1-\delta} (q_{s1} l_{s1})$  to augment  $q_{s1}$  if this is greater than 0. Else,  $R_{p1} = 0$ . Can write in max language.
  - International community:
    - (a) If  $R_{p1} + q_{s1} l_{s1} \ge \frac{\beta}{1-\delta}$ ,  $R_{c1} = 0$
    - (b) Otherwise  $R_{c1} = l_{s1} (q_{s1} + R_{p1}) + \varepsilon$  to augment  $l_{s1}$ 
      - (SQ,Cede) is played and game ends

- 2. Patron might also want to invest to encourage recognition. Most efficient way to do this is to augment  $L_{g1}$  (other options are to push either g or s to war, but probability of other outcome diminishes efficiency of investment, and assume payoff to war is lower to begin with).
- 3. Patron is willing to invest up to  $\frac{\lambda p_{1s} \alpha(1-p_{1s}) + \mu + \beta}{1-\delta}$  toward instigating fighting when this quantity is positive, and will not invest when the quantity is non-positive.
  - c will counter up to this amount (NEED TO CHECK THAT THESE CALCULATONS ARE CORRECT GIVEN THAN INVESTMENT IN  $w_s$  will be weighted down)
- 4. Patron could also invest in  $g_q$  to counter something by c. But this would only been needed if c had incentive to invest in g playing Fight, and we've ruled that out