

Equilibrium Strategy Profiles (For JLEO Revision)

First, need to get timing clear for evolution of state variable. Take state variable to be q_{st} .

- q_{s1} : beginning of the world (or, $Q_{s0} - \mu = q_{s1}$)
- $Q_{s1} = q_{s1} + R_{p1} + R_{c1}$
 - $q_{s2} = Q_{s1} - \mu$

Strategies (this is for the most interesting state variable, but could write it out for the other five)

- For patron: function of q_{st}
- For c: function of $q_{st} + R_{pt}$
- For s: function of $Q_{st} = q_{st} + R_{pt} + R_{ct}$
- For g: not a function of q_{st} at all

According to Mailath and Samuelson (2006) p. 177.

- The strategy profile σ is a stationary Markov strategy if for any two ex post histories \tilde{h}^t and \tilde{h}^τ (of equal or different lengths) terminating in the same state, $\sigma(\tilde{h}^t) = \sigma(\tilde{h}^\tau)$.
- The strategy profile σ is a stationary Markov equilibrium if σ is a stationary Markov strategy profile and a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

We have six state variables, so $s = (q_s, q_g, l_s, l_g, w_s, w_g)$.

- Strategies are a function of all six state variables
 - We can restrict attention to relevant ranges of the state variables. CAN I CHANGE PROP 1 PARTS 1 AND 2 TO BE INITIAL VALUES OF STATE VARIABLES? If so, then these conditions and what is necessary in each period to make the game continue.

- Strategies for the patron and c are also how much to invest in each of the six state variables. Some can be ruled out by preference assumptions:
 - c dislikes war, so will never invest in w_s or w_g . It would also not want to make the government lose, so won't invest in l_g either.
 - Because the patron's preferences are aligned with the secessionists and against the government, it never invests in w_g or l_s .

This leaves four state variables in which the patron may invest: q_s , q_g , l_g and w_s . Three in which c may invest: q_s , q_g , l_s .

- Also, Gov't / Secessionists: Choose unilateral, simultaneous best responses depending on magnitudes of Q_{i1} , L_{i1} and ω_{i1}
 - Game only continues if (SQ,SQ) or (Cede, Cede) was played

Assumptions

- $Q_{s0} \geq L_{s0} \Rightarrow q_{s1} + \mu \geq l_{s1}$
- $Q_{g0} \geq L_{g0} \Rightarrow q_{g1} \geq l_{g1}$

Period 1

1. Patron would like $Q_{s1} \geq L_{s1}$ to prevent c from incentivizing secessionists to Cede

- Equivalent to $q_{s1} + R_{p1} \geq l_{s1} + R_{c1}$ / $Q_{s0} + \mu + R_{p1} \geq L_{s0} + R_{c1}$ / $R_{p1} \geq R_{c1} - (Q_{s0} - \mu - L_{s0})$
 - $R_{c1} \leq \frac{\beta}{1-\delta} \Rightarrow R_{p1} \geq \frac{\beta}{1-\delta} - (Q_{s0} - \mu - L_{s0})$ allows the patron to ensure the original inequality
 - Initial assumption means $R_{p1} \geq \frac{\beta}{1-\delta} + \mu$ is a tighter condition
 - Since patron is willing to pay up to $R_{p1} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\delta}$, when $\frac{\alpha}{1-\delta} \geq \frac{\beta}{1-\delta} + \mu$, it will invest $R_{p1} = \frac{\beta}{1-\delta} - (Q_{s0} - \mu - L_{s0})$ to augment q_{s1} if this is greater than 0. Else, $R_{p1} = 0$.
 - (a) If $R_{p1} + (Q_{s0} - \mu - L_{s0}) \geq \frac{\beta}{1-\delta}$, $R_{c1} = 0$. (SQ,SQ) is played and game continues.
 - (b) If instead $R_{p1} + (Q_{s0} - \mu - L_{s0}) < \frac{\beta}{1-\delta}$ (i.e. assumption doesn't hold), $R_{c1} = l_{s1} - (q_{s1} + R_{p1}) + \varepsilon$ to augment l_{s1} . Note optimal R_{p1} in this case is 0.

* (SQ,Cede) is played and game ends

2. Patron would like $L_{g1} > Q_{g1}$ to achieve recognition directly. Must invest to augment l_{g1}

- Equivalent to $l_{g1} + R_{p1} > q_{g1} + R_{c1}$ / $L_{g0} + R_{p1} > Q_{g0} + R_{c1}$ / $R_{p1} > R_{c1} + (Q_{g0} - L_{g0})$
 - $R_{c1} \leq \frac{\nu}{1-\delta} \Rightarrow R_{p1} > \frac{\nu}{1-\delta} + (Q_{g0} - L_{g0})$ allows the patron to ensure the original inequality
 - Since patron is willing to pay up to $R_{p1} = \frac{\lambda+\mu+\beta}{1-\delta}$, when $\frac{\lambda+\mu+\beta}{1-\delta} \leq \frac{\nu}{1-\delta}$, patron will invest 0 in l_{g1} . $R_{c1} = 0$ as well.
 - If instead assumption 4 did not hold and $R_{p1} > \frac{\nu}{1-\delta} + (Q_{g0} - L_{g0})$, it will invest this amount to augment l_{g1} . Again, $R_{c1} = 0$. (Cede, SQ) is played and game ends.

3. Patron might want to instigate fighting to have a p_{1s} probability of achieving recognition indirectly. If $\frac{\lambda p_{1s} - \alpha(1-p_{1s}) + \mu + \beta}{1-\delta}$ is positive, invest in w_{s1} to change ω_{s1} . Will not invest when the quantity is non-positive. Inequality is $\omega_{s1} > Q_{s1}$

- $\omega_{s1} = -\zeta_s(1-\delta) + W_{s1}p_{1s} + L_{s1}(1-p_{1s}) > Q_{s1}$
- $-\zeta_s(1-\delta) + (W_{s0} + R_{p1})p_{1s} + L_{s0}(1-p_{1s}) > Q_{s0} - \mu + R_{c1}$
- $R_{p1}p_{1s} > R_{c1} - \mu + Q_{s0} - (-\zeta_s(1-\delta) + W_{s0}p_{1s} + L_{s0}(1-p_{1s}))$
- $R_{c1} \leq \frac{\nu p_{1s} - \beta(1-p_{1s})}{1-\delta}$, so if $R_{p1}p_{1s} > \frac{\nu p_{1s} - \beta(1-p_{1s})}{1-\delta} - \mu + Q_{s0} - (-\zeta_s(1-\delta) + W_{s0}p_{1s} + L_{s0}(1-p_{1s}))$, $R_{c1} = 0$ and (SQ,Fight) is played in third stage. Outcome depends on war lottery.
- Patron will spend at most $\frac{\lambda p_{1s} - \alpha(1-p_{1s}) + \mu + \beta}{1-\delta}$

4. Patron could also invest in q_g to counter investment by c in government's payoffs. But this would only been needed if c had incentive to invest in g playing Fight, and we've ruled that out.