

1 Motivation

2 Players and Strategy Spaces

1. Home government (G) chooses $S_G \in \{SQ, C\}$ where SQ means 'Status Quo' of unrecognized statehood and C means 'Cede' the issue of status and recognize the secessionists as an independent state.
2. Secessionists (S) choose $S_S \in \{SQ, C\}$, same as for G except when they Cede, they rejoin the home state.
3. Patron state (P) chooses $p \in [0, \infty)$ to invest in the secessionists status quo payoffs

3 Payoffs

Let, for instance, (SQ, C) mean that G plays SQ and S plays C .

Let us consider a first case where the payoffs for the secessionists are higher in the unrecognized state ('Status Quo') than they are if they cede and rejoin the home state. This, for instance, may be the case very early after taking control of the territory before their economic situation has had a chance to deteriorate. Then

- The payoffs after (SQ, SQ) are $-p, 3, 2 + p$
- The payoffs after (SQ, C) are $-10 - p, 5, 0$
- The payoffs after (C, SQ) are $3 - p, 0, 5 + p$
- The payoffs after (C, C) are $-p, 3, 2$

4 Model

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