Presentation Title Optional Subtitle

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2017

Background

TrustChain

My Thesis

TrustChain with Checkpoints

Protocol Overview

Promoter Registration

Consensus

Validation

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TrustChain




Figure: Every node has a chain. TX block is a six-tuple: $t_{i,j} = (h(b_{i,j-1}), h_s, h_r, s_s, s_r, m)$, one transaction results in two TX blocks—a pair.

TrustChain




Figure: Fork is two correctly signed TX blocks that belong to the same sender and has the same hash pointer but involve different receivers. Only one TX block may be in consensus.

TrustChain

- Everyone has their own chain
- Transactions are on arbitrary data m
- ► Transactions are irrefutable due to hash pointers
- No consensus (my thesis)

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


Figure: CP block is a six-tuple: $c_{i,j} = (h(b_{i,j-1}), h(\mathcal{C}_r), h, r, p, s)$, \mathcal{C}_r is the consensus result at round r, p = promoter indicator, s = signature.

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Protocol Overview

- 1. *n* lucky nodes are selected at random to act as promoters.
- 2. Promoters run a BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerant) consensus algorithm to agree on a set of CP blocks.
- 3. Disseminate the consensus result (the CP blocks).
- 4. Repeat for next round.
- 5. Any interested node can validate that their transaction.

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


Figure: We start in the state where C_{r-1} has just been agreed but not yet propagated.




Figure: Nodes receive consensus result and set promoters indicator p, then send the new CP blocks to promoters of round r.




Figure: Transactions carry on as usual in round r. Note that our CP blocks (round r-1) has not reached consensus yet.




Figure: CP blocks at round r-1 should be in C_r . If we're lucky: $h(k_i||c_{i,j}) < T$, then we're responsible for consensus of round r+1.

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Consensus

- 1. Nodes send CP blocks to the promoters.
- 2. The promoters' identities are encoded in the consensus result.
- 3. Promoters run the some asynchronous BFT consensus algorithm to agree on a set of CP blocks— C_r .
- 4. $n \ge 3t + 1$ is the optimal for BFT consensus.
- 5. C_r and the signatures are disseminated.
- 6. Nodes create new CP blocks when they receive t+1 good signatures and C_r .

Theorem

Assuming the promoters satisfy $n \ge 3t + 1$. The promoter registration and the consensus protocol satisfies agreement, total order and liveness.

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Assume node u is aware of all the past consensus results C_r . Suppose u wish to validate $t_{i,j}$. It performs the following.

- 1. Determine the pair $t_{i',j'}$.
- 2. Find the agreed enclosure for $t_{i,j}$ and $t_{i',j'}$ from C_r , otherwise return "unknown".
- 3. Query i and i' for the agreed pieces and ensure hash pointers are correct. Otherwise return "unknown".
- 4. Check that $t_{i,j}$ and $t_{i',j'}$ are in the agreed pieces and are created correctly using newtx. Otherwise return "invalid".
- 5. Check the checkpoints $c_{i,k}$ and $c_{i',k'}$ that immediately follow $t_{i,j}$ and $t_{i',j'}$ are in the agreed pieces and are created in the same round, i.e. $\operatorname{round}(c_{i,k}) = \operatorname{round}(c_{i',k'})$. Otherwise return "invalid".
- 6. Return "valid".

Validation

In essence, given a TX, ask the receiver to proof that it has a set of transactions that produces some CP block, the CP block should be in the consensus result and the pair of the TX should be in that set.

Theorem

If at least one party of every transaction is honest, then forking and other forms of tampering is guaranteed to be detected if the malicious party is alive.

Question

Given a starting digest and an ending digest, is it possible for the prover to proof to the verifier that it has a set of blocks linked by hash pointers that "fits" inside those digests in zero knowledge.

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
Implementation (4 weeks ago)

- Currently on going—using Python and Twisted
- Completed BFT consensus algorithm
- Completed local TrustChain with Checkpoints
- Next step is networked TrustChain and validation protocol


Implementation

- ▶ Completed BFT consensus algorithm, with erasure coding
- Completed TrustChain with Checkpoints, with experiments on DAS5
- Validation function is working
- Next step is to build validation into a network protocol and do experiments

Experiment with 500 nodes—no gossip



Experiment with 500 nodes—with gossip



Experiment with 500 nodes—with gossip

Conclusion

- ▶ The number of facilitators affects the consensus latency $(O(N \log N)?)$.
- ► The transaction rate has little or not effect on the average consensus latency.

Planned experiments

- Consensus latency (y-axis) vs population size (x-axis)—to investigate how population size impacts consensus latency.
- ► Global transaction rate vs population size—to investigate the scalability property.
- Global validation rate vs population size—to also investigate the scalability property.