

# Sybil Attacks and Their Defenses in Reputation Systems

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**Abstract**

## 1 Introduction

Reputation systems (described in section 2) allow entities, usually humans, to trust each other in the cyberspace based on their prior interactions (logical) or knowledge from other entities. For instance, online marketplaces such as Amazon or eBay often use a reputation system, and new buyers are more likely to buy goods from merchants with a high rating (a metric for reputation).

However, reputation systems are vulnerable to many types of attacks. The Sybil-attack, first described by Douceur[15], is an attack where an entity can assume multiple identities or Sybils, and then attack either another entity or undermine the whole reputation system (we discuss it in more details in section 3). In the marketplace example, the merchant could create multiple fake accounts and submitting a lot of positive feedback to the real account to boost the rating. It is one of the most important attacks because it leads to a large number of consequences including but not limited to spreading false information, ballot stuffing[6] and eclipse attacks[55]. Thus, preventing the Sybil-attack is likely to significantly increase the credibility of reputation systems.

Sybil-defence mechanisms come in various shapes and sizes. Some rely on a trusted third party (subsection 4.1), some introduce a cost in identity creation (subsection 4.2), some exploit the graph characteristics (subsection 4.4)

and so on. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a recent and comprehensive survey that focuses on the Sybil-attack in reputation systems.

To this end, we survey the defence mechanisms proposed by various reputation systems to eliminate or minimise Sybil-attacks as well as general approaches that do not depend on any specific reputation systems. Note that Sybil-attacks do not only exist in reputation systems. Wireless sensor networks and more generally MANETs (mobile ad hoc networks) for example are also vulnerable, the attacker can cripple the routing algorithm or defeat distributed storage mechanisms[42]. Thus defence mechanisms that do not apply to reputation systems are outside the scope of this work and are not covered. On the other hand, since reputation systems are often also peer-to-peer systems, we do cover the more general defence mechanisms.

Our main contributions are the following.

1. TODO
2. TODO

## 2 Reputation Systems

Reputation systems are of interest in many scientific domains. In evolutionary biology, scientists study indirect reciprocity[43]. In experimental economics

First the definitions

- Truster
- Trustee
- Recommender
- Recommendation

One of the first systems - Beth 94[5] PGP (Zimmermann) 95[76] Use of direct and also indirect trust

## 3 The Sybil-Attack

Explain the sybil-attack

Important theoretical results: Sybil-proof[8] - symmetric reputation functions cannot provide Sybil-proofness, must use asymmetric reputation functions.

a test bed for sybil attacks[24]

Quantifying Sybil attack[36]

## 4 Defences

In this section we categorise various defence techniques against the sybil-attack in reputation systems.

### 4.1 Trusted Third Party

One of the earliest and best known reputation system is eBay[46]. The buyers and sellers rely on a trusted third party, in this case eBay, to gather and distribute feedbacks after every transaction. Even when there are no incentives to provide feedback, Resnick and Zeckhauser observed that feedback was provided more than half of the time[46], making eBay one of the most well-known online marketplaces.

In general, trusted third parties manage the issuance and verification of identities. Thus they can apply a fee on the peer for creating a new identity[45] or rate-limit the creation of new identities[15], making sybil-attacks more difficult. Furthermore, trusted third parties often have the ability to manipulate the identities. For example they could punish the attackers by disabling all of their identity when caught, making the sybil-attack much riskier especially when identities are costly.

Trusted third party is likely the most widely used technique in practice. Marketplaces such as Amazon or eBay, online forums such as Stackoverflow or Reddit, all use a form of trusted third party.

Unfortunately, a trusted third party is often a single point of failure. Moreover, being a centralised system, it is difficult to scale up to suit increasing user demands. In the remainder of this section, we focus on distributed techniques for preventing the sybil-attack.

Credence 06[65] - uses central authority to sign key

## 4.2 Costly Identity Creation

### 4.2.1 IP Address

### 4.2.2 Low reputation for new users

Feldman 04[16] - adaptive stranger, low score on entry

## 4.3 Indirect Information

EigenTrust[28] - doesn't prevent sybils, suggests to add cost in ID creation

R2Trust[60] - credibility, tackles colluders, time decay factor

## 4.4 Graph Techniques

Theory[52] Gal-Oz et al. [17] communities are collection of knots, sybils can

form a knot? Regret[47, 48] - information from multiple dimensions Guha

04[18] - no mention of sybil attacks or attacks in general

### 4.4.1 Flow Based

BarterCast[39] SybilRes[12]

### 4.4.2 Topology

SybilGuard[72] SybilLimit[71] SybilInfer[11] SybilShield[53] - assuming sybils

have bad connectedness SumUp[61] GateKeeper[62] - based on SumUp Social-

network[63] - community detection

Distributed Sparse Cut Monitoring[31]

Other systems are built on top: ReDS[2] suggests to use sybilimit or

sybilinfer SybilProof-DHT[33]

## 4.5 Reputation Transfer

Trust-transfer[50]

## 4.6 Self Registration

P-GRID 01[1] Self-registration[14] - distributed registration based on IP address

## 4.7 Cryptography Based Techniques?

Secure-Overlay[35] - ID crypto and SSS Privacy-preserving[49] - blockchain?  
Proof-of-stake[13] SybilConf[58]

## 4.8 Content Driven

[7]

## 4.9 Other

Parental control[59] - uses parents to “observe” find suspects, only for detection, requires a sybil-proof reputation scheme DSybil[70] - recommendation system, need historical data Symon[27] - pair peers together, likelihood for both to be sybils is low, the pair monitor each other to prevent attacks XRep 02[10] IP check, and checks digest, uses existing P2P systems like Gnutella

## 4.10 Unsorted?

Beth and PGP limits Sybil attack to some extent by using social graphs Beth 94[5] PGP (Zimmermann) 95[76]

Yu 00[69] Lee 03[32] - uses flooding, might not be scalable, only talks about DoS Marti 04[38] ARA 05[21] - no mention of sybil, prevents freeriding, prevents short-term abuse because reputation increases gradually FuzzyTrust Song 05[56] - uses fuzzy logic P2PRep/Fuzzy 06[4] - also fuzzy, does not prevent generation of false rumors Xiong 05[67] - no mention of sybil, but tries to mitigate false information PowerTrust 06[75] - uses “power nodes” (from power-law), no mention of sybil, some defence against colluders

Histos and Sopras[73], doesn’t really have structure? Beta[25] Gupta et al.[20]

PeerTrust[66] - DHT, used P-GRID source code, has credibility rating

PerContRep[68]

## 4.11 Does not handle Sybil-attack?

TrustMe[54] is a reputation that focuses on anonymity, no mention of sybil attack

H-Trust[74] does not mention sybil

Coner et al.[9] assumes clients cannot perform sybil attack  
 TrustGuard 05[57] - assumes it is built on secure overlay networks (sybil-proof networks)  
 Scrivener 05[41] - assumes ID cannot be created and discarded

## 5 Related Work

Reputation Surveys: [37] [26] ? [23] [30] [51] ? [22]  
 Sybil Surveys: [34] [40] [44] [19] [29] Sok[3] but also some contribution  
 Other: [64]

## 6 Summary

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