

Katie Sigurdson



Assignment 1

Business Card

The first assignment was to create a business card. In the process of completing the assignment, I learned how to set up the InDesign workspace and how to create a new document with document preferences. Below is a business card which includes my name, title, telephone number and email address.

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Assignment 3

Poster Design

Assignment 3 called for a poster design for a musician's or a band's concert. I chose to create a poster for the USC Thornton Symphony. The assignment involved learning how to place images in an InDesign document, to edit and transform those images, and to use the Effects panel to enhance image.



Assignment 4

Magazine Page Design

For the fourth assignment, we were tasked with creating a magazine layout that either showcased a problem or positive advancement in layout design. For my assignment, I chose to showcase the issue of [breaking words](#) by breaking the word “BREAKING”. I also utilized flowing texting across text frames, aligning text along the baseline, and the use of modular grids.

BREAK- ING NEWS

Baby otters begin swimming lessons at the Cincinnati Zoo



After staying snuggled up in their holts with parents Annie and Wallace for a number of weeks since their birth, the adorable quintet have finally developed the confidence to venture outside for the very time. Led by mum Annie, the unnamed pups – three girls and two boys – began to dip their tiny toes in their pool and splashed around the water’s edge. The zoo’s otter experts say the pups have not yet developed their fully waterproof coats, but the new arrivals will soon build up the courage to fully submerge themselves in the water. Asian short-clawed otters are the world’s smallest species of otter, and the new born pups are currently weigh around just 500 grams. Seeing the pups taking their first steps outside and dipping their paws into the water is wonderful. The pups are gaining confidence all the time and it’s great to see each of their little personalities starting to shine through! Hannah Owens, Assistant Team Manager at the zoo. “Annie and Wallace are experienced parents so, with some

gentle encouragement, the pups will soon be gliding through the water in no time For the time being though, until their waterproof coats are fully developed, they’re just dipping their toes in and getting used to being close to water.” Hannah added “Asian short-clawed otters have evolved to be great swimmers.They have webbed feet, develop thick fur coats which are densely packed and water repellent, boast a powerful rudder-like tail that propels them through the water and they can close their ears and nostrils while swimming – they are the ultimate aquatic animals!” Listed as vulnerable to extinction by the International Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Asian short-clawed otters are the smallest of all 13 otter species and face increasing threats in the wild of South East Asia. The tiny mammals are hunted for their skins and organs, which are often used in traditional Chinese medicine. Their wetland habitats have also been overfished by humans and used for logging and farmland.



The zoo has previously helped fund research and conservation projects in Cheshire which are monitoring and safeguarding threatened UK otter populations – distant relatives of the Asian short-clawed species. Led by mum Annie, the unnamed pups – three girls and two boys – began to dip their tiny toes in their pool and splashed around the water’s edge Otter experts at the zoo say the pups all still sport their baby fur which is not yet fully waterproofed, but the new arrivals will soon build up the courage to fully submerge themselves in water.

Assignment 5

Color Mood Board








In Assignment 5, I selected the fashion brand of [Revolve's Camila Coelho](https://www.revolve.com/camila-coelho/br/efa852/) to create a color moodboard off of. After researching the brand and Camila, I was able to create a swatch of colors in the Swatches panel and to select colors from the image in the layout with the color picker. Additionally I applied my knowledge of gradient colors in the Stroke panel.

Revolve: Camila Coelho

<https://www.revolve.com/camila-coelho/br/efa852/>

I chose a Miami postcard as my inspiration for this assignment due to the fact that the brand I chose is known for night club looks with a Latin flair.



						
Flamingo	Tangerine	Morning Ocean	Mint Mojito	Beach Breeze	Miami Rose	Sunset Cruise
Gradient	Spot	Spot				

Assignment 6

Menu Card Design

In Assignment 6 I chose to design a menu for the restaurant [Tender Greens](#). In this assignment I learned how to create and apply Paragraphy Styles, Character Styles and Object Styles. These styles made creating the sections and keeping items consistent much easier. Additionally, I was able to apply a Tab Style for the prices alignment.

tendergreens

10250 Santa Monica Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90067

plates

your choice of protein, green, and side

pick one protein

chicken	
salt & pepper 250 cal.	\$12
chipotle barbeque 300 cal.	\$12
buttermilk fried (g) 340 cal.	\$12.5
our chicken is served skin on, with white and dark meat	
beef	
steak 270 cal.	\$13
grilled medium rare (r)	
fish	
grilled salmon (r) 160 cal.	\$15
seared tuna 190 cal.	\$13
grilled rare (r)	
more	
falafel 210 cal.	\$11.5
harissa, tzatziki (g)	

pick one green

baby greens 125 cal.
baby lettuces, sherry vinaigrette (v)

butter lettuce 227 cal.
chive, tarragon dressing (r)

kale 265 cal.
parmesan, roasted garlic vinaigrette

romaine hearts 190 cal.
parmesan, caesar dressing (g/r)

baby arugula 180 cal.
parmesan, fennel, lemon vinaigrette

baby spinach 210 cal.
nuts, goat cheese, cabernet vinaigrette

pick one side

sprouted brown rice
240 cal. (v)

mashed potatoes
250 cal.

seasonal veggies
70-250 cal. (v)

sandwiches

the original

roasted red peppers, aioli, on ciabatta (g/r)

pick one

salt & pepper chicken 810 cal.	\$9
chipotle barbeque 830 cal.	\$9
steak 860 cal.	\$10

slumi 990 cal. \$10
p. balistreri salumi, mortadella,
provolone, relish, aioli, on ciabatta (g/r)

fried chicken 950 cal. \$10
buttermilk fried chicken, cabbage slaw,
pickles, chili aioli, on brioce bun (g)

caprese 900 cal. \$8.5
mozzarella, roasted tomatoes, arugala,
aioli, on ciabatta (g/r)

falafel 560 cal. \$8.5
chickpea fritters, tzatziki, harissa,
pickles on lavash (g)

salads

mediterranean steak 800 cal. **\$13**
steak, marinated feta, tomatoes, pickled cucumbers, green olives, herbs, baby greens, lemon vinaigrette (r)

harvest chicken 960 cal. **\$13**
salt & pepper chicken, seasonal fruit, artisan
cheese, buts, baby greens, golden balsamic
vinaigrette

chipotle barbeque chicken 610 cal. \$12.5
avocado, cotija, tortilla strips, green
onion, radishes, romaine, cilantro, lime,
dressing (g)

grilled chicken cobb 700 cal. \$12.5
blue cheese, bacon, egg, avocado, tomatoes
romaine, tarragon dressing (r)

chinese chicken 700 cal. \$12
wontons, peanuts, cilantro, green onions,
carrots, tatsoi, mizuna, pea shoots, sesame
peanut dressing (g)

tuna nicoise 650 cal. \$13
seared tuna, tomatoes, potatoes, capers,
green beans, egg, olives, baby greens,
sherry vinaigrette

happy vegan 700 cal. **\$12**
farro with cranberry & nuts, quinoa with cu-
cumber & beets, green hummus (v/g)

grilled salmon bowl 570 cal. **\$15**
grilled salmon, seasonal salsa, sprouted brown
rice, cotija, cabbage slaw, lime-crema (r)

just for kids

little plate 237-735 cal. \$7

pick one:

- salt& pepper chicken
- fried chicken
- marinated steak
- cheese quesadilla
- grilled cheese
- served with fruit, mashed potatoes & water

desserts

items and prices may vary by location

fresh baked cookie (g) \$2.5
390-400 cal.

local selections

drinks

housemade

- mint lemonade 110 cal.
- agua fresca 220-240 cal.
- hibiscus tea 80 cal.
- the greens 130 cal.

coffee & tea

- cold brew coffee
- iced black/green tea
- hot coffee
- hot tea

alcohol & more

- local craft brews
- rose wine
- red wine
- white whine
- kombucha

catering

10 person minimum

plates

choose two proteins:

- | | |
|-------------|-----------------------|
| steak | salt & pepper chicken |
| seared tuna | falafel |

choose two sides

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------|
| baby greens | romaine hearts |
| mashed potatoes | seasonal veggies |
| sprouted brown rice | |

salads

- | | |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| mediterranean steak | chipotle bbq chicken |
| grilled chicken cobb | tuna nicoise |
| happy vegan | |

sandwiches

- | | |
|----------------------|---------|
| chipotle bbg chicken | steak |
| salumi | falafel |
| caprese | |

a la carte

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------|
| mashed potatoes | seasonal veggies |
| sprouted brown rice | just the greens |

add-ons

- | | |
|--------------|---------------|
| agua fresca | mint lemonade |
| hibiscus tea | iced tea |

cookies

Assignment 7

Book Design

In Assignment 7 I used the wikipedia article on the [Attack on Pearl Harbor](#) as the basis for my book design. Creating this assignment allowed me to utilize almost all of the elements of InDesign that we learned in this semester. In addition to those, I also applied new elements such as utilizing Master Pages and Sections, creating a table of contents, and preparing a PDF for print.

Attack on Pearl Harbor





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Chapter 1

Background to conflict

Diplomatic background

War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility that each nation had been aware of, and planned for, since the 1920s. The relationship between the two countries was cordial enough that they remained trading partners. Tensions did not seriously grow until Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Over the next decade, Japan expanded into China, leading to the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Japan spent considerable effort trying to isolate China, and endeavored to secure enough independent resources to attain victory on the mainland. The “Southern Operation” was designed to assist these efforts.

Starting in December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on USS Panay, the Allison incident, and the Nanking Massacre swung Western public opinion sharply against Japan. loans for war supply contracts.



Pearl Harbor on October 30, 1941, looking southwest

In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, attempting to stymie the flow of supplies reaching China. The United States halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gasoline to Japan, which the latter perceived as an unfriendly act. The United States did not stop oil exports, partly because of the prevailing sentiment in Washington: given Japanese dependence on American oil, such an action was likely to be considered an extreme provocation.

In mid-1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved the Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Hawaii. He also ordered a military buildup in the Philippines, taking both actions in the hope of discouraging Japanese aggression in the Far East. Because the Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain any attack on the United Kingdom’s Southeast Asian colonies, including Singapore, would bring the U.S. into the war, a devastating preventive strike appeared to be the only way to prevent American naval interference. An invasion of the Philippines was also considered necessary by Japanese war planners. The U.S. War Plan Orange had envisioned defending the Philippines with an elite force of 40,000 men; this option was never implemented due to opposition from Douglas MacArthur, who felt he would need a force ten times that size. By 1941, U.S. planners expected to abandon the Philippines at the outbreak of war. Late that year, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, was given orders to that effect.

The U.S. finally ceased oil exports to Japan in July 1941, following the seizure of French Indochina after the Fall of France, in part because of new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption. Because of this decision, Japan proceeded with plans to take the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. On August 17, Roosevelt warned Japan that America was prepared to take opposing steps if “neighboring countries” were attacked. The Japanese were faced with a dichotomy—either withdraw from China and lose face, or seize new sources of raw materials in the resource-rich European colonies of Southeast Asia.

Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during 1941, attempting to improve relations. In the course of these negotiations, Japan offered to withdraw from most of China and Indochina after making peace with the Nationalist government. It also proposed to adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and to refrain from trade discrimination, provided all other nations reciprocated. Washington rejected these proposals. Japanese Prime Minister Konoye

then offered to meet with Roosevelt, but Roosevelt insisted on reaching an agreement before any meeting. The U.S. ambassador to Japan repeatedly urged Roosevelt to accept the meeting, warning that it was the only way to preserve the conciliatory Konoye government and peace in the Pacific. However, his recommendation was not acted upon. The Konoye government collapsed the following month, when the Japanese military rejected a withdrawal of all troops from China.

Japan’s final proposal, delivered on November 20, offered to withdraw from southern Indochina and to refrain from attacks in Southeast Asia, so long as the United States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands supplied provided one million gallons of aviation fuel, lifted their sanctions against Japan, and ceased aid to China. The American counter-proposal of November 26 (November 27 in Japan), the Hull note, required Japan completely evacuate China without conditions and conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers. On November 26 in Japan, the day before the note’s delivery, the Japanese task force left port for Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese intended the attack as a preventive action to keep the United States Pacific Fleet from interfering with its planned military actions in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. Over the course of seven hours there were coordinated Japanese attacks on the U.S.-held Philippines, Guam and Wake Island and on the British Empire in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Additionally, from the Japanese viewpoint, it was seen as a preemptive strike ‘before the oil gauge ran empty’.

Military background

Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect the move into the “Southern Resource Area” (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia generally) had begun very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan’s Combined Fleet. He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command. Full-scale planning was underway by early spring 1941, primarily by Rear Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka, with assistance from Captain Minoru Genda and Yamamoto’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Captain Kameto Kuroshima. The planners studied the 1940 British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto intensively.

Over the next several months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, Emperor Hirohito did not approve the attack plan until November 5, after the third of four Imperial Conferences called to consider the matter. Final authorization was not given by the emperor until December 1, after a majority of Japanese leaders advised him the “Hull Note”

would “destroy the fruits of the China incident, endanger Manchukuo and undermine Japanese control of Korea.”

By late 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the U.S. and Japan were imminent. A Gallup poll just before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not, and 21% had no opinion. While U.S. Pacific bases and facilities had been placed on alert on many occasions, U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south. They also incorrectly believed that Japan was not capable of mounting more than one major naval operation at a time.

Objectives

The Japanese attack had several major aims. First, it intended to destroy important American fleet units, thereby preventing the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese conquest of the Dutch East Indies and Malaya and to enable Japan to conquer Southeast Asia without interference. Second, it was hoped to buy time for Japan to consolidate its position and increase its naval strength before shipbuilding authorized by the 1940 Vinson-Walsh Act erased any chance of victory. Third, to deliver a blow to America’s ability to mobilize its forces in the Pacific, battleships were chosen as the main targets, since they were the prestige ships of any navy at the time. Finally, it was hoped that the attack would undermine American morale such that the U.S. government would drop its demands contrary to Japanese interests, and would seek a compromise peace with Japan

Striking the Pacific Fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor carried two distinct disadvantages: the targeted ships would be in very shallow water, so it would be relatively easy to salvage and possibly repair them; and most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor. A further important disadvantage—this of timing, and known to the Japanese—was the absence from Pearl Harbor of all three of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s aircraft carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga). IJN top command was attached to Admiral Mahan’s “decisive battle” doctrine, especially that of destroying the maximum number of battleships. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto decided to press ahead.

Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war also meant other targets in the harbor, especially the navy yard, oil tank farms, and submarine base, were ignored, since—by their thinking—the war would be over before the influence of these facilities would be felt.

Chapter 2

Breaking off negotiations

Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese embassy in Washington, including the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura and special representative Saburō Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into French Indochina in the summer.

In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cypher machine, in a cipher named PURPLE by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 pm Washington time on December 7, 1941. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time), but because of decryption and typing delays, as well as Tokyo’s failure to stress the crucial necessity of the timing, embassy personnel did not deliver the message to Secretary Hull until several hours after the attack.

The United States had decrypted the 14th part well before the Japanese managed to, and long before embassy staff composed a clean typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, had been decoded Saturday night but was not acted upon until the next morning (according to Henry Clausen).

Ambassador Nomura asked for an appointment to see Hull at 1:00 pm, but later asked it be postponed to 1:45 as the ambassador was not quite ready. Nomura and Kurusu arrived at 2:05 pm and were received by Hull at 2:20. Nomura apologized for the delay in presenting the message. After Hull had read several pages, he asked Nomura whether the document was presented under instructions of the Japanese government; the Ambassador replied it was. After reading the full document, Hull turned to the ambassador and said:

I must say that in all my conversations with you...during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them.

Japanese records, admitted into evidence during congressional hearings on the attack after the war, established that Japan had not even written a declaration of war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration was finally delivered to U.S. ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo about ten hours after the completion of the attack. Grew was allowed to transmit it to the United States, where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).

War

In July 1941, IJN headquarters informed Emperor Hirohito its reserve bunker oil would be exhausted within two years if a new source was not found. In August 1941, Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences. Roosevelt replied Japan must leave China before a summit meeting could be held. On September 6, 1941, at the second Imperial Conference concerning attacks on the Western colonies in Asia and Hawaii, Japanese leaders met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters. The summit occurred one day after the emperor had reprimanded General Hajime Sugiyama, chief of the IJA General Staff, about the lack of success in China and the speculated low chances of victory against the United States, the British Empire and their allies.

Prime Minister Konoe argued for more negotiations and possible concessions to avert war. However, military leaders such as Sugiyama, Minister of War General Hideki Tōjō, and chief of the IJN General Staff Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano asserted time had run out and that additional negotiations would be pointless. They urged swift military actions against all American and European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, who was also the choice of the army and navy, as his successor. Hirohito chose Hideki Tōjō instead, worried (as he told Konoe) about having the Imperial House being held responsible for a war against Western powers.

On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a complete plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito. At the Imperial Conference on November 5, Hirohito approved the plan for a war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, scheduled to start at the beginning of December if an acceptable diplomatic settlement were not achieved

before then. Over the following weeks, Tōjō’s military regime offered a final deal to the United States. TOn November 26, the so-called Hull Memorandum (or Hull Note) rejected the offer and demanded that, in addition to leaving Indochina, the Japanese must leave China (without Manchoukuo) and agree to an Open Door Policy in the Far East.

On November 30, 1941, Prince Takamatsu warned his brother, Hirohito, the navy felt the Empire could not fight more than two years against the United States and wished to avoid war. After consulting with Kōichi Kido (who advised him to take his time until he was convinced) and Tōjō, the Emperor called Shigetarō Shimada and Nagano, who reassured him that war would be successful. On December 1, Hirohito finally approved a “war against United States, Great Britain and Holland” during another Imperial Conference, to commence with a surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its main forward base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.



Kōichi Kido

Intelligence gathering

On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.

Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.

In June 1941, German and Italian consulates were closed, and there were suggestions Japan’s should be closed, as well. They were not, because they continued to provide valuable information (via MAGIC) and neither President Franklin D. Roosevelt nor Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted trouble in the Pacific. Had they been closed, how-



Prime Minister of Japan Hideki Tōjō



Prince Takamatsu

ever, it is possible Naval General Staff, which had opposed the attack from the outset, would have called it off, since up-to-date information on the location of the Pacific Fleet, on which Yamamoto’s plan depended, would no longer have been available.

Planning

Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the forward basing of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch colonies to the south occupied much of the Japanese Navy’s time and attention. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would be inevitably drawn into war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.

The intent of a preventive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, thus removing it from influencing operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies. Successful attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. Planning had long anticipated a battle in Japanese home waters after the U.S. fleet traveled across the Pacific, under attack by submarines and other forces all the way. The U.S. fleet would be defeated in a “decisive battle”, as Russia’s Baltic Fleet had been in 1905. A surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty compared to longstanding expectations. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, Pearl Harbor’s shallow waters made using conventional aerial torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii’s distance meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the continental U.S.

Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British action in the Battle of Taranto, in which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled half the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham’s strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time necessary to establish a “barrier” defense to protect Japanese control of the Dutch East Indies. The delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham’s engineers had devised.[citation needed]

Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral Togo’s surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. Yamamoto’s emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy.



Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

In a letter dated January 7, 1941, Yamamoto finally delivered a rough outline of his plan to Koshiro Oikawa, then Navy Minister, from whom he also requested to be made Commander in Chief of the air fleet to attack Pearl Harbor. A few weeks later, in yet another letter, Yamamoto requested Admiral Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, study the technical feasibility of an attack against the American base. Onishi gathered as many facts as possible about Pearl Harbor.

After first consulting with Kosei Maeda, an expert on aerial torpedo warfare, and being told the harbor’s shallow waters rendered such an attack almost impossible, Onishi summoned Commander Minoru Genda. After studying the original proposal put forth by Yamamoto, Genda agreed: “[T]he plan is difficult but not impossible”. Yamamoto gave the bulk of the planning to Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who was very worried about the area’s air defenses. Yamamoto encouraged Kusaka by telling him, “Pearl Harbor is my idea and I need your support.” Genda emphasized the attack should be carried out early in the morning and in total secrecy, employing an aircraft carrier force and several types of bombing.

Although attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet anchor would achieve surprise, it also carried two distinct disadvantages. The targeted ships would be sunk or damaged in very shallow water, meaning it would be quite likely that they could be salvaged and possibly returned to duty (as six of the eight

battleships eventually were). Also, most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore leave or would be rescued from the harbor afterward. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead.

By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z, after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō at Tsushima.[citation needed] Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest near Kagoshima City on Kyūshū. Genda chose it because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew flew over the 5,000 ft (1,500 m) mountain behind Kagoshima and dove into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to 25 ft (7.6 m) at the piers. Bombardiers released torpedoes at a breakwater some 300 yd (270 m) away.

However, even this low-altitude approach would not overcome the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese weapons engineers created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo, which inflicted most of the ship damage during the eventual attack. Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14- and 16-inch (356- and 406-mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the lightly armored decks of the old battleships.

Concept of a Japanese invasion of Hawaii

At several stages during 1941, Japan’s military leaders discussed the possibility of launching an invasion to seize the Hawaiian Islands; this would provide Japan with a strategic base to shield its new empire, deny the United States any bases beyond the West Coast and further isolate Australia and New Zealand. He identified two possible landing sites, near Haleiwa and Kaneohe Bay, and proposed both be used in an operation that would require up to four weeks with Japanese air superiority.

Genda, who saw Hawaii as vital for American operations against Japan after war began, believed Japan must follow any attack on Pearl Harbor with an invasion of Hawaii or risk losing the war. He viewed Hawaii as a base to threaten the west coast of North America, and perhaps as a negotiating tool for ending the war. He believed, following a successful air attack, 10,000-15,000 men could capture Hawaii, and saw the operation as a precursor or alternative to a Japanese invasion of the Philippines. In September 1941, Commander Yasuji Watanabe of the Combined Fleet staff estimated two divisions (30,000 men) and 80 ships, in addition to the carrier strike force, could capture the islands. He identified two possible landing sites, near Haleiwa and Kaneohe Bay, and proposed both be used in an operation that would require up to four weeks with Japanese air superiority.

Although this idea gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:

Japan’s ground forces, logistics, and resources were already fully committed, not only to the Second Sino-Japanese War but also for offensives in Southeast Asia that were planned to occur almost simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack.

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) insisted it needed to focus on operations in China and Southeast Asia, and refused to provide substantial support elsewhere. Because of a lack of cooperation between the services, the IJN never discussed the Hawaiian invasion proposal with the IJA.

Most of the senior officers of the Combined Fleet, in particular Admiral Nagano, believed an invasion of Hawaii was too risky.

With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed a massive carrier-based three wave airstrike against Pearl Harbor to destroy the Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from which the United States could extend its military power against Japan. However, the confidence of Japan’s leaders that the conflict would be over quickly and that the United States would choose to negotiate a compromise, rather than fight a long, bloody war, overrode this concern.



Planner Commander Minoru Genda stressed surprise would be critical.