



\* This is a fall-through for invalid or not implemented (yet) ops  
ARGSUSED







\* SECINFO (Operation 33): Obtain required security information on  
 \* the component name in the format of (security-mechanism-oid, qop, service)  
 \* triplets.  
 ARGUSED

```
SECINFO4args = &argop->nfs_argop4_u.opsecinfo;
SECINFO4res = &resop->nfs_resop4_u.opsecinfo;
utf8string "utfnm = &args->name;
uint_t len;
char "nm";
struct sockaddr "ca;
char "name = NULL;
nfsstat4 status = NFS4_OK;
DTRACE_NFSV4_2(op__secinfo_start, struct
compound_state *, cs, SECINFO4args *, args);
```

\* Current file handle (cfh) should have been set before getting  
 \* into this function. If not, return error.

cs->vp == NULL ?

Yes

\*cs->statusp =  
 resp->status =  
 NFS4ERR\_NOFILEHANDLE;

cs->vp->v\_type != VDIR ?

Yes

\*cs->statusp =  
 resp->status =  
 NFS4ERR\_NOTDIR;

status =  
 utf8\_dir\_verify(utfnm);

status != NFS4\_OK ?

Yes

\* Verify the component name. If failed, error out, but  
 \* do not error out if the component name is a ".".  
 \* SECINFO will return its parents secinfo data for SECINFO "...".

utfnm->utf8string\_len !=  
 2 || utfnm->utf8string\_  
 val[0] != '.' ||  
 utfnm->utf8string\_val[1]  
 != '.' ?

Yes

\*cs->statusp =  
 resp->status = status;

nm = utf8\_to\_str(utfnm,  
 &len, NULL);

nm == NULL ?

Yes

\*cs->statusp =  
 resp->status =  
 NFS4ERR\_INVALID;

len > MAXNAMELEN ?

Yes

ca = (struct sockaddr \*)svc\_getppcaller(req->rq\_xprt)->buf;  
 name = nfscmd\_convname(ca, cs->exi, nm,  
 NFSCMD\_CONV\_INBOUND, MAXPATHLEN + 1);

\*cs->statusp = resp->status = NFS4ERR\_NAMETOOLONG;  
 kmem\_free(nm, len);

name == NULL ?

Yes

\*cs->statusp = resp->status = NFS4ERR\_INVALID;  
 kmem\_free(nm, len);

\*cs->statusp =  
 resp->status =  
 do\_rfs4\_op\_secinfo(cs,  
 name, resp);

name != nm ?


Yes


kmem\_free(name,  
 MAXPATHLEN + 1);

kmem\_free(nm, len);


out: DTRACE\_NFSV4\_2(op\_\_  
 secinfo\_done, struct  
 compound\_state \*, cs,  
 SECINFO4res \*, resp);

End


























\* Check to see if a given "flavor" is an explicitly shared flavor.  
 \* The assumption of this routine is the "flavor" is already a valid  
 \* flavor in the secinfo list of "exi".


\*  
 \* e.g.  
 \* # share -o sec=flavor1 /export  
 \* # share -o sec=flavor2 /export/home  
 \*  
 \* flavor2 is not an explicitly shared flavor for /export,  
 \* however it is in the secinfo list for /export thru the  
 \* server namespace setup.






\* Check if the security flavor used in the request matches what is  
 \* required at the export point or at the root pseudo node (exi\_root).  
 \*  
 \* returns 1 if there's a match or if exported with AUTH\_NONE; 0 otherwise.  
 \*










\* bitmap4\_to\_attrmask is called by getattr and readdir.  
\* It sets up the vattr mask and determines whether vfsstat call is needed  
\* based on the input bitmap.  
\* Returns nfsv4 status.


\* Set rdattr\_error\_req to true if return error per  
\* failed entry rather than fail the readdir.


\* generate the va\_mask  
\* Handle the easy cases first

\* Check is  
vfsstat is needed


\* bitmap4\_get\_sysattr is called by getattr and readdir.  
\* It calls both VOP\_GETATTR and VFS\_STATVFS calls to get the attrs.  
\* Returns nfsv4 status.





























































\* XXX - issue with put\*fh operations. Suppose /export/home is exported.  
 \* Suppose an NFS client goes to mount /export/home/joe. If /export, home,  
 \* or joe have restrictive search permissions, then we shouldn't let  
 \* the client get a file handle. This is easy to enforce. However, we  
 \* don't know what security flavor should be used until we resolve the  
 \* path name. Another complication is uid mapping. If root is  
 \* the user, then it will be mapped to the anonymous user by default,  
 \* but we won't know that till we've resolved the path name. And we won't  
 \* know what the anonymous user is.  
 \* Luckily, SECINFO is specified to take a full filename.  
 \* So what we will have to in rfs4\_op\_lookup is check that flavor of  
 \* the target object matches that of the request, and if root was the  
 \* caller, check for the root\* and anon\* options, and if necessary,  
 \* repeat the lookup using the right cred\_t. But that's not done yet.  
 ARGUSED


```


PUTFH4args *args = &argop->nfs_argop4_u.opputfh;
PUTFH4res *resp = &resop->nfs_resop4_u.opputfh;
nfs_fh4_fmt_t *fh_fmt_p;
DTRACE_NFSV4_2(op__putfh_start, struct compound_state *, cs, PUTFH4args *, args);

```













































\* Set vattr based on incoming fattr4 attrs - used by setattr.  
 \* Set response mask. Ignore any values that are not writable vattr attrs.

```
int error = 0;
int i;
char *attrs = fattrp->attrlist4;
uint32_t attrslen = fattrp->attrlist4_len;
XDR xdr;
nfsstat4 status = NFS4_OK;
void *vp = cs->vp;
union nfs4_attr_u *na;
uint8_t *amap;
```

\* Make sure that maximum attribute number can be expressed as an 8 bit quantity.

```
ASSERT(NFS4_MAXATTRS <= (UINT8_MAX + 1));
```

may be set later

```
sargp->flag = 0;
sargp->vap->va_mask = 0;
sargp->rdattr_error = NFS4_OK;
sargp->rdattr_req = FALSE;
```


```
xdrmem_create(&xdr, attrs, attrslen, XDR_DECODE);
na = ntovp->na;
amap = ntovp->amap;
```


\* The following loop iterates on the nfs4\_ntov\_map checking  
 \* if the fbit is set in the requested bitmap.  
 \* If set then we process the arguments using the  
 \* rfs4\_fattr4 conversion functions to populate the setattr  
 \* vattr and va\_mask. Any settable attrs that are not using vattr  
 \* will be set in this loop.

xdrmem\_destroy(&xdr);  
 NO-OP

End







ARGSUSED  
 \* verify and nverify are exactly the same, except that nverify  
 \* succeeds when some argument changed, and verify succeeds when  
 \* when none changed.

```

VERIFY4args *args = &argop->nfs_argop4_u.opverify;
VERIFY4res *res = &resop->nfs_resop4_u.opverify;
int error;
struct nfs4_svetit_arg sarg;
struct statvfs64 sb;
struct nfs4_ntov_table ntov;
DTRACE_NFSV4_2(op__verify__start, struct
compound_state *, cs, VERIFY4args *, args);
    
```

cs->vp == NULL ?

Yes

No

```

sarg.sbp = &sb;
sarg.is_referral = B_FALSE;
nfs4_ntov_table_init(&ntov);
resp->status = do_rfs4_set_attr(NULL,
&args->obj_attributes, cs, &sarg, &ntov, NFS4ATTR_VERIT);
    
```

```

*cs->statusp =
resp->status =
NFS4ERR_NOFILEHANDLE;
    
```

resp->status != NFS4\_OK ?

No

```

error = rfs4_verify_attr(
&sarg, NULL, &ntov);
    
```

switch (error)

0 ?

No

-1 ?

Yes

Yes

default

\* do\_rfs4\_set\_attr will try to verify systemwide attrs,  
 \* so could return -1 for "no match".

```

resp->status = NFS4_OK;
    
```

```

resp->status =
NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME;
    
```

```

resp->status =
putermo4(error);
    
```

resp->status == -1 ?

Yes

```

resp->status =
NFS4ERR_NOT_SAME;
    
```


```

done: *cs->statusp = resp->status;
nfs4_ntov_table_free(&ntov, &sarg);
    
```


```

out: DTRACE_NFSV4_2(op__
verify__done, struct
compound_state *, cs,
VERIFY4res *, resp);
    
```


End




ARGUSED  
 \* verify and nverify are exactly the same, except that nverify  
 \* succeeds when some argument changed, and verify succeeds when  
 \* when none changed.























































ARGSUSED


\* Lookup the pathname, it must already exist since this file  
\* was delegated.


\* Find the file and state info for this vp and open owner pair.  
\* check that they are in fact delegated.  
\* check that the state access and deny modes are the same.  
\* Return the delegation possibly setting the recall flag.









































































\* There is a user-level copy of this routine in ref\_subr.c.  
 \* Changes should be kept in sync.



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