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Does Macro-Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment

The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.

JEL codes: E32, E51, F30, G21, G28

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CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN a central tool of the prudential regulation of banks in most countries for the past three decades. Recently, under Basel III, regulators have agreed to vary minimum capital requirements somewhat over time, as part of the cyclical mandate of macro-prudential policies.¹ During boom times, capital requirements would increase, and during recessions they would decline. This cyclical variation is intended to cool off credit-fed booms, mitigate credit crunches, and boost capital and provisioning during booms to provide an additional cushion to absorb losses during downturns.²

This paper analyzes the extent to which this sort of variation in capital requirements is effective in regulating the supply of bank lending over the cycle. Our analysis is made possible by an apparently unique policy experiment performed in the UK during the 1990s and 2000s. As we explain more fully in Section 1, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) varied individual banks' minimum risk-based capital requirements substantially. The extent of this variation across banks in the minimum required risk-based capital ratio was large (its minimum was 8%, its standard deviation was 2.2%, and its maximum was 23%). Importantly, the FSA based regulatory decisions on organization structures, systems, and reporting procedures, rather than high-frequency financial analysis. This institutional characteristic allows us to treat changes in regulatory capital requirements as exogenous with respect to bank-specific credit supply, an assertion that we show has substantial empirical support. Although, the FSA's prudential regime was explicitly microprudential in nature, our analysis of banks' credit supply responses to changes in minimum capital requirements holds important lessons for the efficacy of a future macro-prudential regime. This is especially the case because, as we shall see below, the FSA's bank-specific changes in minimum capital requirements, when aggregated across the banking system in fact yielded a countercyclical regulatory impulse very similar to what is envisaged by Basel III.

Before undertaking our empirical analysis in Sections 1–3, we begin by reviewing the theoretical foundations of macro-prudential capital regulation and the empirical literature relating to those foundations. Three necessary conditions must hold true if the time-varying, macro-prudential capital requirements envisioned under Basel III are to be effective in controlling systemwide credit growth: (i) equity (the key variable of interest in bank capital regulation) must be a relatively costly source of bank finance, (ii) minimum capital requirement ratios must have binding effects on banks' choice of capital ratios, and (iii) when macro-prudential regulation diminishes

1. In addition to cyclical variation of capital ratios, macro-prudential policy could entail other cyclical variation in policy instruments (e.g., liquidity and provisioning requirements) as well as "structural" interventions to promote financial stability. For more details, see Tucker (2009, 2011), Galati and Moessner (2011), and Aikman, Haldane, and Nelson (2011).

2. As regulations have evolved over time, the complexity of capital regulation has also increased. Under the Basel I system, capital requirements consisted of three ingredients: definitions of capital that distinguished between tier 1 and tier 2 capital, a formula for measuring risk-weighted assets, and setting constant minimum ratios of 8% for the total risk-based capital (defined as the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital, divided by risk-weighted assets), and 4% for the tier 1 risk-based capital. Under Basel II, the calculation of risk-weighted assets was modified to permit, under some circumstances, the use of internal models and rating agency opinions. Under Basel III, the Basel I minimum ratio is being raised, with a greater focus on the common equity component of capital, and the so-called "countercyclical capital buffer" implies that minimum risk-based capital ratios will now vary over the economic cycle.

(increases) the supply of credit by banks subject to macro-prudential policy, other sources of credit must not fully offset such changes through increases (decreases) in the credit supplied by those other sources.

Necessary Condition 1: Equity Must Be a Relatively Costly Source of Finance

The supply of loans from regulated banks will not respond to changes in capital requirements unless bank capital is a relatively costly means of financing bank activities. If bank leverage were irrelevant to the cost of bank finance—as implied by the Miller–Modigliani Theorem—then changes in minimum capital requirements would not be useful in reducing credit growth during booms or in mitigating credit crunches; banks would costlessly adjust their capital ratios without any effect on their lending activities.

Theoretical models that incorporate the tax benefits of debt finance and asymmetric information about banks' conditions and prospects imply that, in general, raising funds from external equity finance is more costly for banks than from debt finance, which implies that a rise in capital requirements will raise the cost of bank finance, and thus lower the supply of lending.³

With respect to the asymmetric information costs of equity, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that the adverse-selection costs of raising external equity (which take the form of underpricing of the equity offerings of unobservably healthy banks in their model) apply more to junior securities (like equity) than to relatively senior debt instruments. Equity may also be relatively costly as a source of finance because of *ex post* verification costs. For example, Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that banks that offer debt contracts can economize on those costs.

There is a substantial empirical literature in support of the general proposition that equity capital is relatively costly to raise, and that the financing costs of debt sources of funding increase in the extent to which the debt claim is more equity-like—that is, costs are lowest for deposits, higher for contractual debt and preferred stock (which are *de jure* junior to deposits in many countries and also *de facto* junior because of their longer maturity), higher still for mezzanine instruments (e.g., debt that is convertible into equity), and highest for equity.⁴ Equity prices tend to decline in reaction to an announcement of an equity offering, especially when issuers are informationally opaque, and that announcement effect is lower for convertible debt, and zero for straight debt (James 1987, James and Wier 1990). Underwriting costs

3. There is also a theoretical literature in banking that discusses how agency problems arising from greater capital or capital requirements can give rise to social costs in addition to credit contraction—for example, changes in managerial effort or risk preferences. For a review of that literature, see VanHoose (2008) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008). Admati et al. (2011) express scepticism about the magnitude of equity capital costs for banks.

4. The view that junior instruments are more costly sources of finance also explains the common regulatory reluctance to impose large increases on banks' minimum capital ratios. The initial Basel minimum capital requirements were set at ratios that were quite close to those prevailing at the time. Indeed, the distinctions between tier 1 and tier 2 capital, and the 4% and 8% minimum risk-based capital ratios, were devised in 1988 to allow banks that were subject to the Basel guidelines to comply with the new guidelines without raising significant new capital, and despite significant differences in the capital structures of banks across countries.

for equity are also much higher than for debt (Calomiris 2002). Ediz et al. (1998) and Francis and Osborne (2009, 2012) also find that, consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984), UK banks behave as if tier 2 capital is less costly to raise than equity and that banks that have relatively low costs of raising equity raise equity capital more (as opposed to contracting risky assets) in response to increases in capital requirements.

Because the high cost of equity capital is a necessary condition for credit supply to respond to either a loss of equity capital or an increase in capital requirements, evidence that contractions of credit result from these phenomena is powerful evidence that equity finance is costly. The literature on bank “capital crunches” documents that shocks to bank equity capital have large contractionary effects on the supply of lending (Bernanke 1983, Bernanke and Lown 1991, Kashyap and Stein 1995, 2000, Houston, James, and Marcus 1997, Peek and Rosengren 1997, 2000, Campello 2002, Calomiris and Mason 2003, Calomiris and Wilson 2004, Cetorelli and Goldberg 2009).

Many studies also suggest that increases in regulatory capital requirements can precipitate contractions in the supply of credit (see VanHoose 2008 for a review). Some of these existing studies analyze banks’ lending behavior around the time of regulatory regime changes (Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni 2002), and thus do not isolate the effects of bank minimum capital requirement changes, *per se*. Others analyze cross-sectional differences in lending by banks that differ according to their regulatory circumstances, including whether they are the subject of a regulatory action, or whether they have relatively small buffers of capital relative to the minimum requirement (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1995a, 1995b, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004). Experiencing a regulatory action is a special event, however, and one that is endogenous to a variety of circumstances that may affect bank lending. Similarly, the relative sizes of banks’ capital buffers do not provide a reliable measure of the relative degree to which banks are constrained by regulation; buffers are endogenous to banks’ particular circumstances, which can produce substantial variation in their targeted capital buffers (more on this below). Finally, it is important to control for cross-sectional variation in loan demand when measuring the effects of capital requirements on loan supply, which only some of the preexisting studies of lending attempt to do.

To our knowledge, our study is the first analysis to isolate the bank-specific credit supply response to variation in regulatory minimum capital requirements. We are able to control for contemporaneous variation in loan demand by combining data on employment growth in different sectors of the economy with the sectoral composition of bank loan portfolios.⁵ We document regulatory capital requirements at the level

5. Our study differs in this respect from Francis and Osborne (2012), who also examine the relationship between minimum capital requirements and bank lending, but without an attempt to separate supply from demand. Jimenez et al. (2011) study the effects of bank-specific changes in dynamic provisioning requirements for Spanish banks. Like our study, theirs controls for demand-side influences. Changes in dynamic provisioning should be thought of as changes in the “front-loading” of capital requirements against risky assets, rather than permanent changes in capital ratio requirements. For that reason, the magnitudes of loan-supply reactions to provisioning changes should be smaller than the reactions to changes in minimum capital ratios.

of individual banks, and we show that these requirements vary substantially cross-sectionally and over time. Furthermore, the institutional setup of the FSA regulatory process allows a causal interpretation of changes in the capital requirements on loan supply.

Necessary Condition 2: Capital Requirements Must Bind

A second necessary condition for bank capital requirements to affect the loan supply decisions of banks is that regulatory capital requirements must continuously act as binding constraints on bank capital ratio choices. If market discipline motivates banks to maintain ratios of capital sufficiently far in excess of those required by regulators, then changes in regulatory requirements might have no effect on bank capital choices, and therefore, no effect on bank loan supply. Calomiris and Mason's (2004) study of credit card banks in the 1990s shows that, under some circumstances, market discipline can motivate capital ratios substantially in excess of the regulatory minimum.

Importantly, binding capital requirements should not be confused with banks always holding capital at the level of the minimum regulatory requirement. Rather, binding capital requirements simply mean that banks must adjust their behavior when the regulatory minimum capital ratio changes. In general, binding capital requirements are perfectly compatible with a capital buffer chosen to minimize the costs of complying with capital requirements.⁶ Empirical research has identified substantial heterogeneity with respect to bank responses to capital requirements, and particularly, the extent to which capital requirements bind on banks' choices of capital ratios. In many studies, actual capital ratios respond strongly to changes in capital requirements, but in other studies, there is little observed response, which indicates that in some circumstances market discipline may be the dominant influence on variation in capital ratios (VanHoose 2008).

For our sample of UK banks, there have been studies examining the extent to which changes in bank-specific capital requirements affected actual capital ratios (Alfon, Argimón, and Bascuñana-Ambrós 2005, Francis and Osborne 2009, 2012). These studies find a substantial impact, and both conclude that capital requirements were binding on capital ratio choices. In Section 1, we confirm that minimum capital requirements appear to have been binding on bank capital decisions continuously for our sample of UK banks from 1998 to 2007.

Necessary Condition 3: Limited Substitutability of Alternative Funding

The effectiveness of macro-prudential variation in regulatory capital ratios depends on limited substitutability between the credit supplied by banks that are subject to capital regulation and the financing provided by other sources not subject to minimum capital requirements. To the extent that other sources can offer substitutes for the loans

6. See Suarez and Repullo (2009) and Aliaga-Diaz et al. (2011) for two different frameworks modeling the dynamic behavior of capital buffers.

of regulated domestic banks, there will be offsetting “leakages” to macro-prudential policy-induced variation in the supply of loans by regulated banks. These other sources could include lending by unregulated domestic intermediaries, cross-border bank lending, and securities offerings (such as commercial paper, corporate bonds or equity offerings).

The theoretical and empirical finance literature suggests that loans from intermediaries are not perfect substitutes for securities offerings. Loans involve much more detailed contracting terms than bonds—many pages that describe conditions pertaining to warranties, covenants, and collateral—which must be custom designed for each loan contract and which require monitoring and enforcement after the loan is made.⁷ Furthermore, the importance of “soft” information for limiting the screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs of bank lending imply that there are limits to the ability of offshore lending to substitute for local intermediation, except in the case of very large firms that operate internationally, for whom access to local information is less relevant.⁸ Thus, although “leakages” from all alternative sources of finance could potentially offset the variation in loan supply that results from macro-prudential regulation of affected banks, the most powerful potential substitute for regulated bank lending is lending by local intermediaries that are not subject to domestic capital regulation.

The problem of “leakages” involving local intermediaries is particularly acute for an economy like the UK, which is a global financial center. Resident foreign branches of banks headquartered abroad are not subject to FSA prudential regulation (unlike domestically headquartered banks and resident foreign subsidiaries), but are regulated by their home country regulatory authorities (which, during our period, typically set capital ratio requirements uniformly at 8% of risk-weighted assets for all banks, which was the minimum in the UK).⁹ That means that if the FSA decided to raise minimum capital requirements, foreign branches operating in the UK could be a significant source of leakage.

Regulatory leakages have understandably been of great concern to policymakers engaged in the construction of macro-prudential regimes. In the words of Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of Financial Stability at the Bank of England:

Co-operation will be especially important in the deployment of “cyclical” instruments. If one country tightens capital or liquidity requirements on exposures to its domestic economy, the effect will be diluted if lenders elsewhere are completely free to step into the gap. Basel and the EU are addressing how to handle that where the instrument is the Basel 3 Countercyclical Buffer. (Tucker 2011)

7. There is a large empirical literature on the special characteristics of loans, beginning with James (1987).

8. Evidence that local, “soft” information is relevant for most bank lending is provided in various studies, including Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010).

9. Such foreign branches account for the majority of banks resident in the UK; in our sample they comprise 173 of 277 banks. Moreover, as described in Section 3, these branches account for a nontrivial share of lending to the UK real economy, and are important in several subsectors of the real economy. See Aiyar (2011, 2012) for a more detailed account of the structure of the banking industry in the UK, especially relating to the difference between regulated foreign subsidiaries and unregulated foreign branches.

In Section 3, we investigate the extent to which these concerns about dilution are warranted. Specifically, we ask whether foreign branches operating within the UK increase their lending to “step into the gap” when UK-regulated banks experience increases in their capital requirements. We find that this dilution effect from leakages is large and statistically significant.

In the remainder of the paper, we proceed as follows. Section 1 describes the bank-specific UK database that we employ to measure the relationship between changes in capital requirements and changes in lending, reviews the process that governed changes in capital requirements, reports summary statistics about changes in capital requirements, and describes the relationship between minimum capital ratio requirements and capital ratios. We also show that despite the absence of any explicit macro-prudential mandate in FSA supervision, average minimum capital requirements across the banking system were in fact strikingly countercyclical.¹⁰

Section 2 focuses on the connection between capital requirement changes and bank lending for the UK-resident banks that were subject to FSA capital regulation. We report regression results that demonstrate a large and statistically significant relationship between bank-specific changes in capital requirements and changes in bank lending.

Section 3 estimates the loan-supply response of foreign branches operating in the UK (which are not subject to FSA capital regulations) to changes in the capital requirements imposed on UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries (which are subject to FSA capital regulation). We find evidence for large leakages, which offset about a third of the effect of capital requirement changes on the lending of UK-regulated banks. Section 4 concludes.

1. UK CAPITAL REGULATION, 1998–2007

Our empirical analysis of UK banks’ capital ratio and lending responses to bank capital requirement changes is made possible by a regulatory policy regime that set bank-specific, time-varying capital requirements. These minimum capital requirement ratios were set for all banks under the jurisdiction of the FSA, that is, all UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries. Bank capital requirements are not public information. We collect quarterly data on minimum capital requirements, and other bank characteristics, from the regulatory databases of the Bank of England and FSA. Our sample comprises 104 regulated banks (48 UK-owned banks and 56 foreign subsidiaries), and 173 unregulated foreign branches operating in the UK. Bank mergers are dealt with by creating a synthetic merged data series for the entire

10. On the other hand, this should not be entirely surprising, as the term “macroprudential” originated in the UK in the early 1980s (Clement, 2010).

TABLE 1
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES

| Variable | Definition | Source (Bank of England Reporting Form) | Notes |
|---------------------------|---|---|---|
| Capital requirement ratio | FSA-set minimum ratio for capital-to-risk weighted assets (RWA) for the banking book. Also known as “trigger ratio” | BSD3 | |
| Lending | Bank lending to nonfinancial sectors of the economy | AL | |
| TIER1 | Ratio of Tier 1 capital to RWA | BSD3 | |
| SIZE | Total assets | BSD3 / BT | BSD3 for regulated banks; BT for foreign branches |
| BIG | Dummy variable = 1 when SIZE is in highest decile | BSD3 | |
| RISK SUB | Ratio of RWA to total assets Dummy variable = 1 when bank is a resident subsidiary of a foreign bank | BSD3 | Information from the Bank of England’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Department |
| BUF | Difference between actual capital and the capital requirement ratio, divided by RWA | BSD3 | |
| KAR | Capital asset ratio | BT | |
| WHL | Ratio of repo liabilities to total liabilities | BT | |

period. The variables included in this study are listed and defined in Table 1, and Table 2 reports summary statistics.¹¹

Discretionary regulatory policy played a much greater role in the UK’s setting of minimum bank capital ratios than in the capital regulation of other countries. A key focus of regulation was the so-called “trigger ratio,” a minimum capital ratio set for each bank that would trigger regulatory intervention if breached.¹² Changes in trigger ratios were communicated to the board of directors of the bank in a formal letter. According to Francis and Osborne (2009):

... the FSA inherited from the Bank of England the practice of supplementing the Basel I approach with individual capital requirements, also known as “trigger ratios,” based on analysis of firm-specific characteristics and management practices, and this practice has been retained under Pillar 2 of Basel II. These firm-specific requirements are

11. The data used in this study exclude outliers based on the following criteria: (i) trivially small banks (with total loans less than £3000 on average) or (ii) observations for which the absolute value of the log difference of lending in one quarter exceeded 1.

12. The FSA also maintained a separate requirement for a “target ratio,” which was set above the trigger ratio and was intended to provide a capital cushion to help prevent an accidental breach of the trigger ratio. In 2001, following the Financial Services and Market Act, the FSA stopped setting target ratios, but even before then, the trigger ratio was the primary focus of regulatory compliance.

TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS

| Variable | Entity | Units | Mean | SD | Min | Max | 25 pc | 75 pc | Obs |
|---|------------------|--------------|-------|--------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|
| Minimum capital requirement ratio | Regulated banks | % | 10.8 | 2.26 | 8 | 23 | 9 | 12 | 2,630 |
| Change in min capital requirement ratio | Regulated banks | Basis points | -1.4 | 29.7 | -500 | 500 | 0 | 0 | 2,524 |
| Lending to real economy | Regulated banks | £ 000s | 9,483 | 28,510 | 0 | 274,140 | 121 | 3,600 | 2,630 |
| Lending to real economy | Foreign branches | £ 000s | 630 | 893 | 0 | 10,175 | 82 | 816 | 3,976 |
| Change in lending to real economy | Regulated banks | % | 0.7 | 16.1 | -98.3 | 85.3 | -2.6 | 5.3 | 2,479 |
| Change in lending to real economy | Foreign branches | % | 0.4 | 20.6 | -98.7 | 98.4 | -9.3 | 8.3 | 3,738 |

TABLE 3
AVERAGE CAPITAL REQUIREMENT RATIO BY VARIOUS BANK ATTRIBUTES

| Variable | Percentiles | | | |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| | <25 | 25–50 | 50–75 | >75 |
| Write-offs ^a (mean value within quartile) | 10.36 (0.00) | 10.44 (0.13) | 10.15 (0.48) | 11.57 (2.48) |
| Size ^b (mean value within quartile) | 12.30 (0.03) | 11.06 (0.10) | 10.63 (0.32) | 9.54 (5.16) |
| Retail deposits ^c (mean value within quartile) | 12.45 (3.0) | 10.79 (15.4) | 10.08 (44.3) | 10.21 (73.6) |
| Sectoral specialization ^d (mean value within quartile) | 10.51 (16.1) | 10.87 (39.4) | 10.90 (59.3) | 11.25 (89.4) |

NOTES: The mean values of the variables within each quartile are provided in parentheses below the associated mean capital requirement.
^aDefined as total amount written off as a share of risk-weighted assets.
^bDefined as asset size relative to total assets of the banking system.
^cDefined as the sum of sight and time deposits as a fraction of total liabilities.
^dDefined as lending to the sector to which the bank has the greatest exposure in percentage of total lending by the bank to all nonfinancial nonhousehold sectors.

periodically reassessed and, where necessary, revised to reflect changing bank conditions and management practices. As part of these reviews, the FSA have considered it to be good practice in the financial services industry for a UK bank to hold an appropriate capital buffer above the individual capital ratios advised by the FSA . . .

UK supervisors set individual capital guidance, also known as “trigger ratios,” based on firm-specific reviews and judgments about, among other things, evolving market conditions as well as the quality of risk management and banks’ systems and controls. These triggers are reviewed every 18–36 months, which gives rise to considerable variety in capital adequacy ratios across firms and over time.

The authors further note that the unique, bank-specific, discretionary UK capital regulation regime was intended to fill gaps in the early Basel I system, which did not consider risks related to variation in interest rates, or legal, reputational and operational risks.¹³ Our empirical analysis below confirms that view; changes in capital ratio requirements do not appear to be associated with past or future changes in the credit risk of loans (as measured by changes in loan write-offs). Rather, cross-sectional differences in minimum capital ratio requirements (shown in Table 3) are associated with identifiable bank-specific characteristics (size, reliance on retail deposits, sectoral loan concentration) that could proxy for a variety of other risk differences.

13. Some institutions were reviewed on a continuous basis, while others were reviewed only every 18–36 months. Conceptually, this means that the former could have experienced a number of subsequent small increases, with the latter experiencing larger changes on a more infrequent basis. However, as Figure 3 suggests, the number of banks with more than three changes in a 10-year period is small. Furthermore, as shown by the panel VAR analysis in Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (Forthcoming-a), the persistence of changes in the capital requirement is close to 0. This suggests that regulatory changes were infrequent events.

During this time period, the FSA's approach to supervision was implemented via ARROW (Advanced Risk Responsive Operating frameWork). While in theory, the ARROW approach encompassed prudential risks, this was not one of the core supervision areas, and in practice most of the focus was on systems and processes rather than business risks and sustainability. Indeed, in his high-level review of UK financial regulation following the global financial crisis, Lord Turner, the chairman of the FSA, concludes, "Risk Mitigation Programs set out after ARROW reviews therefore tended to focus more on organization structures, systems and reporting procedures, than on overall risks in business models" (Turner, 2009). Furthermore, an inquiry into the failure of the British bank Northern Rock notes, "Under ARROW I¹⁴ there was no requirement on supervisory teams to include any developed financial analysis in the material provided to ARROW Panels," where developed financial analysis is defined as information on the institution's asset growth relative to its peers, profit growth, the cost-to-income ratio, the net interest margin and reliance on wholesale funding and securitization (FSA 2008a). Thus, high-frequency changes in bank's balance sheet characteristics did not appear to be instrumental in determining minimum capital requirements during the sample period. As a result of this institutional setup, it is unlikely that bank-specific lending growth was a determinant of FSA regulatory decisions.¹⁵

When measuring the capital requirement (trigger ratio) for risk-based capital that is assigned to the individual bank, some complications arise with respect to the treatment of the "banking book" and the "trading book" of the bank. For banks that had both a banking book and a trading book (which is a characteristic of larger, more complex banks, comprising about one-third of the regulated banks in our sample), the FSA often assigned different trigger ratios for the banking and trading book, and uniformly, the trading book trigger ratio is less than or equal to the trigger ratio on the banking book. When we describe capital requirements in tables and graphs, the banking-book trigger ratio, which is also the measure used in our regression analysis, will often be referred to as "trigger ratio" and "capital requirement ratio." There are two main reasons for our focus on the banking book trigger ratio. First, it allows comparability between banks that maintain trading books and those that do not. Second, and more important, it avoids recording spurious regulatory changes when a bank's banking book and trading book expand at different rates. To understand this point, consider a bank with a different banking book trigger ratio and trading book trigger ratio, for which, in a given quarter, the FSA makes *no* regulatory change; that is, both the banking book trigger ratio and the trading book trigger ratio remain exactly the same as in the previous period. Assume that in this quarter the bank's banking book grows slightly relative to its trading book. Focusing on the combined trigger ratio produces

14. The FSA published revised ARROW guidelines in 2006, called Arrow II (FSA 2006). However, financial institutions did not have to submit "developed financial analysis" as part of the ARROW II either (see FSA 2008b, p. 28)

15. This assertion receives further support from the panel-VAR analysis described in Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (Forthcoming-a).




FIG. 1. Histogram of Minimum Capital Requirement Ratio.

the misleading datum of a change in regulatory minimum capital ratios, even though the FSA has not taken any such action. By focusing on the banking-book trigger ratio to measure regulatory changes, our measure captures actual FSA-mandated changes to the trigger ratio, avoiding distortions that result from changes in the proportion of risk-weighted assets held in the trading book.

As Table 2 and Figure 1 show, the variation in capital ratio requirements is large. The mean capital requirement ratio is 10.8%, the standard deviation is 2.26%, the minimum value is 8%, and the maximum value is 23%. Figure 2 displays the distribution of changes in capital requirements, which are divided according to the change in the size of the capital requirements that are imposed on the banks. When defining capital requirement changes in Figure 2, and in the regression analysis below, we exclude very small changes (changes of less than 10 basis points) that result from errors in rounding and that are reversed in subsequent quarters.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, there are no observed changes in capital ratio requirements of between 10 and 30 basis points. The elimination of rounding errors results in 132 remaining observations of changes in banking-book capital requirements in our sample. In general, there are more small changes in capital requirements than intermediate or large changes, although that pattern is more pronounced for UK-owned banks than foreign subsidiaries. As Figure 3

16. Our method of computing the trigger ratio requires that one divide required capital by risk-weighted assets, which creates very small rounding errors that give rise to small implied “changes” in required capital ratios, which are not economically significant changes.




Fig. 2. Distribution of Changes in Capital Requirement Ratios by Magnitude of Change.




Fig. 3. Distribution of Banks by Number of Changes to Capital Requirement Ratio.



FIG. 4. Time Series of Average Capital Requirement Ratio.

shows, most banks either experienced zero or one capital requirement change during our sample period, but 35 banks experienced two or more changes. Few banks experience more than five events which, given the 9-year period, means that regulatory action is typically infrequent.

Figures 4, 5, and 6 plot the average capital requirement ratio for the regulated banking system, with “average” defined in three different ways, against GDP growth. Figure 4 takes a simple (nonweighted) average of the capital requirement for all regulated banks in the sample. Figure 5 weights these capital requirements by the assets of each bank. Figure 6 weights by lending to the real economy rather than by assets, and calculates the average capital requirement not directly in levels but by cumulating across *changes* in the capital requirement over successive periods; the latter is to ensure that the graph abstracts from changes in the sample of banks between time periods due to entry or exit, and only reflects changes in capital requirement ratios. All three measures are closely and positively associated with movements in GDP (the simple correlation coefficients are 0.44, 0.52, and 0.64, respectively, in Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively). The pattern of association is stronger for weighted than for nonweighted capital requirements, although the range of variation is smaller. Average nonweighted capital requirement ratios ranged from a minimum of 10.2% in 2007 to a maximum of 11.2% in 2003.

This is a striking amount of countercyclical variation given that the sample period was one of varying positive growth, but no actual recessions. By way of comparison, the Basel III countercyclical buffer is to vary between 0% and 2.5% over the entire




FIG. 5. Time Series of Average Weighted Capital Requirement Ratio.




FIG. 6. Time Series of Average Weighted Capital Requirement Ratio (Cumulated Changes).

business cycle inclusive of recessions.¹⁷ Thus, although the FSA lacked any explicit macro-prudential mandate over the period, the outcome of its decisions made on a bank-by-bank basis was in fact macroprudential in nature. This provides an ideal testing ground for the likely efficacy of future explicitly macro-prudential regimes.

17. Furthermore, variation in the UK trigger ratio is a stricter embodiment of change over the cycle, given that the failure to meet the trigger ratio can have dire consequences for a bank, while a failure to meet the new Basel III countercyclical capital buffer has more limited consequences (i.e., limits on the distributions of earnings to shareholders).

After 2006, around the time Basel II was introduced,¹⁸ capital requirements declined markedly, and this happened in spite of an acceleration of growth, which was contrary to the previous pattern of countercyclical changes in requirements. That pattern differs from the rises of prior expansionary periods, although the decline is less pronounced for weighted capital requirements than for nonweighted capital requirements (which actually fell during the 2006–07 expansion). As noted above, the introduction of Basel II (which was designed to provide a more comprehensive measure of bank risks than the prior system) may have led supervisors to place less reliance on discretionary setting of bank-specific capital ratios above 8%.¹⁹

To better understand the FSA's approach to setting capital requirements, it is useful to divide the sources of variation in capital ratio requirements into three sets of factors: (i) capital requirement differences that reflect long-term cross-sectional differences in bank type, operations, or condition; (ii) high-frequency cross-sectional changes in bank operations or condition that capture, for example, sudden changes in bank loan quality; and (iii) variation over time in average minimum capital requirements for banks that reflect what could be termed macro-prudential goals. Of these, the variation over the cycle has already been discussed above; below we document variation in the long-term cross-sectional characteristics of banks and high-frequency cross-sectional changes.

In Table 3, we report summary statistics for average long-term bank characteristics and relate those to average capital ratios. The long-term bank characteristics we examine are: size, liability mix, loan write-off ratio, and concentration. Across the four quartiles of average required capital ratios, higher capital requirements are monotonically associated with smaller bank size and a smaller proportion of what could be termed “core” deposits (the sum of sight and time deposits, which excludes repos, certificates of deposit, and all nondepository sources of funding). Higher capital requirements are also monotonically increasing in sectoral concentration, defined as a bank's lending to the sector to which it has the greatest exposure divided by the bank's total lending. With respect to loan write-offs, banks in the highest quartile of average capital requirements have substantially higher write-offs, but within the first three quartiles of average capital requirements, banks do not differ with respect to write-offs.

At high frequency—examining responses of capital requirements to quarterly changes in bank behavior over the prior four quarters—we found practically no connection between changes in bank condition and changes in capital requirements. High-frequency changes in write-offs were negatively correlated with capital requirement changes that occurred within the same quarter, indicating that when some banks experienced large write-offs (resulting in diminished capital) regulators occasionally

18. Basel II was formally introduced in January 2007 in the UK, but the transition period most likely started before that.

19. The fact that discretionary variation of bank-specific capital ratio requirements set by the FSA reflected differences in operational and interest rate risks may explain why capital ratio requirements in excess of 8% were viewed as less necessary after the introduction of interest rate risk measurement in 1998 and the implementation of the Basel II system in 2007. The introduction of Basel II in 2007 generally resulted in substantial reduction in risk-weighted assets for a large number of UK banks.

reduced those banks' minimum capital ratios. It is possible that high-frequency increases in write-offs are moments when supervisors believe that ongoing uncertainty about prospective bank losses has been resolved, in which case it may make sense to reduce capital requirements accordingly. This high-frequency connection between write-offs and capital requirements explained only about 1% of the panel variation in capital requirements.

Overall, therefore, we find substantial variation across banks and over time in minimum capital requirements, and we find that changes in capital requirements are correlated with long-term bank characteristics, as well as cyclical changes in economic and market conditions, but not strongly associated with identifiable high-frequency changes in banks' circumstances. This is consistent with the institutional setup documented earlier, in which FSA regulatory decisions were not typically based on high-frequency changes in balance sheet variables.

As a rough gauge of the extent to which capital requirements were binding on bank behavior, Figure 7 plots the comovements between weighted capital ratios and weighted capital ratio requirements over time, with banks sorted into quartiles according to the buffer over minimum capital requirements. For all four groups of banks, the variation in capital requirements was associated with substantial comovement in capital ratios, confirming the conclusions of Alfon, Argimón, and Bascuñana-Ambrós (2005) and Francis and Osborne (2009, 2012) that capital ratio requirements were binding on banks' choices of capital ratios for UK banks during this sample period.

2. THE EFFECT OF MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT CHANGES ON LENDING BY AFFECTED BANKS

In this section, we estimate the effect of capital requirement changes on bank lending to the nonfinancial corporate sector. We deliberately exclude lending within the financial sector and lending to households. Lending within the financial sector is excluded because our aim is to examine the credit supply impact of capital requirement changes on the real economy. Within the financial sector, gross assets and liabilities are typically much larger than net flows; an expansion or contraction in a bank's gross claims on the financial sector is therefore only tenuously related to credit supply to the real economy. This would not matter if claims on the financial sector were small relative to lending to the real economy, but in the UK this is not the case, and we do not want our data to reflect primarily high-frequency movements in financial claims. Lending to households is excluded for two reasons. First, UK household sector lending is dominated by a handful of UK-owned banks (Aiyar 2011 documents that over 99% of lending to this sector is undertaken by 15 banks). Second, mortgage lending comprises the majority of household lending, and during the sample period




FIG. 7. Covariation between Average Capital Requirements and Average Capital.

studied here, mortgage lending was often transferred off-balance sheet from banks to special purpose vehicles (SPVs).²⁰

Hence, our measure of bank lending consists of all of the sectoral loan categories of a bank's lending except for its loans to financial institutions and households. As discussed in the introductory paragraphs, changes in capital requirements should affect lending by a regulated bank only when bank equity is relatively expensive to raise, and when regulatory requirements are binding constraints.²¹

When seeking to measure the effects on bank loan supply from increased capital requirements it is important to recognize, and control for, variation in bank lending due to changes in loan demand, which is also likely to vary across banks (according to their sectoral specializations), and over the cycle. To identify loan-supply responses to capital requirement changes, in this section we introduce a new way of controlling for bank loan demand, by exploiting information on each bank's exposure to different economic sectors.

Our data set provides us with information on lending by bank i to 14 different sectors. We collected data on employment levels for each of these different sectors at each point in time. Our bank-specific measure of demand is therefore $z_{it} = \sum_q s_{iq,t} \Delta z_{q,t}$, where $s_{iq,t}$ denotes the share of sector q in bank i 's lending portfolio in period t , $\Delta z_{q,t}$ is the growth rate of real activity in sector q , which we define as the quarter t on $t - 6$ quarter employment growth rate, expressed at quarterly frequency.²²

Thus, the general specification is

$$\Delta l_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{k=0}^3 \beta_{t-k} \Delta KRR_{it-k} + \sum_{k=0}^3 \gamma_{t-k} z_{it-k} + X\Pi + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where Δl_{it} denotes lending growth in period t by bank i , ΔKRR_{it} denotes the change in the minimum capital requirement ratio, α_i is a bank-specific fixed effect, and X is a vector of controls. z_{it} is the demand proxy discussed above.

Both the contemporaneous change in capital requirements and three lags are included in the equation. On the basis of regulatory data we only observe a change in the capital requirement when the trigger ratio in a particular report differs from the

20. The Bank of England reporting form used in this study to disaggregate lending by sector—the AL form—only includes securitized lending from January 2010 onward.

21. We model the effects of capital requirement changes on loan supply. We do not model the process through which capital ratio requirements affect capital ratios, although our estimation of loan-supply effects does allow banks with different “buffers” between minimum and actual capital ratios to respond differently to increases in capital requirements. We focus on loan-supply effects for two reasons. First, loan supply is the primary variable of interest. Second, as we discuss further below, buffers vary substantially and persistently across banks, and banks with relatively large buffers tend to exhibit *greater* responsiveness to capital ratio requirement changes, not less. Heterogeneity in buffers likely reflects unobservable bank characteristics associated with the costs of raising capital.

22. It is not only the level of growth in real activity, but also the persistence that matters, for banks to increase lending growth to a particular sector. Because employment growth is volatile, we therefore use the t on $t - 6$ quarter employment growth rate as a proxy for the expansion in real activity in that sector. We note that all of our results are robust to expressing demand as either a year-on-year growth rate, or omitting measures of demand entirely. Note also that in this case, expressing the growth at quarterly frequency effectively means dividing the six-quarter growth rate by 6.

TABLE 4

THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN BANK MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS ON REGULATED BANK LENDING GROWTH

| Dependent variable: Real regulated bank lending growth | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| DBBKR | −0.073** | −0.08*** | −0.078*** | −0.076*** | −0.075*** | −0.057*** |
| (Prob > <i>F</i>) | 0.0121 | 0.00554 | 0.00148 | 0.00114 | 0.00125 | 0.00174 |
| Demand | | 0.02** | 0.025** | 0.028** | 0.028** | 0.023 |
| (Prob > <i>F</i>) | | 0.0461 | 0.0433 | 0.0237 | 0.0261 | 0.134 |
| GDP growth | | | 0.057* | 0.061* | 0.061* | 0.053 |
| (Prob > <i>F</i>) | | | 0.0860 | 0.0640 | 0.0642 | 0.140 |
| Inflation | | | 0.00872 | 0.00674 | 0.00659 | −0.00197 |
| (Prob > <i>F</i>) | | | 0.669 | 0.741 | 0.746 | 0.932 |
| Lags of Write-offs | | | | | −0.00593 | |
| (Prob > <i>F</i>) | | | | | 0.586 | |
| Leads of Write-offs | | | | | | 0.0269** |
| (Prob > <i>F</i>) | | | | | | 0.0381 |
| TIER1 | | | | 0.000605 | 0.000615 | 0.000654 |
| | | | | (0.000592) | (0.000591) | (0.000613) |
| BIG | | | | 0.0230 | 0.0232 | 0.0124 |
| | | | | (0.0182) | (0.0182) | (0.0250) |
| RISK | | | | 0.00106 | 0.00107 | 0.00143* |
| | | | | (0.000794) | (0.000791) | (0.000742) |
| SUB | | | | 0.0219 | 0.0219 | 0.0451*** |
| | | | | (0.0173) | (0.0173) | (0.0125) |
| Constant | 0.00991 | 0.00488 | −0.0415 | −0.150** | −0.148** | −0.157** |
| | (0.00702) | (0.00851) | (0.0365) | (0.0724) | (0.0721) | (0.0652) |
| Observations | 1,815 | 1,815 | 1,815 | 1,814 | 1,814 | 1,564 |
| Number of banks | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 72 |

NOTES: This table presents results from panel regressions of regulated banks. The dependent variable is the growth rate of bank lending to the real sector. We use the contemporaneous and three lags of each of the first five variables: the change in the banking book capital requirement, the demand proxy, real GDP growth, inflation, and the lags of the change in the write-off to total asset ratio. For the sixth variable, we use the contemporaneous value and three leads of that variable instead. We report the sum of coefficients and *F*-statistics in parenthesis for these variables. For the remaining variables we report the estimated coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis. For statistical significance, we use the following convention throughout: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

trigger ratio in the preceding report from 3 months earlier; we do not know when, within that 3-month period, the change in capital requirements was introduced. Moreover, it is possible that FSA regulators—who maintain an ongoing dialogue with the banks they supervise—might inform a bank in advance of a forthcoming change in the capital requirement ratio. Both these considerations indicate the necessity for a contemporaneous term of the dependant variable in addition to lags.

Table 4 reports six versions of our baseline loan-supply regressions. All specifications are estimated in a panel fixed-effects framework, where the bank-specific fixed effect should capture heterogeneity in lending growth arising from relatively long-run, time-invariant bank characteristics. The first column does not include any controls. The second column introduces the demand variable as a control, with the third column introducing standard macro-economic variables used as controls in other studies, GDP growth and inflation.²³ The fourth column introduces

23. A key macro-economic variable that could potentially affect lending growth is monetary policy, and indeed, there is a rich literature documenting this effect, such as the seminal Kashyap and Stein (2000). We have experimented extensively with including monetary policy as an explanatory variable, but because

bank-specific characteristics as additional controls. Specifically, we include TIER1, RISK, SUB, and BIG. TIER1 is Francis and Osborne's (2009, 2012) measure of a bank's low cost of equity capital relative to other banks (which is revealed by its ratio of tier 1 to total regulatory capital). RISK is a measure of the riskiness of bank assets: the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. SUB is an indicator variable that captures whether the bank is a subsidiary of a foreign bank. BIG is an indicator variable that captures whether the bank has assets in excess of £10 billion. Finally, the fifth and sixth columns add the contemporaneous value and three leads or lags of changes in the write-offs to risk-weighted asset ratio to control for possible omitted variable bias due to changes in loan quality.

We find that loan-supply responds negatively to increases in capital requirements. The parameter of interest is tightly estimated across the full range of specifications. Summing across lags of the change in the capital requirement ratio yields estimates between 0.057 and 0.08. That is, an increase in the capital requirement ratio of 100 basis points induces, on average, a cumulative fall in lending growth of between 5.7 and 8 percentage points.²⁴ The demand variable is statistically significant in all but one specification with a value of about 0.02 to 0.028, which means that for a 1% increase in sectoral employment (weighted by the bank i 's portfolio shares), lending growth by bank i rises by between 2% to 2.8%. The fact that the bank-specific demand controls are significant in *addition* to the GDP growth term suggests that demand conditions evolve in a heterogeneous way across sectors. Bank-specific balance sheet characteristics used as controls in other studies (TIER1, RISK, SUB, and BIG) are generally not highly statistically significant, with the exception of SUB in one of the specifications.²⁵

In principle, specification 4 could be subject to endogeneity problems, as a result of both reverse causality and omitted variable bias. We showed in Section 1 that the FSA's institutional setup makes reverse-causality between lending growth and the change in capital requirements unlikely. At the same time we do not want to rule out this possibility *ex ante*.

To assess the extent to which endogeneity bias from reverse causality may be a problem, Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (Forthcoming-a) estimate a panel VAR

of the subtlety of the issues raised, in particular, by possible interactions between monetary policy and changes in regulatory capital requirements, we defer these results to a separate forthcoming working paper (Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek Forthcoming-a). Here, we note only the most pertinent finding from that work: while we find, in conformity with the literature, that monetary policy affects bank lending, its impact appears to be orthogonal to the impact of regulatory capital requirements.

24. Strictly speaking, the cumulative impact on lending growth will differ from these estimates due to compounding.

25. The positive coefficient on SUB in the last column of Table 4 indicates that, *ceteris paribus*, the loan-supply growth of foreign subsidiaries is higher than that of domestic banks. We can think of two explanations for this result. It may simply reflect the smaller average size of foreign subsidiaries. Alternatively, the positive coefficient could reflect the fact that our sample period is one of high average loan opportunities in the UK. Foreign subsidiaries are able to shift capital from other operations to their UK operations during this high-growth period. In contrast, domestic banks operating solely in the UK (the most common profile of a domestic bank in our sample) would have had to raise capital in the market to expand their operations, which presumably would have been more costly. Whichever is the case, there is no significant difference between foreign subsidiaries and UK-owned bank in the slope coefficient on the change in minimum capital requirements (unreported above).

in two variables: lending growth and changes in minimum capital requirements. In general, of course, coefficient magnitudes from the single equation specifications reported here and the panel VAR will be different. But, in the absence of endogeneity bias due to reverse causality, conditional on a valid VAR identification scheme, and some other conditions (which we find to be satisfied in our data), the VAR and single-equation results should be similar.²⁶ Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (Forthcoming-a) find that the VAR impact coefficient of a change in the minimum capital requirement on lending growth is 3.8%, almost identical to our single equation estimates of between 3.76% and 3.94% (depending on which of the specifications in Table 4 is chosen). Furthermore, they also show that the cumulative lending growth impulse response is also similar to the cumulative response estimates reported in Table 4. The comparison therefore strengthens the case that the single equation estimate of the impact of the regulatory change on lending growth is unbiased.

Even absent reverse causality, underlying changes to the quality of the bank's loan portfolio could be driving both regulatory changes in minimum capital ratios and changes in credit supply, thereby generating a spurious correlation between the latter two variables. To address this potential problem we examined the contemporaneous correlation between a proxy for loan quality—write-offs—and minimum capital requirements, and found none.²⁷ Moreover, we found that the change in capital requirements for a bank cannot be predicted by contemporaneous, lagged, or future values of changes in write-offs. This suggests that poorly performing loan books are not the main driver behind changes in capital regulatory requirements. While banks which have relatively high write-offs over the whole time series on average have higher minimum capital requirements than banks that have relatively low write-offs (as shown in Table 3), this systematic difference applies only to the cross-section.

Of course, it may still be the case that changes in loan quality affect loan supply for reasons unrelated to capital requirements and we investigate this in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4. Column 5 replicates the specification in column 4 but with contemporaneous and lagged values of changes in the write-off to risk-weighted asset ratio introduced as additional explanatory variables. If deteriorating loan books were driving both changes in capital requirements and changes in credit supply, then we should find that the coefficients on the regulatory changes become insignificant, or diminish in magnitude. This does not appear to be the case, as the sum of the contemporaneous and lagged write-off coefficients are not statistically significant determinants of lending growth and the sum of coefficients on the changes in capital requirements is unchanged.²⁸

26. For more details on this approach, see Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (Forthcoming-a).

27. Bank-specific data on nonperforming loans, a more direct measure of the quality of the loan portfolio, are not available. However, data on write-offs are available from FSA data and from responses to the Bank of England's PL form (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Documents/reporters/defs/form_PL.pdf).

28. Note that in the NBER working paper version of this paper, we reported a statistically significant effect of lagged changes in the write-off to asset ratio. The significance of lags of write-offs in that version of the paper, as opposed to leads of write-offs in this version, reflects a change in the definition of the

It is also possible that regulators change capital requirements in anticipation of *future* deterioration in loan portfolio quality (and that banks reduce credit supply motivated by the same anticipation). The last column of Table 4 replicates column 4, but with contemporaneous and *leading* values of changes in the write-off to risk-weighted asset ratio (rather than lags) introduced as additional explanatory variables. In this specification, leads of write-offs have a statistically significant positive effect on lending growth and the coefficient on changes in capital requirement declines slightly in the presence of leads of write-offs. This positive coefficient does not suggest that regulators raised capital requirements in anticipation of higher future write-offs (in that case the observed sign on lead write-offs would be negative). Our results seem more consistent with the FSA's stated intent to impose higher minimum capital requirements in response to interest rate risk or operational risk, not higher loan default risk.²⁹

As a further robustness check, we estimated, but do not report, the specifications in Table 4 with time dummies instead of macro-economic controls. The coefficient magnitudes on the capital requirement ratio variable were qualitatively very similar. We also experimented with an autoregressive version of the specification above, while omitting fixed effects. Using fixed effects in an autoregressive framework introduces bias via the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effects. While this could in principle be addressed using GMM techniques, the instrumentation schemes tend to be very data intensive and, we believe, are not appropriate for the sample studied here.³⁰ Instead we follow recent empirical contributions, such as the one-step procedure in Kashyap and Stein (2000) and the internal capital markets specifications in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009), in omitting fixed effects in these specifications, using random effects instead. Again, the results are very similar qualitatively.

In the absence of strong instrumental variables, of course, it is difficult to definitively rule out endogeneity. But in light of the institutional setup of the FSA, the striking similarity between the panel VAR and single-equation estimates, and the robustness of our results to the inclusion of leads and lags of write-offs, it seems unlikely that our estimates are contaminated by serious endogeneity bias.

Table 5 looks more carefully at the role played by the capital buffer, and by bank size, by introducing a term interacting the change in the capital requirement with

demand control variable used in the specifications. Our prior demand specification used sectoral lending of other banks to define the demand control, but this is subject to criticisms related to potential cross-sectional interdependence of lending.

29. The positive coefficient on leads of write offs could reflect a positive correlation between a greater willingness to lend (which is associated with higher loan-supply growth) and a deterioration in loan quality.

30. GMM techniques are most useful in "large N, small T" settings. Under Difference and System GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998), the instrument count is quartic in the time dimension, which in our case numbers slightly under 40 periods (relative to 104 regulated banks in the sample). A large set of instruments leads to biased estimates through overfitting endogenous variables. Roodman (2006) suggests as a rule of thumb that the number of instruments should never outnumber the panel's individual units, and simulations indicate considerable bias even in the presence of much smaller instrument sets relative to the number of panel units. Moreover, since the number of elements in the estimated variance matrix of the moments is quadratic in the instrument count, it is quartic in T . So a finite sample is unlikely to contain adequate information to estimate the matrix well for large T .

TABLE 5

THE INTERACTION OF BANK MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS WITH THE CAPITAL BUFFER AND BANK SIZE

| Dependent variable: Real regulated bank lending growth | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| DBBKR | −0.079*** | −0.12*** | −0.091*** | −0.079*** |
| (Prob > F) | 0.006 | 0.0006 | 0.001 | 0.008 |
| GDP growth | 0.057* | 0.06* | 0.057* | 0.058* |
| (Prob > F) | 0.085 | 0.07 | 0.083 | 0.08 |
| Inflation | 0.00961 | 0.00968 | 0.00900 | 0.00917 |
| (Prob > F) | 0.64 | 0.64 | 0.66 | 0.66 |
| Demand | 0.025** | 0.026** | 0.026** | 0.025** |
| (Prob > F) | 0.047 | 0.042 | 0.04 | 0.046 |
| Buffer in first quartile interaction | 0.016 | | | |
| (Prob > F) | 0.76 | | | |
| Buffer less than median interaction | | 0.044* | | |
| (Prob > F) | | 0.06 | | |
| Size in fourth quartile interaction | | | 0.068 | |
| (Prob > F) | | | 0.19 | |
| Size above median interaction | | | | 0.001 |
| (Prob > F) | | | | 0.002 |
| Constant | −0.0427 (0.0370) | −0.0446 (0.0369) | −0.0418 (0.0362) | −0.0448 (0.0833) |
| Observations | 1,815 | 1,815 | 1,815 | 1,815 |
| Number of banks | 82 | 82 | 82 | 82 |

NOTES: This table presents results from panel regressions of regulated banks. The dependent variable is the real growth rate of bank lending to the real sector. Variables in common with Table 4 are described in the footnotes to that table. The additional variables in this table are interactions of the change in capital requirements with time-invariant indicators on the buffer and SIZE. For statistical significance, we use the following convention throughout: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

dummy variables for, respectively, banks in the lowest quartile of buffer size, banks in the lower half of buffer size, banks in the highest quartile of bank size, and banks in the upper half of bank size. We find some evidence (column 2) that the response of a bank with a capital buffer below the median—that is, a bank that has an average (over time) capital buffer which is “low” relative to other banks—to a change in capital requirements is *smaller* than the response of a bank with a capital buffer above the median. This effect is not statistically significant for banks with a capital buffer in the lowest quartile (column 1), although the sign indicates, similarly, a lower responsiveness.

This finding is consistent with recognizing the endogeneity of capital buffers to bank-specific characteristics. Banks with relatively easy access to capital markets choose to hold smaller buffers, and have a smaller loan-supply response to changes to capital requirements. On the other hand, banks that find it difficult to access capital markets choose to hold larger buffers and also have a larger loan-supply response to changes in capital requirements. These results are analogous to a well-known phenomenon in the investment literature: firms with larger cash holdings exhibit greater cash flow sensitivity of investment, and even greater cash flow sensitivity of cash (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel 1995, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 2007). Moreover, as illustrated by columns

3 and 4, it appears that bank size is a (noisy) indicator of capital buffers, with larger banks tending to hold smaller capital buffers and vice versa.³¹

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 show no statistically significant difference in the responsiveness of loan supply by banks in the upper quartile of the size distribution. This result is somewhat surprising, since one would expect larger banks to find it less expensive to raise capital, and thus to reduce loan supply less in response to an increase in capital requirements. In forthcoming work (Aiyar, Calomiris, and Weiladek Forthcoming-a) we find that, in some specifications, particularly when monetary policy and capital requirement changes are modeled simultaneously, size interactions can matter for the responsiveness of loan supply to capital requirement changes. Thus, the “rejection” of size effects in Table 5 is not robust to more complicated specifications of the policy environment.

Finally, it is worth noting that while we have presented strong evidence that banks react to stricter capital requirements by adjusting credit supply, a regression of changes in actual (nominal) capital on changes in the capital requirement ratio finds no significant relationship. So it appears as though banks change their capital to risk-weighted assets ratio in response to regulatory tightening by adjusting the denominator rather than the numerator.

3. LEAKAGES ASSOCIATED WITH FOREIGN BRANCHES

In Section 2, we showed that UK-regulated banks exhibit a strong loan-supply response to changes in required capital ratios. Here, we explore the extent to which those loan-supply effects are mitigated by endogenous loan-supply decisions by foreign branches operating in the UK, which are not subject to domestic UK capital regulation. As noted in the introductory paragraphs, such branches may “step into the gap” created by macro-prudential policy; when capital-regulated banks contract their loan supply, unregulated banks operating in the UK may offer substitute sources of credit to borrowers.

As Figure 8 shows, the aggregate amount of lending by foreign branches is substantial, although smaller than the aggregate amount of lending by banks that are subject to UK capital regulation. Moreover, branch lending is not confined to one or two sectors, but is rather broad-based. In four sectors lending by branches accounts for 40% or more of total sectoral lending.

Our empirical strategy is to regress foreign branch lending growth on the instrumented lending of a “reference group” of regulated banks. The instrument is the change in capital requirements that occurred for that reference group. We report results for a branch-specific reference group weighted by the sectoral exposures of the branch. z_{it} is the loan demand proxy, as defined previously.

31. This finding is consistent with (although not equivalent to) evidence that larger banks tend to hold less capital in a large cross-country sample of banks (Cihak and Schaek 2007).




FIG. 8. Sectoral Pattern of Lending by Foreign Branches.

Thus, the specification is

$$\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{BRN}} = \alpha_j + \sum_{k=0}^3 \beta_{t-k} \Delta l_{jt-k}^{\text{REF}} + \sum_{k=0}^3 \gamma_{t-k} z_{jt-k} + X\Pi + \varepsilon,$$

where $\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{BRN}}$ denotes lending growth by the foreign branch j and $\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$ denotes lending growth by branch j 's reference group of regulated banks. Note that j indexes branches, while i is reserved to index regulated banks. $\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$ is instrumented using several lags of $\Delta \text{KRR}_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$.

Let \tilde{l}_{qt} denotes the log of aggregate lending by all regulated banks to sector q in period t . Lending growth by the *branch-specific reference group* is constructed as: $\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{REF}} = \sum_q s_{jq,t-1} \Delta \tilde{l}_{qt}$, where, as before, $s_{jq,t}$ denotes the share of sector q in bank j 's lending portfolio in period t .

Let $\Delta \text{KRR}_{qt} = \sum_i \sigma_{iqt-1} \Delta \text{KRR}_{it}$, where σ_{iqt} denotes lending by bank i to sector q as a share of lending by all regulated banks to sector q in period t . This is a measure of the sector-specific change in capital requirements in each period. Then the *branch-specific* change in reference group capital requirements, $\Delta \text{KRR}_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$ is defined as $\Delta \text{KRR}_{jt}^{\text{REF}} = \sum_q s_{jq,t-1} \Delta \text{KRR}_{qt}$. Note that if a sector experiences no change in its capital requirement (i.e., all the banks that lend into this sector experience no change in capital requirements), then by construction this sector has zero weight in the expression $\Delta \text{KRR}_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$.

Note that $\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$ is defined in terms of weighted *changes* in regulated bank lending, and that the weights—the sectoral exposure pattern of the branch—are taken for the

previous period. This is to ensure that that $\Delta l_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$ reflects actual changes in lending by relevant regulated banks, rather than simply changes in the sample of regulated banks across time periods (because of entry or exit of some regulated banks from the sample). Identical considerations apply to the construction of $\Delta \text{KRR}_{jt}^{\text{REF}}$.

Again, both the contemporaneous term and lags of the independent variable of interest—reference group lending—are included in the specification. If banks are made aware by the FSA of an impending increase in capital requirements, those banks are in turn likely to inform loan customers of an intent to contract lending (e.g., by reducing or eliminating lines of credit as they mature). Bank borrowers, therefore, may seek new lending relationships that begin simultaneous with the contraction in loan supply induced by changing capital requirements.

The instruments we use have considerable intuitive appeal in this application. We have shown in the previous section that lending by regulated banks responds strongly to changes in capital requirements. Moreover, it is hard to imagine any channel through which changes in capital requirements could affect lending by unregulated banks except *via* the impact on lending by regulated banks.

Table 6 presents results from instrumental variables regressions. Column 1 does not include any controls, while column 2 adds our definition of demand. In Table 4, we found that the leads of changes in the write-off to asset ratio is significant for explaining lending growth and may affect the coefficient on changes in capital requirements. Column 3 thus introduces a branch-specific reference group changes in the write-off to asset ratio (defined analogously to the reference group for the change in capital requirements). Columns 4–6 introduce, in addition, GDP growth and inflation.

Could lending growth in the UK by foreign branches be affected not just through FSA action on regulated banks, but also by regulatory changes in the foreign branch's home country? Clearly this is possible, but note that in order for this to bias our estimate of leakages, it must be the case that home country regulation on branch j is correlated with FSA regulation on the UK reference group of branch j . We have no *a priori* reason to believe that this is the case. Nonetheless, in columns 5 and 6 we experiment with introducing home country effects. Column 5 introduces the minimum capital requirement ratio in the home country, Capital, a measure of the stringency of other types of capital regulation in the home country, and Official, the power of the authorities to affect bank activity in their home country.³² Column 6 adds home country fixed effects, which are not reported. Column 6 also adds GDP growth and inflation in the home country as additional regressors, to pick up any impact from changes in demand in the home country (although our prior is that the inclusion

32. Data on these variables are taken from the World Bank's survey on "Bank Regulation and Financial Supervision" (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2008). The survey has been carried out in 1999, 2003, and 2007, which means that we only have three time-series observations on regulatory changes. Our assumption in translating these to quarterly frequency is that regulation remains unchanged until the next survey is released. As a result, these variables take the same value from 1998Q3 to 2002Q4, from 2003Q1 to 2006Q4, and from 2007Q1 onward. See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) for an exact definition of these variables. Results given here are for specifications in which the home country variables are introduced in levels. Changing the specifications to include these variables in differences does not alter the results qualitatively.

TABLE 6
LEAKAGES FROM BANK MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS

| Dependent variable: Real branch lending growth | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Regulated bank lending growth (Prob > F) | -3.18*** 0.00109 | -2.83*** 0.00116 | -3.14** 0.0142 | -2.88** 0.0222 | -2.74** 0.0276 | -3.27** 0.0329 |
| Demand (Prob > F) | | 0.082** 0.0287 | 0.09** 0.0437 | 0.056 0.154 | 0.066 0.102 | 0.061 0.17 |
| Leads of changes in Write-offs (Prob > F) | | | 0.621 0.167 | 0.664 0.127 | 0.71* 0.0949 | 0.701 0.132 |
| GDP growth (Prob > F) | | | | -0.20* 0.0593 | -0.19* 0.0624 | -0.24* 0.0567 |
| Inflation (Prob > F) | | | | -0.13*** 0.00840 | -0.14*** 0.00588 | -0.14** 0.0168 |
| Home Country KR | | | | | -1.550 (3.628) | -2.017 (4.147) |
| CAPITAL | | | | | -0.156* (0.0940) | -0.186 (0.113) |
| OFFICIAL | | | | | 0.137* (0.0729) | 0.126 (0.0881) |
| Home Country GDP growth | | | | | | 0.00159 (0.00447) |
| Home Country Inflation | | | | | | -0.0132* (0.00731) |
| Hansen J-statistic | 2.509 | 3.84 | 5.51 | 3.66 | 3.754 | 2.281 |
| (Prob > χ^2) | 0.643 | 0.437 | 0.239 | 0.454 | 0.44 | 0.6842 |
| Anderson Rubin Wald test | 43.40*** | 40.00*** | 38.5*** | 27.76*** | 26.31*** | 25.65*** |
| (Prob > χ^2) | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0005 | 0.0009 | 0.0012 |
| Stock-Wright S-statistic | 41.40*** | 38.09*** | 37.15*** | 26.95*** | 25.50*** | 24.83*** |
| (Prob > χ^2) | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0007 | 0.0013 | 0.0017 |
| Observations | 2,472 | 2,472 | 2,088 | 2,088 | 2,088 | 2,088 |

NOTES: This table presents results from panel regressions of foreign branches. The dependent variable is the real growth rate of bank lending to the real sector. We use the contemporaneous and three lags of the first variable, the change in: the reference group real growth rate of bank lending by regulated banks and instrument it with seven lags of the change in the reference group banking book capital requirement. The demand proxy, real GDP growth, inflation and enter contemporaneously and with three lags. Changes in the write-off to asset ratio enter contemporaneously and three leads. We report the sum of coefficients and chi-square in parentheses for these variables. For the remaining variables we report the estimated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Home country KR is minimum capital requirement in the home country, official is an index of supervisory power in the home country and capital is an index of other type of capital regulation. These three variables were taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) and greater values indicate stricter regulation. Specifications 4–6 include SIZE as the log of total assets, WHL as the fraction of wholesale funding in total assets and KAR as the total capital to total asset ratio, but these are not reported. Specification 6 includes both country fixed effects (not reported) and also the annual real GDP growth rate and inflation in the home country for the previous year (annual rates are used because for many of the home countries these variables are not available at a quarterly frequency). For statistical significance, we use the following convention throughout: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

of exclusion of these variables should make little difference to the coefficient of interest, since there is no obvious reason to expect UK regulatory requirements to be correlated with home country demand conditions).

We find that lending by foreign branches is strongly negatively related to instrumented lending by the foreign branch's reference group.³³ That is, a reduction in

33. The leakages considered in this section pertain to credit substitution of regulated banks by foreign branches. In unreported preliminary regressions, we tested to see whether regulated banks respond to *each other's* changes in capital requirements. We found no significant response. Our interpretation of this fact is as follows: UK capital requirements on average are much higher than those of other countries (which apply to those countries' branches in the UK). The average for UK banks and subsidiaries is 11%, compared to other countries at 8% (the minimum in the UK). Thus, foreign branches have a comparative advantage in being the ones to respond to changes in a UK bank's capital requirements.

loan supply by regulated banks in response to tighter capital requirements indeed induces an increase in loan supply by unregulated foreign branches.³⁴ This conclusion is robust to the inclusion of home country fixed effects, indices of home country regulation, and home country macro-economic conditions. Table 6 also reports a set of postestimation statistics. Across all specifications, the Sargan–Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions cannot reject the validity of the instruments. Conventional tests for weakness of instruments—for example, comparing the Kleibergen–Paap Wald F -statistic against critical values for an “acceptable” level of bias—are not possible, because the relevant critical values have not been tabulated.³⁵ However, to assuage concerns about weak instruments, we report two tests for robust inference in the presence of weak instruments.³⁶

What do these numbers say about the magnitude of leakages from prudential regulation? The simple average of the estimated coefficients in Table 6 is 3.0. That is, the cumulative impact of a *capital-requirement-induced* reduction of 1% in lending growth by regulated banks is an increase in lending growth of 3.0% by foreign branches. As noted earlier, regulated banks are, on average, much bigger than foreign branches and lend more into the real economy. Across the sample, quarterly lending by the average regulated bank was £9.5 billion, about 15 times larger than quarterly lending by the average foreign branch, which stood at £630 million. On the other hand, there are more foreign branches (173) in our cross-section than regulated banks (104). The product of these ratios between branches and regulated banks yields a rough estimate of leakages. Thus, over our sample period, the regulatory leakage from foreign branches amounted to just under one-third: $32.9\% = [3.0 \times (63/950) \times (173/104) \times 100]$.

It appears, therefore, that over the sample period leakages from non-UK regulated banks operating in the UK were qualitatively and quantitatively important.³⁷ Leakages substantially reduced, but did not fully offset, the contractionary credit-supply impact of a tightening in capital requirements. The estimates reported here likely represent a lower bound on the size of total regulatory leakages, which could also occur through

34. The negative coefficient on inflation may reflect a response of foreign branches related to real exchange rate considerations.

35. See Stock and Yogo (2002). The authors tabulate critical values for various combinations of number of endogenous regressors and number of instruments.

36. Results are given for the Anderson–Rubin Wald test and Stock–Wright S test. The null hypothesis tested in both cases is that the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero, and, in addition, that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Both tests are robust to the presence of weak instruments. The tests are equivalent to estimating the reduced form of the equation (with the full set of instruments as regressors) and testing that the coefficients of the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero (see Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002 for further discussion). Both tests indicate rejection of the null across all specifications.

37. As a robustness check we also estimated the “leakage” regressions in reduced form; that is, we estimated various specifications in which lending by branch j is regressed directly on contemporaneous and lagged values of changes in the reference group’s minimum capital requirement. These results support the instrumental variables results noted here. The reduced form regressions also weakly support (at the 10% level of significance) asymmetric leakages; that is, the leakage is stronger in response to increases than decreases in minimum capital requirements on regulated banks (see Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek Forthcoming-b for a detailed exploration of this issue). However, this asymmetrical response is not found in the response of regulated bank lending to increases/decreases in minimum capital requirements.

cross-border lending or via capital markets, but, as noted earlier, there are good reasons for believing that foreign branch lending comprises the major element of such leakages.³⁸ This evidence validates the focus on reciprocal arrangements between financial regulators to prevent leakages from forthcoming macro-prudential regimes, for example, the reciprocity principle enshrined in the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We consider the consequences for bank credit supply of macro-prudential capital regulation, using a unique UK “policy experiment” (the practice of setting bank-specific, time-varying capital requirements) to gauge the potential effectiveness of macro-prudential changes in bank capital requirements. We employ data on individual banks operating in the UK from 1998 to 2007.

For macro-prudential policy to be effective in controlling the aggregate amount of lending in an economy, three necessary conditions must be satisfied: (i) it must be relatively costly to raise equity capital, (ii) regulatory capital requirements must bind on banks, and (iii) macro-prudential “leakages”—substitutes for regulated banks’ lending—must not be able to fully offset the loan-supply effects of variation in capital requirements. The UK evidence suggests that all three conditions were satisfied.

Banks that were subject to UK capital regulation display large and statistically significant responses in their loan-supply behavior to changes in regulatory capital requirements. The loan-supply behavior of banks that were not subject to UK capital requirements—foreign bank branches operating in the UK—responded to increases in UK capital requirements by increasing their loan supply, even as regulated banks contracted lending. This leakage was large, amounting to about a third of the aggregate change in loan supply that otherwise would have resulted. That conclusion reinforces the need for macro-prudential regulators to coordinate changes in capital requirements to prevent regulatory arbitrage by banks that can avoid domestic bank regulation.

Our estimates of the effects of changes in capital requirements on lending supply to the real economy may seem large, especially when compared to recent estimates of this effect produced by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) (2011).³⁹

38. It should be mentioned that the analysis of leakages here can be extended along several dimensions, and we are undertaking several such extensions. For example, in a forthcoming paper (Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek Forthcoming-b), we specifically examine banking conglomerates: groups that operate in the UK both as a subsidiary and a branch. Preliminary analysis suggests that these groups shift loans between the balance sheet of the (regulated) subsidiary to the (unregulated) branch in response to changes in the former’s trigger ratio, and that the magnitude of this effect is greater than leakages that occur between subsidiaries and branches unrelated to each other.

39. We estimate an elasticity of loan supply for regulated banks with respect to the minimum capital ratio requirement of roughly -0.7 , and the net effect (after taking account of foreign branches’ partially offsetting response) is two-thirds of that. These large magnitudes are consistent with another observation noted in our study: that banks do not appear to respond to changes in minimum capital requirements by raising nominal capital, instead carrying out the full amount of adjustment through changes in assets and changes in buffers.

But the BIS study is based on macro-economic data. The econometric identification of loan-supply responses is much more challenging in a macro-economic context. Macro-economic aggregates would be affected by the leakages via foreign branches analyzed in our study. They would also be affected by other potential regulatory leakages, resulting in a smaller net effect on loan-supply from any change in capital requirements. Differences from macro-economic studies may also arise because our paper studies a bank's credit supply response to changes in its *own* minimum capital requirements rather than a systemwide change in such requirements. It is possible that a bank's loan-supply response to such a change, which gives it a cost advantage or disadvantage relative to competing regulated banks, is larger than its response to such a change under a regime under which all competing regulated banks also face a similar change, leaving the relative cost advantage of the bank unaltered. In this case, a similar systemwide change in the minimum capital requirement of all banks would have a smaller aggregate credit supply impact than implied by the coefficient estimates in the first part of this paper. However, this point should not be overstated, because we also present evidence that in fact such micro-prudential regulatory changes, when aggregated, were countercyclical in nature. Minimum capital ratio changes among banks tended to be synchronized, which would tend to reduce or eliminate the relative cost advantage experienced by a bank facing a regulatory change under the micro-prudential regime.

Finally, our results—based on the 1998–2007 UK sample—should not be interpreted as providing a definitive measure of the size of loan-supply responses by regulated banks, or leakages from other banks, either in the future for the UK, or in other countries. The effect of capital requirements on aggregate lending may become stronger once the reciprocity agreement embedded in Basel III is enforced and the branch leakage documented in this paper eliminated. Moreover, the extent to which foreign branches constitute a leakage depends upon their relative size, which has been growing over time in the UK. Furthermore, differences across countries in the structure of their financial systems are likely to play a fundamental role, as well, both for the loan-supply responses of regulated banks and the relevant sources of leakage from other lenders.

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