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NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

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| Placement Director: Jaroslav Borovička | jaroslav.borovicka@nyu.edu | 347-899-6273 |
| Graduate Administrator: Ian Johnson | ian.johnson@nyu.edu | 212-998-8901 |

Education

PhD in Economics, New York University, 2020-2025 (expected)
Thesis Title: Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization
MA in Economics, the University of Tokyo, 2018-2020
BA in Economics, the University of Tokyo, 2013-2018

References

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| Professor Elena Manresa 19 West Fourth St., 8 th Floor New York, NY 10012-1119 212-998-8958 (office) elena.manresa@nyu.edu | Professor Quang Vuong 19 West Fourth St., 8 th Floor New York, NY 10012-1119 212-998-8900 (office) quuong@nyu.edu |
| Professor Thi Mai Anh Nguyen 19 West Fourth St., 8 th Floor New York, NY 10012-1119 212-998-8000 anh.nguyentm01@gmail.com | |

Teaching and Research Fields

Primary fields: Empirical Industrial Organization and Econometrics

Secondary fields: Market Design and Organizational Economics

Teaching Experience

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| Spring, 2022-2023 | Econometrics (MSQE), NYU, TA for Professor Elena Manresa |
| Fall, 2021-2022 | Econometrics (PhD), NYU TA for Professor Quang Vuong and Konrad Menzel |

Research Experience and Other Employment

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| 2023 | Cyber Agent, Research Intern |
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| 2018-2020 | Center for Research and Education in Program Evaluation, Trainee |
| 2018-2019 | Preferred Networks, Intern and Part-time Engineer |

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

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| 2020-2025 | MacCracken Fellowship |
| 2019-2020 | MITOU Advanced |
| 2018-2020 | CREPE Scholarship Program |
| 2018 | Distinguished Graduation Thesis |

Publications

Ikegami, Kei, Kyohei Okumura and Takumi Yoshikawa (2020), “A Simple, Fast, and Safe Mediator for Congestion Management,” AAI, Oral presentation.

Ikegami Kei, Ken Onishi and Naoki Wakamori (2021), “Competition-Driven Physician-Induced Demand,” *Journal of Health Economics*, Vol 79:

Research Papers

Bargaining over Leasing Contracts amid Shifting Power Balance (Job Market Paper)

This paper investigates the inter-firm contract terms by analyzing tenant leasing contracts in shopping malls, with a particular focus on controlling the time-varying power balance between the involved parties. Utilizing a novel dataset covering two shopping malls and their tenants over six years—including contract terms, daily sales, and negotiation records—we estimate a structural model to recover the evolution of power balances. The results reveal that the power balance varies over time due to the influence of tenants' past performance, such as sales per unit area. In our simulations, these temporal dynamics account for approximately 10% of the shopping mall's surplus. Based on these estimated power balance, we show that controlling for them allows valid empirical analysis of the contract terms. Our analysis demonstrates that the selection of contract terms aligns with the risk attitude of the shopping mall manager, and that up to twice the amount of rent can be collected by changing the way to pick a contract while keeping the power balance between the tenants fixed.

Joint Venture Formation in Procurement Auctions (with Ken Onishi and Naoki Wakamori)

We propose a model for joint venture formation in the context of procurement auctions. This model enables us to identify the formation mechanism, which is necessary for simulating counterfactual auction settings. We estimate the model using newly collected Japanese procurement auction data. Our estimates reveal the presence of cost synergies: joint ventures are more likely to be cost-effective compared to standard bidders. Despite this pro-competitive effect, our simulation indicates that excessive encouragement of joint ventures hinders cost-effective procurement by reducing competition. This anti-competitive effect arises from the diminished incentive to enter the auction due to the possibility to compete with joint ventures.

The Efficiency of Cap-Based Regulation in Residency Matching: Evidence from the Japan Residency Matching Program (with Atsushi Iwasaki, Akira Matsushita, and Kyohei Okumura)

This paper investigates the efficiency of cap-based regulation within the Japan Residency Matching Program (JRMP) in addressing the geographic distributional imbalances of medical residents across Japan. Despite the program's aim to efficiently allocate medical students to residency programs,

significant disparities persist, particularly in rural and underserved areas. We develop a theoretical model that extends the classic matching with transferable utility framework to incorporate regional caps and floors as policy constraints. Our model allows for the design of taxation policies that influence equilibrium matching outcomes while respecting these constraints. Using a novel dataset of matching outcomes from 2016 to 2019, we estimate agents' preferences and conduct counterfactual analyses. Our simulation demonstrates that a small monetary intervention and modifying the regional caps could effectively increase the number of residents in rural areas, thereby reducing geographic imbalances.

Resource Procurement for Matching Market: A Nash-in-Nash Approach

This paper examines the procurement of resources for a subsequent matching market. We present a three-stage model: 1) bilateral bargaining between procurers and resource suppliers, 2) suppliers' decisions on resource provision, and 3) the realization of a stable matching outcome. We adopt the Nash-in-Nash approach as the solution concept for bargaining, revealing a unique equilibrium where procurers are unable to incentivize suppliers, resulting in minimal procurement. However, we demonstrate that by committing to an assignment rule that reverses the order of assignment, the government can increase the number of procured resources in equilibrium. Our findings emphasize the social benefits of integrating the allocation and procurement problems.

Research In Progress

Social Learning in Budget Formulation: A Case of Adaptation to Natural Disasters (with Hikaru Kawarazaki)

Wage Stagnation in Daycare Industry: A Two-Sided Market Perspective (with Kan Kuno)

Professional Activities

Conference/Seminar Presentations

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| 2024 | APIOC, JEMIOU, Internal Seminars at NYU (Stern, Student Econometrics Lunch), AEA (Annual Meeting) |
| 2023 | Yokohama National University, Otaru University of Commerce, JEMIOU, KCL (QPE workshop), Internal Seminars at NYU (Student Econometrics Lunch), |
| 2022 | APIOC, Waseda University (Applied Econometrics Conference) |
| Before 2020 | AAAI, APIOC, Kobe University (JEA Annual Meeting), Otaru University of Commerce (SWET), IBIS |

Other Information

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| Programming skills | Python, R, Julia, Stata |
| Languages | Japanese (native), English (fluent) |