Kei Ikegami

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Overview

General Model

- N bidders bid for a single object.
- ▶ X_i is bidder *i*'s private signal. $X = (X_1, ..., X_N)$.
- ▶ S_j is additional random variable which is informative about the value of the object. $S = (S_1, ..., S_M)$.
- ▶ $V_i = u_i(S, X)$ is bidder i's value of the object, where u_i is symmetric across i.
- ▶ $V_i p$ is the payoff for the bidder i winning the auction by paying p.
- ▶ *Y* is the highest signal among bidders other than *i*.
- $v(x, y) = E[V_i | X_i = x, Y = y]$ is the expected value conditional on winning.
- $ightharpoonup r(x) = E[V_i | X_i = x]$ is the unconditional expected value.

Classification of Auctions

- First price auction vs Second price auction
- Independent private value auction(i.p.v) vs Common value auction(c.v)

Models

- In i.p.v, the signals and values are independent among bidders.
- ▶ In c.v, the information of *i* and *j* is not independent and learning about the other bidders' information can cause the bidder to reassess his estimate of the value of the object. (e.g. Timber auction)

First Price Auction

▶ In c.v, the optimal bidding strategy is calculated as follows

Second Price Auction

Cursed Equilibrium

Points

First Price Auction

Second Price Auction

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Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Points

Comparing 000000000000 000000000

Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Random L1 in First Price Auction

Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Random L1 in Second Price Auction

Comparing 000000000000 000000000

Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Random L2 in First Price Auction

Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Random L2 in Second Price Auction

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Conclusion

Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Truthful L1 in First Price Auction

Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Truthful L1 in Second Price Auction

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Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Truthful L2 in First Price Auction

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Nonequilibrium Level-k Models

Truthful L2 in Second Price Auction

Summary Table

▶ Table 1 を挿入

Equilibrium vs Cursed Equilibrium in First Price Auction

- ► i.p.v
- ► C.V.

Equilibrium vs Cursed Equilibrium in Second Price Auction

Models

- ▶ i.p.v
- C.V

Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in First Price Auction

- i.p.v
- C.V

Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in Second Price Auction

- i.p.v
- ► C.V

Comparing

Optimal Bidding Strategy Comparing

Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in First Price Auction

- i.p.v
- C.V

Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in Second Price Auction

- i.p.v
- ► C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in First Price Auction

- i.p.v
- C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in Second Price Auction

- i.p.v
- C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in First Price Auction

- i.p.v
- C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in Second Price Auction

- i.p.v
- ► C.V

Summary: Where Level-k Model Can Improve?

Auction Examples: KL

Auction Examples: AK

Auction Examples: GHP

Preparation for Comparing

How to Compare

Table3a

Table3c

Table3d

Table3b

▶ 他と比率が違う理由もかく

Summary: Could Level-k Model really Improve?

Summary

Implication