LEVEL-k AUCTIONS: CAN A NONEQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF STRATEGIC THINKING EXPLAIN THE WINNER'S CURSE AND OVERBIDDING IN PRIVATE-VALUE AUCTIONS?

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Purpose

Precedents

What's new

Result

General Model



Classification of Auctions

First Price Auction

Second Price Auction

Points



First Price Auction

Second Price Auction

Points

Random L1 in First Price Auction

Random L1 in Second Price Auction

Random L2 in First Price Auction

Random L2 in Second Price Auction

Truthful L1 in First Price Auction

Truthful L1 in Second Price Auction

Truthful L2 in First Price Auction

Truthful L2 in Second Price Auction

Summary Table

▶ Table 1 を挿入

Equilibrium vs Cursed Equilibrium in First Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- C.V.

Equilibrium vs Cursed Equilibrium in Second Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in First Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in Second Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in First Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in Second Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in First Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Random Level-k in Second Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in First Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Cursed Equilibrium vs Truthful Level-k in Second Price Auction

- ▶ i.p.v
- ► C.V

Summary: Where Level-k Model Can Improve?

Auction Examples: KL

Auction Examples: AK

Auction Examples: GHP

Preparation for Comparing

How to Compare

Table3a



Table3c

Table3d

Table3b

▶ 他と比率が違う理由もかく

Summary: Could Level-k Model really Improve?

Summary



Implication

