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*Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace**

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Theory: Current theories of the democratic peace focus on the constraining power of political institutions, culture, or international trade. If instead democracies are much less likely to disagree about each other's policies, then we would expect them to seldom fight regardless of whether they are constrained from acting on conflicts by institutions, culture, or other factors. While previous research on the democratic peace has been careful to construct statistical models of "opportunity"—the physical obstacles nations face in engaging in war—research to date has failed to incorporate "willingness"—the psychological incentives nations have to overcome obstacles in pursuit of their objectives.
Hypothesis: I argue that a satisfactory assessment of the democratic peace requires controlling for willingness as well as opportunity. A measure of the affinity nations have for each other's international policy should correlate with observations of the democratic peace.
Methods: I present a statistical model of national preference using data from the United Nations General Assembly 1950–85 to assess whether joint democracy still accounts for the democratic peace. I test the model using logistic regression and by replicating recent quantitative studies of the democratic peace.
Results: Results support the argument that national preferences account for the lack of conflict between democracies.

What are the origins of the democratic peace? The discovery that war and other lesser military disputes are much less common between democratic states spawned a cottage industry designed to rationalize the observation. Current research has increasingly focused on a set of explanations that describe how democratic norms, institutions, or properties associated with joint democracy *constrain* recourse to international violence (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). "There is something in the internal makeup of democratic states *that prevents them from fighting one another. . . .*" (Maoz and Russett 1993, 624, italics added). The problem with interpreting the ob-

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servation of the democratic peace in this manner is that it ignores the possibility that there is little conflict to be prevented. In the coming pages, I argue that much of the democratic peace can be explained by the variability in the antecedents to conflict between members of dyads and particularly by the lack of a basis for disputes between the world's democracies. I test the argument, comparing it to previous research by replicating the analysis of a major research program on institutional, cultural, and liberalist explanations for the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal et al. 1996; Russett 1993). The results indicate that much of what has been described as the democratic peace can be explained by the similarity of national preferences between democratic states.

Literature

The most prominent of current explanations for the democratic peace fall into one of two general categories. First, some argue that democracies do not fight each other because they are democratic. Cultural or institutional structures that coincide with democratic governance serve to preclude or greatly hinder recourse to conflict behavior between pairs of democracies. Peace is "caused" by these institutional or cultural factors. The nature of these structural or cultural factors have been widely discussed and analyzed elsewhere (Maoz and Russett 1993; Rummel 1983, 1985; Russett 1993; Schweller 1992).

Others argue that liberalism or some other factor that correlates with democratic governance is in fact responsible for constraining conflict behavior between democracies. Democracies do not fight in large part because most of them are intensive trading partners (Barbieri 1996; Farber and Gowa 1994; Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982; Mansfield 1994; Polachek 1980, 1997; Polachek and McDonald 1992; Pollins 1989a, 1989b). The possibility of a spurious correlation between domestic and international politics has been explored by an increasing number of researchers with results that seem to indicate that liberalism is at least partially responsible for the democratic peace (Oneal and Russett 1997a, 1997b; Oneal et al. 1996).

Current explanations, while diverse in many aspects, share the conviction that something associated with joint democracy *constrains* or *mitigates* the conflict behavior of democratic nations. That is, bases for contention between democracies exist, but they are contained by some mechanism unique to, or far more developed between, democratic states. "It follows that *when two democracies confront one another in conflicts of interest*, they are able effectively to apply democratic norms in their interaction, thereby *preventing most conflicts from escalating* to a militarized level. . . ." (Maoz and Russett 1993, 625, italics added). "Thus, *in a conflict between democracies*, by the time the two states are militarily ready for war, diplomats have the

opportunity to find a nonmilitary solution to the conflict" (Maoz and Russett 1993: 626, italics added). In the first explanation democratic norms serve to cap conflictual tendencies while in the second, the plodding institutions of democratic states allow time to develop peaceful alternatives to war. Joint democracy is thus a palliative to the forces that impel conflict to escalate. Finally, this conception of the democratic peace has an important policy implication. If joint democracy *prevents* states from escalating to violent acts, then promoting democracy stands to reduce the incidences of such behavior.

While plausible, this conception presupposes that conflicts between democracies do arise. Indeed, to assert that joint democracy has the effect of "preventing most conflicts from escalating," we must assume that conflicts arise in democracies in numbers roughly comparable to those in non-democracies. If not, then what is being prevented? Thus, most current explanations for the democratic peace argue implicitly that the factors that motivate conflict are not substantially less common between democracies than among other states. It is assumed that democracies are about as likely to *disagree*. Instead, researchers argue that something allows democracies to resolve disagreements in a more amicable manner, that joint democracy constrains costly contests.

Contrary to Kant's original conception, democracies are no less likely to fight wars than are non-democracies (Chan 1984; Kant [1795] 1969; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Weede 1984, 1992). They just do not seem to fight each other (Bremer 1992, 1993; Dixon 1993, 1994; Lake 1992; Small and Singer 1976). Thus, democracy itself does not lead governments or their citizens to more peaceful behavior (Ray 1993). Only when democracies are paired do they become pacific (Morgan and Schwebach 1992). The democratic peace is quite literally international.[1]

Researchers studying the paradox initially focused their search for a cause on domestic factors (Kilgour 1991; Levy 1988; Maoz and Russett 1992; Morgan and Campbell 1991). The most widely adopted explanation is that democratic states possess cultural or institutional attributes that are more effective at preventing escalation of disputes and promoting negotiation or other forms of nonviolent dispute resolution. Democracies are aware, however, that they exist in a world that contains other types of states. Autocracies fail to inculcate the values or institutional characteristics that lead democratic nations toward love of peace. Though cultural or institutional imperatives within democratic societies work toward peace, democracies must continue to interact with states that fail to share democratic convictions. Unless they

[1]Excellent reviews of the literature on the democratic peace abound (Chan 1993; Gleditsch 1992; Hagan 1994; Morgan 1993; Starr 1992). In addition, summaries of recent research can be found in most published sources.

respond in kind, democracies are vulnerable to preemptive or otherwise opportunistic behavior on the part of autocracies. For this reason, war occasionally occurs between democracies and non-democracies.

There are some shortcomings to this explanation (Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996; Layne 1994; Oren 1995; Spiro 1994; Vincent 1987). For example, how and why the democratic imperative of peaceful coexistence is seconded to the imperative of national survival is not clear. The argument posed above seems to imply a certain reticence on the part of democracies to engage in conflict behavior. But democracies are often initiators of military violence. If cultural or institutional constraints serve to make military violence less acceptable or feasible for democracies, it seems inconsistent that democracies should be the escalators. It may be argued that Israel's preemptive attacks of Arab military installations on the eve of the Six-Day War were considered necessary for the survival of the state. It is harder to claim that U.S. bombing of Libya in the wake of terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens could not be avoided or that alternatives were unavailable.

Democratic initiators generally attack vastly weaker foes. Much of the military action conducted by democracies against other states in the past five decades has been against states with inferior military, economic, and political capabilities (Forsythe 1992; James and Mitchell 1995). It was, for example, highly unlikely that Iraq posed a direct military threat to members of the U.S.-lead coalition that confronted Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait. The decision to attack Iraqi positions in Kuwait and along the Saudi border, while it might be justified on a number of grounds, is difficult to support as one necessary for the national survival of the wealthy and powerful democratic nations of Western Europe and North America.

Overcoming constraints against the use of force strong enough to be meaningful would seem to imply the need for substantial threats. Ironically, relatively weak nations are generally chosen as democratic opponents. Viewed merely in terms of their military potential, the world's democracies should pose some of the most substantial of all security challenges to one another. Given the proper conviction, the threat of an invasion of the United Kingdom by France is far more likely than a concerted attack by Bosnian Serbs. Still, the latter play host to British regiments in battle gear. The absurdity of proposing a Gaulic invasion of the United Kingdom is tribute to our implicit awareness that proximity and capability alone are inadequate indicators of potential conflict. If war is likely or even possible, we must first ask ourselves if the policies that nations seek to realize are at odds.

It may be that a simple distinction is made between democracies and autocracies, either by the institutions or by the culture of democratic states. Yes, the values of peace must be maintained, but only for those nations worthy of such behavior. Autocratic states are stricken from the list of nations

considered likely to reciprocate. Still, a distinction that comes down to a value judgment on the part of democratic states is problematic. What is a democracy? The same question must trouble democratic institutions or cultures. Would it not be tempting, for example, to consider South Vietnam a democracy while viewing the Sandinista regime as autocratic? Oren's (1995) observation that the assessment of democracy has been subject to the vicissitudes of national interest is apropos.

Readers may protest that I have incorrectly characterized the institutional and cultural explanations. Democracies are able to make the appropriate distinctions, even if academics are not. This is reasonable and amounts to the sort of collective rationality that appears to act in situations like large elections. Even when individuals cannot give logically consistent explanations for their votes, voters in the aggregate appear to respond to candidate shifts in policy and other relevant variables at the polling place. Still, it is troubling to recognize that democracies know that democracies are *capable* of circumventing the apparati of constraint and that they do so regularly, if only for threats posed by non-democracies. Democracies *can* short-circuit constraints when needed. That they will never do so must be taken on good faith. Democracies, especially the smaller, weaker ones that have proliferated in the past decade, must surely hope that they are never mistaken for another type of regime. Thus, structural and cultural explanations of the democratic peace amount to a conviction that democracies will behave pacifically because they want to. This is tautological, of course, but the only other alternative is to accept that democracies are really curbed by a constraint that we acknowledge they can turn on and off at will.

The second possibility posed by the literature is that democracies do not fight because they generally possess liberal economies. International trade amounts to linkages that make it more difficult and costly for nations to resolve differences through warfare. On balance, nations would rather retain the benefits of bilateral trade than gamble on the spoils of bilateral victory. The problem with the liberal explanation is that the democratic peace is at or near a categorical statement. Democratic/liberal countries do not fight even though their level of trade dependence and in particular bilateral trade interdependence varies substantially from country to country and from dyad to dyad. The cost-benefit metaphor used to rationalize the liberal theory of the democratic peace implies a much more tentative conclusion. War should be less common as trade becomes more profitable, but it should not disappear. Cost-benefit analysis suggests the possibility, even eventuality of liberal/democratic war. Finally, it appears that the liberal explanation is equally applicable to any pair of nations that are heavily trade interdependent. That is, if trade inhibits military violence, this should apply to trading nations that happen to have planned economies. The East European former client states

of the former Soviet Union were intentionally caught in a web of economic interdependence with and by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, loss of trade did not appear to completely inhibit aggression, at least in one direction.

These concerns do not rule out the possibility that either or both explanations operate and contribute to the democratic peace. Instead, they suggest that the explanations available currently are not complete. We may expect to find that the ultimate answer lies in the contributions of several factors. In the next section, I explore the possibility that current constraint-based models of the democratic peace ignore national preferences or the "willingness" of nations to engage in costly contests. I then construct an index of the similarity of national preferences and test the impact of national preference affinity, replicating research on the democratic peace.

Discussion

Disputes between democracies may be rare because there is relatively little disagreement between democracies. Democracies do not fight largely because they have little to gain from fighting. The potential origins of such an affinity are themselves a subject worthy of pondering, but as a first step, let us map out a description of national preference. This will be a simplistic description and for that reason alone there is room to question or improve upon my statements. Nevertheless, simple things tend to work better than complicated ones and in any case, simple is a good place to start.

Observations of the democratic peace are not unlike studying incidents of seasickness in Central Asia. There is nothing to report. Still, we cannot then assume that Uzbek culture makes them hearty seafaring folk or that Tadzhik bureaucrats introduce a mysterious regime that makes local villagers immune to the effects of vertigo. Rather, the absence of a basis for observed behavior must be incorporated into the assessment of cause and effect. Current theories of the democratic peace adopt a model that assumes that disputes arise between nations in a more or less random way. This is clearly not the case. We are likely to observe more major conflict between nations that have greater differences in world views than between nations that see the world similarly. A variety of cultural, social, ethnic, demographic as well as political factors encourage the western industrial democracies (the bulk of the joint democratic dyads in most analyses of the democratic peace) to view their globe in similar ways. They do not fight often or perhaps ever in large part because the preconditions for conflict—substantial disagreements—seldom arise.

Whatever its origin, rationalization of behavior must first assume *motive*, actors must be assumed to have some intent or *willingness*, before one can determine the effectiveness of social, political, or economic measures designed or thought to contain such behavior. "Utility," "preference," "will-

ingness," however described, we have long accepted that nations differ in their objectives in global relations and that these differences are at least potentially an important contributor to conflict behavior (c.f. Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986, 1990, 1992). No doubt some or even much of national preferences are rooted in the form of government, but probably too, much of what nations aspire to is idiosyncratic relative to their governing structures or political cultures. Not all democracies have similar objectives on important international issues. They often do, but just as often international division appears to run along different lines. In the 1970s, Japan and the former Soviet Union were united in opposition to stricter regulations against international whaling. Today, the world's major industrial democracies are often divided on such diverse issues as nuclear testing, Cuban sanctions, and policy in the Bosnian conflict. The question at this level is where nations stand relative to each other on balance. While not a perfect manifestation of preference, nations that disagree often are more likely to come to blows than nations whose world views are in harmony.

Most and Starr (1989) present a reasonably intuitive construct of the determinants of international interactions. States are said to possess opportunity and willingness for some act or outcome. Opportunity constitutes the relative difficulty of accomplishing a task. For example, in considering whether to fight with another nation, opportunity for a given nation might include the distance between the two states, the ratio of military capabilities, etc. None of this tells us much about a nation's priorities, however. Willingness constitutes a nation's resolve to accomplish a given task. Obviously, these factors can potentially balance each other out. States will have more opportunities to act aggressively toward nations that are weaker and toward those that are nearby. Conversely, if issues in dispute are substantial enough, nations may be willing to overcome an imbalance of forces or cope with vast distances to try to achieve their objectives. The United States chose to fight in Korea in spite of the fact that war with Canada was logistically more convenient. The opportunity for war between Canada and the United States is relatively high, while willingness is probably low (what is to be gained?). Conversely, the opportunity for war between the United States and North Korea was low (at least initially), but severe policy differences meant that willingness was substantial. It is incorrect to assume either that states pursue their preferences regardless of costs or that opportunity alone can account for conflict behavior.

Picture war and other uses of force as the end product of a joint escalation decision made by two or more countries. Figure 1 depicts this situation graphically from two perspectives. The "aerial view" divides a chart of opportunity and willingness into two regions. Pairs of nations with little about which to fight or with significant physical or material obstacles to using

Figure 1. Relationship Between Opportunity, Willingness, and the Democratic Peace



force may be at "peace." Nations that have an issue or issues on which they disagree may be in the region of conflicts, or, alternately, in the region of disputes. The "cross section" points out that the three regions overlap. Opportunity and willingness are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for escalation.[2] Tests of the democratic peace must at minimum incorporate necessary conditions— opportunity *and* willingness—in order to make adequate assessments of the proposition that democracies do not fight.

Superimposed on both diagrams are the constraint models of the democratic peace. Previous research has argued that joint democratic norms or institutions serve to prevent some states from escalating from conflicts to disputes. For example, two states that would hypothetically reach a level of escalation at point "A" on the aerial view diagram, would, if they were both democracies, be prevented from reaching the region of disputes. They might, for example, remain at point "B." The problem with this construction is that it is probably not correct. We must accept the counterfactual hypothesis that the pair of nations *would have been* at point "A." Probabilistically, we must assume that the distribution of combinations of opportunity and willingness between democratic pairs of nations and other types of dyads is roughly the same. Yet we have reason to believe that democracies have fewer incentives to fight. If the distribution of opportunity and willingness more often puts democracies at point "B" or even point "C," then they will fight less often regardless of the effectiveness of norms of cooperation or institutions of deliberation.

If joint democracy coincides with a significant reduction in the number of conflicts, then there may be little or nothing that democratic institutions or norms have to prevent. According to the figure, this may happen for one of two reasons. Either states lack the opportunity to engage in a conflict (they are too far apart or they are too weak militarily) or they lack the willingness (there is relatively little about which they disagree). In either case, if there are no conflicts, we can more appropriately attribute the absence of a dispute to the lack of opportunity or willingness than to the constraining power of democratic governance.

Previous research into the democratic peace makes an effort to account for opportunity. Statistical tests include measures of distance (or at least contiguity), military capability, and other factors contributing to or hindering

[2]Most and Starr (1989) seem to imply that opportunity and willingness are sufficient conditions for international conflict. This cannot be correct. A non-negative marginal utility for a good (or for conflict) is a necessary condition, but strategic interaction or cheaper alternatives often allow actors to obtain preferred outcomes without paying "full price." In the international arena, states that are able to demonstrate willingness to use force often obtain their goals without actually needing to use violence. Sufficient conditions for conflict require that states are willing and able to use force while at least one state believes that its opponent lacks either capacity or resolve.

efforts to extract concessions by use of force. Still, tests of the democratic peace have yet to incorporate variability in willingness. If it is plausible that variability in willingness may coincide with democracy or other variables used to assess the democratic peace, then the results to date may be suspect. Variability in willingness may translate into variability in conflict behavior. Thus, if we are to assess the democratic peace faithfully, we must measure willingness.

This conception of opportunity and willingness is not immune to challenge. Perhaps low willingness is just a by-product of joint democracy. States with similar regime types may have similar world views in part because of the similarity of their political systems. Still, low willingness is not simply a substitute for joint democracy. Joint democracy is not even necessarily associated with low willingness. Figure 2 portrays hypothetical relationships between preferences, regime type, and the onset of international disputes. In the upper right-hand corner of the diagram, an arrow runs from "regime type" to "disputes." The negative sign over the arrow indicates that the hypothetical association is negative, joint democracy is thought to lessen the likelihood of international dispute behavior. The alternative hypothesis posed here is represented by an arrow leading from "similarity of preferences" to "disputes" in Figure 2. The similarity of national preferences may account for the reduced incidence of disputes between certain dyads. Figure 2 also represents three conjectural relationships between "regime type," "similarity of preferences," and "antecedents" to both variables. If regime type similarity actually leads to similar preferences, then we could fail to re-

Figure 2. Relationship Between Preferences, Regime Type, and Disputes



ject the alternative hypothesis when in fact the democratic peace hypothesis is correct. A second possibility is that states with similar national preferences are predisposed to adopting similar political systems. This might lead to a failure to reject the democratic peace hypothesis. A third possibility is that regime type and preferences are largely independent or that both regime type and national preferences are accounted for by some set (or sets) of exogenous antecedents. If this is the case, then a comparison of the two hypotheses can be made without misidentifying a cause of the democratic peace. I argue that joint democracy is not the primary contributor to national preferences.

Something "causes" democracy. Studies of democratization point to ecological, material, or cultural factors as antecedents. These factors are probably also relevant to the types of preferences states exhibit. Research on democratization shows that states are more likely to adopt democratic government as they industrialize and increase their wealth (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). Industrialization produces economic and demographic incentives that lead states to share common global objectives. On the one hand, both democracies and industrialized nations have similar world-views. On the other hand, democracies have divided preferences on issues like sanctions against Israel and curtailment of whaling. Each state appears to act somewhat selfishly when assessing issues like territory or use of the sea. So, it can be argued that the similarity of most democracies' world-views derives as much from their economics, culture, or geography as from their politics. Historically, democracy is a geographically and culturally isolated phenomenon. Democracy may induce states to adopt similar preferences, but these nations had similar world-views long before most were democratic.

The argument that joint democracy may lead to similar preferences is theoretically plausible, but the argument is equally applicable to any type of regime. We could say generally that similar political systems encourage similar expressions of national preference. For example, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were probably about as likely to express agreement with communist and fascist nations respectively as is the United States to other democracies. If similar regime type leads to similar preferences, then we have not a "democratic peace" so much as a "regime type similarity peace."[3]

While the import of such an argument is the same, the causal explanation is quite different from those most widely adopted by the literature on the democratic peace. Joint democracy or joint regime similarity would not constrain latent conflict so much as contribute, to some degree, to the absence of conflict motivation between certain nations. As such, joint regime

[3] "Autocracy" is a more heterogeneous category than is "democracy." Future research should focus on differentiating autocratic regimes along ideological or structural lines (Oren 1996).

type becomes just one among several factors leading to similar preferences. Nor is it likely that regime type predominates as an explanation for similar preferences. Other factors like national wealth, geography, culture, ethnic identity, and idiosyncratic political agendas are likely to have major impact. Indeed, democracy may facilitate expression of local and regional idiosyncrasies that actually *increase* differences in expressed preferences. Since democracies are intended to better characterize popular preferences, it is likely that they better express differences in these preferences as well.

The main issue, however, is not whether regime type similarity has an effect on the similarity of national preferences (I accept that it may), but whether the effect is such that it leads us to misattribute the origins of the democratic peace. While it is difficult to establish theoretically which of the three scenarios presented above is most nearly correct, it is a relatively easy task to assess whether regime type and preferences are associated statistically. From a quantitative standpoint, this can happen when much of one or both of the independent variable's covariance with the dependent variable is encumbered by covariance with the other independent variable. I test for this possibility in the empirical section that follows and find little support. There is modest correlation between regime type similarity and similar national preferences (.18 or .36, depending on the indicator of democracy). Almost all of the variance in preference similarity is independent of regime type. The reverse is also true. Further, a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS), designed to assess the possibility that the measure of national preferences is an instrumental variable, shows no support for the proposition that regime type "causes" preferences. At least from a statistical standpoint, the effect of preferences on disputes appears largely independent of regime type.

In the sections that follow, I test the argument that the democratic peace is a product of preference similarity by replicating studies that have served to enhance the credibility of constraint-based explanations of the democratic peace. I develop an index of national affinity based on the similarity of nations' roll-call voting in the United Nations General Assembly. Results show that the democratic peace can be explained by the similarity in national preferences between democratic nations. While this does not negate the findings of other research that joint democracy is associated with the absence of international disputes, it suggests that joint democracy does not pacify international relations *per se*. Making states democratic may not result in an absence of war. Rather, democracy has historically been associated with a subset of countries who saw their global objectives coincide. Indeed, the portent of a new world era, rather than democratically inspired peace, may be the decline of such an association.

Research Design

To test the influence of willingness or the difference in national preferences on the democratic peace, I follow as closely as possible the research design of Oneal et al. (1996). This study is the most recent publication in a series documenting a research program that has heavily influenced the contemporary debate on the theoretical and quantitative bases for the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993).[4] Replicating the study using the original data allows for intercomparability of results and reduces the likelihood of biased analysis. Assessing the effects of willingness in this way also has the advantage that the Maoz and Russett research program is widely known and referenced. These data are available for use so that other researchers may replicate the results. A complete description of the research design of the studies can be found elsewhere (Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal et al. 1996; Russett 1993). I limit additional comments to aspects of the studies that are directly relevant to this study.

The Oneal et al. and Maoz and Russett studies test the proposition that democracies are significantly less likely to engage in Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) in a sample of contiguous and major-power states in the postwar period (Gochman and Maoz 1984).[5] They use logistic regression of a dichotomous dependent variable indicating the presence or absence of a dyadic dispute on two measures of joint democracy and several control variables. The authors measure democracy alternately as an interval variable (Joinreg) or as a dichotomous variable (Democrat).[6] They include interval variables that measure the joint rate of economic expansion within the dyad (Growth), the ratio of military capabilities (Capratio), and both the level and rate of change of economic interdependence within the dyad (Interdep and

[4]In recent papers Oneal and Russett (1997a, 1997b) adopt a measure of trade interdependence that really measures trade dependence. For this reason, I use the earlier studies (Gartzke 1997a). Though their interpretation and technique differ, Oneal and Russett (1997b) replicate some of the analysis presented here with comparable results.

[5]Militarized disputes (MIDs) are a broader category than wars. MIDs include, for example, threats and mobilizations that do not directly reflect theoretical arguments about use of force. Restricting analysis to uses of force or wars might better characterize traditional theory on the democratic peace, but it does not materially alter the results of quantitative tests. Further, such an approach would challenge the intercomparability of the results reported here and those of Oneal et al. (1996) and Maoz and Russett (1993). For a discussion of the relationship between regime type and escalation in disputes, see Senese (1997).

[6]Joinreg, the interval measure of democracy used in Maoz and Russett (1993) and Oneal et al. (1996) is nonlinear. Other indexes have more desirable mathematical properties (Thompson and Tucker 1997). I use the measure here to replicate earlier research. Tests using other indicators of joint democracy show results similar to those reported.

Dinterdp, respectively).[7] Dummy variables indicate the presence of an alliance within the dyad (Allies), and whether the states in the dyad are contiguous (Contig). The variables assessing economic interdependence are included in the more recent study (Oneal et al. 1996). Because disputes may negatively impact the level of trade between nations, Oneal et al. incorporate a one-period lag in their measures of interdependence.

To test the proposition that the willingness can account for some or all of the democratic peace, I add a measure of the similarity of national preferences, called the United Nations Affinity Score or just "Affinity," to the list of independent variables detailed above. I also incorporate a one-period lag in this variable so that disputes do not have the opportunity to precipitate changes in the level of affinity indicated. The affinity index is generated with roll-call data from the United Nations General Assembly.[8] I use roll-call votes for two reasons. First, these data quantify the positions taken by a large number of states on a variety of issues, thus giving some basis for assessing the overall similarity or difference of two states' world views. Second, the dataset covers the entire period assessed by Oneal et al. (1950–85). The measure of affinity is similar in many respects to the index of utility described in Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 109–18). The Bueno de Mesquita measure uses the similarity of nations' alliance portfolios to indicate the similarity of nations' preferences or willingness, but this was not found to be significant in any of the analyses presented here. Problems with the Bueno de Mesquita index appear to be due to the absence of variance in alliance structures during the cold war and the fact that many of the newer nations formed in the wake of colonial decline failed to establish formal alliance ties.[9]

To generate the index of national affinity, pairs of states' recorded votes in a given year were rank-order correlated using Spearman's ρ (StataCorp 1995, vol. 3, 173–75).[10] United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes were recoded from the original data into three categories: votes affirming a

[7]Oneal et al. (1996) add Dinterdp in separate regressions for all the analyses. Dinterdp was dropped here since it is theoretically similar to Interdep, did not substantively alter the results, and added to the complexity of the model.

[8] United Nations Roll-Call Data 1946–85, available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR #5512). The affinity index based on these data is available from the author.

[9]Preliminary analysis over a much longer time span (1816–1992) shows both the alliance portfolio and United Nations General Assembly roll-call indices are robust (Gartzke 1997a). Bueno de Mesquita corroborates the author's supposition that the alliance-based measure is much less effective during the postwar period (personal conversation with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita). See also Oneal and Russett (1997b).

[10]Kendall's τ_b is the more widely used measure. The two measures are functionally equivalent for the purposes here (Gibbons 1993; StataCorp 1995, vol. 3, 174). Spearman's ρ was chosen over Kendall's τ_b because of prohibitive computing time required to generate affinity scores using τ_b. (Each year of affinity scores takes approximately three days to generate on a pentium PC in Stata 4.0

measure (2), votes opposed to a measure (0), abstentions or absences (1). Abstentions or absences generally reflect a nation's stance on a particular vote and are intermediate actions between support or opposition. Nonmembers were coded as missing. This technique generates a large number of correlations. One correlation or index of national affinity exists for each combination of country pairs. There are up to 12,880 possible combinations of states in a given year, based on Correlates of War Interstate System Membership data.[11] Correlations range in value from –1 to 1, where a higher value represents greater affinity in voting behavior. Operationalizing the willingness hypothesis equates to the expectation that nations' conflict behavior will decline monotonically with increases in their joint affinity index.

Technically, the affinity index measures the similarity of nations' voting records in the United Nations General Assembly. Since the cost a nation incurs for revealing preferences in the General Assembly are modest relative to the costs of engaging in disputes, I argue that the affinity index is roughly indicative of the underlying preference ordering states have over the policy spectrum. While it is not always clear that each state's vote in the General Assembly precisely reflects the state's world view, states probably feel freer to express sincere preferences in the General Assembly than in most other international venues. The index thus measures some of the theoretical content of willingness. Nations with negative affinity scores are, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to be considered "enemies" regardless of their regime type.

Figures 3 and 4 depict sample distributions of scores of the index of national affinity for cold war rivals the United States and the Soviet Union. The figures identify, respectively, the affinities of the United States' voting record and that of the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly with all other voting members of the United Nations General Assembly for the year 1980. The number in brackets that follows each state's name is that state's democracy score as measured by the Polity III Database (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The figures provide a more intuitive picture of what the affinity index is measuring. Notice that Figure 3 is bordered on the left by Cuba and on the right by the United Kingdom. In other words, Cuba is said to have the most divergent policy preferences from those of the United States while the policy preferences of the United Kingdom are most closely aligned with those of the United States. Obviously, we expect there to be more basis for conflict between Cuba and the United States in 1980 than

using the latter measure.) Spearman's ρ is generally larger than Kendall's τ_b but the only impact on the study would be a slight change in the coefficient estimated for affinity. As a check, samples of τ_b scores were generated for several years. The Spearman and Kendall based affinity scores correlate perfectly.

[11]Correlates of War Project, Interstate System Dataset 1816–1994, version 1994.1. These data are available through the Peace Science Society (International) homepage at: http://www.polsci.binghamton.edu/peace(s)/.

Figure 3. Affinity of State Vote in U.N. General Assembly to United States Vote, 1980



Figure 4. Affinity of State Vote in U.N. General Assembly to Soviet Union Vote, 1980



between the United States and the United Kingdom. Similarly, in Figure 4, the United States is said to have the least congruent preferences to those of the Soviet Union, while the preferences of Bulgaria are quite close.

Some recent research suggests that democracies share an interest in maintaining the international *status quo* (Kacowicz 1995; Lemke and Reed 1996; Rousseau et al. 1996).[12] An analysis of opportunity and willingness using preferences really subsumes this argument, but it is worth discussing the possibility that maintenance of the *status quo* is the origin of democratic motives. Perhaps it is only among democracies that preferences converge. It does appear from Figure 3 that most democracies are pooled at the right-hand side (most similar preferences). Yet it is equally the case that autocracies are pooled to the right of Figure 4. Notice also in Figure 3 that not all states with high democracy scores share preferences similar to those of the United States. Lebanon, Cyprus, and even Ecuador and Venezuela are separated from the other democracies in the figure by a number of autocratic states. Further, there are autocracies whose preferences are closely aligned with those of the United States (Fiji, Central African Republic, Liberia, others are not labeled) while in Figure 4, Jamaica is more closely aligned with the preferences of the Soviet Union than with its fellow democracies. While there is much cohesion among regime types, there is also divergence. The figures do not suggest that only democracies' preferences converge. Rather, they suggest that the dialectic of the cold war is at work.

It also seems quite clear that what separates regimes of a given type from others with similar political structures is wealth. Industrial democracies are cohesive, but not with their fellow democracies in the developing world. This effect is emphasized by Figure 5, which represents states' preference similarities to voting in the United Nations General Assembly by India in 1980. India, the world's largest democracy, is presumably as susceptible to the forces that are said to affect democratic foreign policy as any other democratic state. Yet India's closest "friends" are the nonaligned nations (mostly autocratic in 1980). In fact, the states *least similar* to India in preferences are the industrial democracies. If democratic preferences converge to protect the *status quo*, it is more likely that this is due to their similar economic interests than to concerns over regime type. All this points to the complex origins of preferences and to their heterogeneity even within

[12]I am grateful to a reviewer for suggesting this literature. Lemke and Reed (1996) apply power transition theory to argue that democratic satisfaction with the *status quo* accounts for the democratic peace. This seems peculiar as power transition theory originally sought to explain wars *among* powerful states that maintain and benefit from the global *status quo*. If Lemke and Reed (1996) correctly identify democracies as forming the *status quo*, then power transition theory would seem to predict democratic major power war.



Figure 5. Affinity of State Vote in U.N. General Assembly to Indian Vote, 1980

regime type. While an explanation of preferences is beyond the scope of this (and perhaps other) research, testing the effects of preferences on the democratic peace is manageable.

Analysis

To assess the effect of preferences or willingness on the democratic peace, I repeat analysis conducted by Oneal et al., using logistic regression (StataCorp 1995, vol. 2, 506–23). Results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1 contains two "constraint" models (I and II) presented by Oneal et al.[13] The models differ only in their use of the interval joint democracy (I, Joinreg) or dichotomous joint democracy (II, Democrat) measures of dyadic regime type. The models incorporating willingness appear to the right of each constraint model (Ia and IIa, respectively). Each differs from its counterpart only in respect to the United Nations affinity score (Affinity) variable. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Equation I (Oneal Eqn 1) tests the influence of the interval measure of democracy. Interval joint democracy (Joinreg) has a negative effect on the propensity of dyads to engage in militarized disputes. This result is significant at the .05 level. In addition, the dyadic rate of economic growth (Growth), the presence of an alliance between members of the dyad (Allies), the ratio of relative military capabilities (Capratio), and the joint level of economic interdependence (Interdep) have a significant negative impact on disputes while the contiguity dummy (Contig) increases dispute likelihood. The effect of these variables is in the direction hypothesized in the democratic peace literature.[14]

Compare the results of Equation I with those of Ia, incorporating the affinity index. Affinity is highly significant, with a negative impact on disputes. That is, the more two nations preferences diverge, the more likely it is that they will engage in a militarized dispute. Nations that have similar preferences are less likely to engage in militarized behavior. Second, the effect of economic interdependence is now significant at the .05 level while the presence of an alliance is no longer a significant predictor of conflict behavior. Most interesting of all, interval joint democracy fails to demonstrate significance even at the .10 level. Introduction of a variable for preferences negates the effect of democracy on the democratic peace.

[13] Models I and II equate to Eqn 1 and Eqn 1a, Table I, respectively (Oneal et. al. 1996, 19). Eqn 2 and Eqn 2a presented in Table I of Oneal et. al. have been dropped because none of the additional variables were found to be significant and because their inclusion needlessly complicates presentation of the results.

[14] For all analyses, sample size, parameters, and significance levels are identical to those in Oneal et al. (1996).

Table 1. "Constraint" versus "Preference" Based Models of the Democratic Peace, Involvement in Militarized Disputes, 1950–85, All Politically Relevant Dyads (Table 1, Oneal et al. 1996)

Dependent Variable: Disputes (Dichotomous, MIDs) Variable	I. (Eqn 1, Oneal)	Ia.	II. (Eqn 1a, Oneal)	IIa.
Interval Joint Democracy (Joinreg)	–0.00350 (0.00179)*	–0.00110 (0.00210)		
Dichotomous Joint Dem. (Democrat)			–1.73 (0.258)***	–1.16 (0.273)***
Economic Growth (Growth)	–0.117 (0.021)***	–0.097 (0.023)***	–0.093 (0.020)***	–0.080 (0.022)***
Joint Alliance Dummy (Allies)	–0.455 (0.098)***	0.0979 (0.117)	–0.332 (0.097)**	0.156 (0.115)
Contiguity Dummy (Contig)	1.28 (0.101)***	1.67 (0.122)***	1.17 (0.102)***	1.56 (0.124)***
Ratio of Mil. Capabilities (Capratio)	–0.00354 (0.00065)***	–0.00232 (0.00061)***	–0.00406 (0.00067)***	–0.00273 (0.00062)***
Economic Interdependence (Interdep)	–8.08 (1.87)***	–3.90 (1.80)*	–3.59 (1.74)**	–1.53 (1.75)
United Nations Affinity Score (Affinity)		–1.22 (0.142)***		–1.12 (0.143)***
Constant	–3.50 (0.091)***	–3.94 (0.110)***	–3.45 (0.091)***	–3.89 (0.110)***
Chi^2	464.54	463.68	573.91	517.47
P of Chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Log likelihood	–2513.7395	–1978.2024	–2524.689	–1990.8806
N	21377	18286	22575	19253

*$p < .05$, two-tailed test; **$p < .01$, two-tailed test; *** $p < .001$, two-tailed test. Values in parentheses ( ) are standard errors.

Comparison of Equations II and IIa shows a similar pattern to I and Ia except that Democrat, the dichotomous measure of democracy, remains highly significant even after the introduction of the affinity measure in Equation IIa. This is intriguing.[15] Oneal et al. report similar robustness for the dichotomous measure of democracy when assessing the effect of economic interdependence. Still, the affinity variable is highly significant in the expected direction. Affinity again appears to make interdependence insignificant.

Table 2 describes the logistic estimates of the same models in Table 1 on the contiguous dyads only (Oneal et al. 1996). Use of a sample of contiguous dyads may be a better test, as Oneal et al. note, because it controls for several factors relating to the opportunity for conflict. The results here are generally comparable to those in Table 1 with a few notable exceptions. The capability ratio in particular is no longer significant in any of the regressions. Of course, contiguity has been removed from the regression as it is completely determined. Interdependence is highly significant. The change in the relevance of economic interdependence may be an artifact of the presence or absence of the major powers. These states may be less vulnerable to economic action by potential antagonists and may bias the results in Table 1. Affinity is highly significant in both regressions. The ordinal measure of democracy (Joinreg) is not significant. Democrat, the dichotomous measure, remains highly significant; but it is less significant when the affinity index is introduced. The affinity index is capturing some of the effect that has previously been attributed to democratic institutions or culture. In three of four sets of regressions, democracy is either insignificant or less significant when the willingness measure is introduced.[16]

[15]One reviewer has suggested that the robustness of the dichotomous measure of democracy can be accounted for by theoretical arguments about democratic recognition or domestic audience costs (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Fearon 1994). I question the internal validity of these arguments (Gartzke 1997b). An alternative explanation for the robustness of the dichotomous measure is that wealthy nations (mostly democracies) are better able to signal their intentions through costly international linkages (Gartzke 1997c).

[16]As described in the discussion section, reported results could conceivably be due to multicollinearity or an instrumental variable problem. The origins of national preferences are difficult to identify, but the observed similarity in preferences between democracies could be caused by democracy itself. To check this, I examined a correlation matrix of all the variables in the study. None of the independent variables are highly correlated. Allies and Affinity show the greatest correlation of all independent variables at .48. Ordinal and dichotomous measures of democracy correlate with the affinity index at .18 and .36 respectively. The low level of correlation between independent variables is remarkable when one considers that factors like democracy are generally thought to coincide with growth and economic interdependence. Another potentially confounding item is simultaneity. Perhaps Affinity is really an instrumental variable for democracy? While conceivable, this surmise is not borne out by the correlation matrix. Nor is it demonstrated through the use of simultaneous equations. To assess the possibility of simultaneity, I ran a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) on

Table 2. "Constraint" versus "Preference" Based Models of the Democratic Peace, Involvement in Militarized Disputes, 1950–85, Contiguous Dyads Only (Table 3, Oneal et al. 1996)

Dependent Variable: Disputes (Dichotomous, MIDs) Variable	I. (Eqn 1, Oneal)	Ia.	II. (Eqn 1a, Oneal)	IIa.
Interval Joint Democracy (Joinreg)	–0.00259 (0.00221)	–0.00134 (0.00246)		
Dichotomous Joint Dem. (Democrat)			–1.60 (0.381)***	–1.01 (0.382)**
Economic Growth (Growth)	–0.149 (0.0235)***	–0.125 (0.0252)***	–0.127 (0.0225)***	–0.108 (0.0242)***
Joint Alliance Dummy (Allies)	–0.551 (0.108)***	–0.193 (0.127)	–0.478 (0.105)***	–0.138 (0.123)
Ratio of Mil. Capabilities (Capratio)	–0.00235 (0.00218)	–0.00210 (0.00229)	–0.00368 (0.00202)	–0.00350 (0.00223)
Economic Interdependence (Interdep)	–15.93 (3.16)***	–12.95 (3.43)***	–10.10 (3.14)**	–9.78 (3.47)**
United Nations Affinity Score (Affinity)		–0.811 (0.166)***		–0.814 (0.165)***
Constant	–2.07 (0.084)***	–2.09 (0.096)***	–2.11 (0.082)***	–2.13 (0.095)***
Chi^2	144.06	120.25	168.44	132.05
P of Chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Log likelihood	–1454.1452	–1256.9099	–1484.1771	–1275.9728
N	6928	6090	7217	6329

*$p < .05$, two-tailed test; **$p < .01$, two-tailed test; ***$p < .001$, two-tailed test. Values in parentheses ( ) are standard errors.

the willingness model, first regressing affinity on democracy and then using the residuals from that regression to predict disputes. Use of these residuals did not alter any of the reported significance levels. Nor did it notably change the coefficients estimated for the variables. This strongly suggests that Affinity is not a proxy for "democraticness." (Results of the two-stage regression are not reported since they do not differ substantively from those in Table 1 and Table 2.)

Conclusion

The results of the analysis and the replication of previous major studies allow for some interesting conclusions. National preferences clearly matter. The measure of affinity is highly significant in all tests, suggesting that an important contributor to the democratic peace has been missed in previous studies. Indeed, affinity is significant enough to displace or reduce the significance of indicators of democracy as an explanation for the democratic peace in three of the four statistical tests. The dichotomous measure of democracy remains highly significant, but this too is reduced in significance by the affinity index.

I have not gone far in unraveling causes for the democratic peace, but I hope that the direction chosen is thought provoking. Though it is clear that additional analysis is necessary, the findings presented here clearly question the sufficiency of constraint models of the democratic peace. Two fundamental problems remain. First, theoretical explanations for the observation of the democratic peace are unconvincing. Second, at the empirical level, little of the variance in overall conflict behavior is accounted for by any model of the democratic peace. These problems are undoubtedly linked. An important step in analyzing the democratic peace will be to begin with plausible models of conflict processes.

Nor is this a stale and purely academic argument. Though speculative, the policy implications are perhaps dramatic. If the democratic peace can be accounted for in part by the affinity of national preferences, then the end of the Cold War poses a challenge to the democratic peace. Gone are the days when the Western democracies were tied together by a common threat. Today, conflicting objectives seem to be multiplying. If a congruence of preferences is necessary for democracies not to fight, then we are entering an age of increasing danger for *pax democratus*. Further, the proliferation of democracies may be less promising for world peace than previously asserted. The findings presented here imply that the democratic peace will be less successful as a phenomenon in newer democracies that are more heterogeneous in culture, attitudes, and presumably preferences. There are many reasons to promote the spread of democratic government, but world peace may not be the result.

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