

DHE-1 Cryptosystem

Hybrid SPN-Fiestel Structure

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Problem with AES and DES

Linear Cryptanalysis

1. Build LAT for S-boxes
2. Find trails with maximum bias

Differential Cryptanalysis

1. Build DAT for S-boxes
2. Find trails with maximum propagation ratio


Issue

Static structure of rounds that enables the computation of weakest trails.


Cipher Structure

- Consists of 20 rounds
- Each round is either SPN type or Fiestel Type
- Round structures are determined by a function `rounds_structure()` using the input key
- Cipher can be customized easily by changing the `rounds_structure()` function
- Or, we can increase cipher to 148-bit security by using additional 20-bits for rounds rather than generating from the master key itself
- Inverted round structure is used during decryption


SPN Round



Fiestel Round




F-function




Block Cipher Mode of Operation

- Use Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) to encrypt multiple blocks



Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode encryption




Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode decryption

SBox Generation - Genetic Optimization

- Parameters Used:
 - Population Size = 200
 - Optimize population using best k from offspring generation, k=100
 - Mutation Probability = 0.4
 - No. of iterations = 100
- Crossover: Ordered crossover
- Mutation: Invert mapping of 2 random input values
- Fitness Function Used:
 n_i and nl_i are the rank (in terms of non-linearity) and non-linearity of i^{th} bit of SBox output

$$fitness \propto \sum_{n_i=1}^{len_of_sbox_op} n_i \times nl_i$$



SBox Generation - Genetic Optimization (contd.)

- Generated 16 8x8 invertible straight S-Boxes for SPN rounds
- Generated 16 6x4 non-invertible compression S-Boxes for Fiestel Rounds
- Highest dimensions generated were 8x8 S-Boxes as higher dimensions required much larger time to generate via Genetic Optimizations
- All S-Boxes generated are balanced
(crossover and mutation do not disturb balancedness)
- Optimized S-Boxes based on non-linearity of output bits
(see fitness function)

Diffusion Layer for SPN round

	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14	S15	S16
bit 1	1	114	99	84	69	54	39	24	9	122	107	92	77	62	47	32
bit 2	17	2	115	100	85	70	55	40	25	10	123	108	93	78	63	48
bit 3	33	18	3	116	101	86	71	56	41	26	11	124	109	94	79	64
bit 4	49	34	19	4	117	102	87	72	57	42	27	12	125	110	95	80
bit 5	65	50	35	20	5	118	103	88	73	58	43	28	13	126	111	96
bit 6	81	66	51	36	21	6	119	104	89	74	59	44	29	14	127	112
bit 7	97	82	67	52	37	22	7	120	105	90	75	60	45	30	15	128
bit 8	113	98	83	68	53	38	23	8	121	106	91	76	61	46	31	16


Diffusion Layer for Fiestel round

	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	S8	S9	S10	S11	S12	S13	S14	S15	S16
bit 1	1	50	35	20	5	54	39	24	9	58	43	28	13	62	47	32
bit 2	17	2	51	36	21	6	55	40	25	10	59	44	29	14	63	48
bit 3	33	18	3	52	37	22	7	56	41	26	11	60	45	30	15	64
bit 4	49	34	19	4	53	38	23	8	57	42	27	12	61	46	31	16

Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis

- Since the structure of cipher is dynamic, it was not possible to find trails for each possible structure.
- As a representative, we have analyzed trails for the structure where each round is SPN type. In general, our cipher would be 2^{20} times harder to break.
- Used a greedy algorithm to find weakest trails, as brute-force is not possible on this large search space
- Bias for weakest linear trail is $\approx 10^{-104}$ ($\approx 2^{-345}$)
- Propagation ratio for weakest differential trail is $\approx 10^{-43}$ ($\approx 2^{-140}$)

Execution Speed (including I/O time)



File Size (\log_2 file size in bytes)	Time Taken (in seconds)
6	0.000192
8	0.000216
10	0.000600
12	0.001765
14	0.007553
16	0.027721
18	0.108517
20	0.444569

Thank You!