

These slides are by courtesy of Prof. 李稻葵 and Prof. 郑捷.

# Chapter Twenty-Five

## Monopoly

# Pure Monopoly

- ❖ Previous chapters
  - An industry with price-taking producers
- ❖ This chapter
  - An industry with only one producer, i.e. **pure monopoly**
  - The producer is called the **monopolist**


# Pure Monopoly

- ❖ The monopolist is faced with the market demand curve.
- ❖ The monopolist is not a price-taker
  - It can change the market price  $p$  by adjusting its output level  $q$ .
- ❖ In this sense, we say that the monopolist has **market power**.

# Pure Monopoly

**\$/output unit**

**$p(y)$**



**Higher output  $y$  causes a lower market price**

**Inverse demand:  $p(y)$   
(Assume ordinary good)**

**Output Level,  $y$**

# Pure Monopoly

- ❖ Suppose that the monopolist seeks to maximize its profit,

$$\Pi(y) = p(y)y - c(y).$$

- ❖ What output level  $y^*$  maximizes profit?

# Profit-Maximization

$$\Pi(y) = p(y)y - c(y).$$

At the profit-maximizing output level  $y^*$

$$\frac{d\Pi(y)}{dy} = \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) - \frac{dc(y)}{dy} = 0$$

So at  $y = y^*$ , we have  $MR = MC$

$$\frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = \frac{dc(y)}{dy}.$$

# Marginal Revenue

Marginal revenue:

$$\mathbf{MR(y) = \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy} .}$$

Assuming  $dp(y)/dy < 0$ , we have

$$\mathbf{MR(y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy} < p(y)}$$

when  $y > 0$ .


# Marginal Revenue

E.g. if  $p(y) = a - by$  then

$$R(y) = p(y)y = ay - by^2$$

and so

$$MR(y) = a - 2by < a - by = p(y) \text{ for } y > 0.$$





# Marginal Cost


**Marginal cost:**

$$\mathbf{MC(y) = \frac{dc(y)}{dy} .}$$


**E.g. if  $c(y) = F + \alpha y + \beta y^2$  then**

$$\mathbf{MC(y) = \alpha + 2\beta y .}$$

# Marginal Cost



# Profit Maximized at $y^*$ or 0



# Recall Elasticity

$$\begin{aligned}\text{MR}(y) &= \frac{d}{dy}(p(y)y) = p(y) + y \frac{dp(y)}{dy} \\ &= p(y) \left[ 1 + \frac{y}{p(y)} \frac{dp(y)}{dy} \right] = p(y) \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon(y)} \right]\end{aligned}$$

where

$$\varepsilon(y) = \frac{p(y)}{y} \frac{dy}{dp(y)}$$

is the own-price elasticity of demand.

# Monopolistic Pricing & Elasticity

$$MR(y) = p(y) \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon(y)} \right]$$

Suppose the monopolist finds  $y^* > 0$  to be the optimal quantity. We must have

$MR(y^*) = MC(y^*)$ , i.e.

$$p(y^*) \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon(y^*)} \right] = c'(y^*)$$

# Monopolistic Pricing & Elasticity

Rearrange the terms, we have:

$$p(y^*) = \frac{c'(y^*)}{1 + \varepsilon(y^*)^{-1}}$$

- ❖ Because  $\varepsilon(y^*) < 0$ , we have  $p(y^*) > c'(y^*)$ .
- ❖ That is, the monopolist's optimal pricing specifies  $p > MC$ .
- ❖ Recall that price-taker assumption implies  $p = MC$ .

# Monopolistic Pricing & Elasticity

- ❖ In addition, note that the monopolist never chooses to produce at a level  $y$  with  $|\epsilon(y)| \leq 1$ .
  - At such  $y$ , we must have  $MR(y) \leq 0 < MC(y)$ , and so decreasing  $y$  a little will increase the profit.
- ❖ “A monopolist never produces at a quantity at which market demand is inelastic.”

# Markup

❖ **Markup**: price – MC

❖ **Markup size**:

$$\begin{aligned} p(y^*) - c'(y^*) &= \frac{c'(y^*)}{1 + \varepsilon(y^*)^{-1}} - c'(y^*) \\ &= \frac{c'(y^*)}{|\varepsilon(y^*)| - 1} \end{aligned}$$

❖ **Markup percentage**

$$\frac{p(y^*) - c'(y^*)}{c'(y^*)} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilon(y^*)| - 1}$$

❖ **Lower demand elasticity is associated with higher markup.**




# A Profits Tax Levied on a Monopoly

- ❖ A profits tax levied at rate  $t$  reduces profit from  $\Pi(y^*)$  to  $(1-t)\Pi(y^*)$ .
- ❖ What is the impact of  $t$  on  $y^*$ ?
- ❖ Zero impact
  - So we say that the profits tax is a **neutral tax**.


# Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist

- ❖ A quantity tax of \$ $t$ /output unit raises the marginal cost of production by \$ $t$ .
- ❖ The quantity tax is **distortionary**.

# Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist



# Quantity Tax Levied on a Monopolist




# The Inefficiency of Monopoly

- ❖ Recall the notion of **Pareto efficient**:
  - No Pareto improvement

# The Inefficiency of Monopoly


\$/output unit

The efficient output level  $y^e$  satisfies  $p(y) = MC(y)$ .




# The Inefficiency of Monopoly

\$/output unit




# The Inefficiency of Monopoly






# The Inefficiency of Monopoly




# The Inefficiency of Monopoly



# The Inefficiency of Monopoly


\$/output unit



$MC(y^*+\epsilon) < p(y^*+\epsilon)$ , so producing an additional  $\epsilon$  amount of output will be a Pareto improvement.

# The Inefficiency of Monopoly


\$/output unit



Not efficient. Efficiency loss is measured by the area of the triangle.  
(**Deadweight loss**)

# The Inefficiency of Monopoly

The monopolist produces less than the efficient quantity, making the market price exceed the efficient market price.



# Why Are There Monopolists?


- ❖ **Product differentiation**
  - **Varian 26.8-10**
- ❖ **Entry barriers**
  - **patents, licenses, etc.**
  - **High quasi-fixed cost, or high marginal cost at the beginning (natural monopoly)**

# Natural Monopoly

- ❖ A natural monopoly arises when the firm's technology has increasing returns to scale to some large extent s.t.
  - AC is decreasing within the range of market demand.
  - Or equivalently,  $MC < AC$

# Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit






# Inefficiency of Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit

Monopoly  $y^*$ :  $MR(y) = MC(y)$   
Efficient  $y^e$ :  $p(y) = MC(y)$



# Regulating a Natural Monopolist

- ❖ What if the government require the monopolist to set  $p = p^e$  to restore efficiency?
- ❖ The monopolist will get negative profit.
  - It will quit.

# Regulating a Natural Monopoly

\$/output unit

$AC(y^e) > p(y^e)$   
so the firm makes a loss.

