

ANSI X9.82, Part 3 DRBGs

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Changes

- Section 7: Functional Requirements modified in accordance with Part 1 changes
 - Removed top-level security requirements (now defined as properties in Part 1)
 - Entropy source → entropy input
- Section 8.2: DRBG Boundary
 - Figures use generic DRBG rather than SHA1_Hash_DRBG

Changes (contd.)

- Section 8.3: Added discussion and figure re the relationship between an instantiation and an instance
- Section 8.4: Seeds
 - Added discussion re seed construction: $\text{seed} = \text{df}(\text{entropy_bits}, \text{personalization_string})$
 - Seed entropy: $\text{entropy} \geq \max(128, \text{strength})$
 - Seed size: depends on the DRBG

Changes (contd.)

- Section 8.5: Keys
 - Key entropy: $\text{entropy} \geq \max(128, \text{strength})$
 - Removed text re keys from an external source
 - Added text re entropy source for a key (i.e., the seed) and key secrecy
 - Key separation: reworded to account for other changes in the section
- Section 8.7: Prediction and Backtracking Resistance
 - Additional text and a figure for explanation of the concepts
 - Goal: backtracking resistance for all DRBGs

Changes (contd.)

- Section 9.2: Effective security strength, etc.
 - `min_entropy` = max (128, strength)
- Section 9.4 and 95: Used different examples
- Section 9.6.1: Instantiation call
 - Removed backward secrecy flag, collision flag and seed as input
 - Added prediction resistance capability request flag and personalization string as inputs

Changes (contd.)

- Section 9.7: Reseeding
 - Combined two reseed functions into one function
 - Usage class is only input parameter
- Section 9.8.2: Generating Pseudorandom Bits
 - Removed collision flag and backward secrecy flag
 - Added prediction resistance flag

Changes (contd.)

- Section 9.9: Inserting Additional Entropy Between Requests
 - Added request sufficient entropy and always update flags
- Section 10: DRBG Specifications
 - Removed SHA1_Hash_DRBG (not desirable for new implementations), Keyed_Hash_DRBG (may be replaced) and 3BlockCipher_DRBG (not desirable)
 - New proposed DRBGs being analyzed

Changes (contd.)

- Section 10.1.2: Hash_DRBG
 - May be replaced or modified; does not provide backtracking resistance
 - Revised to indicate how the personalization string and prediction resistance capability could be used
- Section 10.3.2: Dual_EC_DRBG
 - New specifications
 - To be done: revise method of using the prediction resistance capability; use personalization string

Changes (contd.)

- Section 10.3.3: msDRBG
 - DRBG specified like other DRBGs
 - To be done: revise method of using the prediction resistance capability; use personalization string

Issues

- Allow DRBGs implementations w/o derivation functions when entropy source supports full entropy?
- Instantiation: require *min_entropy* = max (128, *strength*) or require *min_entropy* = *strength* + 64?
- Hash_DRBG: Retain as is, fix, or remove?
- Get_additional_input (as opposed to Get_entropy):
 - Purpose?
 - Entropy requirement?
 - Personalization?

Schedule

- Next draft available early to mid May?
- Written comments by late May?
- Discussion at Toronto Meeting (June 8-11)
- RNG Workshop at NIST (July 19-22)
 - Post draft standard by late June?

