

### 10.1.3 KHF\_DRBG

#### 10.1.3.1 Discussion

**KHF\_DRBG** specifies multiple uses of some Approved hash function. The same Approved hash function **shall** be used throughout. The hash function used **shall** meet or exceed the security requirements of the consuming application. Table 1 in Section 10.1.1 specifies the entropy and seed length requirements that **shall** be used for each hash function in order to meet a specified security level.

**KHF\_DRBG (...)** is specified using two internal functions: **KHF (...)** and **Update (...)**. Both are called during the instantiation, pseudorandom bit generation and reseeding processes to adjust the state.

#### 10.1.3.2 Interaction with KHF\_DRBG

##### 10.1.3.2.1 Instantiating KHF\_DRBG (...)

Prior to the first request for pseudorandom bits, the **KHF\_DRBG (...)** **shall** be instantiated using the following call:

*(status, usage\_class) = Instantiate\_KHF\_DRBG (requested\_strength,  
prediction\_resistance\_flag, personalization\_string, mode)*

as described in Sections 9.6.1 and 10.1.3.3.3.

##### 10.1.3.2.2 Reseeding a KHF\_DRBG (...) Instantiation

When a **KHF\_DRBG (...)** instantiation requires reseeding, the DRBG **shall** be reseeded using the following call:

*status = Reseed\_KHF\_DRBG\_Instantiation (usage\_class, mode)*

as described in Sections 9.7.2 and 10.1.3.3.4.

##### 10.1.3.2.3 Generating Pseudorandom Bits Using KHF\_DRBG (...)

An application may request the generation of pseudorandom bits by **KHF\_DRBG (...)** using the following call:

*(status, pseudorandom\_bits) = KHF\_DRBG (usage\_class, requested\_no\_of\_bits,  
requested\_strength, additional\_input, prediction\_resistance\_requested, mode)*

as discussed in Sections 9.8.2 10.1.3.3.5.

##### 10.1.3.2.4 Removing a KHF\_DRBG (...) Instantiation

An application may request the removal of a **KHF\_DRBG (...)** instantiation using the following call:

*status = Uninstantiate\_KHF\_DRBG (usage\_class)*

as described in Sections 9.X.X and 10.1.3.3.6.

#### 10.1.3.2.5 Self Testing of the KHF\_DRBG (...) Process

A **KHF\_DRBG (...)** implementation is tested at power-up and on demand using the following call:

*status* = **Self\_Test\_KHF\_DRBG** ( )

as described in Sections 9.9 and 10.1.3.3.7.

#### 10.1.3.3 Specifications

##### 10.1.3.3.1 General

The instantiation and reseeding of **KHF\_DRBG (...)** consists of obtaining a *seed* with the appropriate amount of entropy. The entropy input is used to derive a *seed*, which is then used to derive elements of the initial *state*. The *state* consists of:

1. The value *V*, which is updated each time another *outlen* bits of output are produced (where *outlen* is the number of output bits from the underlying hash function).
2. The values *K<sub>0</sub>* and *K<sub>1</sub>*, which are updated at least once each time the DRBG generates pseudorandom bits.
3. The security *strength* of the DRBG instantiation.
4. A counter (*ctr*) that indicates the number of updates of *V* since new *entropy\_input* was obtained whose entropy meets or exceeds the entropy requirement for the security *strength*.
5. A *prediction\_resistance\_flag* that indicates whether or not a prediction resistance capability is required for the DRBG.
6. (Optional) A transformation of the *entropy\_input* using a one-way function for later comparison with new *entropy\_input* when the DRBG is reseeded or prediction resistance is requested; this value **shall** be present if the DRBG will potentially be reseeded or a prediction resistance capability is required for the instantiation.

The variables used in the description of **KHF\_DRBG (...)** are:

<i>additional_input</i>	Optional additional input.
<b>ceiling</b> ( <i>x</i> )	A function returning the smallest integer <i>n</i> such that $n \geq x$ .
<i>ctr</i>	A counter that records the number of times that the <i>state</i> has been updated since the DRBG instantiation was seeded, reseeded or prediction resistance was obtained.
<i>entropy_input</i>	The bits containing entropy that are used to determine the <i>seed_material</i> .
<b>Find_state_space</b> ( <i>mode</i> )	A function that returns a <i>usage_class</i> indicating an available state space. The <i>mode</i> indicates whether the request is made during normal operation or during

testing.

**Get\_entropy** (*min\_entropy*, *outlen*,  $2^{32}$ , *mode*)

A function that acquires a string of bits from an entropy input source. *min\_entropy* indicates the minimum amount of entropy to be provided in the returned bits; *outlen* indicates the minimum number of bits to return;  $2^{32}$  indicates the maximum number of bits that may be returned; *mode* is used to indicate whether the bits are to be obtained during normal operation or during testing. See Section 9.6.2.

$K_0, K_1$

Values in the state that are updated when the DRBG generates pseudorandom bits.

**len(string)**

A function returning the number of bytes in a string.

*M*

The number of bytes in the hash function input block.

*max\_no\_of\_states*

The maximum number of states and instantiations that an implementation can handle.

*max\_updates*

The maximum number of *state* updates allowed for the DRBG instantiation from one seeding, reseeding or prediction resistance operation.

*min\_entropy*

The minimum amount of entropy to be provided in the *entropy\_input*.

*mode*

An indication of whether a process is to be conducted for normal operations or for testing. *mode* = 1 = *Normal\_operation* indicates that normal operation is required; *mode* = 2 = *Fixed\_1* indicates that a predetermined value is to be used during instantiation, *mode* = 3 = *Fixed\_2* indicates that a predetermined value is to be used during reseeding, *mode* = 4 = *Failure* indicates that a failure indication is to be returned.

*N*

The number of bytes in the hash function output block.

*old\_transformed\_entropy\_input*

The *transformed\_entropy\_input* from the previous acquisition of *entropy\_input* (e.g., used during reseeding).

*outlen*

The number of bits in the hash function output block.

*Pad\_0*, *Pad\_1*

Zero padding used by the **KHF (...)** function.

*Padded\_K<sub>0</sub>*

$K_0$  padded with zeros to create *M* bytes.

*Padded\_V*

*V* padded with zeros to create *M* – 9 bytes.

*personalization\_string*

A string that may be used to personalize a DRBG instantiation.

<i>prediction_resistance_flag</i>	Indicates whether or not prediction resistance is to be provided upon request during an instantiation. 1 = <i>Allow_prediction_resistance</i> : requests for prediction resistance will be handled; 0 = <i>No_prediction_resistance</i> : requests for prediction resistance will return an error indication.
<i>prediction_resistance_requested</i>	Indicates whether or not prediction resistance is required during the actual generation of pseudorandom bits. 1 = <i>Provide_prediction_resistance</i> : prediction resistance required; 0 = <i>No_prediction_resistance</i> : prediction resistance not required.
<i>pseudorandom_bits</i>	The string of <i>pseudorandom_bits</i> that are generated during a single “call” to the <b>KHF_DRBG (...)</b> process.
<i>requested_no_of_bits</i>	The number of pseudorandom bits to be generated.
<i>requested_strength</i>	The security strength to be provided for the pseudorandom bits to be obtained from the DRBG.
<i>seed_material</i>	The data used as the <i>seed</i> .
<i>state(usage_class)</i>	An array of <i>states</i> for different DRBG instantiations. A <i>state</i> is carried between calls to the DRBG. In the following specifications, the state for a <i>usage_class</i> is defined as $state(usage\_class) = \{V, K_0, K_1, strength, ctr, prediction\_resistance\_flag, transformed\_entropy\_input\}$ . A particular element of the <i>state</i> is specified as <i>state(usage_class).element</i> ; e.g., <i>state(usage_class).V</i> .
<i>status</i>	The status returned from a function call, where <i>status</i> = “Success” or an indication of failure. Failure messages are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Invalid <i>requested_strength</i>.</li> <li>2. Cannot support prediction resistance.</li> <li>3. No available <i>state</i> space.</li> <li>4. Failure indication returned by the <i>entropy_input</i> source.</li> <li>5. State not available for the indicated <i>usage_class</i>.</li> <li>6. <i>Entropy_input</i> source failure.</li> <li>7. KHF_DRBG can no longer be used. Please re-instantiate or reseed.</li> <li>8. Too many bits requested.</li> <li>9. Prediction resistance capability not instantiated.</li> </ol>



<i>strength</i>	10. Input too long. The security strength provided by the DRBG instantiation.
<i>temp</i>	A temporary value.
<i>transformed_entropy_input</i>	A one-way transformation of the <i>entropy_input</i> for the DRBG.
<i>usage_class</i>	The usage class of a DRBG instantiation. Used as a pointer to an instantiation's <i>state</i> values.
<i>V</i>	A value in the <i>state</i> that is updated whenever pseudorandom bits are generated.

### 10.1.3.3.2 Internal Functions

#### 10.1.3.3.2.1 The KHF Function

The KHF (...) function is used as a compression function and to distribute the effect of the bits in the input values across the entire output string. Let  $N$  be the number of bytes of output from the hash function, and  $M$  be the number of bytes of input into the hash function.

**Comment [barker1]:** Is this correct?

**KHF(...):**

**Input:** string ( $K_0, K_1, V$ ).

**Output:** string  $V$ .

**Process:**

1.  $Pad\_0 = 0x00\ 00\dots00$ .  
Comment:  $M - N$  bytes of zeros.
2.  $Pad\_1 = 0x00\ 00\dots00$ .  
Comment:  $M - N - 9$  bytes of zeros.
3.  $Padded\_K_0 = K_0 \parallel Pad\_0$ .  
Comment: Since  $K_0$  is  $N$  bytes in length,  $Padded\_K_0$  is  $M$  bytes long.
4.  $Padded\_V = V \parallel Pad\_1$ .  
Comment: Since  $V$  is  $N$  bytes in length,  $Padded\_V$  is  $M-9$  bytes long.
5.  $temp = Padded\_V \oplus K_1$ .
6.  $V = \text{Hash}(Padded\_K_0 \parallel temp)$ .
7. **Return** ( $V$ ).

#### 10.1.3.3.2.2 The Update Function

The **Update (...)** function updates the internal *state* of the **KHF DRBG (...)** using the *seed\_material*. The *seed\_material* can be any input string of  $2^{32}$  bytes or less, including the Null string. **Update (...)** makes extensive use of both the **KHF (...)** and the **hash\_df (...)** functions described in Sections 10.2.3.2.1 and 9.6.4.2, respectively. Let  $N$  be the output length of the hash function in bytes, and let  $M$  be the input length in bytes.

**Comment [barker2]:** How about calling this the Update function, rather than the Update function?

**Update (...):**

**Input:** string (*seed\_material*,  $K_0, K_1, V$ ).

**Output:** string ( $K_0$ ,  $K_1$ ,  $V$ ).

**Process:**

1.  $temp$  = the Null string.
2. While (**len** ( $temp$ ) <  $N + M - 9$ ) do:
  - 2.1  $V = \mathbf{KHF} (K_0, K_1, V)$ .
  - 2.2  $temp = temp \parallel V$ .
3.  $temp$  = The rightmost (least significant)  $N+M-9$  bytes of  $temp$ .
4.  $temp = temp \oplus \mathbf{hash\_df} (seed\_material, 8 \times (N + M - 9))$ .
5.  $K_0$  = The rightmost  $N$  bytes of  $temp$ .
6.  $K_1$  = The leftmost  $M-9$  bytes of  $temp$ .
7.  $V = \mathbf{KHF} (K_0, K_1, V)$ .
8. **Return** ( $K_0$ ,  $K_1$ ,  $V$ ).

#### 10.1.3.3.3 Instantiation of **KHF\_DRBG**(...)

The following process or its equivalent **shall** be used to initially instantiate the **KHF\_DRBG** (...) process. Let **Hash** (...) be the Approved hash function to be used. Let  $outlen$  be the output length of that hash function in bits, and let  $N$  be the output length of the hash function in bytes. Let  $M$  be the input length of the hash function in bytes.

**Instantiate\_KHF\_DRBG** (...):

**Input:** integer ( $requested\_strength$ ,  $prediction\_resistance\_flag$ ,  $personalization\_string$ ,  $mode$ ).

**Output:** string  $status$ , integer  $usage\_class$ .

**Process:**

1. If ( $requested\_strength >$  the maximum security  $strength$  that can be provided by the hash function (see Table 1)), then **Return** ("Invalid  $requested\_strength$ ", 0).
2. If ( $prediction\_resistance\_flag = Allow\_prediction\_resistance$ ) and prediction resistance cannot be supported, then **Return** ("Cannot support prediction resistance", 0).
3. If (**len**( $personalization\_string$ ) >  $2^{32}$ ), then **Return**("Input too long.")  
Comment: Find state space.
4. ( $status$ ,  $usage\_class$ ) = **Find\_state\_space** ( $mode$ ).
5. If ( $status =$  "Failure"), then **Return** ("No available state space", 0).  
Comment: Set the  $strength$  to one of the five security strengths.
6. If ( $requested\_strength \leq 80$ ), then  $strength = 80$   
Else if ( $requested\_strength \leq 112$ ), then  $strength = 112$

Else ( $requested\_strength \leq 128$ ), then  $strength = 128$

Else ( $requested\_strength \leq 192$ ), then  $strength = 192$

Else  $strength = 256$ .

Comment: Get the *entropy\_input*.

7.  $min\_entropy = \max(128, strength)$ .

8.  $(status, entropy\_input) = \text{Get\_entropy}(min\_entropy, outlen, 2^{32}, mode)$ .

9. If ( $status = \text{"Failure"}$ ), then **Return** ("Failure indication returned by the entropy source", 0).

Comment: Perform a one-way function on the *entropy\_input* for later comparison during reseeding.

10.  $transformed\_entropy\_input = \text{Hash}(entropy\_input)$ .

Comment: Set up the working values.

11.  $K_0 = 0x00\ 00\dots00$ .

Comment:  $N$  bytes of zeroes.

12.  $K_1 = 0x01\ 01\dots01$ .

Comment:  $M - 9$  bytes of ones.

13.  $V = 0x02\ 02\dots02$ .

Comment:  $N$  bytes of twos.

14.  $seed\_material = entropy\_input \parallel personalization\_string$ .

15.  $ctr = 0$ .

16.  $(K_0, K_1, V) = \text{Update}(seed\_material, K_0, K_1, V)$ .

Comment: Set up the state.

17.  $state(usage\_class) = \{V, K_0, K_1, strength, ctr, prediction\_resistance\_flag, transformed\_entropy\_input\}$ .

18. **Return** ("Success",  $usage\_class$ ).

If an implementation does not handle all five security strengths, then step 5 must be modified accordingly.

If no *personalization\_string* will ever be provided, then the *personalization\_string* parameter in the input may be omitted, and step 13 becomes  $seed\_material = entropy\_input$ .

If an implementation will never be reseeded using the process specified in Section 10.1.3.3.4, then step 9 may be omitted, as well as the *transformed\_entropy\_input* in the *state* (see step 16).

If an implementation does not need the *prediction\_resistance\_flag* as a calling parameter (i.e., the **KHF\_DRBG** (...) routine in Section 10.1.2.3.5 either always or never acquires new entropy in step 7), then the *prediction\_resistance\_flag* in the calling parameters and in the *state* (see step 16) may be omitted, as well as omitting step 2.

#### 10.1.3.3.4 Reseeding a KHF\_DRBG(...) Instantiation

The following or an equivalent process **shall** be used to explicitly reseed the **KHF\_DRBG (...)** process. Let **Hash (...)** be the Approved hash function to be used; let *outlen* be the output length of that hash function in bits, and let *N* be the output length of the hash function in bytes. Let *M* be the input length of the hash function in bytes.

##### **Reseed\_KHF\_DRBG\_Instantiation (...):**

**Input:** integer (*usage\_class*, *mode*).

**Output:** string *status*.

##### **Process:**

1. If  $((usage\_class > max\_no\_of\_states) \text{ or } (state(usage\_class)) = \{Null, Null, Null, 0, 0, 0, Null\})$ , then **Return** ("State not available for the indicated *usage\_class*").

Comment: Get the appropriate *state* values for the indicated *usage\_class*.

2.  $V = state(usage\_class).V$ ,  $K_0 = state(usage\_class).K_0$ ,  $K_1 = state(usage\_class).K_1$ ,  $strength = state(usage\_class).strength$ ,  $prediction\_resistance\_flag = state(usage\_class).prediction\_resistance\_flag$ ,  $old\_transformed\_entropy\_input = state(usage\_class).transformed\_entropy\_input$ .

Comment: Get the new *entropy\_input*.

3.  $min\_entropy = \max(128, strength)$ .
4.  $(status, entropy\_input) = \text{Get\_entropy}(min\_entropy, outlen, 2^{32}, mode)$ .
5. If  $(status = "Failure")$ , then **Return** ("Failure indication returned by the *entropy\_input* source").

Comment: Compare the old *entropy\_input* with the new *entropy\_input*.

6.  $transformed\_entropy\_input = \text{Hash}(entropy\_input)$ .
7. If  $(transformed\_entropy\_input = old\_transformed\_entropy\_input)$ , then **Return** ("Entropy\_input source failure").

Comment: Set up the new working values.

8.  $ctr = 0$ .
9.  $(K_0, K_1, V) = \text{Update}(entropy\_input, K_0, K_1, V)$ .

Comment: Set the state values.

10.  $state(usage\_class) = \{V, K_0, K_1, strength, ctr, prediction\_resistance\_flag, transformed\_entropy\_input\}$ .



10. **Return** ("Success").

#### 10.1.3.3.5 Generating Pseudorandom Bits Using KHF\_DRBG (...)

The following process or an equivalent **shall** be used to generate pseudorandom bits:

**KHF\_DRBG(...):**

**Input:** integer (*usage\_class*, *requested\_no\_of\_bits*, *requested\_strength*, *additional\_input*, *prediction\_resistance\_requested*, *mode*).

**Output:** string (*status*, *pseudorandom\_bits*).

**Process:**

1. If ((*usage\_class* > *max\_no\_of\_states*) or (*state(usage\_class)*) = {Null, Null, Null, 0, 0, 0, Null}), then **Return** ("State not available for the indicated *usage\_class*", Null).

Comment: Get the appropriate *state* values for the indicated *usage\_class*.

2.  $V = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).V$ ,  $K_0 = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).K_0$ ,  $K_1 = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).K_1$ ,  $\text{strength} = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).\text{strength}$ ,  $\text{ctr} = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).\text{ctr}$ ,  $\text{prediction\_resistance\_flag} = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).\text{prediction\_resistance\_flag}$ ,  $\text{old\_transformed\_entropy\_bits} = \text{state}(\text{usage\_class}).\text{transformed\_entropy\_bits}$ .

Comment: If  $\text{ctr} \geq \text{max\_updates}$ , then reseeding could not be done in step 14 (below) during the previous call because of no available entropy source.

3. If (*requested\_strength* > *strength*), then **Return** ("Invalid *requested\_strength*", Null).
4. If (*requested\_no\_of\_bits* >  $2^{35}$ ), then **Return** ("Too many bits requested", Null).
5. If ( $\text{len}(\text{additional\_input}) > 2^{32}$ ), then **Return** ("Input too long.")
6. If ((*prediction\_resistance\_requested* = *Provide\_prediction\_resistance*) and (*prediction\_resistance\_flag* = *No\_prediction\_resistance*)), then **Return** ("Prediction resistance capability not instantiated", Null).
7. If (*prediction\_resistance\_requested* = *Provide\_prediction\_resistance*), then
  - 7.1  $\text{min\_entropy} = \text{max}(128, \text{strength})$ .
  - 7.2 (*status*, *entropy\_bits*) = **Get\_entropy** (*min\_entropy*, *outlen*,  $2^{32}$ , *mode*).
  - 7.3 If (*status* = "Failure"), then **Return** ("Failure indication returned by the *entropy\_input* source", Null).
  - 7.4  $\text{transformed\_entropy\_input} = \text{Hash}(\text{entropy\_input})$ .

- 7.5 If (*transformed\_entropy\_input* = *old\_transformed\_entropy\_input*), then **Return** (“Entropy\_input source failure”, Null).
- 7.6 *ctr* = 0.
- Else
  - 7.7 *entropy\_input* = Null.
8. *seed\_material* = *entropy\_input* || *additional\_input*.
9. If (*seed\_material* ≠ Null), then (*K*<sub>0</sub>, *K*<sub>1</sub>, *V*) = **Update** (*seed\_material*, *K*<sub>0</sub>, *K*<sub>1</sub>, *V*).
10. If (*ctr* ≥ *max\_updates*), then
  - 10.1 *status* = **Reseed\_KHF\_DRBG** (*usage\_class*, *mode*).
  - 10.2 If (*status* ≠ “Success”), then **Return** (*status*, Null).
- Else
  - 10.3 **Return** (“KHF\_DRBG can no longer be used. Please re-instantiate or reseed.”, Null).
11. *temp* = Null.
12. While (**len** (*temp*) < **ceiling**(*requested\_no\_of\_bits*/8)) do:
  - 12.1 *V* = **KHF** (*K*<sub>0</sub>, *K*<sub>1</sub>, *V*).
  - 12.2 *temp* = *temp* || *V*.
13. *pseudorandom\_bits* = Leftmost (*requested\_no\_of\_bits*) of *temp*.
14. (*K*<sub>0</sub>, *K*<sub>1</sub>, *V*) = **Update** (*seed\_material*, *K*<sub>0</sub>, *K*<sub>1</sub>, *V*).
15. *ctr* = *ctr* + 1
16. *state*(*usage\_class*) = {*V*, *K*<sub>0</sub>, *K*<sub>1</sub>, *strength*, *ctr*, *prediction\_resistance\_flag*, *transformed\_entropy\_bits*}.
17. **Return** (“Success”, *pseudorandom\_bits*).

If an implementation will never provide *additional\_input*, then the *additional\_input* input parameter may be omitted, and step 8 becomes *seed\_material* = *entropy\_input*.

If an implementation does not need the *prediction\_resistance\_flag*, then the *prediction\_resistance\_flag* may be omitted as an input parameter, and step 6 may be omitted. If prediction resistance is never used, then step 7 becomes *entropy\_input* = Null.

If an implementation does not have a reseeding capability, then step 14 is omitted, and step 3 takes effect during the next call to the DRBG.

#### 10.1.3.3.6 Removing a KHF\_DRBG (...) Instantiation

The following or an equivalent process **shall** be used to remove a **KHF\_DRBG** (...) instantiation:

##### **Uninstantiate\_KHF\_DRBG (...):**

**Input:** integer *usage\_class*.

**Output:** string *status*.

**Process:**

1. If (*usage\_class* > *max\_no\_of\_states*), then **Return** ("Invalid *usage\_class*").
2. *state(usage\_class)* = {Null, Null, Null, 0, 0, 0, Null}.
3. **Return** ("Success").

#### 10.1.3.3.7 Self Testing of the KHF\_DRBG (...)

[To be added later]

#### 10.1.3.4 Generator Strength and Attributes

#### 10.1.3.5 Reseeding and Optional Input

If an application has a slow source of entropy, such as keystroke timings, it **should** accumulate the entropy until it estimates that it has N bits, and then feed all the entropy into the DRBG as a single optional input. This will permit the DRBG to recover from any compromise.

**Comment [barker3]:** This is a general statement that should be place, say, in Section 9.6.2.