




# MALWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING

## WANNACRY

# WHAT IS IT?

















# BUT WHY?

- Understanding the adversary
- Spotting indicators of compromise (IOCs)
- Responding to an incident
- Understanding intangible warfare



# MALWARE ANALYSIS



- **Basic Static Analysis** - Limited tools and looking at the sample when it is not running.
- **Basic Dynamic Analysis** - Executing the sample and collect basic information.



# WHAT DO I NEED?

- FlareVM – Specialized Windows Reverse Engineering VM
- REMnux - Specialized Linux Reverse Engineering VM
- MITRE ATT&CK – A framework to show how cyber attacks happen
- Windows API – The different functions that make Windows Work

# MALWARE SAFETY





# MALWARE SAFETY

```
Administrator: Command Prom...  
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.2006]  
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.  
  
FLARE-VM Thu 04/11/2024 17:56:46.84  
C:\Users\Admin1\Desktop>ping google.com  
Ping request could not find host google.com. Please check the name and try again.  
  
FLARE-VM Thu 04/11/2024 17:56:52.51  
C:\Users\Admin1\Desktop>ping 8.8.8.8  
  
Pinging 8.8.8.8 with 32 bytes of data:  
PING: transmit failed. General failure.  
PING: transmit failed. General failure.  
PING: transmit failed. General failure.  
PING: transmit failed. General failure.  
  
Ping statistics for 8.8.8.8:  
    Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 0, Lost = 4 (100% loss),  
  
FLARE-VM Thu 04/11/2024 17:56:58.56  
C:\Users\Admin1\Desktop>
```

The background is a dark, futuristic digital environment. It features vertical columns of glowing red binary code (0s and 1s) that appear to be falling or streaming down. In the center, there are two concentric, glowing red arcs that resemble a stylized 'C' or a portal. Below these arcs, a bright, circular light source emanates from a platform, casting a strong glow. The overall aesthetic is high-tech and cybernetic, with a color palette dominated by deep reds and blacks.

**TIME TO START!**





## Ooops, your files have been encrypted!

English

### Payment will be raised on

4/15/2024 12:33:43

Time Left

02:23:54:37

### Your files will be lost on

4/19/2024 12:33:43

Time Left

06:23:54:37

[About bitcoin](#)[How to buy bitcoins?](#)[Contact Us](#)

### What Happened to My Computer?

Your important files are encrypted.

Many of your documents, photos, videos, databases and other files are no longer accessible because they have been encrypted. Maybe you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but do not waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

### Can I Recover My Files?

Sure. We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. But you have not so enough time.

You can decrypt some of your files for free. Try now by clicking <Decrypt>.

But if you want to decrypt all your files, you need to pay.

You only have 3 days to submit the payment. After that the price will be doubled.

Also, if you don't pay in 7 days, you won't be able to recover your files forever.

We will have free events for users who are so poor that they couldn't pay in 6 months.

### How Do I Pay?

Payment is accepted in Bitcoin only. For more information, click <About bitcoin>.

Please check the current price of Bitcoin and buy some bitcoins. For more information, click <How to buy bitcoins>.

And send the correct amount to the address specified in this window.

After your payment, click <Check Payment>. Best time to check: 9:00am - 11:00am

CMT from Mondays to Friday



Send \$300 worth of bitcoin to this address:

115p7UMMngo1pMvKpHijcRdfJNXj6LrLn

[Copy](#)[Check Payment](#)[Decrypt](#)

# FILE HEADERS

PNG\_transparency\_demonstration\_1.png

```
1 1:PNG
2 SUB
3 NUL NUL NUL
4 IHDR NUL NUL ETX NUL NUL STXXE
5 7Žà|, DC1 SOH METX ~@M RçÛaîEM
6 äÿ' JŸrÓ SOH O×À÷/€éÑv{÷Â< /P½>
7 $MDC3×Ã6E×Ñ¹42ëÊ CAN -Ž... "E"
```

npp.8.6.4.Installer.x64.exe

```
1 MZ NUL ETX NUL NUL NUL EOT NUL NUL NUL
2
3 $ NUL NUL NUL NUL NUL NUL NUL 1BS éPfòé
4 fH CANDLE<
```

C:\Users\cyberlab\Downloads\npp.8.6.4.Installer.x64.zip - Notepad++

File Edit Search View Encoding Language Settings Tools Macro

npp.8.6.4.Installer.x64.zip

```
1 P& ETX EOT DC4 NUL NUL NUL BS NUL Q«< X ' õ× (H NUL CAN i I
2 ?RÀQHM@ùãÔ CAN Bœcð RS¹ÖÖ4"ø"s >Ûts ESC] Ýæ6 ·±}ØdS;¥
3 +_šqcøÎ& > · | òŽ - · | çäÖ [î%û"JÉÇn/ÛçB] rçÝ&KWûK>ñÉÛnÝ
4 SYN iú×WB' IESC' FS+ \C-$... DC1¹Â (IVEs>ÂN<Í | Ô"1 DC4ø
5 ý*fÍTnEÖ- ·"ìq& GSû CAN BÝû; xý EM ùýýi DEL δ×
6 G†×Eä1 SOH FF; uš×ÝÚ#ÊVTš=üiÂRL¹ÛS«Nl ué¹U/h¼δ#ÂET
```



# FLOSS

```
24  
25 !This program cannot be run in DOS mode.  
26 t4;lu#SV  
27 GetTickCount  
28 QueryPerformanceCounter  
29 QueryPerformanceFrequency
```

```
164 Wednesday  
165 !"#$$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~  
166 !"#$$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{|}~  
167 GetProcessWindowStation  
168 GetUserObjectInformationW  
169 GetLastActivePopup  
170 GetActiveWindow  
171 MessageBoxW  
172 !"#$$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~  
173 CloseHandle
```

# FLOSS

```
398 WriteFile
399 CreateFileA
400 CreateProcessA
401 http://www.iugerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
402 !This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
403 =j&&LZ661A??~
404 f""D~**T
```

```
550 icaccls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q
551 attrib +h .
552 WNCry@2017
553 GetNativeSystemInfo
554 .?AVexception@@
555 incompatible version
```



```
893 !"#%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~
894 !"#%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ{|}~
895 GetProcessWindowStation
896 GetUserObjectInformationW
897 GetLastActivePopup
898 GetActiveWindow
899 MessageBoxW
900 !"#%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~
901 CloseHandle
902 WriteFile
903 CreateFileA
904 SizeofResource
905 LockResource
906 LoadResource
907 FindResourceA
908 CreateProcessA
909 KERNEL32.dll
910 GetCurrentThreadId
911 FlsSetValue
912 GetCommandLineA
913 DecodePointer
914 UnhandledExceptionFilter
915 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter
916 IsDebuggerPresent
917 RtlVirtualUnwind
918 RtlLookupFunctionEntry
919 RtlCaptureContext
920 EncodePointer
921 TerminateProcess
```

```
286 MSVCP60.dll
287 GetPerAdapterInfo
288 GetAdaptersInfo
289 iphlapi.dll
290 InternetCloseHandle
291 InternetOpenUrlA
292 InternetOpenA
293 WININET.dll
294 _ftol
```

```
1685 GetWindowsDirectoryW
1686 GetFileAttributesA
1687 SizeofResource
1688 LockResource
1689 LoadResource
1690 FindResourceA
1691 Sleep
1692 OpenMutexA
1693 GetFullPathNameA
1694 CopyFileA
1695 GetModuleFileNameA
1696 VirtualAlloc
1697 VirtualFree
1698 FreeLibrary
1699 HeapAlloc
1700 GetProcessHeap
1701 GetModuleHandleA
1702 SetLastError
1703 VirtualProtect
1704 IsBadReadPtr
1705 HeapFree
1706 SystemTimeToFileTime
1707 LocalFileTimeToFileTime
1708 CreateDirectoryA
1709 KERNEL32.dll
1710 wsprintfA
1711 USER32.dll
1712 RegCloseKey
1713 RegQueryValueExA
1714 RegSetValueExA
1715 RegCreateKeyW
1716 CryptReleaseContext
1717 CreateServiceA
1718 CloseServiceHandle
1719 StartServiceA
1720 OpenServiceA
1721 OpenSCManagerA
```

# USING AI FOR MALWARE



## ChatGPT

Understanding the role of the Windows API functions listed in the FLOSS output can give deeper insight into the malware's behavior and its interaction with the Windows operating system. Here's an explanation of some of the key API functions and their relevance to the malware:

### File and Directory Management

- **`CreateFileA`, `ReadFile`, `WriteFile`**: These are fundamental for interacting with files. **`CreateFileA`** opens or creates a file, **`ReadFile`** reads data from an open file, and **`WriteFile`** writes data to an open file. Malware uses these to read from or write to files, potentially for data theft or to manipulate files (e.g., encryption by ransomware).
- **`DeleteFileW`, `MoveFileExW`**: These functions delete and move files, respectively, which can be used by malware to remove traces or rearrange files to confuse users or thwart analysis.
- **`CreateDirectoryA`, `CreateDirectoryW`**: Used to create a new directory, which can be part of setting up a location to store malicious files or logs.

### Process and Thread Management

- **`CreateProcessA`**: Launches a new process, which could be used to start another instance of the malware or another malicious process.
- **`TerminateProcess`**: Ends a process, potentially used to stop security software or other programs that could interfere with the malware's operations.
- **`WaitForSingleObject`**: Waits for a resource to become available. In malware, this could be used to synchronize events like waiting for a data decryption key.



# PESTUDIO

indicator (33)	detail	level
<u>file &gt; embedded</u>	signature: executable, location: .data, offset: 0x0000B020, size: 159744 (b...	1
<u>file &gt; embedded</u>	signature: executable, location: .data, offset: 0x0000F080, size: 5297524 (...)	1
<u>file &gt; embedded</u>	signature: executable, location: .rsrc, offset: 0x000320A4, size: 3514368 (...)	1
<u>file &gt; extension &gt; count</u>	159	1
<u>libraries &gt; flag</u>	Windows Socket Library	1
<u>libraries &gt; flag</u>	IP Helper API	1
<u>libraries &gt; flag</u>	Internet Extensions for Win32 Library	1
<u>imports &gt; flag</u>	28	1
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	2039 bytes	2
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	1403 bytes	2
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	2693 bytes	2
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	3926 bytes	2
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	1554 bytes	2
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	1430 bytes	2
<u>string &gt; size &gt; suspicious</u>	2988 bytes	2
<u>resource &gt; size</u>	R.1831, 3514368 bytes	2
<u>resources &gt; file-ratio</u>	94.41%	2
<u>file &gt; checksum</u>	0x00000000	2
<u>groups &gt; API</u>	synchronization   execution   file   resource   dynamic-library   memory  ...	2
<u>string &gt; URL</u>	http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com	2
<u>label &gt; mutex</u>	Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutex	2

# PESTUDIO

library (7)	duplicate (0)	flag (3)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	type (1)	imports (91)	group	description
<a href="#">WS2_32.dll</a>	-	x	0x0000A3C4	0x0000A144	implicit	<u>13</u>	network	Windows Socket Library
<a href="#">iphlpapi.dll</a>	-	x	0x0000A3FC	0x0000A17C	implicit	<u>2</u>	network	IP Helper API
<a href="#">WININET.dll</a>	-	x	0x0000A3B4	0x0000A134	implicit	<u>3</u>	network	Internet Extensions for Win32 Library
<a href="#">KERNEL32.dll</a>	-	-	0x0000A2B0	0x0000A030	implicit	<u>32</u>	-	Windows NT BASE API Client
<a href="#">ADVAPI32.dll</a>	-	-	0x0000A280	0x0000A000	implicit	<u>11</u>	-	Advanced Windows 32 Base API
<a href="#">MSVCP60.dll</a>	-	-	0x0000A334	0x0000A0B4	implicit	<u>2</u>	-	Windows C Runtime Library
<a href="#">MSVCRT.dll</a>	-	-	0x0000A340	0x0000A0C0	implicit	<u>28</u>	-	Microsoft C Runtime Library

# PESTUDIO

imports (91)	flag (28)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	hint	group (10)	technique (8)	type (6)	ordinal (1)	library (13)
<a href="#">StartServiceCtrlDispatcherA</a>	x	0x0000A6F6	0x0000A6F6	586 (0x024A)	services	-	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll
<a href="#">ChangeServiceConfig2A</a>	x	0x0000A6C0	0x0000A6C0	52 (0x0034)	services	T1569   System Services	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll
<a href="#">CreateServiceA</a>	x	0x0000A688	0x0000A688	100 (0x0064)	services	T1543   Create or Modify System Proc...	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll
<a href="#">QueryPerformanceFrequency</a>	x	0x0000A43A	0x0000A43A	676 (0x02A4)	reconnaissance	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
<a href="#">3 (closesocket)</a>	x	0x80000003	0x80000003	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">16 (recv)</a>	x	0x80000010	0x80000010	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">19 (send)</a>	x	0x80000013	0x80000013	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">8 (htonl)</a>	x	0x80000008	0x80000008	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">14 (ntohl)</a>	x	0x8000000E	0x8000000E	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">115 (WSAStartup)</a>	x	0x80000073	0x80000073	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">12 (inet_ntoa)</a>	x	0x8000000C	0x8000000C	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">10 (ioctlsocket)</a>	x	0x8000000A	0x8000000A	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">18 (select)</a>	x	0x80000012	0x80000012	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">9 (htons)</a>	x	0x80000009	0x80000009	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">23 (socket)</a>	x	0x80000017	0x80000017	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">4 (connect)</a>	x	0x80000004	0x80000004	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">11 (inet_addr)</a>	x	0x8000000B	0x8000000B	0 (0x0000)	network	-	implicit	x	WS2_32.dll
<a href="#">GetAdaptersInfo</a>	x	0x0000A792	0x0000A792	28 (0x001C)	network	-	implicit	-	iphlpapi.dll
<a href="#">InternetOpenA</a>	x	0x0000A7DC	0x0000A7DC	146 (0x0092)	network	-	implicit	-	WININET.dll
<a href="#">InternetOpenUrlA</a>	x	0x0000A7C8	0x0000A7C8	147 (0x0093)	network	-	implicit	-	WININET.dll
<a href="#">InternetCloseHandle</a>	x	0x0000A7B2	0x0000A7B2	105 (0x0069)	network	-	implicit	-	WININET.dll
<a href="#">MoveFileExA</a>	x	0x0000A576	0x0000A576	623 (0x026F)	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
<a href="#">GetCurrentThreadld</a>	x	0x0000A524	0x0000A524	326 (0x0146)	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
<a href="#">GetCurrentThread</a>	x	0x0000A53A	0x0000A53A	325 (0x0145)	execution	-	implicit	-	KERNEL32.dll
<a href="#">CryptGenRandom</a>	x	0x0000A650	0x0000A650	150 (0x0096)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll
<a href="#">CryptAcquireContextA</a>	x	0x0000A638	0x0000A638	133 (0x0085)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	ADVAPI32.dll
<a href="#">rand</a>	x	0x0000A824	0x0000A824	678 (0x02A6)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll
<a href="#">srand</a>	x	0x0000A852	0x0000A852	692 (0x02B4)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	implicit	-	MSVCRT.dll



# PESTUDIO

encoding (2)	size (bytes)	location	flag (58)	label (541)	group (16)	technique (14)	value
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	services	T1543   Create or Modify System Proc...	CreateService
ascii	20	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	services	T1569   System Services	ChangeServiceConfig2
ascii	26	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	services	-	StartServiceCtrlDispatcher
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	services	T1543   Create or Modify System Proc...	CreateService
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	registry	T1112   Modify Registry	RegSetValueEx
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	registry	T1112   Modify Registry	RegCreateKey
ascii	25	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	reconnaissance	-	QueryPerformanceFrequency
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	reconnaissance	T1057   Process Discovery	GetCurrentProcessId
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	reconnaissance	-	GetNativeSystemInfo
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	network	-	GetAdaptersInfo
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	network	-	InternetCloseHandle
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	network	-	InternetOpenUrl
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	network	-	InternetOpen
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	memory	T1055   Process Injection	VirtualAlloc
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	memory	T1055   Process Injection	VirtualProtect
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	MoveFileEx
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	MoveFileEx
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	file	-	WriteFile
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	file	-	WriteFile
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	file	-	WriteFile
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	file	-	WriteFile
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	file	-	SetFileAttributes
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	file	T1485   Data Destruction	DeleteFile
ascii	8	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	MoveFile
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	file	-	WriteFile
ascii	18	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	GetCurrentThreadId
ascii	16	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	execution	-	GetCurrentThread
ascii	18	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	GetCurrentThreadId
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	T1106   Execution through API	CreateProcess
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	T1106   Execution through API	CreateProcess
ascii	22	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	-	RtlLookupFunctionEntry
ascii	16	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	-	TerminateProcess
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	GetCurrentProcess
ascii	21	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	-	GetEnvironmentStrings
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	execution	T1106   Execution through API	CreateProcess
ascii	18	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	execution	-	GetExitCodeProcess
ascii	16	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	execution	-	TerminateProcess
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	-	execution	T1106   Execution through API	CreateProcess
ascii	23	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	desktop	-	GetProcessWindowStation
ascii	24	<a href="#">section:data</a>	x	-	desktop	-	GetUserObjectInformation
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	crypto   obfuscation	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	CryptAcquireContext
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:rdata</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	crypto   obfuscation	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	CryptGenRandom
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:rsrc</a>	x	<a href="#">import</a>	crypto   obfuscation	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	CryptAcquireContext

# CAPA

md5 sha1 sha256 analysis os format arch path	db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb4 e889544aff85ffaf8b0d0da705105dee7c97fe26 24d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c static windows pe i386 C:/Users/Admin1/Desktop/Ransomware.wannacry.exe.malz
---	---

ATT&CK Tactic	ATT&CK Technique
DEFENSE EVASION	Obfuscated Files or Information::Indicator Removal from Tools T1027.005
DISCOVERY	File and Directory Discovery T1083 System Information Discovery T1082 System Network Configuration Discovery T1016
EXECUTION	Shared Modules T1129 System Services::Service Execution T1569.002
PERSISTENCE	Create or Modify System Process::Windows Service T1543.003

# CAPA

MBC Objective	MBC Behavior
ANTI-BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS	Conditional Execution::Runs as Service [B0025.007] Debugger Detection::Timing/Delay Check QueryPerformanceCounter [B0001.033]
ANTI-STATIC ANALYSIS	Executable Code Obfuscation::Argument Obfuscation [B0032.020] Executable Code Obfuscation::Stack Strings [B0032.017]
COMMAND AND CONTROL	C2 Communication::Receive Data [B0030.002] C2 Communication::Send Data [B0030.001]
COMMUNICATION	HTTP Communication::Create Request [C0002.012] HTTP Communication::Open URL [C0002.004] Socket Communication::Connect Socket [C0001.004] Socket Communication::Create TCP Socket [C0001.011] Socket Communication::Create UDP Socket [C0001.010] Socket Communication::Get Socket Status [C0001.012] Socket Communication::Initialize Winsock Library [C0001.009] Socket Communication::Receive Data [C0001.006] Socket Communication::Send Data [C0001.007] Socket Communication::Set Socket Config [C0001.001] Socket Communication::TCP Client [C0001.008]
CRYPTOGRAPHY	Generate Pseudo-random Sequence::Use API [C0021.003]
DATA	Compression Library [C0060]
DISCOVERY	Code Discovery::Inspect Section Memory Permissions [B0046.002] File and Directory Discovery [E1083]
EXECUTION	Install Additional Program [B0023]
FILE SYSTEM	Move File [C0063] Read File [C0051]
PROCESS	Create Thread [C0038] Terminate Process [C0018] Terminate Thread [C0039]



# CAPA

Capability	Namespace
check for time delay via QueryPerformanceCounter	anti-analysis/anti-debugging/debugger-detection
contain obfuscated stackstrings	anti-analysis/obfuscation/string/stackstring
receive data (5 matches)	communication
send data (5 matches)	communication
connect to URL	communication/http/client
get socket status	communication/socket
initialize Winsock library	communication/socket
set socket configuration	communication/socket
create UDP socket (4 matches)	communication/socket/udp/send
act as TCP client	communication/tcp/client
generate random numbers via WinAPI	data-manipulation/prng
extract resource via kernel32 functions	executable/resource
contain an embedded PE file	executable/subfile/pe
get file size	host-interaction/file-system/meta
move file	host-interaction/file-system/move
read file on Windows	host-interaction/file-system/read
get number of processors	host-interaction/hardware/cpu
terminate process	host-interaction/process/terminate
run as service	host-interaction/service
create service	host-interaction/service/create
modify service	host-interaction/service/modify
start service	host-interaction/service/start
create thread (4 matches)	host-interaction/thread/create
terminate thread	host-interaction/thread/terminate
link function at runtime on Windows	linking/runtime-linking
linked against ZLIB	linking/static/zlib
inspect section memory permissions	load-code/pe
persist via Windows service	persistence/service

# MITRE ATT&CK

## ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

layout: side ▾

show sub-techniques

hide sub-techniques

Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement
14 techniques	20 techniques	14 techniques	43 techniques	17 techniques	32 techniques	9 techniques
Cloud Administration Command	Account Manipulation (6)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (5)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (5)	Adversary-in-the-Middle (3)	Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of Remote Services
Command and Scripting Interpreter (9)	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Brute Force (4)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing
Container Administration Command	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	Account Manipulation (6)	BITS Jobs	Credentials from Password Stores (6)	Browser Information Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer
Deploy Container	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (14)	Build Image on Host	Exploitation for Credential Access	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking (2)
Exploitation for Client Execution	Browser Extensions	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (5)	Debugger Evasion	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Services (8)
Inter-Process Communication (3)	Compromise Client Software Binary	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forge Web Credentials (2)	Cloud Service Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media
Native API	Create Account (3)	Escape to Host	Deploy Container	Input Capture (4)	Cloud Storage Object Discovery	Software Deployment Tools
Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Direct Volume Access	Modify Authentication Process (8)	Container and Resource Discovery	Taint Shared Content
Serverless Execution	Domain Policy Modification (2)	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Execution Guardrails (1)	Multi-Factor Authentication Interception	Debugger Evasion	Use Alternate Authentication Material (4)
Shared Modules	Event Triggered Execution (16)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation	Device Driver Discovery	
Software Deployment Tools	External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	File and Directory Permissions Modification (2)	Network Sniffing	Domain Trust Discovery	
System Services (2)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Process Injection (12)	Hide Artifacts (11)	OS Credential Dumping (8)	File and Directory Discovery	
User Execution (3)	Implant Internal Image	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Hijack Execution Flow (12)	Steal Application Access Token	Group Policy Discovery	
Windows Management Instrumentation	Modify Authentication Process (8)	Valid Accounts (4)	Impair Defenses (11)	Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates	Log Enumeration	
	Office Application Startup (6)		Impersonation	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (4)	Network Service Discovery	
	Power Settings		Indicator Removal (9)	Steal Web Session Cookie	Network Share Discovery	
	Pre-OS Boot (5)		Indirect Command Execution		Network Sniffing	
	Scheduled Task/Job (5)		Masquerading (9)		Password Policy Discovery	
	Server Software Component (5)		Modify Authentication Process (8)		Peripheral Device Discovery	
			Modify Cloud Compute		Permission Groups Discovery (3)	
					Process Discovery	
					Query Registry	

# PROCMON

9:08:02.6214851 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\OnDemandConnRouteHelper.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
9:08:02.6215303 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QuerySecurityFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\OnDemandConnRouteHelper.dll	BUFFER OVERFL...	Information: Owner
9:08:02.6215452 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QuerySecurityFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\OnDemandConnRouteHelper.dll	SUCCESS	Information: Owner
9:08:02.6215546 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\OnDemandConnRouteHelper.dll	SUCCESS	
9:08:02.6216951 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	ReadFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wininet.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 3,163,136, ...
9:08:02.6223223 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
9:08:02.6223542 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QueryBasicInfor...	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 9/7/...
9:08:02.6223635 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	
9:08:02.6224428 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
9:08:02.6224690 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFileMapp...	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	FILE LOCKED WI...	SyncType: SyncTy...
9:08:02.6227559 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFileMapp...	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy...
9:08:02.6229944 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	
9:08:02.6230926 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
9:08:02.6231196 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QuerySecurityFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	BUFFER OVERFL...	Information: Owner
9:08:02.6231290 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QuerySecurityFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	Information: Owner
9:08:02.6231374 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winhttp.dll	SUCCESS	
9:08:02.6236293 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	ReadFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wininet.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 2,688,000, ...




# PROCMON

9:08:44.8760867 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QueryBasicInfor...C:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 4/12...
9:08:44.8869216 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFile C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS	Desired Access: G...
9:08:44.8869568 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QueryStandardI...C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 4,0...
9:08:44.8869661 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QueryStandardI...C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 4,0...
9:08:44.8869771 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFileMapp...C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	FILE LOCKED WI...	SyncType: SyncTy...
9:08:44.8869868 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	QueryStandardI...C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS	AllocationSize: 4,0...
9:08:44.8870024 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CreateFileMapp...C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy...
9:08:44.8870520 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile C:\Windows\apppatch\sysmain.sdb	SUCCESS	
9:08:44.8871184 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile C:\Windows\tasksche.exe	SUCCESS	
9:08:44.8872306 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	ReadFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\urlmon.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 562,176, Le...
9:08:44.8900908 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
9:08:44.8901094 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	QueryBasicInfor...C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	SUCCESS	CreationTime: 9/7/...
9:08:44.8901179 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	CloseFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	SUCCESS	
9:08:44.8902333 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	CreateFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
9:08:44.8902607 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	CreateFileMapp...C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	FILE LOCKED WI...	SyncType: SyncTy...
9:08:44.8902806 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	CreateFileMapp...C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTy...
9:08:44.8903997 AM	Ransomware.w...	2948	CloseFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dhcpcsvc6.dll	SUCCESS	
9:08:44.9372877 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	ReadFile C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msvc60.dll	SUCCESS	Offset: 128,000, Le...
9:08:44.9452573 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile C:\Windows	SUCCESS	
9:08:44.9453300 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile C:\Users\Admin1\Desktop	SUCCESS	
9:08:44.9610076 AM	Ransomware.w...	5096	CloseFile C:\Windows\System32\en-US\mswsock.dll.mui	SUCCESS	

# PROCMON

12:25:40.6322732 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData	SUCCESS	Desired Access: E...
12:25:40.6322935 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CloseFile	C:\Users\Admin1\Desktop	SUCCESS	
12:25:40.6324150 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\qankybmjqcuqjt623	SUCCESS	Desired Access: R...
12:25:40.6324519 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	ReadFile	C:\\$Secure:\$SDH:\$INDEX_ALLOCATION	SUCCESS	Offset: 32,768, Len...
12:25:40.6329788 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CloseFile	C:\ProgramData\qankybmjqcuqjt623	SUCCESS	
12:25:40.6338176 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\qankybmjqcuqjt623	SUCCESS	Desired Access: E...
12:25:40.6338575 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CloseFile	C:\ProgramData	SUCCESS	
12:25:40.6340223 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\qankybmjqcuqjt623\qankybmjqcuqjt623	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: R...
12:25:40.6341096 PM	tasksche.exe	3472	CreateFile	C:\ProgramData\qankybmjqcuqjt623\qankybmjqcuqjt623	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: W...





# TCPVIEW

spoolsv.exe	2368	TCP	Listen	0.0.0.0	49668	0.0.0.0	0	4/12/2024 11:21:07 AM	Spooler
services.exe	600	TCP	Listen	0.0.0.0	49669	0.0.0.0	0	4/12/2024 11:21:08 AM	services.exe
svchost.exe	2648	TCP	Listen	0.0.0.0	49670	0.0.0.0	0	4/12/2024 11:21:09 AM	PolicyAgent
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49773	10.0.0.74	445	4/12/2024 11:29:41 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49775	10.0.0.75	445	4/12/2024 11:29:41 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49776	10.0.0.76	445	4/12/2024 11:29:41 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49778	10.0.0.77	445	4/12/2024 11:29:41 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49779	10.0.0.78	445	4/12/2024 11:29:41 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49781	10.0.0.79	445	4/12/2024 11:29:41 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49783	10.0.0.80	445	4/12/2024 11:29:42 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49785	10.0.0.81	445	4/12/2024 11:29:42 AM	mssecsvc2.0
Ransomware.wannacr...	1444	TCP	Syn Sent	10.0.0.16	49786	10.0.0.82	445	4/12/2024 11:29:42 AM	mssecsvc2.0
System	4	TCP	Listen	0.0.0.0	445	0.0.0.0	0	4/12/2024 11:21:08 AM	System
svchost.exe	2080	TCP	Listen	0.0.0.0	7680	0.0.0.0	0	4/12/2024 11:21:07 AM	DoSvc

# WIRESHARK

\*Ethernet

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

!ssdp

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
948	145.117260	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
949	146.130372	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
950	147.129509	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
951	148.122483	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
952	149.169241	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
953	150.141025	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
954	151.124689	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
955	152.368275	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
956	153.126774	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
957	154.125510	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
958	155.143982	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
959	156.118597	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
960	157.129305	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
962	158.130762	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
964	159.124895	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
966	160.126203	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
968	161.598183	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
969	162.142013	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
970	163.122722	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
971	164.352902	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
972	164.672986	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16
973	165.123825	PCSSystemtec_60:79:...	Broadcast	ARP	42	Who has 10.0.0.254? Tell 10.0.0.16



# THANK YOU!

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