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A Defining Presidential Moment: 9/11 and the Rally Effect

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Public approval ratings of George W. Bush surged after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. This study used a quasi-experimental, within-respondents design to investigate the relative contribution of five factors to this classic rally effect: the stimulus event itself, Bush's speech that evening, media exposure, partisan support, and gender effects. Respondents were pretested on the morning of the attacks; one group was posttested immediately after the speech, another group 41 hours later. Stability of effects was examined through an additional study of Bush's 20 September 2001 speech to a joint session of Congress. The findings indicate that Bush's 11 September speech was the critical factor in this rally effect; none of the other factors contributed significantly.

KEY WORDS: 9/11, rally effect, presidential approval, terrorism, political speeches

George W. Bush's job approval ratings shot up 35 to 40 percentage points in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, reaching 90% and hovering in the upper 80s in the months that followed. "Rally 'round the flag" phenomena are well documented in the political science literature, and Bush's surge in public opinion constitutes a quintessential rally. However, there is little research on the process through which such rallies occur. This study considers how presidential speeches may contribute to rally events.

We began a quasi-experimental study during the morning of 11 September to explore the emergence of a rally response to the attacks. We were able to do so

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because we had evaluation instruments available from ongoing research concerning responses to presidential speeches committing United States armed forces abroad. In anticipation of a presidential address to the nation later that day, we pretested respondents within 2 to 3 hours after the attacks. We posttested one group of respondents immediately after Bush's 8:30 p.m. nationally televised address, and posttested another group on 13 September, about 41 hours after that speech but before his next speech at the National Cathedral. We followed up with a study of responses to his 20 September address to a joint session of Congress.

On the basis of these data, we address four general questions in this study. First, did the attack stimulate what some commentators have labeled a Pearl Harbor effect, such that the terrorist event was sufficient by itself to produce a rally response in public opinion? Second, did Bush contribute to the rally response through his televised national address? During the 48 hours immediately following the attacks, Bush's public pronouncements were limited to the 11 September evening address and brief, impromptu remarks and press releases that day and the next. The speech was Bush's principal act of political communication during that period. Third, did the pervasive coverage of the terrorist attacks by the mass media contribute substantially to the rally in support for the president? Fourth, to what extent was the rally response generalized, and to what extent was it conditional on factors previously observed to influence rally behavior, such as sex and partisan identification?

The theoretical significance of the post-9/11 rally in public opinion has three bases. First, rally effects have occupied the attention of political scientists, journalists, and commentators for nearly 30 years. In this respect, the unusual extent and duration of the post-9/11 rally warrants attention. Second, where previous research on rally events has necessarily dealt with commitments of military force abroad, this event provides a unique opportunity to observe a rally that includes an attack on the homeland. Third, as the most substantial mass terrorist attack in recent history, public responses to the attack shed light on the utility of terror as a political strategy. A goal of mass terror is to promote mass anxiety and thereby undermine public confidence in political institutions. In this case, to the contrary, mass anxiety responses appear to have been accompanied by a surge in ingroup solidarity, patriotism, national cohesion, and support for political institutions.

Theoretical Concerns

Surprise military attacks on the nation clearly fall within the broader class of rally events, as described by Mueller (1973), in which situations involving the nation and the office of the president are associated with a surge in public approval for the president. With the targeting of the Capitol and, apparently, the White House, in addition to the successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there was no doubt by midday on 11 September that a potential rally situation was present. Early studies of the rally effect have regarded the situation

or stimulus event as the primary cause of observed patriotic surges in presidential support (Mueller, 1973; Sigelman & Conover, 1981). Media commentaries pointed out similarities between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 and speculated on the possible unifying effects of the event on public opinion. Key points of comparison were the element of surprise, lack of provocation, and loss of life in the thousands. The general hypothesis here is that sudden, dramatic events that substantially threaten the well-being of a nation are sufficient, in and of themselves, to stimulate widespread, patriotic responses in public opinion and behavior. Thus, rally effects would not depend on properties of presidential behavior, nor on the individual characteristics of ralliers, but on the nature of the stimulus event.

More recent literature rejects this "automatic" model on the basis of attention to the role of elites in opinion leadership and mass media effects on public attitudes (Brody, 1991; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). Ragsdale's (1984, 1987) research on presidential speechmaking raises the question of presidential influence on rally responses in public opinion. He found that post–Second World War presidents were likely to make unscheduled public addresses during major national events, that these presidential speeches were found to have significant effects on approval ratings, and that individual presidents were found to be differentially effective in influencing public opinion through speechmaking. Edelman's (1964) discussion of symbolic politics suggests that presidents may influence public responses through speechmaking by activating the facsimile of a face-to-face relationship that, when televised from the Oval Office, brings all the trappings of the office to bear on the credibility of the message. In the context of rally events, public opinion may be predisposed by the situation to respond positively to presidential appeals for support of policy actions. Schubert's (1998) post hoc experimental research on responses to George H. W. Bush's 1990 speech committing armed forces in the Persian Gulf and Bill Clinton's 1994 speech committing armed forces in Haiti—both Oval Office addresses—found significant speech effects on policy approval when the effects of prior attitudes toward the presidents were controlled.

George W. Bush's speech was delivered from the Oval Office on 11 September 2001 from 8:30 to 8:35 p.m. (eastern time) to a nationwide television audience. In this speech, in addition to reassuring the public about the stability of their government, Bush committed the nation to "bring justice" to the terrorists "and those who harbor them." He completed his brief remarks with a direct appeal for national unity: "This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time." His language implied the use of military force abroad and appealed for public support at home. The next day, the *Washington Post*'s report carried the headline "Bush Vows Retaliation." The *Chicago Tribune*'s report used the headlines "President's address somber, if not stirring/Short speech delivers basics: Sorrow, threat," and its commentary was faintly positive: "His tone was more measured than it often is.... He read the address slowly and conquered the impulse to race over individual words" (Warren, 2001). Therefore, the second hypothesis

at stake in this study is that Bush's speech influenced public emotions and opinions, contributing to the rally effect after 9/11.

An alternative perspective on rally events is that public responses are influenced by the quantity and quality of mass media attention. Brody (1991) observed that events are likely to result in rallies during fast-paced international crises when elite commentary is consensual and supportive of the president, and that the presence of elite consensus is conveyed to the public through mass media: "Quite simply, press and television accounts . . . will be unusually full of bipartisan support for the president's actions" (p. 66). From this perspective, rally phenomena present a special case of what Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar (1993) described as "direct persuasion" media effects. Saturation media coverage followed the attacks and continued on a 24-hour cycle on the major television networks. Regular television programming was preempted for days as a nationwide audience was exposed to replays of the World Trade Center explosions and collapse, damage to the Pentagon, and news about casualties, survivors, and the national political response. The public was exposed to a massive amount of media attention that appeared markedly similar in content and tone on television network broadcasts. Not only did the media present similar coverage, but political elites displayed virtual unanimity and bipartisanship in their response to the events and support for the president. Both the Democratic and Republican party leaders in the Senate made supportive comments after Bush's 11 September address. The conditions were certainly in place for substantial influence by the mass media on the public opinion rally. We examine the hypothesis that exposure to mass media coverage made a substantial contribution to the surge in Bush's approval ratings.

Our fourth theoretical concern is with the conditional nature of rally effects. Mueller (1973) observed that males were more likely to rally than females when military force commitments were at stake. This effect has been confirmed through both survey and experimental research designs (Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Fite, Genesi, & Wilcox, 1990; Schubert, 1998). One common feature of studies reporting significant gender differences has been situations involving the commitment of armed forces personnel abroad. Edwards and Swenson's (1997) study examined gender effects in rally responses to Clinton's 1993 Tomahawk missile attack on Iraq, with no threat to U.S. personnel, and found no significant differences in opinion between males and females. Whereas much of the literature reporting a gender effect has been based on aggregate data, Edwards and Swenson analyzed change from pre-event to post-event approval in respondents' attitudes, and therefore their findings present a significant anomaly. Here, we also consider gender differences in rally behavior at the individual level, but where the precipitating event posed substantial risk at home and commitment of military personnel abroad.

Edwards and Swenson's (1997) study also contributed to the literature on rally events by finding that change in approval is conditional on partisanship. They concluded that a rally event was a "force that pushes potential supporters (of a president) over the threshold of approval and, therefore, that more than patriotic

fervor is involved in who rallies" (p. 208). We examine the hypothesis that party identification conditioned the extent of the post-attack rally for Bush. However, to reach the 90% level, Bush's surge in approval obviously included many Democrats and independents, as well as Republicans. Indeed, in January 2002 66% of Democrats in a CBS poll still reported approval of Bush's job performance.

Dependent Variables

Approval. A rally event is defined by increased support for a president in public opinion. One implication of this definition is that increased support is generalized across policy domains. A second implication is that attitudes change, such that rallies occur among people who were previously less than full supporters of the president. We were constrained in our selection of evaluation questions to items that had been used in our other research that focuses on evaluations of presidential speeches. We included two domain-specific (foreign and economic policy) job performance approval items on the pretest (see Appendix A). Because we anticipated a military response to the attacks, we included a posttest question that queried respondents on their approval of the president's commitment of armed forces abroad. Answers to these three questions were recorded on a 100-point response scale, chosen to detect even small changes in a pretest-posttest design (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994).

The posttest question clearly does not provide for a direct measure of attitude change between the pretest and posttest, nor does it provide for a domain-free observation of approval of the president. The pretest foreign policy question covers a much broader policy scope than the posttest item. However, the attacks had become the defining problem of the Bush administration's foreign policy by the evening of 11 September. We argue that the response to the attacks was not just one among various other specific foreign policy problems, but one of overwhelming importance for public opinion. Further, we argue that evaluations of that response are indicative of, although not identical to, more generalized job approval ratings. We test this assumption by examining the correlations between the 11 September post-speech policy approval rating and the domain-specific (foreign and economic) pretest job approval ratings from our 20 September panel study [$\rho(25) = .573, p < .003$; $\rho(25) = .651, p < .0001$, respectively]. These cross-domain effects on explicit job approval ratings support the use of our posttest question as an indicator of support for the president.

An additional concern with the posttest approval question involves the possibility that the wording of the question, "based upon the president's speech and the current situation," invited respondents to disregard their prior feelings and predisposed a supportive response.[1] The current situation would have been very much in their consciousness as they took on the rating task, regardless of the question

[1] We thank an anonymous referee for raising this concern.

wording. However, the reference to the speech does apparently direct attention away from prior attitudes and might have encouraged a reappraisal. Had respondents who were previously less supportive abandoned their prejudice and embraced the president's message, then we should observe a tight clustering of scores within the upper approval range on the measurement scale and an associated loss in dispersion. Additionally, such wording bias would act on the responses as a constant, but would constrain the variance in scores toward the maximum positive end of the response scale for respondents whose prior attitudes were quite supportive. Among 91 respondents who answered both the pretest foreign policy and posttest policy approval questions, the variation in responses was actually slightly greater on the posttest item (s = 20.96 and s = 21.06, respectively). Thus, any wording bias effect did not constrain the variation in responses.

Our approach to dealing with change in attitudes also addresses concern over wording bias. Rather than take the difference between the pretest foreign policy and posttest items as a dependent variable, we use the initial pretest foreign policy approval question as a benchmark against which to assess support for Bush's post-attack policy statements. Although we have no direct measure of change in attitude, we infer change by regressing the posttest policy rating on pretest foreign policy approval [$r(91) = .294, p < .005$]. Because we do not analyze the difference between the pretest and posttest items and because standardization in least squares methods removes the effects of constant sources of bias on scores, wording bias could inflate means, but should have minimal influence on analyses of covariation between the posttest item and predictor variables.

Emotions. Public responses to 9/11, in the United States and elsewhere in the world, forcefully revealed that the relationship between the event and change in political attitudes was mediated by feelings and emotions. The event stimulated an increase in mass perceptions of threat and attendant feelings of anxiety, grief, and anger. The rally in public opinion is conceived as an expression of the impact of the president, other political elites, and the mass media on those feelings and emotions. The president's public communications, the memorial service at the National Cathedral, and the framing of the events in the news—America Under Attack, America Strikes Back, etc.—were explicitly directed at public emotion. We regard the patriotic fervor at work in a rally event as resulting from the interplay of change in states of positive and negative emotional arousal.

In neuroscience research, two systems of affective arousal have been distinguished, one negative and one positive (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Berntson, & Gardner, 1999; Gray, 1987), and this model has been applied in political research on public attitudes toward presidents and presidential candidates (Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). In this circumplex model, positive affect and negative affect are conceived as logically, statistically, and physiologically independent outcomes of systems of emotional arousal that condition both physiological/affective state and felt emotional states.

Negative affect results from a quick cycling system that involves surveillance of the external environment for potential threats or harm. It functions to inhibit or interrupt behavior and to focus attention (Gray, 1987, pp. 20–23; Marcus et al., 2000, p. 56) on the source, so that the organism can choose an appropriate behavioral strategy. Perceived threat arouses fearful/anxious feelings when there is uncertainty about what has happened and who or what is responsible. Anger occurs in this system in response to an external threat when there is certainty over what has happened and an attribution of responsibility (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993, pp. 917–919; Tiedens & Linton, 2001, p. 974). As this stimulus event unfolded, there was threat-related uncertainty over additional attacks, coupled with certainty over the attribution of responsibility to terrorists, after the second plane struck the World Trade Center. Thus, negative emotions triggered by the attack included threat, fear, anxiety, and anger. The functional consequence of this negative emotional system was evident in the seemingly obsessive consumption of mass media coverage of the event by many, including widespread attention to presidential communications.

The positive affect system compares current behavior with past experiences and expectations. Successful matches lead to high levels of felt emotion such as enthusiasm, hope, and determination (Smith et al., 1993; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Mismatches decrease this emotional state, leading to retreat behavior (such as depression) and, ultimately, a willingness to try other approaches (Marcus et al., 2000, pp. 46–49). On a daily basis, individuals act to maintain moderate levels of positive arousal (Cacioppo et al., 1999, p. 847; Marcus et al., 2000, pp. 50–52). It is probable that positive emotions were substantially depressed in the hours, if not days, following the attacks and predisposed acceptance of messages of reassurance and confidence, providing a basis for feelings of enthusiasm, hope, and determination. Consistent with attempts to stimulate positive emotional arousal, Bush's utterance from his 20 September speech to Congress—"We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail"—was incorporated in public service television ads and later in some commercial ads.

The negative emotional system has been labeled the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), because it functions to inhibit behavior as a means to increase attention to threats (Gray, 1982, 1987). The positive emotional system has been labeled the behavioral activation system (BAS) because it initiates action. Theoretically, for a crisis-related rally event to occur, public emotions should display a pattern in which BIS arousal is minimized by political action while BAS arousal is maximized. The policy pronouncement should have the simultaneous emotional effects on public opinion of quelling fears while instilling confidence and efficacy in the political response. Explicitly, perceptions of effective response should be displayed in reductions of perceived threat, fear, and anxiety (as the problem is appropriately addressed) and reduction of anger (as guilty parties are prospectively brought to justice). Simultaneously, the response should stimulate positive feelings of reassurance, hope, and enthusiasm.

Our pretest and posttest instruments contained questions designed to assess respondents' felt emotional states. Indicators of BIS arousal included self-reported feelings of threat, anger, anxiousness, and fearfulness. Indicators of positive emotion included self-reported feelings of reassurance, determination, and inspiration. Both before and immediately after the speech, respondents placed themselves on 100-point horizontal distance scales, ranging from slightly to extremely, after instruction that their response should be based on how they "feel right now." To confirm this theoretical model of emotional response, we conducted principal components analyses of the pretest data, the posttest data, and change measures defined in terms of the difference between the pretest and posttest responses. The results (Table 1) reveal theoretically consistent, simple structure solutions in the unrotated component loading matrices. BAS and BIS patterns in these data are clear-cut and statistically independent. Factor scores were calculated using the regression method to provide the data on emotional responses used in hypothesis testing.

Independent Variables

Speech evaluation. We used semantic differentials to measure evaluations of the speeches, with polarity varied to constrain response sets. One item assessed a global evaluation (strong–weak). A second item addressed the delivery style or performance (nervous–confident). Two other items tapped evaluations of substance, including quality of the argument (convincing–unconvincing) and clarity of the explanation to commit armed forces (confusing–clear). For each item, respondents were presented with 100-point horizontal distance scales for their responses. Cronbach's α was calculated to evaluate the reliability of these four indicators, and the result is acceptable ($\alpha = .8007$). After transposing the polarity of two scales for consistent measurement, principal components analysis was

Table 1. Principal Components Analyses of Self Reported Emotions

	Component loading matrices				Change in states	
	Pretest emotional states		Posttest emotional states		(posttest – pretest)	
Labels	BIS	BAS	BIS	BAS	BIS	BAS
Component	1	2	1	2	1	2
Angry	.772	.173	.767	.173	.701	–.087
Threatened	.767	–.359	.806	–.305	.786	–.103
Fearful	.699	–.405	.790	–.343	.701	–.074
Anxious	.694	.099	.749	.162	.706	.008
Determined	.478	.735	.336	.721	.285	.618
Reassured	–.364	.661	–.178	.753	–.129	.741
Inspired	.374	.657	.187	.829	.135	.802
Eigenvalue	2.656	1.741	2.602	2.041	2.214	1.598
% of variance	37.938	24.865	37.173	29.158	31.629	22.824

Note. BIS refers to behavioral inhibition system; BAS refers to behavioral activation system.

performed to facilitate subsequent data analysis. A single component was extracted (eigenvalue = 2.542) that accounted for 63.54% of the total variance on the four indicators (loadings: weak–strong = .879, nervous–confident = .844, unconvincing–convincing = .843, confusing–clear = .588). Factor scores were calculated on this component to provide data on respondents' evaluation of Bush's speech.

Other independent variables. Other independent variables included form of exposure to the president's speeches, amount of exposure to mass media coverage of the event, gender, and party identification. Respondents either viewed Bush's speeches or were exposed to media coverage about the Bush administration's response to 9/11. *Form of speech exposure* is a dummy variable that distinguishes between respondents who viewed the Bush speeches and those who did not. Because respondents who did not view the speeches were exposed to media coverage, both groups had a basis for responding to the posttest Bush policy approval question.

We assumed that virtually all respondents were exposed to a good deal of media coverage following the attacks and that the television component was substantial for most. *Amount of exposure to media coverage*, therefore, is measurable by the time lag between the attack and the administration of evaluation instruments. Posttests following Bush's 11 September speech were completed by one group of respondents immediately after viewing the speech or exposure to media reports about the speech. A second group of respondents completed the posttest at 12:30 p.m. (central time) on 13 September, about 41 hours after the Bush speech. For respondents who viewed the speech, the posttest time lag represents a substantial difference in the amount of media coverage to which they were exposed, although it is not equivalent to direct data on the actual number of hours watched or column inches read. Additional indicators of media exposure were based on pretest questions regarding television network news viewing and newspaper reading behaviors that assess attentiveness to news in mass media. These two items ($\alpha = .6501$) were combined in an additive index of media attentiveness.

Gender and *partisanship*, among other demographic and background factors, were measured by questions on the pretest instrument. For partisanship, one question addressed party identification, with five response categories,[2] and a second question addressed vote choice in the 2000 presidential election. We also included a self placement scale for political ideology.

Hypothesis Testing

Figure 1 presents a conceptual model of the patterns of effects that we examine. The precipitating facts of this rally event include the terrorist attacks and the

[2] The categories—Independent, leaning Democratic, leaning Republican, Republican, and Democratic—were arranged ordinally before data analysis.



Figure 1. Conceptual model of the 9/11 rally effect. Hypothesis numbers (see text) are denoted H1 to H5; CV, control variable. Dashed line is not tested.

president's speech. The dependent variables include post-speech emotional responses and policy approval. Independent variables include speech exposure, speech evaluation, media exposure, gender, and party identification. Pre-speech emotions and presidential approval are identified as necessary control variables.

The first hypothesis at stake in this study is that the attack itself was sufficient to stimulate a rally effect. We test this hypothesis by contrasting the immediate post-attack approval ratings on our pretest to the pre-attack approval levels reported in national opinion polls. Our second hypothesis is that Bush's national address on the evening of 11 September had significant effects on public opinion, including emotions and policy approval. We test this hypothesis by estimating two equations. One equation examines the effects of speech evaluation and speech exposure on emotional responses; the other includes emotional responses among the predictors of policy approval.

Our third hypothesis is that exposure to media coverage augmented or enhanced the rally response. Therefore, respondents posttested 41 hours after Bush's 11 September speech were expected to display a stronger rally response in approval ratings than those posttested immediately after Bush's speech. Theoretically, media effects should augment speech effects; therefore, we test an additive model of post-speech approval that includes the speech effects and emotional responses. (We

have not advanced a hypothesis regarding media effects on emotional responses.) Our fourth and fifth hypotheses pertain to the conditioning of rally responses on gender and party identification. We conceptualize these as additive effects that might directly bear on post-speech approval.

Research Design

Within the constraints of time and the availability of approved evaluation instruments on 11 September, we used a within-respondents, pretest-posttest, quasi-experimental design. Given the circumstances, respondents could not be randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In addition, the pool of respondents was necessarily limited to undergraduate college students, hence the generalizability of the data is limited as well.

This study is based on three groups of respondents. The first group (Group 1) included 136 students at a Southern university recruited from six undergraduate classes. They completed pretest questionnaires between 9:30 and 11:30 a.m. (central time) on 11 September. All respondents were aware of the terrorist attacks at the time they answered the questions. They were provided with a post-speech questionnaire and were asked to take it with them and to complete it after viewing the anticipated national address by the president. Those unable to view the speech were asked to view media coverage about it and then answer the questions. About 80 of those pretested returned the posttest questionnaire with usable responses.

A second-wave panel design was implemented for this group on 20 September, following the procedure we used on 11 September. Respondents were pretested and instructed to view the president's scheduled address to Congress that evening and then complete the posttest. Completed responses were returned by about 35 respondents.

Because there was substantial attrition in this group of respondents, from the initial pretest on 11 September to the final posttest on 20 September, we report on the comparability of the samples in Appendix B for those respondents without missing data. There is very little difference between the initial pretest and posttest samples. The panel study group was somewhat younger, included more women, and was less attentive to mass media. However, on the more critical variable of partisanship, this group resembles the other two.

The second group (Group 2) of 25 respondents was recruited from an undergraduate political science course at a Midwestern university. These respondents completed the pretest at about 12:30 p.m. (central time) on 11 September. They were all aware of the attacks. This group was instructed to view the anticipated presidential address or, if they could not, to follow media coverage about the speech. This group was posttested at about 12:30 p.m. on 13 September; 23 respondents returned usable responses.

These two groups of respondents constituted the sample for the 11 September portion of this study. Overall, this sample was 55% female and the mean age was

22, revealing some diversity in background experiences. Politically, 52% identified themselves as Democrats or leaning in that direction, 42% reported at least moderately liberal values, and 30% reported at least moderately conservative values.

A third group (Group 3) of 20 respondents viewed the 20 September address to Congress. These participants were recruited from an upper-division undergraduate course at a Midwestern university. A pretest was completed about 2 hours before the speech. Half the respondents watched the speech together and filled out the posttest instrument; the other half viewed the speech independently and completed the posttest afterward. Their responses did not differ significantly.

Results

Event effect. Bush's overall job approval ratings were in the low- to mid-50s range during the summer of 2001. A 13 July 2001 CNN poll reported approval ratings at 57%; an August CBS poll reported 50% approval. A CNN poll conducted in mid-June reported his approval level in foreign policy at 47%. These poll results present a baseline against which to compare our findings of support for Bush in the hours immediately after the attack. Our pretest data, from mid-morning through noon on 11 September, show that 32% of (n = 133) respondents rated Bush above the midpoint on the foreign policy approval scale, whereas 28% (n = 129) rated him above the midpoint on the economic policy approval scale. Among Bush voters, 53% were in the approval range on foreign policy compared to 23% of Gore voters. Fewer than 20% of self-identified Democrats, 30% of independents, and about 60% of Republicans indicated approval on this scale. In short, these data provide no evidence of a rally effect resulting immediately and directly from the event itself.

Table 2 presents the mean ratings of Bush's job performance and the self-reports on emotional state, each with relevant categorical breakdowns. Awareness of the event is revealed in the self-reported emotions that include heightened levels of negative emotion or BIS arousal and depressed levels of positive emotion or BAS arousal. These respondents were clearly moved emotionally by information about the terrorist attacks, and yet they did not display any evidence of a rally in support for the president at this time. Their dominant emotions were anger and anxiousness. These were followed in intensity by threat and determination. Notably, female respondents were more responsive, reporting higher levels of negative emotion and lower levels of positive emotion than males. Political attitudes appear to have had a very modest effect, such that, for instance, Bush voters were slightly more positive and Gore voters slightly more negative in their emotional reactions. Relative to a subsequent rally effect, the important patterns in these results are the low levels of positive emotion and the high levels of negative emotion. Thus, to the extent that the responses of these young adults mirror the broader spectrum of public emotion on 11 September, the challenge to political leadership was to reduce

Table 2. Pretest Data Collected 2 to 3 Hours After the 11 September Attacks

	Bush's approval ratings		Post-attack emotional responses						
	Foreign	Domestic	Threatened	Reassured	Angry	Determined	Fearful	Inspired	Anxious
Sex									
Female	38.53	39.21	63.89	26.64	70.19	55.63	67.61	39.88	66.44
Male	45.18	41.02	48.68	36.86	70.46	65.16	46.69	44.02	65.25
Newspaper reading									
Never	43.87	45.93	54.39	31.22	69.17	63.83	55.17	33.61	60.44
Once or twice a week	43.34	40.85	59.05	27.95	69.54	55.18	61.75	40.72	68.98
Several times a week	40.76	43.53	56.65	36.52	70.35	60.50	58.54	43.85	64.59
Daily	38.91	29.19	55.13	29.04	74.26	69.09	52.00	47.96	66.87
Ideological self-placement									
Liberal	32.62	27.58	52.67	35.04	59.67	48.07	59.33	36.59	53.44
Moderate to liberal	37.89	33.12	66.30	26.67	75.39	62.19	65.21	33.70	72.67
Moderate	40.68	42.86	53.58	33.53	73.45	62.41	58.43	43.18	63.58
Moderate to conservative	47.53	46.95	56.81	31.38	73.78	64.95	52.68	52.68	73.25
Conservative	89.25	84.00	60.80	13.80	61.00	61.60	55.00	37.40	68.00
Party ID									
Democratic	33.19	26.80	64.02	25.13	74.42	57.48	65.19	43.90	65.29
Leaning Dem.	31.95	31.71	59.55	28.75	61.05	53.65	62.80	38.15	69.15
Independent	38.09	42.71	48.62	39.08	69.31	60.28	60.23	35.88	55.92
Leaning Rep.	57.55	56.85	51.95	30.05	71.68	61.50	45.05	44.32	71.71
Republican	56.12	56.83	59.72	34.48	75.36	66.24	57.16	46.16	74.40
Vote in 2000									
Bush	55.17	57.91	52.89	35.73	80.19	68.14	52.92	49.14	69.19
Gore	35.53	29.61	61.76	30.06	72.78	59.83	59.92	39.40	67.36
Didn't vote (18 yrs.+)	36.44	36.20	55.18	29.36	63.39	57.39	57.82	38.00	63.03
Total	41.53	40.04	51.07	31.22	70.31	59.86	59.23	41.73	65.91
N	133	129	145	145	145	142	145	145	144

Note. Data are mean values on 100-point response scales.

public BIS arousal while increasing BAS arousal. Such an effect on public emotions would appear to be a fundamental component of a rally effect in this circumstance.

Speech effect. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, participants in this study (and, no doubt, the nation) were looking for political leadership from the president by evening on 11 September. The graphic images of the attacks on the World Trade Center, the destruction at the Pentagon, the apparent targeting of the White House and Capitol, and the reports of thousands of victims set the stage for the exercise of leadership. Bush delivered a brief, subdued address that appeared to be read from a teleprompter, without dramatic pauses or rhetorical flourishes. Essentially, the president appeared before the nation and spoke, delivering words of reassurance and promising a forceful, retaliatory response. Among the respondents in Group 1, 54 reported viewing the speech and immediately completing the post-speech questionnaire. Their evaluation of the speech was quite favorable, as revealed in means of about 65 or 35 points on the 100-point scale, depending on scale direction (strong–weak $M = 35.02$, nervous–confident $M = 62.37$, convincing–unconvincing $M = 36.11$, confusing–clear $M = 65.07$; SE = ~4).

To analyze the impact of the speech, we defined a dummy variable distinguishing those who reported viewing the speech and those who did not. Our analysis of the impact of the speech on emotional responses is presented in Table 3. Although prior emotions had an expected effect, these data show that a positive evaluation of the speech had both substantial and significant effects on positive post-speech emotions. The causal ordering of these variables is fixed by the events—that is, there is no apparent mechanism by which a surge in positive emotion could have conceivably preceded and thereby driven the speech evaluations. We infer that Bush's speech caused these respondents to feel more positive. However, the speech had virtually no effect on their BIS scores or negative emotions. Apparently, he did not calm their fears, but he did give them hope. Because evaluations of the speech are weakly related with partisan agreement with the president ($r = .239$) and media attentiveness ($r = -.295$), we evaluated their contribution to these equations, but observed no significant effects.

George Bush's approval ratings appear to have improved dramatically after his speech among all respondents who viewed it. From overall foreign policy job performance rating in the morning ($M = 45.03$) to the post-speech approval of his announced policy actions and intentions ($M = 78.10$), his rating improved by 33 points. Granting the problems of comparability of the questions, it may at least be concluded that respondents were far more approving of his response to the attacks than they had previously been of his foreign policy in general. The difference is both dramatic and significant [$t(50) = 10.360$, $p < .0001$] and is consistent with the bounce recorded in national opinion polls.

Our analysis of the effects of the speech on the approval ratings is reported in equations 1 and 2 in Table 4. First, we examined the effects of viewing the speech and evaluations of it with prior attitude controlled, and find significant effects in both cases. To explore whether emotional responses mediate the effects of speech evaluations on the approval ratings, we added the factor scores from the BAS and BIS "Change in States" analysis (reported in Table 1) to the second equation. Here, we observe significant effects for BAS Change, a modest reduction in the effect size for the speech evaluations, and little improvement in statistics on model fit.

Table 3. Analysis of Posttest Emotions

	BAS score			BIS score		
Independent variables	*b*	β	*p* <	*b*	β	*p* <
BAS pretest	.544	.515	.000	−.185	−.179	.061
BIS pretest	.184	.179	.041	.537	.535	.000
Viewed	.267	.106	.223	.081	.033	.726
Speech evaluation	.341	.347	.000	−.014	−.015	.876
Constant	−.214		.280	−.091		.667
R^2	.428			.322		
Adjusted R^2	.398			.286		
SEE	.759			.810		

Table 4. Bush's Post-Speech Policy Approval Ratings

	Post-speech policy approval rating equations						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Pre-speech approval	0.05	0.054	.047	.024	.046	0.039	0.051
Viewed	13.355***	11.714**	12.413**	12.674**	12.581**	13.188**	11.918**
Speech evaluation	9.308***	7.507***	6.397***	6.391***	5.863**	5.767**	5.802**
BAS change		4.917**	3.757*	3.647*	3.745	4.098*	3.762
BIS change		0.021					
Media exposure			−2.883	−17.42	−2.761	7.351	−4.117
Media attention			−2.402*	−5.791	−2.275	0.705	−2.152
Party ID					0.759	16.042	0.846
Sex							3.133
Media: Exposure × Attention				2.56	−0.695		
Exposure × Party ID						−8.341	
Attention × Party ID						−2.422	
Exposure × Attention × Party ID						1.178	
Constant	61.617***	62.719***	76.598***	99.433***	76.169***	51.917	72.872***
R^2	.334	.362	.393	.401	.389	.411	.394
Adjusted R^2	.308	.317	.341	.340	.325	.309	.32
SEE	16.47	16.44	16.14	16.16	16.36	16.55	16.41

Note. Data are ordinary least squares *b* coefficients.
*$p \leq .10$, **$p \leq .05$, ***$p \leq .01$.

Thus, an increase in positive emotion, attributed to the speech, partially mediated the effects of evaluations of it on the approval ratings.

Media exposure. Our primary test of the media exposure hypothesis involves contrast of the post-speech responses of respondents who viewed Bush's 11 September address and responded immediately with those who responded 41 hours later (on 13 September). This test is based on the assumption that, given the compelling nature of the event and the presence of nonstop coverage on virtually all television news outlets, most if not all respondents received substantial broadcast media exposure and may have received much in the print media as well. If the media contributed to the Bush rally, then those respondents who had up to 41 extra, post-speech hours of media exposure would be expected to express stronger presidential approval than others. We also consider the effects of our media attentiveness index that describes respondents' reported news viewing and reading habits. More attentive respondents are expected to have experienced greater media exposure during that period, although the differences in this unique situation are likely to have been small.

Equations 3 through 6, as numbered in Table 4, present our analyses of media effects. In the first of these equations, we add the two media variables to prior approval and the other predictors observed to have significant effects in the preceding analyses. The tolerance coefficients for the predictors are all above .75, and the residuals show no problems with the solution. Media exposure had no significant bearing on the post-speech approval ratings. Media attentiveness displays a marginally significant effect; however, it is negative. Further investigation

of the media attention indicators revealed that more frequent, especially daily, newspaper readers were less approving ($r = -.223$, $p \leq .028$). Equation 4 adds the two-way interaction of the media exposure variables. Here the direction of effect is positive, consistent with the hypothesis, but not significant ($p \leq .347$).

Equations 5 and 6 add partisan identification into the equation, the two-way interactions of party and the media variables, as well as the three-way interaction. Here we examine the possibility, for example, that Democrats were less approving or that Republicans with great exposure or attentiveness were more approving. None of these additional terms show significant effects, not even marginally, nor is there any improvement in the overall model fit statistics. Republican identifiers were more approving, but not significantly so. The regression coefficients for the speech evaluation, viewing, and emotion variables are notably consistent in their performance across these equations. In short, there is no evidence in these data to support the media effects hypothesis for the 9/11 rally situation. In sum, these results reveal that opinion leadership played a critical role in this rally, but that leadership was provided directly by the president and did not depend on intermediaries.

Conditional factors. For descriptive purposes, Table 5 presents bivariate mean breakdowns for Bush's post-speech approval ratings on independent variables of theoretical concern for all respondents completing both questionnaires. Bush's ratings were well up in the approval range on the 100-point response scale in every category. There is very little difference between males and females. Differences between Bush and Gore voters and those for categories of partisan identification

Table 5. Post-Speech Bush Policy Approval Rating

Factor	Mean post-speech approval	Standard deviation	*n*
Sex			
Female	73.51	21.17	55
Male	75.47	17.66	43
Newspaper reading			
Never	82.67	11.54	9
Once or twice a week	75.71	19.41	45
Several times a week	75.10	17.92	29
Daily	63.93	24.52	15
Party ID			
Democratic	68.23	22.86	31
Leaning Dem.	70.50	22.28	10
Independent	74.57	18.66	21
Leaning Rep.	79.75	13.57	16
Republican	82.71	15.64	17
Vote in 2000			
Bush	82.79	12.08	24
Gore	69.06	23.34	35
Didn't vote	73.17	15.96	23

Note. Data are mean values on 100-point response scales.

are in the expected direction, but much smaller than those observed on the pretest. Equation 5 includes a test of the hypothesis that rally responses are conditional on partisan agreement, and results show that these effects were not significant. Bush received bipartisan support in our sample, consistent with Brody's (1991) conception of a rally event.

Equation 7 tests for a gender effect, with main effects for the other independent variables included. Although the gender effect is in the expected direction (ratings by males were slightly higher than those by females), it does not approach statistical significance. In sum, within this pool of respondents, support for Bush's response to the attacks was across-the-board.

Stability of effects, 11 to 20 September. National polling data revealed post-rally stability in George Bush's approval ratings through the fall of 2001. We used the occasion of Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on the evening of 20 September 2001 to explore the stability in our findings of post-speech approval for Bush's policy. To address the possibility that the experience of participating in the study affected responses to the 20 September speech, we compare the responses to the later speech of respondents who participated in the 11 September study (Group 1 above, $n = 35$) with those of a third group (Group 3 above, $n = 20$) who did not participate at that time. As a test of the effect of prior participation, these data present a posttest-only comparison group design. In sum, both groups were composed of undergraduates, equally exposed to the events of 11 September and Bush's speech that evening, and who voluntarily agreed to participate in the 20 September study. However, Group 1 was younger than Group 3 (mean age = 19.83 and 23.55, respectively) and had more female respondents (75% and 45%, respectively).

On the pretest, the two groups did not differ significantly in their rating of Bush's job performance in either foreign or economic policy [$t(44.4) = 0.778$, $p < .441$, and $t(37.7) = 1.697$, $p < .098$, respectively]. Their foreign policy ratings were quite similar [M(Group 1) = 59.68, M(Group 3) = 54.5], although their economic policy ratings were less so [M(Group 1) = 54.39, M(Group 3) = 41.75]. Group means on the separate emotion items are presented in Table 6 to contrast the magnitudes of reported feelings. From these data, it may be observed that the increase in positive emotion associated with the 11 September speech was retained over the next week. Pretest means for positive emotion in Group 1 on 20 September are only about 4 points below the posttest means on 11 September (Table 2). The positive emotion means for Group 3 on 20 September are quite similar to those for Group 1, and the differences are insignificant. Indeed, the only significant differences between Groups 1 and 3 on the 20 September pretest are those for the negative emotions of threat and fear [$t(44.4) = 3.820$, $p < .0001$, and $t(48.7) = 3.159$, $p < .003$, respectively], where Group 3 showed far less emotional arousal. We attribute this result to the disproportionate number of females in Group 1 on 20 September, where female respondents on the Group 1 pretest reported significantly higher levels of negative affect or BIS arousal. In sum, these data reveal similarity between the

Table 6. Emotional Responses to Bush's Joint Session Speech on 20 September

	9/20 Pretest		9/20 Posttest	
Variables	9/11 panel Group 1	9/20 only Group 3	9/11 panel Group 1	9/20 only Group 3
Threatened	50.06	26.80	52.84	34.95
Angry	65.44	49.75	65.16	53.74
Fearful	54.58	31.80	52.31	39.53
Anxious	58.78	51.60	58.28	51.00
Reassured	51.84	45.40	60.66	66.16
Determined	69.50	73.45	72.41	73.00
Inspired	58.03	60.00	67.03	73.11
n	32	20	32	19

Note. Data are mean values on 100-point response scales.

groups in both the emotional responses and approval ratings most subject to the influence of a presidential speech.

"After 19 drafts, six secret rehearsals and the acquisition of a memorable prop . . . Bush flawlessly delivered an address that inspired the nation, rallied the allies and impressed even his critics" (Fineman, 2001, p. 66). Our findings revealed very similar patterns of speech effects for Groups 1 and 3, and we pooled the two groups to assess the impact of the speech. Among the measures of emotion, change from the pretest to the posttest was only significant on two scales. Respondents reported a mean 13.22 gain in reassurance and an 11.0 gain in inspiration [$t(50) = 4.104$, $p < .000$, and $t(50) = 3.723$, $p < .0001$, respectively].

On the speech evaluation scales, respondents reported a very positive reaction [M(strong–weak) = 21.76, M(nervous–confident) = 78.20, M(convincing–unconvincing) = 36.11, and M(confusing–clear) = 65.07]. For the first three scales, these 20 September mean ratings are 13 to 16 points more positive than those for 11 September; the fourth scale involved a 7-point gain. The respondents clearly differentiated between the quality of the speeches. With respect to job approval, Bush's pretest 20 September foreign policy rating was in the approval half of the scale for 62% of the respondents. After the speech, 87% reported net approval for the current foreign policy problem.

Our panel design, in which one group of respondents evaluated both the 11 and 20 September speeches, provides within-respondents data on the stability of the approval ratings that followed Bush's 11 September speech. Unfortunately, there was significant attrition in sample size from the 11 September pretest to the 20 September posttest. Of the respondents from the 11 September study participating in the 20 September study, 32 returned usable response with both pretest and posttest data. Identical questions were asked on the pretests preceding each speech regarding Bush's job performance in foreign and economic policy. The differences between the pretest ratings reveal how evaluations of Bush and the Bush administration's responses to the terror attacks, before the address to Congress, affected

perceptions of Bush's overall performance in foreign and domestic policy. Data presented in Figure 2 reveal significantly more positive ratings in both economic and foreign policy. His economic policy rating improved by an average of 12.46 points [$t(25) = 3.283$, $p < .003$] and his foreign policy rating was up 18.08 points [$t(25) = 4.198$, $p < .0001$]. Although we lack a domain-free evaluation item, the spillover into economic policy is consistent with a generalized support. The post-speech policy ratings were very positive and quite similar.

Change in the influence of pre-speech foreign policy ratings on post-speech policy approval between 11 and 20 September reveals how Bush's response to the attacks redefined evaluations of his job performance. Within the panel study sample, on 11 September, the pretest foreign policy rating was correlated with the posttest policy rating at the .207 level, the 11 September posttest ratings correlated with the 20 September pretest ratings at .573, and the 20 September pretest-posttest correlation was .796. The correlation with the 20 September pretest data reveals that Bush's post-attack policy contributed toward the overall evaluation of his foreign policy job performance, and the speech to Congress reinforced a now-positive predisposition. Thus, although the 20 September speech was polished, practiced, and delivered with rhetorical flair, the 11 September speech was the defining moment for President George W. Bush.



Figure 2. Bush approval ratings, 11 and 20 September 2001 (within-respondents data).

Discussion

Five hypotheses were at stake in this analysis. First was that the event itself triggered a rally effect. In the hours immediately after the attack, we found evidence of negative emotional arousal—threat, anxiety, fear, and anger—but little positive emotion and a predominantly negative appraisal of Bush's job performance in both economic and foreign policy. Apart from brief, impromptu remarks as he moved about the country on his way back to Washington, Bush was not visible on 11 September until his national address. It is possible, but implausible, that a rally in response to the attacks began prior to his speech.

Our second hypothesis was that the evening address, however sober and subdued, triggered a rally effect by presenting Bush to the nation in an appropriate leadership role, reassuring the nation of the government's stability and capacity to function, while committing the nation to a forceful, retaliatory response to the attacks. The data from our respondents show a significant effect for the Bush address on positive emotions (BAS arousal) and a strong effect on approval ratings of his policy statements. These effects on approval ratings were significantly enhanced for those actually viewing Bush's address.

Third, we examined the available data for evidence of media effects on support for the president. Respondents exposed to the extensive media coverage during the 41 hours after the 11 September speech showed no greater approval than those evaluating Bush immediately after the speech. Media attentives were not more likely to approve, but somewhat less so.

Fourth, we examined support for the hypotheses that the rally effect is conditional on (1) sex and/or (2) party identification. Males and females, Republicans, independents, and Democrats all revealed increased support for Bush, and the differences in amount were small and insignificant. In sum, these data reveal an unconditional, across-the-board surge in support for Bush's policy in the aftermath of his 11 September speech.

In retrospect, although Bush's response to the terrorist attacks clearly falls within the broad category of rally events, this event was unprecedented in scale in U.S. history, including consideration of the Pearl Harbor attack. Both of these events were distinguished as surprise attacks, were directed at national territory and institutions, including military targets, and killed thousands of people. What separates this event from all others is that it truly was an act of mass terror, instilling immediate and personal anxiety arousal in the entire national population and striking at institutional symbols of the nation as a whole. The nation, as a people, turned to the president on the evening of 11 September to receive reassurance and the promise of reciprocity; he provided it. Some 23 million people watched the speech on cable networks and a great many more on network television. Our data suggest that this address reassured people and channeled their anger. The sheer scale of the attacks and their broadcast in real time on network television, coupled with a swift political response viewed by a national audience that received

immediate bipartisan support, mitigated the role of mass media in disseminating elite opinion. Arguably, the rally effect was unconditional because the attack was unconditional. People were affected regardless of partisan orientation or sex, the entire Congress was apparently targeted, and the victims in the planes and buildings were men and women, husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, while the survivors were all of those and their children as well. In sum, such an act of massive terror presents a potential rally event that, by its scale, is *sui generis*.

Relative to the literature on rally events, the public response to 9/11 reveals that the scope of a rally may depend on the scale of the event. A second implication involves the generalization that females are less hawkish and less likely to rally than males. Findings supporting this proposition result from situations of the 1950s through 1990. Studies of more recent situations (Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Schubert, 1998) cast doubt on the premise of female passivity, and in this study, women were no less hawkish then men in their attitudes. It is plausible that gender differences in support for the use of force depend on the nature of the situation and the presence of direct threats to human welfare. A third implication of our results, and of the national response to 9/11, is that terrorist attacks of such massive scale may be counterproductive when leaders respond swiftly, publicly, and forcefully. Although the attacks were successful in initially causing widespread anxiety arousal, these emotions were attenuated by effective acts of leadership in a context of consensual and supportive elite commentary. Last, this study describes an impact of presidential behavior on public opinion that may also play a role in other rally situations, especially when presidents turn to prime-time television for national addresses when committing armed forces abroad.

Our results are subject to some fairly obvious qualifications. We could not, under the pressures of time, nor in good conscience, assign respondents randomly to treatment and control groups—some to view only the speech, some to watch only the network news, some not to watch at all. We could not tailor the evaluation instruments to the specific situation of 11 September, because we were limited to available and approved materials. Of course, when we set the study in motion, we did not even know how Bush would respond (although we did presume that he would speak to the nation later that day). Additionally, our pool of respondents consisted of undergraduates and is not representative of a broad spectrum of the population. However, they are human beings who share a physiology of emotional response with all other humans, and their responses are unlikely to differ systematically to an event of such magnitude. Moreover, their expressed attitudes on comparable factors appear similar to those reported in national opinion polls.

Conclusions

There has been diminution in the perceived stature of the presidency over the past 30 years. It is joined with growing appreciation for the importance of mass media in presenting politics to the public through priming and framing effects.

There is also increasing attention in the professional literature to the importance of rhetoric and, to some extent, oratory in the persuasiveness of presidential communications. On these bases, we did not anticipate the results of this study. When he got up in the morning of 11 September, George W. Bush was a president without a popular mandate. By the end of business that day, he had achieved a mandate. During what was probably a most emotionally taxing day in his life, Bush insisted on returning to Washington, DC. He then made a prime-time televised address to the nation, with little opportunity for rehearsal. It was neither by rhetorical nor oratory merits, nor by media comment, a great speech. Yet it appears from our data to have catapulted him into the highest reaches of presidential approval recorded in the United States, cutting across all categories of political cleavage. At a place and time when the nation needed presidential leadership, George W. Bush fulfilled the office of president. Thus, we regard his address to the nation on 11 September 2001 as a defining presidential moment.

APPENDIX A: Question Wording

Pretest Questionnaire

Emotion (response scale: slightly ↔ extremely)

How *threatened* do you feel right now?
How *reassured* do you feel right now?
How *angry* do you feel right now?
How *determined* do you feel right now?
How *fearful* do you feel right now?
How *inspired* do you feel right now?
How *anxious* do you feel right now?

Job Approval (response scale: strongly approve ↔ strongly disapprove)

How do you feel about President Bush's job performance on foreign policy?
How do you feel about President Bush's job performance on economic policy?

Sex and Age

What is your age?
What is your sex?

Political Attitudes

Who did you vote for in the 2000 national election? (George W. Bush, Al Gore, Ralph Nader, don't remember, did not vote, not old enough to vote)

What party do you identify with politically? (independent, leaning toward Democratic party, leaning toward Republican party, Republican party, Democratic party)

How would you characterize your political attitudes? (liberal, moderate to liberal, moderate, moderate to conservative, conservative)

Media Attention (response scale: never, once or twice a week, several times a week, daily)

How often do you watch network news programs on television (CBS, NBC, ABC, CNN, etc.)?

How often do you read a newspaper (other than the campus paper)?

Posttest Questionnaire

Emotions (response scale: slightly ↔ extremely)

How *threatened* do you feel right now?
How *reassured* do you feel right now?
How *angry* do you feel right now?
How *determined* do you feel right now?
How *fearful* do you feel right now?
How *inspired* do you feel right now?
How *anxious* do you feel right now?

Speech Evaluation

Overall evaluation of the speech. (strong ↔ weak)
President's appearance in the performance of the speech. (nervous ↔ confident)
Quality of the argument. (convincing ↔ unconvincing)
Explanation of the reasons for the decision to commit forces. (confusing ↔ clear)

Policy Approval

Based upon the president's speech and the current situation, how do you feel about President Bush's commitment of United States armed forces? (strongly approve ↔ strongly disapprove)

APPENDIX B: Attrition and Characteristics of Group 1 Respondents

	% of Total		
Characteristics	9/11 (a.m.) Pretested	9/11 (p.m.) Posttest	9/20 Panel
Age < 21	60	61	75
Female	61	65	72
Voted for Gore	36	38	28
Democratic or leaning	51	46	53
Daily TV news viewing	34	35	23
Newspaper reading (daily or several times per week)	49	45	34
N	120	75	32

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