

**Comparative discourse analysis of news articles from
the 2014 and 2019 Hong Kong Movements**

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Abstract

This undergraduate dissertation responds to the two social movements in Hong Kong: the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. The news media plays a vital role in society because their words are deliberately manipulative. As existing literature tends not to disentangle the relationship of discursive practices and their social impacts, our research analysed four news articles retrieved from two opposing news outlets: the Global Times and the Hong Kong Free Press. Analysed by a self-developed critical discourse analysis framework – ‘progressive taxonomy’, we discovered an intensification of lexical choices between the two movements, and also a larger degree of intensification for Global Times due to its pro-government nature and a hostile writing style against the protesters. Throughout the project, we discovered through the intensification of lexical choices, the news outlets are subtly manipulating public opinions for the benefit of their side. The difference in natures of the news outlets could alter a news report’s neutrality and the critical role of news media in diplomatic interactions.

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1.Introduction

In the past decade, two significant democratisation movements happened in 2014 and 2019 respectively.

The Umbrella Movement, also known as the Occupying Central Movement in 2014, marked an awakening for Hongkongers towards the Central Government's intervention in Hong Kong matters. Protesters demanded universal suffrage. Highlights for the movement were the 79-days occupation that happened in parts of the city, and the police fired 87 tear gas at the crowd on the 28th of September 2014 (Chan, 2014).

Echoing the slogan 'We will be back' appearing by the end of the occupation, the government's announcement for the amendment of the extradition bill provoked another new wave of social movement in 2019, alongside an outburst of deep-rooted social discontent. 'Five demands, not one less' was a slogan for protesters, but the demands went further as more social conflicts unveiled. Many see this as a revolutionary process due to the elevation of force for both sides: more tear gas shells, rubber bullets and gunshots used by the police; and Molotov cocktails by the protesters (Careery, 2019).

Amid the political interplay between China and the US, international news media also became important as political ideologies spread through their articles by placing the protests' news as headlines of international news media press for attracting attention from international communities including the press (Agur & Frisch, 2019). Internationalised propaganda could be a

tactic for counterbalancing the Hongkongers' promotion (Zheng, 2019), using the media to spread ideas is necessary to gain worldwide attention. Similarly, the Chinese government also gathered support for its stance at the international level to contend with the protestors by employing state propaganda machines (Zheng, 2019).

Such promotion of political ideologies can be realised through variant discursive practices that make a supposedly neutral report more than a reflection of reality. As found by Ghannam's (2011: 94) study on newspaper ideology, the use of languages can change a supposedly neutral report as 'a vehicle of hidden interpretation'. Even with acknowledgement of the increasingly important role of the English media in the Hong Kong movements, it is unclear **how news articles contribute to the propaganda social practice in the 2014 and 2019 movements**. For example, it is ambiguous whether there is an increase in discursive strategies as a response to the elevation of conflicts across the two movements, and whether some news outlets deploy more discursive strategies than others. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the discursive practices by comparing two English news articles from 2014 and two English news articles from 2019. Each year, one is selected from Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP) and one from the Global Times (GT). The four news articles report on the same social topics: police tactics and protester tactics.

Research questions:

- 1) Is there an **intensification of lexical choice** along with the social movements in 2014 and 2019?
- 2) Is there a different degree of the intensification of lexical choices **between the two opposing news institutions**?

2. Literature review

2.1 Discursive practices in news reports

The news media plays a crucial part in shaping public views. Chouliaraki (2000: 298) suggested that news media has the function of ‘providing information and entertainment’, which under marketisation, the news (described as ‘mass media’) had become a ‘service of the viewer’. In other words, the presentation of the ‘fact’ under the use of different discursive practices has a political function. Its indirect effect is to move the public’s emotion, attempting to create ‘societal consensus’ among its audience (Chouliaraki, 2000: 305). Every word that comes from the news media can have a significant impact on society.

Similarly, the press in Chinese society is described by Rawnsley (2013) as one of the ‘main channel[s] of ideological education’ (p.151) that communicates the images and information the Chinese government hopes to portray. In a variety of discursive practices in dissemination, news reports in China are mostly having the function of propaganda. The propaganda apparatus is crucial to the Chinese ruling for ‘mass mobilisation and education, and a method of persuading the governed of the Party’s legitimacy, authority, and intellectual veracity’ (Rawnsley, 2013:149).

News media also has the function of diplomatic strategy. The dissemination of news in the modern world had promoted a ‘democratisation of responsibility’ (Thompson, 1995: 263, cited in Chouliaraki, 2000), drawing individuals to non-local public issues. Based on this idea of paying attention to outside news, the Chinese government developed the strategic ‘external propaganda’ to attract international business opportunities (Rawnsley, 2013). It is done by ‘revealing the bad news along with the good’ (p.151) – the bad news with a portrayal of good sides of China to boost

the country's image. Rawnsley quoted the release of pictures of self-immolation of Falun Gong in 2001 reassured the government's 'narrative' that Falun Gong is a 'dangerous cult that needed to be controlled' (p.152). Yet, this study did not analyse the use of linguistics resources, otherwise, it could potentially disclose further the discursive strategies at play. Thus, it is an importance for our research to investigate discursive details.

Though previous studies addressed the socio-political impacts of the news media, we realised that limited studies are investigating the use of discursive practices in the news media. This phenomenon implies that most of the general public, including ourselves, were unaware of how different parties employ the discursive practices as a political means. Hong Kong's public opinions were affected by the Chinese propaganda using government mouthpieces, such as the Global Times. In contrast, the force of Chinese propaganda was counterfeited by pro-freedom news outlets, such as the Hong Kong Free Press.

2.2 Theoretical background

2.2.1 *Critical discourse analysis (CDA)*

Many studies that investigated media discourse (e.g., van Dijk, 1997; Chouliaraki, 2000) adopted CDA, which is developed by van Dijk (1987) and Wodak (1997) for analysing ideologies in news reports.

van Dijk (1987) pointed out that the true meanings of words depend on lexical choices. His approach is described as socio-cognitive strategies to analyse the ideologies and attitudes of the newspaper to the readers through various linguistic forms and patterns in the discourse structures. Whereas the discourse-historical method by Wodak (1997) systematically realises the functions and objectives on the structuration of linguistic means influenced by social interaction (Heinemann & Viehweger, 1991, cited in Wodak, 1997: 32). Catalano and Waugh (2020) described these scholar founders of CDA, as mentioned above, carried out ‘critical discourse sociolinguistic analysis’. Above all, Catalano and Waugh (2020) defined CDA as an analysis of the connection between language, ideology, power and social structure. They cited the examination of social inequality as an example, which was legitimised and resisted in language. In other words, CDA is the study of how ideology in language use reflects and affects the power relation in society.

Through the ‘comparative discourse analytical approach’, Ekström and Firmstone (2017) analysed the changing nature of mediated political communication, exploring the polarisation of politics in Europe. As they proposed, CDA allows socio-historical relation analysis, which interprets the ideologies and the power of the socio-political context. The data source of political discourse

reveals the intention of shaping reality and history with the manipulation of language, the embedded power structures grow along with socio-cultural development. Their contextual approach focused on the symbolised representations of politics in textual communication strategies, so as to analyse the shaping of politics at a particular time, which explored the impact of journalistic practices on politics.

Thus, in order to analyse the covert ideology of linguistic structuration, the CDA approach is an ideal framework for our analysis. Our research topic shares the same objective with the above CDA scholars to find out how politics is discursively constructed in the context of rising tension, and focuses on the democratic implications in political communications. The media is subordinate to socio-political objectives as an agent to spread political beliefs that urge receivers to adhere, thus achieving the ideology spreading communication goals. In our case, we perceived that news outlets take sides with the protesters or the government authorities and manipulate public opinions through their articles respectively. The embedded political ideologies are inspected through comparisons between the lexical choices over the movements across years.

2.2.2 Composite taxonomy

Flowerdew's (2012) 'composite taxonomy' was designed to analyse the South China Morning Post's news reporting of the Chinese government claiming the right of abode in Hong Kong, in order to examine the linguistic strategies of discrimination. Flowerdew retrieved the discourse strategies from CDA scholar founders who worked on discriminatory stance CDA research for the embedded discursive practices in linguistic strategies framework (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1989; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Graumann and Wintermantel, 1989; Gruber, 1997; Horvat et al., 1997; Teo, 2000; van Dijk, 1993a, b, 1995; van Dijk and Smitherman-Donaldson, 1988; Wodak et al., 1999). Since their taxonomies concentrate on a single theme of power or discrimination, in order to tailor-make a CDA taxonomy for the situation of Hong Kong, Flowerdew integrated the above taxonomies into a border categorisation. Drawing on previous CDA taxonomies subcategories, four discourse strategies were assembled as a result: delegitimation, negative other representation, scare tactics and blaming victim. In addition, referencing his lexical examples, with the same interest in Hong Kong news media, his composite taxonomy framework contributes to our CDA taxonomy.

i. Delegitimation:

Delegitimation is a tactic to discredit the voices of the minority group to outcast them as illegitimate, referring to the labelling of invalidating notions.

For lexical example, a GT article by Chen and Ji (2021) was titled 'So-called documentary on black-clad riot at HK campus pulled hours before screening'. The author used '[s]o-called' to imply the dissatisfying connotation of the documentary, discrediting the documentary. Also, the protest movement is delegitimised by the referral of a 'black-clad riot', negatively labelling the protests at Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

ii. Negative other presentation:

Negative presentation of others is a strategy for justification of inequality, through negatively connotated social or cultural differences, forms or sustains the negative attitudes. The polarisation assigns traits of discursive stereotypes to the out-group, thus shaping a disavowal of guilt and responsibility. This stereotype enhances the status and power by denying and silencing the disempowered minority voice. The use of over-lexicalisation of 'othering', which uses a range of words with similar meaning, results in pejorative effects that deviate the social norms.

As a lexical example, from a GT article: 'During the anti-extradition bill protests in Hong Kong in 2019, a large number of rioters occupied the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, vandalising the campus.' (Chen and Ji, 2021). Reporting the police siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University, the reporters focused on the 'vandalising' actions of the protesters, which aim to form a negative stereotype on the protesters.

iii. Scare tactics:

Scare tactics refers to the exaggeration of threat, usually figures and statistics, to pose a hostile attitude to the minority group, thus eventually leading to the interests and privileges of the majority group.

A lexical example retrieved from the voice of the author is written by Shen (2021), “Who would dare utter a word in protest, though? In a time reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, anyone could become the next target of prosecution as the red line shifts to meet ‘national needs’”. Mentioning that ‘anyone could become the next target of prosecution’ in the context of a pro-government article, the writer aims to scare the public from expressing their opinions, by threatening the possible outcome – ‘prosecution’.

iv. Blaming victim:

The blaming victim tactic shifts the blame and responsibility to achieve justification and relativisation to social imbalance. Blaming the victim as a scapegoat is a disavowal and denial of responsibility to face a reproach, by justifying the majority group with a shift of responsibility.

Lexical examples include: ‘You reap what you sow. This must have been on Beijing’s mind when it forged ahead with a drastic overhaul of Hong Kong’s electoral system’ (Tam, 2021). As an article from SCMP, another pro-government news outlet, the discourse is scapegoating the pro-democratic politicians for overhauling the electoral system as the reason for reform.

Even though Flowerdew's framework matches with the Hong Kong context, his strategies aimed at examining discrimination. Since HKFP focuses on the positive support for the protestors' side, the discourse strategies that HKFP applied may not be exposed by Flowerdew's framework. Similarly, the composite taxonomy framework could not cover the positive remarks of police in the GT articles. Hence, to analyse the opposite aspect, a derivation of composite taxonomy – 'positive self presentation' is adopted. With reference to the 'socio-cognitive' strategies developed by van Dijk (1997, cited in Flowerdew, 2012: 222-224), positive self-presentation is a sub-category opposed to negative other presentation. These socio-cognitive strategies are developed in his research on racism and discrimination, empowering the majority group and discrediting minority groups.

In contrast to negative other presentation, 'positive self presentation' aims to create a positive image of the in-group. This discourse strategy focuses on the positive traits of the group, and presents with positive connotations to form an inclusive attitude.

A lexical example of positive self presentation is derived from an HKFP article by Ng (2019):

'In the process, we have upgraded Hong Kong from a financial centre to a beacon of democracy in Asia and elevated its people from economic beings to role models of nonviolent human rights defenders.'

Protestors' rebellion gained positive results in the author's view, by presenting the contributions as 'elevat[ing]' and 'upgrad[ing]' Hong Kong into a role model of a democratic city.

Adopting these five discourse strategies, our framework – ‘progressive taxonomy’ is developed for the analysis, for it is a progressive version of the collaborated frameworks. This taxonomy is illustrated in Table 1:

	<i>Discourse strategies</i>	<i>Definition</i>
<i>i.</i>	Delegitimation	Discredit voices of the minority group to outcast them as illegitimate
<i>ii.</i>	Negative other presentation	Formation or maintenance of negative attitudes to achieve justification of inequality
<i>iii.</i>	Scare tactics	Exaggeration of threats to pose a hostile attitude to the minority group
<i>iv.</i>	Blaming victim	Shift of blame and responsibility to achieve justification and relativisation
<i>v.</i>	Positive self presentation	Formation or maintenance of positive attitudes to form positive impression

Table 1: Progressive taxonomy

3. Methodology

3.1 Data collection

Four news articles were selected, two from 2014 and two from 2019. For each year, an article comes from HKFP, a pro-democracy press, and another from GT, a Chinese-affiliated news outlet.

Hong Kong Free Press is a local non-profit news institution. As an independent press crowdfunded by journalists and readers, it aims to monitor the core values and freedoms of Hong Kong with a public code of ethics. HKFP seeks to report without fear or favour, even against political or commercial pressure. Its articles primarily focus on the voiceless and under-reported issues ('About Hong Kong Free Press').

Launched in 2009, Global Times is a subsidiary of the People's Daily. Same with its parenting outlet, both Global Times and the People's Daily are 'principal propaganda publication[s]' of the Chinese government (Cai, 2016). From GT's website, the news outlet positions itself to "eliminate the world's 'information deficit' toward China" ('About Global Times'), which means an international propaganda outlet for the Chinese government. Their stance towards the Chinese foreign policies echoes the government. Yet different from the other mouthpieces, GT has a subjective journalistic style, which it claims to be "tentatively broken away from the journalistic tradition" (ibid).

The topics of the news articles from HKFP match the topics of those from GT; both report on protest tactics and police tactics .Table 3 illustrates the relationship between the four articles:

		<i>2014</i>	<i>2019</i>
<i>I.</i>	HKFP (protest tactics)	Pro-democracy class boycott in protest of Beijing's proposal on political reform (Grundy, 2014) (see Appendix 1)	Hongkongers are more than just the world's most polite protesters (Pang, 2019) (see Appendix 2)
<i>II.</i>	GT (police tactics)	Govt denounces HK protests (Wong, 2014) (see Appendix 3)	Hong Kong police disperse illegal rallies (Chen & Wang, 2019) (see Appendix 4)

Table 3: Relationship of the selected news articles

3.2 Data analysis

From the main CDA frameworks for analysing news articles, Flowerdew's (2012) **composite taxonomy** and van Dijk's (1997) **socio-cognitive strategies** are chosen to analyse the retrieved news articles.

In order to address the first research question, the number of discourse strategies identified in 2014 and 2019 will be compared. The increase in the number of discourse strategies will indicate the intensification of lexical choices.

The second research question builds on the first research question. After applying the progressive taxonomy, qualitative analysis is carried out to compare the degree of intensification in lexical choices between the two opposing news outlets of the articles: HKFP and GT. Along with the quantitative analysis, structured by content categories, the quality of progressive taxonomy is reviewed to interpret the ideologies and power in a socio-political context.

The words of the journalists are the main focus of the analysis, the information presentation and incidents depiction are examined using the progressive taxonomy framework. While the quoted contents, whether directly or indirectly, are not analysed with the framework. Instead, the quality is analysed to understand any stance bias of the author.

4. Results

In this section, results for the investigation of the selected news articles will be presented. The presentation will be structured according to the two research questions. For section 4.1, addressing the first research question, data is presented and interpreted for answering whether the lexical choices had been intensified over the course of the two Hong Kong social movements. Section 4.2, in response to the second research question, presents the intensification of lexical choices to different degrees between HKFP and GT.

4.1 Lexical choices across 2014 and 2019




Chart 1: Total number of discourse strategies in years 2014 and 2019

As shown in Chart 1, the total number of discourse strategies rose from 12 in 2014 to 54 in 2019. This drastic increase in quantity indicates an intensification of lexical choices. For example, in the 2014 articles, the referral to the participants of the class boycott are generally lexically neutral.

From the examples below, protest participants are referred to as ‘students’, and ‘activists’. None of the five discourse tactics is applied in these two referrals. Whilst in the 2019 articles, there are often delegitimising remarks of the participants, as shown in examples (1) and (2):

(1) He said that students themselves would bear most of the strike’s impact, describing it as a ‘self-sacrificing tactic.’ (HKFP, 2014)

(2) Some Hong Kong pro-democracy politicians and activists have expressed opposition to the plan for the nomination threshold as they fear it may bar them from running. (GT, 2014)

Example (3) below is the most delegitimising remark in the 2019 articles. Not only is the adjective ‘radical’ added before the noun, but the author also referred to the participants as ‘rioters’. Using the adjective ‘radical’ and the noun ‘rioters’ depicts the protesters as illegitimate, as it focuses on the negative actions of the protesters’ ‘besiege’ and ‘deface’ despite the political demands behind them. Similarly, in example (4), the participants who engaged in clashes with the police are referred to as ‘the mob’. The noun ‘mob’ carries a negative connotation that one could interpret and perceive the protesters as crime-related persons who bring harm to society as delegitimation.

(3) Radical rioters besieged the liaison office of central government in Hong Kong and defaced the national emblem of China in the evening. (GT, 2019)

(4) The mob tried to use barricades to push back the police who were outnumbered by the protesters. (GT, 2019)

Examples (3) and (4) above reveal the reporters' attempts to impact the public perception towards the participants. By the delegitimising reference on the protesters, the reporters enforce a negative public image to disempower the legitimacy of the protesters without sufficient context or justifications. The intensification of lexical choice in the referral of the protesters is a manipulation of public opinion.

Referring to Chart 1, the rise in the number of discourse strategies from 12 to 57 indicates the emergence of 45 discourse strategies. The quantity in 2019 increased by around four times compared to 2014, displaying a significant intensification of lexical choices across years. Such an intensification implies a more severe situation in the protest.

4.2 Lexical choices across HKFP and GT

There is a different degree of intensification of lexical choices between the two opposing news outlets. A total of 46 occurrences of discourse strategies are identified in the GT articles across years, which is more than double of the 21 occurrences in the HKFP articles (see Chart 2).




Chart 2: Total number of discourse strategies in GT and HKFP

As shown in Chart 2, the total number of strategies in GT articles increased from 9 to 37, increased by 28. While the HKFP 14 occurrences increased from 3 to 17, accelerated 14 in the quantity of strategies. The intensification in GT nearly doubled the difference in HKFP, the level of variations between each outlet across years showcased a diverse degree of intensification.

In Chart 3, the difference of occurrences in discourse strategies in 2019 from the two outlets is presented. All discourse strategies have increased, except the absent strategies (ie. scare tactics from both outlets, and blaming victims from HKFP). The degree of intensification of GT is larger than HKFP. An example is the negative other presentation, that the occurrences in the GT articles have counted 8 more than in the HKFP articles as the most significant difference.

The different occurrences of discourse strategies in 2019 of the two outlets




Chart 3: The difference occurrences of discourse strategies in 2019 of the two outlets

According to Chart 4, the increases are reflected in the depiction of protesters (referral of protesters, depiction of protest movements, evaluation of the protesters' tactics, and presentation of the protesters' traits), the police (evaluation of the police tactics and presentation of the police's traits) and the commentaries on external parties, the discourse strategies are organized as 'content categories'.

The different occurrences of content categories in 2019 of the two outlets




Chart 4: The different occurrences of content categories in 2019 of the two outlets

i. Referral of the protesters

With reference to Chart 4, lexical choices are intensified for both news outlets in terms of the referral of the protesters, but in different strategies. Both outlets generally referred to the protesters in neutral terms in the 2014 articles, yet derived away from neutrality in 2019. The HKFP articles used **positive self presentation** to refer to the protesters in examples (5), (6) and (7):

(5) Hongkongers are more than just the world's most polite (6) protesters (HKFP, 2019)

(7) Some frontline protesters argue that targeting specific shops and chains is a deliberate, political act. (HKFP, 2019)

In the 2019 HKFP article, protesters are referred to as 'Hongkongers' (5) in the title, and this remark is used throughout the article. Here, this example is an intensification of lexical choice from the neutral remark of the 'protesters'. This naming of protestors grouped all Hong Kong people to the protestors' side against the government. The inclusive self presentation shows the author's assumption that the protestors are the majority, and presented as if it is a universal fact. The exaggeration in presenting the number of protestors is a positive self presentation that supports the protestors that they are not alone while fighting the authority. Another positive presentation is the polite image of 'protestors' (6) in creating a positive image of the protesters for focusing on the good characteristic of the protesters. More, the referral of 'frontline protesters' in example (7) is also an example of positive self presentation. The adjective 'frontline' may offer the readers a valiant image of the protesters who 'vandalised' shops and chains, with the justification of political motives behind the actions. From the neutral referral of 'protesters' to adding a heroic adjective, HKFP is deliberately signalling their support towards this group of protesters.

If on a stance opposite the ‘frontline protesters’, like GT, they would be referred to otherwise.

Referring to the same group of protesters, GT derived from neutrality to **delegitimisation**:

(8) Radical rioters besieged the liaison office of central government in Hong Kong and defaced the national emblem of China in the evening. (GT, 2019)

(9) The mob tried to use barricades to push back the police who were outnumbered by the protesters. (GT, 2019)

The application of delegitimation in referring to the protesters is demonstrated in examples (8) and (9) from the GT articles. Unnaturally, this occurrence from GT reveals a chauvinistic stance of the author. To merely report on the protesters’ actions locally, such as towards the police and the assemblies in different districts, the reporters would still use neutral nouns in referring to the protesters. Yet to report on the protest and the damage at the central government's liaison office, the incidents seem to have touched the borderline of the reporters, triggering the delegitimising calling of ‘radical rioters’. Only when the property interest of the central government is directly affected, the GT reporters would use delegitimation to call names of the protesters. Not only does it signify the large group of protesters engaged in the clash, but the description of “the mob” is also a delegitimising naming of the protesters. Therefore, to refer to a big group of protesters as ‘the mob’ delegitimise the protesters as if they are ‘violators of pivotal social norms’ (Flowerdew, 2012: 228).

The intensification of lexical choices in different strategies reflects polarisation of stance through polarised referral to the protesters. On one side, HKFP tries to boost the image of the protesters – the group they support with the inclusive positive self presentation, and attempts a neutral referral. While on the other side, GT uses delegitimation to create a negative public opinion. In this sense, the application of distinctive strategies marks a difference in the degree of intensification between the two news outlets.

ii. Depiction of protest movements

Regarding Chart 4, the lexical choices are intensified for HKFP articles on the depiction of protest movements, whereas a tone down in the 2019 GT article. HKFP's degree of intensification is more intense than GT in this sense.

The protest movements are **delegitimised and negatively presented** by the distortion in presenting the protesters' demands and their views towards the notion of universal suffrage. Examples (10) and (11) is an example of negative other presentation, while example (12) is an example of delegitimation:

Some Hong Kong pro-democracy politicians and activists have expressed opposition to the plan for the nomination threshold as they (10) fear it may bar them from running. (GT, 2014)

The conjunction 'as' in the sentence separates the clause of quoting from the 'pro-democracy politicians and activists' and the reason for their 'opposition to the plan for the nomination threshold'. The journalist writes that the reason for the opposition is that the threshold will bar them from running in elections (10). This accusation of the motive for starting Occupy Central without proper quote and reasoning could be considered a false accusation towards the pro-democracy politicians and activists. It discredits the Movement by misrepresenting the root cause of Occupy Central.

They (11) threatened to seal off the heart of Hong Kong's financial district as they push their demands for a (12) "genuine" democracy. (GT, 2014)

Example (11) forms a negative public impression of the Umbrella Movement. It focuses on the negative part of the occupy movement, in which the ‘heart of Hong Kong’s financial district’ is occupied by protesters, affecting the economic activities in the city. Yet, it ignores the motive for the protesters to demand ‘true universal suffrage’ as mentioned in the HKFP 2014 article, and in the protest slogan 「我要真普選」 which means ‘I want true universal suffrage’. The intention for the negative other presentation is to disempower the movement by negatively reviewing the incidents and demands of the protesters. The quotation mark in example (12) is the author’s mockery towards the pro-democracy side, making the phrase an example for the use of delegitimation. In its previous paragraph, the quote for ‘universal suffrage’ promised by the NPC is not put in quotation marks, and once if the same thing is demanded from the pro-democracy side, an opponent of the NPC, the author mocks that it is not the democracy that she supports. The author assumes that the ‘universal suffrage’ promised by the NPC is the ‘right’ form of democracy, while the other “genuine” form demanded is the ‘wrong’ one.

The 2019 GT article shifts the focus from the movement to the protesters. The authors stated their disapproval of the 2019 protests through the description of the protest assemblies. In the 2014 GT article, there were no delegitimising remarks of the assemblies from the author’s voice. However, in 2019, the reporters express their personal opinions through the use of adjectives for **delegitimation**.

On another day of (13) illegal rallies in Hong Kong, police fired tear gas to disperse protesters who repeatedly ignored warnings and engaged in a standoff near the liaison office of the central government in Hong Kong on Sunday. (GT, 2019)

(14) Unauthorized assembly also took place at other locations on Sunday including Causeway Bay and the Golden Bauhinia Square near the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre in Wan Chai. (GT, 2019)

The description of ‘illegal rallies’ (13) is a repetition of the title of the article in the 2019 GT article, which is a reinforcement of the journalist’s stance that the protest has no legal ground to happen. In example (14), the protest assembly is delegitimised as ‘unauthorised’. The adjectives added by the journalist reflect that she assumes that rallies and assemblies that take place in Hong Kong without getting legal approval from the police should be considered ‘illegal’ and ‘unauthorised’. Even with a switched discourse tactic, the quantity of identified discourse strategies still decreased by one, marking a tone-down for GT.

For HKFP, the 2014 article is generally neutral in presenting the protesters’ demands, but derived from neutrality in 2019. This means an intensification of lexical choices. Below are examples from 2019 HKFP articles using **delegitimation towards the Chinese government**, and some **delegitimising referral to the protest assemblies**:

We must remember that the enemy is not mainland Chinese people, but the Chinese state and the Chinese and Hong Kong elite who benefit from its (15) repressive rule. (HKFP, 2019)

And perhaps instead of trying to justify or even simply explain our actions to people who are more invested in their ideas of us than in understanding the reasons we have resorted to these tactics, we should dare to demand greater empathy and real solidarity in the face of (16) a far greater tyranny. (HKFP, 2019)

These examples justify the reasons for protesting. Referencing the universal suffrage defined by the Chinese government, delegitimation is used towards the ruling of the Chinese government in the 2019 HKFP article. The author discredited the Chinese government's proposal as a 'repressive rule' (15) to show his stance against the authority, standing along with the targeted readers – the in-group protestors. A sense of understanding made the article persuasive. Furthermore, the author referred to the Chinese government as 'a far greater tyranny' (16) in the last paragraph of the 2019 article, in response to the condemnation by the police as the police are commonly seen as a crucial part of tyranny as a tool to repress.

The emphasis on solidarity this time around is a reaction to the Umbrella Movement and its aftermath – when (17) disputes between factions led to widespread disillusionment and apathy towards Hong Kong politics. (HKFP, 2019)

Concerning the two movements, this example from the 2019 HKFP article mentions the development of Hong Kong politics due to the 2014 Umbrella Movement. The 2014 Umbrella Movement 'led to widespread disillusionment and apathy' (17). The author delegitimized it as a crack in the society, which caused the social harmony to fall apart due to politics. The author recalled the failure to remind his readers to beware of this regretful mistake.

The intensification in lexical choice of the HKFP article marks the author's depiction of the political climate of Hong Kong, which the use of discourse strategies is to express his discontent towards the central government and his provision for the 2019 protest to succeed in reaching the demands. On the other side, with the misrepresented demands of the Umbrella Movement, the GT authors attack the 2019 protest movements by delegitimising the protest assemblies. Yet, a shift of focus still means a tone-down because of the decreased quantity of discourse tactics.

iii. Evaluation of the protesters' tactics

For protesters' tactics, an increased number of lexical choices is shown in HKFP 2019 article, while the count in GT 2019 article remains still (see Chart 4).

To report and evaluate the protesters' actions, **delegitimation and negative other presentation** are used to reinforce the focus on actions that could be perceived as negative traits of the protesters. This shapes a negative public stereotype towards the protesters and delegitimise their actions. Below are some significant examples:

Over 60 people were arrested on Friday night at the student-led rally in support of the class boycotts after hundreds of protesters (18) broke into a restricted area next to the government headquarters. (GT, 2014)

This example from the 2014 GT article is a presentation of the negative characteristics of the protest. To describe the action of '[breaking] into a restricted area' is to negatively put the fact for the 'entrance' of the Civil Square, where it was restricted at the time. Such description emphasises the negative trait of the protesters, and with the report that '[o]ver 60 people were arrested' during the 'broke-in', the author others the protesters as a minority group of criminals.

The demonstration was meant as (19) revenge for the violence that took place at a subway station in Yuen Long on July 21. (GT, 2019)

The subject for the 'violence' in example (19) is vague, confusing the readers about the violent group in the July 21 incident. This is to trick the readers into perceiving that the protesters take the 'violence' action, thus presenting a negative image of the protesters and the protest movement

that they are targeting the innocent, and eventually forming stereotypes for the public through the tricky use of discursive practices. The quantities of the 2014 and 2019 discourse from the GT articles on the evaluation of the protesters remained as there is no intensification over the years.

(20) Attacking individuals is not only (21) counterproductive; it is also (22) fundamentally contrary to the values we are fighting for: a fair and just system where we all have equal rights to political participation. (HKFP, 2019)

The author delegitimised the act of targeting individuals as ‘attacking’ (20), which imposed a negative attitude of unreasonable violence to the act. The author criticised with own opinion that the violence act tactic is impractical as ‘counterproductive’ (21) and ‘fundamentally contrary’ (22). By emphasising the value of equality in political rights, attacking stores with owners from the opposite stance violated the demands of this protest. These examples indicated that the author stood only for peaceful democracy pursuit.

This is not to say that we cannot (23) condemn the nativist tendencies of particular violent acts. (HKFP, 2019)

The author also delegitimised the protest tactic with ‘condemn’ in own opinion. ‘Condemn’ (23) delegitimised the nature of the protest tactic, shifted focus from the universal value to nativism, which is promoting political ideology from native local citizens’ aspect and against the immigrants. Nativism is regarded as delegitimation since this label is usually unacceptable by nativists, ‘patriots’ would be preferred instead. Also, describing the protest tactic as ‘violent’ acts showcased delegitimation. The author stood against the government, as well as the protest tactic.

For this content category, HKFP's degree of intensification in lexical choices is more remarkable than GT, which shows a difference in the perception of the two outlets. Though the GT articles negatively represent the protesters as the other group by mentioning their tactics, there are also conflicts within the group of protesters. The HKFP authors lexically attack the protest actions that they do not agree with by delegitimation. In comparison, the GT journalists are more consistent with their stance, as they unite and support whoever takes the same stance with them. It is a significant finding that HKFP intensifies its lexical choice towards the other protesters, who are supposed to be an in-group with the authors, implying an internal division.

iv. Evaluation of the police's tactics

Apart from the protesters' tactics, for the police's tactics, an increased number of lexical choices is shown in GT articles (see Chart 4), while such evaluation is not found in both HKFP articles.

Police tactics are evaluated with **blaming victims**, which the discourse strategy is only found in the 2019 GT article:

After the standoff between the police and protesters for some time during which protesters hurling bottles and stones toward the police, the police began to (24) gradually move forward.
(GT, 2019)

This example uses negative other presentation first to bring out the actions taken by the protesters, so that the readers would share the victim-blaming with the author, instead of empathy towards the protesters. This is to play on the cause-effect logic, that the protesters' act of hurling bottles and stones is the cause for the police to 'gradually move forward' (24).

Police have also (25) borne the pressure of residents who think they acted too slowly to protect public security. (GT, 2019)

GT's author also brings in other parties for blaming victims, so as to justify police tactics. Example (25) from the 2019 GT article groups the residents with the police, to justify that not only the police hope to end the 'violent' protests, but also demands personal safety from 'residents' living near the protest area. This is to legitimise the tactics employed by the police, to counter the criticism of 'police violence' in the later paragraph from US Congressman, giving the ground for the police's execution of various tactics.

Whereas the GT mentioned the tactic for the police with **both positive self presentation and negative other presentation:**

As the protestors clashed with police in Yuen Long on Saturday, (26) Chinese mainland internet users took to social media to show their support for the police. (GT, 2019)

Mentioning in earlier clauses about protest incidents, the second part of the sentence changes the subject to introduce the supporting movement of Chinese netizens on social media (26). It first informs about the dismissive attitudes of the protesters towards the police, applying negative other presentation to problematise the protest in Yuen Long, then the support from the other stance, the Chinese netizens. In turn, the use of positive self presentation reveals an inclusive attitude towards the Chinese netizens and the Hong Kong police, and othering the protesters.

The topic hashtag (27) ‘Hong Kong police’ was viewed more than 200 million times as of press time. (28) The topic ‘safeguard Hong Kong’ was viewed 1.47 billion times. (GT, 2019)

‘Safeguard Hong Kong’ is an organisation (守護香港大聯盟) and a slogan of the pro-government group in Hong Kong. In example (27), the topic is ‘viewed 1.47 billion times’, a huge number of views, which implies that people supporting the ‘Hong Kong police’ (28) are a majority. This builds a sense of belonging within the pro-government group as they feel that they are the majority in society.

For the HKFP articles, the police's tactics are not mentioned for that their main focus is on the protest tactics. Yet, as a pro-government news outlet, GT attempts to create a better image for the police that is on their same side, so it uses various tactics to justify and glorify the police's action. Thus, the intensification of lexical choice is more intense for GT than HKFP, in the category of evaluating the police's tactics.

v. Presentation of the protesters' traits

Apart from the police's tactics, the protesters' traits are also presented. The presentation of protesters' traits increases for HKFP (see Chart 4).

The examples from HKFP legitimised protestors' image with **positive self presentation**:

(29) Pro-democracy class boycott in (30) protest of Beijing's proposal on political reform (HKFP, 2014)

During the 2014 (31) pro-democracy Umbrella Movement, multiple op-eds focused on participants' 'politeness' and 'orderliness', marvelling at how they would always clean up after themselves after marches. (HKFP, 2019)

For the 2014 HKFP article title, describing the protest tactic as 'pro-democracy' (29) is a positive self presentation, through association with the universal value – 'democracy'. The 'pro-democracy' ideology supported the protestor's stance and tactic with a tempting pursuit and assumed the opposing government side as non-democratic. Another positive presentation is the lexical choice of 'protest' (30). 'Protest', in this sense, carries a positive connotation compared with 'illegal rallies' used in the 2019 GT article. In the 2019 HKFP article, the author also described the 2014 movement as 'pro-democracy' (31). The universal value, democracy, remained attached to the protestors' side.

With all of this internal reflection on the part of Hongkongers in mind, if western audiences' sympathy continues to be contingent on Hongkongers' fulfillment of their (32) fantasies of peaceful protest, this should give us some pause. (HKFP, 2019)

The polite image imposed by international media constructed unrealistic ‘fantasies’ (32) in western audiences’ minds. This explained why only the peaceful protest tactic was welcomed by the international audiences, but not the vandalism tactic discussed in this 2019 HKFP article.

(33) Some frontline protesters argue that targeting specific shops and chains is a deliberate, political act. (HKFP, 2019)

Apart from ‘Hongkongers’, another positive naming is ‘frontline protesters’ (33), which contradicted the GT’s naming as “the mob” or ‘radical rioters’ (GT, 2019). This naming is relatively neutral compared with the lexical choice of opposing news outlets.

The negative presentation of GT towards the protesters is not counted in this category, for they have been counted in the other content categories, such as in the referral of the protesters. Here, the focus is much on the HKFP’s positive presentation of the protesters for gaining them more support. Intensification of lexical choices is more intense for HKFP in this content category.

vi. Presentation of the police's traits

Despite the protesters' traits, the police's traits are also presented with increased occurrences in the GT articles, as shown in Chart 4. Not only the police's images are improved by scapegoating the protesters, but they are also enhanced by **positive self presentation** that focuses on presenting their positive traits:

Police show (34) restraint in handling demonstrators (GT, 2014)

(35) Police exercise restraint during escalating violent protests (GT, 2019)

The subtitles for both GT articles presented the positive traits of the police, which the police administration is in 'restraint' as mentioned in (34) and (35), given the delegitimising remark of the social movements in the titles. For the 2014 example, positive self presentation creates contrast with the 'demonstrators', and thus a positive impression is presented to the readers. Similar to the 2019 example, the 'restraint' of the police is contrasting with the 'escalating violent protests', creating a positive outlook for the police. Putting this mention as the subtitle of the article signifies the author's stance at the beginning, as the journalists' positive remark of the police 'handling [of the] demonstrators', or the 'escalating violent protests' means that she is supporting the police, marking that the protesters are in the opposite group.

The Hong Kong police (36) acted in accordance with regulations and in a restrained manner on Sunday, but about 8: 40 pm, protesters rushed out from an alley and (37) threw bottles and bricks at the police (GT, 2019).

This sentence is a cross-use of positive self presentation (36) and negative other presentation (37). By using both discourse tactics, the conflict between the manners of the police and the protesters arises. It depicts that the police work in a ‘manner’, while the protesters are not, as they ‘threw bottles and bricks at the police’ (37), which is not a mannered action compared to the police ‘acted in accordance with regulations’. The above example created a positive image of the police by the polarising contrast with the protesters.

After (38) repeated warnings and constant provocations, the police started to disperse protestors by firing tear gas. (GT, 2019)

This example positively justifies the police’s use of tear gas. Its syntax structure places the cause, ‘[a]fter repeated warnings and constant provocations’ (38) , before the fact that the police fired tear gas against the protesters. An implication for such syntax arrangement is to get the moral ground, which the protesters’ ignore and provocations towards the police effects in the police fire of tear gas. This is to shift the blame to the protesters to be ‘disperse[d]’, legitimising police tactics.

An increased occurrence of discourse strategies is found in the GT articles. GT presents police images positively as ‘restraints’ in contrast to the relatively negative impression of protesters. However, there are no discourse strategies in HKFP regarding the police’s traits throughout the years, the absent presentation results in an unchanging degree of lexical choices. Consequently, the level of lexical choice intensification of GT outweighs HKFP.

vii. Presentation of protesters' allies

Not only the protesters alone are depicted, but also the supporting allies are presented with equal amounts of discourse strategies, the lexical choices remain at the same degree (see Chart 4).

For the topic of protest tactic, despite the class boycott and vandalism tactics in 2014 and 2019 respectively, the two HKFP authors focused on the protest tactic of approaching potential allies with **positive self presentation**:

Recently, HKU's student union increased its (39) efforts to reach out to international students.
(HKFP, 2014)

In the 2014 HKFP article, the author mentioned reaching out to international students so as to clarify the criticism of using international students as a tool to boost participation. The author referred to the act of approaching foreign students as 'efforts' (39) to gain the understanding that it is not necessarily using them, but an inclusive act to let non-local students understand the issues in their community, which reinforced the positive attitude towards the protest tactic.

It may also be (40) more fruitful to find allies who understand that violence is simply a means employed in a particular context to achieve particular aims – that rather than condemning the violence of particular individuals and acts, we should turn our attention to the violence of the state and the police that creates the conditions for such acts to occur. (HKFP, 2019)

In the 2019 HKFP article, the author deliberately included self using the personal pronoun 'we' which indicates the stance with the protesters' side. Positive self presentation with the description 'fruitful' (40) legitimises allies who support the author's self-perception.

The depiction of the supporting allies is only involved in the HKFP articles. However, this finding does not present any intensification. Since the protest allies are presented positively with an equal amount of strategies in both 2014 and 2019 articles, there is no increase or decrease. While the GT articles never impose positive connotations on self-allies, the number of discourse strategies remains zero for this content category. The lexical choices for presenting protest allies remain at the same degree.

viii. Criticism of external parties

As shown in Chart 4, the lexical choice intensification is found in both outlets. The degree of intensification is higher than HKFP articles for the criticism of external parties. With the enlarged scale of protest in 2019, there were more parties involved in comparison with 2014. The international media and audiences are mentioned with **negative other presentation**.

Over the past week, international media reports on the Hong Kong protests have been (41) saturated with pictures of destroyed shopfronts. (HKFP, 2019)

In the 2019 HKFP article, the author negatively presents the ‘international media reports’ so as to other them as another group of media out of Hong Kong. Negative attribution builds upon international reporting by emphasising the saturated (41) overuse of stereotypes on protesters, indicating the author’s perception that these reports’ content towards the protest might be limited to one stereotypical image.

At the root of this is also (42) racism: the insistence on seeing Hongkongers as passive and docile objects, rather than active political subjects. (HKFP, 2019)

Western audiences who previously lauded us for our peaceful tactics now condemn us, because they are more invested in their (43) fixed projections of who we are, than understanding why we act the way we do. (HKFP, 2019)

The author then labelled othering ‘international reporting’ as spreading ‘racism’(42). Western audiences who received these peaceful protest ‘fantasies’, constructed a ‘fixed projection’ (43) on the Hong Kong protesters. Once the protest nature in 2019 derived from their expectation of

vandalism, the relatively intense act would be unacceptable from these western audiences' perspectives. The author presents the Western media negatively so as to other them and further impose negative connotations on what they reported.

Others have called on frontline protesters to exercise caution, (44) if only because vandalism may cause international opinion of the Hong Kong protests to sour. (HKFP, 2019)

The author also cited the international reporting's proposition on 'frontline protesters' tactic of vandalism, to express own opinion. The tactic was discouraged by international reporting, worrying that might undesirably cost the reputation of protestors to divert from a positive peaceful image to a negative brutal figure. Since the western audiences value the peaceful and polite idealised presentation of Hong Kong protestors, they believed the peaceful projection tactic would better gain the international audiences understanding and support, rather than attaching the violent image which demoralised their support. However, in the author' own perspective, international reporting was viewed negatively (44), since the author believed the act should not be condemned, but understood and contextualised.

Despite the negative presentation of international parties by HKFP, the authors of the 2019 GT article also commented on the East-West conflicts using **negative other presentation**:

Western media targeted the police and tried to (45) smear their role in the Global Times reporter's opinion. (GT, 2019)

Western and Hong Kong media have (46) blamed the police for their alleged brutality against protesters, but deliberately ignored protestors' violent provocation. (GT, 2019)

These two paragraphs are the negative other presentation mainly towards the Western media by negatively referencing their comment on the 2019 protests in examples (45) and (46). The journalists accuse that the Western media ‘smear’ the work done by the police and ‘blame’ the police for their tactics. These action verbs suggest that the journalists negatively receive the Western commentaries of the police’s tactics, as they go against their stance. The directness of these commentaries is marked very intensively with the phrase ‘in the Global Times reporter’s opinion’, directly pinpointing the remark of the journalists. A possible intention for mentioning the ‘Western media’ with the use of negative other presentation is that GT has a Key Performance Indicator (KPI) that rates quotes from foreign media as a success (Cai, 2016). The reporters are intentionally invoking conflicts by intense lexical choice, and attracting replies from the foreign press so as to achieve the aim of getting mentions.

The lexical choice intensification reflects the othering of international parties as the number strategies emerged in both outlets in 2019. The negative connotation of international reporting, despite the opposing stances, both outlets perceive the western media and audiences as others. The number of negative presentations is higher in HKFP articles for the criticism of external parties. HKFP criticises not only the reporting media, but also the audiences who are influenced by it. At the same time, GT poses a negative attitude only towards the media, since GT journalists collocate western and Hong Kong anti-police media as the other group. The broader focus of HKFP leads to a diverse degree of intensification between two news outlets..

Borrowed words

Aside from the composite taxonomy framework, the quotations implied the bias of the author. The HKFP articles are balanced in citing voices, which it quoted diversely from both sides as they report the news. The HKFP articles quoted from both the student leaders, and from the students who do not support the class boycott in 2014, against the news outlet's stance. However, the **GT quotations** are obviously biased towards the Chinese authorities as they have one-sided quotes only from government officials, and the voice of the other side is absent. For instance, the 2014 GT article quotes thrice from 'The central government', and interviews the pro-Beijing officials, such as Stanley Chan Wing-leung, Stanley Ng Chau-pei, and Regina Ip Lau Suk-ye. Even if they cite interviews from the students, they would only choose to cite the contents that are unfavourable to the pro-democracy side.

(47) Another student protester from the Chinese University of Hong Kong surnamed Ho said on the same report that she feared arrest for participating in the Occupy movement which may leave her with a criminal record. (GT, 2014)

The citation (47) from the student protester about 'arrest' and 'criminal record' is to deter the people from joining the protest, by mentioning the possible legal consequences they will bear. The author speaks through her words to scare the public from participating in the Umbrella Movement. By quoting words from others could give an impression that not only represents the opinion of the author, but also from the other members of society.

(48)The situation is escalating, Wong warned. (GT, 2019)

The reporting verb ‘warned’(48) is a severe express elevation of the protest situation. Such strong wordings deliver the message to the public that they will be in danger because of the protest. While in 2014, the deterrent is deliberate, the ‘warning’ in 2019 is explicitly expressed.

The biased GT quotations show an obvious stance that supports the central government; it manipulates public opinion by citing words beneficial to their side only. While the balanced quotes of HKFP indicate that the news outlet, though claiming to be supporting the protesters, still attempts to publish neutral news reports.

5. Discussion

In the above analyses, we observed a few phenomena on the discursive practices in news articles.

The intensification of lexical choices demonstrates the needs for intensified political discourse strategies in archiving ideologies spreading. Nonetheless, not all of the taxonomies implemented are applicable for these four articles, the absent discourse strategies also indicate the intensified political dispute in 2019. For scare tactics, none of this strategy is found from both news outlets in both 2014 and 2019. This indicates that scare tactic is no longer a helpful approach for ideology spreading nowadays, as the public became less conforming, scare tactic may intensify rebellion in reverse. Likewise, the strategy of blaming victim is only found in GT's 2019 article, the emergence of new discourse strategies indicates the intensified lexical choice, as influenced by the polarisation of political conflicts in 2019.

We observed a difference in the nature between the two outlets. For HKFP, though it claimed to be supporting the pro-democracy stance, they still publish balanced and neutral news articles with minimal journalist's opinions. The 2014 HKFP article attempts to maintain a balance of crafting criticism to both sides by using delegitimation to discredit both sides, in a professional manner. In comparison, it is different for GT, which displayed its stance in their reports by a subjective writing style, namely an overload of progressive taxonomy, and one-sided citations. These differences in the reporting styles and opposing stances resulted in a dissimilar presentation on the same protest movements in 2014 and 2019.

As reviewed in Section 2.1, the analysis in the previous section showed the importance of news as a means of diplomacy. With the reports in English – an international lingua franca, these articles resonate the principle of an “external propaganda” in China. Examples (34) and (35) from the GT articles reports the negative protest news along with a positive presentation of the police, is echoing the “revealing the bad news along with the good” (Rawnsley, 2013: 151). The reporters reveal an ‘anti-government’ protest against the central government and project the good side of the police. Also, we saw both outlets involving in the criticism of the Western media, such as the delegitimising review of HKFP in examples (42) and (43); and a direct criticism from GT in examples (45) and (46). These examples mark interactions with the parties outside the region, on the sense of media presentation. Therefore, the observed phenomenon demonstrates how journalists attempt to interfere with international opinions by manipulating discursive practices in their report of social events.

6. Conclusion

For our two research questions on intensification of lexical choices between opposing news institutions across the two movements, we developed the progressive taxonomy framework with reference to Flowerdew's (2012) taxonomy and one of van Dijk's (1997) socio-cognitive strategies. The five discourse strategies were counted and presented in charts to visualise the intensification of lexical choices across years; the number of discourse strategies between the opposing news outlets is also compared with content categories in Section 4.

The findings of discourse strategies and quotes answered the role of news articles as political propaganda along with the varying degree of lexical intensification. The linguistic propaganda tactics are showcased in solid quantity, which proves the rising tension of the polarising political conflicts, as well as filling the research gap of news articles contributed as a propaganda social practice in the 2014 and 2019 movements. By comparing the discursive practices in English news articles about the Hong Kong movements in 2014 and 2019, the change in lexical choice across years is proved to shift along with the intensified political disputes. In response to the political change across the two movements, political discourse strategies increase in both protester and government stances by analysing news articles from opposing news outlets. As discussed in Section 5, the opposing outlets GT and HKFP demonstrate variation in the number of discursive strategies usage between outlets.

Our research is an ethnography study to understand contemporary politics in the form of CDA linguistics analysis, the influence of power and ideology on language use is visible in quantity. The rationale of reality construction through discourse explains how the lexical choice is embedded with socio-political ideology; in our research context, the role of discursive strategies provides insight into understanding Hong Kong's evolving political struggles. More importantly, for political discourse, the intention of an author may be disentangled by their organisation. Through acknowledging the discursive ideology, the form and function relationship of language use are reflected. Language is shaped and embedded with ideologies as its nature, absolute neutrality is hardly formed in language. This CDA research could ultimately contribute to social change and bring about social justice by raising awareness of the ideology's influence while interpreting the biased lexical choices of radical news outlets. Overall, the purpose of analysing the language used as political strategies is not only to raise awareness to the general public, but also to be implemented to righting or mitigating them.

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Appendix.

Appendix 1: 2014 HKFP article

Pro-democracy class boycott in protest of Beijing's proposal on political reform

Tom Grundy

by TOM GRUNDY

14:04, 19 SEPTEMBER 2014

At least a thousand University of Hong Kong students are expected to take part in a week-long pro-democracy class boycott next week, according to organisers.

Student leaders said the strike, set to commence next Monday, is in protest of Beijing's conservative reform proposal for Hong Kong's 2017 chief executive election. Yvonne Leung, organiser and president of the Hong Kong University Students' Union, said the level of interest in the class boycott was "above average" for a demonstration on political reform.

"There will be other civil disobedience actions to follow", she said, as the city braces itself for a series of "occupation" protests organised by pro-democracy group Occupy Central.

Alex Chow, secretary-general of the Hong Kong Federation of Students, said the class boycott represents "a starting point for a non-cooperative movement to reengage students and society as a whole". He said that students themselves would bear most of the strike's impact, describing it as a "self-sacrificing tactic."

The mood on campus, however, was uncertain. Antonio Shek, undergraduate student in the department of medicine, supported the protest's aims but said he would not be striking. "My classes are about healing people, so if I skip classes it may affect my future," he said.

Some students remained undecided whilst others, such as undergraduate student Claire Leung, pledged only to boycott some of their classes.

"Some classes are compulsory and I have no choice because it counts towards my assessment," said Leung. Though she will boycott some of her other law classes, (6) she does not believe it will affect government policy. Instead, she said the purpose of the strike is to "show our attitude, show our stand and it is to fight for our own future."

Recently, HKU's student union increased its efforts to reach out to international students.

"Their participation can lead to [increased] media attention from foreign countries and this will help the democratisation of Hong Kong... we are sharing the same universal values", said Yvonne Leung.

Leung denies that it is an effort to boost participation, saying the union had a constitutional responsibility to reach out to foreign students. "Our membership includes not only local but non-local students... we must include them in our activities –we're not forcing anyone," she said.

Isha Sengupta, an undergraduate psychology student from India, was among several international

students who were unaware of the strike. “I’m not really aware of what the strikes are exactly about so I’m not going to go on strike. I don’t believe in doing something just blindly,” she said.

Bunly Soeung, a Cambodian student at the Faculty of Education, also did not know about the strike but would be barred from participating anyway. “Actually, I got a scholarship from the university and they do not allow me to get involved in any political activities at all,” Soeung said.

Students from the mainland were reluctant to voice their opinion on record. An undergraduate from Zhejiang province, who wished to remain anonymous, said “I personally won’t take part. I think the effect may be over-estimated... Those who are against it, or who aren’t going to voice out, are keeping silent.”

In an emailed statement, the University of Hong Kong said on Tuesday that it upheld personal freedom of speech, expression, assembly and association for all HKU members. “Teaching and learning activities at HKU would be held as usual”, a spokesperson said.

Chief Secretary Carrie Lam, the Secretary for Education Eddie Ng and the Education Bureau itself have all separately voiced opposition to the strike this month.

On Wednesday, Executive Council member Arthur Li Kwok-cheung said the class boycott was not constructive. Comparing students to the Cultural Revolution’s Red Guard, Li said students should make a bigger sacrifice and give up their education altogether.

In August, China's National People's Congress decided that Hong Kongers may elect their next leader in 2017 but candidates must be chosen by a 1,200-member committee with only two or three allowed to stand. Pro-democracy activists have called the proposal a betrayal of the "one country two systems" agreement complaining that it does not represent true universal suffrage.

Appendix 2: 2019 HKFP article

Hongkongers are more than just the world's most polite protesters

Jun Pang

by JUN PANG

10:00, 14 OCTOBER 2019

Over the past week, international media reports on the Hong Kong protests have been saturated with pictures of destroyed shopfronts. Some have denounced protesters' increasingly "ugly" tactics, mimicking the Hong Kong Police Force's condemnation of "rioters' wanton destruction" of the city.

Just a few weeks ago, Hongkongers were lauded as underdogs bravely facing down an authoritarian regime. Why the shift in tone?

I think there are two main reasons. First, international media outlets have always been enamoured with Hongkongers as the archetypal peaceful protesters. During the 2014 pro-democracy Umbrella Movement, multiple op-eds focused on participants' "politeness" and "orderliness", marvelling at how they would always clean up after themselves after marches.

Early reporting of the ongoing protest movement also marvelled at protesters setting up their own recycling bins and wielding cardboard shields against riot police.

The effect of this idealisation is that once people engage in forms of militant direct action, such as

targeted vandalism, they no longer fit into stereotypical images of how a Hong Kong protester is supposed to act. Western audiences who previously lauded us for our peaceful tactics now condemn us, because they are more invested in their fixed projections of who we are, than understanding why we act the way we do.

At the root of this is also racism: the insistence on seeing Hongkongers as passive and docile objects, rather than active political subjects.

Second, once Hongkongers' methods of protest become more radical, they begin to resemble the kinds of protest that Western governments suppress at home. The chant "no rioters, only tyranny" does not resonate as much with these audiences, because it forces them to take seriously the ways that the same language of "rioting" is used to clamp down on the grievances and protests of marginalised people of colour in their own communities.

One of the principles of this anti-extradition bill movement, that has now morphed into one against police brutality and for democracy, is: "No division; no condemnation; no severing ties." The emphasis on solidarity this time around is a reaction to the Umbrella Movement and its aftermath – when disputes between factions led to widespread disillusionment and apathy towards Hong Kong politics.

What is important in this statement is that it refers not to ideas, but to people; that is, no one is disposable in our movement, and we have to talk through our disagreements, no matter how difficult it is.

Returning to the topic of vandalism, a big debate on “renovations” and “decorations” has been raging on Telegram groups and LIHKG threads. Some frontline protesters argue that targeting specific shops and chains is a deliberate, political act. For example, protesters have smashed up Starbucks storefronts, because the chain’s Hong Kong franchise is owned by Maxim’s.

In September, the daughter of Maxim's founder claimed at the United Nations that children are “exploited” to participate in the movement. Protesters have also vandalised MTR stations because of the perceived collusion between the MTR and the government, particularly after riot police besieged Prince Edward Station on August 31 and MTR refused to release CCTV footage of the attacks.

Others have called on frontline protesters to exercise caution, if only because vandalism may cause international opinion of the Hong Kong protests to sour. Hongkongers are keenly aware that their continued survival requires building alliances with powers that can support their fight for human rights and democracy. But nowhere is there condemnation of vandalism; only continued attempts to understand and contextualise.

Underpinning the debate is the general principle that has guided the movement – that protesters will not sever ties with one another on the basis of particular people’s actions and choices. We afford each other generosity in understanding the grief and anger that leads to particular acts, because we share a common experience of living in a de facto state of emergency.

We also understand that in the spirit of “be water”, our protest tactics have to be flexible and target

all of the structures that oppress us, whether that is the government or the capital interests that prop up the government.

This is not to say that we cannot condemn the nativist tendencies of particular violent acts. We must reject all attacks on individuals that are based on the simple fact that they are from the mainland. We must remember that the enemy is not mainland Chinese people, but the Chinese state and the Chinese and Hong Kong elite who benefit from its repressive rule.

Attacking individuals is not only counterproductive; it is also fundamentally contrary to the values we are fighting for: a fair and just system where we all have equal rights to political participation.

With all of this internal reflection on the part of Hongkongers in mind, if western audiences' sympathy continues to be contingent on Hongkongers' fulfillment of their fantasies of peaceful protest, this should give us some pause.

It may also be more fruitful to find allies who understand that violence is simply a means employed in a particular context to achieve particular aims – that rather than condemning the violence of particular individuals and acts, we should turn our attention to the violence of the state and the police that creates the conditions for such acts to occur.

And perhaps instead of trying to justify or even simply explain our actions to people who are more invested in their ideas of us than in understanding the reasons we have resorted to these tactics, we should dare to demand greater empathy and real solidarity in the face of a far greater tyranny.

Appendix 3: 2014 GT Article

Govt denounces HK protests

By Cathy Wong Source: Global Times Published: 2014-9-29 0:33:09

Police show restraint in handling demonstrators

Police clash with protesters near the government headquarters in Hong Kong on Sunday. Photo: AFP

The central government Sunday condemned the illegal pro-democracy movement Occupy Central for undermining social stability in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) in response to the surprise launch of the protest that has brought chaos to the city's business district.

"The central government firmly opposes all kinds of illegal behavior in Hong Kong that undermines social order and stability. It is fully confident that the Hong Kong government can handle the situation in accordance with the law and resolutely supports such handling," a spokesperson for the State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office said Sunday afternoon.

The central government's liaison office in Hong Kong issued a similar statement Sunday night, slamming the Occupy campaign for blocking traffic and disturbing social order, stressing that the recent reform framework released by the top legislature is not to be challenged.

At a press conference Sunday, Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying also urged the public to engage in rational discussion on political reform, and said the SAR government is resolute in opposing unlawful actions by Occupy Central. "The police shall continue to handle the situation in accordance with the law," he said.

Protesters on Sunday evening spilled out onto some of Hong Kong's busiest streets in the Central and Admiralty districts, paralyzing traffic.

Violent clashes have injured six police officers, according to Hong Kong police.

According to Radio Television Hong Kong, the city's Hospital Authority said as of 9:45 pm Sunday, 26 people had been hospitalized due to the clashes, without identifying them.

Police said they were forced to escalate their action after several warnings and used pepper spray and tear gas to disperse activists intent on forcing their way past police cordons.

Stanley Chan Wing-leung, a Hong Kong-based criminal defense lawyer and former senior inspector of police, believes the police have been restrained in their handling of protesters.

"The police have to prevent further chaos, especially when Monday will be a working day. Hence the situation has left them with no choice but to maintain social order by driving off the protesters," Chan told the Global Times.

Chan believes despite the sudden launch of the protest, the Hong Kong police began preparing for this scenario long ago and have arranged enough manpower to deal with the protests.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) in August adopted a legal framework for ways to elect Hong Kong's top leader by universal suffrage in 2017.

Some Hong Kong pro-democracy politicians and activists have expressed opposition to the plan for the nomination threshold as they fear it may bar them from running. They threatened to seal off the heart of Hong Kong's financial district as they push their demands for a "genuine" democracy.

The Occupy Central protest was widely expected to begin on Wednesday, the 65th National Day, following a wave of class boycotts organized by university and secondary school students since September 22.

Over 60 people were arrested on Friday night at the student-led rally in support of the class boycotts after hundreds of protesters broke into a restricted area next to the government headquarters.

Riding on the week-long school strikes and protests, Benny Tai Yiu-ting, co-founder of the Occupy Central movement, made an earlier-than-expected announcement at a student-led rally outside the

government headquarters in Tamar in the early hours of Sunday morning, kicking off the movement.

While some students supported the early launch, others said Occupy Central had hijacked their protest.

"We were summoned by the student leaders but the Occupy Central organizers have hijacked our protest. I think they are just putting on a show," said a student surnamed Lam at the City University of Hong Kong, reported i-Cable TV network.

Another student protester from the Chinese University of Hong Kong surnamed Ho said on the same report that she feared arrest for participating in the Occupy movement which may leave her with a criminal record.

Late on Sunday, the Hong Kong Federation of Students called on students to retreat from protests in the heart of the city, reported AFP.

"The early launch was a carefully planned tactic by the Occupy Central organizers. They have manipulated and incited innocent students to break into government headquarters," Stanley Ng Chau-pei, spokesperson of an anti-Occupy Central group, the Alliance for Peace and Democracy, told the Global Times.

Ng said the alliance has recently received complaints from parents that their children have been deceived by the Occupy campaign, which uses their passion and lack of knowledge of the city's political reality.

Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee, a Hong Kong legislator, said extreme measures will produce no positive effect but will only affect the livelihood of Hong Kong society.

"They [the activists] won't be able to change the NPC's decisions by street battles. They must take part in constructive discussions with the government," Ip told the Global Times on Sunday.

Appendix 4: 2019 GT Article

Hong Kong police disperse illegal rallies

By Chen Qingqing in Hong Kong and Wang Wenwen in Beijing Source: Global Times Published: 2019/7/29 0:11:21 Last Updated: 2019/7/29 9:15:41

Police exercise restraint during escalating violent protests: observer

Police officers help a trapped car among protesters during a demonstration in Hong Kong on Sunday. Photo: AFP

On another day of illegal rallies in Hong Kong, police fired tear gas to disperse protesters who repeatedly ignored warnings and engaged in a standoff near the liaison office of the central government in Hong Kong on Sunday.

Unauthorized assembly also took place at other locations on Sunday including Causeway Bay and the Golden Bauhinia Square near the Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre in Wan Chai.

According to the website of the Hong Kong Police Force, some protestors committed arson at various locations on Sunday, seriously threatening the safety of everyone.

On Sunday, police arrested eight people at a metro station suspected of carrying offensive weapons.

About 3 pm Sunday, the protesters gathered at Chater Garden in the Central District as planned, but half an hour later they began marching west in defiance of a police order.

The police warned protesters not to deviate from the planned route as they walked along Queensway and Hennessey Road toward Wan Chai, obstructing traffic.

At the previously bustling tourist hub of Hennessey Road, the Global Times reporter saw that there were few tourists despite the stores being open.

As more protesters gathered, the traffic in front of the Sogo Department Store was completely obstructed.

The repeated tactic adopted by some radical protesters in Hong Kong is that when the sun goes down, some protesters begin to build barriers and wait for the police.

On Sunday evening, they adopted the same strategy in Causeway Bay and Sheung Wan. Protesters stopped near the liaison office.

After the standoff between the police and protesters for some time during which protesters hurling bottles and stones toward the police, the police began to gradually move forward.

"From using umbrellas and batons to throwing paint bombs and canisters, from making traffic obstructions to attacking the police, protesters are upgrading their violent means," Kennedy Wong Ying-ho, a Hong Kong lawyer and convener of Safeguard HK, Support the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders Legislation, told the Global Times.

The situation was escalating, Wong warned.

The Hong Kong police acted in accordance with regulations and in a restrained manner on Sunday, but about 8: 40 pm, protesters rushed out from an alley and threw bottles and bricks at the police.

After repeated warnings and constant provocations, the police started to disperse protestors by firing tear gas.

During the protest on July 21, protesters broke a police order and changed route.

Radical rioters besieged the liaison office of central government in Hong Kong and defaced the national emblem of China in the evening.

Two days of violence

Sunday's standoff was a continuation of Saturday's, when protesters took to the street in Yuen Long, which escalated into a standoff and clash with police.

Hong Kong police Thursday denied permission for a protest in Yuen Long on Saturday, citing possible violence which might threaten the safety of villagers and residents.

The demonstration was meant as revenge for the violence that took place at a subway station in Yuen Long on July 21.

Protesters provoked the police by throwing umbrellas and bottles, ramming barricades and cornering them at an intersection.

The mob tried to use barricades to push back the police who were outnumbered by the protesters. Eventually, the police used tear gas to disperse protesters.

The Hong Kong SAR government strongly condemned radical protestors for breaching the public peace and breaking the law deliberately during the Yuen Long protest.

The government said the police would take serious follow-up action with the violent protestors, according to the Xinhua News Agency.

Western media targeted the police and tried to smear their role in the Global Times reporter's opinion.

Western and Hong Kong media have blamed the police for their alleged brutality against protesters, but deliberately ignored protesters' violent provocation.

Police have also borne the pressure of residents who think they acted too slowly to protect public security.

On Friday US Congressman Eliot L. Engel criticized police violence, saying it "tarnished Hong Kong's international reputation for good governance and the fair administration of justice."

A spokesperson for the Office of China's Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong on Sunday rebuked Engel's remarks, saying he was telling a slanderous "bare-faced lie."

"Anyone without prejudice will admit that Hong Kong police have exercised enormous restraint and shown their professionalism when dealing with violence and provocation by the mob," according to the spokesperson.

Wang Dan, an associate professor from the Faculty of Education, Hong Kong University, told the Global Times that there were not many precedents for Hong Kong police using tear gas, but objectively speaking in his opinion, they exercised great restraint.

"Most times during the protests, the police aimed to disperse them and guard their line of defense," said Wang.

"Compare that to what the police in the US, Canada, Australia and the UK did in the face of such situations, such as when Occupy Wall Street occurred - what the Hong Kong police did is much milder,"according to Wang.

As the protestors clashed with police in Yuen Long on Saturday, Chinese mainland internet users took to social media to show their support for the police.

The protesters crossed the line, some netizens posted, and asked the police to show no leniency.

The topic hashtag "Hong Kong police" was viewed more than 200 million times as of press time.

The topic "safeguard Hong Kong" was viewed 1.47 billion times.

Timeline and division of work.

The table below shows all work collaborated and contributed by both CHANG Lai Ting and LEUNG Yi Yan:

<i>Task</i>	<i>Expected finishing time</i>
Sem A	
Data collection and selection	Week 8 (24/10)
Linguistic analysis	Week 10 (7/11)
Consultation	Week 11 (12/11)
Process portfolio – Week 13 (27/11)	
Consultation	Semester break (8/12)
Sem B	
Consultation	Week 8 (11/3)
	Week 11 (1/4)
	Week 12 (15/4)
	Week 13 (23/4)
Final submission (25/4)	
Presentation (30/4, 12nn)	