

Economic Ties that Bind

Economic Integration and its Influence on Civil War Contagion

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April 29th, 2015

The question

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- ▶ Not so much.

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- ▶ Economic effects

Interstate peace through interdependence

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- ▶ Cheap talk

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Intrastate peace through interdependence?

- ▶ Inhibited economic growth
- ▶ Indicator of compatibility
- ▶ The cost of rebellion

Hypothesis

- ▶ States who trade heavily with their civil war-experiencing neighbor are more likely to also experience a civil war than those that do not.

Data + model

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 - ▶ Imports from neighbor as a percentage of total imports
 - ▶ Exports to neighbor as a percentage of total exports
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 - ▶ Neighbor experiencing civil war
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 - ▶ COW Contiguity Data

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- ▶ MLE w/ 2 logit models


Preliminary results

	1	2
Constant	0.83*** (0.16)	1.02*** (0.17)
Imports %	3.49*** (0.96)	
Exports %		1.76*** (0.49)
Civil War Neighbor	0.34* (0.16)	0.16 (0.17)
Contiguity	0.33*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.05)
Num. obs.	2603	2603


*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table : Logistic Regression

First differences



Risk ratios



Future research

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- ▶ Disaggregate trade flows into factor endowments

Why is this important?

- ▶ Represents a vulnerability